

Lora, Eduardo

**Working Paper**

## Structural reform in Latin America: What has been reformed and how it can be quantified (updated Version)

IDB Working Paper Series, No. IDB-WP-346

**Provided in Cooperation with:**

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, DC

*Suggested Citation:* Lora, Eduardo (2012) : Structural reform in Latin America: What has been reformed and how it can be quantified (updated Version), IDB Working Paper Series, No. IDB-WP-346, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, DC

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/88956>

**Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:**

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

**Terms of use:**

*Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.*

*You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.*

*If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.*



**IDB WORKING PAPER SERIES No. IDB-WP-346**

# **Structural Reforms in Latin America:**

## **What Has Been Reformed and How to Measure It (Updated version)**

Eduardo Lora

December 2012

**Inter-American Development Bank**  
Department of Research and Chief Economist

# **Structural Reforms in Latin America:**

**What Has Been Reformed  
and How to Measure It  
(Updated version)**

Eduardo Lora

Inter-American Development Bank



Inter-American Development Bank

2012

Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the  
Inter-American Development Bank  
Felipe Herrera Library

Lora, Eduardo.

Structural reforms in Latin America : What has been reformed and how to measure it (updated version) / Eduardo Lora.

p. cm. (IDB working paper series ; 346)

Includes bibliographical references.

1. Latin America—Economic policy. 2. Latin America—Economic conditions—1982-. I. Inter-American Development Bank. Research Dept. II. Title. III. Series.

IDB-WP-346

<http://www.iadb.org>

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent.

The unauthorized commercial use of Bank documents is prohibited and may be punishable under the Bank's policies and/or applicable laws.

Copyright © 2012 Inter-American Development Bank. This working paper may be reproduced for any non-commercial purpose. It may also be reproduced in any academic journal indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, with previous consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication.

## **Abstract\***

This paper discusses the major changes that took place in the key areas of structural economic policy in Latin America between 1985 and 2009 and presents a set of indexes that attempt to measure how favorable trade, financial, tax, privatization and labor policies are for the free working of markets. On a scale from 0 to 1, the average index for all the countries and all the structural policy areas increased from 0.39 in 1985 to 0.6 at the end of the 1990s, and to 0.65 at the end of the 2000s. The structural reforms have been far-reaching, especially in the trade and financial areas, and to a lesser extent in the areas of taxation and of infrastructure privatization. The indexes can be used to make comparisons over time between areas and between countries. However, they are not adequate for measuring structural policies in Argentina and Venezuela in the 2000s, since some of the heterodox policies that these countries have adopted are not covered by the indexes.

**JEL classifications:** O11, O20, F10, H20

**Keywords:** Structural reforms, Reform indexes, Washington Consensus, Trade opening, Liberalization of markets, Labor regulation

---

\* This paper is an updated version of Research Department Working Paper 462, published in December 2001.

## 1. Introduction\*

Between the mid-1980s and late 1990s there was a profound shift in the structural policies of Latin American and Caribbean countries, inspired by the “Washington Consensus” in vogue at that time.<sup>1</sup> The development model based on protection of domestic markets and state intervention was replaced by a set of policies overwhelmingly oriented toward the goal of improving efficiency, facilitating the working of markets and reducing the distorting effects of state intervention on economic activities.

After the outbreak of the Asian and Russian crises (1997 and 1998), with their negative impact on growth and macroeconomic stability in the region, Latin American societies began to suffer from reform fatigue and the precepts of the Consensus became subject to scrutiny.<sup>2</sup> When the governments of some countries, with Venezuela in the lead, declared their opposition to these precepts, it was feared that reforms could be reversed across the region. In the end, this did not happen, as shown by the reform indexes presented in this document.

This study aims to describe and measure the evolution of structural reforms in the 1985-2009 period. The reform indexes presented here are a modified and updated version of indexes covering the period to 1999 (Lora, 1997 and 2001). The original construction of the indexes was motivated by the absence at the time of measurements on the progress of reforms. As argued then, lack of direct measurements of the structural policies had prevented adequate evaluation of the effects of the reforms on economic growth and other variables. The few studies that had attempted to analyze the effects of the reforms used *outcome* variables, such as the ratio of foreign trade in the economy, or the size of public spending or financial depth,<sup>3</sup> rather than *policy* variables, such as tariffs, tax rates or bank reserve ratios. The reform indexes that were then

---

\* The author is grateful for the valuable assistance of Johanna Fajardo who updated the series for this version and contributed to refining some aspects of the methodology. The author is also grateful for the valuable comments and contributions of information by Andrés Fernández, Arturo Galindo, Gabriel Sánchez, Carlos Scartascini, Reinier Schliesser, and Teresa Ter-Minassian. In addition Andrés Gómez-Peña and Juan David Herreño helped with the final editing. However, any errors are the author's.

<sup>1</sup> Whose main points were originally summarized by Williamson (1990).

<sup>2</sup> See Lora, Panizza, and Quispe (2004).

<sup>3</sup> These are some of the indicators used by Easterly, Loayza and Montiel (1997) who evaluated the effects of the reforms on growth.

proposed were the basis for several studies that examined the effects of the reforms and stimulated construction of other reform indicators.<sup>4</sup>

The structural reform index measures how favorable policies in the trade, financial, tax, privatization and labor areas are for the proper working of markets. The index compares the state of various policy areas in a single country or each policy across countries. On a scale of 0 to 1, the average index for all countries and all structural policy areas was at a level of 0.39 in 1985. By the end of the 1990s the index had reached 0.60 and at the end the 2000s it reached 0.65. These changes involve far-reaching reforms, but they also suggest that not all the reform potential was exploited.

The first part of this paper describes the most important advances in the various areas of structural reform since the mid-1980s, with emphasis on the changes in the 2000s. The second part of the paper summarizes the methodology used to prepare the index and results in each area over time and by country. The Appendix contains more details of the methodology and the index series and their main components.<sup>5</sup>

## **2. The Progress of Reforms**

### ***2.1 International Trade and Foreign Exchange Market Liberalization***

Between the mid-1980s and early in following decade every country began programs to liberalize their trade regimes, with reductions of at least 15 points in average import tariff rates. Tariffs dropped from average levels of 42.2 percent in 1985 to 13.2 percent in 1991, and less than 10 percent from 2005. At the same time, tariff dispersion was markedly reduced (Figure 1). In 2009 (or the last year with data), no country had average tariffs above 14 percent (Figure 2). Although occasional tariff rises tend to attract public attention and international reaction, average tariffs in 2009 were only higher than 10 years before in Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador and Venezuela, with increases in all cases of less than a percentage point.

Licenses and other non-tariff restrictions, which affected 37.6 percent of imports in the pre-reform period, were affecting only 6.3 percent of imports by the mid-1990s.<sup>6</sup> There is no

---


<sup>4</sup> See Fernández-Arias and Montiel (1997), Londoño and Székely (1997), Lora and Barrera (1997), Lora and Olivera (2005), Lora and Panizza (2002), Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999), Bonaglia, Goldstein and Richaud (2000), and Behrman, Birdsall and Székely (2000).

<sup>5</sup> The database presented in the Appendix is available online:  
[https://drive.google.com/?pli=1#folders/0BxHkZL\\_I0N0NjhRUW0xbW9sb3M](https://drive.google.com/?pli=1#folders/0BxHkZL_I0N0NjhRUW0xbW9sb3M)

<sup>6</sup> For 11 countries with information. For a more detailed description see IDB (1996), Part Two.

later information that could be used to make a complete comparison between countries, but there is evidence of restoration of import restrictions in several cases. Argentina has used import licensing systems and quota protection mechanisms (especially anti-dumping) to restrict imports, especially since the international financial crisis. It is estimated that these mechanisms, which applied to 1.2 percent of imports in 2006, affected 2.9 percent of imports in 2009 (or 5% based on the value of imports repressed).<sup>7</sup> Also, Argentina applies taxes (known as retentions) and occasionally quantitative restrictions on agricultural exports that affect the consumption basket.<sup>8</sup> Venezuela has also introduced some quantitative controls and *ad hoc* restrictions to reduce imports from some countries, especially from Colombia between 2002 and 2004 and between 2008 and 2010.<sup>9</sup>

Figure 1. Import Tariff Liberalization, 1985-2010



Sources: see Appendix.

Note: Includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico,

<sup>7</sup> These calculations are taken from Moore (2011). Restrictive measures on imports by Argentina are summarized in INAI (2012).


<sup>8</sup> See the list of restrictions on exports between 2007 and March 2011 in Sharma (2012, Annex 1).

<sup>9</sup> Esguerra et al.(2010).



International trade operations were severely hampered in the 1980s and early 1990s by the presence of multiple foreign exchange markets, usually as a result of authorities' attempts to use a range of expedients to ration the use of foreign exchange, such as attempting to separate some markets from others, maintain currency quotas for imports or impose a series of taxes and restrictions on certain foreign exchange operations. In some cases the result was extreme differences between the free market and the most regulated exchange rates. In 1988, in Peru, Brazil and Honduras the gap between the free or black market and official rates was over 100 percent, and in five other countries between 50 and 100 percent (Lora, 2001). These exchange differentials reflected not only the presence of regulations but also deep monetary imbalances. Resumption of capital flows into Latin America since 1989 and adoption of fiscal and monetary stabilization policies led to the dismantling of these regulations and reduction of exchange premiums. In 1997 only Haiti had an exchange rate differential higher than 20 percent, while in 17 countries (of 24 with data) this gap was less than 5 percent (being negative in the case of Venezuela).

Figure 2. Average Import Tariffs, 1986, 1999, 2009



Source: see Appendix

Note: Nicaragua 1986 is data for 1985, Dominican Rep. 1986 is data for 1988 and Trinidad and Tobago 1986 is data for 1985. Jamaica 2009 is data for 2007 and Trinidad and Tobago 2009 is data for 2008.

The International Monetary Fund ceased publishing information on parallel exchange rates in December 1998 in view of their insignificance and difficulties in information collection. But in some Latin American countries large exchange premiums have recently appeared, reminiscent of the 1980s. In Venezuela, the spread between the market and the (main) official rate averaged 120 percent in the 2007-2011 period with an (annual average) peak of 186 percent in 2009.<sup>10</sup> In Argentina imposition of the “corralito,” which limited withdrawal of deposits from the financial system in 2001, was accompanied by significant exchange rate differentials, which ended in 2003 when the de facto crawling peg system was introduced. However, since October 2011, due to new restrictions on the purchase of foreign exchange, the differentials have reappeared, reaching 40 percent over the official rate in July 2012.<sup>11</sup>

## ***2.2 Financial Liberalization***

The main objectives of the financial reforms adopted especially in the 1990s were to give more freedom of operation to financial intermediaries and reinforce mechanisms for prudential regulation and supervision. The liberalization was intended to reduce reserve requirements, eliminate controls on interest rates and dismantle forced investments and directed credit mechanisms. Between 1990 and 2000, effective reserve requirements were cut in 15 countries (out of 19 with data), and five made reductions of 20 points or more. As a result, the average rate of reserves as a percentage of deposits fell to a minimum (since 1985) of 16.2 percent. Since 2000, effective reserve ratios have risen again, although not to the levels that prevailed until the early 1990s. They have increased in 17 of the 19 countries (more than 20 points in the cases of Argentina and Peru), and reached 23.5 percent on average in the region in 2010. Increasingly, reserve ratios have become part of the arsenal of countercyclical or macroprudential instruments which are managed with macroeconomic stability criteria.<sup>12</sup>

General controls on interest rates which were common in the 1980s had been dismantled in all countries by 1995. During the ten years to 2004, only Costa Rica (of the 19 countries) imposed ceilings on interest rates, but from 2005 Ecuador has had general control of bank interest rates, both lending and deposit, and since 2006 Venezuela has controlled some rates. In addition, with few exceptions, various types of state interference remain on various aspects of

---

<sup>10</sup> Information from GlobalSourcePartners (2012).

<sup>11</sup> See <http://www.dolarcotizacionhoy.com.ar/dolar-paralelo-argentina/> (consulted July 20, 2012).

<sup>12</sup> See a description of these policies in Powell (2012).

loan agreements. The most common forms of interference relate to systems of calculation and interest payment, maximum levels of interest on certain types of loan, and the terms of others. In the 1996-1999 period<sup>13</sup> only Argentina was free from any of the six forms of interference shown in Table 1, whereas Colombia and Ecuador had interference in five of the six dimensions considered. The systems of forced investments and directed credits existing in the 1980s were eliminated or substantially reduced in all countries in the 1990s. However, in the late 1990s forced investments (other than reserve requirements) were in place in seven countries and credit requirements for specific sectors in five countries (of the 21 listed in Table 1).

However, since the mid-1990s a new form of interference in financial operations has emerged: a financial transactions tax (which, rather paradoxically, had only existed in Chile at a rate of 0.5 percent, which was unchanged until 2009, when it was halved). The Dominican Republic, with a rate of 0.15 percent, began this trend in 1993, followed the next year by Brazil (0.25 percent), Trinidad and Tobago (15 percent), and Venezuela (0.75 percent). In 2010, eight countries had financial transaction taxes.

Special mention should be made of the deposit freeze decreed by the Argentine government in December 2001 when the crisis broke out which eventually led to abandonment of the exchange rate and the convertibility law in place since 1991. The so-called “corralito” involved not only extreme interference with agreements between banks and their depositors, but was also the prelude to an expropriation of dollar deposits which were converted to pesos at the old parity exchange rate, instead of the rate effective at the time (4 pesos per dollar).<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> This information, originally collected for IDB by Felaban, has not been updated.

<sup>14</sup> For an analysis of the measures and their macroeconomic context, see de la Torre, Levy-Yeyati and Schmukler (2003).

Table 1. Freedom of Financial Contracts (circa 2000)

	Year of liberalization of interest rates	Have authorities interfered with the following aspects of financial contracts?						Mandatory investments other than reserve requirements	Mandatory loans to selected sectors?
		Currency of denomination of the loans	Duration of loans	Amortization scheme of loans	Interest payment scheme	Maximum interest rate of loans	Maximum interest rate for loans in arrears		
<b>Argentina</b>	1989								
<b>Belize</b>	1995	Yes							
<b>Bolivia</b>	1990				Yes				
<b>Brazil</b>	1989	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes		Yes
<b>Chile</b>	1985				Yes	Yes			
<b>Colombia</b>	1992		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Costa Rica</b>	1995		Yes				Yes		
<b>Dominican Rep.</b>	1999								
<b>Ecuador</b>	1994		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
<b>El Salvador</b>	1990		Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes	
<b>Guatemala</b>	1995	Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	
<b>Honduras</b>	1990		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes		
<b>Jamaica</b>	1998								
<b>Mexico</b>	1988		Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
<b>Nicaragua</b>	1990				Yes			Yes	
<b>Panama</b>	Before 1985				Yes	Yes			
<b>Paraguay</b>	1990					Yes			
<b>Peru</b>	1991				Yes	Yes	Yes		
<b>Trinidad&amp;Tobago</b>	Before 1985								Yes
<b>Uruguay</b>	1985			Yes	Yes				
<b>Venezuela</b>	1989		Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes

Source: The year of liberalization of interest rates is taken from Economist Intelligence Unit country reports, several years. Other information from a survey by IDB and Felaban carried out in 1999-2000. The period of reference of the questionnaire was 1996-2000.

Modern prudential regulation spread to most countries in the wave of financial reforms of the 1990s. At the end of that decade, the 22 countries of the region (based on information from the Economist Intelligence Unit) had adopted the minimum risk-weighted capital requirements set by the Basel Accord on prudential regulation. However, application of other prudential regulations to guarantee adequate capital coverage has been much more heterogeneous. At that time, Argentina and Mexico already required banks to base their minimum capital requirements on market risk, and required deduction from capital of losses caused by overdue loans and by changes in the value of the investment portfolio or by exchange rate fluctuations. In contrast, none of these requirements applied in Honduras, El Salvador and Venezuela.<sup>15</sup> Table 2 shows the heterogeneity in applying these standards by the countries of the region for which standardized information is available until 2008. However, 14 countries (out of the 19 analyzed) have made varying degrees of progress with quality of bank supervision, as reflected in the indexes constructed by Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008). According to these authors, only Costa

<sup>15</sup> According to Barth et al. (2001), plus the Colombian case according to information from the country's Central Bank.

Rica is at a significantly lower level than the other countries in quality of supervision. Moreover, the rigor of supervision in Latin American countries is several notches below maximum recommended standards.

Other salient aspects of the financial reform process have been privatization of public banks, opening of the sector to foreign investment, and the move toward universal banking systems, with fewer restrictions on services and activities permitted to banks and other financial intermediaries. In all these aspects, the process has been very uneven across countries.<sup>16</sup>

**Table 2. Severity of Prudential Regulation (circa 2008)**

	Year of enforcement of capital adequacy requirements as per the Basel Accord	Is the minimum capital-to-asset ratio adjusted by credit risk?	Is the minimum capital-to-asset ratio adjusted by market risk?	Is market valued deducted from the non-realized losses of loans in books?	Is market valued deducted from the non-realized losses of the portfolio of stocks?	Is market valued deducted from the non-realized losses of the portfolio of foreign currencies?
<b>Argentina</b>	1991	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
<b>Bolivia</b>	1995	No	No	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Brazil</b>	1995	No	Yes	No	No	No
<b>Chile</b>	1989	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
<b>Colombia</b>	1992	No	No	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Costa Rica</b>	1995	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
<b>El Salvador</b>	1993	No	No	No	No	No
<b>Guatemala</b>	1995	No	No	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Honduras</b>	1998	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
<b>Jamaica</b>	1997	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Mexico</b>	1994	No	No	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Peru</b>	1993	No	No	No	No	No
<b>Trinidad and Tobago</b>	1994	Yes	No	No	No	No
<b>Venezuela</b>	1993	No	No	No	No	No

Source: Barth, Caprio y Levine (2008)

n.a.=not available.


### **2.3 Tax Reforms**

The tax reforms inspired by the Washington Consensus until the late 1990s were deep. Their common features were neutrality, legal and administrative simplification and higher revenue. Taxes on foreign trade, representing on average 18 percent of receipts in the countries of the region in 1980, were partially replaced by higher receipts from other tax bases, so that by the

<sup>16</sup> See IDB (2001), Chapters 5 and 6.

mid-1990s these taxes were raising only 13.7 percent of revenue,<sup>17</sup> and in the second half of the 2000s only 6.7 percent.<sup>18</sup> The tax burden on foreign trade fell from 2.6 percent of GDP in the second half of the 1980s to 1.7 percent of GDP in the second half of the 2000s.<sup>19</sup>

To moderate the distorting effects of taxation on production and investment decisions, in the 1980s and 1990s 23 Latin American and Caribbean countries adopted value added tax systems on consumption. The basic rates of this tax have changed little since the late 1990s, except in the Dominican Republic (where they rose from 8 to 16 percent) and Venezuela (where they fell from 16 to 9 percent). Currently rates are between 9 percent in Venezuela and 20 percent in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay (Figure 3). Effective collection of VAT (measured as the ratio between revenue and private consumption multiplied by the base rate, or C-efficiency in tax jargon) differs substantially between countries due to reduced rates and exclusions of many final goods and services (especially in countries that apply higher rates), and to difficulties of administration and control, all of which limit the neutrality of this tax (Figure 4).<sup>20</sup>




<sup>17</sup> Calculations based on World Development Indicators, World Bank (2000).

<sup>18</sup> Calculations based on IDB-CIAT (2012).

<sup>19</sup> The information on the 1980s is taken from Lora (2007) and on the 2000s from IDB-CIAT (2012).

<sup>20</sup> The calculations in the Figure need to be treated with caution since they are affected by possible errors in calculating the value of private consumption (which is taken from the National Accounts of the countries).

**Figure 4. Revenue of VAT (percentage of private consumption times the basic tax rate), compared with basic tax rate, 2009**




The extreme marginal rates applied in the 1980s on personal income were cut substantially in the 1990s with only minor adjustments since then. Only Argentina, Chile and Ecuador now have maximum rates of 35 percent or more.

Eleven countries have rates between 25 percent and 30 percent, and only Bolivia and Paraguay have lower rates (13 percent and 10 percent, as shown in Figure 5). For reasons of equity, in some countries these maximum rates only start from income levels that are extremely high for their per capita income levels. For lower income reduced rate differentials are applied, and most countries also have a limit on taxable income (which however in some countries is several times per capita income. See Table 3). These mechanisms severely limit the effectiveness of the personal income tax in Latin American countries. In addition, evasion of personal income tax is estimated to average around 50 percent.<sup>21</sup>


<sup>21</sup> For a more detailed analysis of personal income tax, see Corbacho, Fretes Cibils and Lora (2013), Chapter 7.

Figure 5. Highest personal income tax rates, 1986, 1999 and 2009



Sources: see Appendix

Figure 6. Highest corporate income tax rates, 1986, 1999 and 2009



Source: see Appendix.



**Table 3. Redistributive aspects of personal income taxes**

<b>Minimum income level to start paying the tax (income exempted) and to pay the highest tax rate (in years of average income per capita) (2010)</b>		
<b>País</b>	<b>Income exempted</b>	<b>Income to pay the highest tax rate</b>
Argentina	0.30	3.66
Bolivia	0.23	0.23
Brazil	1.10	2.74
Chile	1.00	11.16
Colombia	2.83	10.65
Costa Rica	1.90	2.86
Dominican Republic	1.82	3.80
Ecuador	2.19	22.30
El Salvador	0.38	3.42
Guatemala	1.56	14.35
Honduras	2.87	13.06
Mexico	0.49	3.39
Nicaragua	2.07	20.68
Peru	1.69	14.69
Uruguay	0.72	10.28
Venezuela	1.45	12.66
<b>Average Latin America</b>	<b>1.41</b>	<b>9.06</b>
<b>Average other middle income countries</b>	<b>0.65</b>	<b>6.46</b>
<b>Average OECD countries</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>2.38</b>

Source: Corbacho, Fretes Cibils and Lora (2013), Chap. 7.

The tax rates on corporate profits were also cut in the 1990s, with minor adjustments in the 2000s. In no country does this rate now exceed 35 percent, and in seven countries it is 25 percent (Figure 6). Although the 1990s reforms improved tax neutrality, most countries maintained systems of tax incentives for activities, sectors or regions. The most common incentives are currently for free zones, export activities and regional development projects (Figure 7). Because of incentives, special treatments, discounts and other tax reduction mechanisms, an average 0.9 percent of GDP is lost in revenue from corporate income tax, about

a quarter of effective receipts (Table 4). It is also calculated that approximately half of the corporate income tax is evaded.<sup>22</sup>

**Table 4. Tax expenditures (exemptions) and actual revenue of corporate income taxes (percentage of GDP)**

	<b>Tax expenditures (exemptions)</b>	<b>Actual tax revenue</b>
Brazil (2007)	0.5	3.9
Chile (2007)	0.9	5.6
Costa Rica (2010)	1.0	2.7
Colombia (2007)	1.4	5.4
Dominican Rep. (2009)	0.5	2.4
Ecuador (2005)	0.4	2.7
Guatemala (2007)	0.9	3.0
Jamaica (2009)	1.0	5.3
Mexico (2007)	1.5	2.4
Paraguay (2010)	0.3	2.6
Uruguay (2010)	1.7	2.6
Simple average	0.9	3.5

Source: Corbacho, Fretes Cibils and Lora (2013), Chap. 8.

#### ***2.4 Privatizations (and Other Forms of Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure sectors)***

The transfer of public companies to the private sector was one of the most active areas of reform in the mid-1980s and late 1990s. The 396 sales and transfers to the private sector implemented in Latin America between 1986 and 1999 account for more than half the value of privatization transactions in developing countries.<sup>23</sup> The highest value of privatizations took place in Brazil and Argentina: US\$61 billion and US\$25 billion, respectively. About 57 percent of the value of privatizations in the region in the 1990s was in the infrastructure sectors, traditionally closed to

<sup>22</sup> Corbacho, Fretes Cibils and Lora (2013), Chapter 8.

<sup>23</sup> Excluding those made by mass distribution of coupons in the countries of Eastern Europe.


private participation and where the potential for productivity gains and efficiency was higher. Another 11 percent came from the sale of banks and related entities, reinforcing trends of financial reform. In relation to the size of their economies, Bolivia, Peru and Brazil were the most active in privatization until the late 1990s. In the 2000s privatizations were concentrated in infrastructure sectors and information ceased to be collected on activity in other sectors.

Considering only the infrastructure sectors, Bolivia and Chile have been the most important privatizers in relation to the size of their economies. From the mid-1980s to 1999, the cumulative value of private sector investment commitments in the infrastructure sectors in Bolivia was equivalent to 51 percent of GDP, and in Chile to 37 percent of GDP (Figure 8).<sup>24</sup> On average, the 19 countries analyzed had secured until then investment commitments from the private sector in infrastructure sectors of 13.5 percent of GDP. Contrary to common belief, the process did not stop in the 2000s (although transfers of existing assets to the private sector did probably lose momentum). By 2010, total commitments almost doubled on average in the 19 countries, reaching 26 percent of GDP. Although Bolivia and Chile continued to be the largest recipients of private investment (cumulative) in the infrastructure sectors, Brazil, Nicaragua and Honduras have been equally or more active since 2000, all with new investments between 19 percent and 27 percent of GDP. Although the sectoral composition of privatization in infrastructure sectors has differed significantly between countries, the energy and telecommunications sectors have attracted most resources in almost all countries. The transport sector has been the most important only in Costa Rica and Jamaica, while the water and sewerage sector has had lower relative importance, except in Chile and Uruguay, where private investments have been spread fairly evenly over different sectors (Figure 9).

---

<sup>24</sup> These figures, which are taken from information collected by IFC-World Bank, are not easily comparable with the series on property transfers used in previous versions of this document. Investment commitments include existing assets as well as new investments, which can take years to complete, or may not be implemented.

**Figure 9. Share of Privatizations by Infrastructure Sector, 1990-2009**



Source: See Appendix.

Although privatizations have continued their progress in almost all countries, since the early 2000s nationalizations of companies have attracted public attention in some countries. Paradoxically, although Bolivia has been a leader in privatizations, it has also been an active nationalizer. A few months after taking, Evo Morales nationalized the Bolivian oil and gas industries in May 2006. Since then, occasional nationalizations of companies in the mining and infrastructure sectors have often raised popular support.<sup>25</sup> In the infrastructure sector alone, nationalizations between 2006 and 2010 represented 1.8 percent of GDP. Argentina and Venezuela also have a recent history of nationalizations. Although in the infrastructure sectors, nationalizations have been modest (Table 5), the total value of the nationalizations put through in Venezuela by the government of Hugo Chavez in the 2000s are estimated at US\$23 billion (equivalent to 7 percent of GDP), ranging from electric utilities and telecommunications to retail consumer chains.<sup>26</sup> In Argentina, apart from the nationalizations in infrastructure sectors, other

<sup>25</sup> For a summary of nationalizations under Evo Morales see Macías (2012).

<sup>26</sup> Calculation of the value of nationalizations in Venezuela is from Borges, 2010.

such measures have included the state takeover in October 2008 of the individual fully funded accounts of the pension system (with assets of US\$30.600 billion, equivalent to 9.3 percent of GDP)<sup>27</sup> and the more recent nationalization of YPF in April 2012 (with an estimated value of US\$18 billion, equivalent to 3.8 percent of GDP).<sup>28</sup>

**Table 5. Nacionalizations, 2006-2010**  
Infrastructure sectors (energy, water, sewerage, telecommunications, transportation)

	Enterprise nationalized	Year of nationalization	Estimated nationalization value (million USD)	Estimated nationalization value (percentage of GDP)
Argentina	Aguas Argentinas	2006	300	0.14%
	Aerolíneas Argentinas	2009	438	0.14%
Bolivia	Aguas del Illimani	2007	15.1	0.11%
	ENTEL (Eurotelecom)	2008	100.0	0.60%
	Corani (Ecoenergy)	2010	18.5	0.09%
	Guaracachi (Rurelec PLC)	2010	142.3	0.72%
	Valle Hermoso (Bolivia Generating Group)	2010	14.2	0.07%
	Empresa de Luz y Fuerza Eléctrica de Cochabamba	2010	32.0	0.16%
Venezuela	CANTV	2007	1300	0.57%
	Electricidad de Caracas	2007	740	0.32%
	Seneca Compañía Eléctrica (CMS Energy)	2007	106	0.05%

Source: News agencies (several years)

Notes:

1. The indemnization for the nationalization of Aguas Argentinas is in dispute in ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes), a judiciary body attached to the World Bank. Aguas de Barcelona y Suez, the former owners of Aguas Argentinas, demands for indemnization USD1,200 million. However, the estimate value of the damaged assets is USD300 million. This is the value taken for the calculations of the privatization index.

2. The indemnization for the nationalization of Aerolíneas Argentinas is in dispute in ICSID. Marsans, former owners of the firm, estimated a price between USD330 and 546 million in 2009. This is the value taken for the calculations of the privatization index. However, Marsans is currently demanding the government of Argentina for more than USD1,000 million.

3. Aguas del Illimani (AISA) was a branch of Lyonnaise des Eaux. In order to declare nul and void the contract with the french firm, the government of Bolivia assumed the debts of the firm in the amount of USD9.6 million. Furthermore, the Bolivian shareholders received USD5.5 million as indemnization.

## 2.5 Labor Reforms

As Dani Rodrik noted, several countries in Latin America adopted more trade and financial liberalization policies and put through more privatizations in a short period than the countries of East Asia did in three decades.<sup>29</sup> Even in the tax area, where progress was more uneven, the pace of the reforms was remarkable, especially until the mid-1990s. And, as we have seen, in the area of privatizations, the process continued with the same force in the 2000s, at least in the infrastructure area. In contrast to the four previous areas of reform, in the labor area changes

<sup>27</sup> See <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/548950.html> .

<sup>28</sup> See [http://www.cincodias.com/articulo/empresas/nacionalizacion-ypf-costaria-argentina-18000-millones-dolares/20120416cdscdiemp\\_1/](http://www.cincodias.com/articulo/empresas/nacionalizacion-ypf-costaria-argentina-18000-millones-dolares/20120416cdscdiemp_1/)


<sup>29</sup> See Rodrik (1996).

have been few and of limited scope. Only six countries undertook major labor reforms between the mid-1980s and 2009: Argentina (1991), Colombia (1991, 2003), Guatemala (1990), Panama (1995), Peru (1991), and Venezuela (1998).

The labor reforms focused on moderating firing costs and facilitating the temporary hiring of workers. In the absence of universal social protection systems in most countries in the region, the regulations that have traditionally governed labor activity were adopted to guarantee job security and protect workers against the risks related to unemployment, sickness and old age, among others. However, these objectives have not always been achieved because the restrictions have stifled job creation and favored informalization.<sup>30</sup>

Without exception, in the countries of the region the expected cost of firing a new worker (with permanent contract) is at least two months' wages, including notice and severance costs. In Bolivia the cost is over four months and in nine other countries it is three to four months' wages (Figure 10). The six countries that introduced reforms changed the rules governing dismissal costs, reducing the amounts and/or converting these costs into predictable annual payments.


Figure 10. Expected cost of dismissing a worker (in months of wages), 2009



Source: see Appendix.

<sup>30</sup> See Heckman and Pagés (2000).

To stimulate stable employment, 14 countries have traditionally imposed restrictions on temporary contracts, severely or totally limiting this type of employment relationship and restricting labor flexibility which certain types of companies may require due to the unstable characteristics of their demand or production processes. Only four countries (Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) have applied partial correctives to this situation.<sup>31</sup>




The average rate of social security contributions (paid by workers and employers) has risen steadily from 19 percent in the mid-1980s to 22 percent in the late 2000s (Figure 11). Only two countries have seen some reduction in social security contributions in the last two decades: after increases in the late 1980s, in Argentina they fell from 50 percent in 1990 to 40 percent in 2003, and in Uruguay from 36.5 percent in the first half of the 1990s to 30.5 percent since 2007. While in most countries the increases have been only a few percentage points, in Colombia, Mexico and the Dominican Republic these contributions have risen more than 10 percentage points since late 1980s (Figure 12). Reforms to pension systems in the 1990s and early 2000s were aimed at linking individual contributions more closely to the benefits provided by the systems, thereby reducing their tax characteristics (between 1993 and 2003 nine countries

<sup>31</sup> In Brazil, between 1998 and 2003, there was a fixed term contract (up to two years) which is rarely used because contracts require union approval. See Gonzaga (2003).

introduced models based totally or partially on individual funding).<sup>32</sup> Only Argentina has subsequently moved in the opposite direction, when the 2008 reform dismantled the individually funded component of the nationalized pension system and took control of individual accounts. Bolivia nationalized the pension system in 2010 but retained the system of individual accounts.<sup>33</sup>

Figure 12. Social Security Contribution Rates, 1986, 1999 and 2009




Source: see Appendix.

Nota: Mexico 2009 includes the surcharge of 20.4% that is part of the employers' contribution to the health and maternity insurance.

<sup>32</sup> See Mesa-Lago (2008).


<sup>33</sup> See ISSA (2012).






On average for the entire region, payroll taxes for items other than social security are now at similar levels to the mid-1980s after climbing nearly a percentage point until the mid-1990s (Figure 13). This trend is due in large measure to Peru, the only country that has made frequent changes to these taxes (increasing from 5 percent in 1985 to a peak of 10.5 percent between 1990 and 1994 to then fall to only 0.7 percent). In the other countries no changes were over one percentage point, with the exception of Venezuela, where this type of tax rose from 2.5 percent to 5.5 percent in 1993 (Figure 14).

**Figure 14. Payroll Taxes (Other than Social Security Contributions), 1987 and 2009**




Fuentes: Agencias nacionales


**Figure 15. Monthly Minimum Wage in Dollars (constant purchasing power parity prices of 2000)**



Fuentes: National agencies and World Bank.

Minimum wages have been combined with higher payroll taxes to produce a significant increase in labor costs for middle- and low-wage workers in formal enterprises, especially since the mid-1990s. The average minimum wage in the region was fairly stable at about US\$200 a month (at constant purchasing power parity prices, PPP, of 2000) from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. Since then wages have steadily risen to the current levels of around US\$400 a month (Figure 15). Only in Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago has the minimum wage fallen in real terms since 1995 (Figure 16).






The minimum wage increases would not result in higher labor costs per unit of output if there were concomitant improvements in productivity. But, in general, labor productivity has lagged compared to minimum wage raises (Figure 17). From the early 1980s to mid-1990s unit labor costs (with or without social security contributions and other payroll taxes) fell nearly 40 percent on average in Latin America, but since then have risen again by a similar percentage. Although the size of the increases has differed from country to country, the only exceptions to this general trend of more expensive unskilled manpower per production unit (including payroll taxes) are Costa Rica (where there has been no great change), and El Salvador, Mexico and the Dominican Republic where there have been significant reductions since the mid-1990s (Figure 18).<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup> IDB (2004, Chap. 7) contains further discussion on the labor implications of minimum wage legislation.

Figure 18. Minimum wage (cum payroll taxes), adjusted by productivity, 1995 and 2007 (2000=100)



Sources: National agencies, World Bank, Fernandez-Arias (2009).

### 3. An Index of Structural Reforms

Several studies have attempted to analyze the effects of the structural reforms on growth, investment and other economic variables.<sup>35</sup> The main difficulty they have found has been to measure the magnitude of the reforms. This is because the most usual economic statistics relate to economic *outcomes*, such as growth, inflation, or foreign trade, and not to *policies* that affect these results. Even variables that are usually considered as policy indicators, such as the fiscal deficit or the financial depth of the economy, are actually *outcome* variables which are influenced by policy decisions and by a variety of other internal and external phenomena, such as the business cycle, terms of trade or foreign interest rates. The area where most efforts have been

<sup>35</sup> For Latin America see, for example, Easterly, Loayza and Montiel (1997). Edwards (1995) discusses various areas of reform in Latin America and summarizes the research that evaluates its main effects. At the world level, see Sachs and Warner (1995) and Thomas and Wang (1995).

made for some time to measure policy variables directly has been import and export regimes.<sup>36</sup> However, even in this area there are difficulties in obtaining adequate series of relevant policy variables.<sup>37</sup>

The lack of precise information on the magnitude of the reforms has prevented assessing the relative importance of the various areas of reform, and distinguishing between the effects on growth of the structural reforms themselves and those derived from macroeconomic stabilization. It has also prevented the use of rigorous empirical methods to analyze issues such as the political economy determinants of the reforms or their political and social consequences.

To overcome these deficiencies, in previous versions of this study an index of structural policies with annual frequency was constructed (initially for the 1985-1995 period, and later for the 1985-1999 period),<sup>38</sup> for most of the countries of Latin America, which is now presented with coverage of 19 countries, and extended to 2009 with slight methodological changes. The index reflects the evolution of the five reform areas outlined above: i) trade policy, ii) financial policy, iii) tax policy, iv) privatizations, and v) labor legislation. The index is intended to reflect the degree of neutrality of economic policies in these five areas, in a range from 0 to 1 for each policy variable (there is usually more than one policy variable in each area) based on the worst and best observations of that variable in all the sample of countries and years. The total index of structural policies is the simple average of the indexes of the five areas, which are in turn the simple average of the indexes for the policy variables considered.

The index is only intended to measure the neutrality of the policies. It was originally constructed to measure progress in the structural policies of economic liberalization promoted by the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990), under the assumption that the primary objective of these policies was to improve efficiency in the allocation of productive resources by eliminating or reducing the distortions caused by restrictive policies on the working of markets. The index is not intended to measure other aspects of the quality of economic policies. For example, it does not consider that an objective of labor legislation may be to provide protection and stability, or that tax policies respond to the needs of tax collection and can pursue redistributive purposes.

---

<sup>36</sup> See Dollar (1992), Lee (1993), Edwards (1993 and 1998), Sachs and Warner (1995), and Wacziarg (1998).

<sup>37</sup> Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) have analyzed in detail the measurement problems of the policy indicators of the most influential studies in this area, and have reached the conclusion that they do not offer an empirical basis for supporting the conclusion that trade opening *policies* are crucial for productivity and growth.

<sup>38</sup> Lora (1997) and Lora (2001), respectively.

Since publication of the first index in 1996, several authors have produced other databases and indexes related to structural reform, some of them for various policy areas (Morley and Pettinato, 1999; World Bank Doing Business, 2004; Ostry, Prati and Spilimbergo, 2009), while others have focused on specific areas such as financial regulation and supervision (Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel, 2008; Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2008) and labor legislation (Aleksynska and Schindler, 2011; Rama and Artecona, 2002).<sup>39</sup>

The policy variables considered in the current version of the index are given below.<sup>40</sup> The Appendix contains a more detailed explanation of calculation methods and sources, as well as the complete series of the total index and subindexes by reform area.

**Trade policy:** The indicators used in this area are only average tariffs (including surcharges) and tariff dispersion. Unfortunately there are no adequate measures of non-tariff barriers to trade nor are there continuous series with common methodologies, which required combining several sources.

**Financial policy:** This area combines four indicators: i) indicator of bank reserve ratios, (ii) indicator of freedom of interest rates, iii) taxes on financial transactions, and iv) quality of banking supervision.

**Tax policy:** This area combines the following policy indicators: i) maximum marginal rate of corporate income tax, ii) maximum marginal rate of personal income tax, iii) productivity of income taxes (measured as the ratio of total direct tax revenue as a share of GDP and the average of the two previous tax rates), iv) basic rate of value added tax, and (v) VAT productivity (defined by the C-efficiency indicator, which is the ratio between revenue and the value of private consumption times the basic VAT rate).<sup>41</sup> We have chosen the top marginal rates of income tax instead of averages, since it is the former that influence labor and investment decisions. We consider the productivity rates of taxes to be indicators of the degree of *effective* neutrality of the taxes (which in turn is the result of the neutrality established in the tax regulations and of the efficiency of collection, which depends on evasion and the collection

---

<sup>39</sup> All these studies cover almost all Latin American countries and a few include some Caribbean countries. With the exception of Morley and Pettinato (1999), all of them also include countries from other regions of the world.

<sup>40</sup> The previous versions have the same basic structure with five policy areas, but use different policy indicators in some areas. In the latest version, when changes have been made to the methodology, the series for the 1985-2009 period have been completely reconstructed to ensure consistency.

<sup>41</sup> Also known in tax circles as VAT C-efficiency. See Corbacho, Fretes Cibils and Lora (2013, Cap. 10).

efforts of the tax administration). Therefore, the higher ratings of tax policy correspond to countries with the lowest, flattest tax rates with most effective collection. The indicators used refer only to national government taxes, which may be a significant deficiency in federal countries where the states have substantial tax powers, such as Brazil and Argentina. Note that the aspects of tax policy that directly relate to taxation of labor are included in the labor legislation index. The taxes on financial transactions that exist in some countries are taken into account in the financial index.

**Privatizations:** The only indicator used in this area is the total or partial participation of the private sector, either as owner, financier, manager or operator in infrastructure projects in the energy, telecommunications, transport and water sectors. The investment value corresponds to the total investment commitments generated at the beginning of the project. The nationalizations that have taken place in some countries in these sectors are also taken into account. The index is constructed from the accumulated value of the privatizations, net of nationalizations, as a percentage of GDP. The accumulated value is taken because the purpose of the index is to measure how much space has been opened to private initiative.

**Labor legislation:** Five aspects of the flexibility of legislation are considered in this area: i) ease of hiring (on a discrete scale that takes values 0, 0.5 and 1); ii) ease of firing, measured by the expected cost of dismissal (in months of wage); iii) flexibility of working hours, as measured by extra costs (on a similar discrete scale); iv) social security contributions and other taxes and contributions on payroll (as proportion of wages); and v) minimum wages (as proportion of per capita income).

Before presenting the results of this methodology, it is important to consider its main limitations of coverage. The indexes do not cover some aspects of the economic policies mentioned in the previous section of this document which are crucial to the working of markets and have resurfaced recently in several countries. In particular, they do not consider: i) restrictions on buying and selling foreign currency in a single market, with the consequent appearance of exchange rate differentials (importance in Argentina since 2011 and in Venezuela since 2007) ii) non-tariff restrictions on imports (used increasingly in Argentina since 2008 and in Venezuela since the early 2000s); iii) temporary freezing of savers' deposits in the banking system and 'pesification' or change of currency denomination of savings and other financial or




commercial contracts (Argentina 2001-2); iv) privatizations and nationalizations in sectors other than infrastructure (especially important in Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela); and v) general price controls on products in the basic consumption basket (Argentina and Venezuela). As is apparent from these limitations, the indexes are inadequate for Argentina and Venezuela (and require some caution in the case of Bolivia), countries which have been very active in introducing unorthodox elements in various policy areas.

### 3.1 Results

The total index of structural reforms, which combines these five policy areas for 19 countries, increased from 0.39 in 1985 to 0.60 in the late 1990s and to 0.65 in the late 2000s.<sup>42</sup> The increase in the index implies important changes, although there are very broad margins of reforms to exploit. The most dynamic period of reforms was between 1989 and 1994, when the index gained 0.10 points of the total of 0.26 of improvement in all the period. Although the changes have been very modest since the mid-2000s, the average index has not decreased in any year (Figure 19).


Figure 19. Structural Reform Index, average of 19 countries



Fuente: See Appendix.


<sup>42</sup> This regional average includes interpolations in the missing data of some countries.

Figure 20. Structural Reform Index, 1986, 1999 and 2009



Source: See Appendix.

The slow pace of structural reforms in the 2000s was a phenomenon common to the 17 Latin American countries considered in the index, and even to Jamaica. Only Trinidad and Tobago reformed more rapidly in the 2000s than in the 1986-1999 period. Figure 20 shows Chile as the leader of the pro-market reform process, closely followed by Trinidad and Tobago, Bolivia and Jamaica (all with rates above 0.7 in 2009). Countries with less pro-market structural policies are, in order, Mexico, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Venezuela. However, the current state of the structural policies analyzed is much more homogeneous across countries than it was in 1986 (but not in 1999), which means that the leading reformers have been the countries that in the mid-1980s had policies that were more adverse to market freedom, such as Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru. As noted above, this apparent homogenization of structural policies should be viewed with caution because the indexes do not cover certain aspects of the policies on which some countries, especially Argentina and Venezuela, have distanced themselves from the rest of the region.




The progress of the reforms has been very uneven by areas. Figure 21 shows what has been the margin of reform used in the total and in each area (measured relative to the average level of each index in 1985). The potential for liberalization that existed in 1985 was used to make far-reaching reforms in the trade and financial areas. In the trade area the reform process was very intense between 1989 and 1995, but with no major changes since then. Excluding Mexico, in this area all countries have reached levels of at least 0.8, and the three most advanced countries (Chile, Peru and Guatemala) have indexes above 0.9 (see Figure 22). On financial reform, there were significant increases in the index until 2005, with only minor advances later. All the countries have achieved levels above 0.6, and the five countries with the highest rates (Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Jamaica) have indexes above 0.95 (Figure 23).

The space for reform has been used much less in the other areas. In taxation, only 30 percent of the space of reform has been used, and policies remain as heterogeneous as in the mid-1980s. Although tax rates have been homogenized, the effectiveness of tax collection is very uneven due to the wide range of tax expenditures and the capacity of tax administrations to control evasion. Countries with higher rates of tax reform (Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago,


Jamaica and Venezuela) have levels above 0.6, while the two countries with tax policies most adverse to neutrality of markets (Brazil and Argentina) have rates close to 0.4 (see Figure 24).

**Figure 22. Index of Trade Reform, 1986, 1999 and 2009**




Sources: see Appendix.

**Figure 23. Index of Financial Reform, 1986, 1999 and 2009**




Sources: see Appendix.

**Figure 24. Index of Tax Reform, 1986, 1999 and 2009**



Sources: see Appendix.

**Figure 25. Index of Privatizations, 1999 and 2009**




Sources: see Appendix.

With respect to privatizations in infrastructure, because the efforts have been very different from one country to another, the average progress of the region has been limited. Privatizations were the only area where the pace of reform was faster in the second half of the 1990s than in the 10 years before. Later, although privatizations have continued, their pace has slowed. The leading privatizers in the infrastructure area have been Bolivia and Chile, followed some distance away by Peru and Argentina (Figure 25).

Finally, practically no use has been made of the potential in many countries for liberalizing labor regimes to facilitate the working of the labor market. More flexible labor markets are found in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Chile, while the most rigid are in

Mexico, Uruguay and Bolivia. However, only Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela, whose labor regimes were among the most rigid in 1986, introduced significant reforms (see Figure 26).



Sources: see Appendix.

#### 4. Conclusion

This purpose of this paper has been to summarize progress in the main areas of structural economic reform in Latin America between 1985 and 2009 and quantify this progress through a set of indexes that attempt to measure to what extent policies are favorable to the free working of markets and to neutrality. According to this indicator, the reforms have been deep, especially in the trade and financial areas, and to a lesser extent in the areas of taxation and privatization of infrastructure sectors. Since the depth and speed of the reforms has varied not only across



structural policy areas, but also across countries, the database summarized here (and included in full in the Appendix to this paper), can serve as the basis for identifying the effects that different reforms have had across countries. The indexes can be used to make comparisons over time, between areas and between countries. However, they are not suitable for measuring structural policies in Argentina and Venezuela during the 2000s when these two countries adopted heterodox policies in areas not covered by the indexes.

## Bibliography

- Abiad, A., E. Detragiache and T. Tressel. 2008. "A New Database of Financial Reforms." IMF Working Paper 08/266. Washington, DC, United States: World Bank. Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1316734>
- Aleksynska, M., and M. Schindler. 2011. "Labor Market Regulations in Low-, Middle- and High-Income Countries: A New Panel Database." IMF Working Paper WP/11/154. Washington, DC, United States: World Bank.
- Barth, J., G. Caprio, and R. Levine. 2008. "Bank Regulation and Supervision Database." Washington, DC, United States: World Bank. Available at: <http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html>
- Behrman, J.R., N. Birdsall and M. Székely. 2000. "Economic Reform and Wage Differentials in Latin America." Research Department Working Paper 435. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.
- Bonaglia Federico, A.G., and C. Richaud. 2000. "Measuring Reform." In: J. Braga de Macedo and O. Kabbaj, editors. *Reform and Growth in Africa*. Paris, France: Development Centre Seminars/OCDE/African Development Bank.
- Borges, J. 2010. "Julio Borges: El Gobierno Ha Gastado \$23 Millardos en Expropiaciones." *El Nacional*, 28 de febrero, 2010.
- Corbacho, A., V. Fretes and E. Lora, editors. 2013. *More Than Revenue: Taxation as a Development Tool*. Development in the Americas report. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.
- De La Torre, A., E. Levy Yeyati and S. Schmukler. 2003. "Living and Dying with Hard Pegs: The Rise and Fall of Argentina's Currency Board." *Economía* 3(2): 43-107.
- Dollar, D. 1992. "Outward-Oriented Development Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-1985." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 40(3): 523-544.
- Edwards, S. 1993. "Trade and Growth in Developing Countries." *Journal of Economic Literature* 31: 1358-1393.
- . 1995. *Crisis and Reform in Latin America*. Washington, DC, United States: Oxford University Press/World Bank.

- . 1998. “Openness, Productivity and Growth: What Do We Really Know?” *Economic Journal* 108: 383-398.
- Easterly, W., N. Loayza and P. Montiel. 1997. “Has Latin America’s post-reform growth been disappointing?” *Journal of International Economics* (Supplement) 43(3-4): 287-312.
- Esguerra, M. P., E. Montes, A. Garavito y C. Pulido. 2010. “El Comercio Colombo-Venezolano: Características y Evolución Reciente.” Cuadernos de Economía 602. Bogotá, Colombia: Banco de la República.
- Fernández-Arias, E., and P. Montiel. 1997. “Reform and Growth in Latin America: All Pain, No Gain?” Research Department Working 351. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.
- GlobalSourcePartners. 2012. [http://www.globalsourcepartners.com/index.cfm?productTypes=db\\_](http://www.globalsourcepartners.com/index.cfm?productTypes=db_)  
Last access: 07/25/2012.
- Gonzaga, G. 2003. “Labor Turnover and Labor Legislation in Brazil.” *Economía* 4(1): 165-222.
- Heckman, J., and C. Pagés-Serra. 2000. “The Cost of Job Security Regulation: Evidence from Latin American Labor Markets.” *Journal of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association* 1(1): 109-144.
- INAI (Instituto para las Negociaciones Agrícolas Internacionales). 2012. *Boletín del INAI*. [http://www.inai.org.ar/sitio\\_nuevo/boletin\\_i2.asp?c=ARGENTINA%20-%20RESTRICCIONES%20A%20LAS%20IMPORTACIONES](http://www.inai.org.ar/sitio_nuevo/boletin_i2.asp?c=ARGENTINA%20-%20RESTRICCIONES%20A%20LAS%20IMPORTACIONES) (last access: July 18, 2012).
- Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 1996. *Economic and Social Progress*. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.
- . 2001. *Competitiveness: The Engine of Growth*. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.
- . 2004. *Good Jobs Wanted*. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.
- Inter-American Development Bank and Centro Interamericano de Administración Tributaria: BID-CIAT. 2012. “Metiendo Presión: Una Nueva Definición de las Cargas Fiscales de América Latina and el Caribe.” Database. Available at:  
<http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0OCB8QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwebdms.ciat.org%3A8080%2Faction.php%3A>

[3Fkt\\_path\\_info%3Dktcore.actions.document.view%26fDocumentId%3D7765&ei=PzprULGhN5D-8ATXzoDACg&usg=AFQjCNGrOud4P1eBzOO48muCicKAFVsmdA](http://3Fkt_path_info%3Dktcore.actions.document.view%26fDocumentId%3D7765&ei=PzprULGhN5D-8ATXzoDACg&usg=AFQjCNGrOud4P1eBzOO48muCicKAFVsmdA)

International Monetary Fund. *International Financial Statistics*.

<http://elibrary-data.imf.org/FindDataReports.aspx?d=33061&e=169393>

ISSA (Asociación Internacional de la Seguridad Social). 2012.

<http://www.issa.int/esl/Observatorio/Perfiles-nacionales>. Last access: July 24 2012.

Lee, J-W. 1993. "International Trade, Distortions and Long-Run Economic Growth." *IMF Staff Papers* 40(2): 299-328.

Londoño, J.L., and M. Székely. 1997. "Distributional Surprises after a Decade of Reform: Latin America in the Nineties." Research Department Working Paper 352. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.

Lora, E. 1997. "A Decade of Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has Been Reformed and How to Measure It." Research Department Working Paper 348. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.

———. 2001. "Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has Been Reformed and How to Measure It." Research Department Working Paper 462. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.

———. 2007. "Trend and Outcomes of Tax Reforms." In: E. Lora, editor. *The State of State Reform in Latin America*. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank and Stanford University Press.

Lora, E., and F. Barrera. 1997. "A Decade of Structural Reforms in Latin America: Growth, Productivity and Investment Are Not What They Used to Be." Research Department Working Paper 350. Washington, DC, U.S.: Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.

Lora, E. and M. Olivera. 2005. "The Electoral Consequences of the Washington Consensus." *Economía* 5(2): 1-61.

Lora, E., and U. Panizza. 2002. "Structural Reforms in Latin America under Scrutiny." Research Department Working Paper 470. Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.

- Lora, E., U. Panizza and M. Quispe-Agnoli, 2004. "Reform Fatigue: Symptoms, Reasons, and Implications." *Economic Review*, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Second Quarter): 1-28.
- Macías, C.M. 2012. "¿Son Beneficiosas las Nuevas Reglas del Juego entre Estados y Multinacionales en América Latina?: Análisis del Impacto en el Desarrollo de Multinacionales extractivas en Bolivia." Documento de Trabajo 6/2012. Madrid, España: Real Instituto Elcano,
- Mesa-Lago, C. 2008. *Reassembling Social Security: A Survey of Pensions and Health Care Reforms in Latin America*. Oxford, United Kingdom and New York, United States: Oxford University Press.
- Moore, M.O. 2011. "Argentina's Contingent Protection Use After the Financial Crisis: There and Back Again?" Working Paper 2011-004. Washington, DC, Estados Unidos: Institute for International Economic Policy. Available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1872563> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1872563>.
- Morley, S., R. Machado y S. Pettinato. 1999. "Indexes of Structural Reform in Latin America." Serie Reformas Económicas 12. Santiago, Chile: Comisión Económica para América Latina.
- Ostry, J.D., A. Prati and A. Spilimbergo. 2009. "Structural Reforms and Economic Performance in Advanced and Developing Countries." IMF Occasional Paper 268. Washington, DC, United States: International Monetary Fund.
- Powell, A. (coordinator). 2012. "The World of Forking Paths: Latin America and the Caribbean Facing Global Economic Risks." IDB Working Paper IDB-MG-126. Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2032441> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2032441>.
- Rama, M., and R. Artecona. 2000, "A Database of Labor Market Indicators Across Countries." Washington, DC, United States: World Bank, Development Research Group.
- Rodríguez, F., and D. Rodrik. 1999. "Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National Evidence." NBER Working Paper 7081. Cambridge, United States: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Rodrik, D. 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform." *Journal of Economic Literature* 34: 9-41.

- Sachs, J.D., and A. Warner. 1995. "Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration." *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 1995(1): 1-95.
- Sharma, R. 2011. "Food Export Restrictions: Review of the 2007-2010 Experience and Considerations for Disciplining Restrictive Measures." FAO Commodity Trade Policy Research Working Paper 32. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization. Available at: <http://ictsd.org/downloads/2011/05/sharma-export-restrictions.pdf>
- Thomas, V., and Y. Wang. 1995. "Distorsiones, Intervenciones and Crecimiento de la Productividad: ¿Es diferente el Sudeste Asiático?" In: M. Aparicio and W. Easterly, editors. *Crecimiento Económico: Teoría, Instituciones y Experiencia Internatconal*. Bogota, Colombia: Banco Mundial/Banco de la República.
- Warcziarg, R. 1998. "Measuring the Dynamic Gains from Trade." Working Paper 2001. Washington, DC, United States: Banco Mundial.
- Williamson, J., editor. 1990. *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?* Washington, DC, United States: Institute for International Economics.
- World Bank. *Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects*. <http://ppi.worldbank.org/>
- World Bank. *World Development Indicators*. <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>.
- World Bank. 2012. *World Integrated Trade Solution WITS*. Available at: <http://wits.worldbank.org>. Ultimo acceso: 04/30/2012.

## Appendix: Structural Rreform Indexes: Calculation Methodology, Sources of Information and Results<sup>43</sup>

The (total) structural reform index is the simple average of five indexes covering the following policy areas: i) trade policy, ii) financial policy, iii) tax policy, iv) privatizations, and v) labor legislation. This Appendix presents the calculation methodology, sources of information and the complete series by country and by year for the total index and the five indexes by area, along with the variables used.

### 1. Trade policy

#### *Countries considered*

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

#### *Sources of information*

The original series of average rates of import tariffs and dispersions is taken from Lora (2001). The data, from 1992, were spliced with those of the *World Integrated Trade Solution* (WITS) of the World Bank.

#### *Calculation of the index*

The index is a simple average, by year and country, of two subindexes computed on a scale of 0-1:

- a. Average rate of import tariffs on a scale of 0-1, where 0 is the highest rate and 1 the lowest of the set of all observations for all countries.
- b. Dispersion of import tariffs on a scale of 0-1, where 0 is the highest rate and 1 the lowest of the set of all observations for all countries.

#### *Additional methodological clarifications on missing data*

Country	Variable	Period with available data	Implications
Dominican Republic	AVERAGE	1989-2009	No subindex calculated between 1985-1988
Dominican Republic	DISPERSION	1990-2009	No subindex calculated between 1985-1988
Ecuador	Average rate of import tariffs (AVERAGE)	1986-2009	No subindex calculated in 1985. The 1986 data have been imputed to the value of the 1985 trade index.
Ecuador	Dispersion of import tariffs (DISPERSION)	1986-1999, 2002-2009	No subindex calculated in 2000 and 2001. The 2002 data have been imputed to the value of the trade index of 2000 and 2001.

<sup>43</sup> The results presented here are available online: [https://drive.google.com/?pli=1#folders/0BxHkZL\\_IfoN0NjhRUW0xbW9sb3M](https://drive.google.com/?pli=1#folders/0BxHkZL_IfoN0NjhRUW0xbW9sb3M)

El Salvador	AVERAGE	1986-2009	No subindex calculated in 1985. The 1986 data have been imputed to the value of the 1985 trade index.
El Salvador	DISPERSION	1986-2009	<i>Ibid.</i>
Honduras	AVERAGE	1985-1995, 1999-2009	No subindex calculated in 1996-1998. The 1999 data have been imputed to the 1996-1998 trade index.
Honduras	DISPERSION	1989, 1995-2009	No subindex calculated in 1985-1988 and 1990-1994. There is no value of the trade index for 1985-88 and 1990-94.
Jamaica	AVERAGE	1986-2003, 2006-2007	No subindex calculated in 1985, 2004-05 and 2008-09. The 1986 data have been imputed to the 1985 trade index, the 2006 data to 2004-05, and the 2007 data to 2008-09.
Jamaica	DISPERSION	1986-2003, 2006-2007	No subindex calculated in 1985, 2004-05 and 2008-09. The 1986 data have been imputed to the value of the 1985 trade index, 2006 to the 2004-05 index, 2007 to the 2008-09 index.
Nicaragua	AVERAGE	1985, 1987, 1990, 1994-2009	No subindex calculated in years with no available data. There is no trade index value for years without information.
Nicaragua	DISPERSION	1985, 1987, 1990, 1994-2009	<i>Ibid.</i>
Paraguay	AVERAGE	1985-1986, 1988, 1990-2009	No subindex calculated in years with no available data. The 1988 data have been imputed to the 1987 trade index, and the 1990 data to 1990.
Paraguay	DISPERSION	1986-2009	No subindex calculated in years with no available data. The 1986 data have been imputed to the 1985 trade index.
Peru	AVERAGE	1985-2000, 2002-2009	No available data. The 2004 data have been imputed to the 2001-2003 trade index.
Peru	DISPERSION	1985-2000, 2002-2009	<i>Ibid.</i>
Trinidad and Tobago	AVERAGE	1988-2003, 2006-2008	No subindex calculated in years with no available data. The 1999 data have been imputed to the 1985-88 trade index, 2006 to the 2004-05 index, and 2008 to the 2009 index.
Trinidad and Tobago	DISPERSION	1988-2003, 2006-2008	<i>Ibid.</i>



## **2. Financial Policy**

### ***Countries considered***

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

### ***Sources of information***

Reserve ratio indicator: Information on bank reserves and deposits from the *International Financial Statistics Yearbook*, International Monetary Fund, various issues.

Freedom of interest rates: Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008) for all the countries, to 2005, except Honduras, and Trinidad and Tobago. The subindex for the latter countries was based on information from national legislation and agencies. The 2005 to 2009 series for all countries was completed with information from national legislation and agencies

Taxes on financial transactions: Data from national legislation and agencies.

Quality of banking supervision: Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008) for all the countries to 2005, except Honduras and Trinidad and Tobago. The subindex for these countries was based on information from national legislation and agencies. The series from 2005 to 2009 for all countries was completed with information from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2008) and national legislation and agencies.

### ***Calculation of the index***

The index is a simple average, by year and country, of four subindexes computed on a scale of 0-1:

- a. Indicator of reserve ratios on a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 corresponds to the highest coefficient and 1 to the lowest of the set of all observations for all countries.
- b. Freedom of interest rates on a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 corresponds to the lowest value of the indicator of free interest rates and 1 to the highest.

The interest rate freedom indicator was based on the methodology of Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008). This methodology considers separately the interest rates paid on deposits and the rates charged on bank loans. If both these rates are determined by the government or are subject to a cap (upper or lower) they are coded 0, if they fluctuate in a band they are coded 1, and if completely unregulated their code is 2. Hence, different combinations of rate determination (deposits, loans) give rise to the following final coding for the freedom of interest rate indicator:

Fully liberalized = 4 if the combination is (2.2). This implies that both rates are determined by the market.

Broadly liberalized = 3 if the combination is (2.1) or (1.2). This implies that while one of the rates is free, the other is subject to a band or only a part of the rates is determined by the market.

Partially repressed = 2/1 if the combination is (2.0), (0.2), (1.1), (0.1) or (1.0). This implies that while one of the rates is free, the other is controlled by the government. It may also be that one or both of these rates are subject to a band or partially free.

Completely repressed = 0 if the combination is (0.0). This implies that the two rates are controlled by the government or are subject to a cap.

- c. Tax rate on financial transactions on a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 corresponds to any rate equal to or greater than 1% and 1 in cases where there is no tax.
- d. Quality of banking supervision, where 1 is the highest value of the quality of banking supervision indicator and 0 the lowest according to the following methodology.

The quality banking supervision indicator was based on Abiad, Detragiache and Tresselt (2008) who took four aspects into account:

- i. Implementation of the capital adequacy ratio based on the Basel Accords ("Yes" is 1, "No" is 0). Before 1993 this variable took the value 0 since this is considered the year when the Accords were widely applied internationally.
- ii. Independence of the supervisory body from the influence of bank executives.

This variable takes the value 0 if the function of the supervising agency lacks an adequate legal framework for independence in matters such as the appointment, change and removal of the manager of the agency or intervention in banking activities, or if the Minister of Finance (MF) heads this entity or if there are constant changes of manager.

Its value is 1 if despite having an adequate regulatory framework for resolving banking problems, the MF is on its board of directors or if there are other problems associated with the full autonomy and independence of the regulator. There is also the opposite case where despite being autonomous, the regulator cannot intervene adequately in banking activities.

The value of this variable is 2 when the legal framework for resolving banking problems is given and there are no problems of autonomy and independence.

- iii. Visits and controls in situ and extra-situ. This variable takes the value 0 when the country lacks a legal framework for implementing this type of control or when

these visits and checks are not made. It takes value 1 if there is a legal framework, but this type of control is implemented in an unsophisticated way. It takes value 2 if this supervision is effective and sophisticated.

- iv. The supervisory body covers all financial institutions without exception ("Yes" is 1, "No or Some" is 0).

As calculated by Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008), the sum of these four variables gives the quality of banking supervision indicator which implies that the banking system is extremely regulated (6), very regulated (4-5), barely regulated (2-3), or unregulated (0-1). Latin American countries receive maximum scores of 2, which is minimal regulation. The values obtained are then re-scaled so that the maximum of 2 becomes the 1 of the quality of supervision index. Note that although banking supervision can be seen as an intervention in the operation of the banks, the proper working of the financial market requires a level of bank supervision designed to contain risks that could threaten confidence in the system.

### *Sources of missing data*

Country	Variable	Period with data available	Implications
All	Freedom of interest rates	1985-2005	The data for 2006-2009 were completed by consulting national legislation and agencies.
All	Quality of banking supervision	1985-2005	The data for 2006-2009 were completed by consulting national legislation and agencies.

## **3. Tax Policy**

### *Countries considered*

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

### *Sources of information*

For the 1985-1999 period, data were taken from Lora (2001 and 2007) where the original sources are given. Thereafter, various issues were used of the *Individual Income Tax and Social Security Rate Survey* and *Corporate and Indirect Tax Survey* of KPMG, in addition to the IDB-CIAT database (2012) of tax burden by type of tax. The data on private consumption and GDP were obtained from the *World Development Indicators* of the World Bank.

### ***Calculation of the index***

The tax index is a simple average, by year and country, of four subindexes computed on a scale of 0 to 1:

- a. Rate of income tax (or the simple average of the maximum rate applied to personal income and the maximum rate applied to corporate income) on scale of 0 to 1.
- b. Productivity of income tax (calculated as the ratio of revenue to GDP and the average income tax rate) on a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 represents the lowest level of productivity and 1 the highest.
- c. Basic VAT rate on scale of 0 to 1, where 0 is the highest tax rate.
- d. VAT productivity (calculated as the ratio between the tax revenue and private consumption times the basic VAT rate, also known as C-efficiency) on the same scale, where 0 represents the lowest productivity.

### ***Methodological considerations for missing data***

Country	Variable	Period with data available	Implementation of VAT	Implications
El Salvador	Basic VAT rate	1992-2009	1992	In the years prior to adoption of VAT, the value of the index was imputed as 0.5 times the value of the index in the year of introduction of VAT.
Jamaica		1991-2009	1991	
Paraguay		1993-2009	1993	
Trinidad and Tobago		1990-2009	1990	
Venezuela		1993-2009	1993	

Country	Variable	Period with available data	Implications
Nicaragua	Basic rate of personal income tax	1985-1986,1991-2009	No index value was imputed to the missing years.
Ecuador	Productivity of income tax	1990-2005	The value of the last index available was imputed to the missing years after 2000.
Jamaica		1985-2003	
Trinidad and Tobago		1985-2003	
Ecuador	Productivity of VAT	1985-2005	The latest available data were imputed for the missing years after 2000
El Salvador		1992-2009	0.5 time the value of the first data available was imputed for the initial years

Jamaica		1991-2003	0.5 times the value of the first data available was imputed for the initial years. The latest available data were imputed for the missing years after 2000.
Nicaragua		1985,1988-2007	The latest available data were imputed for the missing years after 2000
Paraguay		1992-2009	0.5 times the value of the first data available was imputed for the early years
Trinidad and Tobago		1990-2003	The last available data were imputed for the missing years after 2000
Venezuela		1993-2009	0.5 times the value of the first data available was imputed for the initial years

#### **4. Privatizations**

##### *Countries considered*

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. No information is available for Trinidad and Tobago.

##### *Sources of information*

The dollar amounts of privatization are taken from the database of the World Bank's *Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects*, which only covers energy, telecommunications, transport and water. The value of nationalizations in these sectors is taken from news agencies. The GDP series were taken from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators*.

##### *Calculation of the index*

The index is a simple average, by year and country, of total private sector participation (in millions of dollars) in infrastructure projects as a proportion of GDP on a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 represents the lowest participation and 1 the highest of the set of observations.

#### **5. Labor Legislation**

##### *Countries considered*

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.

### ***Sources of information***

- a. Flexibility of the legislation on hiring: Based on Lora (2001) supplemented by information from the ILO (2005) and the legislation of the countries.
- b. Expected cost of firing a worker based on Heckman and Pagés (2000) and Lora (2001) supplemented by information from the ILO (2005) and the legislation of the countries.
- c. Indicator of flexibility of working hours based on Lora (2001) supplemented by information from the ILO (2005) and the legislation of the countries.
- d. Cost of social security contributions (pensions, health, family and unemployment compensation) plus other taxes and contributions (job training programs, housing, etc.). The source is the legislation of the countries supplemented by several issues of *Social Security Programs throughout the World* of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and information from the legislation of the countries consulted by Internet.
- e. Minimum wages: legislation of the countries and series reported in the databases of the statistical offices, central banks and other official sources.

### ***Calculation of the index***

Five indicators are combined in this area and standardized on a scale of 0 to 1:

- a. The first component is an indicator of the flexibility of legislation on hiring. This indicator takes the value of 1 when the legislation does not impose restrictions on temporary contracts, the value of 0.5 when only allows temporary contracts with limited duration and renewability are permitted, and 0 when temporary contracts are limited to temporary functions.
- b. The second indicator is the expected cost of firing a worker, whose calculation methodology is taken from Heckman and Pagés (2000). This is based on a new worker who faces a profile of probabilities of separation from the company assumed to be equal in all the countries, and a weighting different from dismissal for justified and justified cause. The same methodology was applied to the other years not covered by these authors.
- c. The third component is an indicator of the flexibility of working hours, which takes the value of 1 when extra pay for overtime does not exceed 50% and for holidays not exceeding 100%, a value of 0 when extra pay for both overtime and holidays is over 100%, and a value of 0.5 in all other cases. The sources are the same as above.
- d. The fourth component is the cost of social security contributions and other taxes and payroll contributions, on a scale of 0 to 1, where 0 is the highest rate and 1 the lowest of the set of observations.

- e. The last component (which was not included in previous versions of the index) is the level of minimum wages as ratio of per capita income, where 0 corresponds to the highest ratio and 1 to the lowest for all observations. Minimum wages were calculated as the annual average of the monthly data. In countries where the minimum wage is differentiated by sectors, fixed weightings were used according to the weight of the sector in employment, based on household surveys, for an intermediate year in the series.











Table A.3.3. Reserves requirement coefficient (standardized 0-1)																									
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0.51	0.80	0.91	0.90	0.55	0.75	0.78	0.85	0.84	0.88	0.95	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.87	0.80	0.71	0.73	0.86	0.76	0.77	0.72	0.70
Bolivia	0.00	0.60	0.85	0.76	0.64	0.73	0.77	0.83	0.82	0.89	0.87	0.82	0.80	0.95	0.95	0.93	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.94	0.94	0.93	0.93	0.92	0.89
Brazil	0.96	0.81	0.15	0.92	0.96	0.18	0.55	0.92	0.93	0.82	0.90	0.93	0.87	0.90	0.92	0.95	0.94	0.87	0.90	0.89	0.90	0.91	0.90	0.96	0.96
Chile	0.94	0.95	0.95	0.93	0.97	0.96	0.93	0.91	0.93	0.92	0.94	0.95	0.98	0.96	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.95	0.95	0.93	0.92	0.97	0.96	0.95
Colombia	0.75	0.74	0.70	0.69	0.68	0.84	0.82	0.81	0.81	0.85	0.86	0.89	0.90	0.96	0.93	0.94	0.90	0.88	0.88	0.89	0.89	0.91	0.87	0.84	0.80
Costa Rica	0.59	0.59	0.58	0.53	0.53	0.52	0.43	0.49	0.52	0.50	0.42	0.54	0.61	0.56	0.63	0.70	0.78	0.80	0.74	0.74	0.68	0.59	0.60	0.58	0.59
Dominican Rep	0.70	0.58	0.73	0.57	0.61	0.63	0.55	0.64	0.65	0.68	0.68	0.74	0.75	0.72	0.76	0.70	0.65	0.72	0.57	0.60	0.58	0.57	0.58	0.53	0.60
Ecuador	0.74	0.72	0.75	0.72	0.71	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.84	0.90	0.91	0.90	0.91	0.85	0.91	0.94	0.96	0.95	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.96	0.96	0.93	0.92
El Salvador	0.75	0.83	0.76	0.72	0.74	0.71	0.72	0.75	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.86	0.86	0.87	0.82	0.85	0.85	0.87	0.85	0.83	0.83
Guatemala	0.74	0.72	0.79	0.77	0.78	0.77	0.77	0.84	0.77	0.82	0.85	0.83	0.63	0.74	0.85	0.80	0.83	0.76	0.88	0.87	0.88	0.86	0.87	0.88	0.87
Honduras	0.91	0.92	0.94	0.92	0.89	0.91	0.88	0.86	0.92	0.89	0.86	0.84	0.71	0.72	0.79	0.87	0.88	0.85	0.87	0.87	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.87	0.86
Jamaica	0.74	0.62	0.69	0.65	0.62	0.65	0.70	0.64	0.66	0.66	0.65	0.71	0.68	0.68	0.75	0.74	0.75	0.76	0.77	0.85	0.88	0.88	0.89	0.84	0.81
Mexico	0.57	0.68	0.83	0.72	0.92	0.97	0.98	0.99	1.00	0.99	0.75	0.58	0.98	0.96	0.93	0.96	0.93	0.88	0.87	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.87	0.85	0.85
Nicaragua	0.65	0.73	0.67	0.30	0.65	0.35	0.45	0.58	0.68	0.71	0.71	0.72	0.76	0.79	0.83	0.84	0.76	0.76	0.75	0.76	0.75	0.67	0.72	0.70	0.65
Paraguay	0.45	0.39	0.35	0.39	0.52	0.66	0.70	0.68	0.69	0.69	0.68	0.67	0.68	0.64	0.64	0.63	0.60	0.58	0.50	0.51	0.57	0.60	0.57	0.53	0.50
Peru	0.35	0.48	0.55	0.58	0.75	0.66	0.72	0.65	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.63	0.65	0.73	0.74	0.74	0.73	0.72	0.75	0.74	0.65	0.69	0.66	0.64	0.71
Trinidad and Tobago	0.77	0.83	0.90	0.90	0.88	0.87	0.83	0.84	0.88	0.79	0.80	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.85	0.83	0.86	0.85	0.89	0.87	0.86	0.86	0.78	0.78
Uruguay	0.63	0.58	0.56	0.54	0.55	0.49	0.61	0.65	0.65	0.71	0.75	0.74	0.76	0.79	0.78	0.78	0.77	0.83	0.75	0.70	0.66	0.68	0.73	0.58	0.54
Venezuela	0.85	0.87	0.89	0.88	0.89	0.82	0.70	0.72	0.77	0.81	0.84	0.74	0.71	0.68	0.67	0.68	0.69	0.73	0.74	0.73	0.77	0.69	0.63	0.61	0.66

Table A.3.4. Interest rate liberalization (discrete values, 0-3)																									
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0	0	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Bolivia	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Brazil	0	0	0	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Chile	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Colombia	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Costa Rica	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Dominican Rep	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Ecuador	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0
El Salvador	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Guatemala	0	0	0	0	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Honduras	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Jamaica	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Mexico	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Nicaragua	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Paraguay	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Peru	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Trinidad and Tobago	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Uruguay	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Venezuela	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	3	1	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2



Table A.3.7. Financial transactions taxes (standardized 0-1)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40
Bolivia	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.70	0.75	0.85	0.85	0.85
Brazil	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.75	1.00	1.00	0.80	0.80	0.62	0.62	0.70	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.62	1.00	1.00
Chile	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75
Colombia	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.80	0.80	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60
Costa Rica	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Dominican Rep	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85
Ecuador	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.20	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
El Salvador	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Guatemala	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Honduras	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Jamaica	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Mexico	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Nicaragua	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Paraguay	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Peru	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.90	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.93	0.94
Trinidad and Tobago	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Uruguay	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Venezuela	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.25	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.50	1.00	0.00	0.25	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Table A.3.8. Quality of bank supervision (discrete scale)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Bolivia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Brazil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Chile	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Colombia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2
Costa Rica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Dominican Rep	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Ecuador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
El Salvador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Guatemala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Honduras	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2
Jamaica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Mexico	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Nicaragua	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2
Paraguay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Peru	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Trinidad and Tobago	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
Uruguay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2







	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.36	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
Bolivia	0.30	0.30	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
Brazil	0.60	0.60	0.50	0.50	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.35	0.30	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27
Chile	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.48	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40
Colombia	0.49	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.38	0.38	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.39	0.39	0.34	0.33	0.33
Costa Rica	0.50	0.50	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Dominican Rep	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.30	0.27	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Ecuador	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.35	0.35
El Salvador	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.30	0.25	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
Guatemala	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.25	0.25	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31
Honduras	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.30	0.30	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Jamaica	0.58	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Mexico	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.50	0.45	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.34	0.33	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.28
Nicaragua	0.53	0.53	.	.	.	.	0.60	0.39	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
Paraguay	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.10	0.10
Peru	0.50	0.48	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.37	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.20	0.20	0.27	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
Trinidad and Tobago	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.50	0.45	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.40	0.40	0.38	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Uruguay	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.25
Venezuela	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.51	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52
Bolivia	0.59	0.59	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82
Brazil	0.18	0.18	0.32	0.32	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.52	0.59	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63
Chile	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.34	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45
Colombia	0.33	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.49	0.49	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.47	0.47	0.53	0.55	0.55	0.55
Costa Rica	0.32	0.32	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66
Dominican Rep	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.59	0.63	0.64	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66
Ecuador	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.52	0.52
El Salvador	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.32	0.32	0.18	0.59	0.66	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59
Guatemala	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.66	0.66	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58
Honduras	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66
Jamaica	0.21	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66
Mexico	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.32	0.38	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.53	0.55	0.59	0.60	0.62	0.62	0.62
Nicaragua	0.28	0.28					0.18	0.47	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59
Paraguay	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.86	0.86	0.86
Peru	0.32	0.34	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.49	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.73	0.73	0.63	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59
Trinidad and Tobago	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.32	0.38	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.45	0.45	0.48	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66
Uruguay	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.66	0.66	0.66
Venezuela	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53
Regional Average	0.35	0.38	0.43	0.45	0.49	0.53	0.53	0.59	0.62	0.63	0.62	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.65	0.65	0.63	0.62	0.62

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>Argentina</b>	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.20	0.20	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
<b>Bolivia</b>	0.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
<b>Brazil</b>	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.33	0.37	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
<b>Chile</b>	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
<b>Colombia</b>	0.40	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.34	0.33	0.33
<b>Costa Rica</b>	0.50	0.50	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
<b>Dominican Rep</b>	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.30	0.27	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.30	0.25	0.25	0.25
<b>Ecuador</b>	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
<b>El Salvador</b>	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.30	0.30	0.35	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
<b>Guatemala</b>	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.35	0.35	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31
<b>Honduras</b>	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.25
<b>Jamaica</b>	0.45	0.45	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33
<b>Mexico</b>	0.42	0.42	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.36	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.34	0.33	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.28
<b>Nicaragua</b>	0.45	0.45					0.50	0.36	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
<b>Paraguay</b>	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.20	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
<b>Peru</b>	0.55	0.40	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.27	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
<b>Trinidad and Tobago</b>	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.45	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.45	0.45	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.34	0.30	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
<b>Uruguay</b>	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.25	0.25	0.25
<b>Venezuela</b>	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.30	0.30	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>Argentina</b>	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.64	0.64	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36
<b>Bolivia</b>	0.45	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55
<b>Brazil</b>	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.40	0.33	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38
<b>Chile</b>	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.71	0.70	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69
<b>Colombia</b>	0.27	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.38	0.40	0.40
<b>Costa Rica</b>	0.09	0.09	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45
<b>Dominican Rep</b>	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.45	0.51	0.53	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.45	0.55	0.55	0.55
<b>Ecuador</b>	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55
<b>El Salvador</b>	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.45	0.45	0.36	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55
<b>Guatemala</b>	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.55	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44
<b>Honduras</b>	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.55
<b>Jamaica</b>	0.18	0.18	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39
<b>Mexico</b>	0.24	0.24	0.35	0.35	0.33	0.35	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.38	0.40	0.45	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.49
<b>Nicaragua</b>	0.18	0.18					0.09	0.35	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45
<b>Paraguay</b>	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.64	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82
<b>Peru</b>	0.00	0.27	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.51	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45
<b>Trinidad and Tobago</b>	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.18	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.18	0.18	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.38	0.45	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55
<b>Uruguay</b>	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.55	0.55	0.55
<b>Venezuela</b>	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.45	0.45	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38

Table A.4.8. Productivity of income taxes

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.14
Bolivia	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.13	0.15	0.16	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.17	0.06	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.21
Brazil	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.11	0.13	0.14	0.19	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.19	0.21	0.22	0.20
Chile	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.22	0.17	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.17	0.17	0.20	0.27	0.37	0.35	0.29	0.19
Colombia	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.11	0.15	0.15	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.10	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.18
Costa Rica	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.16	0.15
Dominican Rep	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.17	0.15	0.13
Ecuador	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.16
El Salvador	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.08	0.10	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.17	0.17	0.16
Guatemala	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.10
Honduras	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.19	0.19	0.19
Jamaica	0.16	0.21	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.24	0.28	0.28	0.31	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.29	0.32	0.30	0.29	0.33	0.34	0.32	0.32	0.35	0.36	0.37
Mexico	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.17	0.18	0.17
Nicaragua	0.02	0.03					0.05	0.09	0.09	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.13	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.19	0.21
Paraguay	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.17	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.13	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.20	0.38	0.20	0.21	0.31
Peru	0.03	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.20	0.23	0.22	0.18
Trinidad and Tobago	0.20	0.18	0.16	0.21	0.17	0.14	0.18	0.21	0.20	0.18	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.19	0.22	0.20	0.24	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.32	0.29	0.28	0.31	0.36
Uruguay	0.16	0.10	0.12	0.13	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.13	0.15	0.22	0.20	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.25	0.15	0.20	0.20
Venezuela	0.30	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.27	0.33	0.32	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.19	0.23	0.28	0.10	0.12	0.17	0.13	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.18	0.21	0.23	0.17	0.16

Table A.4.9. Productivity of income taxes (standardized 0-1)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0.06	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.06	0.10	0.11	0.16	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.30	0.28	0.28	0.21	0.31	0.38	0.40	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.36
Bolivia	0.00	0.01	0.15	0.31	0.39	0.40	0.46	0.49	0.46	0.44	0.14	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.28	0.24	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.28	0.36	0.40	0.40	0.51	0.53
Brazil	0.22	0.22	0.20	0.22	0.30	0.37	0.27	0.33	0.34	0.48	0.35	0.37	0.41	0.41	0.35	0.35	0.36	0.45	0.43	0.43	0.50	0.49	0.53	0.57	0.51
Chile	0.47	0.47	0.41	0.57	0.43	0.38	0.37	0.37	0.32	0.34	0.39	0.41	0.36	0.33	0.29	0.35	0.38	0.43	0.44	0.52	0.70	0.96	0.91	0.76	0.50
Colombia	0.18	0.28	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.28	0.38	0.39	0.31	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.32	0.31	0.32	0.26	0.33	0.32	0.33	0.38	0.38	0.40	0.43	0.43	0.47
Costa Rica	0.12	0.10	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.14	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.27	0.28	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.36	0.40	0.38
Dominican Rep	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.10	0.07	0.16	0.18	0.19	0.22	0.21	0.24	0.24	0.27	0.28	0.37	0.35	0.33	0.27	0.29	0.30	0.42	0.39	0.34
Ecuador	0.08	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.05	0.16	0.28	0.27	0.27	0.29	0.34	0.37	0.39	0.37	0.42
El Salvador	0.12	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.10	0.20	0.25	0.29	0.27	0.26	0.26	0.29	0.30	0.28	0.29	0.30	0.31	0.36	0.39	0.42	0.42	0.42
Guatemala	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.14	0.12	0.10	0.21	0.13	0.18	0.10	0.14	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.21	0.25	0.24	0.22	0.23	0.27	0.26	0.26	0.25
Honduras	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.22	0.20	0.18	0.24	0.25	0.23	0.27	0.29	0.28	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.34	0.36	0.42	0.48	0.48	0.48
Jamaica	0.41	0.54	0.74	0.73	0.73	0.75	0.63	0.74	0.72	0.80	0.79	0.78	0.78	0.80	0.76	0.82	0.78	0.75	0.86	0.89	0.83	0.84	0.90	0.94	0.96
Mexico	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.27	0.29	0.32	0.33	0.37	0.40	0.38	0.29	0.28	0.31	0.32	0.34	0.32	0.33	0.34	0.33	0.30	0.35	0.38	0.42	0.46	0.44
Nicaragua	0.04	0.05					0.12	0.23	0.21	0.10	0.13	0.14	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.23	0.33	0.38	0.41	0.44	0.47	0.48	0.53
Paraguay	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.24	0.26	0.37	0.42	0.41	0.37	0.37	0.39	0.32	0.27	0.29	0.27	0.35	0.52	1.00	0.51	0.55	0.80
Peru	0.06	0.16	0.11	0.18	0.09	0.03	0.04	0.09	0.14	0.21	0.24	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.24	0.27	0.30	0.26	0.33	0.32	0.36	0.52	0.59	0.56	0.45
Trinidad and Tobago	0.52	0.46	0.41	0.53	0.43	0.36	0.47	0.54	0.52	0.47	0.58	0.62	0.62	0.48	0.57	0.52	0.63	0.59	0.63	0.68	0.83	0.74	0.72	0.81	0.93
Uruguay	0.40	0.24	0.29	0.32	0.22	0.23	0.21	0.25	0.31	0.32	0.39	0.56	0.53	0.56	0.54	0.54	0.50	0.57	0.59	0.60	0.56	0.64	0.37	0.51	0.52
Venezuela	0.78	0.52	0.56	0.58	0.70	0.86	0.84	0.65	0.79	0.66	0.50	0.59	0.74	0.25	0.31	0.44	0.34	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.46	0.53	0.59	0.45	0.42

Table A.4.10. Productivity of VAT (C-Efficiency)																									
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.13	0.14	0.22	0.24	0.33	0.40	0.40	0.34	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.31	0.33	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.37	0.39	0.40	0.44
Bolivia	0.03	0.02	0.10	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.21	0.19	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.20	0.23	0.24	0.27	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.33	0.35	0.38	0.34
Brazil	0.29	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.39	0.52	0.42	0.41	0.42	0.52	0.44	0.42	0.40	0.39	0.39	0.43	0.44	0.47	0.46	0.48	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.51	0.46
Chile	0.65	0.67	0.66	1.05	0.76	0.64	0.65	0.68	0.69	0.68	0.68	0.70	0.71	0.69	0.68	0.71	0.70	0.73	0.69	0.73	0.74	0.72	0.76	0.79	0.69
Colombia	0.21	0.27	0.29	0.30	0.31	0.22	0.25	0.27	0.27	0.29	0.29	0.33	0.32	0.31	0.32	0.27	0.29	0.29	0.32	0.33	0.34	0.35	0.38	0.39	0.38
Costa Rica	0.25	0.31	0.29	0.19	0.18	0.28	0.28	0.31	0.26	0.28	0.28	0.24	0.23	0.27	0.26	0.26	0.28	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.29	0.32	0.34	0.30	0.23
Dominican Rep	0.17	0.16	0.21	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.16	0.17	0.19	0.21	0.16	0.17	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.23	0.35	0.35	0.21	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.18	0.18
Ecuador	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.21	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.24	0.25	0.29	0.45	0.51	0.51	0.48	0.44	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.42	0.47
El Salvador								0.20	0.23	0.23	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.25	0.24	0.23
Guatemala	0.16	0.16	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.21	0.21	0.18	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.23	0.23	0.25	0.27	0.26	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.24	0.22	0.21
Honduras	0.41	0.40	0.43	0.47	0.53	0.82	0.61	0.63	0.68	0.70	0.78	0.78	0.84	1.06	0.74	0.57	0.52	0.52	0.57	0.58	0.58	0.60	0.65	0.66	0.56
Jamaica							0.72	0.95	0.92	0.91	1.01	0.93	0.79	0.82	0.79	0.75	0.74	0.71	0.77	0.75	0.73	0.68	0.64	0.59	0.69
Mexico	0.30	0.28	0.30	0.33	0.30	0.35	0.32	0.38	0.37	0.38	0.28	0.29	0.32	0.31	0.33	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.38	0.37	0.39	0.35
Nicaragua	0.18			0.05	0.08	0.20	0.16	0.25	0.33	0.21	0.14	0.15	0.17	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.22	0.80	0.73
Paraguay									0.46	0.59	0.64	0.60	0.64	0.66	0.59	0.59	0.58	0.58	0.64	0.67	0.73	0.76	0.77	0.77	0.80
Peru	0.37	0.34	0.28	0.46	0.25	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.21	0.28	0.28	0.27	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.29	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.34	0.35	0.35	0.36
Trinidad and Tobago						0.49	0.51	0.45	0.46	0.53	0.54	0.52	0.49	0.47	0.46	0.43	0.54	0.50	0.42	0.46	0.64	0.50	0.49	0.62	0.69
Uruguay	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.28	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.31	0.30	0.28	0.27	0.31	0.33	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.35	0.35	0.36
Venezuela									0.09	0.30	0.40	0.47	0.52	0.59	0.55	0.55	0.53	0.54	0.53	0.79	0.92	1.01	0.77	0.99	1.03

Table A.4.11. Productivity of VAT (standardized 0-1)																									
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0.14	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.12	0.19	0.21	0.30	0.37	0.36	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.28	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.34	0.36	0.37	0.40
Bolivia	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.15	0.15	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.18	0.16	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.17	0.21	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.27	0.26	0.30	0.32	0.35	0.31
Brazil	0.26	0.28	0.27	0.26	0.36	0.48	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.48	0.41	0.39	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.39	0.41	0.44	0.42	0.44	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.47	0.43
Chile	0.60	0.63	0.62	0.99	0.71	0.60	0.61	0.64	0.65	0.63	0.64	0.66	0.67	0.64	0.63	0.66	0.66	0.68	0.65	0.69	0.69	0.67	0.71	0.74	0.65
Colombia	0.19	0.24	0.26	0.27	0.27	0.19	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.29	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.29	0.30	0.31	0.32	0.35	0.35	0.35
Costa Rica	0.22	0.28	0.26	0.16	0.16	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.21	0.20	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.28	0.31	0.27	0.20
Dominican Rep	0.14	0.13	0.19	0.19	0.22	0.22	0.13	0.15	0.16	0.18	0.13	0.14	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.20	0.32	0.32	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.16
Ecuador	0.16	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.19	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.24	0.21	0.22	0.26	0.42	0.47	0.47	0.44	0.41	0.39	0.38	0.40	0.38	0.43
El Salvador	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.17	0.20	0.20	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.21	0.23	0.22	0.21	0.20
Guatemala	0.13	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.21	0.20	0.22	0.24	0.23	0.20	0.17	0.18	0.22	0.19	0.18
Honduras	0.38	0.36	0.39	0.43	0.50	0.77	0.57	0.58	0.63	0.65	0.73	0.73	0.79	1.00	0.69	0.53	0.48	0.48	0.53	0.54	0.54	0.56	0.61	0.62	0.52
Jamaica	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.68	0.90	0.87	0.86	0.95	0.88	0.74	0.77	0.74	0.70	0.70	0.67	0.73	0.71	0.68	0.64	0.60	0.55	0.65
Mexico	0.27	0.25	0.27	0.30	0.27	0.31	0.29	0.34	0.33	0.35	0.25	0.26	0.29	0.28	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.35	0.34	0.35	0.32
Nicaragua	0.15			0.03	0.06	0.17	0.14	0.22	0.30	0.18	0.11	0.12	0.15	0.17	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.19	0.76	0.69
Paraguay	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.42	0.55	0.60	0.56	0.60	0.62	0.55	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.60	0.63	0.68	0.71	0.72	0.73	0.75
Peru	0.34	0.31	0.25	0.42	0.22	0.09	0.13	0.13	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.27	0.27	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.26	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.33
Trinidad and Tobago	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.45	0.48	0.42	0.43	0.49	0.50	0.48	0.45	0.44	0.43	0.40	0.51	0.47	0.38	0.43	0.60	0.46	0.45	0.58	0.64
Uruguay	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.24	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.31	0.32	0.33
Venezuela	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.27	0.36	0.44	0.48	0.55	0.51	0.51	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.74	0.86	0.96	0.73	0.93	0.97

Table A.5.1. Privatizations Index

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.06	0.10	0.16	0.19	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.32	0.36	0.38	0.39	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.43	0.45	0.46	0.47	0.48
Bolivia	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.11	0.24	0.64	0.72	0.78	0.80	0.90	0.92	0.94	0.97	0.98	1.00	1.00	1.00
Brazil	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.14	0.18	0.23	0.27	0.30	0.31	0.33	0.34	0.36	0.38	0.41	0.44
Chile	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.13	0.14	0.16	0.18	0.21	0.24	0.29	0.36	0.41	0.52	0.56	0.63	0.67	0.69	0.71	0.72	0.74	0.76	0.77	0.79
Colombia	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.21	0.23	0.25	0.26	0.27
Costa Rica	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.11
Dominican Rep	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.09	0.16	0.19	0.23	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.29
Ecuador	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.21	0.23	0.25	0.26
El Salvador	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.14	0.19	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.30	0.31	0.32	0.35	0.37	0.37
Guatemala	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.07	0.19	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.28	0.30	0.33	0.35	0.35	0.35
Honduras	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.13	0.13	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.25	0.29	0.31	0.31
Jamaica	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.23	0.31	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.38	0.38	0.39	0.40
Mexico	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.19	0.20	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.24	0.25	0.25
Nicaragua	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.10	0.18	0.19	0.22	0.22	0.25	0.26	0.28	0.33	0.36	0.37
Paraguay	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.13	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.17
Peru	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.11	0.19	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.29	0.33	0.34	0.37	0.38	0.39	0.42	0.44	0.46	0.48
Trinidad and Tobago																									
Uruguay	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11
Venezuela	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.14	0.15	0.17	0.19	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.23
Regional Average	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.11	0.17	0.20	0.23	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.30	0.31	0.33	0.35	0.36	0.37

Table A.5.2. Privatizations less nationalizations as a ratio of GDP (cumulative coefficients since 1985)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.07	0.11	0.13	0.16	0.18	0.20	0.23	0.25	0.27	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.32	0.33	0.33	0.34
Bolivia	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.08	0.17	0.45	0.51	0.55	0.57	0.64	0.65	0.67	0.68	0.69	0.71	0.71	0.71
Brazil	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.19	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.27	0.29	0.31	0.31
Chile	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.13	0.15	0.17	0.20	0.26	0.29	0.37	0.40	0.45	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.51	0.52	0.54	0.55	0.56
Colombia	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.19	0.19
Costa Rica	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.08
Dominican Republic	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.20
Ecuador	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.13	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.18	0.19
El Salvador	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.10	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.19	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.25	0.26	0.26
Guatemala	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.14	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.23	0.25	0.25
Honduras	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.18	0.20	0.22
Jamaica	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.16	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.28
Mexico	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.18
Nicaragua	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.14	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.20	0.23	0.26	0.26
Paraguay	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.12
Peru	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.08	0.13	0.15	0.17	0.19	0.21	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.27	0.28	0.30	0.31	0.33	0.34
Trinidad & Tobago	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Uruguay	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08
Venezuela	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.16

Table A.6.1. Labor Reform Index

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>Argentina</b>	0.64	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.64	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.64	0.66	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.73	0.71	0.70	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69
<b>Bolivia</b>	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.47	0.48	0.47	0.48	0.47	0.47	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.47
<b>Brazil</b>	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64
<b>Chile</b>	0.76	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.74
<b>Colombia</b>	0.71	0.71	0.72	0.72	0.71	0.69	0.68	0.69	0.68	0.70	0.69	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.66	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.70	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69
<b>Costa Rica</b>	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.67	0.68	0.68	0.69	0.68	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.71	0.68	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69
<b>Dominican Republic</b>	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.66	0.69	0.68	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.64	0.64	0.65	0.65	0.64	0.64
<b>Ecuador</b>	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.60	0.60	0.59	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.61	0.60	0.61	0.60
<b>El Salvador</b>	0.44	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.51	0.53	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.52
<b>Guatemala</b>	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.65	0.65	0.64	0.63	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64
<b>Honduras</b>	0.62	0.63	0.63	0.62	0.61	0.62	0.62	0.61	0.61	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.62	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.58
<b>Jamaica</b>	0.91	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.92	0.94	0.93	0.92	0.92	0.93	0.92	0.92	0.93	0.93	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92
<b>Mexico</b>	0.39	0.40	0.40	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.43	0.41	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39
<b>Nicaragua</b>	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.47	0.49	0.53	0.54	0.67	0.67	0.65	0.66	0.66	0.64	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.62	0.61
<b>Paraguay</b>	0.65	0.66	0.65	0.64	0.64	0.65	0.65	0.66	0.65	0.63	0.62	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.65
<b>Peru</b>	0.44	0.41	0.42	0.39	0.45	0.47	0.47	0.55	0.55	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.51	0.62	0.62	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.62	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.65	0.66	0.65
<b>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</b>	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.91	0.91	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.91
<b>Uruguay</b>	0.41	0.41	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.43	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.41	0.41	0.43	0.43	0.43
<b>Venezuela</b>	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.43	0.45	0.45	0.43	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.45	0.42	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.56	0.54
<b>Promedio Regional</b>	0.61	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.63	0.63	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.63

Table A.6.2. Expected cost of firing a worker (in months of salary)																									
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.28	2.23	2.23	2.23	2.23	2.23
Bolivia	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63	4.63
Brazil	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.98	1.98	1.98	1.98	1.98	1.98	1.98	1.98
Chile	2.56	2.56	2.56	2.56	2.56	2.56	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29	3.29
Colombia	3.03	3.03	3.03	3.03	3.03	3.03	3.38	3.38	3.38	3.38	3.38	3.38	3.38	3.38	3.38	3.38	3.38	3.38	2.51	2.51	2.51	2.51	2.51	2.51	2.51
Costa Rica	3.04	3.04	3.04	3.04	3.04	3.04	3.04	3.04	3.04	3.04	3.04	3.04	3.04	3.04	3.04	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60
Dominican Rep.	2.03	2.03	2.03	2.03	2.03	2.03	2.03	2.03	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.67
Ecuador	4.23	4.23	4.23	4.23	4.23	4.23	4.23	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97	3.97
El Salvador	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13	3.13
Guatemala	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90
Honduras	3.10	3.10	3.10	3.10	3.10	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.49	3.53
Jamaica	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06	2.06
Mexico	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67	3.67
Nicaragua	6.66	6.66	6.66	6.66	6.66	6.66	6.66	6.66	6.66	6.66	6.66	6.66	2.64	2.64	2.64	2.64	2.64	2.64	2.64	2.64	2.64	2.64	2.64	2.64	2.64
Paraguay	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	2.47	2.47	2.47	2.47	2.47	2.47	2.47	2.47	2.47	2.47	2.47	2.47	2.47	2.47	2.47	2.47
Peru	5.31	5.31	5.31	5.31	5.31	5.31	5.31	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70	3.70
Trinidad & Tobago	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85	2.85
Uruguay	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76	2.76
Venezuela	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	7.03	3.16	3.16	3.16	3.16	3.16	3.16	3.16	3.16	3.16	3.16	3.16	3.16

Table A.6.3. Expected cost of firing a worker (standardized 0-1)																									
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.78
Bolivia	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39
Brazil	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82
Chile	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61
Colombia	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73
Costa Rica	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72
Dominican Rep.	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71
Ecuador	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
El Salvador	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63
Guatemala	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67
Honduras	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.57
Jamaica	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81
Mexico	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54
Nicaragua	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71
Paraguay	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74
Peru	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54
Trinidad & Tobago	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68
Uruguay	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69
Venezuela	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63
Promedio Regional	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.59	0.59	0.58	0.60	0.60	0.59	0.59	0.62	0.61	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66

Table A.6.4. Hiring flexibility (discrete scale from 1 to 3)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Bolivia	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Brazil	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Chile	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Colombia	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Costa Rica	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Dominican Rep.	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Ecuador	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
El Salvador	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Guatemala	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Honduras	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Jamaica	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mexico	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Nicaragua	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Paraguay	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Peru	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Trinidad & Tobago	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Uruguay	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Venezuela	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3

Table A.6.5. Hiring flexibility (standardized 0-1)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Bolivia	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Brazil	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Chile	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Colombia	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Costa Rica	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Dominican Rep.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Ecuador	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
El Salvador	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Guatemala	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Honduras	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Jamaica	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Mexico	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Nicaragua	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Paraguay	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Peru	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Trinidad & Tobago	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Uruguay	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Venezuela	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Promedio Regional	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29



Table A.6.6. Flexibility of working hours (discrete scale from 1 to 3)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	
Argentina	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Bolivia	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Brazil	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Chile	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Colombia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Costa Rica	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Dominican Rep.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ecuador	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
El Salvador	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Guatemala	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Honduras	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Jamaica	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mexico	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Nicaragua	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Paraguay	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Peru	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Trinidad & Tobago	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Uruguay	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Venezuela	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Table A.6.7. Flexibility of working hours (standardized 0-1)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Bolivia	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Brazil	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Chile	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Colombia	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Costa Rica	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Dominican Republic	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Ecuador	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
El Salvador	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Guatemala	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Honduras	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Jamaica	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Mexico	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Nicaragua	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Paraguay	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Peru	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Trinidad & Tobago	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Uruguay	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Venezuela	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Promedio Regional	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76

Table A.6.8. Social security contributions and other taxes and contributions on payroll (as proportion of wages)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.33	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40
Bolivia	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23
Brazil	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.34
Chile	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22
Colombia	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.30	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.38	0.38	0.38
Costa Rica	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
Dominican Republic	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.19	0.20	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.21	0.22	0.23
Ecuador	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
El Salvador	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.19	0.17	0.19	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21
Guatemala	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
Honduras	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
Jamaica	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Mexico	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.33	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.35	0.36	0.36	0.36
Nicaragua	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22
Paraguay	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26
Peru	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Trinidad & Tobago	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.11
Uruguay	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.36	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.34	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.31	0.31	0.31
Venezuela	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.23

Table A.6.9. Social security contributions and other taxes and contributions on payroll (standardized 0-1)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Argentina	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.47	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32
Bolivia	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.64	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67
Brazil	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.46	0.45	0.45
Chile	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70
Colombia	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.69	0.59	0.59	0.59	0.55	0.59	0.54	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.41	0.40	0.39	0.37	0.37	0.37
Costa Rica	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.42
Dominican Republic	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.77	0.75	0.73	0.71	0.69	0.72	0.70	0.68
Ecuador	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76
El Salvador	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.77	0.80	0.77	0.74	0.72	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71
Guatemala	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80
Honduras	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89
Jamaica	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Mexico	0.60	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.54	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.49	0.47	0.46	0.44	0.43	0.42	0.40	0.40	0.40
Nicaragua	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71
Paraguay	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.63
Peru	0.68	0.69	0.69	0.66	0.63	0.63	0.63	0.56	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.55	0.60	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75
Trinidad & Tobago	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.97	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.95
Uruguay	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.41	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.45	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.52	0.52	0.52
Venezuela	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.80	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.68
Promedio Regional	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.71	0.70	0.70	0.69	0.68	0.68	0.69	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.66	0.67	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.65	0.66	0.66	0.65

Table A.6.10. Minimum wages (as a proportion of income per capita)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>Argentina</b>	0.39	0.31	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.13	0.20	0.17	0.28	0.32	0.32	0.31	0.29	0.29	0.31	0.31	0.33	0.30	0.29	0.39	0.48	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.56
<b>Bolivia</b>							0.51	0.51	0.56	0.60	0.57	0.54	0.54	0.61	0.67	0.68	0.76	0.79	0.75	0.68	0.63	0.59	0.58	0.58	0.63
<b>Brazil</b>	0.33	0.33	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.34	0.29	0.29	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.26	0.27	0.29	0.29	0.30	0.29	0.30	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.34
<b>Chile</b>	0.57	0.40	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.37	0.38	0.37	0.37	0.36	0.34	0.35	0.35	0.38	0.42	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.43	0.39	0.37	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.37
<b>Colombia</b>	0.98	0.91	0.87	0.83	0.84	0.80	0.80	0.72	0.71	0.61	0.61	0.63	0.64	0.67	0.73	0.59	0.61	0.62	0.61	0.59	0.58	0.56	0.54	0.52	0.53
<b>Costa Rica</b>	0.84		0.88	0.81	0.90	0.82	0.81	0.75	0.76	0.74	0.71	0.73	0.73	0.71	0.66	0.69	0.71	0.71	0.69	0.67	0.66	0.63	0.60	0.58	0.65
<b>Dominican Republic</b>	1.08	1.14	1.06	1.11	1.12	1.24	0.84	0.93	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.80	0.77	0.76	0.81	0.78	0.85	0.76	0.67	0.67	0.71	0.62	0.61	0.56	0.58
<b>Ecuador</b>										0.80	0.93	0.99	0.91	0.85	0.81	0.91	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.79	0.74	0.71	0.75	0.70	0.80
<b>El Salvador</b>	2.32	1.31	1.27	1.22	1.39	1.18	1.01	0.98	1.01	0.95	0.90	0.89	0.83	0.82	0.82	0.78	0.75	0.72	0.74	0.73	0.67	0.65	0.63	0.63	0.73
<b>Guatemala</b>												0.68	0.61	0.61	0.63	0.64	0.78	0.78	0.85	0.93	0.87	0.89	0.84	0.81	0.85
<b>Honduras</b>	1.19	1.17	1.11	1.19	1.37	1.14	1.13	1.22	1.16	0.97	0.97	0.96	0.99	1.02	1.04	0.90	0.97	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.98	1.58
<b>Jamaica</b>	0.74	0.58	0.49	0.58	0.57	0.57	0.52	0.65	0.43	0.54	0.70	0.60	0.55	0.69	0.64	0.58	0.54	0.72	0.69	0.74	0.66	0.68	0.69	0.69	0.68
<b>Mexico</b>	0.61	0.64	0.56	0.50	0.45	0.38	0.35	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.29	0.27	0.26	0.25	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.17
<b>Nicaragua</b>							1.71	1.45	1.23	0.68	0.58	0.51	0.60	0.78	0.75	0.73	0.75	0.78	0.80	0.79	0.80	0.85	0.86	0.93	1.13
<b>Paraguay</b>	0.78	0.77	0.78	0.92	0.94	0.88	0.82	0.74	0.78	0.74	0.79	0.69	0.65	0.66	0.64	0.73	0.73	0.72	0.71	0.66	0.62	0.61	0.56	0.51	0.50
<b>Peru</b>	2.09	2.56	2.38	2.73	1.81	1.63	1.55	1.43	1.33	1.54	1.52	1.53	1.64	1.65	1.63	1.75	1.84	1.91	1.85	1.62	1.63	1.69	1.49	1.37	1.50
<b>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</b>														0.68	0.61	0.51	0.54	0.53	0.43	0.37	0.30	0.26	0.25	0.20	0.28
<b>Uruguay</b>	0.48	0.44	0.39	0.34	0.33	0.29	0.26	0.24	0.21	0.19	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.21	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.26
<b>Venezuela</b>	0.72	0.70	0.67	0.54	0.72	0.43	0.49	0.56	0.43	0.47	0.30	0.15	0.43	0.56	0.58	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.41	0.39	0.38	0.39	0.37	0.43

Table A.6.11. Minimum wages (standardized 0-1)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>Argentina</b>	0.90	0.93	0.96	0.95	0.95	1.00	0.97	0.98	0.94	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.94	0.94	0.93	0.93	0.92	0.93	0.94	0.90	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.84
<b>Bolivia</b>	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.83	0.82	0.83	0.84	0.84	0.81	0.79	0.79	0.76	0.75	0.76	0.79	0.81	0.82	0.83	0.84	0.81
<b>Brazil</b>	0.92	0.92	0.94	0.95	0.94	0.94	0.92	0.94	0.94	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.94	0.94	0.93	0.94	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.92
<b>Chile</b>	0.83	0.90	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.90	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.92	0.91	0.91	0.90	0.89	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.90	0.91	0.92	0.92	0.91
<b>Colombia</b>	0.67	0.70	0.72	0.73	0.73	0.74	0.74	0.77	0.78	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.80	0.79	0.77	0.82	0.82	0.81	0.82	0.82	0.83	0.84	0.84	0.85	0.84
<b>Costa Rica</b>	0.73	0.71	0.71	0.74	0.70	0.73	0.74	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.78	0.77	0.77	0.78	0.80	0.79	0.78	0.78	0.78	0.79	0.80	0.81	0.82	0.82	0.80
<b>Dominican Republic</b>	0.63	0.61	0.64	0.62	0.62	0.57	0.73	0.69	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.74	0.75	0.76	0.74	0.75	0.72	0.76	0.79	0.79	0.78	0.81	0.82	0.84	0.83
<b>Ecuador</b>	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.69	0.67	0.70	0.72	0.74	0.70	0.72	0.73	0.72	0.75	0.77	0.78	0.76	0.78	0.74
<b>El Salvador</b>	0.16	0.55	0.56	0.58	0.51	0.60	0.66	0.67	0.66	0.68	0.70	0.71	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.75	0.76	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.79	0.80	0.81	0.81	0.77
<b>Guatemala</b>	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.80	0.75	0.75	0.72	0.69	0.71	0.71	0.73	0.74	0.72
<b>Honduras</b>	0.59	0.60	0.62	0.59	0.52	0.61	0.62	0.58	0.60	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.67	0.66	0.65	0.70	0.68	0.67	0.66	0.66	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.44
<b>Jamaica</b>	0.76	0.83	0.86	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.85	0.80	0.88	0.84	0.78	0.82	0.84	0.78	0.80	0.83	0.84	0.77	0.78	0.77	0.80	0.79	0.78	0.78	0.79
<b>Mexico</b>	0.81	0.81	0.83	0.86	0.88	0.90	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.93	0.94	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.98
<b>Nicaragua</b>	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.49	0.58	0.79	0.83	0.85	0.82	0.75	0.76	0.77	0.76	0.75	0.74	0.75	0.74	0.72	0.72	0.69	0.61
<b>Paraguay</b>	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.69	0.69	0.71	0.73	0.77	0.75	0.76	0.74	0.79	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.78	0.80	0.81	0.82	0.83	0.85	0.86
<b>Peru</b>	0.24	0.06	0.14	0.00	0.36	0.42	0.45	0.50	0.54	0.46	0.47	0.46	0.42	0.41	0.42	0.38	0.34	0.32	0.34	0.43	0.42	0.40	0.48	0.52	0.47
<b>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</b>	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.79	0.82	0.85	0.84	0.84	0.89	0.91	0.93	0.95	0.95	0.97	0.94
<b>Uruguay</b>	0.86	0.88	0.90	0.92	0.92	0.94	0.95	0.96	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.97	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.95
<b>Venezuela</b>	0.77	0.78	0.79	0.84	0.77	0.88	0.86	0.84	0.88	0.87	0.93	0.99	0.89	0.83	0.83	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.88	0.89	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.91	0.88
<b>Promedio Regional</b>	0.70	0.72	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.76	0.77	0.78	0.79	0.80	0.80	0.81	0.81	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.79	0.79	0.80	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.82	0.83	0.80