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Peer Pressure and Productivity: The Role of Observing and Being Observed

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Peer Pressure and Productivity: The Role of Observing and Being Observed

Abstract

Peer effects arise in situations where workers observe each others’ work activity. In this paper we disentangle the effect of observing a peer from that of being observed by a peer, by setting up a real effort experiment in which we manipulate the observability of performance. In particular, we randomize subjects into three groups: in the first one subjects are observed by another subject, but do not observe anybody; in the second one subjects observe somebody else’s performance, but are not observed by anybody; in the last group subjects work in isolation, neither observing, nor being observed. We consider both a piece rate compensation scheme, where pay depends solely on own performance, and a team compensation scheme, where pay also depends on the performance of other team members. Overall, we find some evidence that subjects who are observed increase productivity at least initially when compensation is team based, while we find that subjects observing react to what they see when compensation is based only on own performance.

JEL-Code: D030, J240, M520, M590.

Keywords: peer effects, piece rate, team incentives, real-effort experiment.

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1 Introduction

In a recent survey of the insights for labor economics obtained in the lab, Charness and Kuhn (2011) define “pure” peer effects as applying to “a situation where workers work, side by side, for the same firm but do not interact in any way (except that they observe each others’ work activity)” (p.205). An example of such a situation is the real effort experiment by Falk and Ichino (2006), in which subjects work in pairs and each subject can see what the other is doing and at the same time knows that the other subject is seeing what she is doing, that is, a worker is both observing and being observed. Kandel and Lazear (1992) underline that observability plays a central role for peer pressure. They distinguish between internal pressure (or guilt) and external pressure (or shame), with observability being the discriminant between the two, as “[a] worker feels shame when others can observe his actions. Without observability, only guilt can be an effective form of pressure” (p.806). These two feelings can also be present in settings with anonymous interaction, as discussed in Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008). The distinction between observing and being observed is also prominent in the work of Mas and Moretti (2009). They use data from a supermarket chain and exploit the spatial orientation of the cash desks to provide evidence that the positive productivity spillovers due to the introduction of highly productive cashiers into a shift come from other workers being observed by a high productivity worker and not from observing one.\footnote{Another paper highlighting the effect of being observed is Corgnet et al. (2013). They allow all subjects to split their time between work, leisure and monitoring (observing others remotely). They find that when subjects are aware of when they are monitored, performance under team incentives increases to the same level as under individual incentives, while this is not the case when subjects are only aware of the possibility of being monitored. Note that unlike in our design, here the roles of observer and observed are not exogenously assigned, as all subjects can monitor and be monitored by their peers.}

The aim of this paper is to advance our understanding of the behavioral mechanisms behind peer effects by disentangling the contribution of these two channels of peer pressure: observing a colleague’s work and being observed by a co-worker. To this end, we take the standard setting used to study peer effects, that is, we have subjects perform a computerized task and place the digital equivalent of a “one-way mirror” between them so that only one side can see what the other is doing. In particular, in our experiment subjects work on the slider task developed by Gill and Prowse (2012a). After two rounds in which we measure baseline productivity, we randomly split subjects into three treatments. Subjects in the Control treatment do not observe and are not observed by anyone. The rest of the subjects are in treatment Observed, in which their performance is observed by another subject, or in treatment Observer, in which they observe another subject’s performance. These roles are kept for the remaining 14 rounds, with the pairs of Observer-Observed rematched in each round using a random matching protocol. Notice that the only difference between the Control
and Observed treatments is that someone is anonymously observing the performance of those in the Observed treatment. By comparing productivity in these two treatments, we can establish what is the impact of being observed by a peer. Moreover, we can identify whether observing another subject’s performance has an impact on own performance. To do this, we look at whether what they observe has an impact on productivity of those in the Observer treatment. The fact that those in the Observed treatment never receive information about anybody else’s performance means that in our design there is no reflection problem (Manski, 1993). Another feature of our design is that we can separate the work observation effect from the social effect, i.e. being in the presence of other human beings. In Falk and Ichino (2006) there is a social aspect to the treatment, as players are sitting in the same room. Given the paucity of experimental research in the area, it is unclear to what extent, for example, the reduced variance the authors find in the work outcomes is due to the actual observation of peers working, as opposed to the observation of the peers themselves, as human beings. Our design allows a clean identification of the work observation effect, as the subjects can only see how their peers are working, without being in their physical presence. Notice also that, unlike the setting in Mas and Moretti (2006), in our experiment there are no production externalities between subjects.

We start by distinguishing the role of observing and being observed in a pure peer effects setting, where compensation is on the basis of a piece rate, so there are no payoff externalities across workers. We then extend the analysis to consider peer effects when compensation depends on team performance. Besides being an empirically relevant compensation structure, we expect peer effects to be stronger when compensation is interdependent across subjects, as in the analysis by Kandel and Lazear (1992). To the best of our knowledge, our experimental design is the first one to cleanly disentangle the impact of observing from the impact of being observed by a peer for productivity. We find that both being observed and being an observer have an impact on work performance, and that the type of compensation scheme matters for when these effects are active. In particular, we find that subjects who are observed raise productivity initially, as compared to the control group, when compensation is team based. Following this initial response the control group eventually catches up with the observed, suggesting that being observed spurs subjects to reach a higher level of productivity faster in our experiment. We also find that subjects observing

\[2\]

\[In a recent and related paper, Babcock et al. (2012) compare individual and team incentives in a pay-for-studying experiment. In their setting, there is no free riding, as both team members need to reach a certain performance threshold for a bonus to be paid. The randomly assigned teammate could be either known or anonymous. They find strong positive effects on performance of being assigned to a team with a known partner in the pay-for-study intervention. Individuals assigned to the anonymous team treatment performed about as well as the individual treatment despite a high risk of default by the counterpart. They also find smaller but similar effects in a pay-for-exercise experiment.\]
react to what they see in a non-linear but monotonic way when compensation is based only on own performance. Specifically, they respond negatively to observing low performers and positively to high performers.

The literature suggests that peer pressure can have both a positive and a negative impact on productivity. The worker observing might try to conform to high performers and raise effort (Bernheim, 1994) or feel discouraged by them and hold back from really applying themselves. For example, Bellemare et al. (2010) find evidence of a negative effect in a data entry task where they provide feedback information about the total productivity of another worker in a previous session. Eriksson et al. (2009) study performance under a piece-rate and a tournament pay scheme and find evidence of a negative effect on quality (but not on quantity) of providing feedback on another subject’s performance either halfway during the production period or in a continuous way. Barankay (2012) finds a negative impact on sales performance of providing rank feedback, while other studies like Delfgaauw et al. (2013), Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011) and Beugnot et al. (2013) find instead positive effects of providing information about peers. Both positive and negative forces can also be at play for observed subjects who might feel ashamed if they put too low effort or might internalize their impact on observers and refrain from working too hard or might even under-perform due to a choking under pressure effect (Baumeister, 1984; Ariely et al., 2009). What type of motivation prevails within each condition is, therefore, an empirical question and in the conclusions we will discuss how our results relate to the findings of some of the papers introduced above. The next section describes our experimental design and procedures. Section 3 reports the results, while the last session offers a discussion and concludes.

2 Experimental Design and Procedures

The experiment was conducted at the Royal Holloway Experimental Lab between January 2012 and June 2013. The participants were graduate and undergraduate students at Royal Holloway, University of London. Subjects were recruited using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). Each session was divided into 16 periods and the experiment lasted approximately 75 minutes.

At the beginning of each session detailed instructions (available in the Appendix) appeared on the computer screens and were read aloud. The instructions provided details about the real effort task at hand and the compensation. In particular, we used the computerized slider task developed by Gill and Prowse (2012a). The task involves a screen showing 50 sliders, which can be moved
using the computer mouse and positioned anywhere between 0-100. Each slider is initially placed at 0 and the objective is to position as many sliders as possible at exactly 50. Each slider had a number to its right showing its current position. A screenshot of the task is provided in figure 1. There was no limit in how many times a slider could be moved. Subjects were instructed that their “points score” in the task would be the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 at the end of the 90 second period.

Figure 1: Screenshot of Slider Task.

After the end of the second period new instructions were provided for the second part of the experiment consisting of the remaining 14 periods. In particular, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three treatments: Observed, Observers and Control (we used neutral language in the instructions). From that point on, periods consisted of two stages of 90 seconds each. In stage A subjects in the Observed and Control treatments were working on the task, while the observers were seeing on their screen a copy of their partner’s screen. In Stage B the observers were performing the task, while the other players were seeing a time-out screen. While subjects were performing the task, they could see their current score, the time remaining and their type. In addition, the observers’ screen reported the number of points their partner scored in stage A of the same period.

been used in many experiments, listed in Gill and Prowse (2012b).
In each period subjects in the Observed and Observers treatments were randomly matched with each other.

Our experimental design also involved two conditions: the piece rate condition and the team compensation condition. In the first condition, subjects received 0.35 pence for each point they scored. In the team compensation condition, in each period - from period 3 onwards - one observer, the subject that she observed and one subject in the control group formed a team. They were informed that their payments for the period would be based on the average performance of their team in that period. No information regarding the identity of their teammates was provided at any point.

To summarize, in the first 2 periods of the experiment all subjects worked in isolation. We use these periods as a gauge of individual ability on the task. From period 3 onwards, we implement a 3 x 2 between-subject design, whereby subjects are either in the role of control, observed or observer and are compensated either on an individual or a team basis. We conducted 10 sessions of the piece rate condition and 7 sessions of the team compensation condition, with a total of 179 participants, 107 and 72 respectively. In particular, in the piece rate condition we had a total of 107 subjects (38 observed, 38 observers and 31 control), while in the team condition we had a total of 72 subjects (24 of each type). At the end of the experiment, one period was randomly selected and the points score in that round was used to determine experimental earnings, which averaged £10 per person.

3 Results

3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Nonparametric Analysis

We begin the presentation of our experimental results with some overview of the data. Average productivity across all periods and treatments was 27.5 and 28.4 sliders in the piece rate and team condition respectively. A histogram of the per period productivity by condition is provided in Figure 2, which illustrates that the bulk of observations lies in the range of 20-35 sliders per period.
We next examine the baseline productivity by treatment, defined as the average productivity in periods 1-2, that is, before assignment into treatment took place. Table 1, columns 1-2, contains this information by treatment and condition. Baseline productivity in the control treatment appears to be slightly lower in both conditions. However, when performing pairwise comparisons between control and each of the two treatments within each condition using a two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test we find no significant differences, except between observed and control in the piece rate condition (p-value=0.072). There are no significant differences in initial productivity between observed and observer in either condition according to the same test.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Baseline Productivity and Productivity Improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline Productivity</th>
<th></th>
<th>Productivity Improvement I</th>
<th></th>
<th>Productivity Improvement II</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Piece Rate</td>
<td>Team</td>
<td>Piece Rate</td>
<td>Team</td>
<td>Piece Rate</td>
<td>Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) contain average productivity in periods 1-2 (Standard deviations in parentheses). Columns (3) and (4) contain the ratio of average productivity in periods 3-16 over average productivity in periods 1-2. Columns (5) and (6) contain the ratio of average productivity in periods 3-4 over average productivity in periods 1-2.

We next consider productivity after assignment to treatment - periods 3 onwards. To gain some sense of how productivity on the task evolves, Figures 3 and 4 plot average per-period productivity in the two conditions by treatment. What is evident in these two figures is the steep increase in productivity that takes place in the course of the experiment, in particular in periods 1-7, while subjects seem to reach a plateau in later periods. We compute for every subject a productivity index: the ratio between their mean productivity in the last 14 periods and their mean productivity in the baseline two periods (see columns 3-4 of Table 1). Note that for the control group in the piece rate condition the average productivity improvement is 56%. In the team condition the average productivity improvement is much less dramatic (17%) and the difference between the two control groups is statistically significant (MW-test; p-value=0.005).

\[\text{We note that in this particular group there in an extreme outlier who improves productivity more than nine-fold. In fact, the median productivity increase is a more moderate 27\%. If we exclude the outlier, average productivity improvement is 30\%.}\]
For a visualization of the distribution of this productivity improvement by treatment see the box and whisker plots in Figure 5. In the piece rate condition, the difference in productivity improvement between observed and control is significant (MW-test; p-value=0.03). Our interpretation for this difference, when combined with the fact that the observed are somewhat more productive
initially, is that subjects in the control catch up in the course of the experiment. In the team condition, productivity improvement is very similar across the three groups, in fact the difference between each of the treatments and the control is not significant (MW-test p-value is 0.52 and 0.36 for observed and observer respectively).\(^5\)

The initial increase in productivity we see in figures 3 and 4 is reflecting the fact that learning is an important determinant of performance on the task. The subsequent flattening out, that is common across treatments, might be indicative that there is a ceiling in subjects’ ability to perform the task, which is reached after a few periods of learning. In the last period average productivity in the three treatments is indeed remarkably similar.

The evidence so far is not supporting the presence of any peer effects. However, given that learning appears to be quick and important for this task and may be dominating any treatment effects, it is of interest to examine the initial response to treatments in early periods. We measure the productivity improvement in the early periods by computing a similar productivity ratio as above, using only the first two periods after assignment to treatment (see Figure 6 and columns 5-6 of Table 1). What we see this time is that the performance of the control group in the piece rate condition improves by 30%, whereas this is not the case in the team condition.\(^6\) This difference is

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\(^5\)When we pool observations across the two payment conditions.

\(^6\)Again, this 30% increase is influenced by the presence of the earlier-mentioned outlier. The median increase is
statistically significant (MW-test; p-value=0.02) and suggests that early on some free-riding takes place in the team condition. In order to check for whether assignment into the observed group impacts productivity, we compare productivity improvement across observed and control within each condition. In the piece rate condition we do not find significant differences, whereas, in the team condition, both observed and observers increase productivity by 10% and are significantly different from control (MW-test; p-value is 0.04 and 0.01 respectively).\textsuperscript{7}

![Graph showing productivity ratios by type, using only the first two treated periods.](image)

Figure 6: Differences in the productivity ratios, using only the first two treated periods. Left panel is the piece rate condition, right panel condition team. The scale of the y-axis has been restricted.

To summarize, behavior of subjects on the task is characterized by significant learning, with subjects reaching their capacity in later stages of the session. This makes of particular interest to look at early periods, to see whether treatments have an impact on how fast subjects learn. In the piece rate condition we find no evidence of peer effects, either in the short run or the long run. In the team condition, there is some evidence of free-riding taking place in the short run, captured by the fact that the control group in this condition improves performance less than their counterpart group in the piece rate condition. Furthermore, in the team condition subjects in both the observed and observer treatments improve productivity in the short run relative to the control group. As 12.5%, while excluding this subject the average increase is 7.5%.

\textsuperscript{7}If we look at productivity improvement beyond period 4, convergence between observed and control takes place. In particular, average productivity improvement in periods 5-6 is 12.6% and 7.5% for observed and control respectively, with the difference not being statistically significant (MW-test; p-value is 0.29).
mentioned above, in the long run subjects reach their capacity, so that learning overcomes any treatment effects. We, therefore, conclude that in the team condition, peer pressure leads subjects to overcome the problem of moral hazard in teams and allows subjects to reach their potential faster.

In the next subsection, we look closer at individual behavior using regressions.

3.2 Regression Analysis

We split the presentation of regression results into two parts. We first replicate the nonparametric analysis above and investigate whether there are differences in the productivity of the observed treatment relative to that of the control, for each condition separately. We then turn attention to the behavior of the observers and ask whether their productivity is influenced by the productivity of the observed they are being matched with.

3.2.1 Behavior of those being observed

Table 2 presents OLS regressions of productivity on a dummy for being in the observed treatment, focusing on the post treatment part of the experiment (periods 3 onwards). We consider two alternative specifications: one in which the dependent variable is the number of sliders, and another one in which the dependent variable is the percentage change in productivity relative to the baseline productivity (average productivity in periods 1 and 2). The second specification accounts for differences in starting ability to perform the task. The regressions also include a full set of unreported period and session dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Table 2: Effect on productivity of being observed: Piece rate Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Periods 3-16</th>
<th>Periods 3-4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sliders</td>
<td>% Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>1.014</td>
<td>-0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>28.1***</td>
<td>0.332***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.36)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>966</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *, ** and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. A full set of session and period dummies are included in all columns.

What we see in column 1 is that for the piece rate condition there is an overall positive but insignificant effect on the productivity of the observed. If we consider changes in productivity relative to the baseline in column (2) the coefficient of being observed becomes negative, but is again not statistically significant. When we focus on the initial response to the treatment, in columns 3-4, we see a positive effect of being observed on the number of sliders, however, there is no statistically significant difference in the reaction of the treated group relative to the control when we consider productivity change in column 4. These regression results thus confirm the lack of a significant overall peer effect on the observed also found in the nonparametric analysis.

Results for the team condition are presented in Table 3. For this condition again there is no evidence of an overall treatment effect. We do see a positive and significant effect if we concentrate in periods 3-4. In those periods, being observed is associated with a productivity improvement that is 11% larger than that of being in the control. Again these regression results confirm the pattern of an initial positive effect on productivity of being observed also highlighted in the previous analysis.
Table 3: Effect on productivity of being observed: Team Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Periods 3-16</th>
<th></th>
<th>Periods 3-4</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sliders</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>Sliders</td>
<td>% Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>2.647</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>3.576*</td>
<td>0.110**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.73)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(1.85)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>19.913***</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>20.07***</td>
<td>-0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.60)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(5.20)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *, ** and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. A full set of session and period dummies are included in all columns.

We have also investigated whether being observed leads to a “choking under pressure” effect (Baumeister, 1984; Ariely et al., 2009), whereby a person’s performance may deteriorate when scrutinized. To do this we define a measure of the “accuracy” of a subject’s effort on the task: the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 over number of sliders positioned between 48 and 52. Using this measure we find no evidence that the observed’s accuracy suffers in either condition.

3.2.2 Behavior of those observing

We next consider the behavior of those assigned to the role of observer. In particular, in table 4 we present OLS regressions of the observer’s productivity on a linear and a quadratic term of the matched observed’s productivity, plus a full set of period and session dummies. We report results for two specifications: number of sliders in levels and percentage change relative to baseline productivity. In the piece rate condition there appears to be a significant nonlinear relationship between the productivity of the observed and that of the observer. In particular, the effect of observing somebody whose productivity is higher by 1 slider is -0.14 at the 10th percentile of the observed’s productivity, at the median it is -0.03 and at the 90th percentile it is 0.08, from column 1. Thus, the number of sliders completed in one session by observers decreases when observing a low
productivity subject and increases when observing a high productivity one. In the team condition, the signs of the coefficients are the same as above, but smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant. Thus, we find no evidence of any significant relationship between the productivity of the observed and that of the observer in this condition.

Table 4: Effect of productivity of observed on matched observer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Piece Rate</th>
<th>Team</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sliders</td>
<td>% Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>-0.421***</td>
<td>-0.020***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prod.</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>0.007***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prod.²</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>28.5***</td>
<td>0.328***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.189)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *, ** and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. A full set of session and period dummies are included in all columns.

The pattern that emerges regarding the reaction of observers’ in the piece rate condition is therefore one of responding to extreme observations, with a slight tendency to respond more strongly to low values. The next section provides some interpretation for this finding.

4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks

Peer effects arise in situations where workers observe each others’ work activity. In this paper we disentangle the role played by observing a peer from that of being observed by a peer by setting up a real effort experiment in which we manipulate the observability of effort. We look at both
a piece rate compensation scheme, where pay depends solely on own performance, and a team compensation scheme, where pay also depends on other team members’ performance. Overall, we find some evidence that subjects who are observed work harder when compensation is team based, while we find that subjects observing react to what they see in a non-linear but monotonic way when compensation is based only on own performance. An increase in productivity when being observed is consistent with what was postulated by Kandel and Lazear (1992), namely, that subjects work harder to avoid feeling shameful about low performance when others are observing them. The fact that we find this in the team compensation condition, but not in the piece rate one, is also consistent with the idea that peer effects are stronger when compensation across subjects is linked.

In the piece rate condition, we find a non-linear effect of peer pressure on the observer. The impact on productivity is, however, monotonic within the range of our observations, with a negative impact of observing a subject with low productivity and a positive impact of observing a subject with high productivity, while observing a subject with median productivity has essentially no effect. Bellemare et al. (2010) also find evidence of non-linearity in peer effects, albeit only in their fixed wage condition and not in their piece rate one. Also, in their case the effect is non-monotonic, with the observation of both high and low productivities inducing a negative effect on males. In the conclusions, the authors argue that peer effects may be difficult to find under a piece rate condition as people work at their maximum level of effort and focus their attention on the piece rate, disregarding other information about the performance of peers. One feature of our design that could explain why we do instead find evidence of peer effects in the piece rate condition is that in our setting observers actually see the screen of the observed, while she is working, observing each single movement of the slider. In the Bellemare et al. (2010) setup, instead, subjects are just informed about the other subject’s score. Being able to see another subject’s work activity, and not just the outcome, may be more conducive to the emergence of peer effects in the lab.

On the other hand, in the team compensation condition we do not find any effect, while, as mentioned above, one could have expected the effect to be even stronger. This could be due to some form of income targeting (Camerer et al., 1997; Fehr and Goette, 2007). Recall that the compensation is calculated on the basis of a randomly selected session. When paired with a high performer, an observer knows that in any case the compensation will be adequate if that session is selected for compensation and this could counteract the heightened feelings of guilt when slacking. On the other hand, when paired with a low performer, the desire to make up for this low performance (and thus insure for herself a minimum level of experimental earnings) could counteract...
any reduced feeling of guilt (or enhanced feelings of spite) arising from the low performance of the
teammate. We should also underline that we simply look at the impact of performance that has
just been observed. This is of course a very relevant and prominent measure, particularly in the
team compensation condition, where that productivity will contribute to determine pay in case the
session is selected. Potentially, however, there could be some persistency, and a subject may be
influenced by the whole history of what has been observed so far. To explore this convincingly
would require a larger dataset and we leave this for future research.

What we find in this paper is that both observing and being observed by a co-worker matter for
work effort, albeit, under different incentive structures. A fruitful avenue for future research would
be to consider the size and direction of these peer effects under other compensation schemes, such
as, a fixed pay regime and a relative performance scheme. A further extension of this work would
involve a principal agent design. The observer would have a direct pecuniary interest in the observed
player’s output, but unlike the team compensation condition in our study, this relationship would
not be reciprocal. Such a treatment would allow us to test whether the observation effect differs
depending on the degree of symmetry in the payoffs and tasks of the observer and the observed,
and could allow comparisons to Falk and Kosfeld (2006), who find that a distrusting principal can
have a negative effect on the agents motivation.

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