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Regulatory autonomy and multilateral disciplines: The dilemma and a possible resolution

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World Trade Organization
Trade in Services Division

**Regulatory Autonomy and Multilateral Disciplines:
The Dilemma and a Possible Resolution**

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Regulatory Autonomy and Multilateral Disciplines: The Dilemma and a Possible Resolution

Aaditya Mattoo* and Arvind Subramanian**

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Abstract: A major challenge for the multilateral trading system is to secure the benefits of trade liberalization without infringing on the freedom of governments to pursue legitimate domestic objectives. The difficulty lies in distinguishing between two types of situations. In one, a non-protectionist government cannot prevent certain domestic policies from incidentally discriminating against foreign competitors. In the other, a protectionist government uses a legitimate objective as an excuse to design domestic policies which inhibit foreign competition. The challenge is to devise rules which are sensitive to the difference between these two situations, exonerating the former while preventing the latter. The approach suggested in this paper is to create a presumption in favour of the economically efficient policy measure, with departures inviting justification.

Keywords: international trade, regulation, national treatment, protection

JEL classification: F-13, K-20, K-33

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1. Introduction

A major challenge for the multilateral trading system is to secure the benefits of trade liberalization without infringing on the freedom of governments to pursue legitimate domestic objectives. The difficulty lies in distinguishing between two types of situations. In one, a non-protectionist government cannot prevent certain domestic policies from incidentally discriminating against foreign competitors. In the other, a protectionist government uses a legitimate objective as an excuse to design domestic policies which inhibit foreign competition. The challenge is to devise rules which are sensitive to the difference between these two situations, exonerating the former while preventing the latter.

At the heart of the WTO's disciplines aimed at preventing discrimination against foreign sources of supply through domestic policy measures is the national treatment principle contained in Article III of GATT 1994. And yet giving legal content to the injunction against discrimination is proving fiendishly difficult as recent GATT and WTO panel rulings have demonstrated. Essentially, GATT/WTO panels are being forced to distinguish between domestic regulations of varying hues: from the transparently protectionist to disguisedly trade-restrictive to misguidedly overzealous to necessary and legitimate. This paper attempts to locate the reasons for this difficulty and suggests ways in which it might be resolved.

2. "Likeness" and the dilemma for WTO Law

That there is a dilemma for WTO law has been made evident by recent GATT panels that have lurches between different doctrinal approaches to interpreting "likeness." These might be described as the "Textual" and "Contextual." However, before these approaches are described, it will prove useful to survey certain basic issues in Article III.

The national treatment provision is unequivocal in disallowing measures taken by governments that are overtly discriminatory, i.e, that discriminate on the basis of the provenance of the good. Of course, measures that so transgress Article III can nevertheless be justified under other provisions, including those in Article XX dealing with general exceptions. The problem arises in relation to what might be termed as apparently origin-neutral (AON) measures; namely, those where the basis for applying a domestic tax or implementing a domestic measure is not the provenance of the good but some other

characteristic or set of characteristics. In such cases, a determination under Article III hinges on determining whether or not the imported product and its domestic comparator are "like" each other.

The wider the definition of "likeness," the greater will be the set of measures that are inconsistent with Article III. If a car is a car is a car, a tax on say fuel-inefficient cars would violate Article III because some imported fuel-inefficient car would face higher taxes (and hence be discriminated against) compared with a "like" domestic fuel-efficient car. On the other hand, the narrower the definition of "likeness" the more likely that AON measures will conform with Article III. In the example above, if a fuel-inefficient car is not "like" a fuel-efficient car, the imported fuel-inefficient car would have to be compared with a domestic fuel-inefficient car, and the measure could then be found consistent with Article III.

National Treatment obligations under Article III can be divided into two groups: those relating to taxation (Article III:2) and those relating to other (i.e. non-tax) regulations of various types (Article III:4). In turn paragraph 2 specifies obligations in relation to two situations. The first sentence states that imported products cannot be subject to internal taxes or other internal charges in excess of those applied to *like* domestic products. The second sentence, referring to Article III:1, suggests that such taxes or charges cannot be applied to imported or domestic products *so as to afford protection* to domestic production.

The interpretative note to Article III:2 indicates that the second sentence is to be taken to apply to "directly competitive or substitutable" (DCS) products of which "like products"--the object of attention in the first sentence of Article III:2--form a subset. Thus the thrust of the Article and the interpretative note would point to two standards of disciplines: if it were established that a foreign and domestic product were "like", then any taxation of foreign products in excess of that on domestic products would breach Article III; if, however, foreign and domestic products were not "like," but only "directly competitive or substitutable," then difference of treatment would not be sufficient to constitute a violation; it would also need to be proved that internal taxes were being applied *so as to afford protection*.

Article III:4, on the other hand, refers only to "like" products and does not explicitly encompass within its scope "directly competitive or substitutable" products in the way that Article III:2 does.

GATT panels, when addressing the question of likeness, have needed to adjudicate between the competing objectives of allowing countries a certain measure of regulatory freedom on the one hand, and ensuring the efficacy of multilateral disciplines against a proliferation of protectionist outcomes, on the other. These tugs have been manifested in two distinct approaches to interpreting likeness, referred to above as the textual and contextual. The latter was introduced in the 1992 Panel Report on "United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages" (GATT 1993), and found full expression in the unadopted Panel report on "United States-Taxes on Automobiles," (Inside U.S. Trade 1994; hereafter referred to as the CAFE panel). The textual approach is exemplified in its sharpest form in the Panel Report on "Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages" (WTO, 1996a; hereafter referred to as the Alcoholic Beverages panel).

The textual approach has the following features: first, it defines likeness *a priori* in terms of one or a combination of product characteristics, its end-use, and its tariff classification; second, it makes a distinction between "like" products and "directly competitive or substitutable" products in a manner faithful to the two sentences in Article III:2, and applies different standards of discrimination to the two cases; third, it preserves a distinct role for Article XX and other exceptions provisions in that they would come into play once (and only after) a measure is deemed to transgress Article III.

The contextual approach has the following features: first, it does not attempt to define likeness *a priori*; rather it allows *any* distinction to be made between products on regulatory grounds; and second, the standard for determining whether an infraction of Article III has occurred is to ensure that no protectionist intent underlies the distinction nor that any protectionist effect follows from it. In effect, this gives governments the freedom to define likeness, thereby permitting a larger set of measures to be deemed origin-neutral, and *prima facie*, consistent with Article III. It will be argued below that neither approach offers a completely satisfactory resolution to the interpretation of Article III.

3. Text and Context: An Assessment

A. Critique of the Textual Approach

A strict legal reading of Article III suggests that the independent discipline imposed by the first line of Article III:2 should be maintained: a Member should not discriminate

between products that are a priori like. However, the faithfulness of the textual approach comes attached with two "burdens": first, the need to define likeness, and second to apply standards of disciplines to the two situations in a manner that is well-grounded conceptually. The approach taken by panels has been to establish likeness on a case-by-case basis in terms of criteria such as "the product's end-uses in a given market, consumers tastes and habits, which change from country to country; the products properties, nature and quality, and the products tariff classification" (GATT, 1972). The elevation of certain physical characteristics of the product to decisive status, as certain panels have done, regardless of consumer perception or behaviour in the market-place, does not seem entirely persuasive nor is it capable of consistent application. For instance, the Alcoholic Beverages Panel applies the test thus:

In the Panel's view, only vodka could be considered as like product to sochu since, apart from commonality of end-uses, it shared with sochu *most physical characteristics*. Definitionally, the only difference is in the media used for filtration. Substantial noticeable differences in physical characteristics exist between the rest of the alcoholic beverages at dispute and sochu that would disqualify them from being regarded as like products. More specifically, *the use of additives* would disqualify liqueurs, gin and genever; *the use of ingredients* would disqualify rum; lastly, *appearance* (arising from manufacturing processes) would disqualify whisky and brandy. The Panel therefore decided to examine whether the rest of alcoholic beverages, other than vodka, at dispute in the present case could qualify as directly competitive or substitutable products to sochu." (emphasis added)

It is difficult to see how the Panel has applied what it calls a "market place" test, or for that matter, any rigorous test, to distinguish between the two categories of products. Even in terms of physical attributes, it could be argued that taste is at least as important a determinant of consumer behaviour as "the use of additives," "the use of ingredients", and the "appearance" of a drink. As the Panel itself admitted defining a precise cut-off point between like and DCS products would require an "arbitrary decision."¹

¹In fact the Appellate Body noted: "We do not agree with the Panel's observation in paragraph 6.22 of the Panel Report that distinguishing between "like products" and "directly competitive or substitutable products" under Article III:2 is an "arbitrary decision". Rather, we think it is a discretionary decision that must be made in considering the various characteristics of products in individual cases." (p.21, WTO, 1996b)

Moreover, the proponents of using the above criteria appear to view the act of comparison as between physical objects, whereas the comparison for the purposes of Article III would depend very much on the context and the regulatory issue at hand. As Roessler (1996) observes, "A fox and an eagle are like animals for a hare but not for a furrier." Two cups may be identical in terms of physical attributes, but may fall under different legislative categories if for example they have different recyclable properties (subject to an environmental tax), incineration effects (subject to a sales prohibition), or are simply ordinary utensils (subject to a value-added tax).

In relation to the application of different disciplines to like product and DCS products situations, the Alcoholic Beverages Panel, while arguing strongly for a need to make a distinction applies a test for "affording protection" which trivializes the differences in disciplines. Relying on the interpretative note, the panel argued that DCS products should be "similarly taxed" and concluded that dissimilar taxation afforded protection if the magnitude of dissimilarity was not *de minimis*.² If this were indeed the only difference, then surely the panel could have saved itself the circumlocutions of determining DCS and established right at the beginning that the actual difference was above a *de minimis* level.

A central aspect of the textual approach is that it does not permit the invocation of regulatory objectives in the assessment under Article III - as is done in the contextual approach. It is argued in the Alcoholic Beverages Panel that allowing Article XX-type notions to inform assessments under Article III could lead to the evisceration of the content of Article XX or to its circumvention. Article XX provides for certain safeguards in evaluating departures from non-discrimination, including the need to avoid "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination," and "disguised restrictions," as well as the necessity test for achieving domestic objectives. These safeguards would be avoided if regulatory objectives could be invoked as a defence under Article III.³

This very strength of the textual approach, namely its fidelity to the text, contains a

²This weakness in argumentation was also recognized by the Appellate Body in page 24 of its report (WTO, 1996b). It does not seem satisfactory to reduce the issue of "affording protection" merely to establishing dissimilarity. At the very least, it would be necessary to establish that the difference in taxation is sufficient to induce substitution between products given the level of consumer responsiveness, measured, for instance, by the cross-price elasticity of demand. This may mean little more than establishing that differences are greater than a *de minimis* level, but this level would be defined on the basis of an economically meaningful and justifiable criterion rather than an arbitrary interpretation of dissimilarity.

³Moreover, this approach would apparently flout the injunction in the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties against an interpretative approach that would reduce whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy.

potentially serious weakness relating to the limited set of regulatory objectives that could be invoked to justify departures from national treatment. As noted by Roessler (1996):

"Article XX lists only ten policy goals as justifying measures deviating from other provisions of the General Agreement, but there are far more legitimate policy goals that can only be attained by distinguishing different product categories. For instance, policies designed to harmonize technical standards, to avoid the accumulation of waste, or to tax the consumption of luxury goods are not among the policies covered by the exemptions in Article XX. If one were to rely in the context of Article III only on the characteristics or uses of the products and examine the purpose of the product distinctions only in the context of Article XX, one would arrive at the conclusion that distinctions between physically similar products or products serving similar end-uses could only be made for the ten purposes listed in Article XX, a result that was probably not intended by the drafters of the General Agreement and that would be hardly acceptable to the contracting parties."

The implication of the textual approach would be to create a two-tiered set of obligations depending on the regulatory purpose underlying a measure. First, a less onerous standard would prevail for those regulatory objectives listed in Article XX because a measure enacted for these purposes would have a second line of defence against the charge of discrimination based on the exonerating spirit of Article XX. On the other hand, measures enacted for other purposes--and a host of such purposes could be imagined, including environmental, competition policy, company law, and investment-related matters--would face a more onerous standard because of being deprived of the Article XX defence. Should this - largely artificial and probably unintended - disparity be allowed to prevail in order to maintain a pure textual interpretation of Articles III and XX? An affirmative answer is not compelling from a legal perspective.

Moreover, the problem posed above is not a hypothetical one. Indeed, the GATT has already had to contend with it in the case of the CAFE dispute. If the Panel adjudicating the dispute had adopted a purely textual interpretation and compared imported and domestic cars based on their physical attributes rather than in relation to the environmental purpose at hand, the outcome could have been awkward. For example, if the Panel had deemed that an imported car valued above \$30,000 was "like" a domestic car valued below \$30,000 based on their physical attributes, the Luxury Excise Tax would

have been ruled an infringement of Article III; in a similar vein, cars with fuel efficiency below and above the threshold of 22.5 miles per gallon could have been viewed as “like” each other, favouring a violation ruling in relation to the Gas Guzzler Tax. In both these cases, the defendant would have had no further recourse to a regulation-based defence under Article XX because income distribution, revenue-raising and the environment *per se* are not currently listed in the Article. The matter would have stopped at the Article III stage. Would such a state of law be desirable?

If therefore the textual approach is difficult to apply to a range of known situations, the uncomfortable conclusion is that alternatives have to be found. The claims of an approach or theory need to be tested against the encompassing principle, namely that it be able to explain or apply to all known situations if it is to survive as a credible theory. Failure to encompass these situations would necessitate the search for superior alternatives.

Another problem with a strict textual interpretation is that Article III:4 would appear to apply only to like products and not to DCS. In other words, whereas tax measures relating to DCS would have to pass the disciplines of the "affording protection test", non-tax domestic measures would not. This would open the way for easy circumvention of Article III disciplines by eschewing tax measure in favour of regulatory ones. Such an outcome was probably also not intended by the drafters of the General Agreement nor would be acceptable to WTO members today.

The Appellate Body noted certain errors in law in the Alcoholic Beverages Panel Report,⁴ but on the whole, confirmed the basic approach of the Panel (WTO, 1996b). Thus, it noted that:

If the measure is applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production, then it does not matter that there may not have been any desire to engage in protection in the minds of the legislators or the regulators who imposed the measure. It is irrelevant that protectionism was not an intended objective if the particular tax measure in question is nevertheless, to echo Article III:1, "*applied to imported or domestic products so*

⁴See, for instance, footnotes 1 and 2.

as to afford protection to domestic production."⁵

Two aspects of the Appellate Body Report are, however, significant. First, it emphasizes that the definition of "like products" should be construed *narrowly*. This implies that mere difference in treatment would be sufficient to constitute a violation of Article III:2 only in a limited number of cases - for instance, when products are virtually identical. In most cases, it would be necessary to demonstrate that the tax measure was applied so as to afford protection - i.e. most battles would be fought on the territory of the second sentence of Article III:2 rather than the first sentence of Article III:2. The second significant aspect of the Report is that, even though it dismisses any consideration of the *aims* behind measures, it seems to be more open on how "so as to afford protection" is to be interpreted. Thus, it states:

We believe that it is possible to examine objectively the underlying criteria used in a particular tax measure, its structure, and its overall application to ascertain whether it is applied in a way that affords protection to domestic products. Although, it is true that the aim of a measure may not be easily ascertained, nevertheless its protective application can most often be discerned from the design, the architecture, and the revealing structure of a measure.⁶

The significance of these aspects of the Appellate Body Report is discussed in Section IV.

B. Critique of the Contextual Approach

The rationale for the contextual approach is expressed in the Panel report on United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages:

"The Panel recognized that the treatment of imported and domestic products as like products under Article III may have significant implications for the scope of obligations under the General Agreement and for the regulatory autonomy of contracting parties with respect to their international tax laws and regulations: once products are designated as like products, a regulatory product

⁵Emphasis added by the Appellate Body (p 28, WTO, 1996b).

⁶p. 29 (WTO, 1996b).

differentiation, e.g. for standardization or environmental purposes, becomes inconsistent with Article III even if the regulation is not "applied.. so as to afford protection.." In the view of the Panel, therefore, it is imperative that the like product determination in the context of Article III be made in such a way that it not unnecessarily infringe upon the regulatory authority and domestic policy options of contracting parties."

The solution implied by the contextual approach is to allow the invocation of regulatory objectives in the assessment under Article III itself of whether a measure is discriminatory, subject to the discipline that the distinction made between products is not such as to embody protectionist intent or lead to protectionist effects. To see fully the implications of this approach, recall that Article III.2 specifies two obligations. The first sentence states that imported products cannot be subject to internal taxes or other internal charges in excess of those applied to *like* domestic products. The second sentence, referring to Article III.1, implies that such taxes or charges cannot be applied to imported or domestic products *so as to afford protection* to domestic production. The contextual approach interprets the first obligation in terms of the second by arguing that a regulatory distinction between product categories is illegitimate only if protection is intended or afforded. This interpretation thus circumvents the independent discipline that the first obligation imposes, i.e. that like foreign product must not be treated discriminatorily irrespective of whether it is possible to prove protectionist intent or effect.

While finessing quite ingeniously the problem of determining likeness, the validity of this approach hinges crucially on the standards set for determining whether apparently origin neutral (AON) measures have protectionist intent or effect. The only Panel ruling that exclusively applied these tests was the unadopted CAFE Panel. However, as argued in Mattoo and Subramanian (1996), the standards for establishing protectionist intent and effect were set impossibly high. First, the panel tried to establish protectionist effect by elaborating an "inherence" test, which was impossible to meet because it would essentially require that a technology, production, or design capability was confined to certain national borders. Second, and more importantly, while conferring freedom on countries to enact regulations for domestic policy objectives, it did not require that this freedom be exercised consistently across products that were covered by the professed objective.

(a) *Inherence*: The CAFE Panel attempted to steer between its aversion to an effects-based test and an intrinsic necessity to consider the impact of regulations by creating a

new criterion. This criterion (hereafter referred to as the "inherence" criterion) attempts to evaluate whether regulations inherently divide products into those of domestic and foreign origin. But a closer examination of the Panel's arguments suggests that it is very unlikely that countries, in their domestic regulation, will ever run foul of the inherence test. For example, the Panel found that the threshold set for the gas guzzler tax (GGT) did not discriminate between automobiles of domestic and foreign origin, because the "technology to manufacture high-fuel economy automobiles--above the 22.5 mpg threshold--was not inherent to the United States, nor were low fuel economy automobiles inherently of foreign origin."⁷ In a similar vein, the Panel was "not convinced that the existence of many versions of a given automobile model type was an inherent characteristic of automobiles of foreign origin. Such an advantage would not, therefore, alter the conditions of competition in favour of domestic automobiles, and thereby have the effect of affording protection to domestic production."⁸ Also, "In particular, no evidence had been advanced that EC or foreign automobiles manufacturers did not in general have the design, production, and marketing capabilities to sell automobiles below the \$30,000 threshold, or that they did not in general produce such models for other markets."⁹

The Panel found that the luxury excise tax (LET) and GGT cleared the "inherence" test based on the mere fact that foreign manufacturers had the *capability* to produce goods exempted from the regulation; indeed, this test could be met if the technology is freely available for foreign manufacturers to engage in production. In effect, if any foreign production exists or *could exist* in the product category subject to lower taxes, or if any domestic production exists or *could exist* in the product category subject to higher taxes, it would be impossible to find protectionist intent or effect. Article III.2 could thus only be found to be violated when there was discriminatory treatment of foreign and domestic products which were substitutes in consumption, but did not overlap at all in terms of production *possibilities*.

In fact, a previous Panel had applied a similar test, but it attracted little attention possibly because the circumstances were such that this rather stringent condition was

⁷Auto Panel Report, p. S-3, paragraph 5-25.

⁸Auto Panel Report, p. S-4, paragraph 5-31.

⁹Auto Panel Report, p. S-3, paragraph 5-14.

fulfilled.¹⁰ The special treatment accorded in the Mississippi law to a wine produced from a particular type of grape was found to be inconsistent with Article III.2 since the type of grape could only be grown in the southeastern United States and the Mediterranean region. The Panel concluded that, given the limited growing range of the specific type of grape, at least in North America, the particular tax treatment implied a geographical distinction which afforded protection to local production of wine to the disadvantage of wine produced where this type of grape could not be grown.

But when can it seriously be established, other than for natural or government-mandated monopolies, that a technology, production, or design capability is confined to certain national borders? Moreover, the fact that foreign producers *can* make cheap cars need not alter the fact that their comparative advantage could be in making expensive ones.¹¹

Consider the likely outcome if the inherence criterion had been applied to the case where the Province of Ontario called for a special "environmental" tax per can affecting non-refillable beer cans.¹² This case involved an origin-neutral measure, but was widely perceived as being protectionist. The United States had a small share of the Canadian beer market (less than 3 percent), but nearly all sales comprised cans rather than bottles. It could easily have been established that U.S. producers had the *capability* to market beer in bottles because U.S. producers marketed bottled beer in other countries. On the "inherence" criterion, the tax would have been ruled as consistent with Article III.

(b) *Exemptions: Excessive Regulatory Freedom?* The CAFE Panel raised a fundamental question: to what standards of regulatory seriousness can WTO Members be held, if they are given the measure of freedom that the CAFE Panel confers on them, to enact regulations for domestic policy objectives?

This issue of the seriousness of objective has two facets. The first relates to the *type* of regulatory measure, and the second to the *consistency* of its application. Given a domestic

¹⁰See GATT (1993).

¹¹If inherence had been defined in terms of "economic" rather than technological capability, the inherence standard would have been both more strict and more appropriate. However, economic capability would be very difficult, if not impossible, to establish.

¹²See GATT (1992).

policy objective, which governments are free to pursue under GATT, what instruments should they be permitted or obliged to use? In the case at hand, it was clear, and the Panel recognized this, that the environmental objective could be better served by other forms of policy intervention, such as fuel taxes. However, the CAFE Panel ruled, "The efficiency of the measure was not by itself relevant in assessing conformity under Article III."¹³

It could be argued, nevertheless, that the right to take regulatory action entails a responsibility to apply it *consistently across products* that are clearly covered by the domestic policy (in this case, environmental) objective that the government upholds. One of the shortcomings of the CAFE Panel is its exoneration of the exemption of light trucks and sporting vehicles, from the various tax measures. The exemption raises two types of concerns.

The CAFE Panel affirms the right of countries to define likeness in terms of the regulatory objective being pursued, in this case, fuel efficiency. Having done so, the Article III obligation would require that all vehicles in the fuel-inefficient category were treated alike. For example, were imported fuel-inefficient vehicles treated in the same manner as domestic fuel-inefficient vehicles, including sports utility vehicles? The answer is no. But the Panel deemed imported fuel-inefficient cars to be unlike domestic fuel-inefficient sports utility vehicles. Thus, the Panel conferred the freedom to define likeness in terms of regulatory objectives, but did not require that this freedom be consistently exercised. By allowing exemptions for certain vehicles, the Panel conferred the further freedom to change or switch criterion for likeness away from that implied in the regulatory objective. If such switching of criteria had not been accepted, then there would have been a straightforward violation of Article III because some imported products were not treated in the same manner as like domestic products.

It could also be argued that an exemption of particular categories of products could be seen as evidence of protectionist intent and effect, and should have been scrutinized in this light. This was particularly important to consider in view of the other high standards set for establishing protectionism, as argued above. Admittedly, the proposed criterion of consistent application across similar product groups will open its own Pandora's box of difficulties. What range of products ought to be covered? Does a fuel-efficiency objective necessitate application of taxes to aircraft, motor boats, etc.? In any case, it would seem

¹³Auto Panel Report, p. S-4, paragraph 5-33.

that sports utility vehicles, which are closely related to other passenger vehicles (in terms of the regulatory objective and instruments used) should have been part of the tax measures. The whiff of suspicion created by their exemption is probably warranted. At the very least, the defending contracting party should have been required to justify such an exemption. The Article XX-inspired questions of whether the exemption was "necessary" or whether it acted as a mere "disguised restriction on trade" would be relevant in this regard.

4. A Possible Resolution

As explained above, recent approaches to establishing discrimination under Article III have merit and yet contain flaws that could lead to legal confusion in the trading system in relation to one of its key disciplines. In this section, an alternative approach is proposed that tries to avoid some of the most egregious shortcomings of both.

The starting point for our proposal is the recognition that the list of regulatory objectives in Article XX of GATT 1994 as it currently stands is far too narrow, and cannot be taken as the universe of objectives that can be legitimately pursued by WTO Members. Furthermore, the prospect that these objectives will be broadened in the near future through political negotiation does not appear very promising. In the interim, and in order to avoid legal confusion, it is incumbent on the trading system both to allow Members to implement domestic policies in pursuit of objectives other than those listed in Article XX of GATT 1994, while at the same time ensuring that this is done in a manner that preserves the efficacy and openness of the multilateral trading system. Thus, the proposed solution builds upon the contextual approach outlined earlier in the paper.

Our choice of favouring the contextual approach is also based on the problems emanating from too literal an interpretation favoured by the textual approach (namely the problem related to Article III:4 discussed above) as well as the difficulty in making operational the distinction in standards between like and DCS products.

However, having accepted the underlying logic of the contextual approach, we would propose that *the safeguard against proliferation of protectionist outcomes would be to read into the Article III determination itself the kinds of disciplines - but not just those, as we shall show below - contained in Article XX*. Our proposed approach would take the sting off the criticism against the contextual approach of rendering Article XX redundant and therefore at

variance with the Vienna Convention's injunction against an interpretative approach that has such a consequence. The reason is that, at least in spirit, our approach would preserve all the useful safeguards in Article XX which would have a critical role in determining the consistency with the non-discrimination principle. This is not true of the contextual approach as previously applied because the standards of protectionism that it prescribes in the initial analysis of violation under Article III are different from, and arguably less stringent than, those in Article XX.

This de facto commingling of Articles III and XX that we are proposing is neither radical nor novel from a GATT/WTO legal perspective. Indeed, both the Agreement on "Technical Barriers to Trade" (TBT) and Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures" (SPS) have created an alternative to the two-stage/bifurcated approach of moving from III to XX, by bringing together the regulatory objectives and standards for determining protectionism. Thus the objective and standard are part of the initial determination of the violation rather than being invoked as part of an affirmative defence after a measure has been found to be an infraction of Article III.¹⁴ Thus, Article 2.2 of the TBT provides:

Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia, national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia, available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended use of products.¹⁵

¹⁴It should be noted, however, that both the TBT and SPS relate both to cases where a departure from non-discrimination is assessed, as well as one where a measure that is consistent with non-discrimination is evaluated (the national treatment plus case). Of course, in reality these distinctions are blurred by the approach adopted by the TBT and SPS Agreements, although it is useful to bear these conceptual distinctions in mind.

¹⁵It is interesting that the TBT fleshes out the "affording protection" standard of Article III in the language "with a view to or with the effect of." This language also clarifies that *either* intent *or* effect and not necessarily both would be the yardsticks for determining violation. Second, it is also interesting to note that the list of objectives is explicitly signalled as being non-exhaustive, which would lead to an anomaly if its forbears (Articles III and XX) were more narrowly (and literally) interpreted.

The SPS Agreement also features a similar conflation of objectives and protectionist standards in its Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3:

Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient evidence except...

Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.

Against this background, the following two-stage test is suggested for evaluating whether a measure taken for regulatory reasons affords protection:

(i) *Stipulate an a priori definition of like products based on similarity of end uses, and a clear relationship of substitutability and direct competition based on market conditions.*

The criterion of end use serves to demarcate the class of products within which a particular measure may give rise to protectionist effect. (The protectionist effect may, of course, arise from formally identical or formally different treatment) For example, a higher (say, environmentally-motivated) tax on lawn mowers than on cars would clearly not arouse concern in the same way as a higher tax on large cars than on small cars. But, even within the class of similar end-use, a criterion is necessary to identify when a measure leads to a protectionist effect and to be able to distinguish between situations in which protectionist effect is an incidental consequence of a domestic measure and those in which it is not.

(ii) *There would be a presumption in favour of the choice of the economically optimal policy to achieve a legitimate objective. A Member choosing to pursue an objective by a measure other than the economically optimal would need to justify this choice.*

The GATT precedent of uncritical acceptance of the choice of instruments in the context of Article III needs to cede to a more stringent scrutiny of such a choice like that in the context of Article XX and its famous "necessity" test. This is particularly true if government's are to be granted a large measure of freedom to pursue domestic regulatory objectives. As long as GATT panels relating to Article III focused on protectionist effect,

and did not accept non-protectionist objectives as justification, it did not matter if they accepted the choice of instruments uncritically. However, if Panels permit the invocation of non-protectionist objectives as justification for protectionist effect, the absence of any discipline on the choice of policy instruments and the manner of their application threatens to undermine multilateral rules.

Is there any textual basis for the test that is being proposed? There is, of course, no precedent of GATT/WTO panels applying a necessity test in the context of Article III, and certainly no precedent of economic efficiency being a criteria for determining the legitimacy of domestic regulation. However, even though the test does not find clear support in existing jurisprudence, certain aspects of the Appellate Body Report on Alcoholic Beverages Panel imply that the suggested interpretation is not unduly radical. In determining whether a measure is applied so as to afford protection, the Report prescribes a comprehensive and objective analysis of "the design, the architecture, and the revealing structure of a measure" (see Section 3A). In this analysis, it would seem important to consider whether the measure in question was the economically optimal means of achieving the particular objective. In any case, if the proposed test cannot already be read in Article III, there would seem to be a case for its explicit inclusion to be considered in future negotiations.

The problem with the existing necessity test

How is this criterion of economic efficiency different from the discipline of the necessity test contained in Article XX and why is it preferable to the necessity test? The necessity test as applied by GATT panels itself poses certain problems and is in need of refinement.¹⁶ One problem is that frequently we can conceive of a measure which could also achieve the relevant objective without being inconsistent with a Member's obligations. Thus, not many measures would pass the "necessity-test" if it were applied literally. Hudec and Farber (1996) note:

"In theory, this approach can be abused, given that it is always possible to imagine some less restrictive alternative to any given regulation. In practice, however, GATT tribunals have exercised good judgement and common sense in this exercise." (p. 81)

¹⁶See also Mattoo and Mavroidis (1997)

The 1989 Panel Report on "United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930" states:

"It was clear to the Panel that a contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provision as 'necessary' in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions."

The "Thailand Cigarettes" panel goes further, in actually suggesting alternative, GATT-consistent measures, which would have addressed Thailand's concerns regarding both the quality and quantity of cigarettes consumed. For instance, regarding the supply of cigarettes, it noted:

"...that contracting parties may maintain governmental monopolies, such as the Thai Tobacco Monopoly, on the importation and domestic sale of products. The Thai Government may use this monopoly to regulate the overall supply of cigarettes, their prices and their retail availability provided it thereby does not accord imported cigarettes less favourable treatment than domestic cigarettes or act inconsistently with any commitments assumed under its schedule of commitments."¹⁷

In a similar vein, the 1991 unadopted Panel Report on "United States: Restrictions on Imports of Tuna" argued:

"The United States had not demonstrated to the panel - as required of the Party invoking an Article XX exception - that it had exhausted all options reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection objectives through measures consistent with the General Agreement, in particular through the negotiation of international cooperative arrangements, which would seem to be desirable in view of the fact that dolphins roam the waters of many states

¹⁷See §§ 77-79 of the "Thailand Cigarettes" panel report.

and the high seas.”

The question is: how is the set of measures which are *reasonably available* to a Member to be defined? And from within this set, is a Member obliged to choose the one that is *least inconsistent with a member's GATT obligations*, i.e. is least trade restrictive? The heart of the problem is that, in its exclusive concern with GATT-consistency, the interpretation of Article XX proposed by GATT panels does not explicitly address the issue of *efficiency* of measures.

The efficiency principle

How should the efficiency principle be applied? Economic principles can provide meaningful rules for the choice of instruments. Ideally, state intervention is meant to remedy distortions. The economic theory of optimal policy intervention provides an hierarchy of instruments to deal with the problem of domestic distortions - which are the target of domestic policy instruments falling with the domain of the national treatment obligation. The “first-best” instrument is the one which attacks the divergence between the private and the social cost at the source.

Suppose a country chose to implement the second best policy. This would immediately raise the question: was the first best instrument feasible? But who is to judge the legitimacy of the constraints? If a GATT/WTO panel were to do so, it may be regarded as an unjustified intrusion in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. If the GATT/WTO unquestioningly accepted the legitimacy of these constraints, then it would not be in a position to meaningfully impose any disciplines. The question then is the following: can WTO meaningfully incorporate welfare considerations in the choice of instruments, or must it accept the “revealed preference” of a particular country for a particular instrument? Should a country be obliged to choose the first-best instrument, or must its choice of instrument be accepted as “revealed” constrained national optimum?

The answer, we suggest, should lie somewhere in between. There should be a presumption in favour of the economically first-best instrument. *If a country chooses to pursue an objective by an instrument other than the first-best instrument, then it should be obliged to demonstrate why instruments ranked above it in the hierarchy of instruments were not chosen.* The creation of such a hierarchy is not without precedent in the WTO. In general, WTO law accepts the legitimacy of tariff while seeking to eliminate quantitative restrictions,

reflecting the broad consensus in economic thinking that in most situations the former are to be preferred to the latter. There is also an analogy in the new Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which creates a presumption in favour of international standards but does not oblige Members to use these standards.

An example can be used to illustrate the suggested approach. There are, in principle, a range of instruments which could achieve the objective of reducing the emission of green house gases. The optimal instrument would be a tax on the carbon content of fuels. A tax on cars related to their fuel efficiency would be lower in the hierarchy of instruments, but superior to a tax on cars based on size, which in turn would be preferable to restrictions on the number of cars.

Suppose a country X chose the second-best policy and imposed a tax on cars related to their fuel efficiency, and foreign cars were less fuel efficient than domestic cars. Then the proposed tax would impact more onerously on foreigners, i.e. would have a protectionist effect. According to the economic efficiency principle, this would raise the question: was the first best instrument feasible? Country X could claim that cars were the major source of emissions and a more general economy-wide fuel tax would have entailed significant implementation difficulties which the chosen measure avoided.

If the Panel was convinced of the non-feasibility of the first best policy, the measure would be exonerated and deemed consistent with the Member's obligations according to the "economic efficiency" criterion. However, the measure is certainly not *necessary* in the sense of being the least trade restrictive and hence the "least GATT 1994-inconsistent" available. For instance, one can conceive of any given reduction in emissions being achieved by a measure which would impact equally on all cars, leaving the relative share of imports unchanged. Thus the second-best measure would not pass the necessity test because less trade restrictive measures exist. While under the necessity test a Member is obliged to demonstrate the non-feasibility of all other measures which could achieve the same objective, in our approach a Member is obliged to demonstrate the non-feasibility only of economically superior measures.

The "consistent" application of a measure would be a key aspect of the economic efficiency criteria. The right to take regulatory action entails a responsibility to apply it consistently across products that are clearly covered by the objective that the government professes to uphold. Take the case of the CAFE Panel which affirmed the right of

countries to define likeness in terms of the fuel-efficiency objective. Having done so, the Article III obligation would require that all related vehicles in the fuel-inefficient category were treated similarly. But the Panel decided otherwise in that it did not require that sports utility vehicles that were fuel inefficient be subject to the same regulation as inefficient cars. In other words, in the hierarchy of economically efficient instruments, a tax on all cars related to their fuel-efficiency would be a superior instrument in attaining the environmental objective than a similar tax on a subset of cars. Under our approach, a government's choice of the latter would need to be justified.¹⁸

But consistency in the present context would not merely require uniform application. Consider, for instance, a situation in which foreign cars are in fact more efficient than domestic cars. Say a Member imposed a uniform environmental tax not related to fuel efficiency on all cars. The measure could not be challenged under either the textual approach or the contextual because there would seem to be no protectionist effect on which to base a case. It is, however, lower on the hierarchy of instruments which serve an environmental objective than a tax which distinguishes between cars on the basis of fuel efficiency, and impacts more adversely on imported fuel-efficient cars than a superior economic instrument would have. It could, therefore, be challenged on efficiency grounds and only exonerated if the non-feasibility of economically superior instruments was convincingly demonstrated.

Could it be argued that the efficiency criteria is unduly intrusive in prescribing the choice of domestic policy instrument? There are several reasons why it is not. First, the suggested approach begins by acknowledging that countries may invoke a wider set of objectives than are explicitly recognized as legitimate in Article XX, and imposes disciplines on the choice of the instrument only as a counterweight to this enhanced freedom. Secondly, the necessity test in Article XX is too stringent in any case. The proposed approach lessens the burden on the defendant by requiring, as noted above, that only economically-superior instruments be shown to be non-feasible. Finally, it may well be politically more acceptable for countries to accept international obligations which give primacy to economic efficiency in the attainment of objectives rather than those which put the rights of trading partners above all else.

¹⁸It should be noted that consistency need not require extending the tax to say lawn-movers and the first stage our test would allow such a demarcation to be made.

Political Economy Benefits

This obligation to demonstrate the “necessity” of deviation from the economic optimum will exert useful discipline in curbing the protectionist proclivities of Governments. Often, governments will seek to justify such departures by invoking political necessity or expediency. This is often articulated in terms of the best becoming the enemy of the good. Take the CAFE situation for example. On economic grounds, the first-best intervention for attaining environmental objectives would have been a tax related to the carbon content of fuels. This was ruled out as politically infeasible. But even after selection of the CAFE taxes on vehicles, certain kinds of cars were exempted from the application of the taxes. The United States would have argued that if it had had to expand the coverage of the taxes to include other vehicles, the political opposition from domestic producer groups would have been too strong, effectively thwarting the adoption of the taxes, compromising the ability to meet environmental objectives altogether.

However, this argument could be turned on its head, and argues in favour of the proposal made in this paper. In countenancing selectivity of application of measures, or to put it differently, countenancing an inefficient choice of policy instruments, WTO rules facilitate the adoption of measures that are not only protectionist, but equally important, lead to inferior domestic policy (in this case environmental) outcomes. If it were known in advance that WTO rules proscribe selectivity, the hands of environmentalists would probably have been strengthened in furthering their objectives by tilting the ground in favour of efficient policy objectives.

This issue can be viewed from another perspective. If political constraints in the form of protectionist interests are invoked to justify selective application or inefficient choice of domestic policy instruments, an interpretation of WTO rules that permitted such an outcome would be very odd. Its effect would not be to confer freedom on contracting parties to pursue domestic policy objectives, but rather to pursue them circumscribed by protectionist influences. But it must be the *raison d’être* of WTO rules to address the latter: the WTO would be remiss if it did not relieve the protectionist constraint on the pursuit of efficient domestic policy.

The Legitimacy of Objectives

The question of whether international law can pronounce on the legitimacy of

domestic policy objectives is a thorny one. Clearly, there would be fears of unwarranted intrusion by international bodies into national sovereignty. But having granted countries the right to invoke domestic objectives other than those contained in Article XX as justification for measures that may have an incidental protectionist effect, does it mean that *any* objective and *any* level of its attainment must be unquestioningly accepted? That these questions are reasonable is indeed already reflected in GATT law. The provisions of the TBT agreement cited earlier refer to "legitimate" objectives. Furthermore, the TBT and SPS agreements create a presumption in favour of international standards, suggesting that that should be the reasonable level at which objectives should be pitched, with departures inviting justification.

An example could serve to illustrate the point. Consider that a measure X (say inspection of imported beef) which, if employed by a country, would reduce the probability of an accident to 5 in a billion but also reduce trade by 5 percent. Another measure Y (say ban on imports) would reduce the probability of an accident to 1 in a billion but also reduce trade by 90 percent. If the country chose Y, would its actions be GATT-consistent? If the country's choice of the objective (and attainment) cannot be questioned, then it would. Alternatively, Panels would have to judge the appropriate balance between objectives and their trade restrictive effects. These are difficult questions where boundaries demarcating the permissible from the impermissible will be very difficult to draw. But the fact that such boundaries cannot be drawn does not mean that the most egregious discrepancies cannot be identified and outlawed.

5. Conclusions

Commenting on the kinds of issues raised in this paper, Farber and Hudec (1996) note, "The general problem .. has resisted the best efforts of the (U.S) Supreme Court (for over 150 years), GATT tribunals, international negotiators, and a host of talented legal scholars. The reason, we believe, is that in some ultimate sense the problem is unsolvable.

Negotiating a working border between the two (free trade and regulatory autonomy) depends as much on history, politics, and local terrain as on any overarching vision. No matter how a legal test is articulated, it cannot satisfactorily resolve the tensions between ...autonomy and free trade in all conceivable cases. In the end, the law must have a certain irreducible messiness in dealing with such fundamental tensions."

This paper has proposed a solution that tries to eliminate the glaring inconsistencies of

the two doctrinal approaches that have characterized recent GATT rulings on discerning discrimination under the National Treatment principle. The proposed solution will clearly retain some residual messiness, some irreducible grey area of non-adjudicability, but will at least force a more consistent, widely-applicable, approach to resolving the dilemma that confronts the world trading system in curbing the potential proliferation of protectionist policies.

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