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The Sources of Interindustry Wage Differentials

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**INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL
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Non-technical summary

Empirical analysis using cross-sectional data commonly find significant wage differences across industries. That is, some industries appear to pay higher wages than others to what appear to be equal workers employed in what appear to be equal firms. However, in a perfectly competitive labour market with similar workers and firms, these differences should not exist as wage differences across industries will encourage workers to move between firms, which would equalise wages. To the extent that inter-industry wage differences may reflect the existence of non-competitive mechanisms, they are an empirical finding difficult to explain in labour economics.

In this paper we investigate the existence and sources of inter-industry wage differences. First, we analyse the size and persistence of wage differences between industries. Second, we look at the effect of the characteristics of the worker, the firm and the match between the two. This allows us to answer questions related to (i) the nature of wage differences: is it because wages are truly different, or are they due to different types of workers employed by the industries, and (ii) which of these effects are the most important in explaining differences in wages across industries?

Analysis of the period 1986-2000 suggest the existence of important inter-industry wage differentials. Workers with the same characteristics working in firms with observably equal characteristics have different wages depending on the industry in which they are employed. The wage differences identified are considerable, with some industries paying wages that are more than 41% above the economy average while others pay wages that are more than 26% below the average. Amongst the industries paying the lowest wages, we find the Manufacture of furniture, Textiles, Clothing and Restaurants and cafés. The industries paying the highest wages tend to be related to financial intermediation like Banking or Insurance, the Electricity, gas and water supply services.

However, the estimated inter-industry wage structure is greatly weakened when controlling for unobserved characteristics of workers (e.g., unobserved ability), suggesting that the raw differences are due to the concentration of high wage workers in certain industries and not to genuine differences in wages paid by firms across industries. Further analysis, controlling for unobserved characteristics of firms, shows that compensation policies of firms vary across industries and that by changing industries workers may enjoy substantial wage growth. We thus conclude that inter-industry wage differences reflect different treats given by firms across industries.

Why might firms treat their workers by paying them wages above the economy average? Our results indicate that workers who are paid more than the economy average are less likely to quit. Therefore, we conclude that there is a possibility that firms gain from long term employment relationships. In these circumstances above-average wages are a profit maximising strategy because the costs of higher wages may be offset by the benefits of reduced turnover. This is consistent with a labour market in which industry specific skills are important and where efficiencies are gained from creating incentives to worker-firm attachments.

The sources of interindustry wage differentials.*

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31st March 2009

Abstract

We analyse the nature of interindustry wage differentials using Portuguese data. Estimates from models controlling for observed worker and firm characteristics reveal significant and persistent raw interindustry differentials, which questions the competitive model of the labour market. However, estimates controlling for unobserved worker heterogeneity suggest that the raw differentials are due to the concentration of high wage workers in certain industries and not to genuine differences in compensation across industries. However, a complete decomposition shows that (i) firm effects on average explain 70% of the industry wage premia, and (ii) genuine and sizeable interindustry wage differentials exist. These differentials are shown to increase the time to separation from firms, and are therefore compatible with the competitive model.

Keywords: interindustry wage differentials; unobserved worker firm and match effects; job mobility

JEL Classification: C33, J21, J31, J62, J63.

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1 Introduction

Empirical analyses using cross-sectional data commonly find significant wage differentials across industries. That is, some industries appear to pay higher wages than others to observably equal workers employed in observably equal firms. However, in a perfectly competitive labour market with homogeneous workers and firms, these differences should not exist as wage differences across industries will prompt mobility of workers that equalises wages. To the extent that interindustry wage differentials may reflect the existence of noncompetitive mechanisms, they are an empirical finding difficult to explain in labour economics. Noncompetitive mechanisms, however, are not the only possible explanation for these differentials. Such a wage structure can arise because our observed measures of the qualities of workers are imperfect. Therefore, high wage industries may either be hiring high wage workers or be composed of high wage firms, or have a combination of both. This means that substantial wage differences across industries can be either a consequence of the type of workers employed, or of different compensation policies of firms. A first purpose of this paper is to investigate the existence and sources of interindustry wage differentials. Are cross-sectional industry wage differentials true wage differences, or are they a consequence of unobserved individual heterogeneity? What is the relative importance of unobserved worker, firm and match effects in explaining differences in wages across industries?

Due to lack of appropriate longitudinal linked employer and employee data, decompositions of wage differentials are not common in the literature. The Portuguese data set used here, *Quadros de Pessoal*, enables us to estimate worker, firm and match unobserved effects using the techniques developed in Abowd *et al.* [AKM] (1999) and Woodcock (2008a), and to decompose the interindustry wage differentials into proportions attributable to each of these unmeasured components. Therefore, our analysis contributes to the ongoing debate on the sources of the industry wage structure, and adds to existing evidence for France and the U.S.A.

If interindustry wage differentials exist and persist over time, even after controlling for worker and firm characteristics, then wages play roles other than providing signals for labour reallocation. That is, wages do not reflect temporary differences in productivity caused by

Comments on earlier versions of this paper were received at presentations in the Warsaw International Economic Meeting 2008, the Leibniz Seminar on Labor Research (Berlin Network of Labor Market Research, November 2008), and the Brown Bag Seminar at the Toulouse School of Economics (March 2009).

shifts in the relative demand for labour between industries. There are two possible explanations for the existence of wage differences across industries. Either firms are not maximising profits, or firms find it profitable to pay higher wages. The latter is the main hypothesis of efficiency wage models, which argue that higher wages can increase output and so wages above opportunity costs are profit maximising. Although efficiency wage models can be grouped in categories such as shirking, turnover, adverse selection and fair wages, these categories are not mutually exclusive. Firms may be paying higher wages to accomplish a combination of objectives. However, we can use them individually to test the competitive model. One possibility is to analyse the relationship between the industry wage premia and turnover. Krueger and Summers (1988) suggest that if workers in high wage industries truly receive economic rents then we could expect to find a negative relationship between turnover and interindustry wage differentials. In this case the cost of higher wages would be at least partially offset by the benefits derived from reduced turnover rates. In this context, the second aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the industry wage premia and separations from firms. This analysis is done using duration models in which the dependent variable is the time to separation from firms, and where the industry wage premia is included amongst the explanatory variables.

Our main findings can be summarised as follows. Firstly, we find that wages differ across industries in Portugal and that the dispersion of wage differentials is fairly stable over time. Hence, temporary variations in productivity are not the main force driving the industry wage structure. Secondly, our decomposition of the raw interindustry wage differentials into components due to worker, firm and match effects reveals that unobserved firm effects are the major source of the observed differences in wages. Therefore, interindustry job mobility can have a large impact on the wages received as the nature of the differences is not due to a portable component of compensation (worker effects), but to different compensation policies across firms. Thirdly, we find that the industry wage premium is positively associated with the time to separation from firms. This suggests that the mechanisms generating wage dispersion across industries may be compatible with predictions of the competitive model, insofar as it can be profit maximising for firms to pay higher wages in order to reduce turnover costs.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the issues associated to the identification of interindustry wage differentials in empirical analyses. In Section 4, we docu-

ment cross-sectional differences in wages across industries in Portugal and identify their sources. Section 5 describes the statistical approach used to identify the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in generating these differentials. In Section 6 we decompose the raw interindustry wage differentials into proportions due to unobserved person, firm and match effects. In Section 7, the competitive model is tested by analysing the relationship between the time workers take to separate from firms and the industry wage premia identified in the previous section. Summary and conclusions are presented in Section 8.

2 Theoretical background

In a competitive model where all workers and jobs are homogeneous, information and search costs are low, and issues of worker motivation and risk shifting are not important, the long run labour market equilibrium is characterized by identical wages for all workers and little unemployment. Transitory wage differentials that reflect differentials in labour productivity (caused by demand fluctuations at the firm level, or at any labour market segment level) induce labour mobility. As there is no reason for workers to form attachments to specific firms or industries, they will respond to wage differentials and move between segments, equalizing productivity and restoring wage equality across segments. Therefore, in equilibrium, the competitive model with perfect information entails all workers with the same worker/job match characteristics obtaining the same wage. The model implies the nonexistence of unemployment, because wages adjust until the demand for workers equals their supply and the labour market clears. This suggests that wage dispersion and unemployment are closely related. Differences in wages generate worker flows across firms, and transitions between jobs can involve a period of unemployment. The model also predicts the nonexistence of wage differentials associated with the industry where the worker is employed, except if these are compensating differentials for nonpecuniary aspects of the job. However, reality appears not to comply with these predictions, as introducing the industry of employment commonly adds explanatory power to a wage equation which explains wages solely in terms of worker, firm and worker/firm match characteristics. The existence and persistence of wage differentials leads us to the question of how wages are determined. This is an important issue, because understanding the wage determination process is fundamental to

understanding labour mobility and unemployment.

Responses in the literature to observed interindustry wage differentials range from denial of their existence to accepting that these differences are true. The first approach complies with the competitive model and argues that observed cross-sectional wage differences between industries are illusory rather than reflecting true industry differences in compensation. According to this view the observed wage structure is generated by unobserved heterogeneity of workers and job characteristics. Higher wage industries may be compensating workers for their unmeasured labour quality, or for some less desirable working conditions or job characteristics that affect the utility of workers. If measures of the worker's productive abilities are imperfect and if workers in high wage industries have more productive ability than others, then the industry wage premia could simply be reflecting the earnings capacity of its workforce. In this case, changing industries will not be associated with wage gains or losses for workers because the observed differences are due to a portable component of compensation that will follow the worker to whatever industry he moves to.

The second approach accepts that there are interindustry wage differentials even when controlling for the nature of work and the quality of workers. One possible cause of such wage differentials is the existence of worker-firm attachments. These appear if efficiencies are gained when workers remain with specific firms or industries for extended periods. If efficiencies outweigh the gains in productivity that might come from reallocating labour in response to every transitory demand shock, then the labour market structure, employment rules, and wage structures adjust to encourage long-term attachments and to limit day-to-day competition in the labour market. The result is a segmented labour market where market competition is limited, and workers become attached to specific firms or industries with competition taking place only at specific ports of entry to internal labour markets. If workers do not compete in a single aggregate labour market, the labour market is expected to adjust less rapidly than suggested by the neoclassical model because wages play roles other than providing signals for labour reallocation.

Efficiency wage models provide some alternative explanations for the existence of industry specific wages. Krueger and Summers (1988) and Thaler (1989) group these models into four categories: (i) in shirking models, high wage industries should be those with high monitoring

costs and that have relatively higher costs of employee shirking; (ii) in turnover models, high wage industries are those in which turnover costs are highest; (iii) in adverse selection models, high wage industries are those more sensitive to labour quality differences or have higher costs of measuring quality; (iv) in fair wage models, industries with high profits will pay higher wages, because workers believe that fairness requires firms to share rents. Therefore, despite predictions from the competitive model that a profit maximising firm offers wages equal to the value of marginal productivity of labour, there can be reasons why firms pay supra competitive wages and create incentives for long term attachments of its workforce. These can be part of a profit maximising strategy of firms, and hence not fully incompatible with the neoclassical model.

When longitudinal data on workers became available, within-worker transformations and first differenced regressions were commonly applied in empirical studies of interindustry wage differentials, in the 1980s and early 1990s, to eliminate the effect of worker unobserved heterogeneity, and to identify the sources of the industry effects estimated using cross-sectional data. The results are as varied as the predictions of the models discussed. Murphy and Topel (1987) find evidence that two thirds of the observed differential can be explained by unmeasured worker characteristics. On the other hand, despite not identifying the sources of interindustry wage differentials, Krueger and Summers (1987) find empirical regularities that lead them to conclude that unmeasured worker characteristics cannot explain such differentials. These regularities include evidence suggesting that: (i) by changing industries workers receive wage changes similar to the industry effects found in cross-sectional data; (ii) the industry premia/penalty is similar for different types of quality of workers; and (iii) wage differentials can be explained by product market characteristics. Blackburn and Neumark (1992), by including measures of worker abilities (test scores) in their regressions, conclude that ability can only account for a small portion (10%) of interindustry wage differences observed in cross-sectional analysis. Gibbons and Katz (1992) conclude that a major proportion of interindustry wage differences cannot be explained by the sorting of workers across industries by unobserved productive ability.

More recently, questions of the sources of the industry wage structure have resurfaced due to the emergence of longitudinal linked employer-employee data. Yet, the results using this type of data remain varied. Using French data, Goux and Maurin (1999) find that the wage structure

is mainly due to unmeasured labour quality and that the potential wage gain from switching industries would be less than 3%. Furthermore, the authors conclude that these remaining true differentials do not persist over time. Also using French data, AKM (1999) conclude that person effects are relatively more important in explaining the differentials found in cross-sectional analysis. The same result is obtained by Abowd, Finer and Kramarz (1999) with data for the State of Washington and applying the same decomposition as AKM (1999). Woodcock (2008) using American data finds that, controlling for match effects, firm effects are responsible for 72% of the variance in raw interindustry wage differentials.¹ The difference between the findings of Goux and Maurin (1999) and other papers using matched worker-firm data might be due to the different techniques applied. The other studies use similar statistical methods to decompose the raw interindustry wage differentials found in cross-sectional data, and all provide evidence of the existence of pure interindustry wage differentials. This paper will add to the small empirical literature that controls for measured and unmeasured characteristics of both sides of the labour market. The methodology developed in AKM (1999) is used to distinguish between the two leading explanations of the industry wage structure found in cross-sectional analysis.

3 Data used and the Portuguese labour market

3.1 The Quadros de Pessoal data

The data used in this analysis is the *Quadros de Pessoal* (Lists of Personnel) from Portugal. The *Quadros de Pessoal* is a longitudinal data set with matched information on workers and firms. Since 1985, the survey has been annually collected (in March until 1993, and in October from 1994 onwards) by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and the participation of firms with registered employees is compulsory. The data include all firms (about 200 thousand per year) and employees (about two million per year) within the Portuguese private sector. The analyses in this paper are derived from data collections for each year from 1986 to 2000, with 1990 excluded because the database was not built in that year. Although the survey continues,

¹In contrast with the other studies using linked employer-employee that disaggregate industry coding to a detailed level (more than 90 industries), Woodcock (2008) uses only 8 SIC Major Divisions.

the data currently available for analysis ends in 2000.

Each firm and each worker has a unique registration number which allows them to be traced over time. All information – on both firms and workers – is reported by the firm. In general, the information refers to the situation observed in the month when the survey is collected. In some cases, namely information on dates, reported data may refer to dates in the past (*i.e.*, before the data collection month or to previous years) but is limited to the past within the specific firm where the worker is employed. Information on workers includes, for example, gender, age, education level, level of skill, occupation, date of admission in the firm, date of last promotion, monthly wages (split into some of its components) and monthly hours of work. Firm level data include, for example, the industry, location, number of workers, number of establishments, and legal structure.

Some data management was carried out before implementing any analysis. First, we converted the data from a set of time series-cross sections into longitudinal panel data format. Second, to overcome computer memory size limitations, a 10% random sample of workers was selected from the cleaned panel data set. Third, because we will compute estimates of unobserved person and firm effects, we select only the observations that belong to the largest group of connected workers and firms. This sample contains 1,823,572 observations related to 377,866 workers, 98,438 firms and 589,826 matches over time.²

3.2 The Portuguese labour market

The labour market in Portugal is very regulated. Employment protection regulation covers a wide range of issues such as the conditions under which individual dismissal are fair or unfair, the procedures for individual (and collective) notice and dismissal, severance payments, rules to the use of fixed-term contracts and of temporary work agency employment.

In general, labour market law favours employment security and gives preference to contracts of employment of indefinite duration, and most collective agreements (agreements reached after collective bargaining) make provision for career paths within the firm. This is achieved by,

²More details on the sample selection and construction of groups of connected workers and firms can be found in Ferreira, (2009b).

e.g. defining a set of general rules on the criteria for automatic and merit-based promotions.³ However, while a promotion (career progress) can be decided unilaterally and requires only an agreement between the worker and the firm, downgrading a worker to a lower category is more difficult. Downgrading can not be decided unilaterally, and even when the worker and the firm agree with it a special justification and authorization from the Ministry of Employment is required.

Wages are negotiated yearly and are updated in January (if collective bargaining takes longer to reach an agreement, wages are updated retroactively). Collective negotiations usually occur at the occupation and industry level, and coverage of workers is generally irrespective of union membership. This is a result of existing mechanisms of extension of contracts: (i) an employer accepting an agreement usually applies it to all of its workforce; and (ii) under certain circumstances the Government can extend the negotiated contracts by law. Collective bargaining defines wage floors for different categories of workers, but employers can deviate from this agreed wage level and pay higher wages.

Restrictive employment legislation is a barrier to labour mobility, one of the focal points of this paper. Low levels of job mobility, in turn, create incentives for firms to use fixed-term contracts and reduces the incentives for firms to provide training.⁴ Nevertheless, in spite of the rigid legal setting and the nature of collective bargaining, Portugal was reported by OECD in 2003 to have one of the lowest unemployment rates in the EU and a high degree of wage flexibility in the private sector and when the country is faced with economic shocks (OECD, 2003).

4 Industry affiliation and wages

In the competitive model the wages of workers do not depend on firm or industry affiliation. This prediction is usually tested by defining a wage function as follows:

$$y_{ijt} = x_{.,t}\beta + k_{(j(i,t))}\kappa + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

³Although merit promotions are totally dependent on the employer's will.

⁴For more details see OECD (2006).

where y_{ijt} is the logarithm of real monthly wages of worker $i = 1, \dots, N$ in firm $j = 1, \dots, J$ in period $t = 1, \dots, T$; $x_{i,t}$ is the vector of observed time varying covariates of workers (i, t) and firms (j, t) ; $k = 1, \dots, K$ is a vector of mutually exclusive dummy variables indicating the industry affiliation of firm j ; and ϵ_{ij} is the idiosyncratic error. β and κ are the parameters to estimate. If wages do not depend on industry affiliation, then the parameters κ should be jointly equal to zero. In what follows, we test this prediction.

4.1 Cross-sectional interindustry wage differentials

To assess the existence and stability of relative wages across industries we estimate model (1) using annual data for the period from 1986 to 2000. In all our specifications, we control for worker and firm observed characteristics. Worker related variables include the type of job mobility experienced by the worker within the last year (automatic or merit promotion, entry to the firm after a short or long period of non-employment), gender, years of seniority at the firm and its square, years of potential labour market experience and its square, monthly hours of work and its square, education level (up to ISCED 0/1, ISCED 2, ISCED 3, ISCED 5/6), skill level split into 3 categories (low, medium, high), occupation (ISCO 9 major categories), and a dummy for part time or full time work. Firm-related covariates include percentage of foreign capital, size of firm (micro, small, medium or large), legal structure of the firm (public firm - ruled by private sector laws, sole proprietor, anonymous partnership, limited liability company and other), instrument of collective regulation (4 categories), and region (20 categories). Macroeconomic conditions are controlled for by inclusion of year indicators.

The central variable of our analysis is the industry affiliation of the firm. The classification of industries in Portugal follows the European Standard Industrial Classification (SIC codes). However, until 1994 (inclusive) the coding followed a revision approved in 1978, and from 1995 onwards the coding follows a revision approved in 1993. This change in the coding system makes harmonization over the period difficult and the highest level of disaggregation possible with the data results in 43 different industries. Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]

The cross-sectional estimates of equation (1) for the period 1986-2000 are shown in Tables 2 and 3. These suggest the existence of important interindustry wage differentials. Industry parameters are, in general, individually statistically significant and, contrary to the competitive prediction, the hypothesis that the κ coefficients are simultaneously null is rejected (see F-statistics in the tables). Therefore, workers with the same observed characteristics working in firms with observably equal characteristics have different wages depending on the industry in which they are employed.

The wage differences identified are considerable, with some industries paying wages that are more than 41% above the economy average while others pay wages that are more than 26% below the average. Amongst the industries paying the lowest wages, we find the Manufacture of furniture, Textiles, Clothing and Restaurants and cafés, where the wage penalty ranges from 8% to 26% below the economy average. The industries paying the highest wages tend to be related to financial intermediation like Banking or Insurance, the Electricity, gas and water supply services, and productive services such as transport. The wage premia paid by these industries ranges between 8% to 41% above the economy average. There is considerable dispersion in this wage structure, the estimated standard deviations of the industry coefficients range from 8% to 11% in the period. This suggests that interindustry mobility can have a large impact on wages.⁵

[Tables 2 and 3 about here]

The estimated industry wage structure, however, can be partially transitory and therefore not stable over time. That is, due to demand fluctuations some industries may lower wages relative to the wages paid elsewhere without leading workers to switch to expanding industries. We assess the role of transitory shocks by analysing the degree of linear association between the industry wage structure observed in one point in time, with that observed in other points in time. For this purpose we compute correlations between the 43 industry coefficients observed in each year with those observed in 1986. As is shown in Table 4, the industry wage structure was fairly stable in the period 1986-2000. Weighted correlations between relative wages in 1986

⁵The magnitudes of the weighted standard deviations are comparable to those obtained by Krueger and Summers (1988) and Goux and Maurin (1999).

and all of the subsequent years range from 0.76 to 0.98 which suggests that the structure barely changed in the 15 year period analysed.⁶ Therefore, we conclude that temporary variations in productivity do not seem to drive the structure of wages between industries.⁷

[Table 4 about here]

4.2 Contribution of industry affiliation to wage dispersion

Taken with the previous results, we see that industry affiliation is a significant and stable determinant of wages. We now determine its relative importance in explaining observed wage dispersion using analysis of covariance. In model (1), the total proportion of wage variation explained by the covariates (X) and industry affiliation (K) is given by the R^2 of the regression. If X and K were not correlated, regressions of log wages on each of the covariates alone would give a unique decomposition of the contribution of each set of variables to the total explained variation. However, the possible collinearity between the two sets implies there is no unique variance decomposition. Nevertheless, we can identify the bounds of the share of variance explained by each set of variables.

The share of wage variation unambiguously associated to K is given by the increase in the explanatory power arising from adding industry dummies to a wage regression already including X . This marginal contribution of K corresponds to the minimum estimate of the relative size of the variance contributed by K . The upper bound for the importance of the industry effects is given by the R^2 of a wage equation including only industry dummies.

For this analysis (and that which follows) the observations for the period from 1986 to 2000 are pooled.⁸ The basic decomposition of the sources of wage dispersion is presented in Table 5. The proportion of the variance in wages explained by the covariates and industry affiliation together is 72%. The covariates (industry) first specification allows identification of the portion of wage variation associated unambiguously to the industry (covariates) effects. Therefore, the

⁶There is a discrete fall (of about 0.05) in the strength of the correlation between 1994 and 1995, this fall is most likely to have been caused by the change in the industry coding system than by an effective decrease in the correlations between the wage structure observed in the years post 1994 with that observed in 1986.

⁷According to Krueger and Summers (1987), the structure persists and changes only moderately over longer intervals.

⁸For all the specifications in which the data is pooled, the right hand side and left hand side variables are coded in deviations from the grand means, where the grand mean of y_{ijt} , e.g., is given by: $\bar{y}_{...} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{T_{ij} \bar{y}_{ij.}}{T}$.

minimum estimates of the relative size of the variance contributed by industry and covariates is 2% and 43%, respectively. The upper bound is 29% for industry effects and 70% for the covariates. The large range in the explanatory power (*e.g.* industry effects account for between 2% and 29% of wage variation) arises from a large degree of collinearity between industry and the covariates. These results are in line with those obtained by Dickens and Katz (1987) for the U.S.A., who find that industry effects account for between 7% to 30% of wage variation using 1983 CPS data. They suggest that industry affiliation is an important factor explaining wage dispersion and that noncompetitive mechanisms may be at work in the labour market.

[Table 5 about here]

4.3 Raw interindustry wage differentials

As mentioned previously, a non-competitive labour market is not the only possible explanation for the observed interindustry wage differentials resulting from model (1). Our data set allows us to test whether the industry wage structure remains after we control for unobserved worker, firm and match effects. Therefore, we can investigate if true interindustry wage differentials exist or if the differentials observed in cross-sectional data simply reflect an unequal distribution of unmeasured heterogeneity across industries. Before considering the simultaneous impact of the three types of unobserved effects, we first analyse, with the pooled data, how interindustry wage differentials change as we gradually control for worker and firm heterogeneity. These results are shown in Table 6, and each of its columns includes additional controls. Column (1) displays the results of a model that controls only for industry affiliation and time effects. This column gives us the unadjusted wage differentials between industries, *i.e.*, the difference between average wages in the industry and the economy wide average of wages. Column (2) adds to the model observed worker characteristics, this column gives us interindustry wage differentials adjusted for worker characteristics. In column (3) observed firm characteristics are added as controls. The differentials observed in this column are what we will, henceforth, call raw interindustry wage differentials. That is, they summarize the industry wage structure adjusted for all the worker and firm characteristics that we can observe in the data. Column (4) additionally controls for unobserved worker heterogeneity using the within-worker transformation.

From column (1) we conclude that, similar to our previous cross-sectional results, the industries paying the highest wages are Banking, and Insurance, Electricity, gas and water supply services for which the unadjusted wage premia are more than 66%. Those paying the lowest wages are Clothing, Furniture and Shoes manufactures, for which the unadjusted wage penalty is more than 40%. With no controls for any type of heterogeneity, the standard deviation of the estimated industry wage premia is 29%, which suggests that substantial wage growth can be realized by changing industries. However, the estimates are very sensitive to whether worker observed heterogeneity is controlled for.

As we can see from column (2), the explanatory power of the model increases significantly (from 33% to 68%) when we control for measured worker characteristics, while the dispersion of wages across industries is almost halved (the standard deviation is now 0.15). Adding firm observed characteristics (column 3) further increases the explanatory power of the model (to 72%). While in some industries adding observed characteristics of firms hardly affects the estimated industry effect (compared to the model in column 2), in some others it substantially reduces it. This is reflected in inter-industry wage dispersion, as the standard deviation of the interindustry wage effects falls from 0.15 to 0.10. Thus, it seems that observed characteristics of workers and firms explain much of the observed differences in wages across industries.⁹

If unmeasured ability is time invariant and equally rewarded in all industries, then unobserved productive ability is an individual fixed effect that disappears using the within-worker transformation.¹⁰ The estimates from the model that applies this transformation are presented in column (4). In this model the explanatory power of observed worker and firm characteristics is greatly reduced: the R^2 is now 47%. This suggests that unmeasured labour quality is correlated with measured characteristics and shows the importance of controlling for unobserved effects. Furthermore, much less variation in wages across industries remains. The standard deviation of wages across industries is now 0.06, which means that workers who change industries experience small wage changes. These results are in line with those obtained, for example, by

⁹Using the 2002 European Structure of Earnings Survey, Magda et al. (2008) find similar results for the dispersion of interindustry wage differentials presented in columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 6. In a group of 11 Eastern and Western European countries, Portugal was found to be one of the countries with highest dispersion in the interindustry wage structure when controls for observed worker and firm characteristics are included.

¹⁰The condition that ability is rewarded equally in every industry is what makes it a worker-specific fixed effect, otherwise there is matching (Gibbons and Katz, 1992). If matching exists, the ability of the worker is of the same level in every industry, but the quality of the match (hence compensation) may differ across industries.

Goux and Maurin (1999) and Carruth *et al.* (2004) after controlling for person unobserved heterogeneity.

[Table 6 about here]

Our findings suggest that wages may be being set competitively but more able workers are concentrated in certain industries, making wages appear to be larger in some industries than in others. That is, industries paying higher wages are different from other industries in that they hire a higher proportion of high wage workers. This could drive us to conclude, as Murphy and Topel (1987), that most of the raw interindustry wage differentials (in column 3) are due to unobserved worker heterogeneity and not to true differences in firm compensation policies across industries. However, so far, we have not accounted for unobserved characteristics of firms, despite firms being the wage determining units and industry being a characteristic of the firm. If industry is a wage contour, then ignoring compensation policies of firms in a study of interindustry wage differentials is a major weakness.¹¹ Moreover, as Goux and Maurin (1999, p. 506) suggest, "if the interindustry differentials are not measured as an average of firm effects, an uncertainty over the correct interpretation of estimated industry effects will persist." This means that the analysis cannot be complete until we disentangle the roles of workers and firms in defining the industry wage structure. If firms are an important factor in explaining interindustry wage differences then, as Krueger and Summers (1987) suggest, the dispersion in wages between industries must be decomposed into three parts, the part due to person effects, the part due to firm effects and the part due to the covariance between the two. To do this, we use AKM's (1999) exact decomposition.

5 Statistical approach

5.1 Unobserved heterogeneity and interindustry wage differentials

In the previous section we specified a competitive model of wage determination that only considers observed characteristics of workers and firms, and unobserved worker characteristics

¹¹A wage contour is defined by Dunlop (1964, p. 17) as a stable group of firms "[...] which are so linked together by (a) similarity of product markets, (b) by resort to similar sources of labour force, or (c) by common labour market organization that they have common wage making characteristics".

as determinants of wages. We now specify a match effects model that considers not only observed characteristics, but also unmeasured worker, firm and match effects.¹² This will allow the estimation and decomposition of interindustry wage differences into parts attributable to unobserved individual, firm, and worker-firm match heterogeneity. The match effects model estimates a wage equation of the type:

$$y = X\beta + D\theta + F\psi + G\gamma + \xi \quad (2)$$

where $X_{(N^* \times Z)}$ is the matrix of observable time varying covariates (in deviations from the grand means); $D_{(N^* \times N)}$ is the matrix of indicators for worker $i = 1, \dots, N$; $F_{(N^* \times J)}$ is the matrix of indicators for the firm at which worker i is employed at period t ; and $G_{(N^* \times M)}$ is the matrix of indicators of worker-firm matches. y is a $(N^* \times 1)$ vector of log monthly real wages (also in deviations from the grand means).¹³ The set of parameters to estimate are β , the $Z \times 1$ vector of coefficients on the covariates; θ , the $N \times 1$ vector of worker effects; ψ , the $J \times 1$ vector of firm effects; and γ the $M \times 1$ vector of unobserved match effects.

Because industry is a characteristic of the firm, the pure interindustry wage differential, conditional on the same information as in equation (2), is defined as κ_k for some industry classification $k = 1, \dots, K$.¹⁴ Therefore, the definition of the pure industry effect (κ_k) is the aggregation of the pure firm effects (ψ) within the industry, that is

$$\kappa_k \equiv \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T \left[\frac{\mathbf{1}(K(J(i, t)) = k) \psi_{J(i, t)}}{N_k} \right] \quad (3)$$

where

$$N_k \equiv \sum_{j=1}^J \mathbf{1}(K(j) = k) N_j$$

and $\mathbf{K}(j)$ is a function denoting the industry affiliation of firm j .¹⁵ This aggregation of J firm

¹²This section follows very closely the framework developed in section 2.1 in AKM (1999), and Woodcock's (2008a) extension to incorporate match effects.

¹³In the presence of an unbalanced panel dataset (as we have here) where both workers and firms can enter or exit the panel during the period of analysis, the total number of observations per worker is $N^* = \sum_{i=1}^T T_i$.

¹⁴Model (1) does not consider firm effects. Therefore, it involves the aggregation of firm effects into industry dummy indicators.

¹⁵These equations, e.g. correspond to those found in AKM (1999) p. 258.

effects into κ_k industry effects corresponds to including industry indicator variables in equation (2), $\kappa_{K(j(i,t))}$, and defining what is left of the pure firm effect as a deviation from industry effects, $\psi_{J(i,t)} - \kappa_{K(j(i,t))}$.¹⁶ In matrix notation:

$$y = X\beta + D\theta + FA\kappa + (F\psi - FA\kappa) + G\gamma + \xi \quad (4)$$

where the matrix A , $J \times K$, with element $a_{jk} = 1$ if $K(j) = k$, classifies each of the J firms into one of the K industries. The parameter vector κ , $K \times 1$, is the weighted average of the pure firm effects. $(F\psi - FA\kappa)$ is the firm effect net of industry effects. This effect can also be expressed as $M_{FA}F\psi$, where M_{FA} is the matrix that obtains deviations from industry means. The least squares estimates of equation (4) have no biases due to omitted variables or to aggregation as (4) only decomposes $F\psi$ into two orthogonal components: the industry effects $FA\kappa$, and the firm effects net of the industry effect $(F\psi - FA\kappa)$. It is worth noticing that, because industry affiliation is defined as a characteristic of the firm, we do not have to actually run model (4). Pure industry effects, $FA\kappa$, are standard averages of firm effects within the industry, as shown in (3). An alternative method of computing these averages (and to make the orthogonal decomposition of the pure firm effects) is to specify a model that regresses the pure firm effects ($F\psi$), estimated from equation (2), on the set of mutually exclusive dummy variables for the K industries.¹⁷

If wages are in fact determined according to specification (2), that is if the expected values or probability limit of unobserved worker, firm and match effects are non-zero, then the estimated returns to the observed characteristics, industry affiliation included, are biased if we use model (1).¹⁸ AKM (1999) discuss the biases that arise due to omitted residual firm effects (column 4 of Table 6), and to omitted person and residual firm effects (column 3 of Table 6) when

¹⁶Authors attempt to use industry classifications as detailed as to have more than 90 industry codes. The reason for decomposing industrial aggregates into the most detailed level possible is related to the possibility that average compensation policies of firms may vary across finer levels of classification and not within aggregates, and so estimates can be subject to aggregation biases. The pure industry effects, however, are not subject to this bias because they are computed from firm-level estimates. (Woodcock, 2008)

¹⁷To clarify, we know that in a model without a constant: $Y_i = \beta X_i + u_i \Leftrightarrow Y_i = E[Y|X_i] + u_i$. Therefore, the coefficients obtained are the pure industry effects ($FA\kappa$), or average firm effects within the industry, and the residual from this regression is the remaining, or residual, firm effect ($F\psi - FA\kappa$). (This result is true because industry dummies are mutually exclusive and their covariance is zero.)

¹⁸In the case where person, firm and match effects have non-zero expectation, the bias would not exist only if these components were orthogonal to the observed covariates, which is unlikely.

we specify the wage equation as a function of unobserved person and firm heterogeneity only (that is, the match effect ($G\gamma$) is included in the error term). Woodcock (2008a) extends this discussion by deriving the biases caused by the omission of match effects when wages are also determined by match unobserved heterogeneity.

Understanding the nature and composition of these biases is the tool for decomposing the raw interindustry wage differentials (column (3) of Table 6) into the contributions due to worker, firm, and match effects. Consequently, in the next section we revise the biases generated by the omission of the three components of unobserved heterogeneity, focussing solely on the industry coefficients, and explain the procedure to identify the relative importance of each unobserved effect in explaining the raw interindustry wage differentials.¹⁹

5.2 Omission of person, firm and match effects

If the true data generation process is given by equation (2) but estimates of industry effects are based upon a model that omits person, firm and match effects (and so we estimate some κ^{**} , instead of the pure industry effect, κ), this implies that $D\theta$, $(F\psi - FA\kappa)$ and $G\gamma$ of model (4) are moved into the error term and our model takes the form

$$y = X\beta^{**} + FA\kappa^{**} + \varepsilon \quad (5)$$

where $\varepsilon = (F\psi - FA\kappa) + D\theta + G\gamma + \xi$. Because the set of regressors can be broken up in two groups, in this case X (observed characteristics of workers and firms) and FA (industry effects), we can transform (5) as follows

$$y = P_W y + M_W y = X\beta^{**} + FA\kappa^{**} + M_W y \quad (6)$$

where $W = [X \quad FA]$; $P_W = X(X'X)^{-1}X'$, is the matrix that averages the observations across time for each individual and has typical element \bar{u}_i ; and $M_W = I - P_W$, is the matrix that obtains the deviations from individual means and has typical element $u_{it} - \bar{u}_i$. β^{**} and κ^{**} are

¹⁹The focus on industry coefficients only is for clarity of reasoning. Similarly, the β parameters suffer from the same biases and so this discussion also applies to them.

the least squares estimates obtained from (5). Premultiplying (6) by $(FA)'M_X$ we obtain

$$A'F'M_X y = A'F'M_X FA\kappa^{**}$$

and solving with respect to κ^{**} we obtain the estimator of industry effects²⁰

$$\kappa^{**} = (A'F'M_X FA)^{-1} A'F'M_X y. \quad (7)$$

Under the assumption that κ^{**} is uncorrelated with ξ (but correlated with the other components of the error term of (5)), and because M_X annihilates X (that is, $M_X X = 0$), the expectation of (7) is

$$E[\kappa^{**}] = \kappa + (A'F'M_X FA)^{-1} A'F'M_X (M_{FA}F\psi + D\theta + G\gamma)$$

that is the estimator κ^{**} is equal to the pure industry effects, κ , plus the sum of the employment-duration weighted average of the residual firm effect, the person and match effects inside the industry, given X . This means that the bias is equal to the sum of the weighted portion of firm, person and match effects that is explained by the included covariates. Given that the pure firm effect, $F\psi$, is equal to the sum of the pure industry effect, $FA\kappa$, with the residual firm effect, $F\psi - FA\kappa$, we can rearrange the previous equation and obtain

$$\begin{aligned} E[\kappa^{**}] &= (A'F'M_X FA)^{-1} A'F'M_X F\psi + (A'F'M_X FA)^{-1} A'F'M_X D\theta + \\ &+ (A'F'M_X FA)^{-1} A'F'M_X G\gamma. \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

This expression shows that the raw interindustry wage differential, *i.e.* the differential obtained in a model that does not include unobserved worker, firm and match effects, can be decomposed into the sum of the industry average firm effect, the industry average person effect and the industry average match effect, each of these averages conditional on X . These averages are the expectation of the least squares estimator in auxiliary regressions of each of the omitted

²⁰These estimates are obtained from a Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (FWL) regression. In a model in which the regressors can be split into two groups, and these are transformed to be mutually orthogonal, then OLS estimates of the parameter of interest obtained either from the original specification or from the modified model are numerically identical. See Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) for a thorough presentation of the FWL theorem.

regressors on the included regressors.²¹ Equation (8) is exact if the values of θ and ψ and γ are known in which case we can have a consistent estimate of the decomposition based in (8). The decomposition is done in the following section.

6 The sources of interindustry wage differentials

In this section we decompose the raw interindustry wage differentials into proportions due to person, firm and match effects, as shown in equation (8). The raw wage differentials, κ^{**} , are estimated using model (1). The person, θ , firm, ψ , and match, γ , effects are estimated from the match effects specification (2). The estimation of this model involves a three-step procedure. Firstly, β is estimated after transforming (2) into deviations from match-specific means. Results from partitioned regression imply that $\hat{\beta}$ is a consistent estimate of β . Secondly, $\hat{\theta}$ and $\hat{\psi}$ are computed using the person and firm effects model (a model without unobserved match effects as in AKM, 1999).²² Finally, the match effects estimator is defined as the error from the regression of worker-firm matches on a constant and on the person and firm effects estimated previously.²³ This match effect can be correlated with the observed covariates, but is orthogonal to the person and firm effects.

6.1 Pure interindustry wage differentials

Before moving to the exact decomposition of the raw interindustry wage differentials we present the resulting industry wage structure when we control only for person and firm effects, and when we also include match effects in equation (2). We are thus able to establish whether true interindustry wage differentials exist after we control for all types of measured and unmeasured heterogeneity. These results are shown in Table 7. To the extent that it adds further controls for unobserved heterogeneity, this table can be considered a continuation of Table 6. Compared

²¹This is easier to recognise if we compare the expression of each component of equation (8), with the logic that connects equations (5) and (7).

²²These were estimated using the exact least squares solution (instead of the approximate method of AKM, 1999) as developed by Abowd, Creedy and Kramarz (2002), Ferreira (2009b).

²³That is, we estimate the following model: $\hat{y}_{ij.} = \sum_{t=1}^{T_{ij}} \frac{y_{ijt} - x_{ijt}\hat{\beta}}{T_{ij}} = (\hat{u} + \hat{\theta}_i + \hat{\psi}_j + \hat{\gamma}_{ij})$, where $\hat{\beta}$ is the within-match estimator of β , and $\hat{\theta}$ and $\hat{\psi}$ are the worker and firm unobserved effects previously identified using the person and firm effects model.

to a specification that includes only unobserved worker characteristics (Table 6, column 4), the interindustry wage dispersion doubles when we also consider both person and firm effects (Table 7, column 1) or when we control for person, firm and match effects (Table 7, column 2). The results for the match effects model are unbiased estimates of interindustry wage differentials. The adjusted standard deviation is now 0.15, which suggests that unobserved abilities of workers are not the sole factor influencing productivity, hence wages, and that compensation policies of firms vary across industries.

[Table 7 about here]

The wage structure reported in Table 7 corresponds to our estimate of the pure interindustry wage differentials. These results, however, are an average for the 1986-2000 period and do not allow us to verify the persistence of the pure interindustry wage structure over the 14 year period. To assess how stable these differentials are, we computed the annual average of firm effects within industries and correlated the yearly industry coefficients with that observed in 1986. Our results reveal that the magnitude of the weighted correlations of the pure industry effects in 1986 with those of the following years ranges from 0.92 in 2000 to 0.999 in 1987 (see Table 8). Therefore, the pure interindustry wage differentials are unlikely to be caused by transitory shocks. Given the persistence and large dispersion of the pure interindustry wage structure we understand that if a worker changes industries he can experience considerable wage growth.

[Table 8 about here]

6.2 Decomposition of raw interindustry wage differentials

We now proceed with the decomposition of the raw interindustry wage differentials into a part due to person effects, a part due to firm effects and another part due to match effects as shown in equation (8). The raw industry effects, κ^{**} , estimated from equation (1), are presented in column 3 of Table 6 for reference. The other components of equation (8), that is the industry average firm effect (the first component of the equation) the industry average person effect (the second component), and the industry average match effect (the third component) were

estimated using model (2). Results for the estimated version of equation (8), both when we are in the context of a person and firm effects model or in the context of a match effects model, are presented in Table 9. These regressions yield an R^2 of 1 and the coefficients on the industry average person and firm effects are very close to 1, see column (1). The same is not true for the coefficient of the average match effects, suggesting less precision in its estimate.²⁴ This means that these components fully account for the raw industry effects and that the estimates of the interindustry wage differentials are sufficiently precise to allow an accurate decomposition. Since the industry average person, firm, and match effects are centered to have a zero sample mean, the terms high wage-worker, -firm, or -match mean, respectively, workers, firms or matches whose effect is greater than the economy-wide average of zero. The same interpretation applies to the raw interindustry wage differentials. The R^2 in columns (2) through (4) show results for the upper bound of the share of person, firm and match effects, respectively, in explaining the raw interindustry wage differentials. With the estimated version of equation (8) we find that industry average person effects are able to explain at most 31% while the industry average firm effects explain a maximum of 90% of the observed dispersion in wages across industries.²⁵

In Table 10 we present the exact decomposition of raw interindustry wage differentials for both the person and firm effects model and the match effects model. This decomposition is done in proportional terms as follows

$$\text{share of } \kappa^{**} \text{ due to individual effects} = \frac{(A'F'M_XFA)^{-1} A'F'M_XD\theta}{\kappa^{**}} \quad (\text{a})$$

$$\text{share of } \kappa^{**} \text{ due to firm effects} = \frac{(A'F'M_XFA)^{-1} A'F'M_XF\psi}{\kappa^{**}} \quad (\text{b})$$

and

$$\text{share of } \kappa^{**} \text{ due to match effects} = \frac{(A'F'M_XFA)^{-1} A'F'M_XG\gamma}{\kappa^{**}}. \quad (\text{c})$$

In the case of the person and firm effects model, (a) and (b) (shown in columns 2 and 3, respectively) must add to 1, whilst in the case of the match effects model, (a), (b) and (c)

²⁴The estimated unobserved effects should have an impact equal to its size in the regression, therefore, its coefficient should be one.

²⁵Note that, similar to AKM (1999), the person and firm effects are weakly correlated (correlation below 0.10) and so we expect little of the person effect to be explained by the firm effect.

(shown in columns 4, 5 and 6, respectively) add up to 1. Regardless of the model used, the average proportion of raw interindustry wage differentials due to industry average person effects is about 30%, while the average proportion of raw differentials due to the industry average firm effects is close to 70%. Match effects have a smaller role in explaining the raw industry wage premia (3%). One could think that the low proportion explained by the match effects is due to the assumption that they are orthogonal to person and firm effects. However, Woodcock (2008) also estimates negligible interindustry variation in the match effects despite not assuming orthogonality. We have also checked whether the average proportion explained by each component would differ for the group industries paying wages above the economy average and those paying wages below the economy average. The results remained unchanged. Both in the case of high wage industries and low wage industries, industry average firm effects explain close to 70% of the estimated raw differential.

Our last exercise is to compute the correlation between the industry average person effects and the industry average firm effects. Using the person and firm effects model we obtain a positive correlation (0.45) between these two components, which means that across industries we have either high wage workers working in high wage firms, or low wage workers in low wage firms. Therefore, from the person and firm effects model we conclude that the nature of the raw interindustry wage differentials is related to positive assortative matching, and that the forces that sort person effects are correlated with the forces that sort firm effects within industries. This result contrasts with that obtained by Abowd *et al.* (2005), who find weak positive correlations between industry average person and firm effects, and Woodcock (2008) who, when using the person and firm effects model, finds this correlation to be weak and negative (-0.10). However, Woodcock (2008) finds a positive correlation (0.60) between these two components when using estimates from the hybrid match effects model.

Our main findings can now be summarized as follows. We conclude that the raw interindustry wage differentials are not a temporary disequilibrium in the labour market and are not due to systematic differences in unobserved labour quality across industries. Differences in compensation policies of firms are the main source of the differentials found in cross-sectional analysis. The pure interindustry wage structure (computed as the average firm effects within industry), on the other hand, shows considerable dispersion (weighted standard deviation of

0.15) and is also very persistent.

To some extent, the results found seem to reflect the nature of the Portuguese labour market. Collective bargaining, the predominant means of wage negotiation in Portugal, on the one hand, helps generating wage contours at the industry level as most of the collective agreements are industry-wide and so cover firms with different economic characteristics within the industry. This helps explaining the existence and persistence of a genuine wage structure across industries. On the other hand, we concluded that, in contrast to results found in other studies where both unobserved worker and firm effects were important in explaining the interindustry wage structure, the estimated wage differentials in Portugal are mostly due to firm effects. This result is compatible with a labour market with low levels of labour mobility, but high levels of wage flexibility. As firms can choose to pay higher wages to adjust for specific economic conditions, adjustments in the Portuguese labour market seem to be made via price rather than quantity, while in other economies adjustments may occur through mobility (worker effect) and price (firm effect).

7 Testing the competitive model

We have found that true interindustry wage differentials exist in the Portuguese economy. Different firms pay different wages to workers with the same characteristics (measured or unmeasured), and mobility across industries can generate substantial wage growth. However, it is not yet clear whether non-competitive forces are at work in the economy, or whether these differentials are caused by mechanisms compatible with the competitive model such as rent-sharing or efficiency wage explanations.

The hypothesis of rent sharing between firms and workers is consistent with the fact that the wage premia received by workers in a particular industry extends over many occupations within the industry. It is also consistent with a positive relationship between profitability and wages (Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey 1996); and with a negative correlation between turnover and wage premia (Krueger and Summers, 1988). Efficiency wage hypotheses are also consistent with a negative association between industry wage differences and turnover. One mechanism that would generate this association is the existence of firm (or industry) specific skills and

training. If some firms have more specific skills than others and if they are providing training to their workers, then they are contributing to increase the productivity of its workforce, and making workers more costly to replace. This raises the threshold of the firm in terms of labour turnover, and provides incentives to increase wages in order to reduce the likelihood of separation (Krause, 2000). If industry specific skills are more important than firm specific skills, then all firms within a certain industry will be acting in similar way. Hence, levelling up wages within the industry.²⁶ If, on the other hand, the industry wage structure is generated by compensating differentials for unobserved working conditions, no association is expected to be found between industry wage premia and quits. Therefore, the relationship between the industry wage premia and separations from firms provides a test of the competitive model of industry wage determination.

In this section we examine the association between the industry wage structure identified in the previous section and the time workers take to separate from firms. In the literature, this analysis is typically done using worker-initiated separations, that is quits. We cannot make such a distinction with our data. However, we have noticed in previous work (Ferreira, 2009b) that separations followed by short gaps (less than 1 year) of non-employment seem to be ruled by a process different from that ruling separations followed by long gaps (longer than 1 year) of non-employment. In particular, we concluded that short gaps is more likely to be formed by quits and long gaps by layoffs. Hence, we use such a distinction in the present analysis of the association between interindustry wage differentials and separations.²⁷ We estimate parametric duration models where the dependent variable is the time to separate from firms, the independent variable of interest is the pure industry effect (the effect obtained after controlling for all types of observed and unobserved heterogeneity), and the unit of observation is employment spells.

²⁶Parent (2000), e.g., finds that industry specific skills are more important than firm-specific skills in determining wage growth.

²⁷Although, for robustness checks we also estimate models considering all separations together and separations followed by long periods of non-employment.

7.1 Interindustry wage differentials and labour mobility

In this subsection we present the results obtained from estimating a duration model of the time to quit a firm assuming that time follows a loglogistic distribution.²⁸ As well as the industry wage premia estimated in the previous section, we also include the estimated residual firm effects, person and match effects to control for worker unobserved ability, firm compensation policies and match quality. The vector of observed covariates includes the age of the worker (and its square), gender, educational level, skill level, occupation, part-time or full-time work, dummy for having previously changed firms, type of instrument of collective regulation, size of firm, legal structure of the firm, percentage of foreign capital, region and year. Estimates of the effects of industry wage premia on the time to quit the firm are presented in Table 11. Given the functional form of the model, these coefficients measure relative changes in survival time for a given absolute change in the regressors. A positive coefficient indicates that time to separation is lengthened, while a negative coefficient indicates that time to separation is shortened. Because industry effects are measured in deviation from the grand means, these effects are measured against an economy wide average of zero.

The average effect of interindustry wage differentials on the time to separation is positive and significant, which means that the larger the industry wage premium, the longer workers take to change firms. In the case of quits, increasing the industry wage premium by one unit lengthens the time to quit the industry by 37%.²⁹ The coefficient on the industry wage premium is also positive and significant when we consider layoffs (0.51) and all separations together (0.41).³⁰ Our result is consistent with a context in which firm or industry specific skills are important and where the gains of retaining workers for long periods outweigh the gains in productivity resulting from adjusting the labour force to every transitory demand shock. That is, firms find it optimal to pay wages above the competitive level in order to provide incentives for workers

²⁸Where a quit is separation that is followed by a period of non-employment that lasted less than one year. The choice of loglogistic distribution follows from specification tests. See Ferreira (2009a) for more details.

²⁹To clarify the interpretation, consider model (4) and that the estimated coefficient (κ) for industry k was zero. If the coefficient is now 1, i.e. if the industry pays wages 100% above the economy average, then the time to separate from a firm in this industry, on average, increases by 37%.

³⁰We can think of two potential reasons for the larger effect found for layoffs than for quits. On the one hand, if a worker is fired, a signal about his quality might be being sent to other firms within the industry, hence it takes longer to find a job. On the other hand, having worked for a high wage industry, workers have a high reservation wage. Hence, it takes longer to find a matching offer and/or to adjust expectations.

to remain at the firm. If the benefits firms extract from this longer term attachment offset the costs of higher wages, then this can be a profit maximising strategy. Therefore, the industry wage differentials found in our data might not be totally incompatible with the competitive model.

8 Summary and conclusions

This paper examines the sources of interindustry wage differentials. In a competitive labour market, in the long run, homogeneous workers working in similar firms are paid similar wages. Wage differences across segments of the labour market, be it firms or industries, are due to temporary differences in productivity and are a signal for labour mobility. The flow of workers across segments equalizes wages. However, cross-sectional analysis of wages typically find that there are significant and persistent differences in wages across industries. Unsurprisingly, our cross-sectional analysis using Portuguese data confirms these results. The industry wage structure in Portugal shows high dispersion at points in time and the differentials persist over time. These findings prompt the question of what explains the existence of a structure of wages across industries.

The two most common explanations for the identified cross-sectional interindustry wage differentials are that the wage structure found is due to imperfect measures of labour quality; alternatively, genuine interindustry wage differentials do exist and compensation policies of firms vary across industries. If the industry wage premia are real, then noncompetitive mechanisms may be at work in the labour market, because by paying supracompetitive wages firms might not be maximising their profits. On the other hand, and compatible with a competitive model, firms may find it profitable to pay wages above the competitive level.

We examined the sources of interindustry wage differentials using panel data over a 15 year period. Our models control for observed worker and firm characteristics, but also for unobserved worker, firm and match heterogeneity. Results show that after controlling for all types of heterogeneity the true interindustry wage differentials are sizeable and persistent. This means that compensation policies of firms vary across industries and that by changing industries workers enjoy substantial wage growth. Furthermore, we conclude that firm compensation

policies are the main source of the differentials found in cross-sectional analysis and explain, on average, about 70% of the raw industry wage structure. Unmeasured worker abilities are not as important and account for less than a third of such structure. We thus conclude that interindustry wage differentials are not a trick caused by unmeasured labour productive quality and are not a temporary disequilibrium in the labour market, they reflect different treats given by firms across industries.

Why might firms treat their workers by paying them supra-competitive wages? We focus on the turnover strand of efficiency wage models to investigate if the industry wage structure is caused by mechanisms compatible with the competitive model, by testing the effect of the pure wage premia on the time workers take to separate from firms. Our results indicate that the effect of the industry wage premium on the time to quit firms is positive and significant. This is consistent with a labour market in which industry specific skills are important and where efficiencies are gained from creating incentives to worker-firm attachments.

Some questions remain unanswered and demand further research into the black box of the firm. The major driving force of these differentials or why they exist, has yet to be established. Although efficiency wage models may provide reasons for firms to pay higher wages, we still do not know what differences in the production functions of firms make labour more valuable in some industries than in others. If the reason is related to differences in productivity, then we should be able to identify what generates productivity dispersion across industries. Also any association/causality between these wage contours and characteristics of the product market has yet to be determined. Answers to these questions enhance our understanding of the mechanisms determining why firms pay noncompetitive wages and why that happens with greater intensity in some industries than others.

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Tables

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables

Variable	Mean	Variable	Mean
Log monthly real wage	6.3	Percentage of foreign capital	9.1
Seniority (years)	8.7	Region	20 Districts
Experience (years)	22	Year	1986-2000
Hours of work (monthly)	170		
Yearly gap	0.14		
Gender		Industry	
Men	61.7	Agriculture	1.20
Women	38.4	Silviculture	0.09
Education		Fishing	0.21
ISCED 1	71.6	Mining	0.73
ISCED 2	11.3	Food products	3.92
ISCED 3	12.6	Beverages	0.67
ISCED 5/6	4.6	Tobacco	0.09
Occupations		Textiles	7.45
Directors	1.7	Clothing	6.53
Intellectual and scientific specialists	2.0	Leather	0.33
Professional, technical (intermediate)	8.3	Shoes	3.05
Administrative and managerial workers	14.1	Wood and cork	2.01
Clerical and sales workers	8.5	Furniture	1.45
Agriculture, silviculture and fishing	1.26	Pulp, paper, paper prod.	0.88
Production and related workers	25.6	Publishing and printing	1.33
Equipment operators and labourers	13.9	Industrial chemicals	0.64
Unqualified workers	18.0	Other chemicals	1.01
Skill Level		Petrol, rubber, plastics	1.42
High	18.4	Ceramics	1.30
Medium	43.5	Glass	0.52
Low	38.1	Other non-met min prod.	1.60
Type of work		Base metals	0.92
Full time	91.5	Metallic products	3.38
Part time	8.4	Non-electric materials	1.80
Type of job mobility		Electric materials	2.19
Automatic promotion	7.7	Motor vehicles	2.09
Merit promotion	2.9	Professional instruments	0.25
Separation, small gap	1.6	Other manufacturing	0.39
Separation, big gap	3.1	Elect., gas and water	1.31
Size of firm		Building	9.38
Micro	9.2	Wholesale trade	7.28
Small	25.0	Retail trade	7.84
Medium	29.2	Restaurants and cafes	2.83
Large	36.6	Hotels	1.87
Instrument of collective regulation		Transport	5.05
Collective agreement	4.0	Communications	1.97
Collective contract	82.7	Banking	3.06
Regulating law	3.8	Insurance	0.92
Firm agreement	8.7	Real estate	3.73
Legal structure of firm		Productive services - transport	0.84
Public (Private market law)	4.8	Other productive services	0.79
Sole proprietor	5.3	Social services	3.66
Anonymous partnership	29.0	Personal services	2.00
Limited liability company	55.2		

Note: These statistics are computed over the sample of 1,823,572 worker-year observations. Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessôal (1986-2000).

Table 2: Cross-sectional interindustry regression-adjusted wage differences, 1986-1993

Industry	1986	1987	1988	1989	1991	1992	1993
Agriculture	-0.186 (0.010)	-0.20 (0.010)	-0.167 (0.009)	-0.153 (0.009)	-0.106 (0.010)	-0.126 (0.011)	-0.122 (0.011)
Silviculture	-0.071 (0.038)	-0.046 (0.032)	-0.041 (0.023)	-0.054 (0.020)	-0.012 (0.029)	-0.075 (0.031)	-0.023 (0.033)
Fishing	-0.135 (0.021)	-0.114 (0.022)	-0.181 (0.032)	-0.271 (0.025)	-0.185 (0.028)	-0.217 (0.033)	-0.243 (0.033)
Mining	0.031 (0.009)	0.007 (0.009)	0.025 (0.009)	0.033 (0.008)	0.076 (0.009)	0.099 (0.009)	0.112 (0.009)
Food products	-0.064 (0.004)	-0.073 (0.004)	-0.078 (0.004)	-0.089 (0.004)	-0.076 (0.004)	-0.078 (0.004)	-0.069 (0.004)
Beverages	-0.095 (0.009)	-0.104 (0.009)	-0.107 (0.009)	-0.120 (0.009)	-0.123 (0.010)	-0.112 (0.010)	-0.106 (0.010)
Tobacco	-0.102 (0.019)	-0.077 (0.019)	-0.028 (0.020)	0.046 (0.021)	0.117 (0.024)	0.003 (0.027)	0.034 (0.027)
Textiles	-0.081 (0.003)	-0.075 (0.003)	-0.108 (0.003)	-0.115 (0.003)	-0.119 (0.004)	-0.123 (0.004)	-0.138 (0.004)
Clothing	-0.124 (0.004)	-0.095 (0.004)	-0.108 (0.004)	-0.112 (0.004)	-0.113 (0.004)	-0.128 (0.004)	-0.149 (0.004)
Leather	-0.005 (0.012)	0.021 (0.012)	0.018 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.028 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)
Shoes	-0.087 (0.006)	-0.071 (0.005)	-0.084 (0.005)	-0.108 (0.005)	-0.135 (0.005)	-0.114 (0.005)	-0.114 (0.005)
Wood and cork	-0.120 (0.005)	-0.109 (0.005)	-0.114 (0.005)	-0.095 (0.005)	-0.083 (0.006)	-0.096 (0.006)	-0.091 (0.006)
Furniture	-0.239 (0.007)	-0.246 (0.007)	-0.247 (0.007)	-0.229 (0.007)	-0.234 (0.007)	-0.219 (0.007)	-0.261 (0.007)
Pulp, paper, paper prod.	0.047 (0.007)	0.053 (0.007)	0.036 (0.007)	0.038 (0.007)	0.075 (0.008)	0.034 (0.008)	0.030 (0.009)
Publishing and printing	-0.041 (0.007)	-0.046 (0.007)	-0.049 (0.007)	-0.031 (0.007)	0.019 (0.007)	0.014 (0.007)	0.033 (0.007)
Industrial chemicals	0.073 (0.007)	0.067 (0.007)	0.105 (0.007)	0.094 (0.008)	0.052 (0.010)	0.066 (0.010)	0.086 (0.011)
Other chemicals	0.043 (0.007)	0.034 (0.007)	0.081 (0.007)	0.058 (0.007)	0.058 (0.007)	0.067 (0.008)	0.058 (0.008)
Petrol, rubber, plastics	0.009 (0.006)	-0.012 (0.006)	0.091 (0.006)	0.115 (0.006)	0.101 (0.007)	0.073 (0.007)	0.074 (0.007)
Ceramics	0.021 (0.008)	0.037 (0.007)	0.041 (0.007)	0.029 (0.007)	0.033 (0.007)	0.029 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)
Glass	0.205 (0.010)	0.205 (0.010)	0.168 (0.010)	0.152 (0.010)	0.118 (0.011)	0.098 (0.011)	0.099 (0.011)
Other non-met min prod.	0.003 (0.006)	0.013 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.006)	0.035 (0.006)	0.054 (0.006)	0.041 (0.006)	0.025 (0.006)
Base metals	-0.013 (0.006)	-0.026 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.012 (0.007)	-0.023 (0.008)	-0.016 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)
Metallic products	-0.066 (0.004)	-0.047 (0.004)	-0.055 (0.004)	-0.047 (0.004)	-0.039 (0.005)	-0.028 (0.005)	-0.019 (0.005)
Non-electric materials	-0.073 (0.006)	-0.070 (0.006)	-0.051 (0.006)	-0.048 (0.006)	-0.033 (0.006)	-0.030 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)
Electric materials	0.056 (0.006)	0.065 (0.006)	0.084 (0.006)	0.067 (0.006)	0.073 (0.006)	0.074 (0.006)	0.071 (0.006)
Motor vehicles	0.008 (0.005)	0.043 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.087 (0.006)	0.078 (0.006)	0.086 (0.006)
Professional instruments	-0.031 (0.014)	-0.026 (0.014)	-0.061 (0.016)	-0.048 (0.016)	-0.044 (0.016)	0.015 (0.017)	-0.049 (0.017)

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Table 2: (continued from previous page)

Industry	1986	1987	1988	1989	1991	1992	1993
Other manufacturing	-0.095 (0.011)	-0.098 (0.011)	-0.112 (0.011)	-0.100 (0.010)	-0.084 (0.011)	-0.054 (0.012)	-0.057 (0.013)
Elect., gas and water	0.258 (0.007)	0.246 (0.007)	0.232 (0.007)	0.247 (0.007)	0.245 (0.008)	0.259 (0.008)	0.236 (0.008)
Building	-0.052 (0.003)	-0.068 (0.003)	-0.074 (0.003)	-0.060 (0.003)	-0.068 (0.003)	-0.076 (0.003)	-0.086 (0.003)
Wholesale trade	0.014 (0.003)	0.009 (0.003)	0.012 (0.003)	0.012 (0.003)	0.020 (0.003)	0.030 (0.003)	0.029 (0.003)
Retail trade	-0.049 (0.004)	-0.045 (0.004)	-0.048 (0.004)	-0.037 (0.004)	-0.034 (0.004)	-0.028 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.004)
Restaurants and cafes	-0.091 (0.006)	-0.110 (0.006)	-0.127 (0.006)	-0.121 (0.006)	-0.121 (0.006)	-0.120 (0.006)	-0.130 (0.006)
Hotels	0.031 (0.006)	0.020 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.020 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.028 (0.006)	0.009 (0.007)
Transport	0.109 (0.004)	0.126 (0.004)	0.110 (0.004)	0.108 (0.004)	0.050 (0.005)	0.045 (0.005)	0.047 (0.005)
Communications	0.091 (0.006)	-0.021 (0.021)	0.131 (0.007)	0.022 (0.007)	-0.016 (0.008)	0.019 (0.007)	0.046 (0.008)
Banking	0.289 (0.011)	0.266 (0.010)	0.305 (0.010)	0.369 (0.010)	0.243 (0.009)	0.295 (0.010)	0.265 (0.010)
Insurance	0.413 (0.009)	0.398 (0.008)	0.360 (0.009)	0.348 (0.008)	0.263 (0.008)	0.313 (0.008)	0.255 (0.008)
Real estate	0.102 (0.007)	0.092 (0.007)	0.064 (0.007)	0.041 (0.006)	0.017 (0.006)	0.041 (0.006)	0.030 (0.006)
Productive services - transp	0.287 (0.010)	0.348 (0.009)	0.267 (0.010)	0.335 (0.009)	0.277 (0.010)	0.254 (0.010)	0.259 (0.010)
Other productive services	-0.096 (0.009)	-0.108 (0.009)	-0.130 (0.009)	-0.149 (0.008)	-0.146 (0.008)	-0.143 (0.008)	-0.127 (0.007)
Social services	-0.088 (0.007)	-0.094 (0.006)	-0.086 (0.007)	-0.111 (0.006)	-0.100 (0.006)	-0.093 (0.006)	-0.065 (0.006)
Personal services	-0.088 (0.006)	-0.068 (0.006)	-0.068 (0.006)	-0.055 (0.005)	-0.049 (0.005)	-0.038 (0.006)	-0.029 (0.006)
F-stat	227.81	250.50	231.79	275.61	216.49	224.71	220.92
Weighted SD	0.104	0.103	0.104	0.108	0.102	0.109	0.107
No. of obs	103,925	104,893	109,632	119,886	128,766	132,284	130,095

Note: Because the model does not include a constant the resulting coefficients are proportionate differences in wages between a worker in a given industry and the average worker in the economy. Standard errors in parentheses. Weights are industry employment shares for each year. Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessoa (1986-2000).

Table 3: Cross-sectional interindustry regression-adjusted wage differences, 1994-2000

Industry	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Agriculture	-0.140 (0.011)	-0.110 (0.011)	-0.129 (0.011)	-0.118 (0.010)	-0.109 (0.10)	-0.090 (0.010)	-0.078 (0.010)
Silviculture	-0.011 (0.031)	-0.083 (0.026)	-0.024 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.023)	-0.019 (0.023)	0.055 (0.022)	0.076 (0.024)
Fishing	0.121 (0.031)	-0.051 (0.022)	-0.089 (0.023)	-0.095 (0.022)	-0.150 (0.022)	-0.071 (0.023)	-0.172 (0.023)
Mining	0.046 (0.010)	0.060 (0.009)	0.077 (0.010)	0.066 (0.009)	0.082 (0.009)	0.084 (0.009)	0.102 (0.009)
Food products	-0.086 (0.004)	-0.086 (0.004)	-0.085 (0.004)	-0.090 (0.004)	-0.090 (0.004)	-0.097 (0.004)	-0.103 (0.004)
Beverages	-0.104 (0.010)	-0.072 (0.009)	-0.104 (0.010)	-0.079 (0.010)	-0.051 (0.010)	-0.055 (0.010)	-0.042 (0.010)
Tobacco	0.056 (0.029)	0.059 (0.031)	0.047 (0.032)	0.034 (0.031)	0.104 (0.029)	0.181 (0.027)	0.048 (0.027)
Textiles	-0.158 (0.004)	-0.162 (0.004)	-0.165 (0.004)	-0.163 (0.004)	-0.158 (0.004)	-0.178 (0.004)	-0.151 (0.004)
Clothing	-0.181 (0.004)	-0.174 (0.004)	-0.173 (0.004)	-0.169 (0.004)	-0.160 (0.004)	-0.174 (0.004)	-0.156 (0.004)
Leather	0.036 (0.013)	0.046 (0.014)	0.084 (0.013)	0.057 (0.014)	0.100 (0.015)	0.020 (0.015)	0.068 (0.016)
Shoes	-0.133 (0.005)	-0.131 (0.005)	-0.138 (0.005)	-0.116 (0.005)	-0.109 (0.005)	-0.129 (0.005)	-0.123 (0.005)
Wood and cork	-0.109 (0.006)	-0.077 (0.006)	-0.074 (0.006)	-0.066 (0.006)	-0.058 (0.006)	-0.047 (0.006)	-0.026 (0.006)
Furniture	-0.248 (0.007)	-0.221 (0.006)	-0.198 (0.007)	-0.193 (0.006)	-0.169 (0.006)	-0.180 (0.006)	-0.165 (0.006)
Pulp, paper, paper prod.	0.049 (0.009)	0.062 (0.009)	0.063 (0.009)	0.098 (0.009)	0.084 (0.008)	0.078 (0.009)	0.043 (0.009)
Publishing and printing	0.007 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.007)	0.012 (0.007)	0.001 (0.006)	0.010 (0.006)	0.026 (0.006)
Industrial chemicals	0.091 (0.013)	0.120 (0.012)	0.105 (0.011)	0.095 (0.011)	0.060 (0.011)	0.062 (0.011)	0.073 (0.012)
Other chemicals	0.074 (0.009)	0.083 (0.008)	0.088 (0.008)	0.076 (0.008)	0.065 (0.008)	0.059 (0.008)	0.064 (0.008)
Petrol, rubber, plastics	0.059 (0.007)	0.052 (0.007)	0.040 (0.007)	0.012 (0.007)	0.037 (0.007)	0.026 (0.007)	0.047 (0.007)
Ceramics	-0.030 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.040 (0.007)	-0.017 (0.007)	-0.025 (0.006)	-0.021 (0.006)	-0.090 (0.006)
Glass	0.097 (0.011)	0.069 (0.011)	0.111 (0.011)	0.084 (0.011)	0.138 (0.010)	0.158 (0.010)	0.140 (0.011)
Other non-met min prod.	0.038 (0.006)	0.028 (0.006)	0.039 (0.007)	0.033 (0.006)	0.025 (0.006)	0.037 (0.006)	0.045 (0.006)
Base metals	0.015 (0.009)	-0.018 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.004 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.017 (0.009)	0.022 (0.010)
Metallic products	-0.033 (0.005)	-0.054 (0.005)	-0.047 (0.005)	-0.034 (0.005)	-0.024 (0.004)	-0.020 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
Non-electric materials	-0.021 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	0.017 (0.006)	0.021 (0.005)	0.027 (0.006)	0.064 (0.006)
Electric materials	0.099 (0.006)	0.048 (0.006)	0.010 (0.005)	0.018 (0.005)	0.050 (0.005)	0.031 (0.005)	0.008 (0.006)
Motor vehicles	0.067 (0.007)	0.078 (0.006)	0.047 (0.006)	0.048 (0.006)	0.044 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.023 (0.005)
Professional instruments	-0.122 (0.017)	-0.074 (0.015)	-0.060 (0.014)	-0.079 (0.015)	-0.106 (0.014)	-0.040 (0.014)	-0.073 (0.014)

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Table 3: (continued from previous page)

Industry	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Other manufacturing	-0.071 (0.013)	-0.107 (0.012)	-0.103 (0.013)	-0.111 (0.013)	-0.113 (0.013)	-0.130 (0.013)	-0.081 (0.013)
Elect., gas and water	0.301 (0.009)	0.277 (0.008)	0.230 (0.008)	0.239 (0.008)	0.200 (0.008)	0.199 (0.008)	0.103 (0.009)
Building	-0.086 (0.003)	-0.088 (0.003)	-0.089 (0.003)	-0.084 (0.003)	-0.088 (0.003)	-0.081 (0.003)	-0.061 (0.003)
Wholesale trade	0.031 (0.004)	0.009 (0.003)	0.009 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.026 (0.003)
Retail trade	-0.029 (0.004)	-0.025 (0.003)	-0.024 (0.003)	-0.017 (0.003)	-0.026 (0.003)	-0.024 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.003)
Restaurants and cafes	-0.151 (0.006)	-0.168 (0.005)	-0.181 (0.005)	-0.166 (0.005)	-0.154 (0.005)	-0.157 (0.005)	-0.135 (0.005)
Hotels	0.001 (0.006)	-0.013 (0.006)	-0.012 (0.006)	-0.027 (0.006)	-0.038 (0.005)	-0.034 (0.006)	-0.015 (0.005)
Transport	0.021 (0.005)	-0.018 (0.005)	-0.016 (0.005)	0.020 (0.004)	0.023 (0.004)	0.050 (0.004)	0.070 (0.004)
Communications	0.071 (0.008)	0.131 (0.007)	0.128 (0.007)	0.130 (0.006)	0.087 (0.006)	0.052 (0.006)	0.037 (0.006)
Banking	0.235 (0.010)	0.238 (0.009)	0.251 (0.009)	0.191 (0.009)	0.157 (0.009)	0.165 (0.008)	0.117 (0.008)
Insurance	0.223 (0.009)	0.279 (0.009)	0.285 (0.008)	0.300 (0.009)	0.282 (0.008)	0.257 (0.008)	0.281 (0.008)
Real estate	0.016 (0.005)	-0.072 (0.004)	-0.075 (0.004)	-0.074 (0.004)	-0.069 (0.004)	-0.079 (0.004)	-0.057 (0.003)
Productive services - transp	0.217 (0.011)	0.214 (0.008)	0.238 (0.008)	0.205 (0.008)	0.167 (0.007)	0.104 (0.007)	0.083 (0.007)
Other productive services	-0.160 (0.007)	0.047 (0.014)	0.062 (0.013)	0.047 (0.012)	0.037 (0.011)	0.026 (0.011)	0.016 (0.010)
Social services	-0.069 (0.006)	-0.060 (0.006)	-0.058 (0.006)	-0.068 (0.005)	-0.058 (0.005)	-0.067 (0.005)	-0.036 (0.004)
Personal services	-0.032 (0.005)	-0.018 (0.007)	-0.022 (0.007)	-0.010 (0.006)	0.013 (0.005)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.015 (0.005)
F-Stat	227.19	238.22	241.78	233.22	223.73	224.50	200.48
Weighted SD	0.110	0.108	0.108	0.099	0.090	0.091	0.08
No. of obs	130,439	134,981	134,284	142,809	146,159	150,921	154,498

Note: Given that the model does not include a constant the resulting coefficients are proportionate differences in wages between a worker in a given industry and the average worker in the economy. Standard errors in parentheses. Weights are industry employment shares for each year. Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessoa (1986-2000).

Table 4: Persistence of the raw interindustry wage structure (k^{**}) between 1986 and 2000

Year	Weighted correlation with 1986
1986	1.00
1987	0.979
1988	0.979
1989	0.962
1991	0.921
1992	0.938
1993	0.914
1994	0.891
1995	0.839
1996	0.839
1997	0.838
1998	0.822
1999	0.807
2000	0.761

Note: Weights are average employment shares of each industry in the period from 1986 to 2000. Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessal (1986-2000).

Table 5: Analysis of sources of wage variation

Source of wage variation	Share of TSS
Model with covariates and industry (A)	0.718
Error (1-A)	0.282
Model with covariates first:	
Covariates (B)	0.699
Industry (A-B)	0.019
Model with industry first:	
Industry (C)	0.292
Covariates (A-C)	0.426
Variance of log wages	0.276
Mean of log wages	0
Total no. of observations	1,823,572
No. of industries	43
No. of covariates	74

Note: TSS stands for total sum of squares. Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessal (1986-2000).

Table 6: Estimated interindustry wage differentials with differing controls, pooled data

Industry	Industry & time (1)	Add worker obs. effects (2)	Add firm obs. effects, κ^{**} (3)	Add worker unobs. effects (4)
Agriculture	-0.456 (0.003)	-0.234 (0.003)	-0.144 (0.003)	-0.091 (0.004)
Silviculture	-0.348 (0.011)	-0.117 (0.007)	-0.030 (0.007)	-0.035 (0.008)
Fishing	-0.220 (0.007)	-0.075 (0.007)	-0.112 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)
Mining	0.007 (0.004)	0.030 (0.003)	0.070 (0.002)	0.053 (0.004)
Food products	-0.180 (0.002)	-0.105 (0.001)	-0.082 (0.001)	-0.040 (0.002)
Beverages	0.042 (0.004)	-0.060 (0.003)	-0.093 (0.003)	-0.025 (0.004)
Tobacco	0.360 (0.010)	0.175 (0.007)	0.021 (0.007)	0.063 (0.019)
Textiles	-0.283 (0.001)	-0.181 (0.001)	-0.126 (0.001)	-0.045 (0.002)
Clothing	-0.444 (0.001)	-0.193 (0.001)	-0.140 (0.001)	-0.073 (0.002)
Leather	-0.193 (0.005)	-0.049 (0.004)	0.028 (0.004)	-0.017 (0.006)
Shoes	-0.403 (0.002)	-0.148 (0.001)	-0.112 (0.001)	-0.103 (0.003)
Wood and cork	-0.265 (0.002)	-0.153 (0.002)	-0.081 (0.002)	-0.063 (0.003)
Furniture	-0.430 (0.003)	-0.306 (0.002)	-0.213 (0.002)	-0.111 (0.003)
Pulp, paper, paper prod.	0.177 (0.003)	0.089 (0.002)	0.056 (0.002)	0.000 (0.004)
Publishing and printing	0.046 (0.003)	-0.038 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.025 (0.003)
Industrial chemicals	0.400 (0.004)	0.162 (0.003)	0.082 (0.003)	0.061 (0.004)
Other chemicals	0.276 (0.003)	0.092 (0.002)	0.064 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)
Petrol, rubber, plastics	0.128 (0.003)	0.053 (0.002)	0.051 (0.002)	0.035 (0.003)
Ceramics	-0.170 (0.003)	-0.023 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	0.023 (0.004)
Glass	0.179 (0.004)	0.155 (0.003)	0.135 (0.003)	0.107 (0.006)
Other non-met min prod.	-0.020 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.032 (0.002)	0.034 (0.003)
Base metals	0.100 (0.003)	0.008 (0.002)	-0.010 (0.002)	-0.026 (0.003)
Metallic products	-0.138 (0.002)	-0.088 (0.001)	-0.034 (0.001)	-0.042 (0.002)
Non-electric materials	-0.007 (0.002)	-0.038 (0.002)	-0.010 (0.002)	-0.016 (0.002)
Electric materials	0.105 (0.002)	0.123 (0.002)	0.057 (0.002)	0.033 (0.002)
Motor vehicles	0.169 (0.002)	0.081 (0.002)	0.046 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)

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Table 6: (continued from previous page)

	Industry & time	Add worker obs. effects	Add firm obs. effects, κ^{**}	Add worker unobs. effects
Industry	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Professional instruments	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.017 (0.004)	-0.050 (0.004)	-0.011 (0.007)
Other manufacturing	-0.249 (0.005)	-0.147 (0.003)	-0.093 (0.003)	-0.046 (0.004)
Elect., gas and water	0.656 (0.003)	0.405 (0.002)	0.251 (0.002)	0.117 (0.007)
Building	-0.184 (0.001)	-0.120 (0.001)	-0.074 (0.001)	-0.050 (0.001)
Wholesale trade	0.056 (0.001)	-0.020 (0.001)	0.016 (0.001)	-0.007 (0.001)
Retail trade	-0.163 (0.001)	-0.087 (0.001)	-0.024 (0.001)	-0.035 (0.001)
Restaurants and cafes	-0.418 (0.002)	-0.213 (0.001)	-0.141 (0.001)	-0.102 (0.002)
Hotels	-0.063 (0.002)	0.006 (0.002)	-0.008 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)
Transport	0.278 (0.002)	0.147 (0.001)	0.056 (0.001)	0.041 (0.002)
Communications	0.509 (0.002)	0.263 (0.002)	0.083 (0.002)	0.086 (0.005)
Banking	0.719 (0.002)	0.384 (0.001)	0.250 (0.002)	0.184 (0.004)
Insurance	0.663 (0.003)	0.340 (0.002)	0.309 (0.002)	0.236 (0.007)
Real estate	-0.095 (0.002)	-0.026 (0.001)	-0.042 (0.001)	-0.032 (0.002)
Productive services - transp	0.356 (0.003)	0.204 (0.002)	0.205 (0.002)	0.051 (0.003)
Other productive services	-0.339 (0.004)	-0.085 (0.002)	-0.087 (0.002)	-0.021 (0.003)
Social services	-0.127 (0.002)	-0.134 (0.001)	-0.077 (0.001)	-0.051 (0.003)
Personal services	-0.024 (0.002)	-0.055 (0.002)	-0.025 (0.002)	-0.056 (0.002)
R^2	0.33	0.68	0.72	0.47
Weighted SD	0.287	0.153	0.100	0.064

Note: Because the model does not include a constant the resulting coefficients are proportionate differences in wages between a worker in a given industry and the average worker in the economy. Standard errors in parentheses. Weights are industry average shares of employment in the period 1986-2000. The no. of observations is 1,823,572. Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessal (1986-2000).

Table 7: Estimated interindustry wage differentials with differing controls

Industry	Industry effect given X and:	
	person and firm effects, κ^*	person, firm and match effects, κ
	(1)	(2)
Agriculture	-0.244 (0.001)	-0.253 (0.002)
Silviculture	-0.167 (0.005)	-0.173 (0.006)
Fishing	-0.010 (0.004)	-0.010 (0.004)
Mining	0.025 (0.002)	0.025 (0.002)
Food products	-0.090 (0.001)	-0.093 (0.001)
Beverages	-0.027 (0.002)	-0.028 (0.002)
Tobacco	0.202 (0.005)	0.209 (0.006)
Textiles	-0.123 (0.001)	-0.127 (0.001)
Clothing	-0.186 (0.001)	-0.193 (0.001)
Leather	-0.024 (0.003)	-0.025 (0.003)
Shoes	-0.216 (0.001)	-0.223 (0.001)
Wood and cork	-0.135 (0.001)	-0.140 (0.001)
Furniture	-0.291 (0.001)	-0.301 (0.001)
Pulp, paper, paper prod.	0.100 (0.002)	0.104 (0.002)
Publishing and printing	-0.044 (0.001)	-0.046 (0.001)
Industrial chemicals	0.203 (0.002)	0.210 (0.002)
Other chemicals	0.116 (0.002)	0.120 (0.002)
Petrol, rubber, plastics	0.101 (0.001)	0.104 (0.001)
Ceramics	-0.056 (0.001)	-0.058 (0.001)
Glass	0.186 (0.002)	0.193 (0.002)
Other non-met min prod.	0.004 (0.001)	0.004 (0.001)
Base metals	0.037 (0.002)	0.039 (0.002)
Metallic products	-0.114 (0.001)	-0.118 (0.001)
Non-electric materials	-0.081 (0.001)	-0.084 (0.001)
Electric materials	0.090 (0.001)	0.093 (0.001)
Motor vehicles	0.053 (0.001)	0.055 (0.001)

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Table 7: (continued from previous page)

Industry	Industry effect given X and:	
	person and firm effects, κ^*	person, firm and match effects, κ
	(1)	(2)
Professional instruments	-0.044 (0.003)	-0.045 (0.003)
Other manufacturing	-0.107 (0.003)	-0.111 (0.003)
Elect., gas and water	0.316 (0.001)	0.328 (0.001)
Building	-0.145 (0.001)	-0.150 (0.001)
Wholesale trade	-0.017 (0.001)	-0.018 (0.001)
Retail trade	-0.106 (0.001)	-0.110 (0.001)
Restaurants and cafes	-0.223 (0.001)	-0.231 (0.001)
Hotels	-0.028 (0.001)	-0.029 (0.001)
Transport	0.101 (0.001)	0.105 (0.001)
Communications	0.212 (0.001)	0.220 (0.001)
Banking	0.383 (0.001)	0.397 (0.001)
Insurance	0.357 (0.002)	0.370 (0.002)
Real estate	-0.035 (0.001)	-0.036 (0.001)
Productive services - transp	0.201 (0.002)	0.208 (0.002)
Other productive services	-0.055 (0.002)	-0.057 (0.002)
Social services	-0.072 (0.001)	-0.075 (0.001)
Personal services	-0.050 (0.001)	-0.052 (0.001)
Constant	-0.039 (0.000)	-0.041 (0.000)
R^2	0.92	0.94
Weighted SD	0.145	0.150

Note: Because the model does not include a constant the resulting coefficients are proportionate differences in wages between a worker in a given industry and the average worker in the economy. Standard errors in parentheses. Weights are industry average shares of employment in the period 1986-2000. The no. of observations is 1,823,572. Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessal (1986-2000).

Table 8: Persistence of the pure interindustry wage structure (k) between 1986 and 2000

Year	Weighted correlation with 1986
1986	1.00
1987	0.999
1988	0.998
1989	0.995
1991	0.989
1992	0.988
1993	0.984
1994	0.978
1995	0.945
1996	0.943
1997	0.935
1998	0.935
1999	0.923
2000	0.922

Note: Weights are average employment shares of each industry in the period from 1986 to 2000. Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessal (1986-2000).

Table 9: Estimates of the relation between the raw interindustry wage structure and industry average person, firm and match effects

Independent variables	Coefficients:			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Person and firm effects model:				
Industry average person effect	0.996 (0.007)	1.692 (0.391)		
Industry average firm effect	0.998 (0.002)		1.100 (0.058)	
R ²	1.000	0.313	0.899	
Match effects model:				
Industry average person effect	1.057 (0.012)	1.618 (0.374)		
Industry average firm effect	1.047 (0.009)		1.061 (0.055)	
Industry average match effect	2.343 (0.257)			-25.014 (0.591)
R ²	1.000	0.313	0.899	0.978

Note: These are coefficients of a regression of raw interindustry wage differential on person and firm effects (for the person and firm effects model), and person, firm and match effects (for the match effects model). Standard errors in parentheses. Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessal (1986-2000).

Table 10: Sources of raw inter industry wage differentials, exact decomposition

Industry	Pooled OLS	Person and firm effects model,		Match effects model		
	Raw differential	proportion of κ^{**} due to:		proportion of κ^{**} due to:		
	(κ^{**})	Person eff.	Firm eff.	Person eff.	Firm eff.	Match eff.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Agriculture	-0.144	0.007	0.993	0.007	0.960	0.033
Silviculture	-0.030	0.348	0.652	0.347	0.644	0.009
Fishing	-0.112	0.709	0.291	0.680	0.276	0.044
Mining	0.070	0.039	0.961	0.0379	0.929	0.033
Food products	-0.082	0.361	0.639	0.349	0.613	0.037
Beverages	-0.093	0.209	0.791	0.203	0.762	0.035
Tobacco	0.021	0.362	0.638	0.362	0.633	0.005
Textiles	-0.126	0.465	0.535	0.450	0.513	0.037
Clothing	-0.140	0.309	0.691	0.300	0.664	0.036
Leather	0.028	0.344	0.656	0.342	0.648	0.010
Shoes	-0.112	0.164	0.836	0.162	0.817	0.021
Wood and cork	-0.081	0.292	0.708	0.284	0.682	0.034
Furniture	-0.213	0.135	0.865	0.131	0.834	0.035
Pulp, paper, paper prod.	0.056	0.135	0.865	0.133	0.843	0.024
Publishing and printing	-0.000	0.500	0.500	0.499	0.494	0.007
Industrial chemicals	0.082	0.222	0.778	0.220	0.763	0.016
Other chemicals	0.064	0.120	0.880	0.117	0.852	0.030
Petrol, Rubber, Plastics	0.051	0.322	0.678	0.321	0.670	0.009
Ceramics	-0.004	0.329	0.671	0.329	0.666	0.005
Glass	0.135	0.223	0.777	0.221	0.761	0.018
Other non-met min prod.	0.032	0.227	0.773	0.225	0.759	0.016
Base metals	-0.010	0.561	0.439	0.562	0.435	0.003
Metallic products	-0.034	0.231	0.769	0.230	0.759	0.011
Non-electric materials	-0.010	0.413	0.587	0.414	0.582	0.004
Electric materials	0.057	0.244	0.756	0.237	0.727	0.036
Motor vehicles	0.046	0.398	0.602	0.387	0.580	0.033
Professional instruments	-0.050	0.186	0.814	0.184	0.797	0.019
Other manufacturing	-0.093	0.526	0.474	0.510	0.455	0.035
Elect., gas and water	0.251	0.423	0.577	0.409	0.554	0.038
Building	-0.074	0.075	0.925	0.073	0.900	0.027
Wholesale trade	0.016	0.789	0.211	0.756	0.200	0.044
Retail trade	-0.024	0.283	0.717	0.281	0.706	0.014
Restaurants and cafes	-0.141	0.105	0.895	0.102	0.863	0.035
Hotels	-0.008	0.367	0.633	0.366	0.626	0.008
Transport	0.056	0.616	0.384	0.600	0.368	0.036
Communications	0.083	0.584	0.416	0.563	0.398	0.039
Banking	0.250	0.263	0.737	0.255	0.709	0.036
Insurance	0.309	0.188	0.812	0.182	0.782	0.036
Real estate	-0.042	0.143	0.857	0.142	0.843	0.014
Productive serv - transp.	0.205	0.220	0.780	0.212	0.748	0.040
Other productive serv.	-0.087	0.184	0.816	0.173	0.762	0.065
Social services	-0.077	0.132	0.868	0.130	0.845	0.025
Personal services	-0.025	0.328	0.672	0.329	0.666	0.005
Average Proportion		30.4%	69.6%	29.8%	67.7%	2.5%

Note: column (1) is a transcription of column (3) of Table 6, it reports the estimated raw interindustry wage differentials for reference. Columns (2)-(6) report the proportional decomposition as described in subsection 6.2. Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessoa (1986-2000).

Table 11: Interindustry wage differentials and time to separation

	Quits (small gap)	Layoffs (big gap)	All separations
Industry premia	0.366 (0.063)	0.512 (0.050)	0.410 (0.040)
No. of obs	639,829	639,533	639,829
% separating	6.20	11.84	18.03

Note: Other covariates were included in the specification, but their coefficients are not reported here. The average industry effect is estimated from a regression in which the pure interindustry wage differential is included as a continuous variable. Source: Own calculations based on Quadros de Pessal (1986-2000).