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Discussion Paper No. 850

## **JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS**

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# Japanese Newspapers

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## *abstract*

In Japan, newspapers enjoy a special exemption from antimonopoly prohibitions against resale price maintenance (suppliers' stipulations that bar downstream firms from price discounting), but are each required to set uniform prices throughout Japan. In fact, the newspapers have rarely changed their subscription prices in recent years, and the three leading national dailies, together accounting for about half the total industry circulation, and thirteen other papers accounting for another one eighth of industry circulation, all have set exactly the same price (3,925 yen per month for combined morning-and-evening editions, and 3,007 yen per month for morning-only). The remaining local papers all set lower prices. The authorized resale price maintenance, and prohibition against prices that vary geographically, arguably have allowed collusive price increases, but by precisely how much it is difficult to judge. I here estimate that if the coordinated pricing of the leading national and local newspapers is inflating their prices by 340 yen per month (about a 10 percent increase in their prices), it entails economic waste of 86-billion yen (\$1-billion) per year but is adding only around 5-billion yen per year to newspaper industry profit. The estimate is based on an econometric model of newspaper demand, estimated for 47 Japanese newspapers using March 2007 micro-data. The paper also estimates the demand and supply of newspaper advertising and a newspaper subscription price equation using 2007 cross-section data. The subscription pricing equation reflects the interdependence of demand between morning-only subscriptions and morning-and-evening subscriptions offered by the same newspaper

JEL codes: D4,L4

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# Japanese Newspapers

## 1. Introduction.

In Japan, newspapers enjoy a special exemption from antimonopoly prohibitions against resale price maintenance (suppliers' stipulations that bar downstream firms from price discounting), but are each required to set uniform prices throughout Japan. The three leading national dailies, and eleven of the regional and local dailies, seem to have exploited this antitrust exemption to maintain collusive subscription fees. This has benefitted the other newspapers and may have promoted improvements in their content, but has wastefully diverted resources away from the newspaper business and towards other less valued activities. Econometric estimate of the effects of this poses many challenges which constitute the main burden of the present paper. I can here really only make an educated guess as to how large is the effect on prices of the coordination by the leading newspapers, and I guess it is about ten percent. I then calculate the effects on consumer surplus and newspaper profit of such a collusive price increase based on estimated demand for newspapers constructed from mixed-logit estimate of an indirect utility function using March 2007 micro-data. Such collusion confers social waste in the neighborhood of 86-billion yen (\$1-billion) per year, but only increases newspaper industry profit by 5-billion yen per year (about \$40-million per year). The waste is many times greater than the added profit.

The main reason why collusive price-setting by Japan's leading newspapers imposes economic waste vastly out of proportion to the added profit it confers is that the newspapers are horizontally differentiated. The newspapers would each exhibit a degree of market power even without colluding, facing elasticities of demand here estimated to be less than two. The newspapers gain something by colluding but not much. The relative inelasticity of demand for newspaper subscriptions reflects the daily habit of reading a particular paper. In Japan, most residents can choose among the four national newspapers and at least one local or

regional newspaper. Many of them strongly prefer the one they are in the habit of reading daily.

A further influence on the effects of newspaper collusion is that newspapers sell advertising as well as subscriptions. To put it another way, newspapers are platforms in two-sided markets. I estimate the elasticity of demand for advertising in any Japanese newspaper as 1.3. Because selling advertising is profitable and the demand for advertising is proportionate to newspaper circulation, the newspapers tend to set lower subscription prices than they would if not selling ads. But this means that the loss in consumer surplus from raising the subscription price is relatively great because the price increase is applied to a large circulation. On the other hand, the collusive price increase has little effect on the industry-wide demand for newspaper advertising because it mainly shifts demand from the newspapers that coordinate in setting higher prices toward the ones that do not, rather than causing demanders to not subscribe to any newspaper at all.

The econometric analysis that is the main content of the present paper follows in a line of research on newspaper economics initiated by Rosse (1970) and extending to Van Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007), Cayseele and Vanormelingen (2009), Fan (2011), and others. The main novelties of this paper are that it uses micro-data rather than only aggregate data to estimate demand, and it models the interdependence of demand between morning-only subscriptions and morning-and-evening subscriptions offered by the same newspaper. It is also the first contribution to this literature that focuses on the Japanese newspaper industry, which is among the largest in the world based on circulation and which is showing remarkable resilience in the face of increasing competition from digital media.

The micro-data used here come from a March 2007 random-direct-dial telephone survey of 27,788 persons living throughout Japan conducted by Video Research, Ltd. (the 2007 edition of its annual JREAD survey). I use these data to estimate the common parameters of a mixed-logit indirect utility function relating respondents' choices among

available daily newspaper subscriptions (including the choice of not subscribing to any newspaper), to their own individual characteristics such as age, income and education and to attributes of the newspapers available in the prefecture where each resides. Attributes of the newspapers include subscription price, number of pages of content per month, and whether the subscription is morning-and-evening or morning-only. Although the national newspapers are priced the same everywhere in Japan, they compete with different local and regional newspapers in each prefecture. The variation in choice sets across prefectures is sufficient to identify the effects of subscription price and other newspaper attributes on respondents' choices. I find that price elasticities of demand for most newspapers lie between 1.2 and 2 and that elasticities of demand with respect to number of pages of content per month lie between 0.2 and 0.5. Because many of the Japanese newspapers offer a choice between morning-and-evening subscriptions and morning-only, interpreting these estimates requires a model that can accommodate the effects of price of each type of subscription on the demand for the other type. In effect, the newspapers offering both kinds of subscription are multiproduct oligopolists. I show how profit-maximizing newspapers consider the cross-elasticity of demand between the different types of subscription when setting the prices. I also estimate the demand and supply of newspaper advertising and a newspaper subscription price equation using 2007 cross-section data.

Before describing the analysis and estimates on which these inferences are based, I shall first describe some relevant features of the Japanese newspaper industry and its pricing practices.

## 2. The Japanese Newspaper Industry.

Japan has five national news dailies (Mainichi, Asahi, Yomiuri, Nikkei and Sankei), several bloc papers that are available in contiguous prefectures (Tokyo Shinbun, Chunichi Shimbun, Chugoku Shinbun, and Nishi Nippon Shinbun), and another 40 or 50 newspapers

that mainly serve a single prefecture. The Nikkei, often compared with the Wall Street Journal, features business and financial news and is not a focus of my study here. The other four national dailies, Yomiuri, Mainichi, Asahi, and Sankei together account for about half the total circulation of all newspapers. The total circulation of news dailies (not including sports dailies, tabloids, or political newspapers) in Japan is about 85 percent of the number of households and more than 95 percent of sales are by monthly subscription rather than single-issue.

Table 1 shows the 2007 household penetration rates in each prefecture for the newspapers that are the focus of this study. It includes the four national dailies other than Nikkei and all of the other dailies with circulation of 100,000 or more. Of the 47 newspapers, all four of the national newspapers and nine local newspapers are available in at least some prefectures either as morning-only subscription or morning-and-evening subscription. Another eight newspapers are only available as morning-and-evening subscription. And the remaining 18 do not publish evening editions. It is evident from the table that the local papers enjoy large shares in many of the less populous prefectures. This is even more evident in the Figure 1 showing the cumulative circulation of newspapers in each prefecture of Japan moving from west to east.

The newspaper publishers distribute through independent newsdealers. The typical arrangement entails an exclusive geographic territory assigned by the newspaper company, daily purchase of a number of copies, the number being set by the newspaper company, and resale at a price stipulated by the newspaper –exclusive territory, stipulated resale price and a sales quota. That the newspapers enforce sales quotas, which would violate antimonopoly proscriptions, is widely denied by the newspaper companies but is evidently a fact. The newspapers that are shipped and billed to the distributors, and unwanted by them, are referred to as *oshigami*—literally “push papers”. Documentation of this practice can be found in the Wikipedia entry for “*shinbun hanbai ten*” (newspaper sellers in Japan).

The Japanese newspapers, and other publishers, enjoy a special exemption from antimonopoly prohibitions against resale price maintenance (Antimonopoly, Section 23-2 (4)). The exemption dates from the 1953 amendments to the 1947 Antimonopoly Law. Newspaper publishers are also bound by a special directive of the Japan Fair Trade Commission enjoining against charging differing prices according to the area or person buying (most recently “Specific Unfair Trade Practices in the Newspaper Business”, Fair Trade Commission Notification, no. 9, July 21, 1999, amending the similar earlier notification no. 14, 1964). The directive also disallows discount pricing by newspaper distributors, and disallows the newspaper publishers from imposing minimum quantities (sales quotas) on distributors, though apparently as already stated the publishers do this anyway. Under the special directive, each newspaper is free to set its own price but must then charge that same price wherever the newspaper is sold. Different editions of the newspaper may command differing prices. At least since 1945 and probably before that, the three leading national dailies Yomiuri, Asahi and Mainichi, have all set the same subscription price as one another and changed that price at roughly the same time as one another. Price changes for all of the newspapers are infrequent. The last price change was in 2003, nine years ago. Since then a monthly morning-and-evening subscription to any of the four national newspapers is 3,925 yen (around \$40). A morning-only subscription to the three other than Sankei is 3,007 yen per month. Not only the three leading national newspapers but also 13 local and bloc newspapers set exactly these same prices. The other newspapers set lower prices. The Japan Newspaper Association has publicly supported the continuation of the special antitrust exemption allowing newspapers to maintain retail prices and indeed forestalled the adoption of a proposal in 2001 to repeal it.

Why resale price maintenance? A quick –and I think wrong– answer is that the retail price stipulation is actually a maximum retail price and is to prevent the independent distributors from exploiting the local monopolies that their exclusive territories confer. By



raising the price to increase its own profit a distributor would actually diminish the total profit in the supply chain, the successive monopoly problem. Those who are familiar with US antitrust law will recall the *Albrecht* case<sup>1</sup> in which Herald Publishing Company, publisher of the St. Louis Globe Democrat, was found by the U. S. Supreme Court to have violated prohibitions against resale price maintenance in an apparent attempt to deter exactly this sort of overpricing. The resale price maintenance of Japanese newspapers is different because the sales quotas that the newspapers impose on the distributors deter the distributors from raising prices. The sales quotas are set at levels that not only deter overpricing but that also encourage solicitation of new subscriptions. Because of this, the stipulated retail prices are binding downward; they are price floors, not price ceilings. A simple explanation is that the resale price maintenance is part of a cartel scheme among the newspaper companies.

Examples of resale price maintenance as a producer cartel scheme have been noted empirically and explored theoretically. We have the Telser (1960) discussion of the light bulb case. In the early twentieth century, duopolists Westinghouse and GE sold light bulbs through exclusive independent retail outlets and both stipulated the same minimum resale prices. In Telser's explanation, retail price discounting could be more easily detected and deterred than could wholesale price discounting, and exclusive dealing prevented retailers' profiting from any secret wholesale price discounts that were not passed on as retail price discounts. In Flath (1989) I suggested that a producer cartel scheme was the likely motive for resale price maintenance by the three producers of infant powdered milk in Japan, as documented in a series of antimonopoly cases, from the 1960s and 1970s. Jullien and Rey (2007) develop an algebraic model in which resale price maintenance facilitates collusion among producers because it makes deviations from the collusive scheme easier for the colluders to detect and credibly deter, as explained by Telser. This seems to me to be the essence of the Japanese newspaper cartel too.

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<sup>1</sup> *Albrecht v. Herald Co.*, 390 U.S. 145 (1968).

Another collusive practice of the Japanese newspaper industry is the newspaper holiday. On one particular Monday each month, the newspapers all refrain from issuing a morning and evening edition. The Japan Newspaper association defends this practice as needed to give the newspaper distributors vacation days. This is absurd. By rotating work shifts or deploying substitute workers newsdealers could permit vacations. The newspaper holidays amount to a collusive restriction of industry output, for both distributors and publishers. The fact that the newspaper holidays of the different papers are on the same days is evidence of collusion among the newspaper companies. A rare instance of deviation is also revealing. In February 2002, the Sankei Shimbun refrained from the practice of newspaper holiday. The other papers publicly criticized Sankei but also themselves refrained from holidays. Three months later the practice was reinstated, again with Sankei participating. That deviation by Sankei triggered deviations by the others strongly suggests that the newspaper holidays have the character of a prisoners' dilemma, as is generally true of cartel schemes.

My aim is to assess the actual increase in prices that can be attributed to collusive behavior by the leading Japanese newspapers, and determine also the likely effects of those price increases on profits, consumer surplus and newspaper content.

### 3. Demand for Newspaper Subscriptions

I begin by describing random-parameter logit estimates of the demand for Japanese newspaper subscriptions. The data for this estimation come from the Japan Readers and Area Data (JREAD) survey conducted by Video Research Ltd. This is a random-direct-dial telephone survey conducted in March each year that profiles newspaper readers and subscribers throughout Japan. The data are mostly used by advertisers. I purchased temporary access to the 2007 survey with funds from a JSPS grant. From the 2007 edition of the survey (with some considerable effort) I collected micro data for the 27,788 respondents including

which edition of which newspaper each subscribes to if any, age and education of the head of household, household annual income, prefecture of residence, and whether the respondent participates in local festivals and holiday events (a major focus of local community activity in Japan). I used these data to estimate a utility function that relates the respondents' choices of newspapers to characteristics of the newspapers. The data on newspaper characteristics mostly come from the Japan Audit Bureau of Circulation (JABC), augmented with data from Dentsu, Inc. These include in which prefectures each edition of each newspaper was available, circulation, the subscription prices, number of pages of ads per month and number of pages of content per month. Although the data are cross-sectional for the single year 2007 and the subscription price of each newspaper is geographically uniform, there does exist enough variation in the choice sets across prefectures (that is which newspapers in which editions are available for subscription), to estimate common parameters of an indirect utility function for newspapers.

The basic econometric model is a multinomial logit model of utility with random coefficient on one variable, price of subscription. The utility of newspaper subscription choice  $j$  by individual  $i$  is a linear function of (1) attributes of the choice, (2) interactions between choice-invariant characteristics of the individual and attributes of the choice, and (3) an unobservable error  $\varepsilon_{ij}$  that varies randomly across individuals and alternatives according to the Gumbel distribution (Type I Extreme Value distribution). Stipulate also that the utility function coefficient on price of subscription  $p_j$  varies randomly across individuals according to the Normal distribution<sup>2</sup>.

$$[1] \quad U_{ij} = \beta' x_{ij} + \alpha_i p_j + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

$$\alpha_i = \alpha + \sigma v_i, \text{ where } v_i \sim \text{Normal} [0, 1]$$

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<sup>2</sup> Stipulating that the coefficient on price is distributed normally does allow the possibility of positive price coefficient but in the actual estimates all 27,788 individual price coefficients are negative. I attempted estimates with price coefficient distributed lognormally but the estimates did not converge. On the merits and demerits of lognormal versus normal distribution of random parameters in mixed logit estimates see Hensher and Greene (2001).

$$\varepsilon_{ij} \sim \text{Gumbel}$$

The individual  $i$  chooses from among his choice set  $C_i$  the one alternative with the greatest utility value. The choice set includes any newspapers available for subscription in the place where the person lives and the choice of subscribing to no newspaper at all ( $j=0$ ). It will be the case that  $x_{i0} = 0$  and  $p_0 = 0$ , so by construction, the mean utility value of not subscribing to any newspaper is zero:  $U_{i0}=0$ .

From the observed choice set of each individual, observed attributes of each alternative, observed characteristics of each individual, and observed choice of each individual, I estimate the parameters of the utility function that are common to all individuals ( $\beta$ ,  $\alpha$ ,  $\sigma$ ) using the method of simulated maximum likelihood (computed with the software NLOGIT).<sup>3</sup>

The variables that enter the utility function are made up as follows.

*Attributes of the newspaper subscription choices that do not vary across individuals:*

- Subscription price (units=yen per month)  $p_j$
- Natural logarithm of number of pages of content per month (“news hole”)

*Interactions between choice-invariant characteristics of the individual and attributes of the choice (with units of measurement equal to underlined expressions where present, otherwise equal to zero or one):*

- Age head of household (one of four discrete intervals)  $\times$ 
  1. Natural log of pages of content per month
  2. National newspaper  $\times$  morning-and-evening subscription

<sup>3</sup> The probability that individual  $i$  chooses  $j$  is

$$\pi_{ij} = \int \frac{\exp(\beta'x_{ij}+(\alpha+\sigma v_i)p_j)}{\sum_{k \in C_i} \exp(\beta'x_{ik}+(\alpha+\sigma v_i)p_k)} f(v_i) dv_i ,$$

where  $f(v_i)$  is the density function of  $v_i$ . The simulated approximate probability that individual  $i$  chooses  $j$  is

$$\tilde{\pi}_{ij} = 1/S \sum_{s=1}^S \frac{\exp(\beta'x_{ij}+(\alpha+\sigma v_i(s))p_j)}{\sum_{k \in C_i} \exp(\beta'x_{ik}+(\alpha+\sigma v_i(s))p_k)}$$

where  $v_i(s)$  is the randomly drawn value of  $v_i$  on simulation  $s$  and  $S$  is the total number of simulations (which I set equal to 500). The simulated log-likelihood function is

$$\tilde{L} = \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=0}^J d_{ij} \ln(\tilde{\pi}_{ij})$$

where  $d_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if individual } i \text{ chooses alternative } j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

### 3. Local or Bloc newspaper × morning-and-evening subscription

—Household annual income (one of sixteen discrete intervals ranging from zero to 30-million yen or more per year) if greater than zero ×

1. Natural log of pages of content per month
2. National newspaper × morning-and-evening subscription
3. Local or Bloc newspaper × morning-and-evening subscription

—Each national newspaper (Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Sankei) ×

1. Survey response: “Participates in local festivals and holiday events.”
2. Head of household highest education level is college or above

—For each national and bloc paper, square of road distance (th. Km) from newspaper home base to each individual’s prefecture of residence (home base for national papers Yomiuri, Asahi and Mainichi: Tokyo, for Sankei: Osaka; and for bloc papers Chunichi: Aichi, Chugoku: Hiroshima, and Nishi Nippon: Fukuoka).

Table 2 reports the utility function parameter estimates. Dividing the other coefficients by the estimated marginal disutility of subscription price converts them to monetary units (yen per month). From the estimates several things are evident. First, the marginal value of a page of content becomes less as income rises. Second, the value of morning-and-evening subscription rather than morning-only, holding constant pages of content per month, is greater the greater the income, and is greater for national newspapers than for other newspapers. Third, the more distant is the prefecture of residence from the newspaper home base the lower is its value. This effect is stronger for the bloc papers than for the national papers. And among the national papers it is stronger for Sankei than for Asahi, Mainichi or Yomiuri. Fourth, those who participate in local festivals and holiday events place a lower value on subscription to national papers; this effect is strongest for Sankei. Fifth, college education inclines subscribers to more value Asahi and less value Sankei.

Further interpretation of the estimates comes from simulations that expose the effects on demand for each edition of each newspaper of changes in subscription price or changes in

number of pages of content. I computed arc elasticities and cross-elasticities of demand with respect to changes in prices and pages of content, by simulating the effects of five-percent increases in subscription prices of each edition of each newspaper and five-percent increases in numbers of pages of content in each edition of each newspaper. These estimates may be found in the Appendix tables A1 and A2. It seems that the price-elasticity of demand of most newspapers lies between 1.2 and 2 and is a bit higher for the leading national papers than for the others. The elasticity of demand with respect to pages of content lies between 0.2 and 0.5. This matches some results of other estimates of demand for newspapers in the literature.

Van Cayseele and Vanormelingen (2009) estimate a pair of equations describing the demand for ads and demand for subscriptions in Belgian newspapers. The demand for subscriptions is specified as nested logit, in which readers first choose between subscription to the local paper versus a national one, and then choose within the one category or the other. Demand for subscriptions depends on the characteristics of newspapers and of readers, and on the prices. Van Cayseele and Vanormelingen find that the elasticity of demand for subscriptions ranges from 1.25 to 3.05. Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) estimate a nested logit specification for reader demand and simple logit specification for advertising demand for Italys' four national newspapers. In their preferred specification the newspapers set ad rates noncooperatively but collude in setting cover prices. Fan (2011) estimates a multiple discrete choice model of the demand for U.S. newspapers (a model in which demanders may subscribe to more than one paper), with endogenous choice by newspapers of their quality and their prices, including price of advertising. She uses the estimated model to simulate the effects of mergers of local papers with overlapping markets.

Rosse (1970) estimates a set of equations approximately like the three pricing and content rules implied by profit-maximization, using data for local newspapers across the US. Rosse allows for curvature of the cost function (which the simple model here does not exhibit), and also allows demand for subscriptions to depend directly on amount of ads. He finds a price

elasticity of demand for subscriptions of 1.4, taking into account the effect of change in subscription price on amount of ads, as interpreted by Blair and Romano (1993). Rosse was the first to notice that variation in demand across cities could be exploited as a kind of natural experiment in measuring the effect of shifting demand on the costs and pricing of local newspaper monopolists. As far as I am aware this same principal has not yet been exploited in the study of Japan's local newspapers.

#### 4. Newspaper Pricing and Content.

The next task is to model the subscription prices and advertising prices set by profit-maximizing newspapers in a way that can be used to estimate parameters of the newspaper cost function and establish benchmarks for assessing the effects of coordinated pricing behavior by the leading Japanese newspapers. I begin by laying out a simple algebraic framework for relating newspaper prices, circulation, advertising and content. Much of this will be familiar to students of newspaper economics. Similar models have been sketched in Rosse (1970), Blair and Romano (1993), Van Cayseele and Vanormelingen (2009), and elsewhere. Here I adapt the framework for analysis of the Japanese newspaper industry.

For my purpose, it is necessary to accommodate newspapers that offer their readers a choice between a morning-only subscription and a morning-and-evening subscription.<sup>4</sup> Let  $s_1$  denote the number of morning-only subscribers to the newspaper and  $s_2$  be the number of morning-and-evening subscribers. And denote by  $k_m$  and  $a_m$  the pages of content and ads in the morning edition, and by  $k_e$  and  $a_e$  the pages of content and ads in the evening edition. Here an ad is defined as a printed item supplied to all subscribers, the same as the subscription content. The only difference is that the ad is paid for by the advertiser but the other content is paid for by the subscribers.

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<sup>4</sup> Virtually none proffer evening-only subscriptions. The Shizuoka Shinbun claims to offer a choice between evening-only subscription and morning-and-evening subscription but based on circulation data, hardly any of their subscribers opt for evening-only.

Let us suppose that the demand for ads depends on the price to place an ad per subscriber,  $\frac{p_{am}}{s_1+s_2}$  if in the morning edition or  $\frac{p_{ae}}{s_2}$  if in the evening edition. Let us also suppose that the readers regard the ads indifferently. To keep matters simple, posit a constant-elasticity demand system facing the newspaper in which all elasticities have the appropriate signs and lie within the unit interval:

Demand by morning-only subscribers:

$$[2] \quad s_1 = A_1 p_{s_1}^{-\xi_1} p_{s_2}^{\xi_{12}} k_m^{\theta_{1m}} (k_m + k_e)^{\theta_{1e}}$$

Demand by morning-and-evening subscribers:

$$[3] \quad s_2 = A_2 p_{s_2}^{-\xi_2} p_{s_1}^{\xi_{21}} k_m^{\theta_{2m}} (k_m + k_e)^{\theta_{2e}}$$

Demand for ads in morning edition:

$$[4] \quad a_m = B_m \left( \frac{p_{am}}{s_1+s_2} \right)^{-\xi_a}$$

Demand for ads in evening edition

$$[5] \quad a_e = B_e \left( \frac{p_{ae}}{s_2} \right)^{-\xi_a}$$

Let the cost of newspaper production depend on number of ads and circulation and on amount of content. These costs include first-copy costs and costs that depend on the number of subscriptions of each type:

$$[6] \quad \mathbf{Cost} = \overbrace{f_a a_m + f_a a_e}^{\text{first-copy cost of ad pages}} + \overbrace{f_k k_m + f_k k_e}^{\text{first-copy cost of content pages}} + \underbrace{(c_{0m} + \bar{c}(a_m + k_m))s_1}_{\text{costs that depend on morning-only subscriptions}} + \underbrace{(c_{0m} + c_{0e} + \bar{c}(a_m + k_m + a_e + k_e))s_2}_{\text{costs that depend on morning-and-evening subscriptions}}$$

Here,  $c_{0m}$  and  $c_{0e}$  are the unit cost of distribution in morning and in evening net of advertisers' payments to distributors for including inserts (substantial in Japan, almost as large as advertisers' payments to newspapers for print ads).  $\bar{c}$  is the cost per page of actually printing the newspaper (where  $k$  and  $a$  are the numbers of pages of content and of ads),  $f_k$  is the first-copy cost of producing a page of content and  $f_a$  is the first-copy cost of producing a page of advertising. Notice that because of the terms  $\bar{c}a_m(s_1 + s_2)$  and  $\bar{c}a_e s_2$  in the cost function, the costs are not separable into cost of subscription and cost of advertising. This makes it problematic to speak separately of the profits from subscriptions and from advertising.



Most newspaper advertising in Japan is contracted through advertising agencies, of which Dentsu is the largest. The advertiser pays the ad agency the price set by the newspaper but the ad agency pays a lower price to the newspaper. In the empirical estimates below I will take the publically posted advertising rates of the newspapers to be the prices actually paid by clients but consider the advertising prices received by the newspapers (which I do not observe) to be a set fraction  $\psi$  of these prices, the difference representing the advertising agency commission (The commission rate is  $1 - \psi > 0$  ).

The newspaper chooses content, prices of ads, and prices of subscriptions to maximize total profit:

$$[7] \quad \max_{p_s, p_a, k} \pi = \overbrace{p_{s1}s_1 + p_{s2}s_2}^{\text{revenue from subscriptions}} + \overbrace{\psi p_{am}a_{am} + \psi p_{ae}a_{ae}}^{\text{revenue from advertising}} - \mathbf{Cost}$$

The necessary conditions for maximum profit reduce to the following pricing rules:

Prices of ads:

$$[8] \quad p_{am} = (f_a + \bar{c}(s_1 + s_2))\psi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\xi_a}\right)^{-1}$$

$$[9] \quad p_{ae} = (f_a + \bar{c}s_2)\psi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\xi_a}\right)^{-1}$$

Prices of subscriptions<sup>5</sup>:

$$[10] \quad \left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_1}\right)p_{s1} = c_{0m} + \bar{c}(a_m + k_m) - \frac{\psi p_{am}a_m}{(s_1 + s_2)}$$

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<sup>5</sup> The subscription prices  $p_s$  are set as though the newspaper were receiving a subsidy per subscriber equal to the marginal profit that arises indirectly from advertising with each copy sold (for given price of advertising  $p_a$ ):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial(\psi p_a a - f_a a - \bar{c} a s)}{\partial a} \frac{\partial a}{\partial s} + \frac{\partial(\psi p_a a - f_a a - \bar{c} a s)}{\partial s} &= (\psi p_a - f_a - \bar{c} s) \frac{\partial a}{\partial s} - \bar{c} a \\ &= (\psi p_a - f_a - \bar{c} s) \frac{\psi p_a \xi_a}{s} - \bar{c} a \\ &= \frac{\psi p_a a}{s} - \bar{c} a \end{aligned}$$

This marginal profit equals the marginal revenue that arises indirectly from advertising ( $=\psi p_a a/s$ ), minus the added-cost-per-copy attributable to advertising ( $=\bar{c}a$ ).

$$[11] \quad \left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_2}\right) p_{s2} = c_{0m} + c_{0e} + \bar{c}(a_m + k_m + a_e + k_e) - \frac{\psi p_{am} a_m}{(s_1 + s_2)} - \frac{\psi p_{ae} a_e}{s_2}$$

where

$$[12] \quad \frac{1}{\lambda_1} = \frac{\left(1 + \frac{(p_{s2s2}) \xi_{21}}{p_{s1s1} \xi_2}\right)}{\left(\xi_1 - \frac{\xi_{12} \xi_{21}}{\xi_2}\right)} = \frac{1}{\xi_1} \text{ if } \xi_{21} = 0$$

and

$$[13] \quad \frac{1}{\lambda_2} = \frac{\left(1 + \frac{(p_{s1s1}) \xi_{12}}{p_{s2s2} \xi_1}\right)}{\left(\xi_2 - \frac{\xi_{12} \xi_{21}}{\xi_1}\right)} = \frac{1}{\xi_2} \text{ if } \xi_{12} = 0 .$$

These expressions [12] and [13] capture cross-effects, as when the newspaper raises the price of morning-only subscriptions to increase the demand for morning-and-evening subscriptions. Table 3 lists the estimates of  $\lambda_1$ ,  $\lambda_2$  and other related parameters based on the arc elasticities computed from simulations using the mixed-logit utility function estimate. The mean value across newspapers (in the penultimate row of the table) shows that  $\lambda_1$  and  $\lambda_2$  average *1.4* and *1.3*, slightly lower than  $\xi_1$  and  $\xi_2$  which average *1.6* and *1.8*. This reflects the positive cross elasticity of demand between morning-only subscriptions and morning-and-evening subscriptions to the same newspaper ( $\xi_{12}$  and  $\xi_{21}$  which average *0.4*). I would expect that newspapers would raise subscription prices slightly to exploit this cross effect based on Equations [10] and [11].

The profit-maximizing pages of content  $k_m$  and  $k_e$  fulfill the following:

$$[14] \quad \frac{(f_k + \bar{c}(s_1 + s_2)) k_m}{p_{s1s1}} = \left( \frac{\theta_{1m} + \left(\frac{k_m}{k_m + k_e}\right) \theta_{1e}}{\lambda_1} \right) + \left( \frac{\theta_{2m} + \left(\frac{k_m}{k_m + k_e}\right) \theta_{2e}}{\lambda_2} \right) \frac{p_{s2s2}}{p_{s1s1}}$$

$$[15] \quad \frac{(f_k + \bar{c}s_2)(k_m + k_e)}{p_{s2s2}} = \frac{\theta_{1e}}{\lambda_1} \left( \frac{p_{s1s1}}{p_{s2s2}} \right) + \frac{\theta_{2e}}{\lambda_2}$$

These expressions (showing cost of content relative to subscription revenues) look complicated but have a close relation to the Dorfman-Steiner rule for advertising, most evident for the single-edition case:

$$[16] \quad \frac{(f_k + \bar{c}s_1)k_m}{p_{s_1}s_1} = \frac{\theta_{1m}}{\xi_{s_1}}$$

This expression resembles the Dorfman-Steiner condition describing optimal advertising expenditure. This is because, analytically, the model here is the same as the Dorfman-Steiner advertising model: Demand for subscriptions has constant elasticity ( $0 < \theta_{1m} < 1$ ) with respect to content, just as in the Dorfman-Steiner model demand for the product has constant elasticity with respect to quantity of ads.

The last columns of Table 3 show the arc elasticities of demand with respect to pages of content from the mixed-logit utility function estimate. The last two columns show the imputed cost of content relative to subscription revenue based on Equations [14] and [15]. Multiplying these amounts (right-hand-sides of Equation [14] and [15]) by the subscription prices  $p_{s_1}$  and  $p_{s_2}$  leads to expressions for *content cost per subscriber* that, based on [14] and [15], can be regressed on the reciprocal of number of subscribers  $\frac{1}{s}$  ( $\equiv \frac{1}{s_1}$  or  $\frac{1}{s_2}$ ), and on pages of content properly weighted  $k$  ( $\equiv \frac{k_m(s_1+s_2)}{s_1}$  or  $(k_m + k_e)$ ), to reveal estimates of cost parameters  $f_k$  and  $\bar{c}$ . The result of that OLS regression is the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 [17] \quad \text{content cost per subscriber} &= f_k \times \left(\frac{1}{s}\right) + \bar{c} \times k \\
 &= 2.2 \text{ million yen} \times \left(\frac{1}{s}\right) + 0.96 \text{ yen per page} \times k \\
 \text{s.e.} \quad (5.2) & \qquad \qquad \qquad (0.05) \\
 R^2=0.92 \quad , \quad n=62 &
 \end{aligned}$$

The first-copy costs are not precisely identified by this regression. Perhaps they vary greatly across newspapers. The per-copy cost of actually printing a page of content  $\bar{c}$  is precisely estimated and seems to be just under one yen per page. It is useful to compare this estimate

with the subscribers' marginal valuations of content pages based on the utility function estimate. Figure 2 shows these marginal valuations averaged across subscribers for each edition of each newspaper plotted against monthly pages of content,  $k_m$  if a morning subscription,  $k_m+k_e$  if morning-and-evening. The marginal values decrease as pages increase which reflects the diminishing marginal valuation of each person and self-selection of newspapers with more content by those with higher marginal valuation (because of their higher income for instance). The marginal value of content for the newspapers with most pages of content (large circulation morning-and-evening editions) are fairly close to one yen per page, actually a bit below that. This is consistent with the "efficiency at the top" character of nonlinear pricing schemes as deduced in Mussa and Rosen (1978). The profitable strategy is to supply the efficient quality of content to the higher valuing morning-and-evening subscribers but supply less than the efficient content to the morning-only subscribers to deter subscribers from switching from morning-and-evening to morning-only. I explore this aspect of Japanese newspaper behavior in more detail in Flath (2012). My point here is that the estimated marginal value of content to subscribers is consistent with per-copy cost of actually printing a page of content  $\bar{c}$  of just under one yen per page

#### 4.1. Price of advertising and demand for advertising

Within the basic framework, much of the variation in price of advertising across newspapers can be related to variation in number of subscribers. The price of ads (not per subscriber) varies linearly with number of subscribers. The equations [8] and [9] can be pooled into a single equation:

$$[17] \quad p_a = f_a \psi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\xi_a}\right)^{-1} + \bar{c} \psi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\xi_a}\right)^{-1} s$$

$$\left| \text{where } p_a = p_{am} \text{ or } p_{ae}, \text{ and } s = \begin{cases} s_1 + s_2, & \text{if } p_a = p_{am} \\ s_2, & \text{if } p_a = p_{ae} \end{cases}$$

Newspapers with greater circulation, all else the same, have higher ad prices:

$$[18] \quad \frac{dp_a}{ds} = \bar{c}\psi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\xi_a}\right)^{-1} > 0,$$

but lower ad prices per subscriber:

$$[19] \quad \frac{d\left(\frac{p_a}{s}\right)}{ds} = -f_a\psi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\xi_a}\right)^{-1} s^{-2} < 0.$$

It is possible that elasticity of demand for advertising varies from one newspaper to another. But it turns out that much of the actual variation in ad pricing across Japan's local newspapers is linearly related to number of subscribers, as implied by the model just described and assuming that the elasticity of demand for advertising is the same for all newspapers.

Table 4 reports OLS regressions in which newspaper ad pricing is a linear function of circulation as in equation [17]:

$$[20] \quad p_a = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 s + \epsilon$$

There are four different prices, so four separate regressions. The dependent variable in the left-most regression of the table is the price for a legal notice posted in the society page per centimeter width of a horizontal column (*dan* in Japanese). This is the basic plain-vanilla ad rate that is the anchor for each newspaper's menu of ad prices. The dependent variables in the other three Table 3 regressions are contract prices per horizontal column for black-and-white business display ads. These vary depending on whether the contract is for one, five or fifteen horizontal columns, within a six-month period. A page is divided into fifteen horizontal columns, so these are prices for one-fifteenth page, one-third page or one page, cumulatively within the contract period. The rate for ads smaller than one horizontal column is the same as for a legal notice and is priced per horizontal column per centimeter width. A (Yomiuri Shimbun) page is 37.9 cm wide. A (perhaps typical) small ad might amount to one half column (in other words 1/30th of a page), and so its price would be 18.95 x the price per centimeter portion of a horizontal column for a legal notice. The regressions use 2007 circulation, but 2003 was the year in which the prices were last changed; they have remained

the same in the nine years since then. The unit of observation is the particular edition of each paper. Some of the observations are for ads placed in more than one regional edition of a national newspaper. For these I aggregated the circulation over the regional editions covered. With those observations excluded, Chow tests favored the pooling of national and local papers. Chow tests favored pooling of morning and evening editions even with those observations included. The estimates reported in Table 4 are for the pooled sample. The R-squared is 0.89 for legal notice and 0.90 for the business display ads. It seems that the basic framework adequately describes the newspaper advertising cost function and the ad pricing behavior of newspapers. That is, the newspapers each face a similar elasticity of demand for advertising and have similar first-copy costs of supplying advertising. The newspapers with greater circulation have correspondingly lower incremental costs and so set lower prices. Picard (1998) notes an approximately similar pattern in the advertising rates of U.S. newspapers.

To estimate the demand for newspaper advertising requires instrumental variables for advertising price because of possible endogeneity. In my way of thinking here, the newspaper circulation determines the incremental cost per page of ads, and so given constant elasticity of demand for advertising, circulation also determines the profit-maximizing price of advertising per page of ads. But the demand for ads depends on the price per page of ads per subscriber. The fundamental endogeneity in ad price per subscriber arises from the effects of subscription price on number of subscribers. Using instrumental variables for circulation resolves this endogeneity. My instruments for circulation  $s$  are the number of households in the newspaper home prefecture if it is a local or bloc newspaper, a dummy variable if it is a national newspaper, and number of pages of content per month. Because greater circulation lowers the incremental cost of pages of content, number of pages of content is a valid instrument for circulation (It is inversely correlated with circulation). I estimate the following pair of equations with the generalized method of moments, using SAS software:

Equation 1—Advertising price per page of ads:

$$[21] \quad p_a = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 s$$

Equation 2—Demand for advertising:

$$[22] \quad \ln a = \beta_0 + \xi_a \ln(\gamma_0/s + \gamma_1) + \beta_1 \ln AvgIncome + \beta_2 PcntCollege$$

Instruments for  $s$ : (1) pages of content per month, (2) newspaper home prefecture number of households if bloc newspaper or local newspaper, (3) dummy=1 if national newspaper and =0 if not. *AvgIncome* is average annual household income of subscribers to the newspaper and *PcntCollege* is the percent of the subscribers to the newspaper that have a college education.

From the estimates which are in Table 5, the elasticity of demand for advertising appears to be about 1.3 with a standard error of 0.6. This seems about right, close to the corresponding estimate for Belgian newspapers (=1.5) reported by Van Cayseele and Vanormelingen (2009), and the estimate for U.S newspapers (=1.6) by Rosse (1970). There are three pairs of regressions in Table 2. The dependent variables in the demand equations are the business display ad rates per page of ads divided by circulation, for 1-dan, 5-dan and 15-dan contracts. All three regressions are similar.

From the Table 5 regressions we can glean some information about the first-copy cost of a page of advertising  $f_a$ , the cost per subscriber of actually printing and distributing a page of ads  $\bar{c}$ , and the advertising agency commission rate  $1 - \psi$ . If elasticity of demand for advertising  $\xi_a$  is around 1.3 as here estimated, then first-copy cost of a page of advertising is

$$f_a = \gamma_0 \left(1 - \frac{1}{\xi_a}\right) \approx 1.2 \text{ million yen per page} \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{1.3}\right) = 0.3 \text{ million yen per page}$$

and

$$\bar{c}\psi^{-1} = \gamma_1 \left(1 - \frac{1}{\xi_a}\right) \approx 6 \text{ yen per page per subscriber} \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{1.3}\right) =$$

1.5 yen per page per subscriber.

From my earlier estimate that  $\bar{c}$  is just below one yen per page, this suggests that  $\psi \approx 0.7$  implying an ad agency commission rate of 30 percent. A widely repeated claim in both

Japan and the US is that the standard ad agency commission rate for newspaper advertising is 15 percent. Presuming the other parameter estimates are accurate, that might suggest that the elasticity of demand for advertising is around 1.2 rather than 1.3 which is of course plausible. I don't really know.

I next turn to a major focus of my effort, the pricing of subscriptions.

#### 4.2. Price of subscriptions.

Under the Japan Fair Trade Commission special directive each newspaper is obliged to set geographically uniform prices but need not set the same price as rival newspapers. Nikaie (2010) usefully points out that the legally mandated geographic uniformity can itself lead to softer price competition. This is not part of my analysis. My focus here is on the collusive setting of a common price.

My conjecture, which could be mistaken, is that the Japanese newspapers that all set the same common price per morning-and-evening subscription of 3,925 yen per month which is the highest price set by any in my sample, and morning-subscription price of 3,007 yen per month which is also the highest of any in my sample, are colluding. These newspapers include the three national newspapers Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri,<sup>6</sup> and 11 local newspapers. That leaves 33 other newspapers setting lower prices. The Shizuoka Shimbun is the largest circulation local newspaper with a subscription price below that of the national dailies. Its morning-and-evening subscription price is 2,900 yen per month and its circulation tops 700,000. My strategy is to estimate an equation explaining the subscription prices of the 33 low-pricing newspapers and use that equation to predict out-of-sample the subscription prices of the high-pricing newspapers. A comparison of the predicted prices with the actual prices measures the effect of the resale price maintenance collusion. It is possible that even the

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<sup>6</sup> Though the morning-and-evening subscription price of the other national paper Sankei is 3,925 yen per month, its morning-only subscription price is 2,950 yen per month,.



low-pricing newspapers are parties to collusion in which case this strategy would fail.

Because my sample for this exercise is small I will take a step to broaden it slightly. The step is to make the unit of observation the particular edition of a newspaper, either the morning edition with subscription price  $p_{s1}$ , evening edition with incremental price  $p_{s2} - p_{s1}$ , or morning-and-evening edition (for the eight newspapers in the sample only offered as morning-and-evening) with subscription price  $p_{s2}$ .

The estimating equation is based on Equations [10] and [11] as follows.

Morning edition:

$$[23] \quad \left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_1}\right) p_{s1} = c_{0m} + \bar{c}(a_m + k_m) - \frac{\psi p_{am} a_m}{(s_1 + s_2)}$$

Evening edition, if morning-only subscriptions are also offered:

$$[24] \quad \left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_2}\right) p_{s2} - \left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_1}\right) p_{s1} = c_{0e} + \bar{c}(a_e + k_e) - \frac{\psi p_{ae} a_e}{s_2}$$

Morning-and-evening edition ,if morning-only subscriptions are not offered:

$$[25] \quad \left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_2}\right) p_{s2} = c_{0m} + c_{0e} + \bar{c}(a_m + k_m + a_e + k_e) - \frac{\psi p_{am} a_m}{s_2} - \frac{\psi p_{ae} a_e}{s_2}$$

The dependent variable in the regression is the left-hand side of equation [23], [24] or [25], which one depending on whether the observation is for a morning edition, evening edition, or morning-and-evening edition of a newspaper that does not offer morning-only subscriptions. These variables are constructed from the subscription prices and from the estimates of  $\lambda_1$  and  $\lambda_2$  based on the arc elasticities computed from the mixed-logit estimate of utility. These dependent variables in the regression average around one fourth the amounts of the corresponding subscription prices. Some observations had to be dropped from the sample because of implausible values of elasticities. There were 51 useable observations in the sample.

The explanatory variables are (1) advertising revenue per subscriber which is constructed by multiplying number of pages of ads per month times the posted price per subscriber (I used the 1-dan rate because it had fewer missing observations than the other ad rates), (2) dummy variables for morning-delivery or evening delivery, and (3) total number of pages per month including both content and ads. I also include dummy variables equal to one if the newspaper is among those setting the highest prices (3,925 yen per month for morning-and evening subscription and 3,007 yen per month for morning-only subscriptions), to test for effects of coordinated pricing.

The results of the OLS regression are reported in Table 6. The coefficient on number of pages is  $0.6$  with standard error of  $0.4$ , broadly consistent with the other evidence that printing costs  $\bar{c}$  for both ads and content lie just under one yen per page. The coefficient on advertising revenue per subscriber is negative as expected but small, equaling  $-0.09$  with standard error  $0.05$ . If, as seems to be the case, the elasticity of demand for advertising is only slightly above one (say  $1.2$  or  $1.3$ ) and elasticity of demand for subscriptions is less than 2, then ad revenue per subscriber is not very sensitive to changes in the subscription price and so it is unsurprising that ad revenue per subscriber would have little power in the regression explaining subscription prices.

From the other coefficients it seems that the cost of delivery is 475 yen per month per morning subscriber and 241 yen per month per evening subscriber. But the coefficient for evening delivery is imprecisely estimated.

Finally, the dummy variables for capturing the effects of coordinated pricing show that the newspapers that set 3,925 yen per month for morning-and-evening and 3,007 yen per month for morning-only subscriptions seem to be setting substantially higher morning-and-evening prices, but lower morning-only prices, than the other variables would predict. I hasten to add that the coefficient on the morning-edition coordinated pricing dummy is very imprecisely estimated and not nearly statistically significant. The dependent variable in this regression tends to be about one fourth as great as the corresponding subscription price ( $p_1$  for morning edition and  $p_2-p_1$  for evening edition). That means the effect of coordinated pricing seems to be to raise the morning price little if at all but raise the morning-and-evening price by about 400 yen ( $\approx 4 \times (209-96)$ ) from about 3,525 yen per month to 3,925 yen per month. In short, there is evidence here that the leading Japanese newspapers are indeed pricing collusively. But it is very difficult to judge by exactly how much the subscription prices are affected by this collusion.

I next calculate the effects on consumer surplus and newspaper profits of an end to collusive pricing starting with an assumption about how subscription prices would change if the special exemption from antimonopoly prohibition against resale price maintenance were revoked and coordinated pricing ended. For this calculation, let us suppose that the newspapers now setting morning-and-evening prices of 3,925 yen per month and morning prices of 3,007 yen per month were to lower these by 340 yen per month and 140 yen per month, to 3,585 yen per month and 2,867 yen per month. Suppose also that the other newspapers keep prices unchanged. From simulation using the mixed-logit utility estimate

of newspaper demand it turns out that these price reductions would confer an average increase in consumer surplus of 126 yen per month per household. This is the average difference in mean utility under the two scenarios divided by the utility of a one-yen price decrease (equal to the absolute value of the estimated coefficient on price), as in Small and Rosen (1981). Totaled over all households this would equal about 7.6 billion yen per month (91.2 billion yen per year, roughly \$1-billion per year). It would increase total subscriptions of all newspapers by about 0.7 percent, which would have little effect on the demand for newspaper ads. Much of the shift in subscriptions would be from morning-only to morning-and-evening subscriptions of the same newspaper, rather than switching between national and local papers. It would reduce revenue from subscriptions by 46.4 billion yen per year. Further calculations imply that this would decrease newspaper profit by about 5.3 billion yen per year (3.9 billion yen per year among the collusive newspapers and 1.4 billion yen per year among the non-collusive newspapers). The net increase in social welfare would thus amount to 91.2-5.3=85.9 billion yen per year. The calculation for profit is based on the following and ignores any change in number of pages of content or ads.

From equations [8], [9], [10] and [11], the profit of each newspaper company is

$$[26] \quad \pi = \frac{p_{s1}s_1}{\lambda_1} + \frac{p_{s2}s_2}{\lambda_2} - f_a(a_m + a_{me}) - f_k(k_m + k_e) .$$

Collusive price-setting operates as though  $\lambda_i$  were adjusted downward slightly to  $\lambda_i'$  say, below the level implied by equations [12] and [13], which raises the first two terms on the right-hand side of equation [26], increasing profit. An end to collusive price setting reverses this, and lowers profit. Using the estimated values of  $\lambda_1$  and  $\lambda_2$  and imputing the cartel pricing adjustment from

$$[27] \quad p_{cartel} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda'}\right) = p_{no.cartel} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda}\right) ,$$

the change in profit caused by reversion from collusive pricing to non-collusive is revenue divided by the corresponding adjustment factor,  $\lambda_i$  or  $\lambda_i'$ , differenced. All of this assumes that no newspapers would go out of business and that total costs of production would be little affected.

## 5. Conclusion.

Japan's leading national newspapers and eleven of the largest regional and local papers, protected by a special 1953 exemption from antimonopoly law, have persistently kept their monthly subscription prices at the same common level, which is higher than the

subscription prices of the other newspapers with whom they compete. To assess the effects of this requires two things. The first is knowing how the prices would differ in the absence of coordinated pricing, abetted by the special exemption. That turns out to be very difficult. Despite my best efforts I am only able to venture an educated guess. Based on comparison of the prices of the newspapers setting a higher price in common with one another with the prices of the others, and controlling for number of pages per month and advertising revenue per subscriber, it seems to me that the collusive price increase amounts to no more than around ten percent of the observed common price level of the high pricers. A challenge for further study is to reach a more precise judgment about this, or even to overturn it.

The other thing needed to assess the effects of collusive pricing by Japanese newspapers is an econometric model of the demand for each newspaper and of the relevant parameters of the cost of producing and distributing newspapers. This is done here by constructing and estimating such a model using micro-data. I estimate the parameters of an indirect utility function, based on the survey responses of 27,788 persons living throughout Japan in March 2007. From the estimates of utility function parameters I infer arc elasticities and cross elasticities of demand with respect to subscription prices and pages of content. Similar kinds of estimates but using aggregate data rather than micro-data have been used by others to assess the unilateral effects of mergers in the newspaper industries of the U.S. (Fan, 2011), and the Netherlands (Filistrucchi, Klein and Michielsen, 2012). Here I perform an opposite kind of analysis by simulating the effects of a reduction in price coordination among newspapers rather than an increase in coordination. I find that if an end to price coordination were to lower the prices of the affected newspapers by about ten percent, it would add 91.2 billion yen per year (about 1 billion dollars per year), to the consumer surplus of newspaper subscribers, but would decrease newspaper profit by only about 5.3 billion yen per year (3.9 billion yen per year among the collusive newspapers and 1.4 billion yen per year among the non-collusive newspapers).

Appendix 1. Data sources:

Pages of Ads, Total Pages:

Dentsu Inc. (Annual a). Dentsuu koukoku nenkan (Dentsu advertising annual), Dentsu.

Dentsu Inc. (Annual b). Dentsuu shinbun nenkan (Dentsu newspaper annual), Dentsu.

Subscription Prices, Circulation:

Japan Audit Bureau of Circulation, shinbun hakkousha repoto (Report on newspaper publishers), Nihon ABC kyokai, semi-annual. 2007, and 2007 July-December, Jan-June.

Prices of Advertising:

Koukoutantou.com. Website [http://www.koukokutantou.com/newspaper\\_1.html](http://www.koukokutantou.com/newspaper_1.html)

Survey of Newspaper Readers

Video Research Ltd., Japan Readers and Area Data (JREAD) Survey conducted in March 2007.











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Table 2. Random-parameter logit estimate of utility function

Variable	Parameter	s.e.	z	
Subscription price (yen per mo.) $p_j$	Mean of random coefficient $\alpha$	-0.00073	0.00003	-23.8
	s.d. in subscription price random coefficient $\sigma$	0.00031	0.00005	7.0
	$\beta$ :			
$\ln$ pages of content per month $\ln k_j$		-0.143	0.057	-2.5
$\ln k_j$ × Household annual income =				
less than 1 million yen		-0.055	0.020	-2.8
1 million yen up to 2 million yen		-0.097	0.016	-5.9
2 million yen up to 3 million yen		-0.050	0.015	-3.4
3 million yen up to 4 million yen		-0.005	0.014	-0.4
4 million yen up to 5 million yen		0.028	0.014	1.9
5 million yen up to 6 million yen		0.039	0.015	2.6
6 million yen up to 7 million yen		0.075	0.016	4.7
7 million yen up to 8 million yen		0.096	0.017	5.5
8 million yen up to 9 million yen		0.080	0.019	4.2
9 million yen up to 10 million yen		0.084	0.019	4.3
10 million yen up to 12 million yen		0.129	0.021	6.1
12 million yen up to 15 million yen		0.153	0.027	5.7
15 million yen up to 20 million yen		0.135	0.031	4.3
20 million yen up to 30 million yen		0.113	0.053	2.1
30 million yen or more		0.191	0.087	2.2
$\ln k_j$ × Age, head of household =				
up to 24 yrs.		0.271	0.050	5.4
25 yrs to 44 yrs		0.400	0.056	7.2
45 yrs to 64 yrs		0.603	0.057	10.5
65 yrs or more		0.755	0.059	12.7
Morning-and-Evening subscription to National newspaper				
× Household annual income =				
less than 1 million yen		0.176	0.133	1.3
1 million yen up to 2 million yen		0.233	0.105	2.2
2 million yen up to 3 million yen		0.309	0.073	4.2
3 million yen up to 4 million yen		0.394	0.063	6.3
4 million yen up to 5 million yen		0.287	0.062	4.6
5 million yen up to 6 million yen		0.290	0.063	4.6
6 million yen up to 7 million yen		0.359	0.063	5.7
7 million yen up to 8 million yen		0.516	0.067	7.8
8 million yen up to 9 million yen		0.495	0.077	6.5
9 million yen up to 10 million yen		0.625	0.073	8.6
10 million yen up to 12 million yen		0.656	0.069	9.5
12 million yen up to 15 million yen		0.771	0.080	9.7
15 million yen up to 20 million yen		0.844	0.102	8.3
20 million yen up to 30 million yen		0.969	0.176	5.5
30 million yen or more		1.089	0.217	5.0

Variable	Parameter	s.e.	z
Morning-and-Evening subscription to Local or Bloc newspaper			
× Household annual income =			
less than 1 million yen	-0.187	0.192	-1.0
1million yen up to 2 million yen	0.487	0.116	4.2
2 million yen up to 3 million yen	0.553	0.079	7.0
3 million yen up to 4 million yen	0.438	0.071	6.2
4 million yen up to 5 million yen	0.365	0.075	4.9
5 million yen up to 6 million yen	0.465	0.076	6.1
6 million yen up to 7 million yen	0.447	0.079	5.6
7 million yen up to 8 million yen	0.452	0.089	5.1
8 million yen up to 9 million yen	0.699	0.102	6.9
9 million yen up to 10 million yen	0.659	0.103	6.4
10 million yen up to 12 million yen	0.495	0.101	4.9
12 million yen up to 15 million yen	0.651	0.130	5.0
15 million yen up to 20 million yen	0.727	0.171	4.3
20 million yen up to 30 million yen	0.754	0.305	2.5
30 million yen or more	1.267	0.300	4.2
Participates in local festivals and holiday events			
× Asahi	-0.647	0.030	-21.4
Mainichi	-1.266	0.040	-31.9
Yomiuri	-0.339	0.029	-11.9
Sankei	-1.808	0.066	-27.4
Head of household highest education level is college or above			
× Asahi	0.272	0.036	7.6
Mainichi	-0.471	0.048	-9.9
Yomiuri	-0.152	0.039	-3.9
Sankei	-1.028	0.079	-13.0
Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri			
× Th. Km from Tokyo, squared	-0.010	0.000	-41.3
Sankei			
× Th. Km from Osaka, squared	-0.056	0.002	-26.8
Chunichi			
× Th. Km from Aichi, squared	-0.211	0.021	-10.1
Chugoku			
× Th. Km from Hiroshima, squared	-0.932	0.064	-14.6
Nishi Nippon			
× Th. Km from Fukuoka, squared	-0.664	0.043	-15.5

n=27,778

Chi squared [65 d.f.] = 132,971

Log likelihood function = -51,966

Restricted log likelihood = -118,451

Inf.Cr.AIC=104062 AIC/N = 3.745

Table 3. Parameters of Newspaper Pricing and Content, (Based on Tbl. 2 Mixed-Logit Estimates of Utility)

ID no.	Newspaper	m-e	$p_{s1}$ , $p_{s2}$	$s_1$ , $s_2$	$k_m$	$k_e$	$\frac{p_{s2}s_2}{p_{s1}s_1}$	Elasticity and Cross-Elasticity w.r.t Subscription Price				$\lambda_1$	$\lambda_2$	$1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_1}$	$1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_2}$	Elasticity and Cross-Elasticity w.r.t Pages of Content				$\frac{(f_k + \bar{c}(s_1 + s_2))k_m}{p_{s1}s_1}$	$\frac{(f_k + \bar{c}s_2)(k_m + k_e)}{p_{s2}s_2}$
								$\xi_1$	$\xi_2$	$\xi_{12}$	$\xi_{21}$					$\theta_{1m}$	$\theta_{1e}$	$\theta_{2m}$	$\theta_{2e}$		
1	THE ASAHI SHIMBUN morning		3,007	4,478,447	595		1.05	1.81	0.15		1.61		0.38		0.41	-0.03				0.39	
2	THE ASAHI SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,925	3,588,260		200	1.05		2.15	0.24		1.85		0.46			-0.06	0.42			0.21
13	MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning		3,007	2,510,628	546		0.76	1.88	0.10		1.77		0.43		0.43	-0.02				0.36	
14	MAINICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,925	1,463,199		184	0.76		2.25	0.17		1.87		0.46			-0.04	0.46			0.23
25	YOMIURI SHIMBUN morning		3,007	6,163,453	595		0.82	1.81	0.14		1.65		0.39		0.41	-0.03				0.34	
26	YOMIURI SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,925	3,868,988		351	0.82		2.16	0.23		1.81		0.45			-0.05	0.43			0.21
49	SANKEI SHIMBUN morning		2,950	1,567,455	576		0.41	1.89	0.07		1.82		0.45		0.44	-0.02				0.28	
50	SANKEI SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,925	633,154		227	0.41		2.27	0.20		1.80		0.44			-0.07	0.40			0.20
54	HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN morning		3,007	564,517	608		1.48	1.52	0.66		0.89				0.28	-0.09				0.25	
55	HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,925	639,634		254	1.48		1.84	0.58		1.79		0.44			-0.19	0.29			0.09
56	TOO NIPPO morning + evening	x	3,000	255,976		161			1.26			1.26		0.20				0.34			0.27
58	DAILY TOHOKU		2,600	107,369	460			1.48				1.48		0.32		0.33				0.22	
59	THE IWATE NIPPO morning + evening	x	3,007	231,437		141			1.14			1.14		0.13				0.29			0.25
61	THE KAHOKU SHIMPO morning		3,007	391,485	613		0.37	1.59	0.58		1.33		0.25		0.43	-0.14				0.27	
62	THE KAHOKU SHIMPO morning + evening	x	3,925	109,871		134	0.37		1.86	0.47		1.14		0.12			-0.16	0.31			-0.03
63	AKITA SAKIGAKE SHIMPO morning + evening	x	3,007	260,884		123			1.04			1.04		0.04				0.26			0.25
65	YAMAGATA SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,007	211,003		144			1.16			1.16		0.13				0.27			0.23
67	FUKUSHIMA MINPO		2,905	303,626	586			1.40				1.40		0.29		0.42				0.30	
68	FUKUSHIMA MINYU		2,905	201,876	606			1.51				1.51		0.34		0.27				0.18	
69	THE IBARAKI SHIMBUN		2,905	123,136	534			1.78				1.78		0.44		0.22				0.13	



ID no.	Newspaper	m-e	$p_{s1},$ $p_{s2}$	$s_1,$ $s_2$	$k_m$	$k_e$	$\frac{p_{s2}s_2}{p_{s1}s_1}$	Elasticity and Cross-Elasticity w.r.t Subscription Price				$\lambda_1$	$\lambda_2$	$1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_1}$	$1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_2}$	Elasticity and Cross-Elasticity w.r.t Pages of Content				$\frac{(f_k + \bar{c}(s_1 + s_2))k_m}{p_{s1}s_1}$	$\frac{(f_k + \bar{c}s_2)(k_m + k_e)}{p_{s2}s_2}$	
								$\xi_1$	$\xi_2$	$\xi_{12}$	$\xi_{21}$					$\theta_{1m}$	$\theta_{1e}$	$\theta_{2m}$	$\theta_{2e}$			
70	SHIMOTSUKE SHIMBUN		2,950	321,807	522			1.82				1.82		0.45			0.45				0.25	
71	THE JOMO SHINBUN		2,950	310,175	675			1.86				1.86		0.46			0.41				0.22	
74	THE TOKYO SHIMBUN morning		2,550	304,619	592		1.18	1.51	0.20			1.21		0.17			0.38	-0.04			0.42	
75	THE TOKYO SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,250	280,889		203	1.18		1.94			0.36		1.58			0.37		-0.12	0.40		0.22
76	KANAGAWA SHIMBUN		3,100	218,041	562			1.85				1.85		0.46			0.37				0.20	
77	NIIGATA NIPPO morning		3,007	439,570	600		0.17	1.64	0.60			1.43		0.30			0.45	-0.15			0.25	
78	NIIGATA NIPPO morning + evening	x	3,925	55,784		155	0.17		1.90			0.48		0.73					-0.16	0.32		
79	KITANIPPON SHIMBUN morning		2,987	250,201	747			1.65				1.65		0.39			0.21				0.13	
81	THE HOKKOKU SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,925	84,808		141	0.43		2.35			0.29		1.35			0.26		-0.29	0.59		
82	THE HOKKOKU SHIMBUN morning		3,007	258,466	728		0.43	1.62	0.54			1.48		0.32			0.55	-0.27			0.28	
83	THE HOKURIKU CHUNICHI morning		2,905	93,152	715		0.15	1.77	0.25			1.71		0.41			0.25	-0.25			0.09	
84	THE HOKURIKU CHUNICHI morning + evening	x	3,870	10,238		166	0.15		2.29			0.29		1.06			0.06		0.00	0.56		
85	FUKUI SHIMBUN		2,650	209,144	600			1.51				1.51		0.34			0.38				0.25	
86	THE NIKKAN KENMIN FUKUI		2,100	40,165	628			1.10				1.10		0.09			0.24				0.22	
87	YAMANASHI NICHINICHI SHIMBUN		3,007	208,133	570			1.68				1.68		0.41			0.42				0.25	
88	SHINANO MAINICHI morning		3,007	432,739	722		0.16	1.67	0.50			1.45		0.31			0.33	-0.17			0.20	
89	SHINANO MAINICHI morning + evening	x	3,925	52,492		146	0.16		1.80			0.54		0.76					0.00	0.36		
90	GIFU SHIMBUN morning		2,900	146,283	610		0.25	1.82	0.45			1.66		0.40			0.45	0.00			0.29	
91	GIFU SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,370	31,070		156	0.25		1.91			0.35		1.14			0.12		-0.17	0.35		0.27
92	SHIZUOKA SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	2,900	717,229		154			1.49					1.49			0.33			0.41		0.27
94	THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning		3,000	2,124,288	612		0.40	1.78	0.20			1.64		0.39			0.40	-0.04			0.26	

ID no.	Newspaper	m-e	$p_{s1},$ $p_{s2}$	$s_1,$ $s_2$	$k_m$	$k_e$	$\frac{p_{s2}s_2}{p_{s1}s_1}$	Elasticity and Cross-Elasticity w.r.t Subscription Price				$\lambda_1$	$\lambda_2$	$1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_1}$	$1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_2}$	Elasticity and Cross-Elasticity w.r.t Pages of Content				$\frac{(f_k + \bar{c}(s_1 + s_2))k_m}{p_{s1}s_1}$	$\frac{(f_k + \bar{c}s_2)(k_m + k_e)}{p_{s2}s_2}$
								$\xi_1$	$\xi_2$	$\xi_{12}$	$\xi_{21}$					$\theta_{1m}$	$\theta_{1e}$	$\theta_{2m}$	$\theta_{2e}$		
								95	THE CHUNICHI SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,925					650,297		215	0.40		
97	KYOTO SHIMBUN morning		3,007	192,119	585		2.16	1.82	0.23		1.52		0.34		0.34	-0.11			0.28		
98	KYOTO SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,925	317,881		172	2.16	2.31	0.19		1.99		0.50		-0.19	0.38			0.16		
99	KOBE SHIMBUN morning		3,007	307,099	587		1.08	1.73	0.29		1.53		0.35		0.43	0.00			0.36		
100	KOBE SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,925	254,782		185	1.08	2.44	0.24		1.85		0.46		-0.24	0.49			0.26		
102	NIHONKAI SHIMBUN		1,995	175,497	597			0.68			0.68				0.17				0.25		
103	SANIN CHUO SHIMPO		2,855	180,878	529			1.20			1.20		0.17		0.28				0.23		
104	THE SANYO SHIMBUN morning		3,007	394,612	661		0.24	1.56	0.44		1.47		0.32		0.44	0.00			0.35		
105	THE SANYO SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,925	72,015		136	0.24	2.14	0.24		0.99					0.00	0.24		0.24		
106	THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN morning		3,007	644,166	624		0.15	1.57	0.31		1.43		0.30		0.31	-0.08			0.19		
107	THE CHUGOKU SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,925	73,628		162	0.15	1.91	0.52		0.84					-0.17	0.35		0.05		
108	TOKUSHIMA SHIMBUN morning		3,007	200,102	544		0.36	1.49	0.66		1.19		0.16		0.33	0.00			0.31		
109	TOKUSHIMA SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,925	54,622		185	0.36	1.83	0.50		1.02		0.02			-0.17	0.33		0.33		
110	SHIKOKU SHIMBUN		3,007	208,307	601			1.27			1.27		0.21		0.21				0.17		
111	EHIME SHIMBUN		3,000	318,391	592			1.21			1.21		0.17		0.30				0.25		
112	KOCHI SHIMBUN morning		3,000	84,657	647		2.13	1.43	0.79		0.64				0.32	0.00			0.59		
113	KOCHI SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,770	143,219		177	2.13	1.67	0.61		1.87		0.46			-0.15	0.30		0.16		
114	THE NISHINIPPON morning		3,007	679,137	563		0.34	1.55	0.23		1.34		0.25		0.35	-0.04			0.25		
115	THE NISHINIPPON morning + evening	x	3,925	175,518		182	0.34	2.04	0.64		1.28		0.22			-0.25	0.38		0.21		
116	SAGA SHIMBUN		2,905	141,023	605			1.29			1.29		0.23		0.24				0.18		
117	NAGASAKI SHIMBUN		3,000	190,034	577			1.00			1.00		0.00		0.17				0.17		

ID no.	Newspaper	m-e	$p_{s1},$ $p_{s2}$	$s_1,$ $s_2$	$k_m$	$k_e$	$\frac{p_{s2}s_2}{p_{s1}s_1}$	Elasticity and Cross-Elasticity w.r.t Subscription Price				$\lambda_1$	$\lambda_2$	$1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_1}$	$1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_2}$	Elasticity and Cross-Elasticity w.r.t Pages of Content				$\frac{(f_k + \bar{c}(s_1 + s_2))k_m}{p_{s1}s_1}$	$\frac{(f_k + \bar{c}s_2)(k_m + k_e)}{p_{s2}s_2}$	
								$\xi_1$	$\xi_2$	$\xi_{12}$	$\xi_{21}$					$\theta_{1m}$	$\theta_{1e}$	$\theta_{2m}$	$\theta_{2e}$			
118	KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI morning		3,007	274,491	621		0.37	1.56		0.94		1.05		0.05			0.31	-0.16			0.21	
119	KUMAMOTO NICHINICHI morning + evening	x	3,364	90,269		167	0.37		1.45		0.56		0.93						-0.11	0.22		
120	OITA GODO SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,466	234,159		205			1.32				1.32		0.24					0.20		0.15
122	MIYAZAKI NICHINICHI		2,905	232,578	654												0.14					
123	MINAMINIPPON SHIMBUN morning		3,007	362,219	591		0.09	1.38		1.00		0.80					0.38	-0.13			0.39	
124	MINAMINIPPON SHIMBUN morning + evening	x	3,567	26,034		154	0.09		1.38		0.74		0.25						-0.11	0.32		
126	THE OKINAWA TIMES morning + evening	x	3,160	206,569		137			1.22				1.22		0.18					0.20		0.17
128	THE RYUKYU SHIMPO morning + evening	x	3,160	205,465		134			1.22				1.22		0.18					0.20		0.17
	MEAN			590,764	604	175	0.66	1.56	1.80	0.43	0.40	1.41	1.31	0.31	0.28	0.34	-0.08	-0.13	0.35		0.26	0.11
	S.D.			1,094,598	58	45	0.61	0.27	0.43	0.27	0.17	0.32	0.42	0.12	0.16	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.10		0.09	0.22

Table 4. Regression estimates relating newspaper ad pricing to circulation.

OLS estimates of

$$[22] \quad p_a = f_a \psi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\xi_a}\right)^{-1} + \bar{c} \psi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\xi_a}\right)^{-1} s + \epsilon$$

$$\text{where } p_a = p_{am} \text{ or } p_{ae}, \text{ and } s = \begin{cases} s_1 + s_2, & \text{if } p_a = p_{am} \\ s_2, & \text{if } p_a = p_{ae} \end{cases}$$

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	Ad rate for legal notice (per cm)	Advertising rate for display ad per page of ads (=15 dan)		
		1-dan rate	5-dan rate	15-dan rate
Intercept	8,184,111	2,455,071	2,205,316	1,944,448
s.e.	669,478	387,169	367,110	330,189
Number of subscribers	10.35	6.26	5.96	5.37
s.e.	0.38	0.22	0.21	0.19
R-Square	0.89	0.90	0.90	0.90
n=96				

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Note. The sample includes observations for each edition of each newspaper: morning and evening editions, national and local papers.

Table 5. GMM estimate of two-equation system, based on 1-dan, 5-dan and 15-dan rate for display ad.

Equation 1—Advertising price per page of ads:  $p_a = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 s$   
 Equation 2—Demand for advertising:  $\ln a = \beta_0 + \xi_a \ln(\gamma_0/s + \gamma_1) + \beta_1 \ln AvgIncome + \beta_2 PcntCollege$

Instruments for  $s$ : (1) pages of content per month, (2) newspaper home prefecture number of households if bloc newspaper or local newspaper, (3) dummy=1 if national newspaper, and =0 if not.

Variable		Parameter	1-dan rate		5-dan rate		15-dan rate	
			$p_a$	$\ln a$	$p_a$	$\ln a$	$p_a$	$\ln a$
	Intercept	$\gamma_0$	1,464,644		1,232,950		1,030,722	
		s.e	171,192		160,970		143,329	
$s$	Number of subscribers	$\gamma_1$	6.46		6.23		5.67	
		s.e	0.39		0.38		0.35	
	Intercept	$\beta_0$		28.01		29.08		33.75
		s.e		28.50		26.07		25.24
$\ln(\gamma_0/s + \gamma_1)$	Nat. log of advertising rate for display ad per page of ads per subscriber as predicted by ad price equation	$\xi_a$		-1.30		-1.27		-1.27
		s.e		0.54		0.53		0.55
$\ln AvgIncome$	Nat. log of subscriber average household income	$\beta_1$		-2.81		-3.02		-3.80
		s.e		4.79		4.39		4.25
$PcntCollege$	Percent of subscribers college educated	$\beta_2$		-5.06		-4.71		-3.75
		s.e		5.89		5.50		5.35
Number of observations			63		60		60	

Table 6. OLS regression estimate of subscription price equation.

Estimating equation:

Morning edition:

$$[23] \quad \left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_1}\right) p_{s1} = c_{0m} + \bar{c}(a_m + k_m) - \frac{\psi p_{am} a_m}{(s_1 + s_2)}$$

Morning-and-evening edition ,if morning-only subscriptions are not offered:

$$[24] \quad \left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_2}\right) p_{s2} = c_{0m} + c_{0e} + \bar{c}(a_m + k_m + a_e + k_e) - \frac{\psi p_{am} a_m}{s_2} - \frac{\psi p_{ae} a_e}{s_2}$$

Evening edition, if morning-only subscriptions are also offered:


$$[25] \quad \left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_2}\right) p_{s2} - \left(1 - \frac{1}{\lambda_1}\right) p_{s1} = c_{0e} + \bar{c}(a_e + k_e) - \frac{\psi p_{ae} a_e}{s_2}$$

Parameters to be estimated:  $c_{0m}$ ,  $c_{0e}$ ,  $\bar{c}$ ,  $\psi/s$

Dependent variable = Left-hand side of [23], [24], or [25].

	Dummy=1 if newspaper for which $p_1=3007$ yen per mo. and $p_2=3925$ yen per mo.		Morning delivery	Evening delivery	Pages per month	Advertising revenue per subscriber
	Morning edition	Evening edition				
Coefficient estimate	-96	209	475	241	0.62	-0.09
s.e.	121	131	186	223	0.42	0.04
F	0.62	2.54	6.49	1.17		
Pr>F	0.43	0.12	0.01	0.29		
R-Square	0.90					
n	51					

Figure 1. Morning circulation in 2007 of Japan's national, local and regional newspapers in each prefecture, ranging from west (Okinawa) to east (Hokkaido).



Source: Chou-Mai-Yomi-Kei VS chihoushi no shea araso, dokusen nyuushu, tadoufuku ichiran (Asahi Mainichi Yomiuri Nikkei vs regional newspapers, rivalry for shares and monopolization, summary of number of copies issued in each prefecture), *Facta*, July 2007. <http://facta.co.jp/article/200707008.html>

Figure 2. Marginal value of pages of content per month, based on mixed-logit estimate of utility function.

Average marginal value of pages of content per month, per subscriber, for each edition (morning, and morning-and-evening), of each newspaper

