



NOTA DI LAVORO

81.2013

**Climate Variability, Child
Labour and Schooling:
Evidence on the Intensive
and Extensive Margin**

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Economics

Climate Change and Sustainable Development

Series Editor: Carlo Carraro

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Summary

How does future income uncertainty affect child labour and human capital accumulation? Using a unique panel dataset, we examine the effect of changes in climate variability on the allocation of time among child labour activities (the intensive margin) as well as participation in education and labour activities (the extensive margin). We find robust evidence that increased climate variability increases the number of hours spent on farming activities while reducing the number of hours spent on domestic chores, indicating a substitution of time across child labour activities. In addition, we find no evidence of climate variability on enrolment decisions or educational outcomes, suggesting that households may spread the burden of labour across children to minimize its impact on formal education.

Keywords: Climate Variability, Child Labour, Schooling

JEL Classification: D13, O12, J13, J22, Q54

I am grateful to Gharad Bryan, Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Jon de Quidt, Greg Fisher, Maitreesh Ghatak, Ben Groom, Sol Hsiang, Rob Jensen, Kyle Meng, Anthony Millner, Eric Neumayer, Munir Squires and seminar audiences at the London School of Economics, Columbia University, the EfD 6th Annual Meeting, the 20th Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economics, and the European Economic Association, for helpful thoughts, comments and discussions. This work was supported by the ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and the Grantham Foundation. The data used in this article were collected by the University of Addis Ababa, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE). Funding for the ERHS survey was provided by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). All errors and omissions are my own.

This paper was conferred the 2013 FEEM Award during the European Economic Association (EEA) Congress at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, on 29 August 2013.

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Abstract

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¹First draft: June 2012. Colmer: Grantham Research Institute and Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK. E-mail address: j.m.colmer@lse.ac.uk. I am grateful to Gharad Bryan, Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Jon de Quidt, Greg Fisher, Maitreesh Ghatak, Ben Groom, Sol Hsiang, Rob Jensen, Kyle Meng, Anthony Millner, Eric Neumayer, Munir Squires and seminar audiences at the London School of Economics, Columbia University, the EfD 6th Annual Meeting, the 20th Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economics, and the European Economic Association, for helpful thoughts, comments and discussions. This work was supported by the ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and the Grantham Foundation. The data used in this article were collected by the University of Addis Ababa, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE). Funding for the ERHS survey was provided by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). All errors and omissions are my own.

1 Introduction

While it is clear that income shocks cause significant welfare effects *ex post*, there is a paucity of evidence demonstrating how future income uncertainty can affect economic outcomes *ex ante*. This paper examines how future income uncertainty, proxied by climate variability, affects household investment decisions through the channels of child labour and human-capital accumulation in rural Ethiopia – one of the least developed countries in Africa, characterised by a high vulnerability to climate change and variability.

If households are limited in their ability to mitigate the effects of shocks, then expectations about the incidence of future shocks, as well as the incidence of shocks, may lead them to sacrifice valuable investments with long-run implications to meet short-run needs (Udry, 1994; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Duflo, 2000; Maccini and Yang, 2009; Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010). Even in developed countries, it has been shown that around half of the inequality in the present value of lifetime earnings is due to factors determined by the age of 18 (Cunha and Heckman, 2007; 2008).

The motivation of this paper is two-fold. First, we want to understand how uncertainty affects investment decisions – a question that presents a number of measurement and identification issues. Secondly, we want to better understand how environmental quality affects investment decisions, specifically, how climate can influence decision-making and economic outcomes.

We examine the impact of future income uncertainty on the labour supply of children – a risk-management strategy – and the trade-off between time spent working and educational attainment. This is the first paper to consider how future income uncertainty affects the risk-management strategies of rural households on both the intensive margin (the allocation of time to different child labour activities) and extensive margin (enrolment and labour participation decisions.)²

²Fitzsimons (2007) and Kazianga (2012) consider how households respond along the extensive margin to perceived future risk using cross-sectional data and different identification strategies; however, no detailed empirical analysis of either the intensive and extensive margin has been conducted using panel data, allowing us to control for time-invariant het-

Our results add to the growing literature exploring climatic influence on economic outcomes (Barreca et al. 2013; Burgess et al. 2011; Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007; 2011; 2012; Dell, Jones and Olken, 2009; 2012; Fischer et al., 2012; Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2010; Graff Zivin et al., 2013; Guiteras, 2009; Hsiang, 2010; Schlenker and Roberts, 2009) as well as the literature looking at the impacts of risk on educational outcomes (Fitzsimons, 2007; Kazianga, 2012).

Using two rounds of individual-level panel data, combined with a new data set of village-level meteorological data, we exploit exogenous variation in future income uncertainty to examine the relationship between climate variability and child labour.

We observe that an increase in future income uncertainty results in a substitution of child labour across activities, from labour in the home to labour on the farm, i.e., adjustment on the intensive margin. However, in contrast to the previous literature examining the effects of *ex ante* risk on human capital investments (Fitzsimons, 2007; Kazianga, 2012), we find no evidence to suggest that climate variability decreases the likelihood that children attend school or affects educational attainment, indicating the potential for omitted-variable bias due to unobserved individual heterogeneity. We demonstrate the importance of controlling for time-invariant omitted variables through replicating the results of these previous studies using individual cross-sections.

Our results can be interpreted as causal effects, conditional on the assumption that our measure of climate variability affects child labour and schooling only through uncertainty about future states of the world. In order to support this assumption, we show that our results are robust to controlling for past and contemporaneous rainfall shocks and other time-varying factors which may be correlated with our measure of income uncertainty, as well as time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the village level. Alem and Colmer (2013) also demonstrate rigorous evidence supporting the plausibility of this measure in an examination of the impact of income uncertainty on experienced utility in rural Ethiopia.

erogeneity.

We also present the results from a series of placebo and robustness tests used to disentangle the effect from other confounding factors and provide supporting evidence for the main identification assumption.³

This narrative is distinct from the literature, which has focussed on child labour and reductions in human capital investments as an *ex post* response to adverse shocks (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997; Jensen, 2000; Pörtner, 2001; Ranjan, 2001; Sawada & Lokshin, 2001; Bhalotra & Heady, 2003; Thomas et al., 2004; Beegle et al., 2006). The decision to withdraw children from school, most frequently observed in response to adverse shocks, may arise from a need to reduce expenditures; it is less likely that there would be an increase in child labour due to reductions in the marginal product of labour. If there is an increase in child labour it is likely to be off-farm and so may result in an increase in child labour supply along the extensive margin ,i.e., the decision to engage in work outside of the home.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides a brief background and literature review; section 3 presents a simple theoretical model which supports and motivates our findings; section 4 provides a brief summary of the data along with caveats; section 5 describes our empirical specification and outlines our identification strategy; section 6 presents the main results and a discussion of the implications; section 7 reports supporting evidence and robustness checks; section 8 concludes.

2 Background

In a recent publication, the World Bank (2010) argues that climate change will disproportionately affect poor households, especially women and children. Children may be withdrawn from school in response to climatic shocks, with long-run and irreversible impacts on human capital and, consequently, lifetime earnings. In addition, while the majority of child labour is at home, off-farm

³Appendix C provides a number of more mechanical robustness tests, which help support the statistical and economics significance of the results but matter less for supporting the identification assumptions made.

child labour is very responsive to negative income shocks.⁴ There is little evidence, however, on the role that income uncertainty plays in education and child labour decisions. Uncertainty in climate patterns can pose a serious threat to agricultural productivity (Cline, 2007; Easterling et al., 2007) and place increased pressure on household responsibilities and activities. There is considerable evidence from Asia to show that delays and variation in the timing of the wet season can have significant productivity impacts; the evidence in Africa, mainly due to data limitations, is more scarce.

Developing countries are especially vulnerable to climate change: they are more physically exposed as a result of their location in the Tropics and other areas that are regularly subjected to extreme weather events, such as storms, droughts, flooding, and extreme temperatures; they are more economically sensitive, due to weak infrastructure and heavy reliance on agriculture; they also have a lower adaptive capacity, resulting from institutional and governance factors.

In the face of uninsured risk, households that are subject to greater variability have a greater incentive to accumulate precautionary savings to smooth consumption against future risk (Kimbell, 1991; Paxson, 1992; Carroll, 1997; Carroll & Kimbell, 2001). The pivotal result in this literature states that, in the presence of uninsured risk, prudent households are likely to save more than in the absence of uncertainty. The existing literature focuses on the effects of income uncertainty on consumption and asset portfolios. One channel through which this effect may be observed, first discussed by Cain (1982), and more recently discussed in Fitzsimons (2007), is not to enrol children in school.⁵ Education is an irreversible investment with delayed, and potentially increasing, marginal returns. Fafchamps and Pender (1997) further argue that the precautionary motive for holding liquid assets impedes productive investment, such as investments in education, even if households are able to self-finance them. As a result, it is argued that the effect of the precautionary motive on irre-

⁴Unfortunately, there is not sufficient data to examine the effect of shocks on wage labour carried out by children.

⁵It is assumed that children would engage in child labour in place of this activity, though it is possible that children may remain idle.

versible and illiquid investments, such as education, is augmented. There are two mechanisms which can be explored here. The first mechanism arises from the decision not to enrol children in school to increase saving through reduced educational expenditures, as discussed above, with an assumed increase in the labour supply of children along the extensive margin, or increased idleness. The second mechanism results from a risk-management and productivity motive by which households may invest more in the land, taking more care over the land-preparation and cultivation stages in efforts to reduce the likelihood of crop failure in the event of an adverse shock. This mechanism works along the intensive margin of labour supply. The question that remains is whether an increase in labour supply along the intensive margin is sufficient to also affect decisions on the extensive margin. It is assumed that parents optimally invest in the number and quality of children, determined by investments in human capital, to maximise household welfare. Under this assumption, Fitzsimons (2007) argues that children have an instantaneous earnings potential in addition to the benefit of reduced educational expenditures. Consequently, we might expect that higher levels of risk should result in a greater incentive to increase the number of hours worked by children and reduce investments in education.

If this risk results in reduced investment in human capital then the potential welfare cost may have long-run welfare costs via worsened later-life outcomes and opportunity (Strauss and Thomas, 1998; Maccini and Yang, 2009; Banerjee et al., 2010; Antilla-Hughes & Hsiang, 2013). Indeed, even delays in educational attainment may have large effects if children are not able to reach a level of education that has real returns. These costs may be further exacerbated if households reduce investments in children based on gender (Sen, 1990; Duflo, 2005; Antilla-Hughes and Hsiang, 2013).

However, in many studies, this study included, we observe children are capable of both working and attending school.⁶ Ravallion and Wodon (2000) argue that poor families can protect the schooling of working children because

⁶75% of our sample both attend school and work, either on the farm or in the home. 49% attend school and work on the farm. 59% attend school and work in the home.

there are other things that children do besides school and work.

“One cannot assume that the time these children spend working must come at the expense of formal time at school, although there may be displacement of informal (after-school) tutorials or homework.”

Jayachandran (2013) demonstrates, however, that the displacement of informal schooling may have significant welfare effects of its own. If schools offer for-profit tutoring to their own students, this gives teachers a perverse incentive to teach less during school to increase demand for tutoring. Consequently, those who do not participate in tutoring could be adversely affected.


This paper explores whether uncertainty about future income is enough to displace investment in education. We argue that, while the realisation of income shocks may result in the withdrawal of children from school, it is likely that households are able to reallocate time across activities and children to minimise the effect on education. If this is the case, we would expect to observe an increase in child labour on the intensive margin (the loss-minimisation motive) but no enrolment effects on the extensive margin (the precautionary savings motive). Whether there is an effect on educational attainment depends on whether there is a large enough impact on the intensive margin of education (unobserved in the data) or whether informal education in the form of tutoring is an important determinant, as in Jayachandran (2013).⁷

3 Theoretical Framework

To motivate our empirical work and demonstrate the plausibility of our findings, we introduce a two-period model of the child labour supply decision in agricultural households in the spirit of Rose (2001). The two-period frame-

⁷Ideally, test scores would provide a more accurate measure of educational attainment. To observe an impact on the grades attained there would have to be sufficient impact in order to stop schooling, or to not progress to the next year.

work allows for explicit consideration of *ex ante* and *ex post* decisions.⁸ In both periods, the household makes decisions regarding the time-allocation of children between labour supply on the farm, in the home, and schooling. Time-allocation is normalised to 1. The first period is characterised as prior to the realisation of rainfall. This could be seen as the cultivation and land preparation stages of agriculture. In the second period, rainfall is realised, and again households respond to this through the time-allocation decision, conditional on the decision in period 1. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the model.



In period 1, the household does not know how much rainfall, ξ , there will be, but does know its distribution. The household knows the average level of rainfall over time for the area (μ), and knows the variability of the distribution measured as the coefficient of variation (φ), the standard deviation divided by the mean. In this respect, the coefficient of variation could be seen as the probability of a shock occurring in period 2. The household's time-allocation decision for the first period depends on μ and φ , in addition to household wealth, Y , the shadow price of the activity, ω^i , and the parameters of the production technology, θ .

In each period, time can be allocated to labour on the farm, domestic chores, or schooling.⁹

The *ex ante* labour supply on the farm is:

$$L_1^F = L_1^F(\mu, \varphi, \omega^F, Y, \theta)$$

⁸This paper focusses on *ex ante* decisions. As already mentioned, there is a considerable literature that has focussed on *ex post* responses to adverse shocks (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997; Jensen, 2000; Pörtner, 2001; Ranjan, 2001; Sawada & Lokshin, 2001; Bhalotra & Heady, 2003; Thomas et al., 2004; Beegle et al., 2006). The results presented in the second period of this model are consistent with the results in this literature.

⁹Allowing for an additional dimension, idleness, changes none of the results in the model. For clarity, we restrict our analysis to the three dimensions discussed.

The *ex ante* labour supply in the home is:

$$L_1^H = L_1^H(\mu, \varphi, \omega^H, Y, \theta)$$

The *ex ante* investment in education is:

$$E_1 = E_1(\mu, \varphi, \omega^E, Y, \theta) = 1 - L_1^F - L_1^H$$

There are two channels by which we might expect φ to affect these decisions. First, there is a “portfolio effect” whereby, given the shadow price of an activity, the household will adjust the time-allocation of children away from risky activities on the farm towards less risky investments in schooling and in the home. The second effect results from a precautionary motive. Prior to the realisation of a shock, households may allocate more time to labour on the farm to mitigate the effects of a shock in the event that it is realised. If the precautionary effect dominates the portfolio effect, we would expect the following:

$$\frac{\partial L_1^F}{\partial \varphi} > 0, \frac{\partial L_1^H}{\partial \varphi} < 0, \frac{\partial E_1}{\partial \varphi} < 0$$

In this case, an increase in risk, φ , will increase child labour supply on the farm, reduce child labour supply in the home, and reduce investment in education.

By contrast, if the portfolio effect dominates, then we would expect:

$$\frac{\partial L_1^F}{\partial \varphi} < 0, \frac{\partial L_1^H}{\partial \varphi} > 0, \frac{\partial E_1}{\partial \varphi} > 0$$

In this case, an increase in risk, φ , will reduce child labour supply on the farm, increase child labour supply in the home, and increase investment in education.

In period 2, the value of rainfall, ξ , is realised, and households can respond to it. Conditional on labour supply in period 1, there is no reason for φ to affect household decision-making once ξ is realised. Consequently, the *ex post* labour supply decision for farming is:

$$L_2^F = L_2^F(L_1^F(\cdot), \mu, \varepsilon, \omega^F, Y, \theta)$$

The *ex post* labour supply in the home is:

$$L_2^H = L_2^H(L_1^H(\cdot), \mu, \varepsilon, \omega^F, Y, \theta)$$

The *ex post* investment in education is:

$$E_2 = E_2(E_1(\cdot), \mu, \varepsilon, \omega^E, Y, \theta) = 1 - L_2^F - L_2^H$$

where $\varepsilon = \xi - \mu$, i.e., ε is the deviation in rainfall from the mean.

The effect of ε on time allocation can be separated into an income effect and a substitution effect. If the realisation of rainfall is below average (ε is low), then income is lower and the household may need to withdraw children from school to smooth income (the income effect); however, if the returns to education (child labour on the farm) are decreasing (increasing) as ε increases, then we would expect an increase (decrease) in schooling (child labour on the farm) following a negative shock (the substitution effect). In the literature which has examined *ex post* responses to adverse shocks through education and child labour, the income effect has consistently been shown to dominate the substitution effect at low income levels. The remainder of this paper attempts to tackle the question of *ex ante* decision making in the context of child labour and education, motivated by the hypotheses presented in this model.

4 Data

The analysis conducted in this paper uses two rounds of the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey collected by the University of Addis Ababa, the Centre for the Study of African Economics (CSAE) at the University of Oxford, and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), covering 15 communi-

ties in rural Ethiopia.¹⁰ This paper makes use of the latest two rounds of this panel from 2004 and 2009. These years are included as they contain consistent identifiers of child labour across time and are the only years to contain individual-level identifiers, allowing us to track children across the rounds.¹¹ The villages in the survey represent the diversity of farming systems throughout Ethiopia and capture climate differences across the country. Stratified random sampling is used within each village, based on whether households have male or female heads.

The survey has several features that make it appropriate for the analysis. The main attraction is its detailed information on individuals and the household, including time spent in the previous week working on the farm and in the home. Furthermore, the sample is widely representative of rural Ethiopia, giving it common support. That said, there are several concerns that arise from the use of the survey. The first is attrition, which is a problem with all panel data sets. However, attrition in the ERHS has been limited at 1–2% of households per year (Dercon and Hoddinott, 2009). Nevertheless, if children or households were to exit (or enter) the sample in a way that was correlated with rainfall or climate variability, this would bias our results. A second concern is the small number of clusters in the context of village-level analysis. We bootstrap-cluster our standard errors of our regressions to account for this. A final concern is that the survey design includes an over-sample of households considered to be at risk. This is unlikely to be too great a problem, however, as weather is random and the survey covers a wide geographic area.

Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of the variables used in the analysis.

¹⁰See figure 3 in appendix A for the location of these villages

¹¹The total survey consists of 7 rounds between 1989 and 2009. In 1989, households from six villages in central and southern Ethiopia were interviewed. In 1994, however, the sample was expanded to cover 15 villages across the country, representing 1477 households. Further rounds were completed in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2004 and 2009.

Table 1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
<i>Dependent Variables</i>			
Child labour hours (total)	27.55	16.71	4034
Child labour hours (farm)	13.93	15.17	4015
Child labour hours (domestic)	13.73	12.85	4019
Child labour participation (total)	0.96	0.17	4034
Child labour participation (farm)	0.65	0.47	4034
Child labour participation (domestic)	0.75	0.42	4034
Idle	0.01	0.11	4034
Not Attending	0.10	0.29	4034
Discontinued	0.03	0.18	4034
Zero Grades	0.16	0.37	4034
Primary School Completed	0.09	0.29	4034
<i>Climate Variables</i>			
Climate Variability (annual)	22.91	4.44	4034
Negative Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)	0.69	0.46	4034
<i>Individual Characteristics</i>			
Male	0.52	0.49	3726
Age child	10.89	2.94	4034
Youngest child	0.35	0.47	4034
Grades (head)	1.53	2.83	4034
Grades (spouse)	0.72	1.82	4034
<i>Household Characteristics</i>			
Days worked off-farm	11.56	27.06	4034
Remittances received (birr)	134.12	1066.59	4034
Land (hectares)	1.36	1.95	3603

In the analysis on the intensive margin, child labour – the dependent variable – is defined as the total hours spent working in economic activities and chores per week. We define children to be aged between 6 and 16, consistent with the literature. This is also consistent with the starting age of school in Ethiopia so as not to amplify any effect of variability on enrolment in school. Economic activities generally consist of farming activities, including tending crops, processing crops, looking after livestock, etc. Chores are also included for two reasons. First, child labour is not restricted to economic activities. Second, in rural areas it may be difficult to distinguish between time spent on household chore activities and time spent preparing subsistence food crops. From table 1 we can see that the average number of hours spent per week on all child labour is just under 30 hours per week. This is a considerable

amount of time and is likely to result in a trade-off with education and leisure. Unfortunately, we are unable to identify time spent on education and leisure to provide a full representation of time-use.¹²

The dependent variables used on the extensive margin analysis are whether the child has attended school and whether the child participates in the labour force (by activity). We observe that only 9% of the sample have completed primary school and that 10% do not attend school. Furthermore, 16% of the sample have zero grades.

While not a dependent variable, the grades of the parents are a variable of interest. The average level of education attained by the parents in the sample is considerably lower than that of their children, arguably a result of the developments in education that have occurred over the last few decades. Moreover, the average level of educational attainment for household heads is reported as 1.43 years – just over twice the average level of attainment reported for spouses (0.67 years).

69% of the villages experienced a drought between 2000 and 2009. This variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the village experienced rainfall one standard deviation below the average rainfall for the village in the 5 years prior to the survey.

In terms of household welfare, the average amount of land available for cultivation by the household is just above 1 hectare. Ethiopia has a long history of issues related to land titling and land registration, restricting the sale or rent of land. Consequently, farmers might not use land efficiently, or might not invest in the land to maximise its returns. It is clear that the opportunities for off-farm work are also limited, the average number of days spent working off-farm in the previous 12 months being around 11. This may result from lack of opportunity in addition to factors relating to tenure security, educational attainment, or labour market imperfections.

In addition to the household survey data, annual rainfall data has been constructed from daily precipitation reanalysis data at the village level from the

¹²Ravallion and Wodon (2000) argue on a priori grounds that it would not be difficult for parents to assure that a child working 20 hours per week could still attend school.

ERA-Interim data archive supplied by the European Centre for Medium-Term Weather Forecasting (ECMWF).¹³ Where previous studies have relied on the use of meteorological data provided by the Ethiopian meteorological service, the number of missing observations, or observations which are recorded as zero on days when there are no records, is of concern. The ERA-Interim reanalysis data archive provides daily measurements of precipitation, temperature (min, max, and mean), wind speed and wind direction, relative humidity, cloud cover (a proxy for solar reflectance), and many other atmospheric parameters, from January 1st 1979 until the present day, on a global grid of quadrilateral cells defined by parallels and meridians at a resolution of 0.75 x 0.75 degrees (equivalent to 83km x 83km at the equator).¹⁴ Reanalysis data is constructed through a process whereby model information and observations are combined to produce a consistent global best estimate of atmospheric parameters over a long period of time by optimally fitting a dynamic model to each period simultaneously (Auffhammer et al., 2013). Models propagate information from areas with more observational data for areas in which observational data are scarce. This results in an estimate of the climate system that is separated uniformly across a grid, that is more uniform in its quality and realism than observations alone, and that is closer to the state of existence than any model would provide alone. This provides a consistent measure of atmospheric parameters over time and space. This type of data is increasingly being used by economists (see Burgess et al., 2011; Guiteras, 2009; Hsiang et al., 2011; Kadamatsu, 2012; Schlenker & Lobell, 2010), as they fill in the gap in developing countries, where the collection of consistent weather data is lower down the priority list in government budgets.

By combining the ERHS data set with the ERA-interim data, we create a unique panel allowing for microeconomic analysis of weather and climate in Ethiopia.

It is important to note that all climate data, whether reanalysis or observa-

¹³See Dee et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion of the ERA-Interim data.

¹⁴To convert degrees to km, multiply 83 by the cosine of the latitude, e.g. at 40 degrees latitude 0.75 x 0.75 cells are $83 \times \cos(40) = 63.5 \text{ km} \times 63.5 \text{ km}$.

tional data, are subject to caveats and concerns. Reanalysis data is unlikely to match observational data perfectly. It is limited to some degree by resolution, even where observational data is present. Furthermore, reanalysis data are partly computed using climate models that are imperfect and contain systematic biases. This brings up further concern to issues of accuracy. However, in areas with limited observational data such as Ethiopia, reanalysis data is known to provide estimates that are better than they otherwise could be, because the data is collected at intervals of six hours, over which time weather follows physical laws in an almost linear fashion.

There are statistical reasons as to why reanalysis data may be preferable. Previous studies have relied on the use of meteorological data provided by the Ethiopian meteorological service and the number of missing observations is a concern. This is exacerbated by the serious decline in the past few decades in the number of weather stations around the world that are reporting. Lorenz and Kuntsman (2012) show that since 1990 the number of reporting weather stations in Africa has fallen from around 3,500 to around 500. With 54 countries in the continent, this results in an average of fewer than 10 weather stations per country. Looking at publicly available data, the number of stations in Ethiopia included by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) National Climatic Data Centre (NCDC) is 18; however, if we were to apply a selection rule that required observations for 365 days this would yield a database with zero observations. For the two years for which we have economic data (2004 and 2009), weather station data is available for 50 days from one station (Addis Ababa) in 2004 and is available for all 18 stations for an average of 200 days (minimum of 67 days, maximum of 276 days) in 2009. This is likely to result in a huge increase in measurement error when this data is used to interpolate across the 63 zones and 529 woredas (districts) reported in 2008. If this measurement error is classical, i.e., uncorrelated with the actual level of rainfall measured, then our estimates of the effect of these variables will be biased towards zero. However, given the sparse density of stations across Ethiopia (an average of 0.03 stations per woreda), the placement of stations is likely to be correlated with agricultural output, i.e., weather sta-

tions are placed in more agriculturally productive areas, where the need for weather information is greater.

Rainfall at each village is calculated by taking data points within 100km of the village and then interpolated through a process of inverse distance weighting. Taking the annual measure of rainfall at each village, we calculate the coefficient of variation for rainfall, measured as the standard deviation divided by the mean for the periods 1995–2004 and 2000–2009.

We focus on rainfall data for our measures of village risk and shocks, as the data is both spatially and temporally rich, providing an exogenous measure over a long period of time that is ideal for working with longitudinal data. While weather events and shocks are not the only exogenous factor influencing variability in agricultural output and income, it is arguably the factor that contributes the most to income fluctuations, leading to welfare changes (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1993). This is especially true of Ethiopia, where agriculture accounts for such a large proportion of GDP and employment. Furthermore, it is important to gain a better understanding of the impact of weather risk and shocks on behaviour and decision-making, given the risks that climate change poses to many developing countries. This is key to understanding how current development policy is compatible with adaptation needs in response to climate change, and where gaps in policy arise.

Table 2 reports the mean rainfall for each village for each year of the panel, and the mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation over the entire period.

Table 2: Annual Rainfall (mm) by Peasant Authority and Year

Peasant Association	2004	2009	mean	std. dev.	CV
Haresaw	395	470	476	155	33.12
Geblen	226	261	278	95	34.24
Dinki	810	865	853	162	18.61
Yetmen	667	713	740	149	20.00
Shumsheha	535	627	645	150	23.34
Sirbana Godeti	1150	1218	1086	172	15.61
Adele Keke	1175	1169	1008	177	17.19
Korodegaga	1478	1589	1364	218	15.6
Turfe Kechemane	1170	1177	1024	197	18.86
Imbidir	1051	1062	936	158	16.68
Aze Deboa	1232	1253	1073	210	19.08
Addado	1258	1399	1188	305	25.29
Gara Godo	1546	1520	1318	271	20.16
Doma	1134	1270	1070	257	23.71
Debre Berhan Villages	838	893	855	154	17.53

The mean, std. dev. and CV are calculated for the period 1980-2009.

Rainfall is low and erratic in Ethiopia. From table 2, we observe that there is considerable variability across the villages as well as between years. The average across all the villages is just under 1000mm per annum, but there is considerable heterogeneity. For example, Haresaw and Geblen, villages from the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia, experienced on average 400mm per annum between 1980 and 2009. Figure 1 in appendix A provides a visualisation of the inter-annual heterogeneity in rainfall, as well as a demonstration of the degree to which the villages in the sample represent the average climate of Ethiopia. Figure 2 in appendix A shows density plots for the coefficient of variation over the two periods for which we have economic data, demonstrating the temporal variation we observe, even in a short time frame. Figures 4 and 5 in the appendix provide a visualisation of the spatial heterogeneity in average rainfall and variability.

5 Empirical Specification and Identification Strategy

This paper investigates how future income uncertainty, drawn from historical rainfall variability, affects child labour and human capital accumulation on the intensive and extensive margin. We employ the coefficient of variation in rainfall (hereafter CV), measured as the standard deviation of rainfall divided by the mean for the previous ten years, as an exogenous determinant of the level of risk that households face. Unlike the variance or standard deviation of rainfall, the CV is scale invariant, providing a comparable measure of variation for households that may have very different income levels (Fitzsimons, 2007).¹⁵

Using these measures, we examine the impact of climate variability on child labour hours (the intensive margin), the probability that children attend school, educational attainment (measured as grades attained), and the probability that the children participate in labour activities (the extensive margin). We use the difference-in-means estimation approach (i.e., fixed-effects or “within” regression), which allows us to address the issue of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, captured by village fixed effects.

The use of cross-sectional data does not address this issue, leading to potential omitted-variable bias due to time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity correlated with the treatment effect or the dependent variable. Examples of this unobserved heterogeneity in the context of our paper might include the geography of the village, access to markets, infrastructure such as schools and roads, and access to insurance against covariate shocks, such as food for work programmes.

In addition to village fixed effects, we control for year fixed effects to control for aggregate shocks, economic development, and macroeconomic policies. We also include month fixed effects to control for any seasonal variation in the timing of the survey. Fitzsimons (2007) argues that it is not unrealistic to imagine that households in riskier villages have lower preferences for education;

¹⁵It is important to note that our results are robust to using the standard deviation of rainfall and other time measures of the CV.

however, unlike Fitzsimons (2007), who uses a cross-sectional instrumental variable approach, we are able to control for these factors. Indeed, it is well established that family preferences for education are a major determinant of educational attainment (Heckman, 2007; 2008).

A main concern surrounding the empirical specification of the model is the number of zeros in the child labour data, as it implies that the dependent variable is not normally distributed, leading to inconsistent and inefficient estimates under the Gaussian assumptions of linear regression. To account for the large number of zeroes in the dependent variables, we estimate a fixed-effects Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimator model (QMLE)¹⁶ with cluster-robust Huber-White standard errors at the village level to account for serial correlation within villages.¹⁷

The model is estimated using the following specification:

$$\mathbb{E}(Y_{ihvt}) = \mu_v(\exp(\beta CV_{vt} + \phi X'_{iht} + \alpha_t + \alpha_m)) \quad (1)$$

where subscripts index individuals (i), households (h), village (v) and year (t).¹⁸ Y_{ihvt} corresponds to the number of child labour hours for child i in household h (located in village v) in year t . CV_{vt} corresponds to the coefficient of variation at the village level, our measure of village risk. In addition to these core variables, we include a set of controls and characteristics, X , measured at the individual, household, and village level. μ_v corresponds to the village fixed effects and α_t to the year fixed effects. We interpret the β coefficients in equation 4 as the semi-elasticity of child labour (or grades attained) in response to a unit change in the variable.

As the village-level fixed effect (μ_v) is multiplicative to the rainfall variables, this makes households with higher levels of child labour more responsive

¹⁶See Hausman et al. (1984), Wooldridge (1999; 2010) for an introduction to the model, and Burgess et al. (2011) and Vanden Eynde (2011) for recent applications. See Santos Silva and Tenreiro (2006) for an evaluation of the differences between OLS and QMLE Poisson.

¹⁷Our results are robust to OLS specifications in logs and levels, presented in appendix B.

¹⁸For the analysis of enrolment and labour force participation, we estimate fixed-effects linear probability models.

to climate variability or shocks. As a result, the fixed effects explain all the variation in households that do not have any child labour, therefore these households do not contribute towards the estimation of the β coefficients.

There are a number of benefits to using the Poisson QMLE instead of the standard Poisson MLE. For example, the use of the QMLE does not require that the data follow a Poisson distribution. All that is required is that the conditional mean of the variable of interest be correctly specified. A further benefit in the context of Poisson models is the mitigation of concerns surrounding under- and over-dispersion. This is because, unlike the MLE, the Poisson QMLE does not assume equi-dispersion. All that is required for optimality of the Poisson QMLE is that the conditional variance is proportional to the conditional mean. Furthermore, the Poisson QMLE will still be consistent in the case where the conditional variance is not proportional to the conditional mean. This means that we can work using a fixed-effects framework without needing to use models such as the negative-binomial or zero-inflation Poisson MLE to deal with consistency issues.

Due to the grouped nature of our data, it is likely that the standard errors will be underestimated, resulting in overstated t-statistics. We account for this by clustering the standard errors by group, i.e., at the village level. The importance of clustering is emphasised by Moulton (1986; 1990), and more recently by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004). We cluster at the village level in line with Pepper (2002) and Bertrand et al. (2004), who argue that one should cluster at the highest level where there may be correlation. In our context, we are examining individuals, in a household, which is part of the larger village community. As the variation in climate is measured for each village, we want to cluster at this level.

However, Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) show that when group size is below 30 clusters, asymptotic tests can over-reject the null hypothesis. As a consequence, the use of block bootstrap methods to account for clustering at the village level results in more consistent estimators and asymptotic refinement.

In addition to concerns about the empirical specification, there are a number of caveats related to the data and identification strategy that need to be discussed and, where possible, addressed.

A general concern is measurement error, especially considering the retrospective nature of the survey methods used (Deaton, 1997). This may be a particular issue regarding the dependent variable, which measures the number of hours of child labour. For example, there may be general reporting error due to recall, or hours at lower levels of work being rounded up, e.g., 30 mins becomes one hour. It may also be the case that richer, more educated households deliberately under-report child labour due to a greater understanding of the stigma attached. While this should not bias the results, if we believe that this measurement error is classical, and that any non-classical measurement error is fixed over time, it could increase the size of the standard errors, increasing the risk of type II errors in which we fail to reject the null hypothesis. Given cultural attitudes towards child labour, however, it is likely that concerns about stigma are less than in other contexts.

While measurement error in the dependent variable is possible, this is less of a concern than in the main explanatory variable, CV, which would lead to inconsistent estimation and downward-biased estimates of β_1 . We minimise classical measurement error associated with self-reported data by using the CV, which is measured using quality-controlled meteorological data, as a direct measure of income risk, rather than using an instrumental variable approach, as in Fitzsimmons (2007). However, all meteorological data is measured with some error and so we expect our coefficients to be a lower-bound estimate.

The use of rainfall variables has become increasingly popular in economics as a means of identifying permanent and transitory components of income, as well as income variability. The main advantages of rainfall as a proxy or as an instrumental variable are its strong correlation with income and its presumably random variation. This variation is presumed to be orthogonal to other unobserved determinants of income, offering a potential solution to omitted-variable bias problems. In effect, it is argued that rainfall has no effect on the dependent variable other than through income. Indeed, the key

identifying assumption of this paper is that historical climate variability is exogenous to recent child labour and educational decisions, i.e., the only way in which rainfall has an effect on child labour and educational decisions is through village risk.

However, the effect of weather on permanent and transitory income are based on theoretical frameworks with strong assumptions about the operation of rural labour and land markets, preferences, and technology. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) argue that the assumption of orthogonality with other unobserved determinants may be overly strong. This is a concern noted in Fitzsimons (2007), and also aired here. While a fixed-effects estimation approach controls for time-invariant omitted variables, we are still concerned about time-variant omitted variables that may impact child labour and schooling decisions and are also correlated with our measure of income risk. For example, rainfall shocks may have resulted in disasters that caused damage to schools or infrastructure, directly affecting school attendance and child labour decisions. As a result of this, we control for whether the village has experienced a rainfall shock in the previous five years. We are confident with this measure as, unlike other studies in which the data on shocks is subject to the caveat that it is self-reported, our measure is based on a quality-controlled meteorological measurement.

On a similar note, past rainfall may have affected the labour market decisions of other household members, leading to off-farm labour supply as an attempt to diversify the income portfolio. To control for this, we include whether household members are engaged in off-farm labour, measured as the number of days worked off-farm in the previous 12 months. However, due to labour market imperfections or general equilibrium effects, this may not be an effective method of diversifying risk. For example, Jayachandran (2006) shows that productivity shocks depress wages by more when workers are poorer, less able to migrate, and more credit-constrained because of the inelasticity of these workers' labour supply. Macours et al. (2012) conducted a randomized control trial in Nicaragua and found that a conditional cash transfer allowed households in rural areas to diversify out of agriculture, increasing mean income by

8% and increasing resilience to droughts.

It is more likely that past rainfall may have affected the labour market decisions of household members through the channel of migration or by marrying off family members to other villages in order to diversify covariate risk. Indeed, Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) show that marriage with migration significantly reduces the variation in household food consumption and that households subject to more variable income tend to engage more in longer-distance marriage with migration. In relation to labour market decisions, Bryan, Chowdhury and Mobarak (2012) randomly assign a small cash transfer, equivalent to the cost of travel, to out-migrate during the famine season in Bangladesh. They report that this transfer induces 22% of households to send a family member to migrate, that consumption of the family members with a migrant increases by 30%, and that the effect of this one-time transfer is persistent with positive spillover effects: the migration rate is 10 percentage points higher in year 2, and 8 percentage points higher in year 3. We control for these potential factors as much as we can through the remittances received by the household. In addition, strong regionalisation in Ethiopia means it is very difficult to obtain work outside of your locality, this further mitigates such concerns about migration behaviour.

6 Results and Discussion

In this section we present and discuss the results, examining the effect of climate variability on child labour (total, farming, and domestic chores) and educational outcomes (whether the children have enrolled).

6.1 Child Labour: The Intensive Margin

The effects of climate variability on the number of hours worked by children is estimated using the difference-in-means fixed-effects framework through the Poisson QMLE model.

Turning first to table 3, we examine the effects of climate variability on

the number of hours worked using the specification from equation (4). We observe that an increase in weather risk increases the number of hours worked in farming and decreases the number of hours worked in the home. This results in the net effect of weather risk on child labour being zero. This is demonstrated in column 3, which examines total child labour. This emphasises the importance of looking at the effect of risk on child labour activities separately, in order to observe substitution of labour across activities. Given the small number of clusters observed in our data set (15 villages) we bootstrap-cluster the standard errors in order to provide the most robust classification of the standard errors. This is important as it is more likely that the null hypothesis will be rejected when the number of clusters is small.

Following the discussion at the end of section 5, we interpret these results as the semi-elasticity of child labour in response to a unit change in an explanatory variable. The Poisson QMLE fixed-effects model is non-linear, and so these results are dependent on the coefficient and on the expected value of the number of hours worked, conditional on the coefficient. Consequently, the larger the value of $\mathbb{E}(Y|x)$, the larger the rate of change in $\mathbb{E}(Y|x)$.

Table 3: Number of Hours Worked by Children

	(1) Child Labour (Farm)	(2) Child Labour (Home)	(3) Child Labour (Total)
Climate Variability	0.0406*** (0.0128)	-0.0291*** (0.00667)	0.00814 (0.00774)
Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)	-0.000899 (0.0874)	0.0383 (0.0338)	0.0242 (0.0522)
Male	1.070*** (0.0825)	-0.946*** (0.109)	0.0358 (0.0312)
Age	0.104** (0.0420)	0.150*** (0.0345)	0.129*** (0.0164)
Age ²	-0.00427** (0.00182)	-0.00514*** (0.00160)	-0.00478*** (0.000717)
Grades (Head)	0.00481 (0.00751)	-0.00600 (0.0110)	-0.00155 (0.00750)
Grades (Spouse)	-0.0116 (0.0123)	-0.00898 (0.0104)	-0.00905 (0.00875)
Log Remittances	-0.00927 (0.00608)	0.0109 (0.00698)	0.00132 (0.00335)
Log Days Worked Off-Farm	-0.0129 (0.00828)	-0.0130 (0.0122)	-0.00922 (0.00787)
Land (Hectares)	0.0283** (0.0141)	0.00133 (0.00735)	0.0137 (0.00840)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,212	3,213	3,222
Log-Likelihood	-25,145.945	-20,179.375	-21,639.531

Notes: Fixed effects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

We observe that a one-unit increase in the CV is associated with a 4% increase in the number of hours worked on the farm. Referring to table 1, a one standard deviation change in the CV is 4.44 units. As such, a one standard deviation change in the CV is associated with a 17.76 percentage point increase in the number of hours worked on the farm. To give more structure to the interpretation of this effect, we compare the difference across villages using the

values provided in table 2. We see that the community with the smallest CV is Korodegaga (15.60), and the village with the largest CV is Geblen (34.24). From the results in table 3, we might expect that the average level of farming child labour in Geblen is 62.4% higher than in Korodegaga.¹⁹ We observe that, for domestic child labour, a one-unit increase in the CV results in a 2.9% decrease in child labour in the home. This is especially interesting, as it indicates that there is some substitution between activities in response to increased variability, emphasising the importance of measuring child labour based on different activities as opposed to aggregate measures, as discussed in Beegle et al. (2006). Climate variability may result in more work in the planting and cultivation stages of agriculture in order to minimise losses in the event of a shock: an increase in the intensive margin of labour supply. A one standard deviation change in the CV is associated with a 12.7% decrease in the number of hours worked in the home. Furthermore, a comparison between Geblen and Korodegaga reveals that, on average, the expected level of child labour in the home is 54.05% less in Korodegaga.

With regard to the other coefficients, we see that age has a significant positive effect on the level of child labour across all activities, but at a diminishing rate. This may be an indication of the increasing productivity of children in the home (due to child-care responsibilities increasing with age) and on the farm (due to increased productivity on manual tasks as children develop).

In addition to age effects, we observe significant gender effects. The number of hours worked in farming is increasing for boys, while decreasing in domestic chores by a similar magnitude. This indicates that households may allocate tasks in accordance with potential comparative advantages.

While these results are reduced-form and do not indicate the precise mechanism through which climate variability increases child labour on the farm, our results indicate that it may have a significant impact on household time-allocation decisions. The fact that climate variability has an effect on the number of hours of child labour indicates, from our theoretical framework, that households may invest more child labour in farming to minimise losses in

¹⁹ $(34.24 - 15.6) \times 0.04 = 0.624$

the event of a shock. To understand whether this is merely a change in the intensive margin of child labour supply, with time being allocated differently across activities without a reduction in education on the extensive margin, we must understand the effects of climate variability on enrolment and labour force participation.

6.2 School and Labour Force Participation: The Extensive Margin

From a policy perspective, part of the concern related to child labour relates to the degree that it crowds out educational attainment. As we have observed, climate variability is associated with an increase in child labour on the farm, and a decrease in child labour in the home. Given this substitution, it is of interest to understand whether there are also changes on the extensive margin. An increase in participation, above and beyond the changes in the intensive margin, may have an impact on education if the substitution of activities on the intensive margin is not able to account for the full adjustment. In examining the effects of climate variability on education, we first explore whether climate variability increases the probability that children participate in child labour activities and whether it increases the likelihood that these children either do not attend or delay entry into school, as discussed by Fitzsimons (2007) and Kazianga (2012)).

Table 4 presents results from linear probability models examining the impact of climate variability on participation in child labour on the farm, in the home, and whether the child participates in any child labour.

Table 4: Participation in child labour activities - the extensive margin

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Child Labour (Farm)	Child Labour (Home)	Child Labour (Total)
Climate Variability	0.0165** (0.00783)	-0.00336 (0.00866)	-0.000786 (0.00246)
Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)	-0.00187 (0.0336)	-0.0657 (0.0520)	0.0132 (0.0154)
Male	0.391*** (0.0211)	-0.326*** (0.0362)	-0.0221*** (0.00490)
Age	0.0509*** (0.0157)	0.0509** (0.0231)	0.0544*** (0.0104)
Age ²	-0.00209*** (0.000705)	-0.00212** (0.000989)	-0.00225*** (0.000439)
Grades (Head)	0.0146*** (0.00379)	0.00584* (0.00331)	0.00117 (0.00123)
Grades (Spouse)	0.00000907 (0.00962)	-0.00132 (0.00386)	0.00186 (0.00120)
Log Remittances	-0.00567 (0.00556)	0.00743*** (0.00262)	0.00163 (0.00129)
Log Days Worked Off-Farm	-0.00392 (0.00600)	-0.00695 (0.00430)	0.000673 (0.00269)
Land (Hectares)	0.00983** (0.00443)	-0.00279 (0.00584)	-0.000141 (0.00133)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3222	3222	3222
Adjusted R^2	0.180	0.166	0.023

Notes: Fixed effects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

We observe that there is very little impact on the extensive margin other than for child labour on the farm. This indicates that most of the adjustment takes place on the intensive margin, i.e., that households are able to substitute time across activities.

In examining the effect of risk on the propensity to not attend or delay entry into school, we present results from linear probability models (table 5).

Table 5: Education, Education, Education - the extensive margin

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Not Attending	Never Attended	Zero Grades	Grades Completed
Climate Variability	-0.00460 (0.00989)	0.00272 (0.00176)	-0.00824 (0.0117)	-0.0207 (0.0787)
Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)	0.0271 (0.0604)	-0.0234 (0.0163)	-0.0109 (0.0786)	-0.162 (0.383)
Male	0.000895 (0.00963)	-0.00111 (0.00716)	-0.0170 (0.0278)	0.0447 (0.141)
Age	-0.0644*** (0.0165)	-0.00228 (0.00513)	-0.144*** (0.0172)	0.704*** (0.0859)
Age ²	0.00214*** (0.000583)	0.0000797 (0.000245)	0.00522*** (0.000674)	-0.00966** (0.00394)
Grades (Head)	0.00114 (0.000977)	-0.000899 (0.000587)	-0.00594 (0.00419)	0.0637*** (0.0169)
Grades (Spouse)	-0.00856*** (0.00265)	-0.00114 (0.00107)	-0.0139*** (0.00255)	0.0803*** (0.0284)
Log Remittances	-0.00214 (0.00139)	0.000364 (0.00140)	-0.00123 (0.00316)	-0.0153 (0.0274)
Log Days Worked Off-Farm	0.00407 (0.00336)	0.00210 (0.00167)	0.00253 (0.00461)	-0.0419 (0.0342)
Land (Hectares)	0.00476 (0.00506)	-0.00246 (0.00217)	0.00180 (0.00460)	0.00681 (0.0326)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2959	2484	3222	3222
Adjusted R^2	0.070	-0.004	0.123	0.399

Notes: Fixed effects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

Table 5 shows that we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that climate variability has no effect on the decision to enrol children in school, nor on educational attainment. This is plausible given the adjustment along the intensive margin. In addition, as argued by Fitzsimons (2007), this could indicate that households in riskier villages have lower preferences for education, which is captured by the village fixed effects. If we restrict the sample to be

cross-sectional (for 2004 or 2009) we are able to replicate the results observed in Fitzsimons (2007), i.e., that the variability decreases the probability that children attend school. We present these cross-sectional results in table 6.

Table 6: Education, Education, Education - the extensive margin (Cross-section)

	(1) (2004) Zero Grades	(2) (2009) Zero Grades	(3) (2004) Grades Attained	(4) (2009) Grades Attained
Climate Variability	-0.00560 (0.00612)	-0.0285*** (0.00717)	0.258*** (0.0556)	0.172*** (0.0284)
Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)	–	0.0618 (0.0513)	–	-0.610** (0.292)
Village Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1615	1607	1615	1607
Adjusted R^2	0.077	0.321	0.402	0.496

Notes: In 2004 village shocks in the previous 5 years was omitted as all villages had experienced at least one shock. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

While there is little evidence to support the impact of climate variability on enrolment, there may be an impact on the intensive margin. It is likely to be the case that time is allocated away from informal educational experiences such as homework and out-of-school tutoring. However, without data on time allocation within education, we cannot estimate the elasticity of education with respect to child labour to evaluate a precise trade-off.

7 Supporting Evidence

In order to demonstrate the robustness of the results, we consider a number of additional extensions and robustness checks to try to validate our measure of climate variability and isolate the channel observed in the reduced form

results. In appendix C, we present additional mechanical robustness checks and stress tests.

7.1 Spreading the Burden

First, we test our hypothesis that households spread the burden of labour across children. If we believe that the households' utility is increasing in education, then it is also possible that they may try to smooth the burden of child labour across children to mitigate the impact on education. This might explain in part why we observe no average effect of climate variability on enrolment.

We explore this potential in a number of ways. First, we look at the degree to which the opportunity of spreading the burden across children is available to households by looking at interactions between whether the child has any siblings and climate variability. Although we note that family size is endogenous in this context and, as such, cannot be argued to be causal, it does help to motivate the narrative. In order to deal with this endogeneity issue, we also examine the interaction between climate variability and being the eldest child. While the number of children is endogenous, sibling order is not. The argument made to support this channel is based on the idea that at the time when decisions about educating the eldest child were being made, there was no substitute child labour available and so consequently the burden of labour fell on the eldest child. This allows for multiple sibling families, but accounts for the fact that younger siblings would not have engaged in child labour, or would not have been productive in the same way at such a young age.

We first report the results on the number of siblings and then the results on sibling order. We test the first hypothesis by interacting climate variability with a dummy variable equal to one if the child has no siblings and zero if the child has one or more siblings.

As we observe in table 7, while climate variability itself is insignificant, the interaction term is significant at the 1% level. From column (1), we observe

that if a child has no siblings, then a one standard deviation increase in the coefficient of variation (4.44) increases the probability that the child does not attend school by 2.2 percentage points. As above, if we compare Geblen and Korodegaga, we observe that the probability of not attending school is just over 9% more likely in Geblen if a child has zero siblings relative than if a child has one or more siblings. In terms of educational attainment, we observe from column (4) that a one standard deviation increase in the coefficient of variation (4.44) reduces grade attainment by 0.2 grades. In comparing Geblen and Korodegaga, we observe a reduction in grades close to 1 (0.85). While this does not seem like a particularly large effect, we argue that this is the impact of uncertainty, not the realisation of a shock.

Table 7: Education, Education, Education - Sibling Interaction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Not Attending	Never Attended	Zero Grades	Grades Completed
Climate Variability	-0.00553 (0.0106)	0.00207 (0.00134)	-0.00219 (0.00789)	0.00830 (0.0669)
No Siblings	-0.132*** (0.0411)	-0.0804*** (0.0279)	-0.115* (0.0635)	0.943** (0.475)
Climate Variability \times No Siblings	0.00509*** (0.00164)	0.00301*** (0.00105)	0.00452* (0.00231)	-0.0457** (0.0179)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,959	2,747	3,222	2,959
Adjusted R^2	0.071	-0.003	0.045	0.415

Notes: Fixed effects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

As discussed, we try to deal with the potential endogeneity concerns by considering interactions with the ordering of children. The following table examines the interaction between climate variability and being the eldest child.

Table 8: Education, Education, Education - Eldest Child Interaction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Not Attending	Never Attended	Zero Grades	Grades Completed
Climate Variability	-0.00923 (0.0103)	0.00120 (0.00190)	-0.0124 (0.0117)	-0.00715 (0.0773)
Eldest	-0.255*** (0.0658)	-0.0899*** (0.0262)	-0.218** (0.102)	0.745 (0.561)
Climate Variability \times Eldest	0.00961*** (0.00259)	0.00335*** (0.000986)	0.00882** (0.00396)	-0.0290 (0.0224)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2959	2484	3222	3222
Adjusted R^2	0.079	0.000	0.126	0.399

Notes: Fixed effects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

From table 8, we observe again that, while we cannot reject the null hypothesis that climate variability has no effect on educational outcomes, the interaction with a dummy variable, equal to one if the child is the eldest sibling, and zero otherwise, is significant at the 1% level. From column (1), we observe that if a child is the eldest sibling, then a one standard deviation increase in the coefficient of variation (4.44) increases the probability that the child does not attend school by 4.2 percentage points. As above, if we compare Geblen and Korodegaga, we observe that the probability of not attending school is just over 17.9% more likely in Geblen if a child is the eldest sibling.

While the channel through which this effect occurs is not conclusive (it could simply be the case that elder children are more productive and so are more likely to be used in child labour), this evidence, in addition to the results on the number of siblings, is supportive of an argument in which households spread the burden of labour across children.

7.2 Seasonal Variability

An important placebo test is to check whether climate variability outside of the agricultural season has an effect on child labour. In order to be a good measure of future income uncertainty, climate variability outside of the agricultural season should not be an important determinant.

Table 9: Seasonal Measures of Climate Variability

	(1) Child Labour (Farm)	(2) Child Labour (Chores)	(3) Child Labour (Total)
Climate Variability _{Belg}	0.004* (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)
Climate Variability _{Kiremt}	0.0209* (0.012)	-0.009 (0.007)	0.005 (0.005)
Climate Variability _{Bega}	0.023 (0.022)	-0.022 (0.019)	0.000 (0.014)
Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES
Observations	3,212	3,213	3,222

Notes: Fixed effects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Each variable corresponds to a separate regression e.g. one using the Belg season measure, a second using the Kiremt season measure and finally a third using the Bega season measure. Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

As table 9 shows, the Bega (Dry) season is not an important determinant of child labour, while the Belg and Kiremt rainy seasons are. Interestingly, we observe that the Belg season shows the most evidence of substitution along the intensive margin. This would be consistent with a story of risk-management, as the Belg season is when critical decision-making for agriculture occurs. The Kiremt season is associated with the flowering phases of plant growth and final harvesting.

8 Conclusions

The objective of this paper was to evaluate the extent to which future income uncertainty, proxied by climate variability, influences household decision-making in the context of child labour and human capital accumulation. We observe that climate variability has a significant effect on the number of hours that children work on the farm (the intensive margin), with substitution of time from child labour in the home to child labour on the farm. Contrary to previous research, there is no effect of climate variability on enrolment in school or educational attainment. The only effect we find on the extensive margin is that children are more likely to participate in child labour on the farm. This may be motivated by households' efforts to spread the burden across children to reduce the impact on education and leisure. This mechanism is supported by results which indicate that increased climate variability decreases the probability that children attend school for children with no siblings. This channel is further supported by examining the interaction between climate variability and sibling order, to deal with endogeneity concerns surrounding family size and child labour.

Results on the intensive margin of child labour supply indicate that increased climate variability increases the number of hours worked on the farm with decreases in the number of hours worked in the home. This indication of substitution between activities emphasises the importance of distinguishing between activities when examining the determinants of child labour, as discussed by Beegle et al. (2006). We argue that households form expectations about the likelihood of future income shocks based on the variability of the climate. We posit that, in order to manage this risk, households increase child labour on the farm *ex ante* to minimise losses in the event that income shocks should occur in the future. This hypothesis, supported by our results, contrasts with recent work by Fitzsimons (2007) and Kazianga (2012), who argue that households do not enrol children in school in an *ex ante* response to future income risk, as a precautionary savings mechanism. We show that the results from these studies are likely to be the artefact of the cross-sectional

data used. However, this is not to say that climate variability has no effect on human capital accumulation. Without time-allocation data on education, we are unable to observe the effects of increased child labour on the amount of time spent in school and on more informal educational investments, such as homework and external tutoring, which may limit participation in education at later levels.

These results emphasise the importance of understanding *ex ante* as well as *ex post* responses to fully understand the risk-management practices of households. While this paper focusses on a representative sample of rural Ethiopia, we are not able to examine the effects of weather risk in urban areas, as in Fitzsimons (2007). Consequently, our conclusions may have limited external validity to Ethiopia as a whole; however, it is unlikely that urban areas will be affected by future income uncertainty, proxied by climate variability, as shown in Alem and Colmer (2013). Overall, the results suggest that climate variability may be an important factor in household decisions related to child labour and investment in human capital, pointing to the need for more research into the socio-economic impacts of climate change across a broad range of economic and policy contexts.

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Appendices - For Online Publication

The Following Appendices are displayed in three parts. Appendix A presents a series of Maps and Charts references in the Main text. Appendix B presents regression tables for OLS specifications referred to in the main text. Appendix C presents a series of mechanical robustness tests that demonstrate the validity of our results to alternative specifications and outliers.

Appendix A - Maps, and Graphs

Appendix A presents a series of graphs and maps that have been referenced to in section 2 of the main text. It also provides the complete table of descriptive statistics referred to in the data description.




Figure 1: Differences in the average annual rainfall of the villages and Ethiopia as a whole.




Figure 2: Differences in the Coefficient of Variation across villages between the two time periods.




Figure 3: The ERHS Villages (Dercon & Hoddinott, 2009)




Figure 4: Average Annual Rainfall (1979-2011)




Figure 5: The Coefficient of Variation (1979-2011)

Appendix B - OLS Results and Conditional Logit Specifications

Table A1: Number of Hours Worked by Children - Intensive Margin (OLS - logs)

	(1) Child Labour (Farm)	(2) Child Labour (Home)	(3) Child Labour (Total)
Climate Variability	0.0543** (0.0228)	-0.0189 (0.0239)	0.00823 (0.0129)
Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)	0.0230 (0.120)	-0.0989 (0.142)	0.0597 (0.0809)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3212	3213	3222
Adjusted R^2	0.236	0.259	0.038

Notes: Fixed effects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

Table A2: Number of Hours Worked by Children - Intensive Margin (OLS - levels)

	(1) Child Labour (Farm)	(2) Child Labour (Home)	(3) Child Labour (Total)
Climate Variability	0.556*** (0.172)	-0.326*** (0.121)	0.211 (0.249)
Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)	-0.223 (1.545)	0.471 (0.747)	0.367 (1.462)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3212	3213	3222
Adjusted R^2	0.211	0.256	0.024

Notes: Fixed effects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

Appendix C - Robustness Checks

In addition to our main results we consider a series of robustness checks. We begin by removing outliers from the number of hours worked to establish that the results are not determined by these. We do this by limiting the number of hours worked in each activity to an average of 8 hours per day, then 6 hours per day, and finally 4 hours per day. A second robustness check explores alternative measures of climate variability. The first alternative specification uses the standard deviation of rainfall over the same period. We also consider seasonal measures of the CV and the CV measured over a 5 year period. Finally, we examine whether the relationship between climate variability and child labour is characterised by non-linearities.

We begin by examining the effects of removing outliers on our results, firstly in the dependent variable, and then in our coefficient of interest, climate variability.

Table A3: Removal of Dependent Variable Outliers

	(1) Farming	(2) Chores	(3) Total
<i>Max 8 hours</i>			
Climate Variability	0.0506*** (0.0126)	-0.0290*** (0.0105)	0.0132* (0.00793)
Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)	-0.0152 (0.0800)	0.0527 (0.0638)	0.0152 (0.0528)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,044	3,044	3,044
Log-Likelihood	-21,796.89	-17,698.988	-17,765.703
<i>Max 6 hours</i>			
Climate Variability	0.0312* (0.0174)	-0.0234 (0.0159)	0.00468 (0.0113)
Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)	0.0678 (0.101)	0.0204 (0.0991)	0.0368 (0.0716)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,735	2,735	2,735
Log-Likelihood	-17,168.882	-15,043.177	-13,889.686
<i>Max 4 hours</i>			
Climate Variability	0.0149 (0.0214)	-0.00761 (0.0172)	0.00525 (0.00878)
Rainfall Shock (past 5 years)	0.214 (0.147)	-0.0203 (0.116)	0.0657 (0.0644)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2025	2025	2025
Log-Likelihood	-10,595.168	-10,152.128	-8,678.135

Notes: Fixed effects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

Table A3 indicates that our results are fairly robust to outliers. We observe that child labour in all areas remains significant and of a similar magnitude when the number of hours are restricted to a maximum of 8 per day. These results hold for child labour on the farm when we restrict the number of hours further to 6. Once the sample is restricted to 4 hours, the CV for the separate

activities become insignificant.

Table A4 removes potential outliers in our explanatory variable. We begin by dropping the village with the highest climate variability, Geblen. In the next test, we drop the village with the lowest climate variability, Korodegaga. In the final test, we drop both villages.

Table A4: Removal of Explanatory Variable Outliers

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Child Labour (Farm)	Child Labour (Chores)	Child LabTotal
<i>Geblen Removed</i>			
Climate Variability	0.0400*	-0.0266**	0.00844
	(0.0238)	(0.0122)	(0.0133)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,057	3,058	3,067
<i>Korodegaga Removed</i>			
Climate Variability	0.0235	-0.0198**	0.00489
	(0.0172)	(0.00919)	(0.00957)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3079	3079	3088
<i>Both Removed</i>			
Climate Variability	0.0240	-0.0174	0.00602
	(0.0231)	(0.0118)	(0.0127)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,924	2,924	2,933

Notes: Fixed effects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

While the results remain significant when dropping Geblen, we lose the significance of the result examining child labour on the farm when we drop Korodegaga. However, the result is very imprecise and so indicates that it may be due to measurement error and a reduction in variation than being a zero effect. One we drop both villages we lose significance for all the results, this is unsurprising given how much variation is removed.

Table A5 presents results based on alternative time specifications of the

coefficient of variation, ranging from 2 – 10 years. The results shown present a reasonably consistent magnitude and significance over different temporal scales, weakening as the time period becomes smaller in which it is likely that the measure becomes more highly correlated with weather shocks.

Table A5: Alternative Temporal Specifications of Climate Variability

	(1) Child Labour (Farm)	(2) Child Labour (Chores)	(3) Child LabTotal
Climate Variability _{10years}	0.0406** (0.0165)	-0.0291*** (0.0112)	0.00814 (0.0105)
Climate Variability _{9years}	0.0409*** (0.0159)	-0.0182* (0.0107)	0.0132* (0.00791)
Climate Variability _{8years}	0.0261** (0.0117)	-0.0175** (0.00879)	0.00647 (0.00571)
Climate Variability _{7years}	0.0246*** (0.00737)	-0.00686 (0.00549)	0.00939*** (0.00353)
Climate Variability _{6years}	0.0303* (0.0174)	-0.0186 (0.0163)	0.00851 (0.00737)
Climate Variability _{5years}	0.0220 (0.0167)	-0.0219*** (0.00746)	0.00332 (0.00804)
Climate Variability _{4years}	0.0130 (0.0106)	-0.0155*** (0.00425)	0.000528 (0.00634)
Climate Variability _{3years}	0.00752 (0.00468)	-0.00851*** (0.00265)	0.000306 (0.00286)
Climate Variability _{2years}	0.00412 (0.00531)	-0.00525** (0.00227)	-0.000165 (0.00183)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,924	2,924	2,933

Notes: Fixed effects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

Table A6 tests the robustness of our results to controlling for contemporaneous weather shocks. As is clear, the results remain robust. We observe an increase in child labour on the farm and a reduction in child labour in the home of similar magnitudes to the main specification.

Table A6: Number of Hours Worked by Children - Intensive Margin (Contemporaneous Weather Shock)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Child Labour (Farm)	Child Labour (Home)	Child Labour (Total)
Climate Variability	0.0370* (0.0219)	-0.0261** (0.0126)	0.00697 (0.0107)
Negative Rainfall Shock	0.0359 (0.139)	0.0108 (0.0823)	0.0359 (0.0710)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,212	3,213	3,222
Log-Likelihood	-25,144.587	-20,180.276	-21,638.451

Notes: Fixed effects: Village, Year, Season (Month). Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. All regressions include same controls as table 3. Standard errors are bootstrap clustered at the village level (1000 replications) to account for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level in addition to concerns over the small number of clusters.

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