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Learning in Network Contexts: Experimental Results from Simulations

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Abstract

This paper describes the results of simulation experiments performed on a suite of learning algorithms. We focus on games in *network contexts*. These are contexts in which (1) agents have very limited information about the game; users do not know their own (or any other agent's) payoff function, they merely observe the outcome of their play. (2) Play can be extremely asynchronous; players update their strategies at very different rates. There are many proposed learning algorithms in the literature. We choose a small sampling of such algorithms and use numerical simulation to explore the nature of asymptotic play. In particular, we explore the extent to which the asymptotic play depends on three factors, namely: limited information, asynchronous play, and the degree of responsiveness of the learning algorithm.

1 Introduction

While much of classical game theory is based on the assumption of common knowledge, there are many contexts in which this assumption does not apply. Correspondingly, in recent years there has been increased interest in the process by which a set of initially naive agents *learn* through repeated play of a game. The central question concerns the nature of asymptotic play; what set of strategies do the agents learn to play in the long-time limit? (The recent review by Fudenberg and Levine [21] provides an overview of the literature.)

In this paper we focus our attention on learning that occurs in what we call a *network context*. In network contexts, agents interact through the common use of a resource, such as a communication link or a shared database, which is accessed over a network. The interactions of Internet congestion control algorithms where agents share network bandwidth, as described in [37], is perhaps the most studied example of a repeated game in a network context. As the Internet continues to grow, and more resources are shared by remote users, we expect the network context to become increasingly common. As discussed in [16], the network context differs from the traditional game-theoretic context in four important ways.

I. First, agents have very limited *a priori* information. In general, agents are not aware of the underlying characteristics of the shared resource. In other words, they do not know the payoff structure of the game; they know neither their own payoff function, nor that of the other players. In addition, agents are not explicitly aware of the existence of other players. While agents are aware that there may be other agents simultaneously using the shared resource, they do not have any way of directly observing their presence and, consequently, they know nothing about the number or the characteristics of their opponents. In particular, this implies that players *cannot* observe the actions of other players, a standard assumption in many classical models of learning in economics.

II. Second, the payoff function and the agent population are subject to change over time. Shared resources like network links and computer servers periodically crash, and often experience other unpredictable changes in their capabilities, such as upgrades or route changes. In addition, users of these shared resources come and go quite frequently. Thus, when an agent detects a change in his payoff while keeping his own strategy fixed, the agent cannot tell whether this change is due to changing strategies of the other players, changes in the players themselves, or variations in the characteristics of the shared resource.

III. Third, in many, but not all, cases, learning is actually carried out by a computer algorithm, not by a human user. For instance, congestion control algorithms (*e.g.*, TCP) embedded in a computer's operating system control the sharing of a network link. Similarly, automated algorithms can control the retry behavior for query submission to a database. Thus, the learning that takes place in these contexts is explicitly laid out in the form of a well-defined algorithm. Moreover, these algorithms are intended to be quite general in nature, and do not depend on the detailed specifics of a particular situation. In particular, this means that Bayesian learning algorithms are inappropriate, because the initial beliefs depend on the specific context. In any event, the complexity of prior probabilities is such that it is not possible to use Bayesian updating in any realistic setting.

IV. Fourth, in network contexts, games can be played in an asynchronous fashion. There need not be any notion of definable "rounds of play"; users can update their strategies at any time. Moreover, the rates at which agents update their strategies can vary widely, although in general these rates are determined by circumstances and are not a strategic variable. Due to the geographic dispersion of users of the Internet, for example, there can be varying communication delays to a shared resource, which in turn can lead to updating rates that differ by several orders of magnitude.[1] In addition,

[1]As discussed in [16], standard control theoretic results imply that the frequency at which strategies are updated should not be greater than the inverse of the round-trip

automated agents can learn at very different rates, depending on processor speeds and the nature of the learning algorithms. Thus, asynchrony does not arise from Stackelbergian-type strategic manipulation, but merely from properties of communication and computation. Agents closer to the shared resource, or those who have faster processors or smarter algorithms, have the potential to learn more rapidly and effectively.

We focus on contexts that have these four properties: low information content, non-stationary payoffs, automated learning, and asynchrony. We are interested in what happens when a set of automated agents play a game repeatedly in such a context, and we investigate this behavior empirically. We consider a small sampling of learning algorithms, some of which have been well-studied in the literature; for each algorithm we numerically simulate a set of agents using that algorithm and we observe the set of strategies played in the long-time regime. This work can be seen as a natural counterpart to human economic experiments. In particular, Chen [6] investigates some issues closely related to those considered here using human subjects rather than automated learning algorithms.

We concentrate on the extent to which the asymptotic play depends on the amount of information available to the agents, the degree of responsiveness of the learning algorithm, and the level of asynchrony of play. Of particular interest is the extent to which the asymptotic play is contained in the various solution concepts such as Nash equilibria, the set of serially undominated strategies (D^∞), and the less traditional concepts of serially unoverwhelmed strategies (O^∞) and serially Stackelberg-undominated strategies (S^∞) which are discussed below. Our findings suggest that the asymptotic play of games in network contexts can be quite different from that in standard contexts, where play is typically contained in the serially undominated strategy set.

This paper has 6 sections. Section 2 presents the learning algorithms used in this study, and discusses the relevant solution concepts. Section

communication delay to the shared resource; otherwise, instability may result.

3 contains the simulation results for the sample games considered: several simple two-player games, a class of externality games, and the congestion game. In Section 4, we compare these results with the results of simulations in non-network contexts. Section 5 describes related work, and we conclude in Section 6 with a brief discussion of our results.

2 Background

2.1 Learning Algorithms

The literature is replete with learning algorithms, but but not all of them are applicable in network contexts. Because knowledge of the payoff structure and the other agents is extremely limited, games in a network context are, from a single agent's perspective, most naturally modeled as *games against nature* in which each strategy has some random (and possibly time-varying) payoff about which the agent has no *a priori* knowledge. Consequently, in contrast with belief-based approaches to learning (*e.g.*, Bayesian updating) adopted in much of the literature, learning algorithms for network contexts typically utilize simple updating schemes that do not rely on any detailed assumptions about the structure of the game. Instead, these algorithms employ "trial-and-error" experimentation in an attempt to identify optimal strategies.

The learning algorithms which we simulate are distinguished first of all by their varying degrees of experimentation; we will, for convenience, denote this level of experimentation by the parameter $\epsilon \in [0, 1)$. In static environments, where the payoff structure and the set and characteristics of the other agents is fixed, it may be reasonable to decrease the level of experimentation as time progresses, with experimentation ceasing in the infinite-time limit (*i.e.*, $\epsilon \to 0$ as $t \to \infty$).[2] Many learning algorithms proposed in the literature have

[2]This is apparent in decision problems such as classic bandit problems [22, 27]. It is less transparent, however, in games with multiple players and strategies.

this property. In network contexts, however, the environment is not static; the underlying payoff structure, and the population of agents, are subject to change at any time without explicit notification. As a result, agents should be prepared to respond to changing conditions at all times, and should do so in a bounded amount of time. This requires that a non-zero level of experimentation be maintained in the long-time limit, and that future play be more heavily influenced by payoffs obtained in the recent, rather than the distant, past. This second point can be achieved via a parameter $\gamma \in (0, 1]$ which dictates the rate (and typically inverse accuracy) of learning. We call the ability to respond to changes in the environment in bounded time *responsiveness*, and posit that this property is fundamental to learning in network contexts. As we shall see, responsiveness has important implications for the resulting asymptotic play.

The learning algorithms we discuss also differ in the particular criteria that they are designed to satisfy. Perhaps the simplest criterion is that, when playing a static game-against-nature, the algorithm rapidly learns to play (with high probability) the strategy with the highest average payoff.[3] When combined with responsiveness, and a certain monotonicity property, this leads to the class of so-called *reasonable* learning algorithms introduced in [16]. One example of such an algorithm is the *stage* learning algorithm. Stage learners partition the game into *stages*, which consist of $1/\gamma$ rounds of a game. At each round of play, a stage learner chooses its strategy at random based on the probabilities, or weights, it has assigned to each of its strategies. These weights are updated upon termination of each stage, with weight $1-\epsilon$ assigned to the pure strategy that obtained the highest average payoffs during the previous stage, and weight $\epsilon/(n-1)$ assigned to all other strategies. Another example of a reasonable learning algorithm, so-called *responsive*

[3]The formal definition of probabilistic converge in finite time is described in [16]. In this paper we do not formally define convergence, but take a more pragmatic approach which is appropriate for simulations. That is, we say that play has converged when the numerical properties are unchanged by additional iterations as evidenced by simulations.

learning automata introduced in [15], is a responsive version of simple learning automata (see, for example, Narendra and Thathachar [32]). This algorithm updates weights after every round of play using quite a different method. Another reasonable learning algorithm (for certain choices of parameters) is defined by Roth and Erev [9], and has been used to model human behavior in game-theoretic experiments.

A second criterion, which is a worst-case measure of performance, involves the concept of *regret*. Intuitively, a sequence of plays is optimal if there is no regret for playing a given strategy sequence rather than playing another possible sequence of strategies. Regret comes in two forms: external and internal. A sequence of plays is said to exhibit no external regret if the difference between the cumulative payoffs that are achieved by the learner and those that could be achieved by any other pure strategy is insignificant. The no internal regret optimality criterion is a refinement of the no external regret criterion where the difference between the performance of a learner's strategies and any *remapped* sequence of those strategies is insignificant. By remapped we mean that there is a mapping f of the strategy space into itself such that for every occurrence of a given strategy s in the original sequence the mapped strategy $f(s)$ appears in the remapped sequence of strategies. The learning procedures described in Foster and Vohra [12] and Hart and Mas-Colell [25] satisfy the property of no internal regret. Early no external regret algorithms were discovered by Blackwell [4], Hannan [24], Banos [2], and Megiddo [29]; recently, no external regret algorithms appeared in Cover [7], Freund and Schapire [13], and Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund and Schapire [1].

We investigate six learning algorithms: the reasonable learners discussed above (see [15, 16, 9]), two based on external regret (see [1, 10]), and one based on internal regret (see [25]). Some of these algorithms were initially proposed for quite different settings, in which responsiveness is not necessary and the information level is significantly higher (*e.g.*, agents know their own payoff function). We have extended these learning algorithms for use in

network contexts.[4] We call the versions designed for low-information settings *naive*, and those designed for higher information contexts *informed*. We also consider both *responsive* and *non-responsive* variants. Lastly, each agent has a time-scale parameter A that determines the rate at which it updates its strategies. A player updates its strategy (*i.e.*, runs its learning algorithm) only every A rounds, and treats the average payoff during those A rounds as its actual payoff. We are interested in how the asymptotic play depends on whether agents are responsive, whether they are informed, and on the degree of asynchrony (differences in the A values) among the agents.

2.2 Solution Concepts

To describe the asymptotic play, we introduce several solution concepts. We begin with some notation. We restrict our attention to finite games. Let $\mathcal{N} = \{1, \ldots, N\}$ be a finite set of *players*, where $N \in \mathcal{N}$ is the number of players. The finite set of strategies available to player $i \in \mathcal{N}$ is denoted by S_i, with element $s_i \in S_i$. The set of pure strategy profiles is the Cartesian product $S = \prod_i S_i$. In addition, let $S_{-i} = \prod_{j \neq i} S_j$ with element $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$, and write $s = (s_i, s_{-i}) \in S$. The payoff function $\pi_i : S \to \mathbb{R}$ for player i is a real-valued function on S.

Recall that strategy $s_i \in S_i$ is strictly dominated for player i if there exists some strategy $s_i^* \in S_i$ such that $\pi_i(s_i, s_{-i}) < \pi_i(s_i^*, s_{-i})$ for all $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$. Let D^∞ denote the serially undominated strategy set: *i.e.*, the set of strategies that remains after the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Milgrom and Roberts [30] show that the asymptotic play of a set of *adaptive* learners – learners that eventually learn to play only undominated strategies – eventually lies within D^∞. In addition, it is shown in [15] that certain responsive learners playing synchronously also converge to D^∞. The set D^∞ is widely considered to be an upper bound in terms of solution concepts; that

[4] Detailed descriptions of these algorithms, in both their original and modified forms, are contained in Appendix A.

is, it is commonly held that the appropriate solution concept that arises via learning through repeated play is a subset of the serially undominated set.[5] This may indeed be true in standard game-theoretic contexts.

In [15, 16], however, it is shown that in network contexts, where there is potentially asynchrony and responsive learning, play can asymptotically remain outside the serially undominated set. A more appropriate solution concept for such settings is based on the concept of *overwhelmed* strategies. We say that a strategy $s_i \in S_i$ is strictly overwhelmed if there exists some strategy $s_i^* \in S_i$ such that $\pi_i(s_i, s_{-i}) < \pi_i(s_i^*, s'_{-i})$ for all $s_{-i}, s'_{-i} \in S_{-i}$. Let O^∞ denote the set of strategies that remains after the iterated elimination of strictly overwhelmed strategies. It is shown in [16] that the asymptotic play of a set of reasonable learners lies within O^∞, regardless of the level of asynchrony. However, it is conjectured that O^∞ is not a precise solution concept, only an upper bound. A refinement of O^∞, called S^∞ is defined in [16]. [6] Because its definition is rather cumbersome, we do not present the precise definition of S^∞, but will describe its realization in the games we simulate. Note that $D^\infty \subseteq S^\infty \subseteq O^\infty$.

Another result of interest, due to Foster and Vohra [12], is that a set of no internal regret learners converges to a correlated equilibrium. Note that the support of a set of correlated equilibria is a subset of D^∞; in other words, correlated equilibria do not assign positive probabilities to strategies outside D^∞, but neither do they necessarily converge to Nash equilibria. In contrast, the asymptotic play of a set of no external regret learners need not remain inside D^∞ [7] [23].

[5] Note that this also holds for one-shot games with common knowledge, as the set D^∞ contains all the rationalizable strategies [3, 33].

[6] In [16], a class of "Stackelberg" solution concepts is built from various primitives (such as undominated strategies or correlated equilibria); however for the games studied in this paper most of the "Stackelberg" solution concepts coincide.

[7] Note that this remark pertains only to the no external regret criterion, but says nothing about the convergence properties of specific algorithms which are defined to satisfy this criterion, such as those considered in this study.

In the remainder of this paper, we present the result of simulations of the six learning algorithms on various games. We ask, in particular, whether the asymptotic play converges within the sets D^∞, S^∞, or O^∞. Recall that the term convergence is used informally, both because of experimentation, which precludes true convergence, and our interest in achieving results in finite time. We are interested in which of these concepts, if any, represents an appropriate solution concept for games in network contexts.

3 Simulations in Network Contexts

We consider three sets of games: simple games (two players, few strategies), the congestion game (two players, many strategies), and an externality game (many players, two strategies). The simulations were conducted with varying degrees of asynchrony, ranging from synchronous play to extreme asynchrony with one player acting as the leader (*i.e.*, we vary the value of A from 1 to 10,000 for the leading player and we set $A = 1$ for all other players). The degree of responsiveness is determined by parameters ϵ and γ; for each game, we describe the particular parameter settings.

3.1 Simple Two-Player Games

This subsection presents the results of simulations of four simple two-player games with either two or three strategies per player. The row player is taken to be the leader. The parameter γ was set to .01 for all algorithms, while the degree of experimentation ϵ was set to .025 for the reasonable learning algorithms and .05 for the no regret algorithms. In addition, the no regret algorithms depend on tuning parameters; for the mixing method, $\alpha = 100$, for multiplicative updating, $\beta = 1$, and for the no internal regret algorithm, $\kappa = 2$. The simulations described in this section were run for 10^8 iterations.

3.1.1 Game D

The game depicted in Figure 1 is referred to herein as Game D since it is D-solvable, but it is not S-solvable or O-solvable: *i.e.*, $D^\infty \neq S^\infty = O^\infty$. More specifically, the set D^∞ is a singleton that contains only the strategy profile (T, L), which is the unique Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, $S^\infty = O^\infty = \{T, B\} \times \{L, R\}$. Note that (B, R) is a Stackelberg equilibrium in which the row player is the leader.

1 \ 2	L	R
T	1,2	3,0
B	0,0	2,1

Figure 1: Game D

The graph depicted in Figure 2 describes the overall results of simulations of Game D, assuming responsive learning in a naive setting. In particular, Figure 2 (a) plots the percentage of time in which the Nash equilibrium solution arises as the degree of asynchrony varies. Asynchrony of 100, for example, implies that the column player is learning 100 times as fast as the column player; thus, the row player is viewed as the leader and the column player the follower. Notice that when play is synchronous, all the algorithms converge to the unique Nash solution. However, in the presence of sufficient asynchrony, play does not converge to the Nash solution for any of the algorithms studied. Instead, play converges to the Stackelberg equilibrium, as depicted in Figure 2 (b). These results demonstrate that D^∞ does not always contain the asymptotic play. Note that these results are robust; in particular, the results are unchanged even when the game is studied with "noisy" payoffs $\hat{\pi}_i$, where $\hat{\pi}_i = \pi_i \pm \delta$, for $\delta > 0$.



(a) Nash equilibrium



(b) Stackelberg equilibrium

Figure 2: *Convergence to Equilibria in Game D.* (a) plots the percentage of time in which Nash equilibrium arises as the degree of asynchrony varies, while (b) plots the percentage of time in which Stackelberg equilibrium arises.



(a) Nash Equilibrium ($A = 1$)



(b) Stackelberg Equilibrium ($A = 100$)

Figure 3: *Convergence to Equilibria in Game D for Hart's and Mas-Colell's algorithm.* (a) plots the weights of the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies over time when $A = 1$; notice that play converges to Nash equilibrium. (b) plots these same weights when $A = 100$; notice that play converges to Stackelberg equilibrium.

Recall that (B, R) is the Stackelberg equilibrium in Game D. Figure 3 plots the changing weights over time of strategy B for player 1, and strategy R for player 2 for the no internal regret algorithm due to Hart and Mas-Colell. Both the synchronous case, where play converges to Nash equilibrium, and the asynchronous case for $A = 100$, where play converges to Stackelberg equilibrium, are depicted. In the asynchronous case, the leader slowly learns to prefer the Stackelberg solution, and as soon as the leader moves in this direction, the follower, because he is responsive, follows soon after. This behavior is representative of all the learning algorithms considered.

3.1.2 Game O

The next game that is studied in this section is depicted in Figure 4, and is referred to as Game O, since it is O-solvable. In this game, $\{(T, L)\}$ is the unique Nash equilibrium and $\{(T, L)\} = D^\infty = S^\infty = O^\infty$.

1 \ 2	L	R
T	2,2	3,1
B	1,3	0,0

Figure 4: Game O

Simulations of all the algorithms, for levels of asynchrony ranging from 1 to 10,000, show that Nash equilibrium is played over 95% of the time. In particular, play does not diverge from the Nash equilibrium solution in this O-solvable game, as it did in Game D, regardless of the degree of asynchrony. It has been established that, for reasonable learners, O^∞ is an upper bound on the solution concept. Our data is consistent with the same result holding

for the other classes of algorithms considered, although this is far short of a proof that the O^∞ solution concept applies to them as well. The next game addresses the question of whether the O^∞ solution concept might in fact be too large a set.

3.1.3 Prisoners' Dilemma

This section presents the results of simulations of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (see Figure 5). In this game, $\{(D, D)\}$ is the unique Nash (and Stackelberg) equilibrium, and $\{(D, D)\} = D^\infty = S^\infty \neq O^\infty$, since O^∞ is the entire game. The Prisoner's Dilemma provides a simple test of the conjecture that the outcome of responsive learning in network contexts is described by the S^∞ solution concept, rather than the larger solution set O^∞.

Simulations of all the algorithms, for levels of asynchrony ranging from 1 to 10,000, show that in this game the Nash equilibrium is played over 95% of the time. Since play does not diverge significantly from the Nash (and Stackelberg) equilibrium, the asymptotic play is not spread throughout O^∞; instead, it is confined to S^∞.

1 \ 2	C	D
C	2,2	0,3
D	3,0	1,1

Figure 5: Prisoners' Dilemma

3.1.4 Game S

The last simple two-player game that is studied is a game in which the players have three strategies. The game is depicted in Figure 6, and is referred to as Game S. In Game S, $D^\infty = \{T, L\}$; $S^\infty = \{T, L\} \times \{B, R\}$; and O^∞ is the entire game; thus, $D^\infty \neq S^\infty \neq O^\infty$.

The results of simulations of Game S resemble the results of simulations of Game D. [8] Figure 7 shows that the learning algorithms do not converge to the Nash equilibrium solution of this game when there is asynchrony. Instead, play converges to the Stackelberg equilibrium, as in Game D. This game provides a second test of the conjecture that the outcome of responsive learning in network settings is a strict subset of O^∞.

1 \ 2	*L*	*C*	*R*
T	2,2	4,0	2,0
M	1,1	3,3	0,2
B	0,0	3,0	1,1

Figure 6: Game S

3.2 Externality Games

To test whether similar results apply to games with more than two players, we experiment with externality games. An externality game, as defined in [17], is one in which each agent can choose either to participate or not to participate

[8] Note that in these simulations, the reasonable learning algorithms utilized $\epsilon = .1667$.



(a) Nash equilibrium



(b) Stackelberg equilibrium

Figure 7: *Convergence to Equilibria in Game S.* (a) plots the percentage of time in which Nash equilibrium arises as the degree of asynchrony varies, while (b) plots the percentage of time in which Stackelberg equilibrium arises.

(in some joint venture) and where the payoffs obtained by a given player depend only on whether that player participates and on the total number of participating players. In this section, we study a related class of games which are D-solvable, and moreover, for certain choices of the parameters, the games in this class are S-solvable and O-solvable as well.

The class of games which we consider (class EG) is a discretization of the non-atomic games discussed in [14]. The set of players $\mathcal{N} = \{0, \ldots, N-1\}$, with $i \in \mathcal{N}$. The players have two possible strategies, namely 0 and 1, where 1 corresponds to participation, and 0 corresponds to non-participation. The number of participants, therefore, is given by $\lambda(s) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} s_i$, where s_i denotes the strategic choice of player i. Payoffs are determined as follows. The value to player i of participation is $v_i \in \mathbb{R}$, and the cost of participation is $C_i(\lambda)$, where C_i is a nondecreasing function of the externality. Thus, if player i participates, then $s_i = 1$ and $\pi_i(1, s_{-i}) = v_i - C_i(\lambda(s))$. Otherwise, if player i does not participate, then $s_i = 0$, and $\pi_i(s) = \phi \pi_i(1, s_{-i})$, for $\phi \in [0, 1)$. Intuitively, ϕ measures the extent to which players can opt out of the system.

Note that the parameter ϕ does not affect the standard strategic elements of a given game in this class, such as best-replies or dominated strategies. In particular, if the game is D-solvable for $\phi = 0$ then it is D-solvable for all $\phi \in [0, 1)$. Similarly, varying ϕ does not change the set of Nash equilibria. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that when $\phi = 0$, if the game is D-solvable, then it must also be O-solvable (and therefore, also S-solvable). In contrast, for ϕ sufficiently close to 1, the game is not S-solvable (and therefore, not O-solvable). Thus, by varying ϕ we can create a class of games which are D-solvable but not necessarily S-solvable and not O-solvable.[9]

In our simulations, we consider eight players (*i.e.*, $\mathcal{N} = \{0, \ldots, 7\}$), and we set $v_i = i$ and $C_i(\lambda) = \lambda/\mu$, for $\mu \in \mathbb{R}$. In the first set of simulations, we choose $\mu = 1.9$; we call this Game $\mathrm{EG}_{1.9}$. This game is D-solvable and

[9]Proofs of these claims appear in Appendix B for the class of games considered.

therefore has a unique Nash equilibrium. Moreover, this implies that for $\phi = 0$, this game must also be O-solvable; however, for ϕ sufficiently close to 1, it is neither S-solvable nor O-solvable (see Appendix B). More specifically, when $\phi > 6/11 = .\overline{54}$, Game $\mathrm{EG}_{1.9}$ has a Stackelberg equilibrium with player 2 as the leader which differs from the Nash equilibrium: the Nash equilibrium for all $\phi \in [0, 1)$ is $s = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)$, while the Stackelberg equilibrium (with player as the 2 leader and $\phi > 6/11$) is $s = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1)$.

Simulations of Game $\mathrm{EG}_{1.9}$ were conducted using the naive, responsive variants of the no regret learning algorithms. The convergence results in the asynchronous case (for $A = 5,000$) are listed in Table 1, for $\epsilon = .02$ and $\gamma = .002$. [10] Simulations of all algorithms show rapid convergence (in the empirical sense described earlier) to the Nash equilibrium (NE) for all values of β in the synchronous case, and to the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) when $\beta = .6$ and $\beta = .9$ in the asynchronous case. In particular, in Game $\mathrm{EG}_{1.9}$, for certain choices of the parameters, the asymptotic play is not contained in the set D^{∞}.

Algorithm	$\beta = 0$	$\beta = .5$	$\beta = .6$	$\beta = .9$
Foster and Vohra	NE	NE	SE	SE
Freund and Schapire	NE	NE	SE	SE
Hart and Mas-Colell	NE	NE	SE	SE

Table 1: Game $\mathrm{EG}_{1.9} : \gamma = .002, A = 5,000$

Another game which we simulated in the class EG is Game $\mathrm{EG}_{2.1}$, which is identical to Game $\mathrm{EG}_{1.9}$, except that $\mu = 2.1$. Like Game $\mathrm{EG}_{1.9}$ this game is D-solvable. This implies that for $\phi = 0$, this game must also be O-solvable; however, for ϕ sufficiently close to 1, this game is not O-solvable (see Appendix B). Lastly, unlike Game $\mathrm{EG}_{1.9}$, Game $\mathrm{EG}_{2.1}$, is S-solvable (see

[10] In the algorithm due to Foster and Vohra, $\alpha = 1,000$; in the algorithm due to Freund and Schapire, $\beta = 1$; finally, in the algorithm due to Hart and Mas-Colell, $\kappa = 5$.

Appendix B). This game was simulated assuming all the same parameter values as the previous set of simulations, as well as some additional choices for γ. Selected results of these simulations appear in Table 4. Notice that regardless of the values of γ and ϕ, and even in the presence of extreme asynchrony, play converges to Nash equilibrium. Thus, as $D^\infty = S^\infty \neq O^\infty$, this game provides further evidence for the conjecture that the asymptotic play of learning in network contexts is contained in S^∞.

Algorithm	$\beta = 0$	$\beta = .5$	$\beta = .6$	$\beta = .9$
Foster and Vohra	NE	NE	NE	NE
Freund and Schapire	NE	NE	NE	NE
Hart and Mas-Colell	NE	NE	NE	NE

Table 2: Game $\text{EG}_{2.1} : \gamma \in \{.01, .005, .002, .001\}, A = 10,000$

3.3 The Congestion Game

So far we have considered games with rather small strategy spaces. In this section, we experiment with a larger strategy space, using an example that arises in computer networks. Consider several agents simultaneously sharing a network link, where each agent controls the rate at which she is transmitting data. If the sum of the transmission rates is greater than the total link capacity, then the link becomes congested and the agents' packets experience high delays and high loss rates. The transmission rates are controlled by each agent's congestion control algorithm, which vary the rates in response to the level of congestion detected.

One can model the interaction of congestion control algorithms as a cost-sharing game where the cost to be shared is the congestion experienced. That is, we can model this as a game where the strategies are the transmission rates r_i and the outcomes are the pairs (r_i, c_i), where c_i is the congestion

experienced as function of the strategy profile r. The allocations must obey the sum rule $\sum_i r_i = F(\sum_i c_i)$ where F is a constraint function (*i.e.*, the total congestion experienced must be a function of the total load).

Most current Internet routers use a FIFO packet scheduling algorithm, which results in congestion that is proportional to the transmission rate: *i.e.*, $c_i = [r_i / \sum_j r_j] F(\sum_j c_j)$; this is called the average cost pricing (ACP) mechanism. In contrast, the fair queueing packet scheduling algorithm can be modeled as leading to allocations such that c_i is independent of r_j as long as $r_j \geq r_i$ (this condition, plus anonymity, uniquely specifies the allocations). This is called the Serial mechanism (see [37] for a detailed description).

Chen [6] investigates the two-player congestion game with the following properties: (1) linear utilities $U_i(r_i, c_i) = \alpha_i r_i - c_i$, (2) quadratic congestion $F(x) = x^2$, and (3) a discrete strategy space $S_i = \{1, 2, \ldots, 12\}$. For the choice of parameters $\alpha_1 = 16.1$ and $\alpha_2 = 20.1$, the game defined by the ACP mechanism is D-solvable, but it is not S-solvable or O-solvable. The unique Nash equilibrium is $(4, 8)$ and the Stackelberg equilibrium with player 2 leading is $(2, 12)$. In contrast, the game defined by the Serial mechanism is O-solvable, with the unique Nash equilibrium at $(4, 6)$.

We conducted simulations of both the Serial and the ACP mechanism using the naive, responsive variants of the no regret algorithms with degree of experimentation $\epsilon = .02$. [11] The simulations were run for 10^8 iterations. In our simulations of the Serial mechanism, all of the learning algorithms concentrate their play around the Nash equilibrium. In the ACP mechanism, when play is synchronous, the asymptotic behavior again centers around the Nash equilibrium. However, given sufficient asynchrony (*e.g.*, $A = 5,000$, when $\gamma = .002$), play converges to the Stackelberg equilibrium.

[11] In the algorithm due to Foster and Vohra, $\alpha = 5,000$; in the algorithm due to Freund and Schapire, $\beta = 1$; finally, in the algorithm due to Hart and Mas-Colell, $\kappa = 2,000$.

3.4 Discussion

Our results thus far indicate that when responsive learning algorithms play repeated games against one another, their play can reach outside the serially undominated set, given sufficient asynchrony. In our examples, however, the outcome is either largely inside the serially undominated set, or with sufficient asynchrony, converges to the Stackelberg equilibrium. The transition from one behavior to the other is quite sudden. We did not observe more general behavior, with probabilities spread over a wider set of strategies, although, based on work by Foster and Vohra [12], we conjecture that such behavior arises in more complex games.

4 Simulations in Non-network Contexts

Network contexts differ from standard learning contexts considered in the literature in three important ways: asynchronous play, limited information, and responsive learning. In the previous sections we have looked at how varying asynchrony affects the convergence properties of learners. In this section, we briefly consider the remaining two properties describing network contexts.

First we augment the information structure by considering contexts in which learners are *informed*, where such learners know the payoffs that would have occurred had they chosen an alternative action. This typically arises when players (i) know the payoff matrix, and (ii) can observe the actions of the other players. Not surprisingly, in this setting play outside D^∞ does not arise. Unfortunately in network contexts, informed learning is not an option; the basic structure of the Internet is such that learning is inherently uninformed.

Our second consideration, namely responsiveness, is not inevitable, but instead reflects a common (and appropriate) design choice on the Internet. We find the behavior of naive and non-responsive learners, in the presence of

asynchrony, to be complex and do not claim to understand such asymptotic behavior; for example, we do not know whether play always converges to D^∞. We demonstrate some of this complexity through simulations of the Shapley game, a classic example for which fictitious play does not converge. Irrespective of these complexities, non-responsive learning is not viable in network contexts due to the non-stationarity of the payoff functions.

The results of this section show that the seemingly obvious conjecture that asynchrony alone leads to Stackelberg behavior is not true in general. In our simulations, this conjecture only when we consider naive *and* responsive learning algorithms, as are relevant for network contexts. If the algorithms are informed, or non-responsive, we do not observe Stackelbergian behavior.

4.1 Informed Learning

Recall that the simulations that lead to asymptotic play outside D^∞ utilize the responsive and naive variants of the set of learning algorithms. In our simulations of Game D (see Figure 1), responsive but informed learning does *not* lead to play outside D^∞, even in the presence of extreme asynchrony. Specifically, for levels of asynchrony between 1 and 10,000, simulations of all responsive and informed algorithms show that Nash equilibrium is played over 95% of the time.[12]

Intuitively this occurs because the set of informed learning algorithms compares the current payoff with the potential payoffs of the other possible strategies, *assuming that the other agents keep their strategies fixed.* The key to the Stackelberg solution is that the leader evaluates his payoff in light of the probable responses of other agents. Naive learners, when learning at a slow rate, do this implicitly; that is, they only receive their payoffs after the other players respond to their play. The informed learning algorithms which

[12]The simulations of Game D discussed in this section and the next depend on the same set of parameter values as in Section 3.1; specifically, $\gamma = .01$ for all algorithms, while $\epsilon = .025$ for the reasonable learning algorithms and $\epsilon = .05$ for the no regret algorithms.

we consider do not take this reaction into account.

If informed and responsive learning algorithms do indeed converge to D^∞ in general, this might be seen as an argument to consider only informed learning algorithms. However, in network contexts this is not an option; the information about other payoffs is not available and so we are forced to use naive learning algorithms. However, agents do have a choice as whether to use responsive or non-responsive learning algorithms, a subject to which we now turn.

4.2 Non-responsive Learning

We now consider naive but non-responsive learners. Simulations of Game D (see Figure 1) using non-responsive algorithms, for levels of asynchrony between 1 and 10,000, show that the Nash equilibrium is played over 99% of the time for the set of informed algorithms and over 95% of the time for the naive set. In particular, the behavior of informed but non-responsive learners is similar to that of informed and responsive learners, in that they learn to eliminate dominated strategies, resulting in convergence to D^∞. This seems reasonable since the informed, non-responsive algorithms which we study are approximately adaptive learners in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts [30], who prove that such adaptive learners converge to D^∞.

The case of naive, non-responsive learners is slightly more complicated. What appears to be happening is that while initially the follower responds to the play of the leader, eventually the follower becomes less responsive and therefore stops following, which causes the leader to lose its advantage. Figure 8 depicts the weight over time of strategy B for player 1 and strategy R for player 2 in simulations of the no internal regret learning algorithms due to Hart and Mas-Colell with level of asynchrony 100. Note that values are recorded only every 500 rounds. Notice that player 1 (the leader) is inclined to increase his weight, but in the absence of a noticeable response from player 2 (the follower), player 1 is forced to settle at the Nash equilibrium.



(a) Informed Version



(b) Naive Version

Figure 8: *Asynchronous but Non-responsive Learning via Hart's and Mas-Colell's algorithm in Game D.* (a) plots the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy weights in the informed case; notice that play immediately converges to Nash equilibrium. (b) plots these same weights in the naive case; notice that play again (eventually) converges to Nash equilibrium.

While in our simulations of relatively simple games, the asymptotic play of non-responsive learning algorithms is confined to D^∞, we have no proof that non-responsive, naive learning algorithms in general remain inside D^∞; in fact, the authors are divided as to whether this result holds in the presence of asynchrony. This subject warrants further study. From the perspective of network contexts, however, the analysis of such questions is moot, since non-responsive learners are unsatisfactory for a much simpler reason: their performance is sub-optimal in non-stationary settings.

4.2.1 Non-stationary Environments

Consider a simple, one-player two-strategy game where the payoffs initially are 1 for strategy A and 0 for strategy B. We simulate a non-stationary version of this game where the payoffs are reversed every 5,000 rounds.

Figures 9 and 10 case (a) plot the cumulative percentage of time spent playing the optimal strategy in simulations of sample reasonable learning algorithms.[13] All the reasonable learning algorithms – namely stage learning, responsive learning automata, and the algorithm due to Roth and Erev – spend over 90% of their time at the current optimal strategy in the simulated quasi-static environment. In addition, the resulting fluctuations in the weight of strategy A in this game are depicted in (b); observe that the weight of strategy A changes with the state of the environment.

In contrast to the reasonable learning algorithms, the non-responsive, no regret algorithms (both the naive and informed versions) perform poorly in non-stationary environments. Figure 11 plots the cumulative percentage of time spent playing the Nash equilibrium for Freund's and Schapire's no external regret algorithm, in both its responsive and non-responsive forms.[14] Note that the non-responsive version of the algorithm spends only about

[13]The algorithmic parameters for the reasonable learning algorithms were chosen as follows: $\epsilon = \gamma = .01$.

[14]For simulation purposes, in the algorithm due to Freund and Schapire, $\beta = 1$, and in the responsive case, γ was set equal to .01.



(a) Percentage Time at Nash Equilibrium



(b) Weight of Strategy A

Figure 9: *Responsive LA in Quasi-static Environment.*



(a) Percentage Time at Nash Equilibrium



(b) Weight of Strategy A

Figure 10: *Roth's and Erev's Algorithm in Quasi-static Environment.*



(a) Informed Version



(b) Naive Version

Figure 11: *Freund's and Schapire's Algorithm in Quasi-static Environment.* Responsive vs. Non-responsive Learning.

50% of its time playing the currently optimal strategy. This behavior is representative of all the no regret algorithms studied. This is because the non-responsive no regret algorithms fixate on one strategy early on – the one that is initially optimal – and are unable to adjust to future changes in environmental conditions.

Thus, the criterion of no regret, while perhaps appropriate for learning in static environments, is apparently not sufficient for learning non-stationary payoff functions. Since network contexts are typically non-stationary and since this non-stationarity can be detected only via experimentation (one cannot observe the change in the structure of the game directly), the learning algorithms employed should be responsive.

4.2.2 Shapley Game

In this section, we compare the behavior of responsive and non-responsive learners in a classic example. In particular, we consider the Shapley game (see Figure 4.2.2), a well-known game in which fictitious play, an informed and non-responsive algorithm, does not converge. In this game, fictitious play results in cycling through the cells with 1's in them, namely cells *1, 2, 5, 6, 7*, and *9* in Figure 4.2.2, with ever-increasing lengths of play in each such cell [36]. One is led to conjecture that this fascinating behavior arises because of the clear-cut choices made by fictitious play – the strategy with the highest expected payoff is chosen with probability 1, leading to abrupt transitions in the trajectory of play.

Surprisingly, in our simulations,[15] we observe behavior similar to that of fictitious play for all the non-responsive learning algorithms – both informed (see Figures 13 (a) and 14 (a)) and naive (see Figure 13 (b) and 14 (b)) – even though these algorithms do not induce discrete changes. In particular, Figure 13 plots the cumulative percentage of time player 1 plays each of the

[15]The graphs present the results of simulations of the algorithm due to Foster and Vohra with $\epsilon = .03$; however, the stated outcomes prevail regardless of the choice of algorithm.

1 \ 2	*L*	*C*	*R*
T	1,0 *1*	0,1 *2*	0,0 *3*
M	0,0 *4*	1,0 *5*	0,1 *6*
B	0,1 *7*	0,0 *8*	1,0 *9*

Figure 12: Shapley Game

three strategies; although not depicted, the behavior patterns of player 2 are identical. In addition, Figure 14 depicts the joint empirical frequencies of the various strategy profiles after 10^6 iterations, where the x-axis is labelled *1,...,9* corresponding to the cells in Figure 4.2.2. Via this joint perspective, we see that both informed and naive, non-responsive learners spend very little time playing in cells without a 1 in them. Specifically, in the informed case, the likelihood of play in cells *3, 4*, and *8* approaches 0, and in the naive case this likelihood approaches ϵ/N.

In contrast, the responsive algorithms, while they *do* display the same cycling behavior, the duration of play in each cell does *not* continue to grow. Instead the responsive algorithms spend equal amounts of time in each of the distinguished cells. This is depicted in Figure 15 (a) (the informed case) and Figure 15 (b) (the naive case), which plot the cumulative percentage of time player 1 spends playing each of the three strategies. Notice that these graphs converge to 33% for all strategies. In addition, Figure 16 depicts the joint empirical frequencies of the various strategy profiles after 10^6 iterations. One interesting feature of the set of responsive learning algorithms is that their empirical frequencies converge to that of the fair and Pareto optimal correlated equilibrium; in particular, both players have expected average payoff of 1/2. This follows from the bounded memory of these algorithms.



(a) Informed, Non-Responsive



(b) Naive, Non-Responsive

Figure 13: *Non-Responsive Learning in the Shapley Game.* The cumulative percentage of time player 1 plays each of his three strategies assuming non-responsive learning.



(a) Informed, Non-Responsive



(b) Naive, Non-Responsive

Figure 14: *Joint Empirical Frequencies of Strategy Profiles in the Shapley Game assuming Non-responsive Learning.* The x-axis is labelled *1,...,9*, which corresponds to the cells in Figure 4.2.2.



(a) Informed, Responsive



(b) Naive, Responsive

Figure 15: *Responsive Learning in Shapley Game.* Cumulative percentage of time player 1 plays each of his three strategies assuming responsive learning.



(a) Informed, Responsive



(b) Naive, Responsive

Figure 16: *Joint Empirical Frequencies of Strategy Profiles in the Shapley Game assuming Responsive Learning.* The x-axis is labelled *1,...,9*, which corresponds to the cells in Figure 4.2.2.

5 Related Work

There is a vast literature on learning through repeated play of games, and we make no attempt here to provide a detailed review; see the review by Fudenberg and Levine [21] for a comprehensive discussion.

The work on learning falls roughly into two camps. The "high-rationality" approach involves learning algorithms which aim to predict the strategies of their opponents, and then optimize with respect to those predictions. The prediction methods can be for example, Bayesian (as in Kalai and Lehrer [28]), or calibrated (as in Foster and Vohra [12]), or consistent (as in Fudenberg and Levine [20, 19]). Typically, the asymptotic play of such algorithms is either a correlated or Nash equilibrium. Since these algorithms depend on knowledge of the underlying structure of the game, however, they are not applicable in the network contexts which we consider here.

In contrast, the "low-rationality" approaches to learning are concerned with situations similar to that which we consider here; in particular, agents have no information other than the payoffs which they receive. Examples of such work include Roth and Erev [35], Erev and Roth [8], Borgers and Sarin [5], Mookerji and Sopher [31], and Van Huyck *et al.* [26]; most of these algorithms as they were initially proposed are not responsive, but as we show in Appendix A, they can be made responsive with slight modifications. The focus of these papers is typically on matching the results of human experiments. Here we focus instead on the nature of the asymptotic play. However, it is interesting to note that Chen [6] performed experiments (on the congestion game discussed in Section 3.3) where she compared synchronous and asynchronous play, as well as learning in full information one-shot games (zipper design, where play is repeated, but is against different opponents) versus naive learning in repeated games.

It comes as no surprise that asynchrony can lead to play outside Nash or correlated equilibria. For example, Stackelbergian behavior arises when there are "patient players" [18], or the ability to make commitments Rosenthal [34],

or the capacity to establish reputations [38]). In these prior analyses, the Stackelberg leaders are seen as manipulating the system. The asynchrony that we discuss here comes from a quite different source: the underlying speed of communication and computation of the agents.

6 Conclusion

This paper presented the results of experiments conducted using six learning algorithms, embodying three distinct notions of optimality: one average-case performance measure, and two worst-case performance measures, namely no external and no internal regret. In the suite of relatively simple games which were examined here, all the algorithms exhibited qualitatively similar behavior. Thus, it seems that in network contexts, the key property is not which type of optimality is achieved, but rather, responsiveness.

In low-information settings, where learners are necessarily naive and thus cannot detect changes in the structure of the game directly, algorithms should be able to respond to environmental changes in bounded time. It is shown in this paper that when such naive and responsive learning algorithms operate in asynchronous environments, the asymptotic play need not lie within D^∞. The question of whether play outside D^∞ arises for naive but non-responsive players in asynchronous environments remains open, but presumably would only arise in games with more players and larger strategy sets than have been studied in this paper.

It has been established previously that for reasonable learning algorithms the asymptotic play is contained within O^∞, and it was further conjectured that such play is contained within the smaller set S^∞. Our experimental results are consistent with this conjecture. While these results are suggestive, they are in no way conclusive, and so we are left with the open question of what the appropriate solution concept is for naive and responsive learning algorithms in asynchronous settings.

A Learning Algorithms

For completeness, this appendix describes the learning algorithms which were simulated in this study: responsive learning automata, due to Friedman and Shenker [15], responsive learning via additive updating, due to Roth and Erev [9], multiplicative updating, due to Freund and Schapire [1], the mixing method, due to Foster and Vohra [10], and finally, learning via no internal regret, due originally to Foster and Vohra [12], and simplified by Hart and Mas-Colell [25]. The algorithms are presented in several varieties, depending upon whether they are applicable in informed or naive settings, and whether or not they are responsive. In informed settings, the counterfactual is known – in other words, players are informed of the potential payoff which they might have achieved had they employed any of their other strategies – while in naive settings, the only information pertaining to the payoff structure that is available at a given time is the payoff of the strategy that is in fact employed at that time. Informally, an algorithm is responsive if it weights recent information more heavily than past information and has a non-zero lower bound on the level of experimentation. [16]

A.1 Notation

The algorithms in this Appendix are described from the point of view of a single player engaging in a game against nature. Note that this point of view gives rise to notation which deviates from that of the main paper. The player chooses strategic actions from a strategy set $N = \{1, \ldots, n\}$, for $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $i, j \in N$. The payoff awarded at time t by employing strategy i is denoted π_i^t, and in general, the payoff function at time t is given by $\pi^t : N \to [a, b]$, for $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$. Note that payoffs are assumed to be bounded. For all the types of learning considered in this paper, the algorithm that determines strategic choices is described in terms of a time-dependent vector of probabilities,

[16] The formal definition of responsiveness is given in [16].

namely $p^t = (p_1^t, \ldots, p_i^t, \ldots, p_n^t)$, where p_i^t denotes the probability of playing strategy i at time t.

A.2 Responsive Learning Automata

Responsive learning automata (RLAs) are introduced in [15]. This algorithm is designed for network contexts; it is applicable in naive settings and it is are responsive, as the name suggests. It is known that RLAs are reasonable learners, and therefore, RLAs converge to O^∞ [16]; moreover, in the case of synchronous play, RLAs converge to D^∞ [15].

RLAs are a responsive extension of a simple learning automaton (for a survey of the literature, see Narendra and Thathachar [32]). This simple learning automata is constructed by letting $p_i^0 = 1/n$ and using the following update rule when strategy i is played at time t:

$$p_i^{t+1} = p_i^t + \gamma\pi_i^t(1 - p_i^t) \quad (1)$$

$$p_j^{t+1} = p_j^t(1 - \gamma\pi_i^t), \quad \forall j \neq i \in N \quad (2)$$

where γ is a parameter that controls the tradeoff between learning rapidly (for γ close to 1) and accuracy (for γ close to 0). This learning automaton is not responsive. RLAs achieve responsiveness simply by imposing the requirement that the probability of any strategy never fall below $\epsilon/(n-1)$ according to the following update rules:

$$p_i^{t+1} = p_i^t + \gamma\pi_i^t \sum_{j \neq i} a_j^t p_j^t \quad (3)$$

$$p_j^{t+1} = p_j^t(1 - \gamma\pi_i^t a_j^t), \quad \forall j \neq i \in N \quad (4)$$

where $a_j^t = \min\left\{1, \frac{p_j^t - \epsilon/(n-1)}{\gamma\pi_i^t p_j^t}\right\}$.

The following two sections describe alternative learning mechanisms based on additive updating due to Roth and Erev [9] and Foster and Vohra [12].

A.3 Simple Additive Updating

A second example of learning via additive updating is the naive learning algorithm of Roth and Erev [9] which is reasonable, for certain choices of the parameters. The updating scheme is as follows: $p_i^t = q_i^t / \sum_{j \in N} q_j^t$. If strategy i is played at time t then the q_i's are updated as follows:

$$q_i^{t+1} = (1-\gamma) q_i^t + \pi_i^t (1-\epsilon) \tag{5}$$

$$q_j^{t+1} = (1-\gamma) q_j^t + \pi_i^t (\epsilon/(n-1)), \quad \forall j \neq i \in N \tag{6}$$

where γ behaves as in the RLA. It is straightforward, although quite tedious, to show that this algorithm is reasonable.

The following sections describe additive and multiplicative learning rules that satisfy the no external regret optimality criterion.

A.4 Additive Updating Revisited

This section presents an additive updating rule due to Foster and Vohra, known as the mixing method [10], which exhibits no external regret. The mixing method was originally designed for use in informed settings, and consequently updates weights according to the cumulative payoffs achieved by all strategies, including the payoffs that would have been obtained by strategies which were not played. The cumulative payoffs obtained at time t by strategy i (notation ρ_i^t) is computed as follows: $\rho_i^t = \sum_{x=0}^{t} \pi_i^x$.

In the case of two strategies, say A and B, the mixing method updates the weight of strategy i as follows:

$$w_A^{t+1} = \min \left\{ \max \left\{ \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\alpha(\rho_A^t - \rho_B^t)}{2(\rho_A^t + \rho_B^t)}, 0 \right\}, 1 \right\} \tag{7}$$

where the truncations ensure that the probability assigned to strategy A is between 0 and 1. It is shown in Foster and Vohra [10] that the optimal value of α is $\sqrt{T}$, where T is the number of iterations, at which point, the mixing method exhibits no external regret. In general, when the number

of strategies $n > 2$, the algorithm utilizes pairwise mixing of strategies via Equation 7, followed by further mixing of the mixtures.

The mixing method can be modified for use in naive settings by utilizing an estimate of cumulative payoffs that depends only on the payoffs obtained by the strategies that are actually employed and the weights associated with those strategies. In particular, let $\hat{\pi}_i^t = (\mathbf{I}_i^t / p_i^t)\pi_i^t$ where $\mathbf{I}_i^t$ is the indicator function: $\mathbf{I}_i^t = 1$ if strategy i is played at time t, and $\mathbf{I}_i^t = 0$, otherwise. In other words, $\hat{\pi}_i^t$ is equal to 0 if strategy i is not employed at time t; otherwise, $\hat{\pi}_i^t$ is the payoff achieved by strategy i at time t scaled by the likelihood of playing strategy i. Now estimated cumulative payoffs (notation $\hat{\rho}_i^t$) are given by: $\hat{\rho}_i^t = \sum_{x=0}^{t} \hat{\pi}_i^x$. The naive variant of the mixing method uses $\hat{\rho}_i^t$ in place of ρ_i^t in Equation 7. This update procedure yields a set of weights which must then be adjusted for use in naive settings, in order to ensure that the space of possible payoffs be adequately explored. This is achieved by imposing an artificial lower bound on the probability with which strategies are played. In particular, let $\hat{p}_i^t = (1 - \epsilon)p_i^t + \epsilon/n$, and compute $\hat{\pi}_i^t$ in terms of $\hat{p}_i^t$.

Finally, the mixing method can be modified to achieve responsiveness by utilizing exponential smoothing. In the responsive variant of this algorithm $\tilde{\rho}_i^t$ is substituted for either ρ_i^t or $\hat{\rho}_i^t$, depending on whether the setting is informed or naive. In particular, for $0 < \gamma \leq 1$, in informed settings and naive settings, respectively, $\tilde{\rho}_i^{t+1} = (1 - \gamma)\tilde{\rho}_i^t + \pi_i^t$ and $\tilde{\rho}_i^{t+1} = (1 - \gamma)\tilde{\rho}_i^t + \hat{\pi}_i^t$.

A.5 Multiplicative Updating

This section describes an algorithm due to Freund and Schapire [13] that achieves no external regret in informed settings via multiplicative updating. The development of the variants of the multiplicative updating algorithm is analogous to the development of additive updating.

The multiplicative update rule is computed in terms of the cumulative payoffs achieved by all strategies (namely ρ_i^t) including the surmised payoffs of those strategies which are not played. In particular, the weight assigned

to strategy i at time $t+1$, for $\beta > 0$, is given by:

$$p_i^{t+1} = \frac{(1+\beta)^{\rho_i^t}}{\sum_{j \in N}(1+\beta)^{\rho_j^t}} \tag{8}$$

The multiplicative updating rule given in Equation 8 can be modified in a manner identical to the mixing method, using $\hat{\pi}_i^t$ and $\hat{p}_i^t$ to become applicable in naive settings, and using $\tilde{\rho}_i^t$ to achieve responsiveness. A naive variant of this multiplicative updating algorithm which achieves no external regret appears in Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund, and Schapire [1].

A.6 No Internal Regret

This section describes an algorithm due to Foster and Vohra [12] that achieves no internal regret in informed environments, and a simple implementation due to Hart and Mas-Colell [25]. In addition, the appropriate naive and responsive modifications are presented. Note that learning via no internal regret algorithms converges to correlated equilibrium [11, 25], and therefore converges inside the set D^∞.

Regret can be interpreted as a feeling of remorse over something that happened as a result of one's own actions. Formally, the regret felt by player i at time t is formulated as the difference between the payoffs obtained via strategy i and the payoffs that could have been achieved had strategy j been played whenever i had been played in the past: *i.e.*, $\mathrm{R}_{i\to j}^t = \mathbf{I}_i^t[\pi_j^t - \pi_i^t]$. Cumulative regret is given by: $\mathrm{CR}_{i\to j}^t = \sum_{x=0}^t \mathrm{R}_{i\to j}^x$ and internal regret is defined as $\mathrm{IR}_{i\to j}^t = (\mathrm{CR}_{i\to j}^t)^+$, where $X^+ = \max\{X, 0\}$.

Consider the case of a 2-strategy game, with strategies A and B. The components of the weight vector, namely p_A^{t+1} and p_B^{t+1}, are updated via the following formulae, which reflect cumulative feelings of regret:

$$p_A^{t+1} = \frac{\mathrm{IR}_{B\to A}^t}{\mathrm{IR}_{A\to B}^t + \mathrm{IR}_{B\to A}^t} \qquad \text{and} \qquad p_B^{t+1} = \frac{\mathrm{IR}_{A\to B}^t}{\mathrm{IR}_{A\to B}^t + \mathrm{IR}_{B\to A}^t} \tag{9}$$

If there is significant regret for having played strategy B rather than strategy A, then the algorithm updates weights such that the probability of playing strategy A is increased. This algorithm is due to Foster and Vohra [12]. In general, if strategy i is played at time t,

$$p_j^{t+1} = \frac{1}{\kappa} \text{IR}_{i \to j}^t \qquad \text{and} \qquad p_i^{t+1} = 1 - \sum_{j \neq i} p_j^{t+1} \tag{10}$$

for $\kappa > 0$. This algorithm is due to Hart and Mas-Collell [25].

In a naive setting, it is necessary to compute an estimate of internal regret. Recall that the regret at time t for having played strategy i rather than playing strategy j is given by: $\text{R}_{i \to j}^t = \mathbf{I}_i^t[\pi_j^t - \pi_i^t]$. An estimated measure of expected regret $\hat{\text{R}}_{i \to j}^t$ is given by: $\hat{\text{R}}_{i \to j}^t = p_i^t[\mathbf{I}_j^t \hat{\pi}_j^t - \mathbf{I}_i^t \hat{\pi}_i^t]$. Note that the expected value of this estimated measure of regret is the expected value of the actual measure of regret. Now an estimate of cumulative internal regret is given by $\hat{\text{IR}}_{i \to j}^t = (\sum_{x=0}^t \hat{\text{R}}_{i \to j}^x)^+$. Finally, weights are updated as in Equation 10, with $\hat{\text{IR}}_{i \to j}^t$ used in place of $\text{IR}_{i \to j}^t$.

Like the additive and multiplicative updating algorithms, the no internal regret learning algorithm is made responsive via exponential smoothing of the payoffs. In the informed case, notice that the expected value of cumulative regret is $p_i^t[\rho_j^t - \rho_i^t]$. Thus, it suffices to use $\tilde{\rho}_i^t$ and $\tilde{\rho}_j^t$ as defined previously when computing internal regret.

This concludes the discussion of the learning algorithms that were selected for simulation in this study. While this appendix is primarily a survey of the literature, it also includes extensions to the algorithms for applicability in network contexts. In future work, we hope to extend the scope of our simulations by considering additional related algorithms.

B Results on the Class EG

In this appendix, we discuss the claims that are made in Section 3.2 that pertain to Game $\text{EG}_{1.9}$ and Game $\text{EG}_{2.1}$. First of all, we note that for $\phi = 0$,

both of these games are D-solvable. This can be shown via the general technique of analyzing the best-reply (Cournot) dynamics of the relevant class of games as in [14]; however it can also be shown directly for these simple examples.

Consider Game $\text{EG}_{1.9}$ for a set of 8 players. For player 7, even when $\lambda = 8$, $\pi_7 = 7 - 8/1.9 > 0$. Thus, participation dominates non-participation for player 7, and similarly for players 5 and 6, implying that $\lambda \geq 3$. Now, given that players 5, 6, and 7 eliminate their dominated strategies, for players 0, 1, and 2, non-participation dominates participation. For example, if player 2 participates, then $\pi_2 \leq 2 - 4/1.9 < 0$. Thus, given that players 0, 1, and 2 eliminate participation because it is dominated, continuing this line of reasoning, we find that non-participation is dominated for players 3 and 4. Finally, the unique outcome via the iterated elimination of dominated strategies is $s = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)$. By an analogous argument, we note that Game $\text{EG}_{2.1}$ is also D-solvable with outcome $s = (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)$.

The above argument also shows that Game $\text{EG}_{1.9}$ and Game $\text{EG}_{2.1}$ are D-solvable, for $\phi \in (0, 1)$, since dominated strategies are unchanged for these values of ϕ. Moreover, these games are also O-solvable, for $\phi = 0$, since in this case one can show that any dominated strategy is also overwhelmed using the monotonicity properties of the payoff functions. However for ϕ close to 1, neither game is O-solvable. In particular, participation sometimes yields a higher payoff than non-participation, but sometimes this effect is reversed, depending on the strategies of the other players. For example, consider player 7 in Game $\text{EG}_{1.9}$, when $\phi = .9$. Participation with seven other players yields payoffs of $\pi_7 = 2.79$; but non-participation with no other participants yields $\pi_7 = 5.83$, while non-participation with seven participants yields $\pi_7 = 2.51$. In fact, no strategies are overwhelmed either game for ϕ close to 1.

While both Game $\text{EG}_{1.9}$ and Game $\text{EG}_{2.1}$ are D-solvable, and neither are O-solvable, these games differ in terms of S-solvability. In particular, Game $\text{EG}_{2.1}$ is S-solvable, while Game $\text{EG}_{1.9}$ is not. Consider first Game $\text{EG}_{1.9}$; in particular, consider the possible payoffs of player 2 as the leader.

If player 2 participates, then player 3 does not, which results in payoffs of $\pi_2(1) = 2-5/1.9$; on the other hand, if player 2 opts out, then player 3 does in fact participate, which yields payoffs of $\pi_2(0) = \phi(2-6/1.9)$. Consequently, player 2 participates when $\phi > 6/11$, since this implies that $\pi_2(1) > \pi_2(0)$. Therefore, there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium in Game $\mathrm{EG}_{1.9}$ with player 2 as leader which differs from the Nash equilibrium. Now consider Game $\mathrm{EG}_{2.1}$. In this game, regardless of whether or not player 2 participates, player 3 participates, since $\pi_3 = 3 - 6/2.1 > 0$. Consequently, player 2 only participates when $\pi_2(1) = 2 - 6/2.1 > \phi(2-6/2.1) = \pi_2(0)$ which cannot be satisfied for any $\phi < 1$. A more detailed argument can be used to show that this game is indeed S-solvable.

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