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Working Paper

Assessing the Welfare Effects of Unemployment Benefits Using the Regression Kink Design

IZA Discussion Papers, No. 7589

Provided in Cooperation with:

IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

Suggested Citation: Landais, Camille (2013) : Assessing the Welfare Effects of Unemployment Benefits Using the Regression Kink Design, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 7589, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/89851>

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IZA DP No. 7589

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August 2013

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Discussion Paper No. 7589
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ABSTRACT

Assessing the Welfare Effects of Unemployment Benefits Using the Regression Kink Design^{*}

I investigate in this paper partial equilibrium labor supply responses to unemployment insurance (UI) in the US. I use administrative data on the universe of unemployment spells in five states from the late 1970s to 1984, and non-parametrically identify the effect of both benefit level and potential duration in the regression kink (RK) design using kinks in the schedule of UI benefits. I provide many tests for the robustness of the RK design, and demonstrate its validity to overcome the traditional issue of endogeneity in UI benefit variations on US data. I also show how, in the tradition of the dynamic labor supply literature, one can identify the purely distortionary effects of UI using variations along the returns-to-employment profile brought about by exogenous variations in the benefit level as well as in the benefit duration. I then use these estimates to calibrate the welfare effects of an increase in UI benefit level and in UI potential duration.

JEL Classification: J22

Keywords: unemployment insurance, regression kink design

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^{*} I would like to thank Moussa Blimpo, David Card, Gopi Goda, Mark Hafstead, Caroline Hoxby, Henrik Kleven, Pascal Michailat, Enrico Moretti, Peter Nilsson, Emmanuel Saez, Nick Sanders, John Shoven, Johannes Spinnewijn, Till von Wachter and seminar participants at Bocconi, Lausanne, Toulouse, LSE/UCL, Pompeu Fabra, EIEF Rome, Stanford, Stockholm, USC and Wharton for helpful discussions and comments. I am especially grateful to Bruce Meyer and Patricia M. Anderson for letting me access the CWBH data.

Introduction

The motivation of this paper is twofold. First, the socially desirable level of unemployment insurance (UI) depends on labor supply responses to variations in the generosity of unemployment benefits. There is an extensive literature trying to estimate these behavioral responses. Yet, it seems that we still lack credible and consensual estimates of these behavioral responses, especially in the US. During the recent Great Recession, the heated public policy debate over the desirability of the federally mandated UI benefit extensions has shown the lack of consensus concerning not only the magnitude of labor supply responses to UI but also how these responses might be affected by changing labor market conditions, thus reaffirming the importance of readily available estimates of these behavioral responses.

Second, labor supply responses to a change in the schedule of UI benefits will most of the time be a combination of liquidity effects and moral hazard effects. Welfare analysis relies critically on our ability to estimate the respective size of these two types of effects, since only the latter are distortionary. Still, we also lack an idea of the size of these liquidity effects, and, to date, there is no clear strategy for estimating the liquidity effects of UI in a timely manner.

This paper contributes to the literature on the optimal design of UI along these two dimensions. I provide new estimates of the partial equilibrium labor supply responses to unemployment insurance (UI) in the US, identifying the effect of both benefit level and potential duration in the regression kink (RK) design, using kinks in the schedule of UI benefits. A large empirical literature is devoted to the estimation of labor supply effects of UI¹. These studies use very different sources of variation to identify the effect of UI generosity, and so far, the most credible sources of identification have come from sharp discontinuities in the potential duration of benefit entitlements by age that exist in several European countries (see for instance [Lalive \[2008\]](#) in Austria, or [Schmieder et al. \[2012\]](#) in Germany)². Unfortunately, such sharp discontinuities enabling credible non-parametric estimation of the labor supply effects of UI do not exist for the *level* of UI benefit, and do not exist at all in the US. I first contribute to this large body of empirical literature by providing the first credible non-parametric identification of the effect of both UI level and UI potential duration, overcoming the traditional issue of endogeneity in UI benefit variations on US

¹A general survey on labor supply responses can be found in [Krueger and Meyer \[2002\]](#) and a survey on the effect of UI potential duration is given in [Card et al. \[2007b\]](#)

²Baseline UI durations being significantly longer in most European countries, the validity of these estimates in the US context are questionable.

data. While most of the recent development in the empirical literature on unemployment insurance has been achieved using exhaustive administrative data from European countries and sharp discontinuities in eligibility rules, this paper shows that the combination of kinked schedules in state UI rules and access to exhaustive state UI records offers promising avenues for the development of research on UI in the US.

The idea used in this paper of relying on kinky UI schedules to estimate the effect of UI on labor supply originates from [Card et al. \[2012\]](#) who coined the term “regression kink design”. I contribute to the nascent literature on the RK design by providing what is, to the best of my knowledge, the first thorough empirical investigation of its validity. I use administrative data from the Continuous Wage and Benefit History Project (CWBH) on the universe of unemployment spells in five states in the US from the late 1970s to 1984³. Since identification in the regression kink design relies on estimating changes in the slope of the relationship between an assignment variable and some outcomes of interest, the granularity of the CWBH data is a key advantage and smaller samples of UI recipients would in general not exhibit enough statistical power to detect any effect in a RK design. I provide compelling graphical evidence and find significant responses of unemployment and non-employment duration with respect to both benefit level and potential duration for all states and periods in the CWBH data. I propose and implement a series of tests for the robustness of the RKD estimates that should constitute the basis for any practical implementation of the RK design. These tests include graphical and regression based tests of the identifying assumptions as well as placebo tests and kink-detection and kink-location tests. I also use variations in the location of the kink over time to implement a difference-in-difference RK strategy to check the robustness of the results. Overall, replicating the RK design for all states and periods, my results suggest that a 10% increase in the benefit level increases the duration of UI claims by about 3%, and that increasing the potential duration of benefit by a week increases the duration of UI claims by about .3 to .5 week. These estimates are higher than estimates found in European countries using sharp RD designs but are still lower than previous estimates on US data. Interestingly, I am able to show that using the same strategy as [Meyer \[1990\]](#), who found slightly higher elasticities on a smaller subset of the same data, one can still find results that converge to my RKD estimates by adding a richer set of controls for previous earnings.

Another contribution of the paper relates to the identification of liquidity versus moral hazard

³Records begin in January 1976 for Idaho, in January 1979 for Louisiana, January 1978 for Missouri, April 1980 for New Mexico and July 1979 for Washington

effects of UI, an issue that has received more attention since the contributions of [Chetty \[2008\]](#) and [Shimer and Werning \[2008\]](#). I show how the dichotomy between liquidity effects and moral hazard effects can be reinterpreted in light of the more traditional literature on dynamic labor supply, and how the purely distortionary effects of UI on search effort (that I call moral hazard effects to follow [Chetty \[2008\]](#)) can be related to Frisch elasticity concepts. The method proposed in this paper to identify the moral hazard effects of UI relies on using variations along the returns-to-employment profile brought about by exogenous variations in the benefit level as well as the benefit duration. I implement empirically this identification strategy, and estimate the ratio of liquidity to moral hazard effects, taking once again advantage of the RKD, which enables me to estimate the effect on search effort of both benefit level and potential duration. My results suggest that the ratio of liquidity to moral hazard effects in the response of labor supply to a variation in unemployment benefits is around .5. This confirms the existence of significant liquidity effects as found in [Chetty \[2008\]](#). But interestingly, the identification strategy for moral hazard and liquidity effects proposed in this paper only uses administrative UI data and the RK design, and can therefore deliver timely estimates of liquidity effects without the need for data on consumption or on assets.

Finally, I use my RKD estimates of the labor supply responses to UI and of the ratio of liquidity to moral hazard effects to calibrate the welfare implications of an increase in UI benefit level and in UI potential duration. My calibrations show that the size of the liquidity effect is critical to assess the welfare implications of UI policies and that both an increase in the benefit level and in the potential duration of benefits would have provided positive (yet small) welfare gains. Though these policy recommendations are local, the calibration strategy suggested in this paper can be easily replicated for all US states and at any point in time with simple UI administrative data. By a simple application of this strategy, any UI administration could calibrate in a timely manner the welfare implications of small adjustments to its UI rules (such as a change in the maximum benefit amount or a benefit extension) without the need to estimate separately the consumption smoothing benefits of UI with consumption data.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 1, I present a simple dynamic model to show how the moral hazard effect can be identified using variations in the returns-to-employment profile over time, that, in practice, come from variations in both benefit level and potential duration. In section 2, I present the RKD strategy, the data and provide with institutional background on the functioning of UI rules. In section 3, I present the results of the labor supply

effects of benefit level and potential duration, and I present several tests for the robustness of the RKD estimates. Finally, in section 4, I estimate the liquidity to moral hazard ratio of the effect of UI, and calibrate the welfare benefits of UI using my RKD estimates.

1 Theoretical Framework

Relating moral hazard and liquidity effects to estimable behavioral responses: The dichotomy between the purely distortionary effects of UI (moral hazard effect) and the liquidity effects of UI is critical to assess the welfare impact of UI. But, to date, the dichotomy has been of little practical interest because of the difficulty to disentangle these two effects empirically⁴. I show in this section how the dichotomy between liquidity effects and moral hazard effects can be reinterpreted in light of the more traditional literature on dynamic labor supply and how to use the insights from this literature to back out moral hazard effects from comparing the behavioral response of current search effort to variations in benefits at different points in time.

In a standard dynamic labor supply model, with time-separability, a change in the net return to work today has two effects on current labor supply. First, there is an effect due to the manipulation of the current return to work keeping marginal utility of wealth constant: this effect relates to the concept of Frisch elasticity. Second, there is a wealth effect due to the change in the marginal utility of wealth⁵. Note also that any variation in the future returns to work only affects current labor supply through the marginal utility of wealth. An obvious corollary is that you can back out the wealth effects and the Frisch elasticity component by comparing the effect on current labor supply of a marginal change in the return to effort today versus that of a marginal change in return to effort in the future. This is the principle of the methodology used in [MaCurdy \[1981\]](#), which relies on exploiting (exogenous) variations in the wage profile, keeping marginal utility of wealth constant.

Importantly, only the Frisch elasticity component is relevant for welfare analysis, because wealth effects are non-distortionary and can be undone by lump sum wealth transfers. In the context of unemployment benefits, the problem is that most studies exploit variations in the ben-

⁴Apart from [Chetty \[2008\]](#), using variations in severance payments, there has been no attempt to empirically estimate the magnitude of liquidity effects.

⁵See appendix [C.1](#) for a simple exposition of a standard dynamic labor supply model without state dependence, and how Frisch elasticities can be identified using variations in the wage profiles.

efit level across individuals, i.e. variation in the full profile of benefits. When changing the full sequence of benefits, the effect on current effort is inevitably a mix of wealth effects and of purely distortionary “Frisch” effects (moral hazard effects). [Chetty \[2008\]](#) is indeed making explicitly this claim, but this can be interpreted in light of the more general critique formulated by [MaCurdy \[1981\]](#) in the context of static labor supply empirical studies. The idea developed here is that one can use, as has been traditionally done in the dynamic labor supply literature, variations in the net return to effort at different points in time in order to disentangle wealth effects from the distortionary (moral hazard) effects⁶. The only notable difference in the context of unemployment benefits is the presence of state-dependance: search effort today affects in which state one ends up tomorrow. Because of this, variations in future benefits do not only have an effect on current job search effort through the marginal utility of wealth, but also through the net return to search effort today. I build on a simple partial equilibrium dynamic search model, a class of models that has been used extensively to analyze the welfare implications of UI benefits ([Chetty \[2008\]](#), [Schmieder et al. \[2012\]](#)).

To make the point across and explain the intuition of the main results, I only present a simplified two-period version of the model. Proofs and discussion for the multi-period model are in appendix [C](#). The model describes the behavior of a worker who is laid-off and therefore becomes unemployed before the start of period zero. If the worker is unemployed at the start of period i , he exerts (endogenous) search effort s_i , which has a utility cost $\psi(s_i)$, with $\psi' \geq 0$ and $\psi'' \geq 0$. Search effort s_i translates into a probability to find a job⁷ that I normalize to s_i to simplify presentation⁸. If employed in period 0, the worker gets utility $u(c_0^e) = u(A_0 - A_1 + w_0 - \tau)$, where A_0 is the initial level of wealth and $u' \geq 0$; $u'' \leq 0$. w_0 is the wage rate (assumed exogenous) and τ is the payroll tax paid to finance UI benefits. If employed in period 1, the worker gets utility $u(c_1^e) = u(A_1 - \bar{A} + w_1 - \tau)$ where \bar{A} is asset level at the end of period 1, subject to the non-Ponzi condition $\bar{A} \geq 0$. We can also introduce liquidity constraints of the form $A_1 \geq L, \bar{A} \geq L$. If unemployed in period 0, the worker gets utility $u(c_0^u) = u(A_0 - A_1 + b_0)$, where b_0 are UI benefits in period 0. And if unemployed in period 1, the worker gets utility: $u(c_1^u) = u(A_1 - \bar{A} + b_1)$. Lifetime utility at the start of period 0 is

⁶Note also that if agents are totally credit constrained, or totally myopic, the dynamic dimension of the problem is irrelevant, and the effect of UI benefits is a mix of contemporaneous income effects and substitution effects, as in the static case. Identification of distortionary effects of UI would then simply require the use of contemporaneous income shocks to control for income effects.

⁷This captures the presence of search frictions in the labor market.

⁸We also assume that search effort is not observable from the social planner, and this is why we describe as “moral hazard” the distortions in search effort induced by UI benefits.

given by:

$$\mathcal{U} = s_0 u(c_0^e) + (1 - s_0) u(c_0^u) - \Psi(s_0) + \beta \left(s_0 u(c_1^e) + (1 - s_0) \left(s_1 u(c_1^e) + (1 - s_1) u(c_1^u) - \Psi(s_1) \right) \right)$$

where β is the discount factor, and we assume interest rates to be zero for simplicity. Maximizing utility with respect to search effort in period 0, s_0 , yields the following first-order condition:

$$\Psi'(s_0) = \underbrace{u(c_0^e) + \beta u(c_1^e)}_{\text{Lifetime utility if employed in period 0}} - \underbrace{\left(u(c_0^u) + \beta \left(s_1 u(c_1^e) + (1 - s_1) u(c_1^u) - \Psi(s_1) \right) \right)}_{\text{Lifetime utility if unemployed in period 0}} \quad (1)$$

This is the standard optimal intratemporal allocation rule where the marginal disutility of effort in period 0 equals the marginal return to effort in period 0, *i.e.* the lifetime utility of getting employment starting in period 0 minus the lifetime utility of staying unemployed in period 0⁹. From this intratemporal allocation rule we get that:

$$\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b_0} = - \frac{u'(c_0^u)}{\Psi''(s_0)} = \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial A_0} - \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w_0} \quad (2)$$

This decomposition, at the centre of the argument in [Chetty \[2008\]](#) can be thought of as a standard dynamic decomposition of the effect of current returns to effort between a Frisch elasticity concept keeping marginal utility of wealth constant ($\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w_0}$), that from now on will be referred to as the moral hazard effect of UI benefits, and a wealth effect $\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial A_0}$ ¹⁰.

Individuals choose their consumption level every period once the result of the search process is realised. From their optimal choice we get the standard Euler conditions determining the optimal inter temporal allocation of consumption:

$$u'(c_0^e) = \beta u'(c_1^e) \quad (3)$$

$$u'(c_0^u) = \beta (s_1 u'(c_1^e) + (1 - s_1) u'(c_1^u)) \quad (4)$$

Using (1), (3) and (4), we can retrieve the simple relationship between the effect of current and

⁹In the absence of state-dependance (or in a static model), only $u(c_0^e)$ and $u(c_0^u)$ would appear in this first-order condition, and future wages would only affect current effort through the marginal utility of wealth (wealth effect). See appendix C for a simple example of a two-period labor supply model without state-dependance.

¹⁰I explain more in depth in appendix C.1 the comparison between this decomposition and the one obtained in a standard model without state dependance.

future wages on current effort:

$$\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w_1} = (1 - s_1) \cdot \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w_0} \quad (5)$$

The intuition for this relationship, which stems directly from the presence of state dependence, is simply that increasing wages tomorrow induces me to search more today to benefit from the extra consumption tomorrow if I am employed at the start of the period, but at the same time, I can delay search until tomorrow and find a job tomorrow with probability s_1 to benefit from the extra wages tomorrow. The effect of increasing the net reward from work tomorrow on search effort today is therefore $s_1\%$ smaller than the effect of increasing wages today on search effort today¹¹.

Using 5, and Euler conditions 3 and 4, a change in b_1 can therefore be decomposed as:

$$\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b_1} = -\beta \frac{(1 - s_1)u'(c_1'')}{\psi''(s_0)} = \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial A_0} - \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w_1} = \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial A_0} - (1 - s_1) \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w_0} \quad (6)$$

And therefore we have that:

$$\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b_1} - \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b_0} = s_1 \cdot \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w_0} \quad (7)$$

In a model with no state dependence, the effect of future benefits would give us the wealth effect directly but here, because of state dependence, the effect of future benefits on current search effort is larger in absolute value than the pure wealth effect, as shown in equation (6), since the change in future benefits also affects the net return to effort in the current period. Then the difference between the effect of current and future returns, which would give us the Frisch elasticity directly as in MaCurdy [1981] in the absence of state dependence, here gives us s_1 times the moral hazard, because the effect of benefits tomorrow also contains a moral hazard dimension; but we know that

¹¹The best way to understand this result is to rewrite lifetime budget constraint:

$$\begin{aligned} A_0 + s_0(w_0 - \tau) + (1 - s_0)b_0 + s_0(w_1 - \tau) + (1 - s_1)s_0(w_1 - \tau) + (1 - s_0)(1 - s_1)b_1 &\geq C_0 + C_1 \\ A_0 + b_0 + b_1 + s_0 \underbrace{[\Delta c_0 + (1 - s_1)\Delta c_1]}_{\text{Price of effort at time 0}} + s_1 \underbrace{[\Delta c_1]}_{\text{Price of effort at time 1}} &\geq C_0 + C_1 \end{aligned}$$

where $\Delta c_0 = (w_0 - \tau - b_0)$ and $\Delta c_1 = (w_1 - \tau - b_1)$. In other words, by exerting effort at time 0, your reward is the extra money Δc_0 you gain in period 0 compared to remaining unemployed plus the extra money you earn tomorrow $(1 - s_1)\Delta c_1$ because you will enter period 1 as employed. The reason your return for tomorrow is $(1 - s_1)\Delta c_1$ and not simply Δc_1 is because you could also have had Δc_1 by exerting effort tomorrow instead and therefore get Δc_1 with probability s_1 . In other words, altering the total price of effort at time 0 by dw_0 or by $(1 - s_1)dw_1$ is equivalent, and should have the same effect on effort at time 0. Hence the result that $\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w_1} = (1 - s_1) \cdot \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w_0}$.

this moral hazard component is $s_1\%$ smaller than the moral hazard component of today's benefits. In other words, variations in search effort brought about by changes in the profile of benefits contains a lot of information, but one needs to take explicitly the state-dependance dimension of the dynamic problem to retrieve parameters that are meaningful for welfare analysis.

The strategy used in this paper to identify the moral hazard effects of UI relies on the use of variations along the returns-to-employment profile. This is the usual route followed by the dynamic labor supply literature, and this is a natural route to follow here once understood the clear relationship between the moral hazard effects of UI and a Frisch elasticity concept. The difficulty encountered in the traditional dynamic labor supply literature is to find credibly exogenous variations in the wage profiles. In this paper, I exploit exogenous variations in the returns-to-employment profiles due to exogenous variations on both benefit levels and benefit duration in the UI system. Proposition 1 generalises insight of (7) to a multi period case and shows how the moral hazard and liquidity effects can be disentangled simply by using estimates of the behavioral responses to a change in both benefit level and potential duration.

PROPOSITION 1. *If the borrowing constraint does not bind after B periods, the moral hazard effect Θ_1 of providing UI benefits b for B periods is a linear combination of the effects on exit rate at the start of a spell of an increase in benefit duration $(\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial B})$ and of an increase in benefit level $(\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \Big|_B)$*

$$\frac{1}{B} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \Big|_B - \frac{1}{b} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial B} = \Phi_1 \Theta_1 \quad (8)$$

where $\Phi_1 = \frac{S(B) - \frac{D_B + s_0}{B}}{D_B - s_0(B-1)}$. $S(B)$ is the survival rate at time B and D_B is the average duration of covered UI spells.

Proof: see appendix C.

This result can easily be understood as a simple extension of (7). Start from a system where $b_0 > 0$ and $b_1 = 0$. Changes in b_0 can then be seen as changes in the benefit level and changes in b_1 as changes in the benefit duration. The advantage of proposition 1 is to relate the structural approach of dynamic models to statistics that can be estimated in reduced-form using credibly exogenous variations in both benefit levels and potential durations for the same individuals. This result relies of course on our ability to test the assumption that the credit constraint is not yet

binding after B periods. In section , I provide a simple test of this assumption using post-exhaustion behavior with administrative data. An important point to note here is that this assumption does not mean that the liquidity effect is zero. In other words, the fact that the credit constraint is not binding after B periods does not mean that the existence of a credit constraint does not affect the optimal consumption path chosen by the unemployed during an unemployment spell.

Optimal UI formula: As explained above, the importance of isolating moral hazard from liquidity effects relies on the fact that only the first are distortionary. Once the pure moral hazard component of behavioral responses to UI is identified, it becomes possible to calibrate the optimal benefit level (or the optimal potential duration, see appendix C) following a Baily-type formula, where only the behavioral response of unemployment duration and the moral hazard component need to be plugged-in. As in Chetty [2008], appendix C shows that in the T -period model with a two-tier UI system, at the optimum, if the credit-constraint is not binding at time B , the UI benefit level b is such that¹²

$$1 + \rho_1 = \omega_1 \frac{D_B}{T - D} \left(1 + \varepsilon_{D_B} + \varepsilon_D \frac{D}{T - D} \right) \quad (9)$$

where $\rho_1 = -1 - \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \Big|_B \geq 0$ is the liquidity to moral hazard ratio in the effect on exit rate at time 0 of giving benefit level b for B periods. And $\omega_1 = \frac{B}{D_B - s_0(B-1)} - 1$. ε_{D_B} is the elasticity of the duration of paid unemployment with respect to the level of UI benefits and ε_D is the elasticity of the duration of total unemployment with respect to the level of UI benefits. The intuition for (9) is that the larger the behavioral response to a variation in UI benefits (captured by the elasticities on the right hand side), the more costly it is for the government to provide UI. But if the behavioral response is large compared to the moral hazard component, it also means that a large share of the elasticity is driven by non-distortionary liquidity effects¹³. The advantage of optimal formula (9) is that it does not require an estimation of the consumption smoothing benefits of UI, which can prove arduous. In the tradition of the sufficient statistics approach, formula 9 offers local¹⁴ policy recommendations, without estimation of the full structural model. If the left-hand side of equation (9) is larger than the right-hand side, then there is a net welfare gain from increasing the level

¹²For the proof, see appendix C. I also show in appendix C that this formula carries over very simply for determining the optimal benefit duration in a two-tier system.

¹³Note that the intuition for the formula holds whether the credit constraint is slack or not. The interest here is that if the credit constraint is not yet binding at the exhaustion point (an assumption that can be tested as shown in the empirical section), the first-order condition of the planner's problem takes this very simple form.

¹⁴Local here means in the neighborhood of the actual policy parameters, where the statistics entering the formula are estimated.

of benefits b , at a constant level of potential duration B . For this type of approach to be useful though, the components of the welfare formula need to be statistics that can be easily estimable, and preferably at high frequency, to be able to make readily available policy recommendations. The interest of optimal formula 9 is that, as will become apparent in the empirical sections of the paper, all the statistics entering the formula are estimable with administrative UI data at high frequency using the regression kink design.

2 Empirical strategy

Assessing the welfare effects of UI benefits rests critically on our ability to identify and estimate the behavioral responses of search effort to changes in UI benefits. The empirical challenge lies in the difficulty to find credibly exogenous and time invariant sources of variations in UI benefits. Most sources of variations used in the literature on US data come from changes in state legislation over time¹⁵, with the issue that these changes might be endogenous to labor market conditions. I describe in this section how one can use the presence in most US states of kinked schedules in the relationship between previous earnings and both benefit level and benefit duration to estimate the responses of labor supply to UI benefits using administrative data on UI recipients. My empirical strategy has several important advantages. First, in contrast to studies using regional or time variation in UI benefits, the RK design holds market-level factors constant, such that I identify changes in the actual behavioral response, net of any market level factors that may change over time or across regions. Second, the RK design allows me to identify behavioral responses with respect to both benefit level and potential duration for the same workers in the same labor markets. With these estimates, one can recover the liquidity versus moral hazard ratio of the effect of UI benefits following proposition 1, and fully assess the welfare effects of an increase in both benefit level and benefit duration. Finally, my empirical strategy, based on the use of administrative data, delivers high frequency estimates of behavioral responses without the need for quasi-experimental policy reforms, which is critical for welfare recommendations based on sufficient statistics formula.

2.1 Regression Kink Design

My identification strategy relies on RK designs¹⁶, which offer valid non parametric inference

¹⁵See for instance Meyer [1990] or Card and Levine [2000].

¹⁶There has been recently a considerable interest for RK designs in the applied economics literature. References

of the average treatment effect in the absence of instruments. Here, I consider a model where the treatment is continuous and is a known deterministic function of the running variable, as in [Nielsen et al. \[2010\]](#) or [Card et al. \[2012\]](#). This type of setting can be thought of as a *sharp* design in the sense that everyone is a complier and obeys the same treatment assignment rule. I am interested in the following model:

$$Y = y(b, D, W_1, W_2, \varepsilon)$$

where Y is a duration outcome, b (the level of UI benefits) and D (total potential duration of benefits) are two continuous regressors of interest, W_1 , W_2 are two other potentially endogenous regressors, and ε is unobservable heterogeneity¹⁷.

$H(\cdot)$ is the c.d.f. of ε . I am interested in the estimation of the two average marginal effects of b and D , α and β :

$$\alpha = \int \frac{\partial y(\cdot)}{\partial b} dH(\varepsilon|b, w_1) \quad \text{and} \quad \beta = \int \frac{\partial y(\cdot)}{\partial D} dH(\varepsilon|D, w_2)$$

These constructs are the effect of a marginal increase in b (resp. D) for b , w_1 (resp. D , w_2) fixed at their kink point value integrated on the distribution of the unobservable¹⁸. Given that $b = b(W_1)$ (resp. $D = D(W_2)$) is a deterministic, continuous but kinked function of the endogenous assignment variable W_1 at $W_1 = k_1$ (resp. $W_2 = k_2$). it is possible to identify α and β as:

$$\alpha = \frac{\lim_{w_1 \rightarrow k_1^+} \frac{\partial E[Y|W_1=w_1]}{\partial w_1} - \lim_{w_1 \rightarrow k_1^-} \frac{\partial E[Y|W_1=w_1]}{\partial w_1}}{\lim_{w_1 \rightarrow k_1^+} \frac{\partial B(w_1)}{\partial w_1} - \lim_{w_1 \rightarrow k_1^-} \frac{\partial B(w_1)}{\partial w_1}}$$

$$\beta = \frac{\lim_{w_2 \rightarrow k_2^+} \frac{\partial E[Y|W_2=w_2]}{\partial w_2} - \lim_{w_2 \rightarrow k_2^-} \frac{\partial E[Y|W_2=w_2]}{\partial w_2}}{\lim_{w_2 \rightarrow k_2^+} \frac{\partial D(w_2)}{\partial w_2} - \lim_{w_2 \rightarrow k_2^-} \frac{\partial D(w_2)}{\partial w_2}}$$

Identification relies on two assumptions. First, the direct marginal effect of the assignment variable on the outcome should be smooth. The second condition requires that the derivative of the conditional probability density function is continuous for all ε at the kink so that density of

include [Nielsen et al. \[2010\]](#), [Card et al. \[2012\]](#), [Dong \[2010\]](#) or [Simonsen et al. \[2010\]](#).

¹⁷Note that I allow for completely unrestricted non-additive heterogeneity. This very general non-parametric framework has the advantage of nesting a wide range of duration model such as the accelerated failure-time model or other semi-parametric duration models. In particular, I do not impose modeling assumptions that may not be empirically valid such as the proportional hazard assumption traditionally used in duration analysis.

¹⁸This can be thought of as an average treatment effect (ATE) weighted by the ex ante probability of being at the kink given heterogeneity type.

the unobserved heterogeneity evolves smoothly with the assignment variable at the kink¹⁹. These assumptions are somewhat stronger than in the case of a RD design, since not only the conditional p.d.f. of the assignment variable but its derivative also need to be continuous for all unobservable individual types ϵ . These assumptions are always fundamentally untestable, i.e. whether each individual's ex ante density and its derivative are continuous is fundamentally untestable, since for each individual we only observe one realization. But first, knowledge of the institutional details are a good way of assessing the credibility of the RKD identification assumption. In the case of UI, manipulation of the assignment variable seems complicated and the local random assignment seems likely to hold. Very few people know the schedule of UI benefits while still employed. Moreover, to be able to perfectly choose ex ante one's position in the schedule of both benefit level and potential duration, it is necessary to know continuously one year in advance the date at which one gets fired and the schedule that shall apply then²⁰ and to optimize continuously not only one's highest-earning quarter but also the ratio of base period earnings to the highest-earning quarter. Second, it is always possible to check empirically for clear violations of the RKD assumptions. In particular, to assess the validity of the smooth density assumption, it is useful to check whether pre-determined covariates have a c.d.f that is twice continuously differentiable with respect to the assignment variable. I do so by estimating changes in the slope of the conditional expectation function of some pre-determined covariates like age, education or gender given the assignment variable. I also provide another test which consists in extending the approach of McCrary [2008] and test for the continuity of both the p.d.f of the assignment variable and of its first derivative around the kink.

Because the denominator of the estimand is deterministic²¹, estimation of α and β only relies on the estimation of the numerator of the estimand which is the change in the slope of the conditional expectation function of the outcome given the assignment variable at the kink. This can be done by running parametric polynomial models of the form:

¹⁹The two conditions are needed because a marginal increase in the assignment variable w_1 induces an effect on the outcome through b (because of the deterministic relationship between b and the assignment variable) but also through the direct effect of the assignment variable on the outcome and through the change in the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity. Only if the latter two effects are smooth and cancel out by differencing on both sides of the kink can the change in the derivative of the conditional expectation function at the kink isolate the causal effect of b on the outcome.

²⁰As shown in figures 1 and 2, the schedule changes rather frequently.

²¹It is the change in the slope of the schedule at the kink.

$$E[Y|W = w] = \mu_0 + \left[\sum_{p=1}^{\bar{p}} \gamma_p (w - k)^p + \nu_p (w - k)^p \cdot D \right] \quad \text{where } |w - k| \leq h \quad (10)$$

where W is the assignment variable, $D = \mathbb{1}[W \geq k]$ is an indicator for being above the kink threshold, h is the bandwidth size, and the change in the slope of the conditional expectation function is given by ν_1 .

To assess the welfare effects of UI benefits, I have shown in section that one needs to estimate not only the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to UI benefits, but also the effect of UI on the exit rate at the start of a spell. The advantage of the RKD setting is that it can easily be extended to the estimation of the effect of unemployment benefits on the hazard rate at different points of the hazard support as explained in appendix A.1.

2.2 Data

The data used is from Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH) UI records²². This is the most comprehensive, publicly available administrative UI data set for the US. CWBH data contains the exhaustive of all unemployment spells and wage records for five US states from the late 1970s to 1984. Records begin in January 1976 for Idaho, in January 1979 for Louisiana, January 1978 for Missouri, April 1980 for New Mexico and July 1979 for Washington²³. This enables me to replicate and successfully test for the validity of the RK design in many different settings and labor market conditions. Two other important advantages of the data are worth noting. First, CWBH data provides accurate information on the level of benefits, potential duration, previous earnings and work history over time. Given the large degree of measurement error found in survey data, administrative data like the CWBH are the only reliable source to implement identification strategies such as the regression kink design. Administrative data was also supplemented by a questionnaire given to new claimants in most states participating to the CWBH project, which gives additional information on socio-demographic characteristics of the claimants such as ethnicity, education, spouse's and dependents' incomes, capital income of the household, etc²⁴. Second, the granularity of the CWBH data, which contains the exhaustive of unemployment spells, is a key advantage and

²²I am especially grateful to Bruce Meyer and Patricia M. Anderson for letting me access the CWBH data.

²³The CWBH also contains a small sample of records for Pennsylvania that I was not able to exploit. For all details on the CWBH dataset, see for instance Moffitt [1985a]

²⁴Some of these questionnaire information are unfortunately not available for certain years depending on the state.

smaller samples of UI recipients would in general not exhibit enough statistical power to detect any effect in a RK design. I report in table B1 in appendix A descriptive statistics for the CWBH sample. It is interesting to note that the composition of the UI recipients in the CWBH is relatively close to that of UI recipients during the Great Recession²⁵. A notable difference, though, is the relatively lower fraction of very long term unemployed during the 1981-83 recession than during the Great Recession, as pointed out by Aaronson et al. [2010], which may be partly due to a change in labor supply responses at the extensive margin for female workers.

Unemployment Insurance claims are observed at weekly frequencies in the administrative data so that all duration outcomes are measured and expressed in weeks. I focus on several duration outcomes: the duration of paid unemployment, the duration of claimed unemployment, and the duration of the initial spell as defined in Spiegelman et al. [1992]²⁶. Unfortunately, the duration of total non-employment cannot easily be computed with administrative UI data since unemployed individuals traditionally leave the dataset after exhausting their benefits. In Washington state though, the wage records matched to the UI records contain information about reemployment dates so that I was able to compute non-employment durations.

2.3 Institutional Background: Kinks in UI Schedules

In almost all US states, UI benefits depends on the labor market activity of the claimant in the period before becoming unemployed. This period, defined as the base period, is traditionally the last four completed calendar quarters immediately preceding the start of the claim. The weekly benefit amount b received by a compensated unemployed is a fixed fraction τ_1 of his highest-earning quarter (hqw) in the base period²⁷ up to a maximum benefit amount b_{max} :

$$b = \begin{cases} \tau_1 \cdot hqw \\ b_{max} \end{cases} \quad \text{if } \tau_1 \cdot hqw > b_{max}$$

²⁵For an interesting comparison, see for instance Table 2.1 in Krueger and Mueller [2011]

²⁶The duration of claimed unemployment corresponds to the number of weeks a claimant is observed in the administrative data for a given unemployment spell. This duration differs from the duration of paid unemployment. First, because most states have instated waiting periods, and second, because a lot of spells exhibit interruptions in payment with the claimant not collecting any check for a certain number of weeks without being observed in the wage records. The initial spell, as defined in Spiegelman et al. [1992], starts at the date the claim is filed and ends when there is a gap of at least two weeks in the receipt of UI benefits.

²⁷Some states, such as Washington, use the average of the two highest-earning quarters in the base period. For details about states' legislation and sources, see appendix.

Figure 1 plots the evolution of the weekly benefit amount schedule in Louisiana for the time period available in the CWBH data. The schedule applies based on the date the UI claim was filed, so that a change in the maximum weekly benefit amount does not affect the weekly benefit amount of ongoing spells. In Louisiana, τ_1 is equal to $1/25$ which guarantees a constant replacement ratio of 52% of the highest-earning quarter up to the kink, where the replacement ratio decreases. The number of weeks a claimant can collect UI benefits is determined by two rules. First, there is a maximum duration D_{max} that cannot be exceeded, usually 26 weeks. But the total amount of benefits that a claimant is able to collect for a given benefit year is also subject to a ceiling, which is usually determined as a fraction τ_2 of total earnings in the base period bpw . So the total amount of benefits collected is defined as:

$$B = \min(D_{max} \cdot b, \tau_2 \cdot bpw)$$

This ceiling in the total amount of benefits determines the duration of benefits, since duration $D = \frac{B}{b}$ is simply the total amount of benefits divided by the weekly benefit amount. Duration of benefits can therefore be summarized as²⁸:

$$D = \begin{cases} D_{max} \\ \tau_2 \cdot \frac{bpw}{\min(\tau_1 \cdot hqw, b_{max})} \end{cases} \quad \text{if } \tau_2 \cdot \frac{bpw}{\min(\tau_1 \cdot hqw, b_{max})} \leq D_{max}$$

Duration is thus also a deterministic kinked function of previous earnings, as shown in Figure 2. All the details on the rules pertaining to the kinks in potential duration are described in appendix D.7.

The rules for the determination of benefit duration discussed above constitute the basis of the UI benefit system (Tier I) that applies in each state. During recessions, and depending on state labor market conditions, two additional programs superimpose on Tier I to extend the duration that UI benefits are available. The first program is the permanent standby Extended Benefit program, federally mandated but administered at the state level (Tier II). This program provides with an additional duration of 50% of regular state duration up to a total of 39 weeks when the state unemployment rate reaches a certain trigger. When the EB program is in action, the slope of the relationship between previous earnings and benefit duration is steeper but the location of the kink

²⁸Idaho is the only state in the CWBH data with different rules for the determination of benefit duration.

is identical as shown for instance in figure 2.

On top of the EB program, federal extensions are usually enacted during recessions (Tier III). During our period of analysis, the Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) program was in action from September 1982 to March 1985. The FSC program had four different phases with additional duration of 50% to 65% of state regular duration with maximum depending on state labor market conditions²⁹. The FSC introduced additional kinks in the relationship between previous earnings and benefit duration as shown in figure 2 in the case of Louisiana. Most importantly, benefit extensions create non-stationarity in the potential duration of benefits over the duration of a spell, which creates challenges for inference in the RK design, as I discuss in section 3.2.

3 Effect of UI benefits on unemployment duration

I present in this section results of the estimation of the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to both UI benefit level and UI potential duration, which are key inputs in welfare formula 9. The objective of this section is also to assess the validity of the RK design to estimate these elasticities. I propose and run several tests aimed at assessing both the validity of the identifying assumptions, and the robustness of the RK estimates.

3.1 Benefit level

In the baseline analysis, I divide for each state all the unemployment spells in subperiods corresponding to stable UI schedules. In figures 3 and 4 and in the robustness analysis of table 2 though, I group unemployment spells over several periods, which has the advantage of providing with a larger number of observations at the kink for statistical power³⁰. For exposition purposes, I focus mainly on the case of Louisiana but all the results for all states and periods are displayed in appendix B.

Graphical Evidence: I begin by showing graphical evidence in support of the RKD assumptions. First, I plot the probability density function of the assignment variable in order to detect potential manipulation of the assignment variable at the kink point. Figure 3 panel A shows the

²⁹For details on the FSC, see appendix and Corson et al. [1986]

³⁰For each unemployment spell, I center the highest quarter of earnings at the kink point in the schedule that is applicable given the date the claim was filed. If the maximum benefit amount increases from b_{max1} to b_{max2} , then the change in slope at the kink remains unaffected but the level of benefit at the kink is higher and the pooled estimate represent an average of the marginal effects at b_{max1} and b_{max2} and pooled analysis will therefore yield more efficient estimates.

number of spells observed in each bin of \$250 of highest quarter of earnings³¹ centered at the kink point in Louisiana. The graph shows no signs of discontinuity in the relationship between the number of spells and the assignment variable at the kink point. To confirm this graphical diagnosis, I also performed McCrary tests as is standard in the Regression Discontinuity Design literature. The estimate for the log change in height and its bootstrapped standard error are displayed directly on the graph and confirm that we cannot detect a lack of continuity at the kink. This test is of course only a partial one because, first, as explained above, the assumption of continuity of the ex ante individual density is fundamentally untestable, and second, because it does not provide evidence on the continuity of the derivative of the conditional density at the kink. But the spirit of the McCrary test can be simply extended to test for violation in the continuity of the derivative, as done in [Card et al. \[2012\]](#). The idea is to regress the number of observations N_i in each bin on polynomials of the average highest quarter of earnings in each bin (centered at the kink) $(w - k)$ and the interaction term $(w - k) \cdot \mathbb{1}[W \geq k]$. The coefficient on the interaction term for the first order polynomial (testing for a change in slope of the p.d.f) reported on panel A of figure 3 is insignificant which supports the assumption of a continuous derivative of the conditional density at the kink.

A key testable implication of a valid RK design is that the conditional expectation of any covariate should be twice continuously differentiable at the kink. This can be visually tested by plotting the mean values of covariates in each bin of the assignment variable as done in figure 3 for the first sub period in Louisiana. Panels B, C and D of figure 3 all suggest that the covariates evolve smoothly at the kink, in support of the identification assumptions of the RK design. Formal tests can also be performed by running polynomial regressions of the form described in equation 10. Results are described in the next subsection.

The pattern for the outcome variables offers a striking contrast with that of covariates, as shown in figure 4 which display the evolution of the mean values in each bin of the main outcome of interest, the duration of UI claims, against the assignment variable centered at the kink, for all five states³². There is a sharp visible change in the slope of the relationship between the duration of UI claims and the assignment variable at the kink point of the benefit schedule for all five states³³. This

³¹The choice of the bin size in our graphical analysis is done using the formal test of excess smoothing recommended by [Lee and Lemieux \[2010\]](#) in the RD setting. A bin size of \$250 is the largest that passes the test for all states and outcomes of interest.

³²Results for the other duration outcomes of interest are displayed in figures B2 and B3 and reveal the exact same patterns.

³³It is interesting to note that for Missouri, the change in slope seems to be smaller, which is due to a smaller change

provides supportive evidence for the identification of an effect of benefit level on unemployment duration in the RK design.

Estimation Results: Table 1 shows the results for the baseline specification of equation 10 in the linear case for Louisiana for all five sub periods. In each column, I report the estimate of the weighted average treatment effect $\hat{\alpha} = -\frac{\hat{Y}_1}{\tau_1}$, with robust standard errors. Each estimate is done using nominal schedules, but the $\hat{\alpha}$ are rescaled to 2010 dollars and they should be interpreted as the marginal effect of an extra dollar of 2010 in weekly benefit amount on the average duration (in weeks) of the outcome. I also report the elasticity with respect to the benefit level ($\epsilon_b = \hat{\alpha} \cdot \frac{b_{max}}{\bar{Y}_1}$, where \bar{Y}_1 is mean duration at the kink point) and its robust standard error, as well as the p-values from a Goodness-of-Fit test that consists in comparing the polynomial model to the same polynomial model plus a series of bin dummies. The results are consistent across the three duration outcomes of interest, with an estimated elasticity of between .25 and .6 depending on the sub period of interest. In each case, the linear specification is not considered too restrictive compared to the model including bin dummies as suggested by the large p-values of the Goodness-of-Fit test. For covariates, to the contrary, I cannot detect evidence of a significant change in the slope of the conditional expectation at the kink for any of the five periods.

In table 2 panel A, I analyze the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the polynomial order³⁴. I display the results of the estimation of equation 10 for a linear, a quadratic, and a cubic specification³⁵. I also report the Aikake Information Criterion (AIC) for all specifications. The estimates for α are of similar magnitude across the different specifications. Standard errors of the estimates nevertheless increase quite substantially with higher order for the polynomial. The AIC suggest that the quadratic specification is always dominated but the linear and the cubic specification are almost equivalent, and none of them is too restrictive based on the p-values of the Goodness-of-Fit test. Table 2 panel B explores the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the bandwidth level. Results are consistent across bandwidth sizes, but the larger the bandwidth size, the less likely is the

in slope in the benefit schedule, where τ_1 is equal to 1/20, instead of 1/25 in most other states. Besides, the relationship between unemployment duration and highest quarter of earnings seems to be slightly increasing on the right of the kink in Missouri, contrary to other states, where it is decreasing. This might be due to the very low level of the kink in the distribution of previous earnings compared to other states, since in Missouri, both τ_1 and b_{max} are very small. Because of this, liquidity effects might be stronger on the right side of the kink in Missouri than in other states, and higher previous earnings lead to higher unemployment duration.

³⁴In table 2, I group unemployment spells over all five periods periods, which has the advantage of providing with a larger number of observations at the kink for statistical power, as explained above.

³⁵For all three specifications, the bandwidth is set at 2500.

linear specification to dominate higher order polynomials. Overall though, it should be noted that the RKD does pretty poorly with small samples, and therefore is quite demanding in terms of bandwidth size compared to a regression discontinuity design. In practice, I found that the precision of the estimates would fall quite substantially when reducing bandwidth sizes below 1500.

Because the total duration of non-employment matters for the government's budget constraint, the elasticity of the duration of total non-employment is also a necessary statistics for assessing the welfare effects of UI, as shown in proposition 9. In appendix table B5, I display estimates of the elasticity of all duration outcomes, including the duration of total non-employment, in Washington, the only state for which we observe reemployment dates from wage records in the CWBH data. Interestingly, the marginal effect of a change in benefit level on the duration of non-employment is very similar to the effect on the duration of UI claims or on the duration of paid UI. But the duration of non-employment being usually quite longer than the duration of paid UI, the elasticity of non-employment duration is relatively lower than the elasticity of paid UI spells.

One important contribution of this paper is to provide a thorough assessment of the validity of the regression kink design. I therefore provide three additional tests for the robustness of the RKD estimates, intended to constitute the basis for a set of good practices when implementing RKD estimation. For the sake of brevity, most of the details of these tests are given in appendix A.

The first two tests deal with the issue of functional dependence between the forcing variable and the outcome of interest. A key identifying assumption of the RK design is that, conditional on b , this relationship is smooth at the kink. But in practice, it could be that the relationship between the forcing variable and the outcome (in the absence of a kink in the schedule of b) is either kinked or simply quadratic. Then, the RKD estimates are likely to be picking up this functional dependence between y and w_1 instead of the true effect of b on y . One way to control for this type of issue would be to compare two groups of similar individuals with different UI schedules, so that kinks would be at different points of support of the forcing variable. As shown in appendix A.2, under the assumption that the functional dependence between y and w_1 is the same for the two groups, the average treatment effect can be identified and estimated in a "double-difference regression kink design". To implement this strategy, the idea is to use the presence of variations in the maximum benefit amount over time, that shift the position of the kink across the distribution of the forcing variable (as shown in figure 1). The problem though is that, taken separately, each variation in max_b is too small to give enough statistical power to detect changes in slopes because the bandwidths

are too small, and as previously pointed out, the drawback of the RKD is to be quite demanding in terms of bandwidth size. The idea therefore is to compare periods that are further away in time³⁶. Figure A2 in appendix A shows the relationship between the duration of paid unemployment and the forcing variable in 1979 and 1982. Interestingly, there is a kink in this relationship in 1979 at the level of the 1979-kink in the schedule, and this kink disappears in 1982, when a new kink appears right at the level of the 1982-kink. Furthermore, in the interval between the 1979 and 1982 kinks, there is a change in slope in the relationship between the duration of unemployment and the forcing variable. This evidence is strongly supportive of the validity of the RK design. Table A1 reports the double-difference RKD estimates of the effect of benefit level corresponding to the evidence of figure A2. The point estimates are perfectly in line with the baseline RKD estimates of table 1. The DD-RKD strategy being a lot more demanding, the precision of the estimates is nevertheless quite reduced compared to the baseline RKD strategy.

Another way to test for the functional dependence between earnings and the outcome is to run RKD estimates using as the forcing variable a placebo, i.e. a proxy for previous earnings, that would not be too correlated with the highest quarter of earnings. In the CWBH data, the variable that is best suited for this strategy is the reemployment wage. Appendix Table A2 explores the robustness of the RKD results using the post unemployment wage as a placebo forcing variable instead of the pre-unemployment highest quarter of earnings. Results show that we cannot detect any effect in these placebo specifications which confirm that the baseline RKD estimates are not just an artefact picking up a functional dependence between earnings and unemployment duration.

Another series of tests that should constitute the basis of any RKD analysis are non-parametric or semi-parametric tests inspired by the literature on the detection of structural breakpoints in time series analysis, following for instance Bai and Perron [2003]. I carry out here a straightforward test that consists in trying to detect the location of the kink by looking for the kink point that would minimize the residual sum of squares or equivalently maximize the R-squared. Details of the test are given in appendix A.4. I report in figure A3 the evolution of the R-squared as I change the location of the kink point in specification (10). The evolution of the R-squared as one varies

³⁶The obvious drawback of this option is that the identifying assumption is less likely to hold as one compares periods that are further away in time. In particular, one may worry about the high inflation rates during this period. It is important to note here that the maximum benefit amount increased in Louisiana a lot faster than inflation (40% between September 1979 and Sept 1982 and total inflation was less than 20% during that period), so that there is a clear and important change in the schedule in *real* terms. To further alleviate this concern, I also control for quadratic in *real* highest quarter of earnings in the DD-RKD specifications and find similar results.

the location of the kink points provides evidence in support of the validity of the RKD design. The R-squared increases sharply as one moves closer to the actual kink point and then decreases sharply, supportive of the existence of a kink around 0. Despite their bad small sample properties, I recommend that these non-parametric or semi-parametric tests are always performed when running RKD estimation, to make sure that the estimates are not picking up some spurious breakpoints in the relationship between the forcing variable and the outcome of interest.

Comparison to other studies & cyclical behavior: I replicate the RKD estimation procedure for all states and periods. All the estimates are displayed in appendix B. Overall, estimates of the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the benefit level are consistently between .1 and .6. The average elasticity of the duration of initial spell for all 5 states and periods is .32 (standard deviation is .2), where each period of analysis is defined as the entire period for which the benefit schedule is left unchanged and which represents a total of 26 different estimates. To get a sense of the validity of the RK design, it is useful to compare the RKD estimates to existing estimates in the literature. My estimates are on the lower end of the spectrum when compared to traditional benchmarks in the literature on US data. Estimation of the effect of UI benefit level in this literature has however always been struggling with the endogeneity issue due to the joint determination of UI benefits and previous earnings. Most empirical studies on US data therefore use proportional hazard models and add controls for previous earnings³⁷. In table A3 in appendix A.5, I report the estimates of Cox proportional hazard models on the CWBH data³⁸, which enables me to compare my results to the widely cited benchmark of Meyer [1990], who used a smaller sample of the same CWBH records. Appendix table A3 shows that the estimates of Meyer [1990], who found an elasticity of .56³⁹, can be fully replicated using his specification. The drawback of these estimates is that they do not fully address the endogeneity issue due to the joint determination of UI benefits and previous earnings. Meyer [1990] only controls for previous wages using the log of the base period earnings. Interestingly, if one adds a richer set of non parametric controls for previous earnings to mitigate the concern of endogeneity, and fully controls for variations across labor markets by adding time fixed effects interacted with state fixed effects, the results

³⁷See for instance estimates in Chetty [2008], Kroft and Notowidigdo [2011] or Spinnewijn [2010], and surveys in Holmlund [1998] or Krueger and Meyer [2002]

³⁸All the details of the estimation procedure are given in appendix A.5.

³⁹See Meyer [1990], Table VI, column (7). Coefficient estimates for $\log(b)$ in the proportional hazard models of table A3 can be interpreted as the elasticity of the hazard rate s with respect to the weekly benefit level. However, under the assumption that the hazard rate is somewhat constant, these elasticities can be easily compared to the RKD elasticities of unemployment duration, since $D \approx 1/s$ so that $\epsilon_D \approx -\epsilon_s$

converge to the RKD estimates and the elasticity goes down to around .3. The reason is that, as one controls more efficiently for the functional dependence between unemployment duration and previous earnings, the only identifying variation in benefit level that is left comes from the kink in the benefit schedule, and the model naturally converges to the identification strategy of the RKD. Overall, I find this evidence to be supportive of the validity of the RK design.

Following the Great Recession, a recent literature has been interested in estimating how labor supply responses to UI vary over the business cycle in order to assess the optimality of UI rules that are contingent on the state of the labor market (Schmieder et al. [2012], Kroft and Notowidigdo [2011]). I take advantage of the large variations in labor market conditions across states and over time in the CWBH data to investigate how the RKD estimates vary with indicators of (state) labor market conditions⁴⁰. I correlate the RKD estimates with the average monthly unemployment rate from the Current Population Survey prevailing in the state for each period. Results suggest that increases in the state unemployment rate are associated with a slight decrease in the estimated elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the UI benefit level. In my preferred specification, the results imply that the elasticity varies between .38 (.09) when the state unemployment rate is at 4.5% (minimum in the CWBH data) and .25 (.10) when the unemployment rate is at 11.8% (the max in the CWBH data). Overall, this evidence supports the idea of a small cyclicality of the (partial equilibrium) labor supply responses to UI, and is in line with the evidence of Kroft and Notowidigdo [2011] for the US, although the cyclicality of the estimates is somewhat larger in their analysis. One needs to acknowledge that the standard errors on the estimated coefficient is rather large and the results of this exercise should be interpreted with some caution⁴¹.

3.2 Benefit Duration

The presence of frequent changes in the schedule of potential duration complicates the estimation of the effect of potential duration in the CWBH sample⁴². These frequent changes in the

⁴⁰All the details on the analysis of the cyclical behavior of the estimates are once again given in appendix A.6.

⁴¹In table A3, columns (4) to (6), I also investigate how the effect of the log benefit correlates with state unemployment conditions in the standard Cox proportional hazard model, and find similar results, with the estimated elasticity decreasing slightly between .36 for the bottom quartile of the distribution of state×month unemployment rates in the CWBH data and .27 for the top quartile of unemployment rates.

⁴²These frequent changes are due first to the federal extensions of the FSC program following the 1981 recession, but also to the functioning of the EB program before the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981: because of the existence of two triggers (a national trigger, and a state trigger), and because of the lower level of unemployment required for these triggers to be activated, the number of EB sequences was much larger before 1981 than it is today. In Louisiana for instance the schedule changed 11 times between January 1979 and December 1983.

schedule of potential duration are a concern for identification because a fundamental requirement of the RK design is that the unemployed anticipate the stationarity of the schedule during the whole duration of their spell. Only observations for which the schedule did not change from the beginning of the spell to the end of the potential duration can be kept in the estimation sample for estimating the effect of potential duration on actual unemployment duration. In Louisiana for instance, when I restrict the sample to spells with a stationary schedule throughout the whole potential duration of the spell, I am left with only 3 sub periods⁴³. The small sample size issue of having to split the data in stationary sub periods is reinforced by the necessity to break down observations according to their weekly benefit amounts, since individuals with $b = b_{max}$ and $b \leq b_{max}$ face different schedules⁴⁴. Given state UI parameters, sample size at the kink can become too small for inference. Because of these constraints, the number of estimates for the effect of potential duration is more limited than for the effect of benefit level.

Figure 5 plots the mean values of the duration of UI claims in each bin of the assignment variable for the 3 sub-periods of analysis in Louisiana, and shows clear signs of a kink in the relationship between the assignment variable and the duration of initial spell at the kink. But the smaller sample size at the kink makes the relationship between the outcome and the assignment variable a little noisier visually than in the case of the kink in the benefit level schedule depicted in figure 4.

Table 3 presents the results for the average treatment effect $\hat{\beta}$ with robust standard errors for Louisiana. For each of the three sub periods with stable schedules⁴⁵, I report the estimates of the preferred polynomial specification based on the Aikake Information Criterion. The effect of an additional week of UI on average duration is consistently around .2 to .5 for all duration outcomes and sub-periods of interest. The linear specification is always preferred and is never rejected by the Goodness-of-Fit test as indicated by the reported p-values. For covariates in columns (4) to (8), to the contrary, the same estimation procedure does not reveal any kink in the relationship with the assignment variable, which supports the validity of the RK design.

⁴³The first sub period contains all spells beginning between 01/14/1979 and 01/31/1980, the second contains all spells beginning between 09/12/1981 and 05/01/1982, and finally the third sub period contains all spells beginning after 06/19/1983 to 31/12/1983. In all three sub periods, the number of observations in the estimation sample around the kink is four to five times smaller than for the estimation of the effect of benefit level.

⁴⁴Note also that for individuals hitting the maximum weekly benefit amount $b = b_{max}$, the location of the kink changes every time the statutory maximum weekly benefit amount is increased which further reduces the estimation sample size of observations with stationary schedule.

⁴⁵For the third sub period, the 12 weeks maximum duration of FSC-III and FSC-IV introduces a small second kink in the schedule, visible in figure 2, but due to a lack statistical power to detect its effect, I focus on estimation of the effect of the larger kink.

The estimates of an increase of .2 to .3 weeks of unemployment with each additional week of UI are in line with previous estimates in the US such as [Moffitt \[1985b\]](#), [Card and Levine \[2000\]](#), and [Katz and Meyer \[1990\]](#). They are slightly higher than existing estimates in Europe using RD designs such as [Schmieder et al. \[2012\]](#) for Germany. This could be due to much longer baseline durations in European UI systems. In [Schmieder et al. \[2012\]](#) for instance, baseline potential durations, at which the effect of an extension of UI are estimated, are between 12 to 24 months, which is 2 to 4 times longer than in the US.

How are the estimates presented here informative about the effect of UI extensions in the Great Recession? UI institutions have little changed since the late 1970s: replacement rates and baseline durations of state UI programs are more or less the same. Nevertheless, institutional settings were different, and in particular, the relative generosity of safety nets for the long term out-of-work has declined significantly in the 1990s with a complete overhaul of welfare programs. A consequence is that elasticities are potentially slightly greater today because the continuation value of unemployment past the UI exhaustion point is lower than in the CWBH data. [Rothstein \[2011\]](#), however, finds very small effects of UI extensions during the Great Recession, but his identification strategies might be picking up equilibrium effects in the labor market, which might be lower during recessions in the presence of negative job search externalities as suggested in [Landais et al. \[2010\]](#).

4 Moral hazard, liquidity and welfare calibrations

I describe in this section how to use the RK design to produce timely estimates of the welfare effects of UI. The previous section has shown that the RK design can deliver robust and timely estimates of labor supply effects of both the level and the duration of UI benefits, which are key inputs in optimal formula (9). But to fully calibrate formula (9) and conduct welfare analysis, it is important to distinguish purely distortionary effects from wealth/income effects. I therefore implement the result of Proposition 1 which shows that, under the assumption that the liquidity constraint is not yet binding at exhaustion, the purely distortionary effects of UI can be identified by comparing labor supply responses to an increase in the benefit level versus an increase in the potential duration of UI.

To implement empirically this full calibration strategy, one needs to compute all statistics entering formula (9), which include total non employment duration (D), as well as survival rates after exhaustion ($S(B)$). In the CWBH data, Washington is the only state for which this information is

available through the matched UI records-wage records. But, in practice, any UI administration could implement these calibrations since all UI administrations link UI records with wage records to compute UI eligibility. To compute the liquidity to moral hazard ratio, one needs to estimate at the same time the effect of benefit level and that of potential duration. I therefore focus on the longest period (July 1980 to July 1981) for which we have a stationary schedule in Washington for both benefit level and potential duration.

4.1 Test for the slackness of the liquidity constraint

The result of proposition 1 relies on the assumption that the liquidity constraint is not yet binding at the exhaustion point B . I begin by providing a simple test for this assumption. The intuition for the test is simple. If the liquidity constraint is binding, it means that the unemployed can no longer deplete their asset; they are hand-to-mouth, and therefore, benefits that they have received in the past do not have any effect on their future behavior. If to the contrary, exit rates after the exhaustion point are affected by benefits received before exhaustion, it means that agents can still transfer part of their consumption across time periods.

Formally, if the Euler equation is satisfied, one can express the effect of benefit in period 0 on effort in period 1 using (4):

$$\frac{\partial s_1}{\partial b_0} = \frac{u''(c_0^u)}{\beta(u'(c_1^e) - u'(c_1^u))} \leq 0$$

$\frac{\partial s_1}{\partial b_0}$ is inversely proportional to the liquidity effect. In other words, when the Euler equation holds and agents can transfer money freely across periods, an increase in benefits earlier during the spell reduces the probability of exiting unemployment because it increases asset level. But when the agents can no longer smooth consumption perfectly or have little asset to transfer across periods, the denominator (which is directly proportional to the consumption smoothing benefits of UI) increases and $\frac{\partial s_1}{\partial b_0}$ tends to be small in absolute value. When agents hit the borrowing constraint, they become hand-to-mouth and set consumption equal to income every period, in which case the Euler equation does not hold any more and $\frac{\partial s_1}{\partial b_0} = 0$.

The implementation of the test relies on estimation of $\frac{\partial s_{B+1}}{\partial b_B}$, the effect of receiving extra benefits at time B on exit rates after benefit exhaustion at time $B + 1$. To identify $\frac{\partial s_{B+1}}{\partial b_B}$, the idea is to compare the exit rates conditional on still being unemployed after the maximum exhaustion point of two individuals, one having been given exogenously one more week of covered UI than the

other. Once again, the RK design can be used to implement the test, taking advantage of the kink in the schedule of the potential duration of benefits, which creates variations in the number of weeks that individuals can collect UI before time B , or equivalently in the total amount of benefits that individuals can collect before time B . I run regressions of the form of equation (10) where the outcome is the probability of exiting unemployment between 40 and 60 weeks⁴⁶, conditional on still being unemployed after 39 weeks (the maximum duration of benefits in Washington between July 1980 and July 1981). The assignment variable is the ratio of base period earnings to highest quarter of earnings, that determines the potential duration of UI. The RKD identifies⁴⁷ $\partial s_{B+1} / \partial B$ that I then divide by the benefit amount b to get $\frac{\partial s_{B+1}}{\partial b_B}$ ⁴⁸.

Results are reported in column (1) of table 4. Having received one extra dollar of benefits before 39 weeks reduces the exit rate out of unemployment after exhaustion by a statistically significant .19 percentage point. This means that benefits received before the exhaustion point still have a negative effect on exit rates after the exhaustion point, or in other words, that the liquidity constraint is not yet binding at the exhaustion point. Note that *per se*, this statistics is interesting in the sense that it is inversely related to the consumption smoothing benefits of UI at the exhaustion point. The lower this statistics, the larger the liquidity effect of UI benefits at exhaustion. It would therefore be interesting to be able to replicate this type of test to look at the evolution of this statistics over the business cycle. I also provide some quantile regression analysis in appendix A.7 showing that this test does not seem to be contaminated by heterogeneity.

4.2 Liquidity effects and calibrations

To calibrate the welfare effects of UI, following proposition 9, I need estimates of the elasticities of paid unemployment duration and of total non-employment duration, as well as estimates of the

⁴⁶Because of the small number of observations, I am forced to choose a rather large interval to increase the precision of the estimates.

⁴⁷As explained in appendix A.1, when dealing with hazard rates, identification requires some assumptions regarding the selection process in case some unobserved heterogeneity θ also determines the exit rate out of unemployment $s_t(\{b_t\}_{t=0}^B, \theta)$. Under the assumption that the heterogeneity effect is additively separable, in which case $\frac{\partial^2 s_B}{\partial b_B \partial \theta} = 0$, then $\frac{u''(c_B^u)}{u'(c_{B+1}^u) - v'(c_{B+1}^e)}$ is point identified. I ran tests of smoothness of the relationship between observable covariates at the kink and the assignment variable conditional on still being unemployed after 39 weeks, and could not detect significant changes in slope, indicative of the validity of the identifying assumption.

⁴⁸I assume here that a marginal change in the potential duration of benefits B normalized by the benefit amount b is the same as a marginal change in b_B . This would be the case if B could be increased by a fraction of period. This simplification does not affect the validity of the test but only the interpretation of the coefficient in column (1) of table 4.

liquidity to moral hazard ratio. In table 4, I give in column (2) and (3) RKD estimates of the elasticities for the period of interest in Washington.

Estimation of liquidity and moral hazard effects: The estimation of liquidity and moral hazard effects follows from the application of the result of proposition 1. In practice, I estimate separately in the regression kink design the effect of an increase in benefit level ($\left. \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \right|_B$) and of an increase in potential duration ($\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial B}$) on the hazard rate out of unemployment at the beginning of a spell⁴⁹. Proposition 1 requires that we estimate the effect of benefit level and potential duration for the same individuals. To ensure that the characteristics of individuals at both kinks (in benefit level and potential duration) are the same, I use a re-weighting approach described in appendix A.8. Column (4) of table 4 reports $\left(\frac{1}{B} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \right|_B - \frac{1}{b} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial B} \right)$, the difference between the RKD estimate of the effect of benefit level (divided by the potential duration) and the RKD estimate of the effect of potential duration (divided by the benefit level) on s_0 . Standard errors for all statistics in column (4) are bootstrapped with 50 replications⁵⁰. By a simple application of proposition 1, this difference is then divided by $\Phi_1 = \frac{S(B) - \frac{D_B + s_0}{B}}{D_B - s_0(B-1)}$ to compute the moral hazard effect Θ_1 of an increase in benefit level and the ratio of liquidity to moral hazard ρ_1 in the effect of an increase in benefit level. I use the observed average survival rates and durations for the full period July 1980 to July 1981 in Washington and for individuals at the kink of benefit level in order to compute Φ_1 .

The estimate reported in column (4) suggests the existence of substantial liquidity effects, with a ratio of liquidity effect to moral hazard effect of 44%. This estimate is however smaller than the figures reported in Chetty [2008], who finds a ratio of roughly 1.5 using data on severance payments. The great advantage of the RKD strategy is to be able to estimate liquidity effects from administrative UI data directly, without the need for information on severance payments or for consumption data. The assumptions for the validity of the identification strategy pursued here are however important to keep in mind. First, the unemployed must be rational and forward-looking. If individuals were perfectly myopic for instance, the Euler equation would not hold. The test about the slackness of the liquidity constraint seems to indicate a certain degree of consumption smoothing over time, ruling out perfect myopia. But evidence in the labor market (see for instance

⁴⁹To increase the precision of the estimates, I choose to define s_0 as the probability of exiting unemployment in the first 4 weeks. Shorter definitions for period 0 yield similar results but the standard errors on the estimates of the effect of potential duration increase sharply.

⁵⁰To be precise, I merge observations from both samples, the one at the benefit level kink and the one at the potential duration kink, and draw with replacement 50 different samples from that merged sample. I then replicate the full estimation procedure from these 50 samples to compute the standard errors on $\left(\frac{1}{B} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \right|_B - \frac{1}{b} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial B} \right)$, Θ_1 and ρ_1 .

DellaVigna and Paserman [2005]) indicates that job seekers may exhibit a lot of impatience. Even though our identification strategy is valid independently of the value of the discount factor, it rules out the possibility of forms of impatience such as hyperbolic (beta-delta) discounting. My identification strategy also necessitates that individuals have very precise information about their benefit level and potential duration of UI. This seems to be the case nowadays, unemployed individuals receiving in most states at the beginning of their claim a summary of their rights, with the amount of their weekly benefits and total duration of benefits in weeks⁵¹. Finally, my identification strategy postulates that unemployed individuals are able to form rational expectations about their survival rates and expected duration of unemployment at the start of a spell. Evidence in the labor market also suggests that unemployed individuals may actually exhibit biased perceptions about their unemployment risks (Spinnewijn [2010]). It is unfortunately difficult to know to what extent such biased beliefs are likely to affect my estimates, since the moral hazard estimate is at the same time an increasing function of the expected duration of unemployment and a decreasing function of the expected survival rate at exhaustion. In other words, biased beliefs would not affect my estimate if the bias is a simple shifter of the survival curve. If this is not the case, one would need to compare the full (biased) expected survival curve to the true survival curve to know how these biased perceptions affect the moral hazard and liquidity estimates.

Calibrations I now use these estimates to calibrate the welfare effects of UI. To calibrate $D_B/(T - D)$, which is equivalent to the Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR), I use the total number of paid unemployed divided by the total number of employees paying payroll taxes in the wage records in Washington for the period July 1980 to July 1981. I find $D_B/(T - D) \approx 3.9\%$. Similarly, I calibrate $D/T - D \approx 8.5\%$ as the average unemployment rate in Washington during the period computed from CPS⁵². From the CWBH data in Washington, I get that $\omega_1 = \frac{B}{D_B - s_0(B-1)} - 1 \approx 17$. Plugging the estimated elasticities of column (2) of table 4 into formula 9, I get the right-hand side of the optimal formula $\omega_1 \frac{D_B}{T-D} (1 + \varepsilon_{D_B} + \varepsilon_D \frac{D}{T-D}) \approx 1.14$. With a ratio of liquidity to moral hazard $\rho_1 \approx .44$, it means that the left-hand side of the formula ($1 + \rho_1 \approx 1.44$) is greater than the right-hand side. This indicates that increasing the benefit level from its current level would be

⁵¹Unfortunately, I was not able to find a copy of UI benefit summary for the period covered by the CWBH, and could not confirm that such information was already present at the time.

⁵²The way I calibrate the ratios $D_B/(T - D)$ and $D/T - D$ relies on the assumption, implicit in the model, that each state UI agency balances its own budget every period. This assumption is somewhat restrictive, since the federal government subsidizes state UI agencies in practice. In particular, half of the cost of EB extensions is paid by the federal budget.

welfare increasing⁵³.

These calibrations show that the size of the liquidity effects is critical to assess the welfare impact of UI. In the absence of liquidity effects ($\rho_1 = 0$), the behavioral responses to UI would be entirely driven by moral hazard, and the right-hand side of the formula in equation (9) would be greater than the left-hand side. The RKD strategy pursued here offers a simple way to investigate the presence and size of liquidity effects, but this exercise also clearly demonstrates the need for a deeper understanding and identification of the consumption smoothing benefits of UI.

5 Conclusions

This paper shows that the RK design is a fruitful instrument for empirical research on UI. First, it can be used, as has been done here, to non-parametrically estimate partial equilibrium labor supply responses to both benefit level and potential duration. The many tests provided in this paper for the robustness of the RK design, which I hope will serve as a basis for a code of good practice, demonstrate its validity to overcome the traditional issue of endogeneity in UI benefit variations on US data. Second, I have also shown how, in the tradition of the dynamic labor supply literature, one can identify the purely distortionary effects of UI using variations along the returns-to-employment profile brought about by exogenous variations in the benefit level as well as in the benefit duration thanks to the RK design.

Overall, my results confirm the evidence in Chetty [2008] that liquidity effects are substantial, and that an increase in the replacement rate and duration of UI might be welfare increasing⁵⁴. The advantage of calibrating the welfare formula using the regression kink design as described in this paper, is that the formula can technically be tested in real time, so that any UI administration could

⁵³Similarly, one can calibrate the formula for the welfare effects of the potential duration of UI, derived in appendix C.4. Under the approximation that $\rho_2 \approx \rho_1$, and given that in the CWBH data, $\omega_2/B \approx 14.2$, we get that the right-hand side of equation (25) is approximately equal to 1.29, which is slightly lower than the left-hand side of the formula. Once again, the result of this calibration suggest that a small increase in the potential duration of UI would be welfare increasing.

⁵⁴It is important however to remember that these policy recommendations are only valid locally, at the value of the policy parameters at which the statistics entering the formula are estimated. Extrapolating the optimal level of benefit and duration of UI from these statistics would require the implausible assumption that all statistics would remain unchanged if we were to modify the policy parameters. However, we can gauge from the calibrations that the optimal level and duration of UI benefit are not substantially higher, since the welfare gains of increasing the benefit level ($\frac{dW}{db}$) or potential duration ($\frac{dW}{dB}$) of UI are relatively small. Moreover, my calibrations are also local in the sense that the empirical strategy identifies the average liquidity effect and behavioral responses at the kink, and might not be valid for the full spectrum of the earnings distribution.

easily estimate the welfare effects of the small adjustments that are usually done in UI legislation such as a change in the maximum benefit amount.

Yet, the calibrations presented here are obtained in a very stylized version of the labor market⁵⁵. Models in the tradition of [Baily \[1978\]](#) and [Chetty \[2006\]](#) such as the one presented here take a pure partial equilibrium view of the labor market, with an infinitely elastic labor demand. The unemployment problem is represented as a pure labor supply story, with no effect of UI on labor market equilibrium through labor demand effects. As shown in [Landais et al. \[2010\]](#), in equilibrium search-and-matching models of the labor market, partial equilibrium labor supply responses to UI are no longer sufficient to compute the optimal trade-off between insurance and moral hazard, and one needs to estimate equilibrium employment responses as well.


⁵⁵Note for instance that throughout the paper, I have assumed perfect take-up of UI. Evidence shows that the take-up rate of UI is actually significantly lower than 100%. As shown in [Kroft \[2008\]](#), in the presence of responses to UI at the extensive margin with endogenous take-up costs, social multiplier effects arise and the optimal replacement rates can be substantially higher than in traditional models with responses only along the intensive margin.

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
Figure 1: LOUISIANA: SCHEDULE OF UI WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNT, JAN1979-DEC1983



Sources: Louisiana Revised Statutes RS 23:1592 and yearly *Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws* 1976 to 1984, Dpt of Labor, Employment & Training Administration.

Notes: The graph shows the evolution of the schedule of the weekly benefit amount (WBA) as a deterministic and kinked function of the highest quarter of earnings in Louisiana. The schedule applies based on the date the UI claim was filed, so that a change in the maximum weekly benefit amount does not affect the weekly benefit amount of ongoing spells.


Figure 2: LOUISIANA: SCHEDULE OF UI POTENTIAL DURATION, JAN1979-DEC1983



Sources: Louisiana Revised Statutes RS 23:1592 and weekly state trigger notice reports


Notes: The graph shows the evolution of the schedule of the potential duration of UI benefits as a deterministic and kinked function of the ratio of base period earnings to highest quarter of earnings in Louisiana. The schedule applies based on the date of the week of certified unemployment so that changes in the schedule do usually affect ongoing spells. Specific eligibility rules also apply to qualify for the different phases of the FSC.

Figure 3: DISTRIBUTION OF HIGHEST QUARTER EARNINGS AND COVARIATES, LOUISIANA




Notes: The graphs test the validity of the smoothness assumptions of the RK design (for the first sub-period of analysis in Louisiana). For all 4 panels, highest quarter of earnings, which is the assignment variable in the RK design for the estimation of the effect of benefit level, is centered at the kink. The binsize is 250 and passes the test of excess smoothing recommended in [Lee and Lemieux \[2010\]](#). Panel A shows the p.d.f of highest quarter of earnings. I also display two tests of the identifying assumptions of the RKD. The first is a standard McCrary test of the discontinuity of the p.d.f of the assignment variable. I report here the log difference in height of the p.d.f at the kink. The second is a test for the continuity of the first derivative of the p.d.f. I report here the coefficient estimate of the change in slope of the p.d.f in a regression of the number of individuals in each bin on polynomials of the assignment variable interacted with a dummy for being above the kink. See text for details. Panel B, C and D show the mean values of the covariates in each bin of \$250 of highest quarter of earnings. The graph shows evidence of smoothness in the evolution of covariates at the kink, in support of the RKD identification assumptions. Formal tests of smoothness are displayed in table 1.

Figure 4: RKD EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECT OF BENEFIT LEVEL: DURATION OF UI CLAIMS VS HIGHEST QUARTER EARNINGS FOR ALL 5 STATES



Notes: The graph shows for the first sub-period of analysis in each state the mean values of the duration of UI claims in each bin of \$250 of highest quarter of earnings, which is the assignment variable in the RK design for the estimation of the effect of benefit level. The assignment variable is centered at the kink. The graph shows evidence of a kink in the evolution of the outcome at the kink. Formal estimates of the kink using polynomial regressions of the form of equation 10 are displayed in table 1. The red lines display predicted values of the regressions in the linear case allowing for a discontinuous shift at the kink.

Figure 5: RKD FOR THE EFFECT OF POTENTIAL DURATION: DURATION OF UI CLAIMS VS ASSIGNMENT VARIABLE IN LOUISIANA FOR 3 PERIODS



Notes: The graph shows for the three sub-periods of analysis of potential duration in Louisiana the mean values of the duration of initial spell in each bin of .05 of the assignment variable centered at the kink. The graph shows evidence of a kink in the evolution of the outcome at the kink. Formal estimates of the kink are displayed in table 3. The red lines display predicted values in the linear case allowing for a discontinuous shift at the kink.

Table 1: RKD ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF BENEFIT LEVEL, LOUISIANA 1979-1983

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Duration of Initial Spell	Duration UI Claimed	Duration UI Paid	Age	Male	Years of Education	Number of Dependents
Jan-Sep 1979							
α	.024 (.018)	.028 (.019)	.026 (.018)	-.242 (.219)	-.003 (.006)	.013 (.044)	.01 (.031)
ε_b	.256 (.198)	.302 (.198)	.261 (.179)				
p-value	.19	.146	.264	.107	.392	.062	.151
N	1898	1898	1898	1889	1878	1730	1314
Sep 1979-Sep 1980							
α	.043 (.015)	.048 (.015)	.043 (.015)	.142 (.159)	-.003 (.005)	.031 (.035)	-.017 (.027)
ε_b	.442 (.151)	.489 (.15)	.414 (.139)				
p-value	.224	.104	.166	.477	.06	.931	.53
N	3399	3399	3399	3387	3368	3131	1847
Sep 1980-Sep 1981							
α	.035 (.015)	.038 (.015)	.037 (.014)	-.056 (.169)	.003 (.006)	-.055 (.041)	-.055 (.026)
ε_b	.375 (.155)	.4 (.155)	.364 (.142)				
p-value	.049	.023	.035	.634	.246	.871	.932
N	2776	2776	2776	2760	2737	2588	1653
Sep 1981-Sep 1982							
α	.051 (.018)	.04 (.017)	.05 (.017)	.279 (.153)	-.007 (.005)	-.001 (.037)	.004 (.035)
ε_b	.516 (.179)	.417 (.174)	.471 (.162)				
p-value	.108	.19	.176	.336	.478	.067	.125
N	2905	2905	2905	2887	2862	2654	1031
Sep 1982-Dec 1983							
α	.055 (.012)	.052 (.012)	.047 (.012)	-.17 (.128)	-.008 (.004)	.03 (.035)	-.009 (.025)
ε_b	.676 (.151)	.668 (.152)	.55 (.14)				
p-value	.597	.739	.513	.337	.707	.288	.938
N	3994	3994	3994	3965	3945	3614	2097

Notes: Duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. α is the RK estimate of the average treatment effect of benefit level on the outcome. Standard errors for the estimates of α are in parentheses. The elasticity of the three duration outcomes with respect to the UI benefit level $\varepsilon_b = \hat{\alpha} \cdot \frac{b_{max}}{\bar{Y}_1}$, where \bar{Y}_1 is mean duration at the kink point, are also reported. P-values are from a test of joint significance of the coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin dummies are added to the polynomial specification in equation 10. All estimates for this table are for the linear case. Each period corresponds to a stable schedule for the benefit level (cf. figure 1).

Table 2: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF THE RKD ESTIMATES, EFFECT OF BENEFIT LEVEL, LOUISIANA SEPT 81- DEC 83

	(1)	(2)	(3)		(4)	(5)	(6)
	A. Sensitivity to Poly Order				B. Sensitivity to Bandwidth		
	Duration of Initial Spell	Duration UI Claimed	Duration UI Paid		Duration of Initial Spell	Duration UI Claimed	Duration UI Paid
	Poly Order=1				Bandwidth=1500		
α	.053 (.01)	.047 (.01)	.048 (.01)	α	.063 (.022)	.05 (.021)	.162 (.224)
p-value	.396	.706	.442	p-value	.405	.61	.277
AIC	53847.4	53323.4	53555.8	Opt. poly	1	1	3
	Poly Order=2				Bandwidth=2500		
α	.092 (.041)	.075 (.039)	.091 (.04)	α	.063 (.104)	.047 (.01)	.072 (.102)
p-value	.478	.729	.549	p-value	.291	.706	.38
AIC	53849.5	53326.5	53558.1	Opt. poly	3	1	3
	Poly Order=3				Bandwidth=4500		
α	.063 (.104)	.074 (.1)	.072 (.102)	α	.099 (.047)	.076 (.046)	.094 (.046)
p-value	.291	.551	.38	p-value	.2	.363	.208
AIC	53845.1	53324.0	53554.0	Opt. poly	3	3	3

Notes: The table explores the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the polynomial order (panel A) and of the bandwidth (panel B) for the regression specification in equation 10. In panel A, the bandwidth level is equal to 2500 for all specifications. α is the RK estimate of the average treatment effect of benefit level on the outcome. Standard errors for the estimates of α are in parentheses. P-values are from a test of joint significance of the coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin dummies are added to the polynomial specification in equation 10. AIC is the Aikake Information Criterion.

Table 3: BASELINE RKD ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF POTENTIAL DURATION, LOUISIANA

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Duration of Initial Spell	Duration UI Claimed	Duration UI Paid	Age	Years of Education	Male	Dependents
Period 1: Jan 1979 - Jan 1980							
β	.216	.185	.222	-.107	.014	.004	-.013
	(.119)	(.12)	(.117)	(.167)	(.032)	(.006)	(.026)
p-value	.685	.596	.65	.163	.123	.519	.072
N	3107	3107	3107	3091	2839	3078	1952
Opt. Poly	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Period 2: Sep 1981 - Apr 1982							
β	.3	.299	.272	.071	.013	-.007	-.016
	(.103)	(.099)	(.099)	(.113)	(.024)	(.004)	(.025)
p-value	.593	.546	.488	.416	.118	.31	.427
N	2659	2659	2659	2644	2415	2624	951
Opt. Poly	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Period 3: Jun 1983 - Dec 1983							
β	.502	.456	.457	-.004	-.003	-.028	-.092
	(.087)	(.081)	(.084)	(.096)	(.025)	(.017)	(.082)
p-value	.746	.837	.747	.837	.492	.234	.264
N	1750	1750	1750	1738	1586	1731	935
Opt. Poly	1	1	1	1	1	2	2

Notes: Duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. β is the RK estimate of the average treatment effect of potential duration on the outcome. Standard errors for the estimates of α are in parentheses. P-values are from a test of joint significance of the coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin dummies are added to the polynomial specification in equation 10. The optimal polynomial order is chosen based on the minimization of the Aikake Information Criterion.

Table 4: RKD ESTIMATES OF BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO UI, TESTS FOR THE SLACKNESS OF THE LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINT, AND LIQUIDITY EFFECT ESTIMATES, WASHINGTON, JUL 1980 - JUL 1981

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Test for slackness of the liquidity constraint	Effect of benefit level	Effect of potential duration	Liquidity and moral hazard estimates
$\frac{\partial s_{B+1}}{\partial b_B}$	-.0019 (.00082) [.337]			
ϵ_{D_B}		.689 (.114) [.842]	1.361 (.685) [.382]	
ϵ_D		.356 (.076) [.893]	.446 (.434) [.163]	
$(\frac{1}{B} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \Big _B - \frac{1}{b} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial B}) \times 10^3$				-.068 (.01) .0023 (.00029)
Moral Hazard: Θ_1				.440 (.018)
Liquidity to Moral Hazard: ρ_1				
N	529	5772	2047	7819

Notes 1: For all columns, standard errors for the estimates are in parentheses. P-values are reported between brackets and are from a test of joint significance of the coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin dummies are added to the polynomial specification in equation 10. The optimal polynomial order is chosen based on the minimization of the AIC. The bandwidth for the RK estimate of benefit level is 2500 (assignment variable: highest quarter of earnings) and .75 for the RK estimate of the potential duration (assignment variable: ratio of base period to highest quarter of earnings).

Notes 2: This table shows how to use the RKD to estimate all the statistics entering formula (9) to calibrate the welfare effects of UI. Column (1) begins by testing for the slackness of the liquidity constraint. It reports the RK estimate of $b \cdot \frac{\partial s}{\partial b_B}$, the effect of one additional dollar of UI before 39 weeks on the exit rate of unemployment after exhaustion, between 40 weeks and 60 weeks. The estimates suggest that the Euler equation holds and that variations in benefits prior to exhaustion affect exit rate of unemployment after the exhaustion point. Column (2) reports the RKD estimate of the elasticity of UI duration (ϵ_{D_B}) and of the elasticity of non-employment duration (ϵ_D) with respect to benefit level. Column (3) reports the RKD estimate of the same elasticities with respect to potential duration. Column (4) reports the liquidity effect estimates following the strategy detailed in section . $(\frac{1}{B} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \Big|_B - \frac{1}{b} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial B})$ is the difference between the RKD estimate of the effect of benefit level (divided by the potential duration) and the RKD estimate of the effect of potential duration (divided by the benefit level) on s_0 defined as the exit rate out of unemployment in the first 4 weeks of unemployment. To ensure that the characteristics of individuals at both kinks (in benefit level and potential duration) are the same, I use a reweighing approach described in appendix B. Following proposition 1, this difference is then used to compute the moral hazard effect Θ_1 of an increase in benefit level and the ratio of liquidity to moral hazard ρ_1 in the effect of an increase in benefit level. For the three statistics of column (4), bootstrapped s.e. with 50 replications are in parentheses. See text for additional details.

Appendix. NOT FOR PUBLICATION

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A Additional Results, Figures and Tables on the Robustness of the RK Design

A.1 RKD for effect of UI benefits on the hazard rate at different points of the hazard support.

The advantage of the RKD setting is that it can easily be extended to the estimation of the effect of unemployment benefits on the hazard rate at different points of the hazard support.

Let $s_t = Pr[Y = t | Y \geq t, W = w]$ define the hazard rate at time t conditional on the assignment variable, I am interested in the average effect on the hazard rate of a continuous regressor b ⁵⁶:

$$\alpha_t = \frac{\partial s_t(Y|W=w)}{\partial b}$$

Under the assumption that $\frac{\partial s_t(Y|W=w)}{\partial w} |_{b=b(w)}$ is smooth, the logic of the RK design can be extended to identification of α_t and we have:

$$\alpha_t = \frac{\lim_{w \rightarrow k_1^+} \frac{\partial s_t(Y|W=w)}{\partial w} - \lim_{w \rightarrow k_1^-} \frac{\partial s_t(Y|W=w)}{\partial w}}{\lim_{w \rightarrow k_1^+} \frac{\partial b(w)}{\partial w} - \lim_{w \rightarrow k_1^-} \frac{\partial b(w)}{\partial w}}$$

Estimation of α_t is done by estimating the numerator of the estimand, with a linear probability model of the following form:

$$Pr[Y = t | Y \geq t, W = w] = \mu_{t,0} + \left[\sum_{p=1}^{\bar{p}} \gamma_{t,p} (w - k)^p + \nu_{t,p} (w - k)^p \cdot D \right] \quad \text{where } |w - k| \leq h \quad (11)$$

where $\nu_{t,1}$ gives once again the numerator of the RK estimand for the effect of benefit level on the hazard rate at week t .


Figure A1 displays the RKD estimates of α_t in Louisiana where I define hazard rates as the probability of exiting unemployment each month. The graph shows that having higher benefits has a negative impact on the probability of exiting unemployment, and that this effect is particularly strong at the beginning of a spell.

Note that the assumption that $\frac{\partial s_t(Y|W=w)}{\partial w} |_{b=b(w)}$ evolves smoothly at the kink is actually relatively strong regarding the selection process (into remaining unemployed) when unobserved heterogeneity θ also determines the exit rate out of unemployment $s_t(\{b_t\}_{t=0}^B, \theta)$. In fact, it implies that the heterogeneity effect is additively separable, in which case $\forall t, \frac{\partial^2 s_t}{\partial b_t \partial \theta} = 0$, meaning that the unobserved heterogeneity only acts as a shifter, independently of UI benefits. Once again, even though this smoothness assumption is fundamentally untestable, it is nevertheless always possible to check empirically for clear violations by looking for all t at the smoothness of the p.d.f of

⁵⁶The same logic applies to effect of potential duration D .

the assignment variable (conditional on still being unemployed after t weeks) around the kink, as well as at the smoothness of the relationship between some covariates and the assignment variable (conditional on still being unemployed after t weeks) around the kink.

Figure A1: RKD ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF BENEFIT LEVEL ON THE HAZARD RATE, LOUISIANA, 1979-1983



Notes: The graph shows RKD estimates of $\alpha_t = \frac{\partial s_t(Y|W=w)}{\partial b}$, the effect of benefit level on the hazard rate at time t . Time periods for the definition of the hazard rate are in months. The grey shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval for the estimates. The graph shows that having higher benefits has a negative impact on the probability of exiting unemployment, and that this effect is particularly strong at the beginning of a spell.

A.2 RKD in Double-Difference

One main issue with the identifying assumptions of the RK design concerns the functional dependence between the forcing variable and the outcome of interest. It could be that the relationship between the forcing variable and the outcome is either kinked or quadratic. Then estimates are likely to be picking up this functional dependence between y and w_1 .

A simple way to understand the issue is to remember the basic intuition behind the RK design. The model that I am interested in is $y = f(b, w_1, \varepsilon)$, where I want to get an estimate of f'_1 . In this model, we have: $\frac{dy}{dw_1} = f'_1 \frac{\partial b}{\partial w_1} + f'_2 + f'_3 \frac{\partial \varepsilon}{\partial w_1}$. The RKD assumes that f'_2 and f'_3 are the same on both sides of the kink (smoothness assumptions). Then, it follows that

$$\frac{\Delta_{k^+,k^-} \frac{dy}{dw_1}}{\Delta_{k^+,k^-} \frac{\partial b}{\partial w_1}}$$

identifies f'_1 , because $\Delta_{k^+,k^-} f'_2 = 0$ and $\Delta_{k^+,k^-} f'_3 = 0$.

If the assumption of smoothness in the functional dependence between the forcing variable and the outcome is violated, meaning that $\Delta_{k^+,k^-} f'_2 \neq 0$ then, identification is not possible in the standard RKD. But if we have two sets of observations A and B for which we are willing to assume that $\Delta_{k^+,k^-} f'_2$ is the same, and for these two groups

$$\Delta_{k^+,k^-} \frac{\partial b}{\partial w_1}$$

is different, then f'_1 is identified by α_{DD} , where:

$$\alpha_{DD} = \frac{\Delta_{A,Bk^+,k^-} \frac{dy}{dw_1}}{\Delta_{A,Bk^+,k^-} \frac{\partial b}{\partial w_1}} \quad (12)$$


Such an identification strategy is reminiscent of double-difference strategies. In practice it consists in comparing the change in slope at point k in the relationship between the outcome and the forcing variable for two identical groups of observations, but one of the two groups is subject to a kink in the schedule of b at k , and the other group is not.

To implement this strategy, the idea is to use the presence of variations in the maximum benefit amount over time, that shift the position of the kink across the distribution of the forcing variable (as shown in figure 1). The problem though is that, taken separately, each variation in max_b is too small to give enough statistical power to detect changes in slopes because the bandwidths are too small, and as previously pointed out, the drawback of the RKD is to be quite demanding in terms of bandwidth size. The idea therefore is to compare periods that are further away in time. The obvious drawback of this option is that the identifying assumption is less likely to hold as

one compares periods that are further away in time. In particular, one may worry about the high inflation rates during this period. It is important to note here that the maximum benefit amount increased in Louisiana a lot faster than inflation (40% between September 1979 and Sept 1982 and total inflation was less than 20% during that period), so that there is a clear and important change in the schedule in *real* terms ⁵⁷. Figure A2 shows the relationship between the duration of paid unemployment and the forcing variable in 1979 and 1982. Interestingly, there is a kink in this relationship in 1979 at the level of the 1979-kink in the schedule, and this kink disappears in 1982, when a new kink appears right at the level of the 1982-kink. Furthermore, in the interval between the 1979 and 1982 kinks, there is a change in slope in the relationship between the duration of unemployment and the forcing variable. This evidence is strongly supportive of the validity of the RK design.

⁵⁷To further alleviate this concern, I also control for quadratic in *real* highest quarter of earnings in the DD-RKD specifications and find similar results.

Figure A2: RKD IN DOUBLE-DIFFERENCE USING VARIATIONS IN THE MAXIMUM BENEFIT LEVEL, LOUISIANA, 1979 vs 1982



Notes: The graph shows the average value of the duration of paid unemployment in each bin of the forcing variable in 1979 (panel A) and 1982 (panel B). The maximum benefit amount has been increased by more than 40% during the period, shifting the position of the kink in the schedule across the distribution of the forcing variable, as shown by the two red bars indicating the position of the kink for the two periods. The change in slope between the two periods in the interval between the two kinks is indicative of an effect of b on y , and can be used to identify the average treatment effect of b in a double-difference RKD. See text for details.

Table A1: DOUBLE-DIFFERENCE RKD ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF BENEFIT LEVEL USING VARIATIONS IN THE MAXIMUM BENEFIT LEVEL, LOUISIANA, 1979 VS 1982

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Duration of Initial Spell	Duration UI Claimed	Duration UI Paid	Duration of Initial Spell	Duration UI Claimed	Duration UI Paid
	A. 1979 Kink			B. 1982 Kink		
α_{DD}	.064 (.035)	.088 (.035)	.051 (.035)	.065 (.034)	.069 (.034)	.05 (.034)
h_-	2500	2500	2500	1400	1400	1400
h_+	1400	1400	1400	2500	2500	2500
Opt. Poly	1	1	1	1	1	1
N	6495	6495	6495	4744	4744	4744

Notes: The table reports the results of the implementation of a Double-Difference RKD using variations in the maximum benefit amount over time, as described in the previous subsection. α_{DD} is the Double-Difference RKD estimate of the average treatment effect of benefit level as described in equation (12). It consists in comparing the change in slope at point k in the relationship between the outcome and the forcing variable for two identical groups of observations, but one of the two groups is subject to a kink in the schedule of b at k , and the other group is not. Standard errors for the estimates of α_{DD} are in parentheses. There are two sets of DD-RKD estimates, one for each kink. For the 1979-kink, I compare the change in slope in the duration of unemployment spells at the level of the 1979-kink in the forcing variable for the unemployed in 1979 (who had a schedule of benefit kinked at that point) against the unemployed in 1982 (who had a continuous schedule of benefits at that point). For the 1982-kink, I compare the change in slope in the duration of unemployment spells at the level of the 1982-kink in the forcing variable for the unemployed in 1982 (who had a schedule of benefit kinked at that point) against the unemployed in 1979 (who had a continuous schedule of benefits at that point). h_- and h_+ are the sizes of the lower and upper bandwidth. The optimal polynomial order is chosen based on the minimization of the AIC.

A.3 Placebo forcing variable

Another way to test for the existence of a kinked or quadratic functional dependence between earnings and unemployment duration is to use a placebo forcing variable. The placebo needs to be a good proxy for lifetime earnings, but must not be too correlated with the highest quarter of earnings that determines the benefit level. Table [A2](#) explores the robustness of the RKD results by using the post unemployment wage as a placebo forcing variable instead of the pre-unemployment highest quarter of earnings. The post unemployment wage used is the wage for the first quarter of full employment after an unemployment spell. Post unemployment wages are available only for spells starting after September 1979 in Louisiana. Post unemployment wages are correlated with lifetime earnings but are not too much correlated with the highest quarter of earnings that determines the benefit level. Therefore, this table explores to what extent the baseline results are driven by some functional dependence between earnings and unemployment duration and shows that we cannot detect any effect in these placebo specifications using post unemployment wages as a forcing variable.

Table A2: ROBUSTNESS: RKD ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF BENEFIT LEVEL USING POST UNEMPLOYMENT WAGE AS THE FORCING VARIABLE, LOUISIANA

	(1) Duration of Initial Spell	(2) Duration UI Claimed	(3) Duration UI Paid
Sep 79-Sep 80			
α	-.024 (.046)	-.022 (.045)	-.02 (.045)
Opt. Poly	1	1	1
Sep 80-Sep 81			
α	-.025 (.026)	-.019 (.026)	-.019 (.026)
Opt. Poly	1	1	1
Sep 81-Sep 82			
α	.026 (.034)	.031 (.033)	.019 (.033)
Opt. Poly	1	1	1
Sep 82-Dec 83			
α	.01 (.024)	.009 (.024)	.005 (.023)
Opt. Poly	1	1	1

Notes: The table explores the robustness of the RKD results by using the post unemployment wage as a placebo forcing variable instead of the pre-unemployment highest quarter of earnings. The post unemployment wage used is the wage for the first quarter of full employment after an unemployment spell. Post unemployment wages are available only for spells starting after September 1979 in Louisiana. Post unemployment wages are correlated with lifetime earnings but are not too much correlated with the highest quarter of earnings that determines the benefit level. Therefore, this table explores to what extent the baseline results are driven by some functional dependence between earnings and unemployment duration and shows that we cannot detect any effect in these placebo specifications using post unemployment wages as a forcing variable. α is the RK estimate of the average treatment effect of benefit level on the outcome. Standard errors for the estimates of α are in parentheses. The displayed estimates are for the optimal polynomial order chosen to minimize the Aikake Information Criterion.

A.4 Non-parametric tests for the the existence and location of a kink

An important concern in the RKD is that the estimates are picking up some spurious breakpoints in the relationship between the forcing variable and the outcome of interest. Despite their usually bad small sample properties, I recommend that non-parametric or semi-parametric tests for the detection and location of structural breakpoints are always performed when running RKD estimation, following the tests existing in the time series analysis literature, like for instance [Bai and Perron \[2003\]](#). The number of tests that one can implement is large, but will usually fall within one of two categories. Tests for the existence of one or several breakpoints. And tests trying to detect the location of these breakpoints. By essence, testing for the statistical significance of the RKD estimates can be seen as falling into the first category. One could nevertheless envisage testing for the existence of more than one breakpoint, in order to make sure that the RKD estimates are not driven by the existence of multiple kinks in the relationship between the outcome and the forcing variable. An example of such tests can be found in [Bai and Perron \[1998\]](#).


Here, I carry out a straightforward test that falls in the second category. I intend to make sure that the real location of the kink in the schedule is the location that would be detected if one were to look for the location of the kink in the data without knowing where the kink actually stands. The test simply consists in running the RKD specification⁵⁸ of equation (10) for a large number of virtual kink points k , and then in looking at the kink point that minimizes the residual sum of squares or equivalently that maximizes the R-squared⁵⁹. For efficiency, I again group all unemployment spells for all periods together, and center the assignment variable at the kink point applicable given the schedule in place at each particular time. Because of the large variance of unemployment durations across individuals, I collapse the observations in bins of \$50 of the assignment variable in order to reduce the residuals sum of squares to begin with⁶⁰. I report in figure A3 the evolution of the R-squared as I change the location of the kink point in specification (10). The evolution of the R-squared as one varies the location of the kink points provides evidence in support of the validity of the RKD design. The R-squared increases sharply as one moves closer to the actual kink point and then decreases sharply, supportive of the existence of a kink around 0. The kink point that maximizes the R-squared is situated \$200 to the right of the real kink point, but one cannot reject the hypothesis that the kink point is actually at 0. I interpret these results as strong evidence in support of the validity of the RK design.

⁵⁸I again group all unemployment spells for all periods together, and center the assignment variable at the kink point applicable given the schedule in place at each particular time.

⁵⁹I conduct here a simple grid search but these tests can become computationally burdensome when looking for several breakpoints or for more complicated models, in which case the use of more efficient algorithms is recommended, as in [Bai and Perron \[2003\]](#)

⁶⁰This procedure increases the power of the test considerably.

Figure A3: R-SQUARED AS A FUNCTION OF THE LOCATION OF THE KINK POINT IN RKD SPECIFICATION (10), LOUISIANA



Notes: The graph shows the value of the R-squared as a function of the location of the kink point in RKD specification (10). The assignment variable is centered at the actual kink point in the benefit schedule so that virtual kink points are expressed relative to the real kink point in the schedule. Inspired by non-parametric tests for the detection of structural breakpoints in time series analysis, I conduct a grid search to look for the kink point that maximizes the R-squared. See text for details.

A.5 Proportional hazard models

To get a sense of the validity of the RK design, it is useful to compare the RKD estimates to the estimates of more standard empirical strategies widely used in the existing literature. Most empirical studies on US data use proportional hazard models. In table A3, I report the estimates of Cox proportional hazard models on the CWBH data which enables me to compare my results to the widely cited benchmark of Meyer [1990], who used a smaller sample of the same CWBH records.

This table estimates the effect of UI weekly benefits levels b on the hazard rate of leaving UI using the CWBH complete data for the 5 US states. I fit standard Cox proportional hazard models. All specifications include controls for gender, ethnicity, marital status, year of schooling, a 6-pieces exhaustion spline and state fixed effects. u denotes the state unemployment rate. $\log(b)$ denotes the log-weekly UI benefit amount. $p25$ and $p75$ denote the 25th and 75th percentile of unemployment rates (among all state \times quarter in our data).

Coefficient estimates for $\log(b)$ in the proportional hazard models can be interpreted as the elasticity of the hazard rate s with respect to the weekly benefit level. Under the assumption that the hazard rate is somewhat constant, these elasticities can be easily compared to the RKD elasticities of unemployment duration, since $D \approx 1/s$ so that $\epsilon_D \approx -\epsilon_s$.

Column (1) replicates the specification of Meyer [1990], Table VI, column (7). Note that Meyer [1990] was using a much smaller sample of the same CWBH records. The estimates show that the result of Meyer [1990], who found an elasticity of .56, can be fully replicated using his specification. The drawback of these estimates is that they do not fully address the endogeneity issue due to the joint determination of UI benefits and previous earnings. Meyer [1990] only controls for previous wages using the log of the base period earnings. Column (2) further adds non-parametric controls for previous earnings and experience. Column (3) further adds year \times state fixed effects. Interestingly, if one adds this richer set of non parametric controls for previous earnings to mitigate the concern of endogeneity, and fully controls for variations across labor markets by adding time fixed effects interacted with state fixed effects, the results converge to the RKD estimates and the elasticity goes down to around .3. The reason is that, as one controls more efficiently for the functional dependence between unemployment duration and previous earnings, the only identifying variation in benefit level that is left comes from the kink in the benefit schedule, and the model naturally converges to the identification strategy of the RKD. Overall, I find this evidence to be supportive of the validity of the RK design.

Columns (4) to (6) investigate the cyclicalities of the partial equilibrium labor supply elasticities in the standard proportional hazard model to analyze the robustness of the results of table A4. Columns (4) and (5) add the interaction of $\log(\text{UI})$ and high unemployment dummies (unemployment rate above the median across all US states in the same quarter in column (4) and unemployment rate above 8% in column (5)). Column (6) adds the interaction of $\log(b)$ with quartiles for the level of unemployment (quartiles defined across all state \times quarter cells in our sample).

Table A3: SEMI-PARAMETRIC ESTIMATES OF HAZARD RATES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>Meyer [1990]</i>					
log(b)	-0.587*** (0.0394)	-0.274*** (0.0365)	-0.320*** (0.0368)	-0.341*** (0.0374)	-0.323*** (0.0370)	
State unemployment rate	-0.0550*** (0.00518)	-0.0552*** (0.00519)	-0.0207 (0.0142)	-0.0226 (0.0143)	-0.0251 (0.0153)	-0.105*** (0.0209)
log(b) × (u > median)				0.0248** (0.00812)		
log(b) × (u > .08)					0.00527 (0.00685)	
log(b) × (u < p25)						-0.363*** (0.0376)
log(b) × (p25 < u < median)						-0.353*** (0.0371)
log(b) × (median < u < p75)						-0.292*** (0.0371)
log(b) × (u > p75)						-0.274*** (0.0378)
Non-param controls for previous wage & experience	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year × state F-E	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
# Spells	39852	39852	39852	39852	39852	39852
Log-likelihood	-136305.0	-136364.8	-135976.0	-135971.4	-135975.7	-135946.2

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

This table estimates the effect of UI weekly benefits levels b on the hazard rate of leaving UI using the CWBH complete data for 5 US states from the late 1970s to early 1980s. I fit Cox proportional hazard models. All specifications include controls for gender, ethnicity, marital status, year of schooling, a 6-pieces exhaustion spline and state fixed effects. u denotes the state unemployment rate. $\log(b)$ denotes the log-weekly UI benefit amount. $p25$ and $p75$ denote the 25th and 75th percentile of unemployment rates (among all state × quarter in our data). Column (1) replicates the specification of [Meyer \[1990\]](#), Table VI, column (7) ([Meyer \[1990\]](#) was using a much smaller dataset). Column (2) further adds non-parametric controls for previous earnings. Column (3) further adds year × state fixed effects. Columns (4) and (5) add the interaction of $\log(b)$ and high unemployment dummies (unemployment rate above the median across all US states in the same quarter in column (4) and unemployment rate above 8% in column (5)). Column (6) adds the interaction of $\log(b)$ with quartiles for the level of unemployment (quartiles defined across all state × quarter cells in our sample).

A.6 Cyclical behavior:

Following the Great Recession, a recent literature has been interested in estimating how labor supply responses to UI vary over the business cycle in order to assess the optimality of UI rules that are contingent on the state of the labor market (Schmieder et al. [2012], Kroft and Notowidigdo [2011]). I take advantage of the large variations in labor market conditions across states and over time in the CWBH data to investigate how the RKD estimates vary with indicators of (state) labor market conditions. I correlate the RKD estimates with the average monthly unemployment rate from the Current Population Survey prevailing in the state for each period⁶¹. Results are displayed in table A4. In all specifications, I weight the observations⁶² by the inverse of the standard error (of the elasticity)⁶³

Column (1) to (3) correlates the estimated elasticity with the unemployment rate for all three duration outcomes. In all three columns, the coefficient on the state unemployment rate is very small (around -.02 and not significantly different from zero), which means that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a .02 percentage point decrease in the estimated elasticity. This result implies that elasticity varies between .38 (.09) when the state unemployment rate is at 4.5% (minimum in the CWBH data) and .25 (.10) when the unemployment rate is at 11.8% (the max in the CWBH data). This evidence is in line with the evidence of Kroft and Notowidigdo [2011] for the US, though the cyclical nature of the estimates is somewhat larger in their analysis. One needs to acknowledge though that the standard errors on the estimated coefficient is rather large and the result of this type of exercise should always be interpreted with caution.

The estimates are not affected by the inclusion of state fixed effects as shown in column (4). In column (5), I add more observations by estimating the RKD model for subsets of the labor force in each state and sub-period. Here, I estimate the RKD elasticity for young (below 40) and old (above 40 years old) workers separately, but one can think of other partitions of the labor market, as long as: 1) unemployment rates can be computed for these sub-labor markets, 2) variation in unemployment rate across these sub-labor markets is large enough, and 3) each sub-labor market is large enough in order to estimate RKD elasticities with enough precision. Adding several estimates within state and sub-periods has two advantages. First, it increases the statistical power of the analysis, and more importantly, it enables me to control for the level of the policy parameters at which the elasticity is estimated. Each RKD elasticity is of course by nature endogenous to the level of the maximum benefit amount and the potential duration at which it is estimated, and these parameters vary for each state and sub-period. Results in column (5) show that partitioning the data into a larger number of sub-labor markets does not affect the result. The coefficient of the correlation between the unemployment rate in the sub-labor market and the RKD elasticity is still negative, and somewhat smaller in absolute value, though the amount of variation over time

⁶¹To know to what extent variations in labor market conditions across states are a good proxy for business cycle fluctuations is another question. I tend to prefer in table A4 specifications with state fixed effects so that all variation in labor market conditions is variation over time, which mimics more clearly the concept of business cycles.

⁶²Each observation is a RKD elasticity estimate of unemployment duration with respect to the UI benefit level for a state and sub period.

⁶³Weighting reduces substantially the standard errors on the estimates of the correlation of the elasticity with labor market conditions, without affecting the point estimates.

in each sub-labor market when controlling for sub-labor market fixed effects (here for age group fixed effects) is rather limited.

In table A3, columns (4) to (6), I also investigate how the effect of the log benefit correlates with state unemployment conditions in the standard Cox proportional hazard model, and find similar results, with the estimated elasticity decreasing slightly as the state unemployment rate increases.

Table A4: CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE RKD ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF BENEFIT LEVEL

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Average Treatment Effects				
	ϵ_b	ϵ_b	ϵ_b	ϵ_b	ϵ_b
	Initial Spell	UI Paid	UI Claimed	Initial Spell	
<i>U</i>	-0.0195 (0.0262)	-0.0293 (0.0263)	-0.0259 (0.0239)	-0.0289 (0.0303)	-0.00576 (0.0445)
Kink (K\$2010)					-0.111 (0.170)
Potential Duration					-0.00950 (0.0177)
State F-E				×	×
Age Group F-E					×
Inverse s-e weights	×	×	×	×	×
<i>N</i>	26	26	26	26	52

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Each observation is a RKD estimate of the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the UI benefit level for a state and sub period. Initial spell refers to the elasticity of the duration of the initial unemployment spell as defined above. UI paid refers to the elasticity of the duration that UI is paid, and UI claimed refers to the elasticity of the duration of the UI claim. *U* is the average monthly state unemployment rate from CPS and in column (5) *U* is the average monthly state unemployment rate from CPS for each age group (the young, below 40, and the older workers, above 40 years old). Unemployment rates are expressed in percentage points, so that the results in column (1) for instance should be interpreted as follows: a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a .019 percentage point decrease in the estimated elasticity.

A.7 Heterogeneity in the test for slackness of the credit constraint at benefit exhaustion

One potential concern with the test for the slackness of the liquidity constraint presented in section 4 of the paper is that the average effect, which shows that on average the liquidity constraint is not yet binding at benefit exhaustion, is contaminated by heterogeneity. In particular, it may be that some individuals hit the credit constraint, and for them, $\frac{\partial s_{B+1}}{\partial b_B} = 0$. To investigate the extent of heterogeneity in the estimate, I estimate quantile treatment effects of the effect of past benefits on D_{B+1} , the duration of non-employment after 39 weeks (conditional on being unemployed after 39 weeks). In case of a large degree of heterogeneity, (some people being extremely credit constrained, and some other being less credit constrained), we would expect these quantile treatment effects to be very different: because the amount of your credit constraint is directly correlated with your exit rate after exhaustion (the less asset you have, the harder your search effort), the lower quantile of the distribution of D_{B+1} should react much less (or even not at all) to a change in prior benefits. Results, reported in table A5 show that even though lower quantile of the distribution do react a little less to a change in benefits before 39 weeks, differences across quantiles are small and not statistically significant. This evidence is supportive of the fact that the credit constrained is not firmly binding at benefit exhaustion. Almost everybody maintains some ability to transfer money across periods at time benefits are exhausted (albeit certainly at different costs).

Table A5: HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS IN THE TEST FOR SLACKNESS OF THE CREDIT CONSTRAINT AT EXHAUSTION

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Quantile Treatment Effects				
	q=.1	q=.25	q=.5	q=.75	q=.9
$\frac{\partial D_{B+1}}{\partial b_B}$.109 (.068)	.194 (.091)	.545 (.200)	.220 (.170)	.256 (.172)
p-value	.231	.475	.365	.521	.198
Optimal poly.	1	1	1	1	1
N	529	529	529	529	529


Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.

A.8 Construction of weights for the reweighted approach estimation in liquidity effects and moral hazard estimates

To make sure that our comparison of the effect of benefit level and potential duration using the two deterministic and kinked benefit schedules is not mixing heterogeneous individuals, we re-weight the observations in the sample for the RKD estimates of $\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \Big|_B$ (sample 1) to match the distribution of observable characteristics of observations in the sample for the RKD estimates of $\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial B}$ (sample 2). To generate these weights, for each period, I merge observations from both samples. I then estimate a probit model of the probability that a given observation in this merged sample belongs to sample 1. The predictors in this regression are gender, age, age squared, education in years, and dummies for 5 main industries. Using predicted propensity score p , I then weight each observation in the RKD regressions with the weight $\omega = p/(1 - p)$

B RKD Figures & Results for all 5 states


Figure B1: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN CWBH STATES 1976-1984



Sources: Current Population Survey


Notes: The graph shows the evolution of the monthly unemployment rate in the 5 states with the universe of unemployment spells available from the CWBH data. The CWBH data for the 5 states covers period of low unemployment as well as the two recessions of 1980 and 1981-82 with two-digit national unemployment rates, which gives the opportunity to examine the evolution of behavioral responses to UI over the business cycle.

Figure B2: RKD EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECT OF BENEFIT LEVEL: DURATION UI PAID VS HIGHEST QUARTER EARNINGS FOR ALL 5 STATES



Notes: The graph shows for the first sub-period of analysis in each state the mean values of the duration of paid UI in each bin of \$250 of highest quarter of earnings, which is the assignment variable in the RK design for the estimation of the effect of benefit level. The assignment variable is centered at the kink. The graph shows evidence of a kink in the evolution of the outcome at the kink. Formal estimates of the kink using polynomial regressions of the form of equation 10 are displayed in table 1. The red lines display predicted values of the regressions in the linear case allowing for a discontinuous shift at the kink.

Figure B3: RKD EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECT OF BENEFIT LEVEL: DURATION OF INITIAL UNEMPLOYMENT SPELL VS HIGHEST QUARTER EARNINGS FOR ALL 5 STATES



Notes: The graph shows for the first sub-period of analysis in each state the mean values of the duration of initial spell in each bin of \$250 of highest quarter of earnings, which is the assignment variable in the RK design for the estimation of the effect of benefit level. The assignment variable is centered at the kink. The graph shows evidence of a kink in the evolution of the outcome at the kink. Formal estimates of the kink using polynomial regressions of the form of equation 10 are displayed in table 1. The red lines display predicted values of the regressions in the linear case allowing for a discontinuous shift at the kink.

Table B1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR FULL CWBH SAMPLE

	Idaho			Louisiana			Missouri			New Mexico			Washington		
	Mean	s.d.	N	Mean	s.d.	N	Mean	s.d.	N	Mean	s.d.	N	Mean	s.d.	N
Duration Outcomes (wks)															
Initial spell	13.9	12.4	33365	14	10.6	34077	12.2	10.9	28665	14	12.6	27004	17.6	15.4	41992
wks UI paid	11.7	10.7	33365	13.8	10.4	34077	12.5	11.3	28665	13.4	12.8	27004	16.2	14.8	41992
wks UI claim	15.8	12.2	33365	15.1	10.4	34077	15.4	11.8	28665	15.8	12.6	27004	18.9	15.4	41992
Earnings and Benefits (\$2010)															
bpw	25136	22164	33365	26993	19446	34077	23733	17334	28665	23334	17132	27004	31232	20380	41992
hqw	9827	16405	33365	9581	6441	34077	8211	5830	28665	8252	5382	27004	8982	5321	41992
wba	262.4	86.3	33365	304.8	117.1	34077	225	51.4	28665	230	69.5	27004	286.7	94.7	41992
potential duration Tier I	20	5.5	33365	25	4.4	34077	22.1	5.2	28665	25.7	1	27004	27	4.2	41992
Covariates															
age	30.2	12.7	33361	34.6	12.7	33850	34.8	12.7	28651	33.7	11.4	26924	34.2	11.9	41955
male	.666	.471	33361	.683	.465	33624	.609	.488	28663	.651	.477	27002	.627	.484	41972
educ. (yrs)	12	2.2	17774	11.4	2.7	31272	11.3	2.2	1867	11.7	2.5	26482	12.4	2.4	41702
dependents	2	1.6	18781	2	1.6	17325	2	1.6	21746	2.2	1.7	25534	1.7	1.5	28834
censored	.165	.362	33365	.128	.323	34077	.151	.382	28665	.162	.336	27004	.107	.289	41992

Notes: The initial spell, as defined in Spiegelman et al. [1992], starts at the date the claim is filed and ends when there is a gap of at least two weeks in the receipt of UI benefits. The duration of paid UI corresponds to the number of weeks a claimant receives unemployment compensation. The duration of a UI claim is the number of weeks a claimant is observed in the administrative data for a given unemployment spell. bpw is the base period earnings, and hqw is the highest quarter of earnings. wba is the weekly benefit amount of UI. Potential duration Tier I is the potential duration of the regular state UI program. In Missouri, information on education level is almost always unavailable.

Table B2: RKD ESTIMATES, EFFECT OF BENEFIT LEVEL, IDAHO, 1976 - 1983

	(1) Duration of Initial Spell	(2) Duration UI Claimed	(3) Duration UI Paid
Period 1: jan1976 to jul1978			
α	.037 (.009)	.037 (.008)	.043 (.009)
ε_b	.337 (.086)	.386 (.086)	.334 (.072)
p-value	.022	.007	.003
N	7487	7487	7487
Period 2: jul1978 to jul1980			
α	.087 (.009)	.079 (.008)	.09 (.009)
ε_b	.756 (.079)	.815 (.084)	.698 (.07)
p-value	.035	.02	.099
N	8143	8143	8143
Period 3: jul1980 to jul1981			
α	.065 (.016)	.038 (.014)	.057 (.016)
ε_b	.58 (.144)	.392 (.141)	.445 (.125)
p-value	.602	.277	.38
N	3596	3596	3596
Period 4: jul1981 to jun1982			
α	.006 (.02)	.005 (.016)	-.002 (.018)
ε_b	.053 (.143)	.048 (.144)	-.015 (.122)
p-value	.443	.57	.273
N	3968	3968	3968
Period 5: jun1982 to dec1983			
α	.047 (.022)	.048 (.02)	.045 (.022)
ε_b	.381 (.182)	.466 (.195)	.319 (.16)
p-value	.121	.275	.062
N	2245	2245	2245

Notes: Duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. α is the RK estimate of the average treatment effect of benefit level on the outcome. Standard errors for the estimates of α are in parentheses. P-values are from a test of joint significance of the coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin dummies are added to the polynomial specification in equation 10. The optimal polynomial order is chosen based on the minimization of the Aikake Information Criterion. Periods correspond to stable UI benefit schedules.

Table B3: RKD ESTIMATES, EFFECT OF BENEFIT LEVEL, MISSOURI JAN 1978 - DEC 1983

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Duration of Initial Spell	Duration UI Claimed	Duration UI Paid
Period 1: jan1978 to dec1979			
α	.02 (.009)	.02 (.01)	.031 (.01)
ε_b	.164 (.075)	.165 (.08)	.196 (.064)
p-value	.131	.479	.259
N	6071	6071	6071
Period 2: dec1979 to dec1980			
α	.031 (.012)	.026 (.013)	.044 (.013)
ε_b	.226 (.089)	.179 (.087)	.24 (.073)
p-value	.49	.346	.077
N	5500	5500	5500
Period 3: jan1981 to jan1982			
α	.01 (.012)	.005 (.012)	.02 (.013)
ε_b	.084 (.102)	.043 (.102)	.13 (.084)
p-value	.877	.843	.942
N	3625	3625	3625
Period 4: jan1982 to aug1982			
α	.033 (.016)	.034 (.017)	.049 (.018)
ε_b	.232 (.117)	.239 (.119)	.277 (.102)
p-value	.174	.091	.006
N	2550	2550	2550
Period 5: aug1982 to dec1983			
α	.052 (.011)	.043 (.012)	.061 (.012)
ε_b	.376 (.082)	.317 (.085)	.364 (.07)
p-value	.489	.529	.597
N	5036	5036	5036

Notes: Duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. α is the RK estimate of the average treatment effect of benefit level on the outcome. Standard errors for the estimates of α are in parentheses. P-values are from a test of joint significance of the coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin dummies are added to the polynomial specification in equation 10. The optimal polynomial order is chosen based on the minimization of the Aikake Information Criterion. Periods correspond to stable UI benefit schedules.

Table B4: RKD ESTIMATES, EFFECT OF BENEFIT LEVEL, NEW MEXICO 1980 - 1983

	(1) Duration of Initial Spell	(2) Duration UI Claimed	(3) Duration UI Paid
Period 1: apr1980 to jan1981			
α	.051 (.019)	.046 (.019)	.055 (.018)
ϵ_b	.353 (.129)	.332 (.135)	.34 (.114)
p-value	.20 2851	.24 2851	.18 2851
Period 2: jan1981 to jan1982			
α	.033 (.012)	.026 (.013)	.031 (.012)
ϵ_b	.316 (.118)	.272 (.129)	.262 (.105)
p-value	.3 4906	.29 4906	.37 4906
Period 3: jan1982 to jan1983			
α	.041 (.016)	.023 (.017)	.037 (.016)
ϵ_b	.342 (.137)	.202 (.147)	.273 (.122)
p-value	.9 3905	.783 3905	.647 3905
Period 4: jan1983 to dec1983			
α	.04 (.015)	.03 (.015)	.04 (.015)
ϵ_b	.382 (.14)	.297 (.149)	.335 (.123)
p-value	.391 4209	.389 4209	.375 4209

Notes: Duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. α is the RK estimate of the average treatment effect of benefit level on the outcome. Standard errors for the estimates of α are in parentheses. P-values are from a test of joint significance of the coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin dummies are added to the polynomial specification in equation 10. The optimal polynomial order is chosen based on the minimization of the Aikake Information Criterion. Periods correspond to stable UI benefit schedules.

Table B5: BASELINE RKD ESTIMATES, EFFECT OF BENEFIT LEVEL ON UNEMPLOYMENT AND NON-EMPLOYMENT DURATION, WASHINGTON 1979 - 1983

	Duration Initial Spell	Duration UI Claimed	Duration UI Paid	Non- Employment Duration
Period 1: July 1979- July 1980				
α	.085 (.018)	.078 (.017)	.087 (.018)	.088 (.022)
ε_b	.68 (.147)	.69 (.152)	.657 (.136)	.419 (.104)
Opt. Poly	1	1	1	1
p-value	.162	.197	.198	.327
N	3485	3485	3485	3485
Period 2: July 1980- July 1982				
α	.07 (.017)	.059 (.016)	.077 (.017)	.056 (.02)
ε_b	.583 (.138)	.546 (.146)	.591 (.128)	.278 (.097)
Opt. Poly	1	1	1	1
p-value	.987	.991	.985	.968
N	3601	3601	3601	3601
Period 3: July 1982- Dec 1983				
α	.054 (.021)	.035 (.02)	.055 (.021)	.059 (.022)
ε_b	.37 (.146)	.263 (.153)	.351 (.137)	.281 (.105)
Opt. Poly	1	1	1	1
p-value	.022	.036	.009	.183
N	4275	4275	4275	4275

Notes: Duration outcomes are expressed in weeks. Washington is the only state for which we observe reemployment dates from wage records in the CWBH data. I therefore constructed a variable for the total duration of non-employment in Washington, and display in column (4) the estimates of the effect of benefit level on this duration outcome as well. α is the RK estimate of the average treatment effect of the UI benefit level on the outcome. Standard errors for the estimates of α are in parentheses. P-values are from a test of joint significance of the coefficients of bin dummies in a model where bin dummies are added to the polynomial specification in equation 10. The optimal polynomial order is chosen based on the minimization of the Aikake Information Criterion. Periods correspond to stable UI benefit schedules.

C Proofs and Results

C.1 Understanding the comparison with a simple dynamic labor supply model with no state dependance:

Here, I briefly present a very simple two-period model with no state dependance, to understand how one can relate a dynamic search model to this general class of models. I also show how the Frisch elasticity literature uses variations along the wage profile over time to identify distortionary effects and liquidity effects separately, and how this relates to the technique employed in this paper to identify moral hazard effects and liquidity effects. Imagine a simple two-period model where utility in each period is given by $U_t = u(c_t) - \psi(s_t)$ where s_t is some effort level that brings a monetary reward (wage) r_t . $\psi(\cdot)$ is increasing and convex. Agents start with some asset level A_0 . The individual's program is therefore: $\max_{c_0, c_1, s_0, s_1} U_0 + U_1$ s.t. $r_0 s_0 + r_1 s_1 + A_0 \geq c_0 + c_1$ The first order conditions give us:

$$\begin{cases} \psi'(s_0) = \lambda r_0 \\ \psi'(s_1) = \lambda r_1 \\ u'(c_0) = \lambda \\ u'(c_1) = \lambda \end{cases}$$

where λ is the Lagrange multiplier, or in other words, the marginal utility of wealth. Combining these first order conditions we get the Euler equation giving the optimal inter temporal allocation:

$$\frac{u'(c_0)}{u'(c_1)} = 1$$

And the static intratemporal optimal allocation rule:

$$\psi'(s_0) = r_0 u'(c_0)$$

From this, we immediately see that the response to a change in the return to effort at time 0 is the sum of a liquidity effect and of a distortionary effect:

$$\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial r_0} = \frac{-\lambda - r_0 \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial r_0}}{\psi''(s_0)} = \frac{-u'(c_0)}{\psi''(s_0)} - \frac{r_0 u''(c_0)}{\psi''(s_0)}$$

This decomposition is exactly the same as the one in [Chetty \[2008\]](#), and is at the centre of the dynamic labor supply literature: The first-term is the distortionary effect (or Frisch effect, keeping marginal utility of consumption constant). The second one is a liquidity effect because we alter the marginal utility of consumption: $-\frac{r_0 u''(c_0)}{\psi''(s_0)} = \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial A_0}$. Here of course, the return to effort is continuous (r), but it is easy to see from a simple Taylor expansion that it is equivalent to the liquidity effect ($-\frac{u'(c_e) - u'(c_u)}{\psi''(s_0)} = \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial A_0}$) that we have in [Chetty \[2008\]](#) in the case of the return to job search effort.

The important insight from extending this simple example to a multi period case is that, in the absence of state-dependance as is the case here, effort at time t is always a function of wage at time t and all other wages affect current effort only through λ , because of the optimal inter temporal

allocation rule. So that we have $s_t = s_t(r_t, \lambda_t)$ where $\lambda_t = \lambda_t(r_0, \dots, r_N, A_0)$.

From this, there are two possible routes to identify the purely distortionary effects (or Frisch elasticities) of a change in the wage rate. The first route, as in [MaCurdy \[1981\]](#) is to impose some structure on the problem by specifying the utility function so as to obtain a nice log-linear form for the Frisch effort function of individual i : $\ln(s_t^i) = \beta \ln r_t^i + \alpha \ln \lambda_t^i$ and under some assumptions, the marginal utility of consumption can be written as an individual fixed effect and a time effect $\ln \lambda_t^i = \gamma_i + e_t$. Then, the model can be identified in first-difference using panel data and variations along the wage profile: $\Delta \ln(s_t^i) = \beta \Delta \ln r_t^i + \Delta e_t$. The difficulty is to find credibly exogenous variations in the wage profile.

The second route is to use more credibly exogenous variations, and use reduced form estimates of the effect of a change in the wage at different point in times. This is the route chosen in this paper. The idea is that we have:

$$\begin{cases} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial r_0} = \frac{-\lambda - r_0 \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial r_0}}{\Psi''(s_0)} \\ \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial r_1} = \frac{-r_0 \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial r_1}}{\Psi''(s_0)} \end{cases}$$

And we also know that $\frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial r_1} = \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial r_0}$. The difference in the reduced form estimates of the effect of a change in wages at time 0 and 1 can identify the Frisch effect $\frac{-\lambda}{\Psi''(s_0)}$ keeping marginal utility of wealth constant. This technique has the advantage that the identifying variations are more transparent, but relies on the exact same idea of using variations along the wage profile over time. In this paper, the only complication comes from the presence of state dependence, as explained in section 1.

C.2 Multi-period model:

Here, I present the multi-period model extension of the simple model presented in section 1 of the paper and derive the main results. The model describes the behavior of a worker living T discrete periods (e.g., weeks) who is laid-off and therefore becomes unemployed in period zero. When unemployed, the worker exerts search effort in each period s_t that translates into a probability to find a job⁶⁴. This probability is normalized to s_t to simplify presentation. Search effort is not observable (hence the presence of moral hazard) and has a utility cost $\psi(s_t)$ increasing and convex. Wages w_t are exogenous⁶⁵, and when an unemployed finds a job, it lasts forever. When unemployed, an agent starts her unemployment spell with asset level A_0 ⁶⁶ and receives unemployment insurance benefits b_t each period. The presence of liquidity constraints is captured by the fact that workers

⁶⁴This captures the presence of search frictions in the labor market.

⁶⁵Empirical evidence seems to support this assumption that wages in fact do not respond much to UI. There is a vast empirical micro literature in labor trying to estimate how re-employment wages are affected by the generosity of UI benefits. The striking finding is that it has proven impossible to find such an effect. [Card et al. \[2007a\]](#) use full population administrative payroll data from Austria in a compelling regression discontinuity design and find no effects (very precisely estimated) on subsequent re-employment wages. Wages of workers who are already on the job are even less likely to respond to a change in benefits than wages of workers who are coming from unemployment and negotiating with employers. So wages of existing workers are likely to respond less than wages of new hires to UI generosity.

⁶⁶As a baseline, I consider that the initial asset level A_0 is exogenous. I also do not allow for heterogeneity in the baseline. But, as in [Chetty \[2008\]](#), both assumptions can easily be relaxed to allow for partial self insurance and heterogeneity, without affecting the results.

cannot deplete their asset A_t below a certain value L . To finance the unemployment benefits, the government levies a lump sum tax τ on each employed worker.

The value function of finding a job at time t is:

$$V(A_t) = \max_{A_{t+1} \geq L} u(A_t - A_{t+1} + w_t - \tau) + \beta V(A_{t+1})$$

where β is the agent's discount factor. The value function of being unemployed at time t is:

$$U(A_t) = \max_{A_{t+1} \geq L} u(A_t - A_{t+1} + b_t) + \beta J(A_{t+1})$$

$$J(A_t) = \max_{s_t} s_t \cdot V(A_t) + (1 - s_t) \cdot U(A_t) - \psi(s_t)$$

In this set up⁶⁷, the optimal search effort in period t is implicitly defined by the first-order condition $\psi'(s_t) = V_t(A_t) - U_t(A_t)$. The effect of a change in benefit b_t on optimal search effort at time t can be expressed as the sum of two effects: $\frac{\partial s_t}{\partial b_t} = \frac{\partial s_t}{\partial A_t} - \frac{\partial s_t}{\partial w_t}$. The first term is a liquidity effect that is proportional to the difference in marginal utility of consumption while employed and unemployed. The second term is the standard moral hazard effect that arises because b_t works as an unemployment subsidy, and distorts the relative price of employment. Since the government cannot observe effort and cannot contract directly on s_t , any increase in b_t leads to a decline in search effort.

Planner's problem: The planner sets taxes τ and benefits b_t to maximize welfare W_0 (defined as the expected life-time utility of an unemployed worker), under a balanced-budget constraint: $D_B \cdot b = (T - D)\tau$ where D_B is the duration of paid unemployment and D is the total duration of unemployment. I restrict attention here to the class of typical UI systems where benefits are defined by a constant level b for a fixed period B ⁶⁸. Therefore choosing the optimal benefit schedule amounts to choosing potential duration B and benefit level b .

Timing of the model: Individuals enter unemployment at period $t = 0$. At the beginning of every period, if the individual is still unemployed, she chooses search effort. Once search effort realized, she chooses consumption. The value function of finding a job at time t is:

$$V(A_t) = \max_{A_{t+1} \geq L} u(A_t - A_{t+1} + w_t - \tau) + \beta V(A_{t+1})$$

The value function of being unemployed at time t is:

$$U(A_t) = \max_{A_{t+1} \geq L} u(A_t - A_{t+1} + b_t) + \beta J(A_{t+1})$$

$$J(A_t) = \max_{s_t} s_t \cdot V(A_t) + (1 - s_t) \cdot U(A_t) - \psi(s_t)$$

⁶⁷ V is always concave. But U might not always be. For simplicity, and following Chetty [2008] who shows that in simulations U is always concave, we assume U is always concave.

⁶⁸A large theoretical literature has derived the full optimal time-path of UI benefits. See for instance Hopenhayn and Nicolini [1997], or ?.

s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} u(c_t^u) &\geq 0 \\ u(c_t^e) &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

We assume that $\psi(\cdot)$ is increasing and convex.

Optimal search:

$$\Psi'(s_t) = V(A_t) - U(A_t) \quad (13)$$

Euler equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall t \quad u'(c_t^e) &= \begin{cases} \beta u'(c_{t+1}^e) \\ u'(w - \tau) \text{ if } A_t = L \end{cases} \\ \forall t \quad u'(c_t^u) &= \begin{cases} \beta [s_{t+1} u'(c_{t+1}^e) + (1 - s_{t+1}) u'(c_{t+1}^u)] \\ u'(b_t) \text{ if } A_t = L \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, if the credit constraint is not binding at time t we have that:

$$\forall t \quad u'(c_0^e) = \beta^t u'(c_t^e) \quad (14)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \forall t \quad u'(c_0^u) &= \sum_{j=1}^t \left(\prod_{i=1}^{j-1} (1 - s_i) s_j \right) \beta^j u'(c_j^e) + \beta^t \prod_{i=1}^t (1 - s_i) u'(c_t^u) \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^t f_1(t) u'(c_0^e) + \beta^t S(t) u'(c_t^u) \\ &= F_1(t) u'(c_0^e) + \beta^t S(t) u'(c_t^u) \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

where $f(t) = \prod_{i=0}^{t-1} (1 - s_i) s_t$ is the probability that the unemployment spell lasts exactly t periods and $f_1(t) = \prod_{i=1}^{t-1} (1 - s_i) s_t$ is the probability that the unemployment spell lasts exactly t periods conditional on being still unemployed at the beginning of period 1. Similarly, $\prod_{i=0}^t (1 - s_i) = S(t)$, is the survival rate at time t and $\prod_{i=1}^t (1 - s_i) = S_1(t)$ is the survival rate conditional on being still unemployed at period 1. $F(t) = 1 - S(t) = \sum_{s=0}^t f(s)$ is the probability that the length of a spell is inferior or equal to t and $F_1(t)$ is the same probability conditional on being still unemployed at period 1.

Effect of benefit level at time t on optimal search:

$$\frac{\partial s_t}{\partial b_t} = - \frac{u'(c_t^u)}{\Psi''(s_t)}$$

Effect of benefit level at time $t + j$ on optimal search at time t :

$$\frac{\partial s_t}{\partial b_{t+j}} = - \frac{\beta^j \prod_{i=1}^j (1 - s_{t+i}) u'(c_{t+j}^u)}{\Psi''(s_t)}$$

We define the effect on any variable Z of a change in the constant benefit level b for a finite period of potential duration of UI benefits B as:

$$\left. \frac{\partial Z}{\partial b} \right|_B = \sum_{i=0}^{B-1} \frac{\partial Z}{\partial b_i}$$

Decomposition of the effect of an increase in benefit level at time t into the moral hazard and liquidity effects:

From 13, we have that:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial s}{\partial A_t} &= \frac{u'(c_t^e) - u'(c_t^u)}{\Psi''(s_t)} \\ \frac{\partial s}{\partial w_t} &= \frac{u'(c_t^e)}{\Psi''(s_t)} \end{aligned}$$

so that:

$$\frac{\partial s}{\partial b_t} = \frac{\partial s}{\partial A_t} - \frac{\partial s}{\partial w_t} \quad (16)$$

which is the Chetty (2007) decomposition of the effect of benefits between the liquidity and moral hazard effect.

Similarly, the effect on search effort at time 0 of a change in the constant benefit level b for a finite period of potential duration of UI benefits B can also be written as the sum of two components, a moral hazard and a liquidity effect:

$$\left. \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \right|_B = \overbrace{\left. \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial a} \right|_B}^{\text{liquidity effect}} - \underbrace{\left. \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w} \right|_B}_{\text{moral hazard effect}} \quad (17)$$

where $\left. \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial a} \right|_B = \sum_{i=0}^{B-1} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial a_i}$ is the effect of a change in the level of an annuity that pays a every period and $\left. \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w} \right|_B = \sum_{i=0}^{B-1} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w_i}$

C.3 Optimal benefit level b :

Planner's problem:

The social planner chooses the UI benefit level to maximize expected utility subject to a balanced-budget constraint and given a potential duration of benefits B :

$$\max_{b, \tau} W_0 = (1 - s_0)U(A_0) + s_0V(A_0) - \Psi(s_0)$$

$$\text{subject to } D_B \cdot b = (T - D)\tau$$

The first order condition is given by:

$$\frac{dW_0}{db} = (1 - s_0) \left[\frac{\partial U_0}{\partial b} \Big|_B - \frac{\partial U_0}{\partial w} \Big|_B \frac{d\tau}{db} \right] + s_0 \underbrace{\left[\frac{\partial V_0}{\partial b} \Big|_B - \frac{\partial V_0}{\partial w} \Big|_B \frac{d\tau}{db} \right]}_{=0} = 0$$

From 13, we have that:

$$\forall y, \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial y} \Big|_B = \frac{1}{\Psi''(s_0)} \left[\frac{\partial V_0}{\partial y} \Big|_B - \frac{\partial U_0}{\partial y} \Big|_B \right]$$

So that:

$$\frac{dW_0}{db} = -(1 - s_0) \Psi''(s_0) \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \Big|_B - \frac{d\tau}{db} \left((1 - s_0) \frac{\partial U_0}{\partial w} \Big|_B + s_0 \frac{\partial V_0}{\partial w} \Big|_B \right) \quad (18)$$

We also know that: $\forall t, \frac{\partial V_0}{\partial w_t} = \beta^t u'(c_t^e)$ so that :

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial V_0}{\partial w} \Big|_B &= \sum_{t=0}^{B-1} \beta^t u'(c_t^e) \\ &= Bu'(c_0^e) \quad \text{if the credit constraint does not bind at time } B \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

And, similarly: $\forall t, \frac{\partial U_0}{\partial w_t} = \sum_{j=1}^t f_1(j) \beta^j u'(c_j^e)$ so that :

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial U_0}{\partial w} \Big|_B &= \sum_{t=1}^{B-1} F_1(t) \beta^t u'(c_t^e) \\ &= \sum_{t=1}^{B-1} F_1(t) u'(c_0^e) \quad \text{if the credit constraint does not bind at time } B \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

And therefore, if the credit constraint does not bind at time B

$$\begin{aligned} (1 - s_0) \frac{\partial U_0}{\partial w} \Big|_B &= \sum_{t=1}^{B-1} (1 - s_0) F_1(t) u'(c_0^e) \\ &= \sum_{t=1}^{B-1} F_0(t) u'(c_0^e) \\ &= (B - D_B - s_0) u'(c_0^e) \end{aligned} \quad (21)$$

where we use the fact that $\sum_{t=0}^{B-1} S(t) = D_B$, the average duration of unemployment truncated at B .

Note that the moral hazard effect of an increase in b can also be expressed as a simple function

of $u'(c_0^e)$ if the credit constraint is not binding at time B :

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w}\Big|_B &= \frac{1}{\Psi''(s_0)} \left[\frac{\partial V_0}{\partial w}\Big|_B - \frac{\partial U_0}{\partial w}\Big|_B \right] \\ &= \frac{(D_B - s_0(B-1))u'(c_0^e)}{(1-s_0) \cdot \Psi''(s_0)}\end{aligned}\quad (22)$$

Using (17), (19), (21) and (22), we can rewrite (18) such that:

$$\frac{dW_0}{db} = -(1-s_0)\Psi''(s_0) \left[\left(\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial a}\Big|_B - \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w}\Big|_B \right) + \frac{d\tau}{db} \left(\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w}\Big|_B \cdot (B/(D_B - s_0(B-1)) - 1) \right) \right]$$

We get from the government budget constraint that:

$$\frac{d\tau}{db} = \frac{D_B}{T-D} \left(1 + \varepsilon_{D_B} + \varepsilon_D \frac{D}{T-D} \right)$$

where $\varepsilon_{D_B} = \frac{b}{D_B} \frac{dD_B}{db}$ is the elasticity of the duration of paid unemployment with respect to the benefit level and $\varepsilon_D = \frac{b}{D} \frac{dD}{db}$ is the elasticity of the duration of total unemployment with respect to the benefit level.

Therefore, if the credit constraint is not yet binding at time B , the first-order condition $\frac{dW_0}{db} = 0$ takes a simple form:

$$1 + \rho_1 = \left(\frac{B}{D_B - s_0(B-1)} - 1 \right) \frac{D_B}{T-D} \left(1 + \varepsilon_{D_B} + \varepsilon_D \frac{D}{T-D} \right) \quad (23)$$

where $\rho_1 = -\frac{\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial a}\Big|_B}{\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w}\Big|_B}$ is the liquidity to moral hazard ratio in the effect of an increase of benefit level.

When the lefthand side of 23 is superior to the righthand side, it is socially desirable to increase the benefit level b , at the given level of potential duration B .

C.4 Optimal potential duration B :

To analyze marginal changes in B , I assume that a marginal change in the potential duration of benefits B normalized by the benefit amount b is therefore the same as a marginal change in b_B ⁶⁹. In this context, following the same logic as previously, we have that :

$$\frac{dW_0}{dB} = b \cdot \frac{dW_0}{db_B} = b \cdot \left(-(1-s_0)\Psi''(s_0) \left[\left(\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial a_B} - \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w_B} \right) + \frac{d\tau}{db} \left(\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w_B} \cdot (1/(S(B) - s_0) - 1) \right) \right] \right)$$

⁶⁹This is the case if B can potentially be increased by a fraction of period (a week in our case) and that if the potential duration B is not an integer number of periods, then, we can change b_t within a period such that the benefits in a given period is the fraction of the period that is covered time the benefit amount b .

Differentiating the budget constraint of the government, we get that:

$$\frac{d\tau}{db_B} = \frac{1}{b} \cdot \frac{d\tau}{dB} = \frac{D_B}{B \cdot (T-D)} (\varepsilon_{D_B,B} + \varepsilon_{D,B} \frac{D}{T-D}) \quad (24)$$

where $\varepsilon_{D_B,B} = \frac{B}{D_B} \frac{dD_B}{dB}$ is the elasticity of the duration of paid unemployment with respect to the potential duration of UI benefits and $\varepsilon_{D,B} = \frac{B}{D} \frac{dD}{dB}$ is the elasticity of the duration of total unemployment with respect to the potential duration of UI benefits. Note of course that because $D_B = \sum_{t=0}^{B-1} S(t)$, we have that $\frac{\partial D_B}{\partial B} = \sum_{t=0}^{B-1} \frac{\partial S(t)}{\partial B} + S(B)$, which means that the effect of a change in potential duration on the actual average duration of UI benefits is the sum of the mechanical effect of truncating the distribution of spells at a later point in time $S(B)$ and a behavioral response. This point is central to the argument in [Schmieder et al. \[2012\]](#).

Using (24) and

$$1 + \rho_2 = \left(\frac{1}{S(B) - s_0} - 1 \right) \frac{D_B}{B \cdot (T-D)} (\varepsilon_{D_B,B} + \varepsilon_{D,B} \frac{D}{T-D}) \quad (25)$$

where $\rho_2 = -\frac{\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial a_B}}{\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial w_B}}$ is the liquidity to moral hazard ratio in the effect of an increase of potential duration. When the lefthand side of 25 is superior to the righthand side, it is socially desirable to increase the potential duration of benefits, at the given level of benefit level b .

C.5 Proof of proposition 1:

Effect of increase in benefit level on exit rate at time 0 if potential duration=B:

$$\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \Big|_B = \sum_{i=0}^{B-1} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b_i} = -\frac{u'(c_0^u)}{\Psi''(s_0)} - \sum_{i=1}^{B-1} \frac{\beta^i S(i) u'(c_i^u)}{\Psi''(s_0)}$$

Using Euler equation when borrowing constraint does not bind, we have that:

$$\frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \Big|_B = - \left\{ \frac{B u'(c_0^u)}{\Psi''(s_0)} - \sum_{t=1}^{B-1} \frac{F_1(t) u'(c_0^e)}{\Psi''(s_0)} \right\} \quad (26)$$

Effect of an increase in potential duration scaled by the benefit level b , using Euler equation when borrowing constraint is not binding:

$$\frac{1}{b} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial B} = \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b_B} = - \left\{ \frac{u'(c_0^u)}{\Psi''(s_0)} - F_1(B) \frac{u'(c_0^e)}{\Psi''(s_0)} \right\} \quad (27)$$

Using 26 and 27, we have that:

$$\frac{1}{B} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \Big|_B - \frac{1}{b} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial B} = (S(B) - \frac{D_{B+s_0}}{B}) \left\{ \frac{u'(c_0^e)}{(1-s_0)\psi''(s_0)} \right\} \quad (28)$$

The moral hazard effect of increasing benefit level b for B periods is given by (22) so that:

$$\frac{1}{B} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial b} \Big|_B - \frac{1}{b} \frac{\partial s_0}{\partial B} = \Phi_1 \Theta_1 \quad (29)$$

where $\Phi_1 = \frac{S(B) - \frac{D_{B+s_0}}{B}}{D_{B-s_0}(B-1)}$

D State UI Information

Information on state UI laws come from the *Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws*, published bi-annually by the US Dept of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. I consulted state laws and state employment agencies for more detailed information on benefit schedule variations⁷⁰.

D.1 Idaho

In Idaho, the fraction of highest quarter of earnings to compute the weekly benefit amount is $1/26$ for the whole period 1976 to 1984.

Maximum benefit amount

The maximum benefit amount in Idaho in January 1976 is $b_{max} = \$90$.

It was then increased seven times until December 1983:

\$99 for claims filed after 04jul1976
\$110 for claims filed after 01jul1977
\$116 for claims filed after 01jul1978
\$121 for claims filed after 01jul1979
\$132 for claims filed after 01jul1980
\$145 for claims filed after 01jul1981
\$159 for claims filed after 20jun1982.

Minimum benefit amount

The minimum benefit amount in Idaho in January 1976 is $b_{min} = \$17$.

It was then increased twice until December 1983:

\$36 for claims filed after 01jul1980
\$45 for claims filed after 01jan1984.

Duration of Benefits

Idaho has a special determination rule for potential duration described in table B5.

⁷⁰CWBH has exhaustive information in Georgia on unemployment spells and wage records. But because of the parameters of the UI system in Georgia, the RK design was inoperable. $\tau_1 = 1/25$, $D_{max} = 26$, $\tau_2 = 1/4$ so that $D_{max} \cdot \frac{\tau_1}{\tau_2} > 4$ always larger than $\frac{b_{pw}}{h_{qw}}$ for all individuals on the left side of the benefit level kink. I don't have any observation with only kink in benefit level at the kink.

Table B5: Determination of Potential Duration 1st tier UI Idaho: 1976-1984

Ratio of bqw/hpw		UI Duration	
At Least...	Less Than...	before Jul 1st 1983	after Jul 1st 1983
1.25	1.50	10	
1.50	1.750	12	10
1.750	2.00	14	12
2.00	2.250	16	14
2.250	2.500	18	16
2.500	2.750	20	18
2.750	3.000	22	20
3.000	3.250	24	22
3.250	3.500	26	24
3.500	—	26	26

D.2 Louisiana

In Louisiana, the fraction of highest quarter of earnings to compute the weekly benefit amount is 1/25 for the whole period 1979 to 1984.

Maximum benefit amount

The maximum benefit amount in Louisiana in January 1979 is $b_{max} = \$141$.

It was then increased four times until December 1983:

\$149 for claims filed after 02sep1979

\$164 for claims filed after 07sep1980

\$183 for claims filed after 06sep1981

\$205 for claims filed after 05sep1982

Minimum benefit amount

The minimum benefit amount in Louisiana from January 1979 until December 1983 is always \$10.

Duration of Benefits

The fraction of base period earnings to determine the total amount of benefits payable for a given benefit year is 2/5. The maximum duration of benefits was set at 28 weeks. It was reduced to 26 weeks for claims filed after 03apr1983.

D.3 Missouri

In Missouri, the fraction of highest quarter of earnings to compute the weekly benefit amount is $1/20$ from the beginning of the period covered by the CWBh data (January 1978) until December 2nd, 1979 when it becomes .045.

Maximum benefit amount

The maximum benefit amount in Missouri in January 1978 is $b_{max} = \$85$.

It was then increased only once until December 1983:

\$105 for claims filed after 02dec1979.

Minimum benefit amount

The minimum benefit amount in Missouri from January 1979 until December 1983 is always \$15.

Duration of Benefits

The fraction of base period earnings to determine the total amount of benefits payable for a given benefit year is $1/3$. The maximum duration of benefits is 26 weeks for the whole period covered by the CWBH data.

D.4 New Mexico

In New Mexico, the fraction of highest quarter of earnings to compute the weekly benefit amount is $1/26$ for the whole period covered by the CWBh data (January 1980 to December 1983).

Maximum benefit amount

The maximum benefit amount in New Mexico in January 1980 is $b_{max} = \$106$.

It was then increased three times until December 1983:

\$105 for claims filed after 02dec1979.

\$117 for claims filed after 01jan1981

\$130 for claims filed after 01jan1982

\$142 for claims filed after 01jan1983

Minimum benefit amount

The minimum benefit amount in New Mexico in January 1980 is \$22.

It was then increased to: \$24 for claims filed after 01jan1981

\$26 for claims filed after 01jan1982

\$29 for claims filed after 01jan1983

Duration of Benefits

The fraction of base period earnings to determine the total amount of benefits payable for a given benefit year is $3/5$. The maximum duration of benefits is 26 weeks for the whole period covered by the CWBH data.

D.5 Washington

In Washington, the weekly benefit amount is computed as a fraction of the average of the two highest quarters of earnings. The fraction to compute the weekly benefit amount is $1/25$ for the whole period covered by the CWBh data (June 1979 to December 1983).

Maximum benefit amount

The maximum benefit amount in Washington in June 1st, 1979 is $b_{max} = \$128$.

It was then increased to:

\$137 for claims filed after 25jun1979

\$150 for claims filed after 06jul1980

\$163 for claims filed after 01jul1981

\$178 for claims filed after 01jul1982

\$185 for claims filed after 01jul1983

Minimum benefit amount

The minimum benefit amount in Washington in June 1979 is always \$17.

It was then increased to: \$41 for claims filed after 06jul1980

\$45 for claims filed after 01jul1981

\$49 for claims filed after 01jul1982

\$51 for claims filed after 01jul1983

Duration of Benefits

The fraction of base period earnings to determine the total amount of benefits payable for a given benefit year is $1/3$. The maximum duration of benefits is 30 weeks for the whole period covered by the CWBH data.

Note that until February 26, 1983, the state of Washington provides for 13 weeks of State-funded additional benefits for individuals who have exhausted their regular and Federal-State Extended Benefits⁷¹. However, no additional benefit period was paid while a Federal program was in effect.

⁷¹The additional benefits correspond to an *ad hoc* program which is triggered on only if the Governor determines it necessary.

D.6 EB trigger dates

Information on national and state triggers and trigger dates comes from the weekly trigger notice reports of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Note that in the weekly trigger notice reports, there are sometimes some slight adjustments ex-post because of lags in the computation of the IUR triggers. I therefore rely on ex post trigger notices where the starting and ending dates of each episodes of EB are indicated.

National Trigger Dates

Until the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, (effective July 1st 1981), the EB system had two triggers. A national trigger and state specific triggers. During the period 1976 to 1981, the national trigger was on three times, from 2/23/1975 to 7/2/1977, from 8/28/1977 to 01/28/1978, and from 7/20/1980 to 1/24/1981, automatically triggering periods of EB in all US states.

Idaho Trigger Dates

During the period 1976 to 1984, and on top of national EB periods, the EB trigger for Idaho was on four times: from 4/30/1978 to 7/29/1978, from 2/25/79 to 6/6/1979, from 2/17/80 to 7/18/81, and finally from 10/18/81 to the end of the period covered by the CWBH data.

Louisiana Trigger Dates

During the period 1979 to 1984, and on top of national EB periods, the EB trigger for Louisiana was on three times: from 7/20/1980 to 1/24/1981, from 9/12/1981 to 10/23/1982, and finally from 1/23/83 to the end of the period covered by the CWBH data.

Missouri Trigger Dates

During the period 1978 to 1984, and on top of national EB periods, the EB trigger for Missouri was on twice: from 6/1/80 to 7/25/1981, and from 3/26/1982 to 6/19/82.

New Mexico Trigger Dates

During the period 1980 to 1984, and on top of national EB periods, the EB trigger for New Mexico was on only once from 8/29/82 to 11/27/82

Washington Trigger Dates

During the period 1979 to 1984, and on top of national EB periods, the EB trigger for Washington was on without interruption from 7/6/1980 to 7/2/83.

D.7 Graphical illustration of the kinks in the schedule of UI benefit level and of UI potential duration

To analyze independently the effects of duration and of the benefit amount in the regression kink design, it is useful to break down the sample in different subgroups. Figure D1 summarizes the kinked schedules of the weekly amount and potential duration of UI benefits for Louisiana for all the different subgroups. First, for claimants who hit the maximum weekly benefit amount,

$b = b_{max}$, there is a kink in the relationship between potential duration and base period earnings bpw at $bpw = D_{max} \cdot \frac{b_{max}}{\tau_2}$.

$$D = \begin{cases} D_{max} \\ \frac{\tau_2}{b_{max}} \cdot bpw \end{cases} \quad \text{if } bpw \leq D_{max} \cdot \frac{b_{max}}{\tau_2}$$

The schedules of b and D for this subgroup is displayed on the left of panel B in figure D1.

For claimants who are below the maximum weekly benefit amount, $b < b_{max}$, there is a kink in the relationship between potential duration and the ratio of base period earnings to the highest-earning quarter at $\frac{bpw}{hqw} = D_{max} \cdot \frac{\tau_1}{\tau_2}$.

$$D = \begin{cases} D_{max} \\ \frac{\tau_2}{\tau_1} \cdot \frac{bpw}{hqw} \end{cases} \quad \text{if } \frac{bpw}{hqw} \leq D_{max} \cdot \frac{\tau_1}{\tau_2}$$


These claimants are displayed on the right of panel B in figure D1.

Finally, if $\frac{bpw}{\min(hqw, \frac{b_{max}}{\tau_1})} \leq D_{max} \cdot \frac{\tau_1}{\tau_2}$,

$$D = \tau_2 \cdot \frac{bpw}{\min(\tau_1 \cdot hqw, b_{max})}$$

, potential duration is always inferior to the maximum duration D_{max} but the relationship between duration and highest quarter earnings hqw exhibits an upward kink at $hqw = \frac{b_{max}}{\tau_1}$, which is also the point where the relationship between the weekly benefit amount b and hqw is kinked. The schedule for these claimants is displayed on the left of panel A in figure D1. When estimating the independent effect of b on unemployment duration in the regression kink design, I drop these observations and focus only on individuals with maximum potential duration ($D = D_{max}$) to avoid having two endogenous regressors kinked at the same point.

Figure D1: UI BENEFIT SCHEDULE: WEEKLY BENEFIT AMOUNT (GREY) & POTENTIAL DURATION(BLACK), LOUISIANA



Notes: The graph shows the weekly benefit amount (wba: grey dots) and potential duration (potduration: black dots) of Tier I observed in the CWBH data for Louisiana for 1979 to 1983. Each dot is the average value in the corresponding bin of the assignment variable. Panel A shows that the weekly benefit amount is a kinked function of the highest quarter of earnings. Panel B shows that potential duration is a kinked function of the base period earnings for individuals with $b = b_{max}$ (left) and of the ratio of base period to highest quarter earnings for individuals with $b < b_{max}$ (right).