Bacon, Laura

Working Paper
Liberia's gender-sensitive police reform. Starting from scratch? Improving representation and responsiveness

WIDER Working Paper, No. 2013/114

Provided in Cooperation with:
United Nations University (UNU), World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER)


This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93713

Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
Liberia’s gender-sensitive police reform

Starting from scratch? Improving representation and responsiveness

Laura Bacon*

October 2013

Abstract

After its 14-year civil war, Liberia worked with multiple donors and partners to restore security. This paper explores the Liberia National Police’s innovative efforts to create a more gender-sensitive police service and describes the international and domestic support it received in doing so. In particular, the paper analyses Liberia National Police’s efforts to (1) recruit female police officers and (2) train a specialized unit to address gender-related crimes. Ambitious recruitment efforts brought more women on board, but some critics regarded the related fast-track program as misguided or ineffective. The specialized unit increased awareness about and response to gender-based violence, but was impeded by a broken judicial system. Success factors of both projects included the timing (post-conflict window of opportunity), the context (momentum for gender-sensitive reforms), local ownership....

Keywords: Liberia, police, reform, post-conflict, women, sexual and gender-based violence

JEL classification: D73; D78 F35; J16
a supportive president), and the nature of the aid (problem-driven interventions and iterative learning, vast financial and technical support, including dedicated and continuous support from the United Nations). However, the sustainability of projects’ successes remained uncertain, given Liberia’s extremely low technical capacity—especially its weak rule of law—as well as certain flaws in the program design.
1 Introduction

Liberia’s 14-year civil war ended with a peace agreement in 2003. Of a population of approximately three million, an estimated 270,000 Liberians were killed and hundreds of thousands were displaced.1 The post-war context was fragile. In the Liberian countryside—difficult to reach even during peaceful times—services such as education and health had been on hold for years. In Monrovia, the coastal capital city to which many Liberians fled during the war, residents were traumatized and infrastructure had crumbled. With a GDP per capita of US$135 in 2003, an unemployment rate of 85 per cent, and following one of the steepest economic collapses ever recorded in the world, Liberia’s economy was flailing.2,3,4,5 Helping to maintain the tenuous peace was the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the largest peacekeeping mission in the United Nations history.

Security was UNMIL’s and Liberians’ first concern. Although the disarmament and demobilization process mostly quieted the gunfire, a ‘culture of violence’ continued, especially against women.6,7 During the war, more than half of Liberian women had been sexually or physically assaulted.8 After the war, violence against women and girls (including rape) and armed robbery continued to be the two primary security concerns in Liberia.9 Citizens had lost trust in the justice system during the war, and the post-war rule of law needed massive reform—especially because by 2003 Liberia had 15 different security agencies with overlapping functions and mandates.10 Beginning in 2003, the UNMIL Police

---

5 See Appendix A for a graph of Liberia’s GDP drop.
8 Studies on assault against women during the war report a wide range of percentages (from 12 per cent to 92 per cent), depending on how the research questions were worded, in what county the respondents lived, and whether the violence included domestic violence. In this paper, data on sexual assault were derived from multiple sources, including: (1) Vinck, P., Pham, P., Kreutzer, T. (2011). ‘Talking Peace: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Security, Dispute Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Liberia,’ 34. Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley; (2) Omanyondo, M. (2005). ‘Sexual Gender-Based Violence and Health Facility Needs Assessment,’ World Health Organization; and (3) Johnson Sirleaf, E. ‘Liberia’s Gender-Based Violence National Action Plan.’ www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR27/21.pdf [accessed 6 June 2013].
Commissioner and Liberia National Police (LNP) Inspector General began to implement reforms through a Rule of Law Implementation Committee.\textsuperscript{11}

Within the justice system, Liberia’s police service was known as particularly incompetent and brutal. During the war, some police units were known as perpetrators of rape and murder.\textsuperscript{12} After the war, the LNP had to build its reputation and gain the confidence of Liberians. In doing so, LNP had to address two major, interrelated challenges related to gender: (1) Liberia had a significant gender imbalance—only 2 per cent of police officers were women, and (2) LNP was known for its poor responsiveness to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). The 2003 peace agreement called for Liberia’s police service to start from scratch. In this post-conflict context, could Liberia’s new police service prove to be more responsive and representative?

This paper explores how post-conflict Liberia and its partners dealt with these challenges and opportunities from 2005 to 2013, focusing particularly on context, timing, local ownership, project design, and aid modalities.\textsuperscript{13} Section 2 provides background on the local context and aid in Liberia. Sections 3 and 4 describe and provide evaluations of two innovative gender-sensitive reforms in the LNP: (1) the accelerated recruitment of female police officers and (2) the creation of a specialized unit to address SGBV. Because failures in addressing SGBV were attributable to larger justice system bottlenecks, Section 5 describes the follow-up steps Liberia and the donor community took to address those issues. Section 6 analyses and discusses what worked well, what did not, and offers analysis and explanations for the outcomes. This final section also offers what can be learned from Liberia’s experience, as well as what was on Liberia’s horizon for gender-sensitive police reform at the time of this writing.

This paper uses several sources of data to inform its analysis and arguments. First, it relies on a review of the policy and research literature surrounding aid, security sector reform, and gender-related policies in Liberia. Second, it examines reports, speeches, and press releases written by aid organizations and the Liberian government. Third, the paper draws heavily on interviews and interactions between 2008 and 2013 with leaders from the United Nations and other donors, Liberian public sector officials (including many police officers and leaders), and civil society leaders in Liberia. Finally, the author draws upon personal observation during visits to Liberia.

The finding of this paper is that Liberia was the recipient of ‘good aid’ in that its gender-sensitive projects were innovative with positive outcomes. However, results were mixed: from 2005 to 2013, ambitious recruitment efforts brought more female police on board, but the related fast-track program was neither in-depth nor monitored enough to be effective and had some negative side effects for women. The specialized unit increased awareness about and response to gender-based violence, but was impeded by a broken judicial system.


\textsuperscript{13} Much of the content and many of the interviews cited in this paper are derived from a historical case studies produced by Princeton University’s research program, Innovations for Successful Societies: Bacon, Laura M. ‘Building an inclusive, responsive national police service: Gender-sensitive reform in Liberia, 2005–2011.’ Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University, accessed at www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties on 2 June 2013.
Success factors of both projects included timing and local context (post-conflict window of opportunity and momentum for gender-sensitive reforms), local ownership (including a supportive president), and the nature of the aid (vast financial and technical support, dedicated and continuous for over a decade from the United Nations and other bilateral donors). Of note, Liberian leaders and international donors engaged in an iterative process of identifying problems and devising solutions—a gradual process that continued throughout the years of reforms covered in this paper. However, the technical and financial sustainability of projects’ successes remained questionable, given Liberia’s extremely low capacity and certain flaws in program design.

2 Gender-sensitive reform in a fragile state context: opportunities and challenges

After the civil war, the Government of Liberia and its international partners had several opportunities to make progress on gender-sensitive police reform. First, women had built credibility as peace agents in Liberia by accelerating the war’s end. As chronicled in the documentary Pray the Devil Back to Hell and acknowledged by the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize committee, thousands of Liberian women joined together during the war in an interfaith peace movement, rallying for a ceasefire and barricading peace talks until negotiators reached an agreement.\(^{14}\)

Second, in 2005, Liberians elected the first female president in Africa. At her inauguration—an event brimming with hopeful Liberians and a supportive international community—President Johnson Sirleaf pledged to support the women in the country, saying:

> During the years of our civil war, they [women] bore the brunt of inhumanity and terror. They were conscripted into war, gang-raped at will, forced into domestic slavery. Yet it is the women … who labored and advocated for peace throughout our region. … I want to here and now gratefully acknowledge the powerful voice of women of all walks of life whose votes significantly contributed to my victory. My administration shall thus endeavor to give Liberian women prominence in all affairs of our country. My administration shall empower Liberian women in all areas of our national life.\(^{15}\)

The president followed through with this promise soon after her inauguration by appointing several women to high-level positions in her cabinet and the LNP.

A third window of opportunity for police reform was that Liberia’s transition and post-war period was characterized by significant momentum for gender-sensitive reform. Liberian leaders and their international counterparts were mandated to act by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security. Passed in 2000, Resolution 1325—and follow-up resolutions such as 1820, 1888, 1889, and 1960—urged countries to increase women’s representation in the security sector and to take special measures to prevent


In 2005, the Liberian legislature passed a ‘rape law’ that expanded the definition of rape and set harsh penalties for sexual assault. The Government of Liberia and UNMIL set a goal to increase the percentage of female police officers from 2 per cent in 2005 to 20 per cent by 2014. The United Nations, itself, set the same 20 per cent female target for itself for its peacekeeping missions.

Domestic institutional support for gender-sensitive reform derived from many organizations and planning documents, including Liberia’s Ministry of Gender and Development (founded during the war, in 2001, by the national legislature, and became more functional and donor-supported after the war) and the National Plan of Action for the Prevention and Management of Gender Based Violence in Liberia. The National Plan of Action for Gender Based Violence was developed from 2004 to 2006 by the Ministry of Gender and Development in collaboration with the World Health Organization and Liberian ministries and agencies. The estimated budget was US$1.5 million to establish and US$6 million for the second phase (donated by SIDA). The national plan established the Gender Based Violence Taskforce, representatives from the police, ministries, donors, NGOs, and other stakeholders who met regularly to share data and follow up on cases of gender-based violence. Momentum picked up as Liberia planned to host the International Colloquium on Women’s Empowerment, Leadership Development, International Peace and Security—a massive meeting in March 2009 attended by high-level leaders from around the world.

A fourth opportunity to strengthen Liberia’s police reform was the presence of vast international support. Leaders around the globe were thrilled at the prospect of a peaceful, better-governed, gender-sensitive Liberia, and threw their support behind President Johnson Sirleaf, a Harvard-educated World Bank economist with a relatively clean record.

---

16 For more on UNSCR 1325 and the other resolutions mentioned, see: United States Institute of Peace. ‘What is UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and Why is it so Critical Today.’ www.usip.org/gender_peacebuilding/about_UNSCR_1325 [accessed 6 June 2013].


23 In 2009, Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission ruled that Johnson Sirleaf should be banned from government for 30 years because of her early support for Liberian President Charles Taylor. More information can be found in: Gordon, G. (3 July 2009). ‘In Liberia, Sirleaf’s Past Sullies her Clean Image.’ Time. www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1908635,00.html [accessed 6 June 2013].
International aid organizations and donors flooded into Liberia, determined to diminish the suffering and make their mark as the nation began to rebuild.24

Donor flows to Liberia—including that from UNMIL—were estimated at approximately US$356 million in FY2009/2010, US$426 million in FY2010/2011, US$340 million in FY2011/2012, and US$566 million in FY2012/2013.25,26 In 2008, aid in Liberia represented 771 per cent of government spending.27 In 2012, aid flows to Liberia represented approximately 39 per cent of GDP, including 2 per cent of GDP for budget support.28 Private sector companies also began to invest in Liberia. By 2013, Liberia’s ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP was the highest in the world.29

Post-conflict Liberia had four unique mechanisms to handle development aid. First, in 2005 as a unique means of promoting accountability and fiscal transparency, Liberia and its international partners created a partnership called GEMAP (Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program). GEMAP—an effort to build capacity and prevent corruption—was overseen by the president of Liberia and the US Ambassador who served as chairs of an economic governance steering committee, and was co-ordinated by a technical team.30 Second, President Johnson Sirleaf relied heavily on her Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee, which co-ordinated Liberia’s development agenda and helped co-ordinate Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy. Third, Liberia’s Ministry of Finance created an Aid Management Unit to help track and direct aid flows. Finally, in 2008, Liberia created a Philanthropy Secretariat to help match foundations’ contributions with needs on the ground and to relieve the burden on other government officials.31

Liberia’s top bilateral donors included (1) the United States, (2) UK, (3) Germany, (4) Norway, and (5) Sweden. For the gender-sensitive reforms described in this working paper, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark also played a large role. Major organizations contributing to Liberian aid included the UN system (also see below for more on UNMIL), the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Commission, and foundations.32

Aid modalities varied over time and across donors, but the primary methods of giving included: (1) funds for projects not executed by the Government of Liberia (between 62 to 65 per cent); (2) Liberian government-executed projects (approximately 6 to 24 per cent); (3)

24 See Appendices B, C, D, and E for more data on donors and aid inflows.
30 For more, see the GEMAP website: www.gemap-liberia.org
budget support (4 to 14 per cent); (4) a pooled fund (approximately 2 to 10 per cent); and (5) contributions to a trust fund (1 to 14 per cent). (See Appendices B, C, and D for more.)

Foremost among Liberia’s external supporters after the war was the United Nations. UNMIL was founded in 2003 by United Nations Security Resolution 1509. At that time, it was the largest peacekeeping force in the history of the United Nations (UN), with 15,000 peacekeeping troops and 1,115 police officers from around the world, as well as an annual budget of more than US$800 million at its peak in fiscal year 2004/2005. In the 2003 peace agreement, UNMIL was designated as the lead body in overhauling the police service and developing Liberia’s civilian police capacity.

LNP’s counterpart at UNMIL was the UN Police (UNPOL), whose role included recruiting police staff, developing training programs, and addressing violence against women and girls as a weapon of war. Of the many benefits of working with UNPOL, LNP could potentially leverage the experience and expertise of many countries. For example, countries contributing police personnel to UNMIL in 2013 included: Argentina, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, the Gambia, Germany, Ghana, India, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, the United States, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

In addition to UNMIL’s massive peacekeeping force and civilian police, other United Nations entities had a major presence in Liberia, all of which engaged and invested deeply in LNP’s gender-sensitive reforms. Examples included United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM, which in 2011 became part of UN Women).

Another window of opportunity was that the LNP was starting anew, as the security sector reform process involved deactivating all former police officers and inviting them to apply to join the new service. Friedman describes the police reform process, determined by Liberia’s peace agreement parties and UNMIL in 2003: ‘They planned to deploy an interim Liberian police service made up of 400 officers, supported by more than 1,100 UNPOL while the UN trained a new national police service. Though UNMIL did not have an executive policing mandate and lacked the authority to arrest criminals, UNPOL supported the Liberian police through training and mentoring while a 15,000 member peacekeeping force maintained a stable environment in which the police could develop.’ Starting the police service nearly from scratch meant the opportunity to vet new officers, to weed out those who were unqualified or ill-suited for police service—including those affiliated with rebel groups and those who had committed war crimes—to train recruits, to build a different policing culture, and to make a change.

---

34 See Appendices F and G for more details on UNMIL budget and strength from its founding to present.
However, on the flip side of these opportunities were challenges. For one, creating a police service from scratch would be difficult. There was little institutional memory, because officers were deactivated in the security sector overhaul. The post-war state of the police was abysmal and had little infrastructure on which to build. As described by Friedman: ‘Post-war Liberia lacked any effective rule of law. Many police stations had been abandoned, destroyed, or taken over by rebel forces. … Police stations that still functioned lacked basic equipment, vehicles, fuel and communication systems.’ Furthermore, police officers’ capacity to perform their duties was extremely low because the war had deprived them over a decade of education, training, and proper professional experience. Poor infrastructure and low technical capacity would be a constant constraint throughout Liberia’s post-conflict police reforms.

Another challenge was that LNP had a tarnished image after the war. Peace talk participants attempted to reverse that image by agreeing to dissolve security units that developed reputations for corruption and predation. Such units included the former President Charles Taylor’s notorious Anti-Terrorist Unit, known for committing murder, torture, and rape. But the police’s violent reputation would not disappear immediately. In addition, the LNP did a poor job handling cases of SGBV, such as domestic abuse, child abuse, and sexual assault. The head of the SGBV Unit of Liberia’s Ministry of Gender and Development recalled that, before and during the war: ‘The police didn’t know how to handle SGBV. If someone came to report domestic violence, the police would say, ‘It’s your fault you were beaten.’ If a woman reported rape, the police would suggest she had caused it. They would make it worse, and women would be traumatized.’

A third challenge for enhancing responsiveness was the pattern of low reporting rates for rape. Stigmatization and taboos associated with rape in Liberia worsened the problem of underreporting that commonly characterized such crimes. In a study commissioned by the United Nations in 2008, only 12.5 per cent of Liberian women who had been raped said they had reported their cases to the police. In Liberia, as in other countries, most rapists were known to their victims and often were neighbours or family members, which hindered reporting. Furthermore, an extraordinarily high rate of sexual assaults were committed against children. A 2006 report by Doctors Without Borders indicated that 85 per cent of 658 rape victims treated at its clinic were younger than 18; 48 per cent were under 12. Most sexual assault cases were settled outside of court, either privately or through traditional or customary structures.

---

38 Friedman, J. (2011: 2).
A fourth challenge both for recruiting women and for responding to SGBV was Liberia’s culture and history: the security services had been predominantly male throughout Liberia’s history, a pattern common to security services throughout the world. This would make it more difficult to recruit women to the police service. Furthermore, Liberia’s history of male domination and violence against women—which worsened during and after the war—meant that the country’s ‘rape epidemic’ and ‘culture of violence’ would be extremely difficult to combat.

Finally, the enormous donor presence in post-war Liberia provided plenty of resources and support, but also posed hazards. There was the danger—especially in a post-war context—that aid organizations could prioritize pet projects, proceed without a full understanding of the Liberian context, or create reforms unsustainable in donors’ absence. Of particular concern, outsiders’ solutions had the potential to take ‘starting from scratch’ too far, failing to consider Liberia’s vast existing customary, traditional, and informal structures. Furthermore, donor projects would need to ensure that investments were not concentrated solely in the capital. The majority of Liberians lived in villages that were difficult to reach, especially during the rainy season, and were hours or days away from donor projects and development in the capital.

3 Early initiatives

After Liberia’s civil war ended, the LNP—alongside UNMIL, and with support from other aid organizations—engaged in two major gender-sensitive initiatives. The first was to improve women’s participation in the LNP, with the goal of reaching a 20 per cent female police service by 2014. The second was to enhance responsiveness to SGBV.

The LNP’s dual goals of representation and responsiveness were related. Poor responsiveness to SGBV was explicitly linked to a shortage of women in the security sector. Few

---


48 LNP also engaged in other gender-sensitive initiatives, such as the drafting of a gender policy, the creation of a gender unit, and the coordination of an association of female police officers. The description and evaluation of these other gender-related projects is beyond the scope of this paper because (1) these projects did not engage donors to the same extent as the recruitment of female officers through the ESP and the creation of the Women and Children Protection Section (WCPS), and (2) ESP and WCPS are arguably more innovative and unique than the initiatives mentioned above. Readers interested in learning more about the gender unit can find more information at Bowah, C. and Salahub, J. E. (2011). African Women on the Thin Blue Line: Gender-Sensitive Police Reform in Liberia and Southern Sudan. North-South Institute. Salahub (Ed), and in the association of female police officers at Becker, J., Brown, C. B., Ibrahim, A. F., Kuranchie, A. (23 April 2012). Freedom through Association: Assessing the Contribution of Female Police Staff Associations to Gender-Sensitive Police Reform in West Africa. The North-South Institute. Canada.

women in police ranks meant few women to respond to and conduct the kind of sensitive investigations required for gender-based crimes, whose victims often preferred to speak with female officers.\textsuperscript{51,52,53,54} However, recruiting more female officers was also driven by beliefs that Liberia’s leaders and public sector should be more representative of its citizens and that women would make important contributions to a security sector from which they had been discouraged previously.

### 3.1 Female police officer recruitment

In early 2005, LNP’s transitional leaders and their international counterparts created a gender policy that laid the groundwork for (1) correcting the gender representation imbalance, (2) setting up a gender unit, and (3) responding to the needs of gender-based violence survivors. LNP and UNMIL launched a countrywide recruiting drive that targeted women at high-schools and universities, at community events, and at rural gathering places throughout Liberia’s 15 counties. LNP’s personnel office worked to build a recruitment strategy that emphasized special incentives for young women to join the police service, such as education, lodging, and meals at the National Police Training Academy, in addition to regular salaries.\textsuperscript{55}

In 2006, President Johnson Sirleaf appointed Beatrice Munah Seah as Liberia’s first female inspector general, the top position in the LNP, and in 2007, she appointed Asatu Bah-Kenneth as the LNP’s deputy inspector general.\textsuperscript{56} Beginning in 2006, LNP’s leaders, as well as LNP’s gender, personnel, and community services units, worked to showcase the growing numbers and prominence of women in the police service. Top LNP women acted as role models and educators in the recruitment effort. For instance, the deputy inspector general helped university students understand that their degrees would enable them to start as higher level officers than those starting immediately after high-school.\textsuperscript{57}

In January 2007, India sent an all-female Formed Police Unit to serve as part of UNMIL. The unit guarded officials, supported LNP training and security efforts, and served as role models for Liberians, visiting villages and speaking in schools and colleges about their experiences. Rakhi Sahi, commander of the unit, said: ‘Besides achievements as a police officer, I think


\textsuperscript{52} Interviews with Patricia Kamara, Assistant Minister, Ministry of Gender and Development, Liberia and Vera Manly, WCPS Chief, Liberia National Police, June and July 2011.


\textsuperscript{54} This is not to imply that male officers cannot investigate sexual assault cases responsibly or well. Liberia trains all of its officers—male and female—in proper investigation techniques. And the majority of LNP officers, including WCPS officers, are male.

\textsuperscript{55} Interviews with Roland Foley, LNP Chief of Personnel, June and July 2011.

\textsuperscript{56} More biographical information on both women can be found in Bacon, L. M. (2012). Munah Sieh stepped down from her position in 2009. As of the submission of this draft, she had been convicted of corruption related to irregularities in the procurement of officer uniforms, an allegation she denied.

\textsuperscript{57} Interview with Asatu Bah-Kenneth, former LNP Deputy Inspector General and LNP WCPS Chief, July 2011.
the biggest accomplishment that I can talk about is building up the confidence of the Liberian women… Women as well as men in Liberia look up to us. For them, it is a very unique feature that women can take up arms and stand on the roadside and protect them.58

By early 2007, the percentage of women in the LNP had more than doubled from 2 per cent to 5 per cent, but the 20 per cent goal remained distant. The key hurdle was that many women did not have the required high-school education.59 In 2007, because of the years of war and because parts of the country did not encourage girls’ education, only 5 per cent of women had completed high-school.60

In response to this obstacle, an ‘Education Support Program’ (ESP) was created to enable women between the ages of 18 and 35 who had completed at least ninth grade to earn the equivalent of a high-school degree and enter police training. The impetus for the ESP was a combined effort of UNMIL and UNPOL. The first of its kind, it was not modelled after other programs. After the original program was conceptualized, the LNP, Ministries of Gender, Education, and Justice, the West African Examination Council (WAEC), and Stella Maris Polytechnic (the school in Monrovia hosting ESP) joined the effort.61

The implementation of the program—including public awareness campaigns and recruitment—was co-ordinated by UNPOL and LNP. The co-ordinator, Sylvia Bisanz (UNMIL’s Community Relations Advisor), led a team composed of five UNPOL officers (with more officers loaned from other sections during the various campaigns) and five LNP officers.

The ESP had three sessions—one pilot cohort in 2007, a second cohort in late 2007, and a third cohort in 2008. The first round of ESP was funded by the Netherlands at a cost of US$59,518, the second cohort was funded by Belgium at a cost of US$35,937, and the third phase was funded by Germany at a cost of US$69,820.62 The third educated a smaller number of students, but was more expensive because it included accommodation subsidy as

59 Correspondence with Sylvia Bisanz, Community Relations Advisor, UNPOL, UNMIL, 8 July 2011.
61 Other technical steps of ESP were as follows (as provided by Sylvia Bisanz, UNPOL Community Relations Advisor and coordinator of ESP program): First, the Ministry of Education signed a letter of agreement accepting the outcome of the WAEC conducted exams to be equivalent to a high-school certificate. Second, WAEC signed a letter agreeing to administer the aptitude test, develop the curriculum for the three months program, conduct the GCE exams including grading, print the certificates of achievement and provide detailed budget. Stella Maris Polytechnic signed a letter of agreement to conduct tutorials during each three-month program, provide classrooms, feed the students, provide all textbooks and educational materials, print ID cards, and submit a detailed budget. To ensure accountability of funds, UNPOL submitted a detailed project document to UNDP with a request for funding. Once Stella Maris submitted its budget, a 50 per cent advance payment was disbursed to ensure the acquisition of textbooks and educational material, the printing of ID cards, and for the daily lunch of the students. As payment of stipends to students was done every two weeks, funds were requested to UNDP every two weeks with the daily attendance sheet signed by the students attached. However, students recruited from rural villages qualified for an accommodation subsidy once a month. Payment to WAEC for services rendered was done as services were provided, e.g. after they concluded the aptitude test. As the third round of program targeted women from rural counties, it was deemed more efficient for WAEC officials to travel (on UN flights) to locations for the aptitude test.
62 Correspondence with Sylvia Bisanz, Community Relations Advisor, UNPOL, UNMIL, 29 July 2013.
students were coming from rural counties, plus a number of trips WAEC officials made to the five regions to conduct aptitude tests. 63

The ESP program operated as follows: After co-ordinators encouraged Liberian women to apply, WAEC determined female applicants’ education level and assessed their ability to learn the required material. In the first cohort, fewer than half of the 350 applicants were accepted into the program.64 Through the next three months, the accepted female police aspirants underwent intense schooling six full days per week. The program provided lunches and transportation and housing stipends. Instructors, mostly Liberians and other West Africans, taught classes in 11 subjects and administered progress exams every month.65 After three months, the institute conducted final exams followed by official exams administered by WAEC. Successful candidates then followed the standard procedures to enter basic police training at the academy.

ESP cohorts improved LNP’s gender imbalance. Before the ESP—from 2004 to 2006—LNP’s first 29 classes of recruits had an average of only four female recruits per 150 (2.6 per cent) in each class.66 LNP Training Academy classes 30 and 31 had slightly larger numbers of women (25 and 33, respectively), likely because of the LNP’s recruitment campaigns. Numbers skyrocketed after the ESP. In 2007, the pilot cohort of the ESP program produced 124 female recruits, and 105 joined the LNP; the second ESP cohort produced 110 and 104 joined the LNP; and the third ESP cohort produced 87 and 78 joined the LNP.67 As a result of the three cohorts in the program between 2007 and 2008, approximately 300 women joined LNP training classes, significantly increasing female enrollment from 5 per cent to 12 per cent.68

Recruitment efforts continued, led by UN Women, Liberia’s Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Gender and Development, UNMIL, and the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET).69 By 2013, 767 of the LNP’s 4,417 officers were women (17.4 per cent).70

3.2 Women and children’s protection section

In 2005, LNP created a special unit, the Women and Children Protection Section (WCPS), dedicated to responding to reports of domestic violence, sexual assault, and crimes against children. UNMIL and UNICEF supported the creation of this section, and UNPOL were

63 Correspondence with Sylvia Bisanz, Community Relations Advisor, UNPOL, UNMIL, 29 July 2013.
64 Correspondence with Sylvia Bisanz, Community Relations Advisor, UNPOL, UNMIL, 8 July 2011.
65 Correspondence with Sylvia Bisanz, Community Relations Advisor, UNPOL, UNMIL, 8 July 2011.
assigned to WCPS as colleagues and trainers. WCPS units throughout the country were funded through a US$1.6 million grant from the Norwegian Government, administered through UNDP.71

WCPS’s mission was modelled after an innovative unit in neighboring Sierra Leone. With the support of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, Kadi Fakondo—a high-ranking police officer from Sierra Leone—had established Family Support Units in 2001 to encourage survivors of rape, domestic violence, or sexual crimes to report the crimes to the police.72,73,74 Sponsored by UNICEF, Fakondo and another officer came from Sierra Leone to Liberia in 2005 to train the first two batches of LNP WCPS officers and to train trainers for future sessions. Each batch of Liberian trainees consisted of 25 male and female LNP officers, some of whom were new to the police, and some of whom were LNP veterans who had to repeat basic training due to the deactivation process. Training included instruction in topics such as creating case reports for crimes of domestic violence and sexual assault, investigating reports, collecting evidence, and maintaining confidentiality. The training emphasized the importance of building the community’s confidence by protecting victims, even if perpetrators or acquaintances with power tried to derail the case.

WCPS training went beyond the traditional gender training every Liberian police officer received. Every trainee at the police academy went through six hours of gender training on topics such as gender awareness, gender-based violence, sexual exploitation, and sexual abuse.75 However, to be a WCPS officer required extra training, as well as follow-up training in the field. The two-week WCPS course, in its most recent form, includes the following:76

- concept of gender, including gender analysis in LNP work (3 hours)
- gender issues (6 hours)
- introduction to human rights (7 hours)
- overview of investigative techniques (15 hours)
- introduction to criminal investigation (5 hours)
- forensic awareness (3 hours)
- case files (10 hours)
- responding to domestic violence (3 hours)
- crime scene management (10 hours)
- domestic violence awareness (3 hours)
- report writing (5 hours)
- testifying in court (3 hours)
- court visitation (5 hours)

---

WCPS began operations in September 2005, staffed by the first 25 trainees. Asatu Bah-Kenneth, who had been in the police service for two decades, attended the first WCPS training and was named to head the section in 2005 (She was later appointed as LNP’s deputy inspector general). WCPS’s organizational structure included a director, deputy director, chief of administration, chief of operations, chief investigator, three crime squad heads, as well as several investigators, officers, and support staff. Two of WCPS’s three squads—the sexual assault unit and juvenile unit—had been independent LNP operations previously, while the third, domestic violence, was new.

WCPS’s original single-room building next to LNP headquarters was too small for the 25-member staff and lacked provisions for the kind of confidentiality required for reporting and investigating sensitive cases. UNMIL provided tents, partitions, and office supplies to fill these gaps until a new headquarters building was completed. After several batches were trained, Bah-Kenneth and her UNMIL counterparts began to build new units across Liberia and deploy section officers to other counties.

Accurate record-keeping was crucial to WCPS’s many activities—collecting victims’ statements, coordinating investigations, and following up—and WCPS and UNPOL continued to hone the section’s information management and investigation processes. On a monthly basis, WCPS compiled data from all of its units into a report, which it then sent to members of the Gender Based Violence taskforce.

To spread awareness about WCPS to the Liberian people, UNICEF, UNMIL, Bah-Kenneth’s team and other supporters designed awareness campaigns, including leaflets, posters, school visits, community meetings, billboards and radio shows. Section officers engaged with journalists on a regular basis to make sure their services were publicized. In its early months, the section also engaged in advocacy events such as marches and radio features to support the 2005 passage of Liberia’s broadened and toughened law on rape. The section engaged in community outreach with other police units. For instance, the Community Policing Unit organized weekly community-discussion trips that included representatives from the Gender Unit, the Personnel Unit and the Traffic Patrol Unit. WCPS officers joined these outreach sessions, explaining how to report crimes and preserve evidence.

The Norwegian Refugee Council’s gender-based violence program worked with the LNP and others to devise a ‘Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Referral Pathway.’ The pathway—which was depicted on brochures, posters, and LNP presentations—publicized proper reporting channels so that victims, police, hospitals, counselors and courts understood victims’ rights and reporting options. In clear language, it emphasized that survivors should never pay bribes or fees for reporting.

Changing cultural norms was an important responsibility of WCPS. Many Liberians did not realize that rape was a reportable crime and did not know how to preserve evidence or where to go for help. With support from UNMIL, WCPS and its counterparts posted billboards around Monrovia with messages like ‘Rape is a crime’ and ‘Against my will is against the law,’ and co-ordinated a ‘Stop Rape’ campaign that culminated in an event at the sports stadium, with songs, skits, and speeches by Liberian leaders and public figures. Through such campaigns, the Liberian public became increasingly aware of laws against rape and where to seek help.

In May 2011, the new WCPS headquarters in Monrovia—funded by the Government of Norway—was completed and dedicated with a launch ceremony. By June 2013, over 300
officers had received WCPS training. At last count, 180 active WCPS officers—approximately one-third of whom were women—were stationed in 52 police stations spread across all of Liberia’s 15 counties.

4 Project evaluations

In a context of a supportive president and eager external community, ambitious recruitment efforts in Liberia from 2005 to 2013 brought more women to the LNP, but the ESP left a mixed legacy. WCPS enhanced awareness about and response to gender-based violence, but was impeded by a broken judicial system. Both sets of reforms were limited by extremely low capacity, in terms of both resources and technical ability to perform necessary duties. Another notable aspect of both reforms is that donors and their Liberian counterparts continued to identify problems and address them through an iterative approach throughout the eight years covered in this analysis.

To the author’s knowledge, no thorough impact evaluations had been conducted of either project by the time this working paper was prepared. Existing reports and observers provide mixed reviews on both initiatives, with concluding positions similar to those held by the author of this paper. UNMIL’s report on the ESP evaluated the program as follows: ‘The ESP recruitment effort has promoted equality for women and girls in Liberia by providing education, sustainable income, improved security, and new sense of women’s rights.’ However, most interviewees—including those who worked for UNMIL—felt ESP was flawed, with negative consequences for trainees and the LNP (See below for more details on this position). Yet almost all interviewees reported, more generally, that goals set and efforts to recruit women were laudable.

Outsiders’ assessments of police responsiveness to SGBV were similarly mixed. UNMIL’s monthly reports heralded the Women and Children’s Protection Section, as did the donors (especially the Norwegian government). Indeed, WCPS was particularly successful in raising awareness that rape is a reportable crime. However, analysts such as de Carvalho and Schia argue that (1) the donor community in Liberia was too focused on sexual assault at the expense of reforming the larger justice system and (2) donors approached Liberia as starting from scratch and did not build on Liberia’s vast traditional and informal justice systems.

The following section provides a more detailed explanation of both projects’ outcomes.

4.1 Evaluation and analysis of female police officer recruitment

By 2013, the LNP had made strides in terms of female representation in its police service, but there was still much to do. From 2 per cent female officers in 2005, the police had increased its proportion of female officers to 17 per cent by 2013. This percentage was higher than the roughly 3.47 per cent of women in the Armed Forces of Liberia but lower than the

---


approximately 27.5 per cent in Liberia’s Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. In comparison, approximately 25 per cent of Ghana’s police service is female.

Projections suggested that Liberia would not reach its goal of 20 per cent female police officers by 2014. However, the trajectory for female officers was moving in the right direction. In 2013, women held 36 LNP leadership positions (of approximately 534 positions), up from 26 in 2011. The percentage of female trainees continued to rise. For instance, in 2012, the national police academy trained 245 police recruits, of which 48 were women (19.6 per cent). Another positive sign is that in 2012 the Ministry of Gender and Development proposed that the goal of female representation in security sector institutions should be increased from 20 per cent to 33 per cent in Liberia’s next poverty reduction strategy.

However, some elements of the recruitment reforms were not as effective. Women were poorly represented in the LNP’s specialized and elite forces such as the Police Support Unit (PSU) and Emergency Response Unit (ERU). For instance, of the 523 operations PSU officers in July of 2011, only 31 (6 per cent) were women. Of 324 ERU officers in 2011, only 19 (6 per cent) were women. Furthermore, while the number of female police officers was rising, there were few female police officers deployed outside Monrovia. For instance in 2011, of the 71 female WCPS officers deployed around the country in 2011, only five (7 per cent) were in rural counties.

Another problem was that LNP had not created a comprehensive directory of its officers to track retention, attrition, training, and promotion. As a result, it was impossible to determine whether female officers were being promoted at the same rate as male officers. Anecdotally, several LNP officers and partners noted that women were not rising in rank at the same rate, especially female graduates from the ESP. Theoretically, the LNP’s Gender Affairs Unit—founded on paper in 2005 and in practice in 2008—should track such data, but the unit lacked capacity and was still beginning to craft a strategy and action plans years after founding. (In fact, the Gender Affairs Unit could be an example of what Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock describe as ‘isomorphic mimicry’ in development reforms—the tendency to introduce reforms that enhance an entity’s external legitimacy and support, even when they do not demonstrably improve performance.) The head of the Gender Affairs Unit as well as

---

81 Secretary-General of the United Nations (28 February 2013) and Griffiths C. (2011).
82 Secretary-General of the United Nations (28 February 2013).
83 Secretary-General of the United Nations (15 August 2012).
84 Interview with William Mulbah, deputy director for training and development at the National Police Training Academy in June 2011.
85 Interview with William Mulbah, 2011.
87 Interviews with key stakeholders, 2011.
several other interviewees and reports often cited the number of women in ‘senior positions’ at LNP yet could not report the total number of senior positions.89

As a means of accelerating female officer recruitment, the ESP received mixed reviews. Champions believed it provided an accelerated professional gateway for women who were not able to complete high-school. A senior gender adviser at UNDP believed that the program could be used as a model for increasing women’s participation in other sectors within Liberia.90 Others acknowledged that the ESP significantly boosted the number of women in the LNP; the slowly rising percentage of female officers prior to 2007 suggested that the increased rates of women would not have been possible without the program.

However, many observers expressed reservations. A former police officer and top official at the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization offered her assessment that the program had been created in a desperate effort to reach the goal of 20 per cent women in the police service: ‘They were looking for numbers and not quality … and so they didn’t find the best.’91 She noted that some men resented a fast-track education program for women because men, too, had missed out on education during the war.92 Finally, she challenged the ‘starting from scratch’ approach, questioning the decision to seek new female recruits rather than tap into the LNP’s pool of experienced women who had left the police in the deactivation process.93

Others worried that the LNP—including the women who went through the program—suffered as a result of the ESP. Nielsen, UNMIL’s commissioner of police, said that the program created a caste system and did a disservice to trainees:94

The problem with a high-school equivalency is that it only gives you a piece of paper that says you’re literate. It doesn’t mean you can read it. Which is all well and good in itself, but then we come along and develop a merit-based promotional policy with a written exam. So, we brought these women into an organization where there were pre-existing women who did have high-school or college degrees, and immediately began the process of a caste system. The ones who did have those things looked down on those who didn’t. The real problem is, we condemned those young women to a career as a patrolman, because they can’t read and write. ... How can they compete? They can’t.95

Other observers were concerned that the female graduates of ESP could become a liability to the LNP if not further trained and mentored, or that they might have extremely high rates of attrition going forward.96 UNMIL’s Sylvia Bisanz, who helped co-ordinate the program, said: ‘I believe that overall the program was successful. However, prolonging it a little might
be beneficial.’ Another co-ordinator of the program, Napolean Abdulai of UNDP, noted that the LNP needed to invest in continuing education for the recruits coming out of the Educational Support Program. ‘You can’t just recruit them and leave them all at the corporalsergeant level,’ he said. ‘You want them to be role models.’

In summary, in an ambitious effort to increase the number of female officers, the LNP raised the percentage of women from 2 per cent to 17 per cent. Top female leaders at LNP and donor-funded recruitment campaigns contributed to this rise. Furthermore, in an innovative fast-track education program, Liberia and its partners attempted to address many women’s barrier to joining the police: lack of a high-school diploma. However, the reforms were not flawless: the LNP would not necessarily reach its target of 20 per cent women by 2014; LNP’s Gender Affairs Unit needed more technical capacity to fulfill its mission; and the design and impact of the ESP drew many critics.

4.2 Evaluation and analysis of women and children protection section

Measuring WCPS’s precise impact on rates of gender-based violence would be impossible. Because few victims report rape—not just in Liberia, but in most contexts—real rates of sexual assault will never be known. Furthermore, in an important point discussed later in this paper, most criminal cases in Liberia do not make their way through the formal system. Isser, Lubkemann, and N’Tok estimate that 50 per cent of rape cases were never reported, 28 per cent were taken to an informal forum (e.g., family heads, traditional leaders, elders, secret society members, soothsayers, midwives, chiefs), and 21 per cent were taken to a formal forum (e.g., police officers, magistrates, government officials). So the total amount of WCPS reports of gender-based violence would never reflect actual SGBV crime rates in Liberia.

Still, observers within and outside the LNP evaluated WCPS positively, especially for its awareness-raising campaigns. The deputy director of training at the National Police Training Academy said that people never used to report sexual assault or domestic violence to the police, but now ‘if there is a problem, people go to the WCPS first.’ A United States Embassy officer said that the WCPS was ‘highly regarded.’ The Liberian community was more aware than ever about the illegality of and ability to report sexual crimes because of ubiquitous billboards, media announcements, community events, posters, and other forms of publicity. Officials at the Ministry of Gender and Development, as well as taxi drivers and other non-government officials, noted that many Liberian women would respond to harassment by threatening to make a report to the WCPS.

97 Interview with Bisanz (2011).
98 Interview with Abdulai (2011).
101 Interview with William Mulbah (2011).
102 Interview with U.S. Embassy official, who wished not to be named (2011).
Many observers and internal actors believed that higher rates of reporting indicated enhanced trust in the LNP, rather than higher incidence of crime. After WCPS was founded, the number of Liberians reporting SGBV to the police rose—including many people reporting rapes that had happened years earlier. For example, in 2008:

…[the] Women and Children Protection Section of UNICEF handled 2,352 cases of which 707 were Gender Based Violence (GBV) including sexual violence. Out of the 707 cases, 272 were sent to court, 235 pending and 200 cases withdrawn. 124 survivors of sexual violence 0-35 years of age (3 boys, 116 girls and 5 women) accessed psychosocial care, protection and medical services at the two Safe Homes. 98 were reintegrated into their families and communities, 26 are currently receiving services at the Safe Home, established by UNICEF for sexually violated girls.

Although higher rates of reporting might indicate more trust in Liberia’s police, the situation was still bleak, with Liberia’s ‘rape epidemic’ persisting a decade after the war ended. In 2013, armed robbery and rape were still Liberia’s two most commonly reported crimes. Of the victims of sexual assault, 70 per cent were minors and nearly 18 per cent were under 10 years old. The acting UNPOL gender adviser summed up LNP’s progress on responding to SGBV: ‘They’re doing a good job given the challenging circumstances and resources they have.’

However, as in most Liberian institutions, WCPS needed further capacity building and training. Some officers lacked the skills needed to write reports, investigate crimes effectively, and follow up. To address this problem, UNMIL along with LNP/WCPS instituted periodic in-service or refresher courses to enable section investigators to revisit important aspects of their training. To complement in-service training, the Norwegian Refugee Council offered WCPS officers courses based on the Ministry of Justice’s handbook on prosecuting sexual and gender-based crimes.

Like the rest of the LNP, WCPS also faced resource limitations. Most section officers did not have vehicles. Lack of transportation jeopardized confidentiality; for example, a former WCPS section head mentioned that she had often paid for private taxis for victims so that they would not have to travel from WCPS headquarters to the hospital in a shared taxi (as shared taxis are customary in Liberia). Furthermore, transportation difficulties compromised the integrity and feasibility of the investigation. The deployment of WCPS officers in 52 units across the country meant communities were closer to formal institutions.

---


107 Secretary-General of the United Nations (28 February 2013).

108 Interviews with Vildana Sedo, Acting UNPOL Gender Advisor, June and July 2011.

109 Interview with Bah-Kenneth (2011).
than in the past, but some Liberians still had to walk hours to reach the nearest section office, and officers had to make the same trek to investigate the crime. Additionally, WCPS lacked communication resources, such as cellphones and computers. Most officers outside of Monrovia reported cases to headquarters through hard copy, via UNMIL vehicles passing through, or by calling or sending text messages.

Officer attrition was another issue, because there were few incentives. WCPS officers did not receive an extra bonus for their specialized training, whereas members of specialized units like the ERU and the PSU enjoyed higher salaries and greater access to per diem payments. While WCPS officers earned approximately US$91 to US$100 per month, officers in other specialized units could make more than US$200, including bonus and per diems. Not surprisingly, some of the best WCPS officers transferred to other units.

Interestingly, some critics complained that WCPS had more resources than other units at the police, because donors tended to prioritize WCPS. For instance, in some rural counties, WCPS had a motorcycle or car or better facilities than other units within the LNP. Sometimes, estimations of WCPS resources were inflated: The head of WCPS’s juvenile unit noted that other officers had an inaccurate perception of WCPS’s resources: ‘Other police officers feel we have been sponsored by donors and think that we have extra wages for the work we do. They think there is a special fund for WCPS investigators. Then they go to WCPS training and realize there isn’t.’

The UN Secretary General’s assessment of the WCPS in 2012 was as follows: ‘While intensive in-service training has improved the handling of cases involving SGBV and their referral by the police to the courts, the criminal justice system continues to face enormous challenges in dealing with such cases.’ These challenges were so great—and they so deeply compromised WCPS’s mission—that donors and the Government of Liberia decided to take further steps. The next section describes justice-related constraints and follow-up projects.

5 Addressing constraints to success: follow-up projects

During reforms to enhance responsiveness to SGBV, LNP and its partners encountered judicial hurdles. As more Liberians learned that they could report rape to the police, the WCPS’s caseload and the number of cases it sent to the courts grew. By 2009, a backlog of more than 100 cases had developed.

Although the backlog partly reflected the difficulties of investigating new allegations of crimes that had taken place years earlier, it was also a by-product of a slow-moving justice system. Police officers did not always co-ordinate well with prosecutors, and officers did not always have the technical capacity to follow proper procedures. Sometimes investigations did not collect enough evidence to support the case in court. As a result of insufficient evidence as well as low capacity, court proceedings moved at a glacial pace—when courts heard these cases at all.

---

110 Interview with Anna Stone, project manager of the SGBV project at the Norwegian Refugee Council, July 2011.
111 Interviews with Korlu Kpanyor, head of WCPS Juvenile Unit, June and July 2011.
In February 2009, leaders at Liberia’s Ministry of Justice took two steps, both of which were designed to address the police’s obstacles in responding to gender-based violence. First, the ministry—with support from UNFPA and funded by the Government of Denmark—established Criminal Court E (known as a ‘Special Court’ or the ‘rape court’), a fast-track mechanism intended to overcome Liberia’s backlog of cases involving SGBV.113 The court used in camera hearings, in which a private witness room enabled the victim and any witnesses to testify and receive questions without having to face the accused perpetrator.114

Second, the justice ministry created SGBV Crimes Unit in April 2009, funded by a US$1,046,827 grant from UNFPA, UNDP, and the Liberian Government.115 The mission of the unit—intended as a pilot project—was to counsel victims, improve police officers’ ability to run investigations, co-ordinate police officers and prosecutors, train prosecutors to tackle cases involving sexual violence, and build public awareness. The SGBV Crimes Unit was set apart from both the Ministry of Justice and police headquarters for reasons of confidentiality.

Although the joint initiatives of the Criminal Court E and the SGBV Crimes Unit were promising steps, a shockingly small number of cases made it to and through court. From its founding in February 2009 through July 2011, the SGBV Crimes Unit was able to shepherd only 16 of approximately 200 cases through Criminal Court E, eight of which ended in convictions ranging from seven years to life imprisonment.116 By 2013, the court had tried 34 rape cases: 18 defendants were found guilty, 15 were found not guilty, and one verdict was not resolved due to a hung jury; 280 cases were dropped because of lack of sufficient evidence.117 Meanwhile, over 100 people accused of rape sat in prison waiting for trial and accusers waited in vain for their day in court.118

Both the crimes unit and criminal court faced massive challenges. The SGBV unit had a backlog of more than 100 cases when it was established. The leader of one donor project said: ‘It’s almost like the Crimes Unit was set up to fail, which I think is just really unfair, because potentially it could be amazing. It could be a really great resource for Liberia.’120

Felicia Coleman, head of the SGBV unit, explained that there were many difficulties and challenges in managing rape cases. She lamented that complaints often came to the police or the unit long after the evidence had been destroyed, rendering investigation and conviction more difficult. In rare instances when complaints were reported immediately, Liberia had no forensic laboratory to analyse the evidence. Finding witnesses was impossible in most cases.

113 For more about the court and its relation to Liberia’s plans to combat SGBV, see the court’s founding document (legislature.gov.lr/sites/default/files/Criminal%20Court%20E.pdf) and (stoprapenow.org/uploads/features/SGBVemail.pdf).
115 Abdulai, E.S. (November 2010).
116 Interview with Felicia Coleman, head of SGBV unit, July 2011.
119 Abdulai, E.S. (November 2010), 11-12.
120 Interview with Anna Stone (2011).
The overarching problem, Coleman said, was that a single court or crimes unit could not solve Liberia’s broad and deep justice system problems. ‘The entire criminal justice system needs to be reformed,’ she asserted. ‘The jury system needs to be overhauled. … The challenges are enormous and run across the entire system: the jury, the court, old laws, witnesses, the communities.’

One clear bottleneck was that only one judge was active at Criminal Court E, although the law technically provided for two judges. Anna Stone, a lawyer working as the project manager for the Norwegian Refugee Council’s SGBV project, agreed that the court’s major bottleneck was that the judge and juries could hear only one case at a time:

> What we need to have is not another building or specialized court. We need more judges. … You’ve only got one judge [of Criminal Court E]. … One judge! When she's sick, the court stops functioning. A second judge who is familiar with the special procedures of Criminal Court E is needed.'

An independent evaluation of the SGBV crimes unit concurred, recommending that ‘a second judge should be added to the one sitting judge … because the time spent on one case by the long-present judge makes the trial process too slow and thus handles few cases only.’

Other bottlenecks in moving cases through the judicial system included lawyers, the jury, and the note-taking process. First, according to an independent analysis, defense lawyers tended to file ‘unnecessary and delay-tactic motions,’ which the Liberian system required be adjudicated before continuing the trial. Second, the analysis recommended that the Liberian government should empanel another grand jury for sexual offenses and other related cases in order to help a greater number of cases move from grand jury level to trial stage. Furthermore, the analysis reported that, ‘the Special Court typist is not a trained stenographer. The current arrangement is so slow that it distorts the flow of evidence as the witnesses testify. Persistently, the court would have to wait for the machine to catch up with the proceedings.’

When the court was created, there was a great deal of optimism and hope that the backlog of sexual violence cases would finally be resolved. For instance, UNMIL Independent Human Rights Expert Charlotte Abaka told reporters in 2008 that she was ‘encouraged’ by the creation of the new court dedicated to sexual assault, saying, ‘The undue delay in prosecuting such cases will now be a thing of the past.’ Unfortunately, by 2013, almost everyone was disappointed as the backlogs and delays continued.

Although Liberia undoubtedly needed a holistic approach to reforming its justice system, the LNP was nonetheless taking small steps to improve its part of the equation. Vildana Sedo, acting UNPOL gender adviser and UNPOL officer at WCPS noted: ‘LNP has made huge

---

121 Interview with Felicia Coleman (2011).
122 Interview with Anna Stone (2011).
123 Abdulai, E. S. (November 2010: 21).
124 Abdulai, E. S. (November 2010: 21).
125 Abdulai, E. S. (November 2010: 21).
126 Abdulai, E. S. (November 2010: 20).
progress. The problem is that the criminal judicial system is unable to support what LNP achieves.\textsuperscript{128}

Liberia’s rule of law reforms, which complemented LNP reforms from 2005 to 2013, were very slow for a number of reasons. Blume cites some of the following as problems: ‘principally a lack of Liberian capacity; mutual accusations of incompetence between UNMIL and Liberian lawyers; resistance of the Liberian judiciary to engage in reforms; and UNMIL’s state-centred approach to legal reforms. Many of these issues were exacerbated by personality clashes between individuals in UNMIL and the Liberian judiciary.’\textsuperscript{129}

6 Analysis and discussion

From 2003 to 2013, Liberians and their development partners trained over 4,000 police officers, recruited over 700 female police officers, created a specialized police unit to address SGBV, and scaled up this unit in 52 locations around the country. The following section assesses which aspects of Liberia’s gender-sensitive reforms were the strongest and weakest, and asks: What helped donors increase the number of female police officers and create WCPS units all over the country? To the extent that these two reforms were successful, what made them so and what could other development agencies learn from Liberia’s experience? And, when projects did not match goals and expectations, what could international actors have done better? This section considers explanations based on timing, local context, local ownership, project design, and aid modalities.

An overall framing for successes and failures of these gender-sensitive reforms could find support in Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock’s concept of ‘problem-driven iterative adaptation’—a pragmatic synthesis of development reform results describing interventions which ‘(i) aim to solve particular problems in local contexts, (ii) through the creation of an ‘authorizing environment’ for decision-making that allows ‘positive deviation’ and experimentation, (iii) involving active, ongoing and experiential learning and the iterative feedback of lessons into new solutions, doing so by (iv) engaging broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate, and relevant.’\textsuperscript{130} In part, the extent to which the programs (ESP, WCPS, Special Court E, SGBV Crime Unit) were driven by problems rather than imposed solutions, took into account the local context, allowed for experiential learning, and engaged a broad set of agents determined the extent to which the programs were effective and sustainable.

6.1 Findings

Timing and local context

In some respects, the timing and context of Liberia’s gender-sensitive police reforms was ideal. There is no question that Liberia was in a desperate situation and in need of aid after its 14-year conflict. Most structures were shattered, services like electricity, water, education, health, and security were non-existent, residents were displaced and traumatized, crime rates

\textsuperscript{128} Interview with Vildana Sedo (2011).
\textsuperscript{130} Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock (2012).
were high, ex-combatants were still armed, and there was no formal rule of law. External support—security, financial, technical, human capital—was welcomed by Liberians. Crowds cheered when the UN tanks rolled in, and those tanks remained in Monrovia for years after the war ended.\footnote{UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (13 October 2003). ‘County Nominees Rejected as New Parliamentarians Meet.’ IRIN: Humanitarian News and Analysis. www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=46681 [accessed 6 June 2013].} The local context, then, was ripe for good aid.

As mentioned earlier in this paper, donors took advantage of a post-conflict window of opportunity that included strong momentum for gender equality as well as an opportunity to change norms while starting from scratch. With a female-led peace movement that helped stop the war, a newly-elected female president, a female inspector general of police, gender-sensitive donor nations, and a UN mission with a mandate to incorporate gender mainstreaming in security sector reform, there was a great deal of energy behind the recruitment and responsiveness initiatives. Nielsen observed: ‘This is a very gender-sensitive nation. This president is very conscious of this. This [UNMIL] is a gender-sensitive mission. The SRSG [Special Representative to the Secretary General, the head of UNMIL] is gender sensitive. The three most powerful people in this country are women: the president, the SRSG, and the U.S. ambassador. It’s not something any of us can ignore, nor do we want to.’\footnote{Interview with John Nielsen (2011).} In this new era, donors and their Liberian partners had leeway to ambitiously recruit female police and create a new unit to respond to gender-based violence.

However, analysis indicates that the timing of these projects was not always successful. For instance, the ESP brought 300 new women into the LNP. However, the program may have been rushed in an effort to meet the goal of 20 per cent. The program may not have lasted long enough nor did it include enough follow-up training, monitoring, and evaluation to ensure that the women recruited through ESP were successfully integrated and thriving as police officers.

In another example of reforms that could have been timed differently, the WCPS was not as effective as it could have been because Liberia’s entire justice system was weak and needed to be addressed. Had more resources and capacity building efforts been concentrated earlier on holistic improvements of Liberia’s rule of law, it is possible that fewer WCPS cases would have been backlogged in the court system. Indeed, because WCPS cases were backlogged in courts, it is possible citizens may have lost faith in the unit over time and instead sought alternative mechanisms (e.g., settling outside of the formal system).

In terms of the context of aid needs, Liberia needed infrastructure and security support and functional services, but also needed things that were extremely difficult to provide well: cultural and norm changes (e.g., women’s belonging in security services, willingness to report crimes to formal systems) and massive capacity building (e.g., literacy, investigation skills, monitoring and evaluation, report writing). Those would be complicated and expensive to deliver/support; they would both determine and depend on the extent of local ownership.

**Local ownership**

Sustainability and capacity issues arose in the gender-sensitive police projects supported by bilateral donors, international NGOs, and UN partners. Questions behind every initiative were, or should have been: is there local ownership? Are there Liberians leading and
supporting this effort? What will happen when we pull out? Is there enough capacity—technical and financial—to continue where donors left off? Donors tried to build sustainability and Liberians strived to assume ownership of projects, but the jury was still out as to whether achievements could persist. The Liberians’ lack of technical, financial, physical capacity to perform their roles would continue to hinder progress on security.

Some observers believed that Liberia’s gender-sensitive policing reforms had enough internal political will and capacity to sustain after outsiders departed. For instance, Dave Beer, chief superintendent at the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who worked for the UN in Liberia, lauded Liberia’s efforts to recruit more women to the police, noting that the reforms were locally led. ‘This was done by the government, not by the international community,’ Beer said. ‘[Efforts] displayed not only lot of creativity and a desire to have much more gender balance, but it was a real indicator of political will to make some substantive change.’

However, Liberia’s institutional and technical capacity was still low; for instance, many (male and female) officers struggled with investigations and had limited literacy skills. Nielsen said that UNPOL continued to with the National Police Training Academy to create literacy training, report writing, and other sorts of training for current police officers. In 2011, leaders from UNDP, UN Women, and LNP described plans to provide follow-up and continued training for all officers, especially ESP graduates, to try to ensure that these officers did not fall behind.

In 2013, the UN Secretary-General described the security situation as ‘stable but fragile’ and confirmed that ‘addressing issues such as the quality of training, professional standards, accountability, public trust, and sustainability is central to the ability of the police to perform their duties.’

UNMIL provided massive support in the form of security, logistics, human capital, strategy, and funding, and continued to extend its mission to ensure the Liberian government would keep making progress. UNMIL’s sustained presence in the country meant that ownership was still shared rather than in Liberia’s hands. Vildana Sedo, UNPOL’s acting gender adviser, expressed concern that the UN’s ‘hand holding’—unless consciously aimed at developing sustainable capabilities—could jeopardize the LNP’s ability to carry out reforms when UNMIL and others left Liberia. Liberians, too, were aware that ownership was their responsibility, as well. Liberia Representative Regina Sokan-Teah said: ‘They [UNMIL] want us to take ownership of the security sector instead of leaving it in the hands of strangers. … They will not continue to be here; they will leave some day. We need to take security into our own hands.’

UNMIL planned to decrease its troops by 50 per cent (about 4,200 personnel) between August 2012 and July 2015, but increased the number of UNMIL’s formed police units to a new ceiling of 1,795. Through Security Council Resolution 2066 (2012), which extended UNMIL’s mission through 30 September 2013, the UN reiterated its calls on the Government of Liberia to ‘continue to combat SGBV and, in co-ordination with UNMIL, to continue to

134 Secretary-General of the United Nations (28 February 2013).
135 Interview with Vildana Sedo (2011).
combat impunity for perpetrators of such crimes and to provide redress, support, and protection to victims, including through the strengthening of national police capacity in this area and by raising awareness of existing national legislation on sexual violence.’ At the time this written paper was submitted, it was still uncertain as to how Liberians would perform without external support.

Project design

Liberia’s gender-sensitive programs had unique and innovative elements as well as critical design flaws. Unique and innovative elements include the prioritization of cultural/norm change, an emphasis on awareness-raising educational campaigns, study trips, role modeling, and side-by-side embedding. Design flaws related both to problems within specific programs (e.g., lack of monitoring and evaluation, lack of transparency), as well as to the general attempt to operate within a weak rule of law, as attempts to enhance responsiveness to sexual- and gender-based violence were limited by a broken justice system.

Donors’ and LNP’s reform efforts to recruit female officers helped change societal and cultural norms. According to UNMIL, gender equity projects were part of a larger plan to improve governance countrywide. Nielsen observed that President Johnson Sirleaf was ‘aware of the fact that Liberia, like much of the region, historically has a ‘big man’ culture. It’s tribal in that sense. And that’s the change that’s wanted. … I don’t think [women] are quite as cruel as the big men have proven themselves to be here, so there’s more logic to this than gender equity. … The logic is: you get better governance than they were getting before if a large portion of decision makers within their governments are women.’

Donors and the Liberian police invested not only in recruitment and investigation projects but also awareness-raising initiatives, whose impact should not be underestimated. For instance, UNMIL radio often featured information and shows on gender-related topics, Monrovia’s billboards were plastered with messages and images about reporting rape, Liberia’s international partners helped the country prepare for holidays (which tended to have awareness events as well as higher rates of gender-based violence), and donors sponsored massive campaigns both on women’s participation in security sector reform and on rape prevention. For such activities, outcomes and metrics of success are hard to track—but likely contributed to norm changes in Liberia.

Recruitment and responsiveness efforts changed norms throughout the country but also within the LNP. For instance, the LNP started disaggregating its human resources data by gender. Leaders of the training academy were very conscious of how many women were in its training classes and its specialized units; LNP reports always included total numbers followed by a gender breakdown. In another example, the LNP headquarters and training academy featured posters that sensitized officers to gender issues. For example, a poster depicting a woman hitting a man had the message, ‘This, too, is gender violence.’ Another poster read: ‘Violence against any sex or age is gender violence.’ Williams, a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization officer who served as a LNP officer in the 1980s, said: ‘When we were at the LNP, there was no such thing as the word ‘gender.’ … The issue of

gender didn’t come to Liberia, even though it did exist after the war. [Then] everyone started hearing the word: gender, gender, gender.  

In terms of unique design elements that other countries could model after the Liberian experience, international actors might try to expose government officials to a wealth of experiences through study trips, role modeling, and side-by-side embedding. Liberian government officials went on sponsored trips and came back with new ideas. Napoleon Abdulai, security sector reform adviser at the UNDP, said: ‘In Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali, you have many more women in higher positions in the security sector who make decisions. They’re not leaders in a ceremonial sense. They control budgets.’ Study trips were important because they helped instill the gender-sensitive ideas that outsiders had been pushing within Liberia to some resistance. Abdulai noted: ‘People thought that it was because of the president and international community that we were pushing these things. But when you go out, you see what gender experts were saying. Then you see it in reality.’

Of note, Liberian officials did not perceive the extent of male domination in Liberian institutions until they travelled and returned as ‘apostles for gender mainstreaming.’ For instance, Liberia’s House of Representatives national security committee chairman came back from a trip to Ghana fired up to make changes. ‘They went to Ghana to the police headquarters,’ Abdulai said, ‘and realized that what gender experts were saying in Liberia was actually being implemented there.’ The study trip had enabled them to see that the Ghanaian police service provided separate toilets for men and women, and that women received longer maternity leave than in Liberia. The Ghanaian police also provided supplementary education and scholarships to women, who were sometimes excluded from such opportunities during their youth.

Role modeling was another successful component incorporated into the design of Liberia’s reforms. It was critical that the president had appointed women to high-level positions at the LNP, and that those women were in the spotlight. Nielsen stressed the importance of female role models. ‘I’m a believer in this; I became a convert in this. The first IG [inspector general of the police] was a woman. And it was a good thing. Children learn what they see. So having an IG in the hallways—a woman, and she made a point of having senior women around her—changed the perspective of the men at the top of the LNP, especially the young officers coming up. So you were building respect.’

The presence of the all-female Indian Formed Police Unit also helped reinforce the image of women leading security efforts.

Another element of the mutual learning design included the embedding of outside experts with local police. UNPOL worked side by side with LNP leaders, enabling hourly feedback, training, and mentorship. For instance, six UNPOL officers were assigned to WCPS. Not only did this regular contact help Liberian police institutionalize new practices and build their technical capacity through on-the-job training and learning, but this arrangement also helped UNPOL better understand the Liberian context and challenges. Nielsen of UNMIL said: ‘This mission [UNMIL] has 39 different nations contributing police officers and, therefore,
professional perspectives on policing.’ Such a diversity of opinions could potentially confuse or dilute the development efforts (and sometimes did, in Liberia’s case), but the variety of counterparts also let Liberians learn from a broad array of experiences and cultures.

Thoughtful project design is key to success in international development and post-conflict reconstruction. The intent behind gender-sensitive programs in Liberia was laudable but, in certain instances, the design proved ineffective due to lack of foresight and also financial constraints. The attempt to fast-track education and recruitment should have been more transparent in its goals and process and accompanied by robust follow-up measures. Furthermore, some donors privileged SGBV projects over broader justice reforms and did not pay adequate attention to customary and traditional justice systems. Donors’ efforts in Monrovia did little for Liberians in rural counties.

Although the ESP was a powerful tool for fast-tracking women into police service, it needed to be strong enough to adequately prepare the trainees for service. To fast track a high-school education is an understandable goal in a post-conflict context, but the sessions likely were not long or in-depth enough for the participants to build the skills they needed to thrive in the police service. Donors should have worked with LNP leaders to provide support and retraining after the initial program and also to evaluate and publish the impact of the program over time.

Transparency was also an issue. Although ESP had many champions at the time it was implemented, many donors and Liberians were quick to criticize the program years later. In particular, many felt that ESP encouraged the police to cut corners and lower standards to get more women in the police service, while program designers insisted that no corners were cut. The program design should have included transparent and clear communication about the program’s goals and standards. An example of this disconnect: UNMIL’s operations coordinator said that UNPOL and LNP intentionally separated the women’s education program from the formal recruitment process so that ESP graduates had to go through the same recruitment procedures as other officers: ‘We try to detach [the ESP] from the academy so it doesn’t look as if we are cutting corners.’ Upon completing the fast-tracked high-school certificate process, he noted, women ‘start afresh’ with the police’s other entry requirements. However, most observers did not believe that the ESP graduates had started afresh. Transparency on this front could have prevented misperceptions later on.

Program design must also address the key barriers to progress. High-school education was one barrier to recruiting more female officers, and the ESP attempted to address this issue. However, there were other issues preventing women from joining the police. The LNP’s chief of personnel said: ‘Recruiting women within the LNP is a very challenging task. Women don’t regard LNP as a profession because of the low salary, the low incentives, and their concepts and perceptions of the police.’ The starting salary for a new police recruit was approximately US$91 to US$100 per month, while officers for private security companies could make two to ten times as much. UNMIL’s Nielsen noted that the

---

145 Interview with Nielsen (2011).
146 To be fair, both male and female police officers, and both ESP and non-ESP graduates struggled with record writing, investigations, computer use, and case reports.
148 Interview with Foley (2011).
opportunities for professional development were limited, as LNP’s highest-level positions were politically appointed. Another disincentive was that officers might be deployed to Liberia’s rural counties, where there were few roads, schools, hospitals, and other amenities. Going forward, programs would need to be designed to help the LNP overcome other obstacles to recruiting women.

With respect to gender-based violence in Liberia, the UN Secretary-General’s 2013 report on UNMIL described some of the critical problems: ‘Effective investigation and prosecution of SGBV cases remain problematic, and out-of-court settlements are prevalent.’ Liberia’s gender-based violence issues went beyond untrained officers. Solutions would not be found in a single unit in the police nor in one special court. Donors and LNP would need to invest more in prevention, while still addressing investigation and prosecution issues. The UN Secretary-General’s 2013 report on UNMIL stated:

Notwithstanding important progress made in strengthening response mechanisms and the reporting of crimes of sexual and gender-based violence, the prosecution of these cases remains a challenge, owing to weak institutional capacity and the high cost, both financially and socially, of the victims and their families. Efforts for prevention require much greater attention, both from the Government and international partners.’

Schia and de Carvalho report that the international response to crime in Liberia was fragmented and ineffective, focusing on symptoms rather than causes. One of the anonymous interviewees in their paper said: ‘Everyone looks at GBV at the expense of a holistic picture of the criminal justice system. The problem is the legal system as a whole.’ Another interviewee lamented: ‘Why can’t victims of rape get justice? It’s not because they’re women; not because they’re victims of rape; it’s because nobody gets justice here!’

Aid modalities

The sheer amount of external support enabled the execution of many quick impact projects in Liberia. A lot could be done—and was done—with US$350 to US$500 million in aid flowing into Liberia each year, with UNMIL’s physical and technical support (estimated at US$600-800+ million per year), and with tens of thousands of outsiders on the ground helping with co-ordination and training. Outside supporters invested a great deal of money and time in Liberia, and some also made the ultimate sacrifice; from 2003 to 2013, UNMIL lost 124 peacekeepers, 19 police, and 32 other mission staff.

The amount and duration of external resources in Liberia enabled unprecedented progress in a disastrous post-conflict context. It could be argued that—because of UNMIL’s unique and solitary influence in LNP training and reforms, in addition to the vast amount of resources pouring into the country from numerous donors in numerous modalities—exactly how each donor contributed to LNP’s gender-sensitive policing reforms had less of an impact on

---

149 Secretary-General of the United Nations (28 February 2013).
150 Secretary-General of the United Nations (28 February 2013).
151 Schia, N. N. and de Carvalho, B. (2009).
outcomes than timing, local context, local ownership, and project design. As mentioned earlier, the side-by-side embedding (from UNMIL), which involved a major investment of human and financial resources, likely had the most impact on capacity building.

Donor projects often did not heed the common refrain—‘Monrovia is not Liberia’—and rather focused primarily in the capital. One WCPS chief implemented a thoughtful solution to try to address this problem; she recommended that all of LNP’s in-service and ‘refresher’ courses she and donors organized should rotate from county to county to ensure that section operations did not become too centralized in Monrovia. To be effective going forward, donors and the government would need to adopt similar approaches and broaden their reach, not just rotating but basing projects outside the capital.

One criticism is that donors took the ‘start from scratch’ element too far, treating Liberia as ‘terra nullius.’154 Schia and de Carvalho write: ‘What we witness in Liberia is to a large extent what Sarah Cliffe and Nick Manning have termed ‘the fallacy of terra nullius’—the inability of the UN to take into account pre-existing institutions and the assumption that everything must ‘start from zero.’”155 Specifically, UNMIL, the Norwegian government, and other donors did not pay appropriate attention to the role of traditional/customary justice in Liberia.156 In a 2009 study of Liberia’s dual justice system, the United States Institute of Peace found that only 2 per cent of criminal cases reached formal courts, 45 per cent went to traditional/customary courts, and the rest never made it to any system.157 Given the importance of the informal justice system in Liberia, Schia, de Carvalho, Isser, Maturu, and others believe it is essential that international actors explore Liberia’s dual system of customary and statutory law to see how they might work together and complement one another, but that outside supporters have focused almost exclusively on statutory law.158,159 Furthermore, there is a ‘propensity to apply readymade, generic solutions that resonate well with Western donors.’160

Maturu explains why the traditional system often works better for Liberians and why the LNP and Ministry of Justice efforts to respond to gender-based violence have not trickled down to rural crimes:

Most magistrate courts and police stations are located in large urban centers; most Liberians are not. The average walking time to police stations and courts is 3.5 hours and can go up to 10-12 hours. In comparison, customary institutions exist in all communities at all levels, and are also much more cost effective. Many formal judicial proceedings will not go forward unless ‘fees’ are paid to keep cases from being neglected. The overall costs for the

154 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 Schia, N. N. and de Carvalho, B. (2009: 19).
160 Ibid.
customary justice system are significantly lower, more consistent, and transparent, and sometimes even free.'\textsuperscript{161}

According to Isser et al., Liberians are extremely dissatisfied with the formal justice system, especially at the local level: ‘[E]ven if the formal justice system were able to deliver affordable, timely, and impartial results, it would still not be the forum of choice for many rural Liberians.’\textsuperscript{162} In fact, it could be that some of the reforms to strengthen the formal system—such as the ban on handling matters of serious crimes in customary courts might be making things worse: ‘State policies aimed at regulating and limiting the customary justice system in order to comply with human rights and international standards are having unintended adverse consequences.’\textsuperscript{163} For instance, many Liberians interviewed for the Isser et al. study believed that—because chiefs complied with the ban \emph{and} because formal courts could not yet fulfill their mission—the ban led to less justice rather than more.\textsuperscript{164}

Both sides of this argument make valid points. On one hand, donors treating Liberia as a blank slate and not taking traditional and informal systems of law more fully into account could appear to fall into the trap of not understanding local context, at best, and counterproductive/ cultural imperialism at worst. However, it could be argued that Liberia’s male-dominated security sector and its rape epidemic were rooted in traditional culture and that a robust and institutionalized rule of law would be necessary to change norms and achieve justice; thus, donors’ efforts to actively recruit women, move criminal cases to the formal system, and earn citizens’ trust in the formal justice system were well-placed.

\subsection*{6.2 Looking forward}

Alongside its ongoing projects, Liberia planned to adapt new approaches to address some of the challenges discussed in this paper and also to prepare for the transition of security responsibilities from UNMIL to the Government of Liberia.

In 2013, the LNP and its partners—the Ministry of Gender and Development, UN Women, UNDP, and UNPOL—announced the launch of a renewed recruitment campaign targeting women in Liberia’s rural counties.\textsuperscript{165} The campaign would address issues raised earlier in this working paper. If successful, it would continue to increase the percentage of female officers and ensure the police service had officers sensitive to the needs and characteristics of the rural counties not near the capital.

To address the challenges of the justice sector reform, the Government of Liberia along with UNMIL and UNDP developed a plan to build ‘justice and security hubs’ across the country with the goal of promoting ‘a co-ordinated and decentralized national justice and security system.’\textsuperscript{166} The Liberia’s 2011 Peacebuilding Priority Plan centered on the development of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{161} Maturu, S. (2012).
\item \textsuperscript{162} Isser, D. H., Lubkemann, S. C., N’Tow, S. (2009).
\item \textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Ibid, 5.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Sherif, A., and Maina, G. (March 2013). ‘Enhancing security and justice in Liberia: The Regional hub model. Policy & Practice Brief: Knowledge for durable peace. ACCORD (The African Centre for the
five regional ‘Justice and Security Hubs,’ with the investment of US$13 million by the UN Peacebuilding Support Office. The hubs had the potential to address two recommendations mentioned earlier in the paper: approaching justice in a more comprehensive manner and investing in projects outside of Monrovia. Hubs would provide community patrols, psycho-social and legal services to SGBV victims, outreach, enhanced support to existing police forces, and community services by offenders under rehabilitation.

In 2013, lack of resources, capacity issues, and gender imbalances continued to be major constraints in Liberia, as in many other post-conflict countries. However, Nielsen provided a vivid picture of how community perceptions of the LNP were changing: ‘As our inspector general likes to say, ‘I want our children to run to the policeman, not away from them.’ And they do.’

References


Interview with Nielsen (2011).


Ghana Police Service (2013). ‘Police Administration: Broad Formation.’ Available at: www.ghanapolice.info/broad_formation.htm


Index Mundi (2013). ‘Liberia – GDP per capita (current US$).’ Available at: www.indexmundi.com/facts/liberia/gdp-per-capita


Norwegian Refugee Council (2011). ‘Women’s Rights Through Sensitization and Education (WISE).’ Available at: www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9474672.pdf


Appendices

Appendix A: Liberia GDP per capita

X axis = year
Y axis = US$

Note: Index Mundi (2013). ‘Liberia—GDP per capita (current US$).’
www.indexmundi.com/facts/liberia/gdp-per-capita [accessed 6 June 2013]
## Appendix B: Reported Donor Flows by Donor and Modality (2009-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Budget Supp.</th>
<th>Pooled fund/LRTF</th>
<th>Trust funds</th>
<th>GOL executed</th>
<th>Non-GOL executed</th>
<th>Total by partner</th>
<th>Shares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfrDevBank</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID/UK</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>116.1</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td></td>
<td>116.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix C: Overview of Liberian Donors and Modalities (2009)

Source: Overview of the Aid Management Unit, Liberia. Accessible on page 7: www.mof.gov.lr/doc/Quarter%20Two%20Narrative%20Final%20Final.pdf
Appendix D: Aid Pillar, Sectors, and Modality

Projected disbursements by aid modality and partner, FY2010/2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Budget Support</th>
<th>Pooled Fund Contribution</th>
<th>Trust Fund Contribution</th>
<th>GoI-executed Projects</th>
<th>Non-GoI Executed Projects</th>
<th>% of total aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID/UK</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation Partners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN System subtotal, o/w</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The following did not submit data: Government of China, Japan, France, Ireland, and some United Nations Agencies. UNMIL is excluded, as is NGO private funding and some foundations.

**Appendix E: Poverty Reduction Strategy: Gross Financing Gap**

FY2008-09 through 2010-11 (in US$ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total GoL Revenue</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>272.9</td>
<td>329.8</td>
<td>824.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of GoL Revenue for PRS</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government PRS Financing</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>163.7</td>
<td>214.4</td>
<td>510.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix F: Funding allocations approved for UNMIL

UNMIL Funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year (July-June)</th>
<th>UNMIL Funding (approximate, in US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004\textsuperscript{170}</td>
<td>US$564,614,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005\textsuperscript{171}</td>
<td>US$821,986,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006\textsuperscript{172}</td>
<td>US$722,422,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2007\textsuperscript{173}</td>
<td>US$717,119,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008\textsuperscript{174}</td>
<td>US$688,330,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009\textsuperscript{175}</td>
<td>US$603,708,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010\textsuperscript{176}</td>
<td>US$560,978,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2011\textsuperscript{177}</td>
<td>US$524,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012\textsuperscript{178}</td>
<td>US$525,559,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2013\textsuperscript{179}</td>
<td>US$502,224,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-2014\textsuperscript{180}</td>
<td>US$477,550,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: In 2013, United Nations missions with more funding that Liberia included missions in Haiti, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur, Lebanon, South Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire.\textsuperscript{181}

Sources: United Nations budget documents cited in footnotes.

\textsuperscript{170} daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/612/11/PDF/N0361211.pdf?OpenElement
\textsuperscript{171} daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/352/15/PDF/N0435215.pdf?OpenElement
\textsuperscript{172} daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/311/85/PDF/N0731185.pdf?OpenElement
\textsuperscript{173} daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/215/07/PDF/N0621507.pdf?OpenElement
\textsuperscript{174} daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/339/57/PDF/N0933957.pdf?OpenElement
\textsuperscript{175} daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/327/07/PDF/N1032707.pdf?OpenElement
\textsuperscript{176} daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/305/64/PDF/N1130564.pdf?OpenElement
\textsuperscript{177} daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/314/01/PDF/N1231401.pdf?OpenElement
\textsuperscript{178} daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/319/70/PDF/N1331970.pdf?OpenElement
\textsuperscript{179} www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/691
\textsuperscript{180} daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/319/70/PDF/N1331970.pdf?OpenElement
Appendix G: UNMIL strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15,000 military personnel:</td>
<td>8,256 total uniformed personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 military observers</td>
<td>6,671 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160 staff officers</td>
<td>125 military observers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,115 police officers, including formed</td>
<td>1,460 police (including formed units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>units; and the appropriate civilian</td>
<td>453 international civilian personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>component</td>
<td>962 local staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>224 UN Volunteers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix H: Education Support Program

Statistics on Education Support Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESP YEAR</th>
<th>LNP Class #</th>
<th>ESP Initial</th>
<th>No shows</th>
<th>Drop-outs/Fallen</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Additio-nal</th>
<th>Total Sent to</th>
<th>Joined</th>
<th>Drop-outs</th>
<th>LNP</th>
<th>LNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007-MAR</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-OCT</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-FEB</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Women in Liberia National Police training classes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Recruitment Class Number</th>
<th>Number of Women</th>
<th>% Women total LNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004-2006</td>
<td>1-29</td>
<td>177*</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>32*</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>33*</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*ESP RECRUITMENT CLASSES