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HABIT FORMATION IN
AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY

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September 2004

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Habit Formation in an Interdependent World Economy\textsuperscript{1}

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Economic interdependence of heterogeneous habit forming consumers is examined by using a two-country model. Due to endogenous interest rate adjustments, consumption-habit dynamics in one country are affected by the other country’s habits and preferences. To characterize the interactive dynamics, we construct an aggregate world felicity function from individual countries’ felicity functions and introduce a global aggregate habit capital, defined as the sum of individual countries’ habit capitals. External indebtedness depends crucially on international differences in habit-adjusted disposable income less habitual living standard. The international average of, and difference in, the strength of habit formation play a key role in macroeconomic adjustment and the effects of fiscal policies. An increase in fiscal spending in one country can make that country better off, and the neighbor worse off, due to intertemporal terms-of-trade effects.

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1 Introduction

An important stylized fact is that consumers’ habit forming behavior has a significant effect on intertemporal choices, and hence various macroeconomic phenomena (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane 1999, Carroll et al. 2000, Fuhrer 2000, Boldrin et al. 2001, Díaz et al. 2003). Accordingly, there have been numerous attempts to better understand open macroeconomic phenomena by incorporating habit formation. For example, by introducing consumers’ habit-persistent behavior to small-country models, Mansoorian (1993a, b) and Ikeda and Gombi (1999) derive its implications for current account dynamics and macroeconomic policies. Amongst others, Gruber (2002) provides empirical support to an “intertemporal current account model” with habit formation as explaining the actual current account behavior of the G-7 countries.

However, in the existing studies, including those small-country analyses, habit formation is examined within the representative-agent framework, in which consumers’ interactions due to pecuniary externalities are completely neglected. When the interest rate is endogenously determined in a heterogeneous agent, general equilibrium setting, one consumer’s (or country’s) habit forming behavior is affected by other consumers’ (or countries’) habits and preferences. It has a particular importance to examine how this produces different results from those the literature has predicted using small-country and/or representative-agent models. The analysis would enable us to address how habit formation in consumption affects each consumer’s (country’s) long-run indebtedness and the transmission mechanism of various policies.

This paper presents a tractable two-country world economy model with heterogeneous habit forming consumers. The purposes of the paper are: (i) to analyze interactive habit forming consumer behavior in a world economy; (ii) to examine long-run external indebtedness; and (iii) to address how fiscal policies in one country affect the two countries’ consumptions, wealth holdings, and welfare levels. Devereux and Shi (1991) examine similar issues using a two-country model with variable discount rates and capital accumulation. At the cost of assuming away capital accumulation, our main interest is to focus on habit formation as a more empirically relevant component of the process of macroeconomic adjustment.

Under habit formation, it is well known that consumption dynamics depend crucially on intertemporal complementarities induced by the preferences for habits. For example, when the marginal utility of consumption
is strongly and positively related to habits, which Ryder and Heal (1973) designate adjacent complementarity, optimum consumption is tied tightly to and comoves positively with current habits. In this case, the typical open economy implication is that when a negative income shock occurs, consumers desave to maintain the present consumption level at the habitual standard, which causes a deterioration in the current account (see, e.g., Mansoorian 1993a, b). By contrast, when there are heterogeneous consumers or countries, the behavior of individual consumers is affected by other consumers’ habits and preferences, as well as their own, due to interest rate adjustments. Equilibrium intertemporal complementarity in consumption can thus differ from what is defined by individual consumers’ subjective preferences. Our main interest is to address how equilibrium intertemporal complementarity in consumption is determined under international interdependence, thereby adding new insights to the macroeconomic implications of habit formation.

To examine habit forming consumer behavior in the interdependent world economy, we propose to reduce the general equilibrium dynamic model in two ways. First, we construct a world felicity function from both countries’ felicity functions. One appealing aspect of this approach is the ability to thereby characterize intertemporal complementarities in each country’s equilibrium consumption in a similar way as in a small-country case. Even though habit preferences in one country display distant (resp. adjacent) complementarities, its equilibrium consumption behavior may exhibit adjacent (resp. distant) complementarities. A corollary is that even if one country has no preference for habits, the time series of consumption rates will display habit-persistent patterns.

Second, we define an aggregate habit capital as the sum of individual countries’ habit capitals. When aggregate output is constant, the aggregate habit capital is also constant since, from the market clearing condition, it equals aggregate output. When aggregate output changes at a point in time due to exogenous shocks, the aggregate habit formation affects consumption dynamics as an additional dynamic source. The resultant consumption behavior in each country is then affected by the aggregate habit capital, as well as its own habit capital.

Long-run external indebtedness is characterized by defining the effective disposable income that can be allocated for saving under habit formation as surplus income. It is shown that a country is more likely to be a long-run creditor the larger surplus income it has. Surplus income depends on disposable income (i.e., output income less government spending), the initial
stock of habit capital, and the strength of adjacent complementarity. When a country’s disposable income is larger (resp. smaller) than its habitual consumption level, we show that the country has larger (resp. smaller) surplus income and hence is more likely to be a creditor (debtor), the stronger adjacent complementarity it exhibits. This result is shown to be consistent with Devereux and Shi’s (1991) proposition that a country tends to be a long-run creditor the more patience it has. The novelty of this paper is that which country is more patient depends on the relative strengths of adjacent complementarity and how much greater disposable income than the habitual consumption standard they have.\(^1\)

We address macroeconomic adjustments in response to an increase in country H’s fiscal spending financed with lump-sum taxes. The consumption dynamics in a country are governed by the aggregate habit capital, in addition to its own habit capitals. The relation between the equilibrium consumption and these habit capitals depends on the international average of, and difference in, intertemporal complementarities. As shown in the literature (see, e.g., Mansoorian 1993a, b), in the small-country case negative income shocks, such as an increase in fiscal spending, necessarily lowers both initial and steady-state consumption levels; and decreases (resp. increases) net foreign assets under adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity. By assuming that the initial holding of net foreign assets, and hence the income re-transfer effect due to interest rate changes are negligible, we show that an increase in a country’s fiscal spending (i) can increase the initial or steady-state consumption level of that country, with the other country’s consumption being crowded out; (ii), as in the small country case, necessarily worsens (resp. improves) the steady-state external asset position if the country’s preference displays adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity, irrespective of the other country’s preferences; and (iii) has long-run and short-run spill-over effects on the other country’s consumption, depending crucially on whether the policy implementing country displays adjacent or distant complementarity.

With non-negligible initial net foreign assets, an increase in fiscal spending induces additional income effects by changing the world interest rate. Even though fiscal spending is assumed to generate no direct utility, it is shown, as an important welfare implication, that due to the intertemporal

\(^1\)For the effect of habit formation on wealth distribution, see Díaz et al. (2003). They show that habit formation decreases wealth inequality by raising wealth poor consumers’s precautionary savings more than wealth rich ones'.
terms-of-trade effect, an increase in fiscal spending financed by lump-sum taxation can benefit the policy implementing country and harm the neighboring country. This is an intertemporal version of (reversed) “immiserizing growth” discussed by, e.g., Bhagwati (1958) and Brecher and Bhagwati (1982).

By using a two-country model, Bianconi (2003) exhibits the possibility that an increase in fiscal spending has a reversed immiserizing growth effect due to changes in the intratemporal terms of trade. He shows that an increase in a country’s fiscal spending financed by capital taxation contracts the production frontier in that country, and thereby appreciates the real exchange rate, which can improve the asset position and the welfare level. However, this reversed immiserizing growth effect cannot take place when government spending is financed by a lump-sum tax, and/or when there is only one consumption good (see Bianconi 2003, p.26). By contrast, fiscal spending in our habit forming economy can make the policy implementing country better off by improving the intertemporal terms of trade, even when the policy is financed by lump-sum taxation in a single good economy.2

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present a two-country model. In Section 3, we examine equilibrium dynamics of consumption, the interest rate, and net foreign assets. Section 4 analyzes the effects of an increase in one country’s fiscal spending. In Section 5, welfare enhancing government spending is discussed. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 The other literature concerning two-country dynamic models include Turnovsky and Bianconi (1992), Kalayalcin (1996), and Bianconi and Turnovsky (1997), which focus on supply side adjustments such as capital accumulation and/or leisure/labor choice. See also Ikeda and Ono (1991) for an analysis of non-monotonic multi-country dynamics under heterogeneous consumer preferences.
and $y^*$, respectively. Throughout the paper, the foreign country’s variables are represented with superscript asterisks.

Consumption forms habits. Letting $z_t^{(s)}$ represent the time-$t$ habit, we specify $z_t^{(s)}$ as the average of the past consumption rates $c_s^{(s)}$, $s \leq t$: $z_t^{(s)} = \alpha \int_{-\infty}^{t} c_s^{(s)} \exp (-\alpha (t - s)) \, ds$, or equivalently

$$\dot{z}_t^{(s)} = \alpha \left( c_t^{(s)} - z_t^{(s)} \right), \quad (1)$$

where $\dot{x}$ represents the time derivative of variable $x$ and $\alpha$ represents the discount rate for past consumption rates. We assume that consumers in both countries have the common discount rate $\alpha$ for past consumption rates. This enables us to obtain the tractable dynamics of a two-country equilibrium.

Consumers H and F have different preferences over consumption and habits. Consumer H’s preferences are specified as

$$U_0 = \int_0^{\infty} u(c_t, z_t) \exp (-\theta t) \, dt, \quad (2)$$

where $\theta$ represents the subjective discount rate, which is assumed constant. Following Ryder and Heal (1973), function $u$ is assumed to satisfy the following regularity conditions: (C1) $u_c > 0$; (C2) $u_z \leq 0$; (C3) $u_c(c, c) + u_z(c, c) > 0$; (C4) $u$ is concave in $(c, z)$; (C5) $\lim_{c \to 0} u_c(c, z) = \infty$ uniformly in $z$; and (C6) $\lim_{c \to 0} \left[ u_c(c, c) + u_z(c, c) \right] = \infty$. Consumer F’s utility $U_0^*$ is specified in the same way.

Due to habit formation, consumer preferences are intertemporally dependent. Within the representative agent framework, Ryder and Heal (1973) characterize the resulting intertemporal complementarities in consumption by adjacent and distant complementarities: With adjacent complementarity, an increase in today’s habits increases the marginal utility of today’s consumption more than it increases marginal disutility of habits, thereby enlarging today’s optimal consumption. Under distant complementarity, an increase in today’s habits increases marginal disutility of habits so much that it reduces today’s consumption rate. We apply this idea to characterize each country’s preferences: Consumer H’s preference is said to display adjacent (distant) complementarity when $u_{cz}(c, c) + \frac{\alpha}{\theta + 2\alpha} u_{zz}(c, c) > (<) 0$. Similarly, adjacent and distant complementarities in country F are defined in terms of $u^*$. In the case of the representative agent economy, the intertemporal complementarities displayed by consumers’ preferences definitely determine the equilibrium dynamics (see, e.g., Ryder and Heal 1973 and Ikeda and Gombi
1999). In contrast, when the economy consists of heterogeneous agents, as in the present case, pecuniary externalities through markets divert each agent’s consumption saving behavior from what is predicted from each agent’s own preference, as shown in the following section.

To ensure the steady state, let us assume that 
\[ \theta = \theta^*. \]

Unlike in the single agent model, the interest rate \( r \) can deviate from this subjective discount rate.

Let \( b_t \) denote net foreign assets held by consumer H. The flow budget constraint for consumer H is given by
\[
\dot{b}_t = r_t b_t + y - c_t - \tau, \tag{3}
\]
where \( \tau \) represents a lump-sum tax levied by the government in country H. Given the initial values \((b_0, z_0)\), consumer H chooses \( C_0 = \{c_t, b_t, z_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \) so as to maximize (2) subject to: (i) the flow budget constraint (3); (ii) the formation of consumption habits (1); and (iii) the transversality conditions.

Letting \( \lambda_t (\geq 0) \) be the shadow price of savings and \( \xi_t (\leq 0) \) that of habit formation, the optimal conditions are given by
\[
\begin{align*}
&u_c(c, z) = \lambda_t - \alpha \xi_t, \tag{4} \\
&\dot{\lambda}_t = (\theta - r_t) \lambda_t, \tag{5} \\
&\dot{\xi}_t = (\theta + \alpha) \xi_t - u_z(c_t, z_t), \tag{6}
\end{align*}
\]
together with (1), (3), and the transversality conditions for \( b_t \) and \( z_t \). Consumer F’s behavior can be specified in exactly the same way.

The governments in the two countries follow the balanced budget principle. Their fiscal spendings \( g \) and \( g^* \) equal tax revenues from lump-sum taxes \( \tau \) and \( \tau^* \), respectively. By substituting this into (3) we obtain the balance of payment equation,
\[
\dot{b}_t = r_t b_t + y - c_t - g. \tag{7}
\]

The model is closed by introducing the market clearing conditions:
\[
\begin{align*}
&c_t + c_t^* = Y (\equiv y + y^* - g - g^*), \tag{8} \\
&b_t + b_t^* = 0, \tag{9}
\end{align*}
\]
where $Y$ represents the disposable aggregate income. By Walras’ law, these are not independent: (9) together with (7) and the corresponding constraint for the foreign consumer imply (8). In sum, the equilibrium time path of $(b_t, b^*_t, c_t, c^*_t, z_t, z^*_t, r_t, \lambda_t, \lambda^*_t, \xi_t, \xi^*_t)$ is determined by equations (1), (4) through (7), the corresponding equations for $F$, and the market equilibrium condition (8) or (9).

3 Two-Country Equilibrium

3.1 The world felicity function

In this economy consumption dynamics in the two countries interact through international market transactions. To ease the analysis, it is useful to define aggregate habit capital $Z_t$ as

$$Z_t \equiv z_t + z^*_t.$$  

(10)

Since $\alpha$ is assumed to be internationally identical, the dynamics of $Z_t$ can be expressed from (1) and the market clearing condition (8) as

$$\dot{Z}_t = \alpha (Y - Z_t).$$  

(11)

Note that this is an autonomous dynamic equation. If $Z_t$ and $z_t$ are given, $z^*_t$ are determined from (10) as

$$z^*_t = Z_t - z_t.$$  

(12)

By using (12), dynamics can be drastically simplified in the following manner. Define $\sigma$ as:

$$\sigma = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda^*},$$

which is constant over time since $\dot{\lambda}_t/\lambda_t = \dot{\lambda}^*_t/\lambda^*_t$ from (5) (and the corresponding equation for $F$). We then construct aggregate indices for $(u, u^*)$ and $(\xi, \xi^*)$ as:

$$v(c, z, Z) \equiv u(c, z) + \sigma u^*(Y - c, Z - z),$$  

(13)

$$\varsigma \equiv \xi - \sigma \xi^*,$$  

(14)

where (8) and (12) are substituted.
The new felicity function $v$ represents an aggregate utility function with weights being given by relative individual marginal utilities. We could call it the world felicity function. The new shadow price $\zeta$ is the weighted difference in the shadow prices of habits. From the definition of $v$, $\zeta$ could be regarded as net marginal gains of transferring consumption capital from consumer F to H. With these definitions, we can reduce the equilibrium dynamics of consumption habits around a steady-state point as follows:

**Proposition 1:** In equilibrium, consumer H’s habits around a steady-state point are governed by

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
\dot{z} \\
\dot{\zeta} \\
\dot{Z}
\end{pmatrix} = 
\begin{pmatrix}
M & \frac{-QM_{vz}v_{cc}}{v_{cc}v_{zz} + v_{cc}v_{zz}} \\
0 & 0 \\
\alpha & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
\dot{z} \\
\dot{\zeta} \\
\dot{Z}
\end{pmatrix};
$$

(15)

$$M = \begin{pmatrix}
-\alpha \left(1 + \frac{\theta}{v_{cc}}\right) & -\frac{\alpha^2}{v_{cc}} \\
\frac{(v_{cc})^2 - v_{cc}v_{zz}}{v_{cc}v_{zz}} & \theta + \frac{\alpha(v_{cc} + v_{zz})}{v_{cc}}
\end{pmatrix},$$

where $\hat{x}$ denotes deviations of variable $x$ from its steady-state value $\bar{x}$: $\hat{x} \equiv x_t - \bar{x}$.

**Proof.** See Appendix A. 

**Remark 1:** The dynamic equation (15) is block recursive, where coefficient matrix $M$ for habit and its shadow price $(\dot{z}, \dot{\zeta})$ is exactly the same as in the case of the small-country model (e.g., Ikeda and Gombi 1999 and Mansoorian 1993a, b), except that $v$ and $\zeta$ represent the world average preferences, instead of individual countries’ preferences.

**Remark 2:** As easily seen, Proposition 1 is an application of the second theorem of welfare economics. Without any distortion, the Pareto optimal resource allocation attained as a complete market equilibrium can be duplicated as a solution to a social welfare maximization problem:

$$\max U_0 + \beta U_0^\ast,$$

subject to $Y = c_t + c_t^\ast$, $Z_t = z_t + z_t^\ast$, $\dot{z}_t = \alpha (c_t - z_t)$,

and $\dot{Z}_t = \alpha (Y - Z_t)$. 8
Indeed, the corresponding Hamiltonian function,

\[ H_t = u(c_t, z_t) + \beta u^*(Y - c_t, Z_t - z_t) + \varsigma_t \alpha (c_t - z_t) + \iota_t \alpha (Y - Z_t), \]

produces the same optimal condition as in Proposition 1 when weight \( \beta \) is set equal to \( \sigma \).

Since the dynamic equation (11) of aggregate habit \( Z \) is autonomous, it is noteworthy that, if the economy is initially in steady-state equilibrium, and if the steady-state value of \( Z \), which equals \( Y \) from (11), does not change, the aggregate habit stays at value \( Y \). In other words, in the absence of aggregate income shocks, the aggregate habit dynamics degenerate at \( \bar{Z}(= Y) \), so that the equilibrium dynamics in (15) are completely described by the \( (\hat{z}, \hat{\zeta}) \) dynamics, as in the small-country case. Note, however, that the transition matrix here is defined in terms of the world felicity function.

3.2 Equilibrium dynamics

3.2.1 Habit and consumption

Dynamic system (15) has two stable roots:

\[ \omega \equiv \theta - \sqrt{(\theta + 2\alpha)^2 - 4\alpha (\theta + 2\alpha) \Omega} < 0 \]

and one unstable root, which is conjugate with \( \omega \), where \( \omega \) is a characteristic root of \( M \); and \( \Omega \equiv -\left( v_{cz} + \frac{\alpha}{\theta + 2\alpha} v_{zz} \right) / v_{cc} \). In parallel with intertemporal complementarities with respect to the individual consumers’ preferences, \( \Omega \) captures equilibrium intertemporal complementarities: we refer to the world felicity function as displaying adjacent (distant) complementarity when \( v_{cz} (c, c) + \frac{\alpha}{\theta + 2\alpha} v_{zz} (c, c) > (\leq) 0 \), i.e., \( \Omega > (\leq) 0 \).

Let us introduce complementarity indices \( \Omega^H \) and \( \Omega^F \) for the individual countries’ preferences, in parallel with \( \Omega \), as

\[ \Omega^H \equiv -\left( u_{cz} + \frac{\alpha}{\theta + 2\alpha} u_{zz} \right) / u_{cc} \text{ and } \Omega^F \equiv -\left( \dot{u}_{cz} + \frac{\alpha}{\theta + 2\alpha} \dot{u}_{zz} \right) / u_{cc}^\ast, \]

where, e.g., a positive \( \Omega^H \) represents adjacent (distant) complementarity for H. The indices, \( \Omega^H \) and \( \Omega^F \), capture the strength of habit formation of the
individual consumers H and F. When $\Omega^H$ is larger than $\Omega^F$, for example, complementarity between consumption and habit is stronger for consumer H than for consumer F.

**Definition:** Consumer H is *more (less) in the habit of consuming* than consumer F when $\Omega^H > (<) \Omega^F$.

From the definition (13) of \( v \), the intertemporal complementarities with respect to the individual countries’ preferences can be related to those prevailing in equilibrium by:

$$\Omega = \varepsilon \Omega^H + (1 - \varepsilon) \Omega^F;$$  \hfill (17)

$$\varepsilon \equiv \frac{u_{cc}}{u_{cc} + \sigma u_{cc}}.$$  

Therefore, adjacent (distant) complementarity in both countries implies adjacent (distant) complementarity in the two-country equilibrium. When the individual countries’ preferences display different intertemporal complementarities, equilibrium intertemporal complementarity is determined by the relative strength of intertemporal complementarities regarding the individual preferences.

As shown in Appendix B.1, the saddle plane governed by the two stable roots are expressed as

$$\dot{z} = \omega \dot{z} - (\omega + \alpha)(1 - \delta)\dot{Z},$$  \hfill (18)

$$\dot{Z} = -\alpha \dot{Z},$$  \hfill (19)

where

$$\delta \equiv \varepsilon \Omega^H / \Omega.$$  

By equating (18) to (1), the consumption dynamics are given by

$$\dot{c} = \left( \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\alpha} \right) \left( \dot{z} - (1 - \delta)\dot{Z} \right).$$  \hfill (20)

Differentiate this by \( t \) and substitute (1), (19), and (20) successively into the result. Then, by taking (8) into account, we obtain the motion of each country’s consumption as

$$\dot{c} = \omega \dot{c},$$  \hfill (21)
\[ \hat{c}^* = \omega \hat{c}^*. \]  

Irrespective of the second-order habit dynamics of (18) and (19), therefore, the equilibrium consumption dynamics are of the first order. Equations (1) and (21) jointly govern the equilibrium dynamics of \((c, z)\); and equations (1) and (22) do dynamics of \((c^*, z^*)\). The resulting phase diagrams are illustrated in the \((c, z)\) and \((c^*, z^*)\) planes of Figure 1.

To understand the consumption-habit dynamics given by (20), consider first the case without any aggregate income shocks, \(\hat{Z} = 0\), in which case the equilibrium \(\hat{c}-\hat{z}\) relationship reduces to:

\[ \hat{c}_t = \left( \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\alpha} \right) \hat{z}_t \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{c}^*_t = \left( \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\alpha} \right) \hat{z}^*_t. \]  

(23)

From equations (16) through (23), when the world felicity function displays adjacent complementarity \((\Omega > 0)\), \(\omega + \alpha\) is positive and thus the stable arms (23) are positively sloping, whereas under distant complementarity with respect to \(v\) \((\Omega < 0)\) the trajectories have a negative slope with negative \(\omega + \alpha\). That is, in equilibrium, both countries experience positive or negative comovements between consumption and habits, i.e., \(dc_t^{(c)}/dz_t^{(z)} > (\<) 0\), as the world felicity function displays adjacent or distant complementarity. This property is the same as in the small-country case except that intertemporal complementarities here are defined in terms of the world felicity function, instead of each country’s felicity function.

When aggregate habit capital \(\hat{Z}\) varies, the equilibrium consumption dynamics depend on \(\hat{Z}\). The second term of (20) captures the effect of an increase in \(\hat{Z}\) for given \(\hat{z}_t\). Alternatively, we substitute the definition of \(\delta\), (17), and (10) successively into (20) to obtain

\[ \hat{c} = \left( \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\alpha \Omega} \right) \left( \varepsilon \Omega^H \hat{z} - (1 - \varepsilon) \Omega^F \hat{z}^* \right). \]  

(24)

Since \((\omega + \alpha)/\Omega\) is positive irrespective of whether the world felicity function displays adjacent or distant complementarity,\(^3\) this reveals that the sign of \(\hat{c}\) is determined by the relative magnitudes of \(\varepsilon \Omega^H \hat{z}\) and \((1 - \varepsilon) \Omega^F \hat{z}^*\). \(\hat{c}\) can thus be negative even when \(\varepsilon \Omega^H \hat{z}\) is positive if \((1 - \varepsilon) \Omega^F \hat{z}^*\) is large enough. Suppose that both the countries’ preferences display adjacent complementarities, \(\Omega^H, \Omega^F > 0\). If \(\hat{z}\) and \(\hat{z}^*\) are positive, each country’s consumer plans

\(^3\)When \(\Omega = 0\), we have \(\omega + \alpha = 0\). It can be shown from (16) that \(\lim_{\Omega \to 0} (\omega + \alpha)/\Omega = \alpha\).
to consume a larger quantity than the steady-state level. Since a positive $\hat{c}^*$ implies a negative $\hat{c}$ in equilibrium, the sign of equilibrium $\hat{c}$ should be negative when $(1 - \varepsilon) \Omega^F \hat{z}^*$ is larger than $\varepsilon \Omega^H \hat{z}$. As will be shown later, the market will be cleared by a rise in the interest rate.

It is important to note that even if one country has no preference for habits, the time series of consumption rates will display seemingly habit-persistent patterns. For example, suppose that country H has no preference for habits: $u_z = 0, u_{zz} = 0, u_{cz} = 0$, and hence $\Omega^H = 0$. From (20), the equilibrium consumption of country H still depends on its own habit capital, with root $\omega$ being determined solely by country F’s preferences for habits (see (16) and (17)). Given that $c$ is related to $c^*$ by market equilibrium condition (8), and that $z$ is related to $z^*$ and $Z$ by (10), the dependence of $c^*$ on $z^*$ due to country F’s habit preferences induces the dependence of $c$ on $(z, Z)$ even though $c$ does not depend directly on $z$.

3.2.2 The interest rate

As is proven by Appendix B.2, the interest rate dynamics are given by

$$ \hat{r} = \kappa \left( \Omega^H - \Omega^F \right) \hat{z} + \left[ \frac{(1 - \varepsilon) \Omega^F (\Omega^F - \Omega^H) \kappa}{\Omega} + \frac{\Omega^H \Omega^F}{\Omega} \eta \right] \hat{Z}, \quad (25) $$

where $\kappa$ and $\eta$ are defined as

$$ \kappa \equiv \frac{\omega u_{cc}^* (\theta + 2\alpha)}{\lambda^* (\alpha + \theta - \omega) (u_{cc} + \sigma u_{cc}^*)} (> 0); \eta \equiv -\frac{\alpha u_{cc} u_{cc}^*}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} (> 0). $$

Equation (25) reveals that the equilibrium interest rate is driven by country H’s habit capital $\hat{z}$ and the aggregate habit capital $\hat{Z}$. Since $\hat{z} - \hat{z}^* = 2\hat{z} - \hat{Z}$, a change in $\hat{z}$ with a given $\hat{Z}$ can be taken as a change in difference between the two countries’ habit capitals $\hat{z}$ and $\hat{z}^*$. Equation (25) thus implies that the dynamics of $\hat{r}$ rely on the difference between and the sum of the two countries’ habit capitals. The dynamics of habit capitals $z$ and $Z$ are jointly generated by (18) and (19). It is easy to show that the resulting dynamics of the interest rate can be non-monotonic. As seen from (25), the interest rate also depends on the difference in the two countries’ intertemporal preferences $\Omega^H$ and $\Omega^F$ as well as on the average $\Omega$ of the two.

It is too complicated to analyze (25) directly and thereby show how these factors determine the equilibrium interest rate. Instead, we focus on
three special cases: (i) the aggregate habit stock stays constant at the initial steady-state value, i.e., $\hat{Z}_t = 0$ for all $t$; (ii) the two countries’ preferences exhibit identical degrees of adjacent complementarity, i.e., $\Omega^H = \Omega^F = \Omega$; and the preferences have no intertemporal dependence on average in the steady state, i.e., $\Omega = 0$ (or equivalently $\omega = -\alpha$) and hence $\Omega^F = -\frac{\epsilon}{1-\epsilon}\Omega^H$.

Case (i): $\hat{Z}_t = 0$ for all $t$. In this case, equation (25) reduces to:

$$\hat{r} = \kappa (\Omega^H - \Omega^F) \hat{z}. \tag{26}$$

This reveals that the equilibrium interest rate depends crucially on international difference $\hat{z}$ in habit capital through international difference $\Omega^H - \Omega^F$ in intertemporal complementarity. The interest rate positively (negatively) co-moves with $\hat{z}$ when consumer $H$ is more (less) in the habit of consuming than consumer $F$. To understand this relationship, suppose that consumer $H$’s preferences display distant complementarity ($\Omega^H < 0$) whereas country $F$’s display adjacent complementarity ($\Omega^F > 0$); and that $z(t) < \bar{z}$, and hence, from (12), $z^*(t) > \bar{z}$. With distant complementarity for consumer $H$’s preference, he or she would consume more now than in the future steady state if $r$ equaled $\theta$. Consumer $F$ would also consume more now than in the future due to adjacent complementarity. This would give rise to excess demand in the “present good” market. The market clearing $r(t)$ should thus be higher than its steady-state level $\theta$. By the same reasoning, in the case of adjacent complementarity for country $H$ with distant complementarity prevailing in country $F$, $r(t)$ is positively correlated with $z(t)$. As shown later, the dynamics of $\hat{z}$ are monotonically driven by stable root $\omega$ when $\hat{Z}_t = 0$. From (26), therefore, the interest rate in this case displays monotonic dynamics,

$$\dot{r} = \omega \hat{r},$$

This case takes place (i) when the values of $\Omega^i$ ($i = H, F$) happen to be the same in steady state; (ii) when the felicity functions take quadratic forms with constant and internationally identical second-order derivatives; or (iii) when the two countries are perfectly identical with respect to preferences, endowments, and the initial stocks of habit capitals and net foreign assets. In case (iii), although the $\Omega^i$ values are globally identical, we cannot examine the case of non-zero $b_0$.

If country $H$ is identical to country $F$ ($\Omega^H = \Omega^F$), or if country $F$ is small in the sense that $\lambda^*$ is infinitely large ($\lambda^* \to \infty$), for which case $\kappa$ is zero, the interest rate dynamics degenerate at $\theta$ as in the small-country case (e.g., Ikeda and Gombi 1999).
Case (ii): $\Omega^H = \Omega^F = \Omega$. When the two countries’ preferences exhibit the identical degrees of adjacent complementarity, the equilibrium interest rate is determined from (25) as

$$\hat{r} = \eta \Omega \hat{Z}, \quad (27)$$

implying that the aggregate habit stock and the average preferences play crucial roles in this case. Suppose that the current aggregate habit stock is larger than its steady-state level, $Z(t) > \bar{Z}$. Then, if consumers exhibit adjacent (distant) complementarity, i.e., $\Omega > 0 \ (\Omega < 0)$, *ceteris paribus* there prevails excess demand (supply) in the present good market. This renders the equilibrium interest rate higher (lower) than its steady-state interest rate $\theta$. The equilibrium interest rate positively (negatively) comoves with the aggregate habit stock, which exhibits monotonic motions with stable root $-\alpha$ (see (19)). The resulting dynamics of $r$ are given explicitly by

$$\dot{r} = -\alpha \hat{r}. \quad (28)$$

Case (iii): $\Omega = 0$ (or equivalently $\omega = -\alpha$). From (25), the equilibrium interest rate in case (iii) is given by

$$\hat{r} = \varepsilon \kappa \Omega^H \left( \frac{1}{\varepsilon} \hat{z} - \frac{1}{1 - \varepsilon} \hat{z}^* \right). \quad (29)$$

The two-country’s habit stock $\hat{z}$ and $\hat{z}^*$ affect the interest rate in the opposite direction. When $\Omega^H$ is positive (negative), for example, a positive $\hat{z}$, *ceteris paribus*, causes excess demand (supply) for the present good. Since $\Omega^F = -\frac{\varepsilon}{1 - \varepsilon} \Omega^H$ is negative in this case, a positive $\hat{z}^*$, *ceteris paribus*, causes excess supply. The sign of $\hat{r}$ is determined by the relative magnitudes of the countervailing effects. Since from (18) and (19) $\dot{z}$ and $\dot{z}^*$ are generated by $\dot{z} = -\alpha \hat{z}$ and $\dot{z}^* = -\alpha \hat{z}^*$, respectively, the law of motion of the interest rate is given by (28) again.

3.2.3 Net foreign assets

The transition dynamics of net foreign assets also depend on the property of the world felicity function and international heterogeneity in habit formation. As shown by Appendix B.3, by linearizing (7) and substituting (24) and (25)
into the result, we can obtain

\[
\hat{b}_t = \frac{1}{\theta - \omega} \left( \omega + \alpha - a_1 b_0 \right) \hat{z}_t + \left[ - \frac{(\omega + \alpha)(1 - \varepsilon)\Omega^F}{\alpha(\theta - \omega)\Omega} \right] \hat{Z}_t,
\]

where \(a_1\) and \(a_2\) represent the coefficients of \(\hat{z}\) and \(\hat{Z}\) in (25):

\[
a_1 = \kappa \left( \Omega^H - \Omega^F \right),
\]

\[
a_2 = \frac{(1 - \varepsilon) \Omega^F (\Omega^F - \Omega^H) \kappa}{\Omega} + \frac{\Omega^H \Omega^F}{\Omega} \eta,
\]

respectively.

Two habit stocks \(\hat{z}_t\) and \(\hat{Z}_t\) affect \(\hat{b}_t\) by changing consumption and the interest rate. Changes in the habit stocks affect consumption through (20) and thereby influence the accumulation of net foreign assets. This effect is expressed by the terms without \(b_0\) in (30), which depend on \(\omega + \alpha\), i.e., whether the world felicity function displays distant or adjacent complementarity. The habit stocks also affect the interest rate by (25). The resulting change in interest income alters the time profile of net foreign assets. The effect is captured by the terms associated with \(b_0\) in (30). These income re-transfer effects through interest rate changes may well have various adverse effects. To avoid analytical complexity, we get rid of the effects by assuming that the initial amounts \(b_0\) of net foreign assets for both countries are negligible, as in Devereux and Shi (1991). The implications of a nonzero \(b_0\) will be discussed briefly in Section 5 and in Appendix C.

**Assumption 1:** \(b_0^* \approx 0\).

With Assumption 1, equation (30) reduces to

\[
\hat{b}_t = \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\alpha(\theta - \omega)} \left( \hat{z}_t - (1 - \delta) \hat{Z}_t \right).
\]

Combining (20) with the above equation yields the saddle arm in the \((b, c)\) plane:

\[
\hat{b}(t) = \frac{1}{\theta - \omega} \hat{c}(t).
\]
Since from (21) the dynamics of $\hat{c}(t)$ are monotonic, those of $\hat{b}(t)$ are also monotonic. Figure 1 depicts the saddle arm in the $(b, c)$ plane as upward sloping schedule $DD'$. 

### 3.3 Steady state

From (1), (5), (7), and (30), the steady-state equilibrium, $(\bar{c}, \bar{c}^*, \bar{z}, \bar{z}^*, \bar{Z}, \bar{b}, \bar{b}^*, \bar{r})$, is determined by:

\begin{align*}
\bar{c} &= \bar{z}, \bar{c}^* = \bar{z}^*, \quad (32) \\
\bar{c} + \bar{c}^* &= Y = \bar{Z}, \quad (33) \\
\bar{r} &= \theta, \quad (34) \\
\bar{r}\bar{b} + y &= \bar{c} + g, \quad (35) \\
\bar{b} &= \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\alpha (\theta - \omega)} (\bar{z} - z_0) - \frac{\omega + \alpha (1 - \varepsilon) \Omega F}{\alpha (\theta - \omega) \Omega} (\bar{Z} - Z_0), \quad (36) \\
\bar{b} &= -\bar{b}^*. \quad (37)
\end{align*}

Together with (8), (9) and (12), where (36) comes from (30) evaluated at $t = 0$. By substituting (32) and (34) into (35), we obtain

$$\bar{r}\bar{b} + y = \bar{c} + g. \quad (38)$$

Combining (33) and (36) yields

$$\bar{b} = \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\alpha (\theta - \omega)} (\bar{z} - z_0) - \frac{\omega + \alpha (1 - \varepsilon) \Omega F}{\alpha (\theta - \omega) \Omega} (Y - Z_0). \quad (39)$$

Equations (38) and (39) jointly determine $(\bar{b}, \bar{z})$. Figure 2 depicts the determination of $(\bar{b}, \bar{z})$: schedule $BB'$ depicted with a positive slope represents (38), whereas schedule $SS'$, which represents (39), can be either positively or negatively sloping as the world felicity function displays either adjacent or distant complementarity. Even when schedule $SS'$ is positively sloping, schedule $BB'$ is always steeper than $SS'$. The steady-state equilibrium point $(\bar{b}, \bar{z})$ is given by the intersection point $E$ of the two schedules. Given this, $(\bar{c}, \bar{c}^*, \bar{z}^*, \bar{Z})$ is determined by (32) and (33); and $\bar{b}^*$ by (37).

From linearity of (38) and (39), we can examine the determinants of the long-run external asset distribution by solving the two equations for $\bar{b}$ as

$$\bar{b} = -\frac{\omega + \alpha}{\omega (\theta + \alpha) \Omega} (I - I^*), \quad (40)$$

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where
\[ I = \varepsilon \Omega^H \left( y - g + \frac{\omega (\theta + \alpha)}{\alpha (\theta - \omega)} z_0 \right), \]
\[ I^* = (1 - \varepsilon) \Omega^F \left( y^* - g^* + \frac{\omega (\theta + \alpha)}{\alpha (\theta - \omega)} z_0^* \right). \]
Roughly, terms \( I \) and \( I^* \) represent disposable incomes \( y^* - g^* \) in excess of habitual consumption levels \( \frac{\omega (\theta + \alpha)}{\alpha (\theta - \omega)} z_0^* \), adjusted by the relative strengths of adjacent complementarities \( \varepsilon \Omega^H \) and \((1 - \varepsilon) \Omega^F \). For short, we call \( I \) and \( I^* \) surplus incomes.

**Definition:** \( I \) and \( I^* \) are surplus incomes.

Since \( (\omega + \alpha) / \Omega \) is positive, (40) implies that \( \bar{b} \) is positively proportionate to the international difference \( I - I^* \) in surplus income:

**Proposition 2:** With Assumption 1, long-run net foreign assets in one country are positively proportionate to the difference of the country's surplus income from the other country's.

Proposition 2 implies the four parts of Corollary 1 below. First, whether country H is a creditor or debtor depends crucially on the relative magnitudes of surplus incomes \( I \) and \( I^* \): \( \bar{b} < \bar{b}^* \Leftrightarrow I \succ I^* \). Suppose that a country’s disposable income exceeds the habitual consumption level. Then, if its preferences are of adjacent complementarity, *ceteris paribus* it saves the excessive income and thereby holds positive external assets in the long run. When its preferences are of distant complementarity, in contrast, *ceteris paribus* it consumes more than the excessive income to hold negative external assets in the long run. The same is true for the other country. In equilibrium, the country with a larger (resp. smaller) surplus income accumulates (resp. decumulates) external assets.

Second, from (40), the effects of increases in fiscal spending are obtained as
\[ \frac{d\bar{b}}{dg} = -\frac{d\bar{b}^*}{dg} = \frac{\varepsilon \Omega^H}{(\theta + \alpha) \omega} \left( \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\Omega} \right), \]
\[ \frac{d\bar{b}^*}{dg^*} = -\frac{d\bar{b}}{dg^*} = \frac{(1 - \varepsilon) \Omega^F}{(\theta + \alpha) \omega} \left( \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\Omega} \right), \]
implying that an increase in a country’s fiscal spending reduces (resp. enlarges) its long-run external assets and hence enlarges (resp. reduces) the other country’s when consumer preferences in the policy implementing country display adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity. For example, an increase in \( g \) reduces or enlarges \( \bar{b} \) as \( \Omega^H \) is positive or negative. Irrespective of the two-country setting, note that this property is the same as in the small-country case.

Third, a permanent income transfer from country H to country F, \(-dy = dy^* > 0\), affects each country’s external asset position as

\[
\left. \frac{d\bar{b}}{dy} \right|_{dy = -dy^*} = -\left. \frac{d\bar{b}^*}{dy} \right|_{dy = -dy^*} = -\frac{\omega + \alpha}{\omega(\alpha + \theta)}.
\]

It follows that the income transfer reduces or enlarges country H’s net foreign assets as the world felicity function exhibits adjacent or distant complementarity.

Fourth, the initial stock \( z_0 \) of habit capital has qualitatively the same implication for the external asset position \( \bar{b} \) as fiscal spending \( g \). These discussions can be summarized in the following corollary.

**Corollary 1:** With Assumption 1,

(i) a country is a creditor (resp. debtor) in steady state when its surplus income is larger (resp. smaller) than the other country’s: \( \bar{b} \lesssim 0 \Leftrightarrow I \gtrless I^* \);

(ii) an increase in a country’s fiscal spending reduces (resp. enlarges) its long-run external assets and hence enlarges (resp. reduces) the other country’s when consumer preferences in the policy implementing country display adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity: \( \frac{d\bar{b}}{dg} = -\frac{d\bar{b}^*}{dg} \lesssim 0 \Leftrightarrow \Omega^H \gtrless 0 \);

(iii) a permanent income transfer from country H to country F reduces (resp. enlarges) H’s net foreign assets when the world felicity function exhibits adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity: \( \left. \frac{d\bar{b}}{dy} \right|_{dy = -dy^*} = -\left. \frac{d\bar{b}^*}{dy} \right|_{dy = -dy^*} \lesssim 0 \Leftrightarrow \Omega \lesssim 0 \); and

(iv) the initial stocks of habit capitals have qualitatively the same implication for external asset positions as fiscal spending.

**Remark 3:** Devereux and Shi (1991) show that a country will tend to be a long-run creditor the more patient it is and/or the greater is its disposable income. Our results, especially Corollary 1 (i), can be related to their discussion as follows. Starting from the initial situation that disposable incomes
equal the habitual consumption standards in the two countries, consider a marginal increase in country H’s disposable income, making its disposable income greater than the habitual consumption standard. As conjectured from the small-country analysis (and as will be indeed shown later), when country H’s preferences are more of adjacent complementarity than country F’s, then, in response to the positive income shock, country H is more reluctant to increase consumption in the short run and hence more likely to be a creditor in the long run. In this case, country H can be regarded as more patient than F in the short run and, consistent with Devereux and Shi (1991), the more patient country becomes a long-run creditor. What differs from their discussion is that which country is more patient depends on the relative strengths of adjacent complementarity and how much greater disposable income than the habitual consumption standard they have. To see this, consider a marginal decrease in country H’s disposable income, in which case the new level of disposable income is lower than the habitual consumption standard. When country H’s preferences are more of adjacent complementarity than country F’s, country H is more reluctant to decrease consumption in response to the negative income shock and becomes a debtor in the long run. It is true that the less patient country is a long-run debtor. In this case, however, it is country H that is the less patient.

### 3.4 Welfare

From the linearized equilibrium dynamics obtained above, Appendix B.4 shows that the welfare levels of countries H and F are given by

\[
U_0 = \frac{u(\overline{z}, \overline{z})}{\theta} + \frac{(\omega + \alpha) u_c + \alpha u_z}{\alpha(\theta - \omega)} (z_0 - \overline{z}) \\
- \frac{(\omega + \alpha)(1 - \varepsilon) \Omega^F}{\alpha(\theta + \alpha)(\theta - \omega) \Omega} \left[ (\theta + \alpha) u_c + \alpha u_z \right] (Z_0 - Y), \quad (44)
\]

\[
U_0^* = \frac{u^*(\overline{z}^*, \overline{z}^*)}{\theta} + \frac{(\omega + \alpha) u_c^* + \alpha u_z^*}{\alpha(\theta - \omega)} (z_0^* - \overline{z}^*) \\
- \frac{(\omega + \alpha) \varepsilon \Omega^H}{\alpha(\theta + \alpha)(\theta - \omega) \Omega} \left[ (\theta + \alpha) u_c^* + \alpha u_z^* \right] (Z_0 - Y), \quad (45)
\]

respectively.
4 Effects of government spending

Let us next consider an increase in fiscal spending \( g \) in country H, financed by lump-sum taxes.\(^6\)

4.1 Consumption and net foreign assets

As shown by Corollary 1(ii), an increase in country H’s fiscal spending reduces or increases its own net foreign assets in steady states as its preferences exhibit adjacent or distant complementarity, as in the small-country case (e.g., Ikeda and Gombi 1999). The effect on the steady-state consumption level is somewhat in contrast to the small-country case, where an increase in \( g \) necessarily decreases \( \bar{c} \). From (8), (38) and (39), the effect on steady-state consumption is obtained as follows:

\[
\frac{d\bar{c}}{dg} = \frac{d\bar{z}}{dg} = \frac{\theta d\bar{b}}{dg} - 1 = \frac{\varepsilon \theta \Omega^H}{(\theta + \alpha) \omega} \left( \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\Omega} \right) - 1, \quad (46)
\]

\[
\frac{d\bar{c}^*}{dg} = -\frac{\varepsilon \theta \Omega^F}{(\theta + \alpha) \omega} \left( \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\Omega} \right) \Rightarrow 0 \Leftrightarrow \Omega^H \lesssim 0. \quad (47)
\]

From (46), an increase in \( g \) decreases \( \bar{c} \) whenever \( \Omega^H \) is positive. When \( \Omega^H \) is negative, however, \( \bar{c} \) can increase due to an increase in interest income \( \theta \bar{b} \) in excess of the lump-sum tax increase if \( \Omega \geq 0 \) and hence \( \Omega^F > 0 \), that is if the world felicity function and hence consumer F’s felicity function exhibit adjacent complementarities.\(^7\)

\(^6\)We could consider three types of shocks: a shock that affects both of the BB’ and SS’ schedules in Figure 2 (e.g., an increase in fiscal spending in country H); one that shifts the BB’ schedule, leaving the SS’ schedule (e.g., an income transfer between the two counties, \(-dy = dy^*\)); and one that shifts the SS’ schedule, leaving BB’ unchanged (e.g., productivity shocks \( dy^* \) in country F). For the effects of income transfers, see Gombi and Ikeda (2003). The effects of productivity shocks \( dy^* \) in country F can be obtained from the effects of fiscal spending in country H by replacing country H’s variables with country F’s.

\(^7\)Formally, from (17) and (46), we can obtain

\[
\frac{d\bar{c}}{dg} > 0 \Leftrightarrow -\frac{1 - \varepsilon}{\varepsilon} \Omega^F \leq \Omega^H < \frac{\omega (1 - \varepsilon) (\theta + \alpha)}{\alpha \varepsilon (\theta - \omega)} \Omega^F.
\]

From this relation, it can be seen that necessary conditions for \( d\bar{c}/dg \) to be positive are: \( \Omega^H < 0 \), \( \Omega^F > 0 \), and \( \Omega \geq 0 \) by noting that \( \frac{(1 - \varepsilon)(\theta + \alpha)}{\alpha \varepsilon (\theta - \omega)} \leq \frac{1 - \varepsilon}{\varepsilon} \Leftrightarrow \Omega \gtrless 0 \).
Figure 3 illustrates the case that $\Omega^H < 0; \Omega^F > 0$; and $\Omega > 0$, for which case the slope of the $SS'$ schedule is positive but gentler than that of $BB'$. An increase in $g$ shifts both the schedules to the left. When the leftward shift of schedule $SS'$ is larger or smaller than that of $BB'$, $\bar{z}$ and hence $\bar{c}$ decreases or increases.

From (47), the spill-over effect on country F’s consumption $\bar{c}^*$ depends crucially on whether country H’s preferences display adjacent or distant complementarity, $\Omega^H \leq 0$. This is because the effects on $\bar{b}$ and hence on $\bar{b}^*$ rely crucially on the sign of $\Omega^H$. When country H’s preferences exhibit adjacent complementarity ($\Omega^H > 0$), an increase in $g$ decreases $\bar{b}$, increases $\bar{b}^*$ and hence increases $\bar{c}^*$, and vice versa.

From (20) and (46) the impact effect on country H’s consumption is derived as

$$\frac{dc(0)}{dg} = \frac{\varepsilon \Omega^H}{\theta + \alpha} \left( \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\Omega} \right) - 1. \tag{48}$$

In the small-country case, consumption of the country plumps more or less than its disposable income as the preferences exhibit distant or adjacent complementarity (see, e.g., Ikeda and Gombi 1999). In the same way, (48) implies that $dc(0)/dg \gtrless -1 \iff \Omega^H \gtrless 0$: when country H’s intertemporal preference exhibits adjacent (or distant) complementarity $\Omega^H > 0$ (or $\Omega^H < 0$), H’s consumption does not plump (or plumps) more than its disposable income on impact. Two points are noteworthy, however. First, the impact effect given by (48) is that on equilibrium consumption, which reflects the interest rate adjustment. Second, we cannot exclude the pathological case that equilibrium consumption $c(0)$ increases on impact when consumer H’s preferences display strong adjacent complementarity.\footnote{Note from (46) and (49) that}

Given that $dc(0)/dg \gtrless -1 \iff \Omega^H \gtrless 0$, market-clearing condition (8) implies that country F’s consumption decreases or increases as $\Omega^H$ is positive or negative. Formally, from (48) and (8), we obtain that

$$\frac{dc^*(0)}{dg} = -\frac{\varepsilon \Omega^H}{\theta + \alpha} \left( \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\Omega} \right) \gtrless 0 \iff \Omega^H \gtrless 0. \tag{49}$$

\footnote{Note from (46) and (49) that}

$$\frac{dc(0)}{dg} - \frac{dc^*>(0)}{dg} \frac{\varepsilon \Omega^H}{\theta + \alpha} \left( \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\Omega} \right) \left( 1 - \frac{\theta}{\omega} \right) \gtrless 0 \iff \Omega^H \gtrless 0.$$
Therefore, when H’s preferences display distant (or adjacent) complementarity, country F’s consumption jumps up (or down) on impact. Comparing (47) with (49) yields
\[
\frac{dc^* (0)}{dg} \underset{\geq}{\iff} 0 \iff \frac{d\bar{c}^*}{dg} \underset{\geq}{\iff} 0 \iff \Omega^H \underset{\geq}{\iff} 0,
\]
implying that the impact effect of an increase in fiscal spending on country F’s consumption is necessarily opposite to its steady-state effect. Since there is no direct income shock in country F, any increases or decreases in $\bar{c}^*$ should be financed by increases or decreases in $\bar{b}^*$, which are only brought about by decreases or increases in $c^*(0)$ to cause current account surplus or deficits in transition.

The transition dynamics are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 by using the phase diagrams introduced in Figure 1. Figure 4 treats the case in which $\Omega^H > 0$, i.e., consumer H’s preferences are of adjacent complementarity. From (41), an increase in $g$ reduces $\bar{b}$ and hence $\bar{c}$ (see (46)). Although $c(0)$ may decrease or increase (see (48)), savings necessarily reduce to generate the current account deficits, as in the case of adjacent complementarity in small-country models. As $c(0)$ decreases or increases, saddle arm $DD'$ in the $(b, c)$ plane shifts downward or upward. Net foreign assets $b$ gradually decumulate from $b_0$ to $\bar{b}$ along the new saddle arm, $D_1D_1'$. Since $\bar{b}^*(= -\bar{b})$ increases, $\bar{c}^*$ increases (see (47)). To realize this, $c^*(0)$ necessarily drops to induce the current account surplus (see (49)). As depicted in the $(z^*, c^*)$ plane, the resulting transition dynamics of $z^*$ are non-monotonic: at the earlier stage, following the discrete drop in $c^*$, $z^*$ decreases over time. As $c^*$ monotonically increases toward $\bar{c}^*$, $z^*$ sooner or later stops decreasing and starts rising toward $\bar{z}^*(= \bar{c}^*)$.

When $\Omega^H < 0$, i.e., when consumer H’s preferences are of distant complementarity, an increase in $g$ enlarges $\bar{b}(= -\bar{b}^*)$ and decreases $\bar{c}^*$. The effect on $\bar{c}$ is ambiguous because the increase in $\bar{b}$ may increase the disposable income in a steady state irrespective of the lump-sum tax increase. Figure 5 depicts the normal case of a negative $\Omega^H$ in which $\bar{c}$ is reduced by the increase in $g$. The impact on F’s consumption is positive, whereas that on H’s consumption is negative.

The following point is noteworthy. By considering a temporary income shock, Fuhrer (2000) shows that the habit formation model is useful to replicate non-monotonic responses of consumption that characterize the aggregate data. As shown above (see, e.g., Figures 4 and 5), even when the income
shock is permanent, the short-run response of consumption can exceed, or be opposite to, the long-run response. This implies that, in an interdependent economy, the habit model has a potential of explaining non-monotonic responses of consumption even without temporariness of income shocks.

4.2 The interest rate

The effect on the interest rate can be computed by differentiating (25) with respect to $g$ and by substituting (46) into the result as

$$\frac{dr(0)}{dg} = \frac{\alpha \varepsilon u_{cc}^* \Omega^H}{\lambda^* (\theta + \alpha) (\alpha + \theta - \omega) (u_{cc} + \sigma u_{cc}^*) \Omega} \left\{ u_{cc} (\omega - \theta) (\theta + 2\alpha) \Omega^H - \{\alpha (\omega + \alpha) u_{cc} + (\theta + \alpha) (\alpha + \theta - \omega) \sigma u_{cc}^*\} \Omega^F \right\}. \tag{50}$$

Instead of discussing the general properties of this complex result, we restrict our attention to the two special cases (ii) and (iii) discussed in Section 3.2.2. Consider case (ii), in which consumer preferences exhibit identical degrees of adjacent complementarity: $\Omega^H = \Omega^F = \Omega$. Equation (50) then reduces to

$$\frac{dr(0)}{dg} \bigg|_{\Omega^H=\Omega^F=\Omega} = \eta \Omega \leq 0 \iff \Omega \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{\alpha} 0. \tag{51}$$

This implies that an increase in $g$ raises (or lowers) $r(0)$ as the world felicity function displays adjacent (or distant) complementarity. Such a policy affects the commodity market on both the supply and demand sides: it reduces the supply of the good that can be absorbed by consumption; and it decreases disposable income in country H. In the case of adjacent complementarity, the decrease in disposable income would make the current consumption level in country H lower, but not so much as the steady-state consumption level if the interest rate is constant at $\theta$. This means that there would be excess demand in the current good market. To clear the market, the interest rate rises above $\theta$, which, in turn, decreases the aggregate consumption level to the lowered aggregate supply of the good. Alternatively, when the world felicity function exhibits distant complementarity, an increase in $g$ produces excess supply in the present good market, thereby lowering the interest rate. After the initial response, the interest rate then monotonically converges toward $\theta$ as seen from (28).
In case (iii), in which \( \Omega = 0 \) (or equivalently \( \varepsilon \Omega^H = -(1 - \varepsilon) \Omega^F \)), equation (50) is simplified to

\[
\left. \frac{dr(0)}{dg} \right|_{\Omega=0} = \kappa \Omega^H \left( \frac{\varepsilon \theta \Omega^H}{(\alpha + \theta)(1 - \varepsilon) + 1} \right) = \kappa \Omega^H \left( \frac{\varepsilon \theta \Omega^H}{(1 - \varepsilon)(\alpha + \theta) + 1} \right).
\]

This implies that when \( \Omega^H > 0 \), an increase in \( g \) causes excess demand in the present good market to raise the equilibrium interest rate, as in case (ii) with a positive \( \Omega \). When country H’s preferences are of a moderate distant complementarity, such that \( - (\alpha + \theta) (1 - \varepsilon) / (\theta \varepsilon) < \Omega^H < 0 \), the interest rate initially falls since an increase in \( g \) causes excess supply in the present good market, as easily conjectured from the discussions in case (ii). Under strong distant complementarity: \( \Omega^H < - (\alpha + \theta) (1 - \varepsilon) / (\theta \varepsilon) \), in contrast, the equilibrium interest rate is raised by the policy. Note that the condition under which the paradoxical case occurs can be rewritten as

\[
\Omega^H < 0 \text{ and } \left. \frac{dz}{dg} \right|_{\Omega=0} < -\varepsilon.
\]

Even when \( \Omega^H < 0 \), therefore, the interest rate initially goes up if the decrease in steady-state consumption is sufficiently small. In that case, due to distant complementarity an initial decrease in consumption is so small that excess demand prevails in the present market. From (28), monotonic transition dynamics follow the initial response.

### 4.3 Welfare

Irrespective of how each country’s consumption responds over time, an increase in government spending \( g \) necessarily reduces country H’s welfare. To see this, we substitute (8) into (44) and (45), differentiate the results by \( g \), and incorporate (46) and (47). The results are simply given by

\[
\frac{dU_0}{dg} = -\frac{\lambda}{\theta} (< 0),
\]

\[9\text{From (29), we can derive}
\[
\left. \frac{dr(0)}{dg} \right|_{\Omega=0} = -\frac{\kappa \Omega^H}{1 - \varepsilon} \left( \left. \frac{dz}{dg} \right|_{\Omega=0} + \varepsilon \right).
\]
\[
\frac{dU_0^*}{dg} = 0.
\]

As in the case of income transfers, the increase in \( g \) harms country H’s welfare by the amount equal to the present value of the marginal utility. The marginal change in \( g \), however, does not affect country F’s welfare in this non-distortionary competitive equilibrium.\(^{10}\) However, these properties are limited to the case of \( b_0 = 0 \).

5 Welfare-enhancing fiscal spending: An implication of \( b_0 \neq 0 \)

We have so far assumed that \( b_0 \) equals zero by Assumption 1. When \( b_0 \neq 0 \), however, an increase in government spending \( g \) has additional welfare effects by causing income re-transfers through interest rate changes, i.e., changes in the intertemporal terms of trade. Even though government spending is assumed to provide no direct utility, we shall show that an increase in \( g \) can enhance country H’s welfare level due to favorable changes in the intertemporal terms of trade, i.e., rises (resp. falls) in the world interest rate if the country is a creditor (resp. debtor).

Let us now abandon Assumption 1 to allow \( b_0 \) to take a non-zero value. For expository purposes, we focus on case (ii), \( \Omega^H = \Omega^F = \Omega \). As shown in Appendix C, an increase in \( g \) affects country H’s welfare by

\[
\left. \frac{dU}{dg} \right|_{\Omega^H=\Omega^F=\Omega} = -\frac{\lambda}{\theta} \left( 1 - \frac{\theta}{\alpha + \theta} \eta \Omega b_0 \right),
\]

implying the increase in \( g \) improves country H’s welfare if \( \frac{\theta}{\alpha + \theta} \eta \Omega b_0 > 1 \).

With a positive \( b_0 \), the policy is welfare enhancing if \( \Omega \) is a sufficiently large positive number, i.e., if consumers’ preferences are of sufficiently strong adjacent complementarity. Note that the term \( \frac{\theta}{\alpha + \theta} \eta \Omega b_0 \) represents an income re-distribution effect due to interest rate changes since, as derived in Appendix C, the effect on the interest rate is given by

\[
\left. \frac{dr(0)}{dg} \right|_{\Omega^H=\Omega^F=\Omega} \overset{\forall}{\equiv} 0 \Leftrightarrow \Omega \overset{\forall}{\geq} 0.
\]

\(^{10}\)The same result can be obtained from Bianconi and Turnovsky (1997, p.80) by assuming that \( g \) does not generate direct utility and that there is no initial external indebtedness.
With adjacent complementarity ($\Omega > 0$), *ceteris paribus* an increase in $g$ causes excess demand for the present good, raises the interest rate, and enlarges the disposable income and the welfare level if $b_0$ is positive and large. This is an intertemporal version of (reversed) immiserizing growth discussed by the trade theory (e.g., Bhagwati 1958, Brecher and Bhagwati 1982): a creditor country, i.e., an exporter of the present good, can be better (resp. worse) off due to intertemporal terms-of-trade improvements (resp. deteriorations) by decreasing (resp. increasing) the supply of the present good.

These changes in the intertemporal terms of trade cause spill-over effects on country F. Appendix C derives 

$$\frac{dU^*}{dg} \bigg|_{\Omega^H=\Omega^F=\Omega} = -\frac{\eta \Omega \lambda^*}{\theta + \alpha} b_0,$$

which reveals that the increase in $g$ makes country F worse (resp. better) off when $\Omega b_0 > 0$ (resp. $\Omega b_0 < 0$). With a positive $b_0 (= - b_0^*)$, for example, an increase in $g$ induces a deterioration (resp. an improvement) in country F’s intertemporal terms of trade, thereby harming (resp. benefiting) country F.

These results can be summarized as follows:

**Proposition 3:** Suppose that country H is as much in the habit of consuming as country F: $\Omega^H = \Omega^F = \Omega$. Then, due to intertemporal terms-of-trade effects, an increase in fiscal spending $g$ in country H

(i) enhances the country’s own welfare if and only if $-\frac{\eta \Omega \lambda^*}{\theta + \alpha} b_0 > 1$; and

(ii) harms country F if and only if $\Omega b_0 > 0$.

**Remark 4:** By using a two-country model, Bianconi (2003) shows the possibility that an increase in fiscal spending has a reversed immiserizing growth effect due to changes in the *intratemporal* terms of trade. He shows that an increase in a country’s fiscal spending financed by capital taxation contracts the production frontier in the country, and thereby appreciates the real exchange rate, which can improve the asset position and the welfare level of the country. However, as pointed out in Bianconi (2003, p.26) this reversed immiserizing growth effect cannot take place when government spending is financed by a lump-sum tax, and/or when there is only one consumption good. Proposition 3 shows that with habit formation, fiscal spending can make the policy implementing country better off by improving the *intertemporal* terms of trade even when the policy is financed by lump-sum taxation in a single good economy.
6 Conclusions

We have examined the process of macroeconomic adjustment in a tractable two-country model of heterogeneous habit forming consumers. Our conclusions can be summarized as follows:

1. To focus on interactive consumption-habit dynamics, we have proposed to construct the world felicity function and the aggregate habit capital, which successfully help to characterize intertemporal complementarities in the two-country equilibrium.

2. External indebtedness depends crucially on international difference in surplus income, i.e., the effective disposable income that can be allocated for saving under habit formation. This is shown to be consistent with the existing proposition (e.g., Devereux and Shi 1991) that a country tends to be a long-run creditor the more patient it is. Our contribution is that which country is more patient is determined endogenously from the relative strengths of adjacent complementarity and how much greater disposable income than the habitual consumption standard they have.

3. When the initial holding of net foreign assets, and hence the income re-transfer effect due to interest rate changes are negligible, an increase in a country’s fiscal spending (i) can increase the initial or steady-state consumption level of that country, with the other country’s consumption being crowded out; (ii), as in the small country case, necessarily worsens (resp. improves) the steady-state external asset position if the country’s preference displays adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity, irrespective of the other country’s preferences; and (iii) has long-run and short-run spill-over effects on the other country’s consumption, depending crucially on whether the policy implementing country displays adjacent or distant complementarity.

4. With non-negligible initial net foreign assets, an increase in fiscal spending in one country can make the country better off and the neighbor worse off due to (reverse) intertemporal terms-of-trade effects.
Appendices

A Proof of Proposition 1

Note first that \( \lambda / \lambda^* \) is constant because \( \lambda_t / \lambda_t^* = \lambda_t^* / \lambda_t^* \) from (5). By eliminating \( c^* \) and \( z^* \) using (8) and (12) from the foreign counterpart of (4), combining the resulting equation and (4) yields:

\[
\frac{u_c (c, z) + \alpha \xi}{u_c^* (Y - c, Z - z) + \alpha \xi^*} = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda^*} = \text{constant}.
\]

By totally differentiating this equation, we obtain:

\[
\dot{c} = -\frac{\lambda^* u_{cz} + \lambda u_{cz}^*}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} \dot{z} - \frac{\alpha \lambda^*}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} \dot{\xi} + \frac{\alpha \lambda}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} \dot{\xi}^* + \frac{\lambda u_{cz}}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} \dot{Z}.
\]

We substitute this equation into (1), (6), and the foreign counterpart of (6) and eliminate \( c^* \) and \( z^* \) using (8) and (12) from the resulting equation. Then, from (11), the autonomous dynamic equation system with respect to \( (\dot{\hat{z}}, \dot{\hat{\xi}}, \dot{\hat{\xi}}^*, \dot{\hat{Z}}) \) is obtained as follows:

\[
\dot{\hat{z}} = -\alpha \left( \frac{\lambda^* u_{cz} + \lambda u_{cz}^*}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} + 1 \right) \dot{z} - \frac{\alpha^2 \lambda^*}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} \dot{\hat{\xi}} + \frac{\alpha \lambda}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} \dot{\hat{\xi}}^* + \frac{\lambda u_{cz}}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} \dot{\hat{Z}},
\]

\[
\dot{\hat{\xi}} = \left\{ \frac{u_{cz} (\lambda^* u_{cz} + \lambda u_{cz}^*)}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} - u_{zz} \right\} \dot{z} + \left( \theta + \alpha + \frac{\alpha u_{cz} \lambda^*}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} \right) \dot{\hat{\xi}} - \frac{\alpha u_{cz} \lambda^*}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} \dot{\hat{\xi}}^* - \frac{\lambda u_{cz} u_{cz}^*}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} \dot{\hat{Z}},
\]

\[
\dot{\hat{\xi}}^* = -\left\{ \frac{u_{cz}^* (\lambda^* u_{cz} + \lambda u_{cz}^*)}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} - u_{zz}^* \right\} \dot{z} - \frac{\alpha^2 \lambda}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} \dot{\hat{\xi}}^* + \left( \theta + \alpha + \frac{\alpha u_{cz} \lambda}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} \right) \dot{\hat{\xi}} + \left( \frac{\lambda u_{cz}^2}{\lambda^* u_{cc} + \lambda u_{cc}^*} - u_{zz}^* \right) \dot{\hat{Z}},
\]

\[
\dot{\hat{Z}} = -\alpha \dot{\hat{Z}}.
\]

From the definitions (13) and (14) of \( v \) and \( \varsigma \), respectively, this autonomous system reduces to (15).
B Equilibrium solutions

B.1 Dynamics of habit capital $z$: (18)
The stable roots of dynamics (15) are given by $\omega$ and $-\alpha$ as in (16). Letting $m$ denote $(z, \zeta, Z)'$, the general solution to (15) can thus be expressed as

$$\dot{m}(t) = A_1 \exp(\omega t) q + A_2 \exp(-\alpha t) h,$$

where $q \equiv (q_1, q_2, q_3)'$ and $h \equiv (h_1, h_2, h_3)'$ represent the eigen vectors associated with stable roots $\omega$ and $-\alpha$, respectively. From (15), it is easy to confirm that $q_3 = 0$. By eliminating $A_1 \exp(\omega t)$ and $A_2 \exp(-\alpha t)$ from the three equations in the above vector equation, we obtain

$$\dot{\zeta} = \frac{q_2}{q_1} \dot{z} + \frac{q_1 h_2 - q_2 h_1}{q_1 h_3} \dot{Z}, \quad (53)$$

where the coefficients of $\dot{z}$ and $\dot{Z}$ can be obtained by exploiting the definition of the eigenvectors $q$ and $h$ as

$$\frac{q_2}{q_1} = -\frac{(\omega + \alpha) v_{cc} + \alpha v_{cz}}{\alpha^2},$$

$$\frac{q_1 h_2 - q_2 h_1}{q_1 h_3} = -\frac{v_{cc}(v_{cz} v_{ZZ} + v_{cz} v_{zz})}{\alpha v_{cc} v_{zz} + (2\alpha + \delta) v_{cc} v_{cz}} + \frac{\{(\omega + \alpha) v_{cc} + \alpha v_{cz}\} \{\alpha v_{cc} v_{ZZ} - (2\alpha + \delta) v_{cc} v_{cz}\}}{\alpha^2 (\alpha v_{cc} v_{zz} + (2\alpha + \delta) v_{cc} v_{cz})}.$$ 

Substituting (53) into the $\dot{z}$-equation in (15) yields (18).

B.2 The interest rate
From (1) and (4) through (6), the optimal consumption dynamics are given by

$$\dot{c} = -\frac{\lambda}{u_{cc}} \left( \hat{r} - \hat{\phi} \right),$$

where $\phi$ represents the rate of time preference,

$$\hat{\phi} = \frac{\alpha (u_{zz} + u_{cz})}{\lambda} \hat{z} - \frac{\alpha (\alpha + \theta)}{\lambda} \hat{\xi}.$$
Substitute (21) into the above Euler equation. The resulting equation can be solved for \( \hat{r} \) as
\[
\hat{r} = -\frac{\omega u_{cc}}{\lambda} \hat{c} + \frac{\alpha (u_{zz} + u_{cz})}{\lambda} \hat{z} - \frac{\alpha (\alpha + \theta)}{\lambda} \hat{\xi}.
\] (54)

In the above, \( \hat{\xi} \) can be obtained from (14), (19), (52), and (53) as
\[
\hat{\xi} = -\frac{u_{cc} \Omega^H}{\theta + \alpha - \omega} \hat{c} + \frac{u_{zz}}{\theta + 2\alpha} \hat{z}.
\] (55)

Substituting (55) and (20) successively into (54) yields (25).

### B.3 Net foreign assets

Set
\[
\hat{b} = \kappa_1 \hat{z} + \kappa_2 \hat{Z}.
\] (56)

Differentiating (56) with respect to time \( t \) yields
\[
\dot{b} = \kappa_1 \dot{z} + \kappa_2 \dot{Z}.
\] (57)

Since \( \dot{b} \) is given by (7), this equation implies
\[
\left( \begin{array}{c} \dot{b} \\ \dot{c} \end{array} \right) = \left( \begin{array}{c} r b_0 + r \dot{b} - \dot{c} \\ 0 \end{array} \right) = \kappa_1 \dot{z} + \kappa_2 \dot{Z}.
\] (58)

Substitute (18), (19), (20), (25), and (56) into (58). By comparing the coefficients of the resulting equation, we obtain
\[
(\omega - r) \kappa_1 = a_1 b_0 - \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\alpha},
\]
\[
-(\omega + \alpha) (1 - \delta) \kappa_1 - (r + \alpha) \kappa_2 = a_2 b_0 + \left( \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\alpha} \right) (1 - \delta).
\]

This simultaneous equation can be solved for \( \kappa_1 \) and \( \kappa_2 \) as
\[
\kappa_1 = \frac{1}{r - \omega} \left\{ \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\alpha} - b_0 a_1 \right\},
\] (59)
\[
\kappa_2 = \frac{(1 - \delta) (\omega + \alpha)}{\alpha (r - \omega)} + \frac{b_0}{r + \alpha} \left\{ \frac{(1 - \delta) (\omega + \alpha)}{r - \omega} a_1 + a_2 \right\}.
\] (60)

Substituting (59) and (60) into (56) yields (30).
B.4 Welfare

To obtain the welfare level of country H, linearize instantaneous utilities \( u(c_t, z_t) \) around a steady state and substitute the result into the lifetime utility function \((2)\) to obtain

\[
U_0 = \int_0^\infty \{ u(\bar{c}, \bar{z}) + u_c \hat{c}_t + u_z \hat{z}_t \} \exp (-\theta t) dt.
\]

Since, from \((21)\) and \((1)\), \( \hat{c}_t \) and \( \hat{z}_t \) are solved as

\[
\hat{c}_t = \hat{c}_0 \exp(\omega t) \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{z}_t = \left( \hat{z}_0 - \frac{\alpha \hat{c}_0}{\omega + \alpha} \right) \exp(-\alpha t) + \frac{\alpha \hat{c}_0}{\omega + \alpha} \exp(\omega t),
\]

the lifetime utility is expressed as

\[
U_0 = \int_0^\infty \{ u(\bar{c}, \bar{z}) + u_c \hat{c}_0 \exp((\omega - \theta) t) +
\]

\[
+ u_z \left( \hat{z}_0 - \frac{\alpha \hat{c}_0}{\omega + \alpha} \right) \exp(- (\alpha + \theta) t) + \frac{\alpha u_z \hat{c}_0}{\omega + \alpha} \exp((\omega - \theta) t) \} dt
\]

\[
= \frac{u(\bar{c}, \bar{z})}{\theta} + \frac{\hat{c}_0}{\omega - \theta} \left( u_c + \frac{\alpha u_z}{\omega + \alpha} \right) + \frac{u_z}{\alpha + \theta} \left( \hat{z}_0 - \frac{\alpha \hat{c}_0}{\omega + \alpha} \right).
\]

The initial optimal consumption \( \hat{c}_0 \) is obtained by setting \( t = 0 \) in \((20)\). Substituting it into the above equation yields \((44)\). Equation \((45)\) can be obtained in the same way.

C Dynamics with non-zero \( b_0 \): The identical degrees of adjacent complementarity

C.1 Solutions

By assuming that the two countries’ preferences exhibit the identical degrees of adjacent complementarity, \( \Omega^H = \Omega^F = \Omega \), we shall derive equilibrium solutions in the case of a nonzero \( b_0 \). In this case, from \((18)\), \((19)\), \((20)\), \((25)\), and \((30)\), the equilibrium dynamics are generated by the following equations

\[
\dot{z} = \omega \hat{z} - (\omega + \alpha)(1 - \delta) \hat{Z}, \quad (61)
\]
\dot{Z} = -\alpha \dot{Z}, \quad (62)
\hat{c} = \left( \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\alpha} \right) \left( \dot{Z} - (1 - \delta) \dot{Z} \right),
\dot{\hat{c}} = \omega \hat{c},
\dot{\hat{r}} = \eta \Omega \dot{Z},
\hat{b} = \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\alpha (\theta - \omega)} \dot{\hat{z}} - \left\{ \frac{(1 - \delta) (\omega + \alpha)}{\alpha (\theta - \omega)} + \frac{b_0 \eta \Omega}{\theta + \alpha} \right\} \dot{Z}. \quad (63)

U_0 = \frac{u(\bar{z}, \bar{z})}{\theta} + \frac{(\omega + \alpha) u_c + \alpha u_z}{\alpha (\theta - \omega)} (z_0 - \bar{z}) - \frac{(\omega + \alpha) (1 - \delta)}{\alpha (\theta + \alpha) (\theta - \omega)} [(\theta + \alpha) u_c + \alpha u_z] (Z_0 - Y), \quad (64)
U_0^* = \frac{u^*(\bar{z}^*, \bar{z}^*)}{\theta} + \frac{(\omega + \alpha) u_c^* + \alpha u_z^*}{\alpha (\theta - \omega)} (z_0^* - \bar{z}^*) - \frac{(\omega + \alpha) \delta}{\alpha (\theta + \alpha) (\theta - \omega)} [(\theta + \alpha) u_c^* + \alpha u_z^*] (Z_0 - Y), \quad (65)

respectively.

Define the effective habit stock \( e \) as
\[ e \equiv z - (1 - \delta) Z. \quad (66) \]

By using the effective habit stock, the equilibrium dynamics can be summarized as
\[ \dot{\hat{b}} = -\alpha \hat{b} + \frac{(\omega + \alpha)^2}{\alpha (\theta - \omega)} \hat{c}, \quad (67) \]
\[ \dot{\hat{c}} = \omega \hat{c}. \quad (68) \]

Figure 6 illustrates the phase diagram in the \((e, b)\) plane.

Note that (63) can be rewritten in terms of \( \hat{c} \) as
\[ \hat{b} = \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\alpha (\theta - \omega)} \hat{c} \cdot \frac{b_0 \eta \Omega}{\theta + \alpha} \dot{Z}. \quad (69) \]
The steady state equilibrium is determined by the following two schedules, $CC'$ and $DD'$:

\[
CC': \bar{b} - b_0 = \frac{\omega + \alpha}{\alpha (\theta - \omega)} (\bar{e} - e_0) - \frac{b_0 \eta \Omega}{\theta + \alpha} (Y - Z_0), \quad (70)
\]

\[
DD': \bar{\theta} \bar{b} = \bar{e} + (1 - \varepsilon)Y + g - y, \quad (71)
\]

where schedule $CC'$ is obtained by evaluating (69) at $t = 0$; and $DD'$ is obtained by substituting (66) for $\bar{c} (= \bar{z})$ in (35). The two schedules are illustrated in Figure 6, where schedule $CC'$ is positively- (resp. negatively-) sloping when the world felicity function displays adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity, $\Omega > 0$ (resp. $\Omega < 0$). It can be easily shown that the slope of schedule $DD'$ is larger than that of $CC'$;\(^{11}\) and that, when $\Omega > 0$, schedule $CC'$ is steeper than the $\dot{b} = 0$ schedule which is obtained by setting $\dot{b} = 0$ in (67).\(^{12}\) The steady-state equilibrium is determined at the intersection of the two schedules.

### C.2 The effect of fiscal spending

The effects of an increase in fiscal spending $g$ on $\bar{b}$ and $\bar{e}$ are obtained from (70) and (71) as

\[
\frac{d\bar{b}}{dg} = - \frac{1}{\omega (\theta + \alpha)} \frac{\delta (\omega + \alpha)}{\omega (\theta + \alpha)} - \frac{\alpha \eta (\theta - \omega) \Omega}{\omega (\theta + \alpha)^2} b_0, \quad (72)
\]

\[
\frac{d\bar{e}}{dg} = \frac{\alpha \delta (\theta - \omega)}{\omega (\theta + \alpha)} - \frac{\alpha \theta \eta (\theta - \omega) \Omega}{\omega (\theta + \alpha)^2} b_0. \quad (73)
\]

As seen by comparing (41) and (72), the first terms on the right hand sides in these equations represent the same effects as are discussed in Section 4.2 whereas the second terms capture income effects that arise under non-zero $b_0$ due to interest rate changes. In fact, differentiating (51) by $g$ yields

\[
\frac{dr (0)}{dg} \bigg|_{\Omega^u = \Omega^r = \Omega} = \eta \Omega, \quad (74)
\]

\(^{11}\)The slope of schedule $DD'$, $1/\theta$, minus that of $CC'$, $(\omega + \alpha)/\alpha (\theta - \omega)$, equals $- \omega (\theta + \alpha)/\alpha (\theta - \omega)$, which is positive.

\(^{12}\)The slope of schedule $CC'$, $(\omega + \alpha)/\alpha (\theta - \omega)$, minus that of the $\dot{b} = 0$ schedule, $(\omega + \alpha)^2/\alpha^2 (\theta - \omega)$, equals $- \omega (\omega + \alpha)/\alpha^2 (\theta - \omega)$, which is positive (resp. negative) when $\omega + \alpha > 0$ (resp. < 0).
implying that, with adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity, $\Omega > (\text{resp.} <) 0$, *ceteris paribus* an increase in $g$ causes excess demand (resp. supply) for the present good, and raises (resp. lowers) the interest rate. From (72), therefore, when country H is a creditor, $b_0 > 0$, the increase (resp. decrease) in the interest rate has an additional positive (resp. negative) effect on steady-state external asset holding of country H. Consequently, in contrast to the case of a zero $b_0$, even under adjacent complementarity, an increase in $g$ can enlarge steady-state external asset holding of country H by increasing interest income if $b_0$ is positive and sufficiently large.

Figure 7 illustrates such a case by assuming that $\Omega > 0$ and $b_0 > 0$. An increase in fiscal spending shifts both the $CC'$ and $DD'$ schedules upward. Due to a dominant interest-income effect, these shifts bring the steady-state point from $E_0$ to $E_1$ with a higher $\bar{b}$ and a lower $\bar{c}$. In transition the effective habit stock $e$ decreases monotonically whereas net foreign assets increase non-monotonically.

From (66) and (73), the effects on consumptions and habit capitals are given by

$$
\frac{d\bar{c}}{dg} = \frac{d\bar{c}}{dg} + (1 - \delta) \frac{dY}{dg} = \frac{\delta \theta (\omega + \alpha)}{\omega (\theta + \alpha)} - 1 - \frac{\alpha \theta \eta (\theta - \omega) \Omega b_0}{\omega (\theta + \alpha)^2},
$$

(75)

$$
\frac{d\bar{c}^*}{dg} = \frac{d\bar{c}^*}{dg} = 1 - \frac{d\bar{c}}{dg} = -\frac{\delta \theta (\omega + \alpha)}{\omega (\theta + \alpha)} + \frac{\alpha \theta \eta (\theta - \omega) \Omega}{\omega (\theta + \alpha)^2} b_0,
$$

(76)

in which the last terms on the right hand sides represent the income effect of interest rate changes. When $\Omega b_0 > 0$, an increase in $g$ increases country H’s interest income, thereby having a positive effect on $\bar{c}$ and a negative one on $\bar{c}^*$.

The welfare effects are obtained from (64), (65), (75) and (76) as

$$
\left. \frac{dU}{dg} \right|_{\Omega^H = \Omega^F = \Omega} = -\frac{\lambda}{\bar{\theta}} \left(1 - \frac{\theta}{\alpha + \theta} \eta \Omega b_0 \right),
$$

$$
\left. \frac{dU^*}{dg} \right|_{\Omega^H = \Omega^F = \Omega} = -\frac{\eta \Omega \lambda^*}{\bar{\theta} + \alpha} b_0,
$$

34
Equations (74) and (77) reveal that an increase in $g$ benefits country H when the income effect of interest rate changes is sufficiently large. From (74) and (78), the spill-over effect on country F’s welfare is positive or negative as the interest rate revenue of country F is enlarged or reduced by the policy. For example, when country H is a creditor ($b_0 > 0$) and when preferences display adjacent complementarity ($\Omega > 0$), an increase in $g$ raises the interest rate and causes income transfers from country F to H. This makes country F worse off. If $b_0$ and/or $\Omega$ are/is large enough, the increase in fiscal spending makes country H better off by raising her interest revenues.
References


Figure 1. Equilibrium dynamics
Figure 2. Steady-state equilibrium
Figure 3. Steady-state effects of an increase in fiscal spending when $\Omega_{H} < 0, \Omega_{F} > 0$, and $\Omega > 0$. 
Figure 4. The effects of an increase in fiscal spending when $\Omega_H > 0$. 
Figure 5. The effects of an increase in fiscal spending when $\Omega_{tt} < 0$. 
Figure 6. Equilibrium dynamics
Figure 7. Effects of an increase in fiscal spending when $\Omega > 0$ and $b_0 > 0$. 