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Migration and Immigrants:  
The Case of the Netherlands

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Migration and immigrants:  
The case of the Netherlands

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Abstract: This paper surveys migration to and from the Netherlands since the sixteenth century with an emphasis on the post-war period. Existing studies on the labour market performance of immigrants and ethnic minorities are considered and some new results from our recent research are presented.


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1. Introduction

In the early 1960s, the Netherlands switched from emigration to immigration country, possibly for the second time since the Golden Age. The increase in prosperity in the Netherlands reduced emigration and induced new immigration flows at the same time. Post-war immigrants can be distinguished in three main groups: immigrants from former colonies, those who were recruited for unskilled jobs (so-called guest workers), and more recently refugees. The social economical position of ethnic minorities is, in general, not comparable with natives although a clear improvement in their position is observable. Policy makers have reacted on a constant migration surplus with a restrictive immigration policy, at the same time aiming to improve the position of immigrants who have already arrived. However, the restrictive immigration policy aims at selected immigrant groups who are supposed to be a burden for the Dutch welfare system. Immigrants from developed countries and top managers from everywhere can enter the Netherlands relatively easily. Despite the restrictive immigration policy, rising labour shortages in certain sectors induce new discussions about the need for immigrants from time to time. Recently this discussion has been intensified due to the process of ageing.

This article examines the migration experience of the Netherlands. The focus will be on the labour market effect and the performance of some specific immigrant groups such as: Turks, Surinamese, Moroccans, Antilleans and refugees. Section 2 gives a historical overview of the migration from and to the Netherlands with an emphasis on the post-war immigration and its impact on the Dutch society. Section 3 focuses on the labour market position of the migrants who arrived in the post-war period and the impact of immigration on the labour market. Section 4 considers labour market effects of immigration. Section 5 concludes.

2. The ebb and flow of migration

2.1 Migration until 1945

The Netherlands is turning into an immigration country, possibly for the second time in its history. The first period of an immigration surplus was from 1585 to 1670, a period which

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3 The Dutch experience until 1980 is surveyed and analysed in Hartog and Vriend (1989). Van Ours and Veenman (1999) also document Dutch post-war immigration history, partly overlapping with and partly complementary to this paper.
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was known as the Golden Age in Dutch history. Migration seems to be of all times, at least in the Netherlands. However, the percentage of immigrants was higher in the 17th and 18th century than in the 1990s (Lucassen and Penninx, 1997:29). In the period of the Golden age, there was relatively great prosperity and tolerance in the Netherlands in comparison to the surrounding countries, which attracted many immigrants. A large number of immigrant workers as well as religious and political refugees moved to the Netherlands for either a short stay or to settle permanently. Lucassen and Penninx (1997) estimate that foreign-born people composed more than 6% of the Dutch population between 1585 and 1780. They argue that the change in the share of foreigners is closely correlated with the relative prosperity of the Netherlands. The number of immigrants was high until the mid-eighteenth century; the percentage of immigrants sharply decreased in the 19th century while the economy stagnated.

In the 17th and 18th century, a relative small number of migrants left the Netherlands. In these two centuries, no more than 10,000 people emigrated to North America while from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, the number of Dutch people leaving the Netherlands was higher than the number of immigrants. An overwhelmingly large part of Dutch emigrants headed for North America. After the mid-1840s, the total number of Dutch people who emigrated to North America has been estimated around 250,000 (HIM, 2001). Bad potato and rye harvests were the main push factors while the favourable economic condition in North America attracted many Dutch immigrants. After 1870 the number of immigrants experienced an increase from 50,000 between 1890 and 1900 to 175,000 in 1930 (Lucassen and Penninx 1997).

Figure 1 illustrates the migration pattern for almost the entire 20th century. Until 1960, the Netherlands was considered to be an emigration country although, from time to time, immigration was larger than emigration in connection with various historical events such as wars and economic crises. During the First World War, thousands of Belgian refugees crossed the border trying to escape from the war. From 1920 to 1940, a large portion of immigrants was composed by Jews and other opponents of the Nazi regime from Eastern Europe, Germany and Austria. After the German invasion in 1940, many Dutch people fled to the UK.
2.2 Migration 1945-1998

After the Second World War, the Netherlands experienced an emigration surplus in the recovery period of the economy until the early 1960s. Since 1961 the annual immigration flows exceed emigration flows systematically except in one year, namely 1967 (see Figure 1). From this year on the Netherlands can be considered more of an immigration country than an emigration country. The immigration flow highly fluctuated between a range of 37,000 and 127,000 people in a year while the emigration flow demonstrated a stable pattern around 60,000 people per year since 1953.4

2.2.1 Immigration

Immigration follows a common European sequence, of post-war and post-colonial restructuring, recruitment of unskilled guest workers, immigration curbs and arrival of refugees in large numbers (Zimmerman, 1995). In the Netherlands, decolonisation refers to Indonesia (1949) and Surinam (1975). Right after the war, in 1947, only about 104,000 people with a foreign nationality were counted, i.e. 1.1 % of the population (Penninx et al., 1994: 8-10). The first large immigration flow was from Indonesia, which had been a Dutch colony until December 1949. Large numbers of Eurasian repatriates5 who had been interned in the Japanese camps in the Dutch East Indies/ Indonesia during the War returned home. The two major immigration waves occurred directly after the de-colonisation of Indonesia in 1949 between 1949-1951 and between 1952-1957. Another immigration stream occurred in the early 1960s after the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia about New Guinea (see Figure 2). Migration from Indonesia has caused no economic problems for migrants with Dutch citizenship (which they possessed in case of two Dutch parents, and could choose in case of one Dutch parent) and apparently, integration has been smooth. Problematic, however, was the position of Moluccans, mostly former soldiers in the Dutch-Indies Army and their families. They were concentrated in certain areas in the Netherlands, isolated and deliberately declined integration, hoping to return to an independent Moluccan republic. After 1974, their labour market position was relatively poor (Veenman, 1990). There have been severe and violent political confrontations, as Moluccans required the Dutch

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4 Dutch population grew from some 9 million in 1945 to some 16 million in 2000

5 They were born in Indonesia, often from mixed parents. They had never been in the Netherlands before
government to support their action for an independent republic. After the early 1990’s, political tensions eased and their labour market position improved (Lucassen and Penninx, 1994, 145).

Two large immigration flows occurred after the de-colonisation of Surinam in 1975 and between 1979-1980 prior to the expiry of the transitional agreement on the settlement and residence of mutual subjects (see Figure 3) (Lucassen and Penninx, 1997: 42-44). Immigration from Surinam and Dutch Antilles has not led to smooth economic integration, and these groups are still targets for economic policies (see below).

The period of overall net-immigration started in the beginning of the 1960s (see Figure 1). The flow of large numbers of ‘guest workers’ after that time (the 1960s) created an immigration surplus in the Netherlands. During the long post-war boom, the demand for workers for unskilled jobs increased while the supply of unskilled Dutch workers was decreasing. The shortage of unskilled labourers was compensated by the inflow of Mediterranean workers (Hartog and Vriend 1979). Workers were actively recruited or came spontaneously from countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Morocco, Yugoslavia and Tunisia. The Dutch government regulated the recruitment practices by bilateral agreements with the countries in the 1960s. The total number of immigrants reached 235,000 in 1970 (Penninx et al., 1993: 17). The recruitment policy stopped during the first oil crisis but the immigration from the recruitment countries continued as a chain-migration, at first in the form of family reunification throughout the 1970s and later on in the form of family formation in the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 4).

Between 1982 and 1983 the immigration flow stagnated and even dropped almost to the level of emigration, no doubt as a reaction to the deep recession of the Dutch economy after the second oil crisis in 1979. The increase of immigration in the second half of the 1980s was dominated by family formation/re-union of ‘guest workers’. Additionally, the flow of political refugees and asylum seekers, from politically unstable areas in the world, has also increased.

While the chain-migration from Turkey and Morocco has continued during the last two decades, the number of south European immigrants did not grow much after the end of formal recruitment, and even experienced a decrease. From 1958 till the early 1960s, both
immigration from and emigration to the EU countries increased substantially. Figure 6 shows that the immigration surplus is closely correlated to economic performance of the Netherlands\textsuperscript{6}. An increase in unemployment encourages emigration and discourages immigration, and a decrease in unemployment leads to a reversed situation (Heijke, 1979; Hartog and Winkelmann 2000). However, in the EU area migration flows remain within a small range, possibly due to a relative simultaneity of the business cycle of European economies.

In the end, Surinamese, Antillians, Turks and Moroccans became the largest ethnic minority groups and this group is gradually growing due to a combination of continuous immigration and a relatively high birth rate. Table 3 indicates the composition of the population in the Netherlands in 1996 and 2000. The number of second generation Turks and Moroccans has increased by 25.7 and 29.7\% in this period. In 2000, the Netherlands had a total of 2,775,325 residents or 17.5\% of the total population who were born abroad or who had at least one parent who was born abroad\textsuperscript{7}. About half of these people are originally from the so-called non-western countries making up about 8.8\% of the entire population. The largest group, in this category, is Turks (308,890), followed by Surinamese (302,515), Moroccans (262,220), and Antilleans and Arubans (107,200). About half of the ethnic minorities are from Western countries and these immigrants do not get attention from research or policy, at least up to now. More than half of Western immigrants (56.4\%) are from European countries. People from the southern European countries (89,305) compose only 11.6\% of total number of people from European countries. According to UNCHR, the number of the political refugees was 118,700 in 1999 (see below).

In the 1990s, restrictive immigration policy has led to a decline and relative stabilisation in the flow of Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese immigrants but the overall immigration flow has not decreased. Obviously the restrictive policy had a certain impact on immigration flows generated by ethnic social networks in the form of family formation and reunification.

\textsuperscript{6} Unemployment increased in 1967, in 1973, and reached a peak of some 12\% in 1982/83. During the 1990’s it dropped substantially.

\textsuperscript{7} Since 1992, this definition is applied to the ethnic background of the residents because the identification of an immigrant is increasingly undermined by assimilation/integration. Children of first generation immigrants were born in the Netherlands or came to the Netherlands at early ages. Moreover, between 1985-1998, 491000 people have gained the Dutch nationality.
Immigration streams are now increasingly dominated by political refugees and asylum seekers.

2.2.2 Emigration

In the last two centuries, the main destinations of Dutch emigration have been the specific immigration countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and the USA. In the early 1950’s, there was a sharp increase, accompanied by a deliberate emigration policy: subsidies for transport, counselling, guidance, and bilateral international agreements for admission of Dutch. Motives for emigration were fear of unemployment, the Cold War, perceived lack of opportunities for agriculture and generally low economic expectations. Emigration decreased considerably after 1952 to a relatively stable trend, contrary to the overall immigration pattern (see Figure 1). The reaction of emigration to changes in migration policy and macro economic developments is clearly small compared to immigration.\(^8\) Two peak years of emigration are associated with the periods of economic recession in 1967 and in the beginning of the 1980s. In both years, the destination of Dutch emigrants was to the traditional emigration countries. Between 1946 and 1972, 481,000 Dutch citizens emigrated mainly to Canada, the US, Australia and New Zealand. The economic recession in the beginning of 1996 caused only a small increase. After this recession, other EU-countries became much more an alternative destination for the Dutch migrants. On the other hand, while the return migration of Turks and Moroccans mirrors the business cycle until 1990, it seems to be weaker correlated with the business cycles of the Dutch economy since then. This is likely due to the restrictive immigration policy of the Dutch government with regard to immigrants from non-EU countries. The policy has led to a lower number of both immigrants and emigrants.

The situation was notably the other way around for guest workers from Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. The immigrant population from these countries did not grow since 1973. In the formation process of the European union, the number of immigrants from southern European countries has continuously decreased while most of the guest workers, especially the Spanish workers, returned home. On balance, the yearly immigration surplus was positive between

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\(^8\) Although small, reactions are discernible. Hartog and Winkelmann (2000) find strong evidence that Dutch migration to New Zealand in the postwar period was sensitive to unemployment in both countries.
1973 and 1983 (see Figure 6). It appears that rising commodity trade between the members of the European Economic Community (EC) worked as substitute for migration. Straubhaar (1988) finds a strong correlation between intra-EC-trade and intra-EC-migration: the intra-EC-migration share of the entire EC-migration decreases by 1.3 per cent while the intra-EC-trade share of the total EC-trade increases by 0.8 per cent.

Migration to other EU-countries increased considerably between 1959-1967. Emigration in both directions demonstrates a marginally decreasing trend until 1987 and then increases again. While the EU migration balance is negligible, the open European market did create non-negligible flows between countries.

Emigration can thus be summarized as an early post-war peak to the traditional immigration countries, increased intra-EU labour mobility with a negligible balance and volatile return migration of Turks and Moroccans, and other guest workers.

### 2.2.3 Refugees

Until 1983, the annual number of refugees is counted in hundreds.\(^9\) Thereafter, a strongly increasing trend in the number of asylum requests is observed. The increasing immigration in the second half of the 1980s is consequently related to political refugees and asylum seekers from various countries.

There is a clear change in the composition of the asylum seeker population. The origin of asylum seekers moves with the centres of violence and oppression. In the 1980s, a large group of asylum seekers came from Turkey, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Iran, Poland, Ghana, Somalia while in the 1990s, most of the asylum seekers came from Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Iran, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and Somalia (Lucassen and Penninx 1997, UNHCR 2001)

It should be noted that an increase in asylum requests is not identical with an increase in admitted refugees. Over time the number of rejections has increased as well. As Table 5 indicates, before 1992 some 10 to 20% were admitted, while since then the proportion has

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\(^9\) Mostly, they came from communist countries, like Poland, Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968); they easily found their way into Dutch society.
risen to a third. In turn, the rejection of an asylum request does not mean that the rejected asylum seeker leaves the Netherlands. Many asylum seekers move to illegality or an unknown destination. Some are able to acquire a residence permit on the basis of another reason like marriage with a Dutch citizen. Moreover, the asylum procedure takes very long time and is quite complicated. These factors seriously hinder an estimation of total number of refugees. Altogether UNHCR (2001) estimated a total of 131,800 refugees in the end of 1998.

2.2.4 Migration policy

The flow of guest workers was initiated by employers, but regulated by a series of international treaties; the intention was temporary residence, and initially, each year about 30% of residing immigrants indeed returned (Hartog and Vriend, 1989). When unemployment strongly increased after the early 1970’s, the guest workers did not return to their homelands, and were massively hit by unemployment. In the meantime, the Netherlands had become a magnet for international migration flows with its internationally high standard of living. As a reaction the Dutch government tightened its immigration policy since the second half of the 1980s. Labour migration had already been banned in 1973. On the other hand, increased European integration made it easier for EU immigrants to settle, culminating in completely free mobility of labour under the Treaty of Amsterdam (2 October 1997). For non-EU residents, family formation and re-union are the two main grounds of admission, subject to strict conditions. They are allowed to settle (temporary) in the Netherlands if and only if they are:

i) a minor family member (younger than 15 years old) or the partner of a legal resident (native Dutch or legal non-Dutch) with a paid job which provides an income above the minimum wage.

ii) students, who are mostly allowed on the basis of bilateral agreements.

iii) labour migrants, according to the Law on Foreign Workers, who are mostly top managers and top sportsmen.

iv) political refugees, although their selection procedure has become increasingly strict.

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10 Estimates of the admission proportion are unreliable. In many cases, the flow of admission in a given year is simply divided by the stock of refugees waiting for a decision in that same year! A recent Dutch study relating ultimate decisions to initial requests found an admission proportion around .5 (Doornbos and Groenendijk, 2001)
Students are allowed to work only limited hours. Asylum seekers do not have access to the labour market as long as they are in the legal procedure of application for a refugee visa. Because migrants from non-EU countries are not allowed to settle as labour migrants, a request for asylum remains their only possibility to enter the Netherlands. This may well contribute to the increase in the number of asylum seekers. The Dutch government motivates excluding asylum seekers from the labour market by claiming that ‘this policy discourages potential asylum seekers’.

The initial guest workers were supposed to be temporary workers and hence, their integration was no policy goal. The main aim was to ensure that immigrants would have sufficient opportunities to participate in Dutch society without giving up their own life style and values, since this would strengthen ties with the home country.

In the deep recession of the 1980’s, minority unemployment was seen as an inevitable outcome of restructuring and modernising of the industrial sector (Lucassen and Penninx 1997). Government efforts focussed generally on supplying short training and on guiding job searches via labour offices, with some special emphasis on minorities. But at the time, providing income support dominated over active labour market policies. Later, there were attempts to improve the position of minorities in agreements with employer associations to set targets for minority employment shares, but this proved completely ineffective. By the end of the 1980s, the government policy switched to the Canadian model in which the employer is asked to state the ethnic composition of the work force in their annual report. But in 1998, unemployment among ethnic minorities was still four times higher than that of the native Dutch citizens (Table 4, discussed below). The poor performance may be attributed to the voluntary character of the measurement since employers are not sanctioned if they refuse to publish ethnic composition of their workforce. In 1998 the government started a special introductory program for immigrants, including Dutch language courses and introduction to Dutch society in general, to be implemented by local government. The program is not run very tightly, is inefficient and has low quality.

2.5 Undocumented workers

While the Dutch government tries to prevent immigration from non-EU countries, a gradual liberalisation of the immigration policy is observable for those workers from Poland and
some other eastern European countries who are prepared to work in unskilled (seasonal) jobs (Van Ours and Veenman, 1999). But naturally, the restrictive immigration policy creates a population of undocumented workers. These workers become illegal after the refusal of their request for refugee status or they enter the Netherlands legally or illegally without applying for legal residence status at all. Engbersen et al. (1999) estimate the number of undocumented immigrants in the four largest cities in the Netherlands as 40,000, divided over Amsterdam (18,000), Rotterdam (11,000), The Hague (8,400) and Utrecht (2,600). Hardly anything is known about immigrants who become illegal after the refusal of their request for refugee status, except for the suggestion (or hope) of policy makers that they move to surrounding countries. Undocumented immigrants are often from the same countries as settled immigrants, as a shadow population of legal immigrants, and live in large cities like other immigrants. They operate through networks of (own) immigrant communities. They earn an informal income at the ‘daily spot markets’ for unskilled, dirty, unattractive low-paid manual jobs in labour intensive sectors like horticulture, catering, industry etc (see Hartog and Zorlu, 1999 for evidence on textile sweatshops). Despite the enforcement policies of the Dutch government, undocumented immigrants seem to be permanent members of Dutch society just as in other advanced economies (Zorlu 2000). They serve as lubricant for cyclical and seasonal adjustments in the highly regulated Dutch labour market, as young, highly motivated workers for jobs deemed unattractive by formal workers. The famous gedoogbeleid (tolerated non-compliance) solves the problem when undocumented labour is in high demand.

3. The labour market position of ethnic minorities

The labour market positions of the three main groups (migrants from former colonies, guest workers and refugees) are characterised by strong differences, just as their migration history. Immigrants from former colonies often speak the Dutch language before they arrive. They are also more familiar with Dutch society. However, we still observe significant differences within this category. The position of Indonesians has strongly improved while Surinamese, Dutch Antilleans and Arubans have a less favourable position, even though improvement in their position is also noticeable.

Immigrants who initially arrived as guest workers also strongly differ in their social career in the Netherlands. The South Europeans – Italians, Spanish, Portuguese, Greeks, and
Yugoslavs, and their descendants - have improved their position significantly while Turks and Moroccans still occupy an unfavourable position (Veenman and Roelandt, 1994; Lucassen and Penninx, 1997: 141-165; Van Ours and Veenman, 1999). Related to these differences, policy attention and research concentrate mainly on Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans.

**Employment and earnings**

Ethnic minorities have been disproportionately affected by the increasing unemployment in the beginning of the 1980s. Especially ‘guest workers’ employed in low skilled jobs in the manufacturing industry lost their jobs. Once they were unemployed it was difficult to re-enter in the new jobs in manufacturing and services. The share of low skilled employment decreased by 35 percentage points between 1970 and 1996. More than two-thirds of the decrease occurred between 1970 and 1984. Virtually all of it is due to the fact that low skilled jobs within industries disappeared by skill upgrading. The shift of employment from manufacturing to services is responsible for only about 4-percentage point of the decrease in low skilled employment (Zorlu and Hartog 1999). As a result the unemployment rate among ethnic minorities is three times higher than among the native Dutch labour force, for all age categories (Table 4). Moroccans and Turks have the worst opportunities in the Dutch labour market. Guest workers have not survived the intense restructuring and skill upgrading of the Dutch economy. They ended up in unemployment, early retirement schemes and disability benefits, just as low-skilled older Dutch natives. Downward wage pressure was mitigated by the social minimum (legal minimum wage, social benefits) which at the same time created openings for undocumented workers.

The low qualification level of ethnic minorities causes disadvantages in job level, participation level and earnings in addition to unemployment. Table 4 presents main labour market indicators by ethnicity. Especially the low schooling level and the young age of Moroccan and Turkish workers is notable. More than 40 per cent of the Moroccan/ Turkish labour force only has a primary school education. However, the unemployed Moroccan and Turkish workers are from all education categories while the native Dutch workers with the lowest level of education are clearly over-represented in registered unemployment.

Table 4 also indicates that a skill upgrading takes places for the entire labour force, which
appears to be stronger for ethnic minority groups, especially Turks and Moroccans. Still, the educational gap for ethnic minorities is dramatic (Antilleans excepted). The poor educational achievement of second generation immigrants is closely related to the age of arrival in the Netherlands (Van Ours and Veenman 1999). Those who arrived young successfully participate in the Dutch educational system, while youngsters arriving in the middle of their school career have difficulties ‘catching-up’ with their class mates. Especially young people from non-Dutch-speaking countries must first learn the Dutch language, in a handicapped parental environment with poor language skills and limited knowledge about Dutch society and the Dutch educational system. Just as among the first generation, the education gap is largest for Turks and Moroccans and smallest for Antilleans.

Lack of human capital explains only a part of low employment level of immigrants. Kee (1993, Chapter 6) studies employment differences in the early 1980’s between Dutch men and four groups of immigrants, Antilleans, Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans, with employment gaps with Dutch men ascending in that order. The employment probabilities are explained from schooling, experience and some household characteristics. For Moroccans and Antilleans, differences in characteristics more than explain the gap: at equal characteristics, they would even have higher employment probabilities. For Surinamese, 25% of the employment gap can be so explained, for the Turks 40%; such a decomposition thus leaves 75 and 60% for discrimination. It is remarkable that the difference is not along the cultural and language divide, with Surinamese and Antilleans at one end, Turks and Moroccans at the other. But the results also indicate that Turks and Moroccans would not benefit from extra education in their homeland, while Antilleans and Surinamese definitely would. Similarly, Turks and Moroccans would not benefit from extra work experience in their homeland, while Antilleans and Surinamese would. Turks and Moroccans with poor language skills also do worse. The overall effect of characteristics thus appears an averaging that does hide some relevant differences. Van Beek (1993) uses an employer survey to analyse taste for discrimination. He estimates weights that employers attribute to characteristics when hiring and finds high relative weights for age (27%), gender (23%), ethnic background (10%), health (10%), education (7%), and language (5%) of a low skilled worker. The ideal worker is described as a young, healthy, native Dutch male. The first four main characteristics (age, gender, ethnic background, and health) can typically not be influenced by the workers themselves. Several studies stress the role of discriminatory
behavior of employers, especially against Turks and Moroccans (Niesing et al., 1994; Bovenkerk et al., 1995; Van Ours and Veenman, 1999). However, the high unemployment is only a small part of their labour market disadvantage. Niesing et al. (1994) suggest that especially Turks and Moroccans occupy more frequently jobs without promotion opportunities and employers are not eager to keep these workers.

While male ‘guest workers’ have become increasingly unemployed and their descendants have entered the labour market, the labour supply of (married) women has increased strongly during recovery from the slump of the 1980’s. The recovery was also characterised by an increase in part-time and flexible employment. The allocation of part-time and flexible jobs shows some marked patterns by gender and ethnic background. Women are more frequently part-time employed than men. However this pattern highly varies across the ethnic minority groups. Part-time and flexible jobs are not only confined to the low end of the labour market; to neutralise this effect we consider differences for medium job levels, standardized for education (medium), age (35) and family composition (married, two children). The likelihood that such a woman is a part-time worker is the highest for women with an EU-country background (95%), followed by native Dutch women (93%), women from non-European countries (85%), Eastern European countries (79%) and Turkey (58%), Morocco (47%) and Surinamese/Antillean women (39%). Surinamese/Antillean and Moroccan women are more likely to be full-time workers, with probability of 61 and 53 per cent, respectively. EU women are least likely to work full time (5%). The probability for Dutch women, at 7%, is surpassed by non-European (15%), East-European (18%) and Turkish women (30%). On the other hand all ethnic minority men are more likely to be part-time workers than native Dutch men (6%), except Turkish men. The highest probability is for East-European, Moroccan and Surinamese/Antillean men (21 to 33%). Flexible jobs have almost zero probability for all groups except Turkish women (12%) and East-European men (10%). Indonesian people are about the same as Dutch in their employment status distribution (results taken from Zorlu, 2001).

Hartog and Vriend (1990) studied allocation of workers over job levels and earnings using survey data of Turks and Moroccans aged 16 to 25 and similar data for Dutch youth in the early 1980’s. The over-representation of young Turkish and Moroccan workers in low-level jobs can be explained by their personal characteristics like sex, family background and
experience. With identical characteristics, their distribution over job levels would not differ from the distribution for native Dutch.

Van Ours and Veenman (1999) report on regressions of labour earnings for male household heads working at least 30 hours a week in 1994, using education, occupation, supervisory position or not, work experience, age and time in the Netherlands. The factors explain a large share of the earnings gap with native Dutch: 98% for Turks, 87% for Surinamese, 81% for Antilleans and 78% for Moroccans. At first sight again, there is no relation to cultural or language distance. Kee (1993) uses small samples of these immigrant groups in 1984-1985, a period of high unemployment, for deeper analysis of wage differences (for male household heads, 18-65). For Turks and Moroccans, schooling and (potential) experience in the home country have no effect on wages. For Antilleans and Surinamese, schooling in the home country does raise earnings, at about the same rate as schooling they obtain in the Netherlands. For all groups, schooling in the Netherlands is rewarded less than for Dutch natives. Also for all groups, experience in the Netherlands is rewarded better than experience in the home country. But only for Surinamese is there a return to home country experience.

The effect of proficiency in the Dutch language is not very well established. Simple dummies for self-reported proficiency are not significant in OLS regressions. Estimates with the more complicated McManus model generate no transparent results although many interaction effects with schooling and experience come out. (Kee 1993, chapter 5).

Recently, a large and representative sample, LSO (LoonStructuurOnderzoek or Wage Structure Survey), of the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) has become available, with data for 1997. The large number of observations on ethnic minorities in these data allows studies with more details and precision than before. Zorlu (2001) studies the wage discrimination between native Dutch and seven ethnic minority groups within and between gender categories for the first time. For the first time also, the position of two successful immigrant groups, workers from the EU countries and Indonesia, are included. On average, EU and Indonesian men earn more weekly wages than Dutch men, i.e. 2.7% and 11% respectively. For women, EU, Eastern European and Indonesian immigrants earn 6.6% and 15% more. The gap in average weekly wages with Dutch men is some 17.6 to 44% for East-Europeans, non-Europeans, Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese/Antilleans. For women, the gap is even larger, at 10 to 48%, and women from EU-countries and Suriname/Antillean
women even exhibiting an earnings advantage over Dutch women. Among men, 73 to 80% of the gaps are due to differences in characteristics, for women it varies from 35-81% when only women with a earnings disadvantage are concerned.\textsuperscript{11} The descriptive statistics indicate that Indonesian men and EU women are, on average, higher educated than their Dutch counterparts, Indonesian women and EU men are slightly lower educated than the Dutch counterparts. Both categories of immigrants are older than the Dutch, and, as a consequence, more experienced. Remarkably, a large share of EU and Eastern European immigrants has a university education\textsuperscript{12}. The estimations suggest that all ethnic minority groups face a certain degree of wage discrimination compared to their own gender. The degree of discrimination strongly differs by gender and ethnic groups, ranging between 0.2 to 21 percentage points in mean offered wages. Among men, discrimination component of the wage gap is lowest for Turkish and EU immigrants (0.004) and is the highest for Moroccan immigrants (0.15). Among women, the results are quite different. It is low for Indonesian (0.02), EU (0.024), Turkish (0.03) and Surinamese/Antillian women (0.046) but it is extremely high for Moroccan women (0.212). The wage gap attributed to discrimination is entirely caused by the under-valuation of characteristics of immigrant female. Also Dutch female have a treatment disadvantage (0.01), suggesting that their characteristics are slightly undervalued.

If we look at gender wage discrimination within ethnic group, some surprising results turn up. The wage discrimination for Indonesian, Surinamse/Antillian, non-European and Dutch are low, ranging 0.003 for Indonesian to 0.047 for Dutch women. On the other hand Moroccan women face the highest discrimination level (0.099) which is even depressed by the under-valuation of characteristics of Moroccan male (-0.11), despite a significant level of Moroccan female treatment disadvantage (0.212). A treatment disadvantage for Non-European, Surinamese/Antillian and Indonesian men eliminates a part of gender wage gap for women from the same ethnic background.

Poor performance in the wage and salary sector stimulates immigrants to find other income generating activities. Many immigrants establish their own small (family) businesses like restaurants, groceries, clothing repair shops, bakeries, butcher shops etc. in the areas of large

\textsuperscript{11} Characteristics used are education, experience, tenure, hours worked, part-time/full-time, family composition, job level, public sector and big city dummies, and selectivity correction for participation.

\textsuperscript{12} The share of workers with a university education in the labour force for the different gender and ethnic groups is as follows: Dutch women (6%), EU women (9%), Eastern European women (16%); Dutch men (8%), EU men (12%); Eastern European men (14) (Zorlu, 2001).
cities where a large concentration of immigrants can be found. These small firms basically rely on family and cheap labour. However, not all immigrant groups are proportionally represented in small businesses. In 1997, Tillaart and Poutsma (1998) count a total of 34,561 immigrant business firms in the Netherlands, of which 6,324 Turkish, 5,613 Surinamese, 3,266 Chinese, 2,496 Moroccan, 1,611 Egyptian, 1,581 Antillean/Aruban and 1,344 Italian.

**Undocumented workers**

By nature, the position of undocumented workers is hard to monitor. However, a unique study exists on the Turkish clothing industry in Amsterdam, with data obtained from direct observation (Hartog and Zorlu, 1999). After 1980, when the Dutch textile industry collapsed, an informal clothing industry emerged in Amsterdam, operated by Turkish entrepreneurs and creating a textbook variety of a perfectly competitive labour market. As long as officials tolerated the sector, many undocumented workers entered from Turkey. The labour market was very transparent, with high labour mobility and wages directly related to productivity. Wages were highly differentiated, and starting wages were well below the official social minimum. When the policy of tolerated non-compliance ended, a wage differential emerged between documented and undocumented workers, thus shifting part of the employer’s expected fines for illegal employment to workers. Also, when the EU signed a treaty with Turkey allowing untaxed textile imports, the sector moved to Turkey: commodity and labour mobility appeared substitutes. The sector has now reduced to a fraction of its former size, and has a mixed legal/illegal structure.

**Refugees**

The labour market position of refugees is hardly documented in the Netherlands. They can not be identified in official statistics. It is however a well known fact that the long application period affects the future career of refugees negatively while this ineffective period leads to large burdens for the government budget, in 1997 estimated at 1.4 billion guilders, 0.2 % of GDP (Mattheijer, 2000: 32). Mattheijer (2000) surveys available Dutch studies on refugees and concludes that they are highly educated (with educational composition similar to the Dutch), predominantly from urban areas, and invest more in specific Dutch human capital than guest workers (learn Dutch language faster, complete the immigrant introduction courses
more often and apply more effort to integrate in Dutch society (o.c., 85)). The recent study of Tillaart et al. (2000) indicates that the age and skill composition of refugees strongly differs by country of origin. Afghans and Iranians are higher educated than Somalis, Ethiopians and Eritreans. The percentage of refugees with university education is highest for Afghans (47), followed by Iranians (37) and Somalis (23). They arrived in the Netherlands at a relatively advanced age. They too, find that on average, refugees are equipped with more human capital than other immigrants. However, the average unemployment rate is considerable and 42% of the employed workers have a part-time or flexible job or are the owner of a small business (4% among refugee groups studied by Tillaart et al. (2000). The employment rate seems to correlate with the residence duration of refugees from various countries of origin.

4. Labour market effects of immigration

The inflow of Mediterranean guest workers may well have induced a substantial downward pressure on the unskilled wage. Between 1958 and 1972, the unskilled relative wage for men in manufacturing was stable, in spite of strong excess demand, while for unskilled women in manufacturing it increased markedly (from 73 to 94% of the skilled wage). Employers considered women no substitute for men in those days. Estimating additional cost of importing labour at 10%, it takes a wage elasticity of Dutch unskilled labour supply below .84 to make the employer strategy of recruiting import labour a rational strategy, i.e. generating lower wage cost than letting excess demand drive up wages (Hartog and Vriend 1989).

Less speculative is an analysis of cross-effects of the presence of immigrants on wages. Using a large nationwide survey in 1998, Zorlu and Hartog (2000) estimate Mincer type earnings functions for three skill levels and include as regressors the proportion of immigrants in the respondent’s city of residence (548 cities).13 As Table 1 (panel A) indicates, the presence of EU residents has no discernable effect on wages of native Dutch workers. Non-EU immigrants, best characterised as unskilled labour, have a negative effect on low skilled Dutch and a positive effect on high skilled Dutch, while leaving medium

13 The data, from a national survey in regional newspapers, were organized by SEO Foundation for Economic Research. We are grateful to professor Bernard van Praag for permission to use these data.
skilled wages unaffected: substitutes for low skilled Dutch, complements to high skilled Dutch.

The elasticities are comparable in magnitude to those found for the USA (Borjas, 1999) . In panel B, based on data collected by CBS (Zorlu and Hartog, 2001), the immigrant groups are further decomposed. Again we find that EU immigrants have no significant effect on native wages, and the same holds for “Other immigrants”. The presence of Turks depresses all wages, making them substitutes for all skill levels. Moroccans are only complements with medium skill natives, and Surinamese are only complimentary to high skilled native labour. These results are the first ever estimated for the Dutch economy and need further scrutiny in extended research.

Table 1. Log wage effect of percentage immigrants in local labour market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low skilled</th>
<th>Medium skilled</th>
<th>High skilled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>Coeff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A) OLS estimates, 1998, GPD survey 548 cities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU immigrants</td>
<td>.0070</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>-.00006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU immigrants</td>
<td>-.0037</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>-.00058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) IV estimates, 1997, LSO data (CBS), 572 cities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU immigrants</td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>-.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both data sets have also been used to retrieve the parameters of a translog production structure. Combined with assumptions on wage elasticities of native supply (0.5, 0.6 and 0.7 respectively, for unskilled, medium and high skilled) and the skill composition of immigrants, we have simulated the effect of an immigration wave equal to 5% of the labour force. Using the data on which panel B is based, we predict wages to fall for all Dutch
natives, but in different magnitudes, as reproduced in Table 2.

Table 2. Predicted effect of increase in immigration by 5% of total labour force, on wages of the skill groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in the log wage of</th>
<th>Recruitment policy</th>
<th>Balanced immigration policy</th>
<th>Selective immigration policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low skilled wages</td>
<td>-0.200</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium skilled wages</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High skilled wages</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under recruitment policy, the immigrants are mostly unskilled (skill composition .75, .20, .05), under balanced immigration, the skill composition of immigrants is equal to that of native Dutch (.30, .45, .25) and under selective immigration, the immigrants are higher skilled (.1, .6, .4). The wage effects are substantial, especially so for the unskilled under recruitment policy and for the high skilled under selective immigration.

5. Conclusions

In 1950, the Netherlands had 10 million inhabitants, in 2000 almost 16 million. This means continuation of a tradition of high population growth by international standards. In the five centuries after 1500, French population increased fourfold, Belgian sixfold, and the Dutch fifteenfold (De Vries and Van der Woude, 1995, 72). While the birth surplus dropped after the early 1960’s from an annual average of 160,000 to 60,000 in the period 1976-1995, the migration surplus made up partially, by growing from next to nothing to an annual average of 35,000 (Van Ours and Veenman, 1999). But remarkably, population growth itself is taken for granted. While pressure on space for residential, recreational and productive purposes and traffic noise and congestion create mounting problems and policy debates, the question of a desirable size of the population is never explicitly posed. And it has taken a long time for economic and social policies to switch to an orientation on permanent rather than temporary settlement and to accept explicitly that the Netherlands had shifted from an emigration to an immigration country. Admittedly, this had not been the case since the seventeenth century.
Only in 1998, a program for introducing immigrants to Dutch society got started, although the immigration surplus has been positive since 1962. The shift in policy from passive income support to active labour market programs has also come about quite slowly. Within the active programs, ethnic minorities have been designated special target groups, but the success of these programs is not evident, except perhaps for direct public sector job creation (Salverda, 1998).

The strong performance of the Dutch economy in the second half of the 1990s has generated substantial labour shortages in some sectors such as ICT, health, education, construction, agriculture etc. while the decrease in the numbers of unemployed workers seems to have reached its limit. Many unemployed people are considered unfit for the available jobs. The emerging labour shortage in addition to the ageing of the labour force has stimulated discussion about a need for new immigrant labour in the Netherlands. However, the focus is now on skilled labour rather than unskilled. Again, policy makers stress their preference for short-terms contracts and an immigration policy to prevent permanent settlement of contracted workers.

After the Second World War, immigration to the Netherlands has had three main sources. First, the de-colonisation of Indonesia and Surinam generated sizeable immigration flows, concentrated in 1949-1957 for the former and peaking in 1975 and 1979-1980 for the latter. Second, the post-war economic growth attracted ‘guest workers’ from Mediterranean countries. The primary flow started with the first recruitment treaty in 1960 (with Italy) and tapered off in the slack labour market of the 1970’s, but then was superseded by family re-union flows. Also, increasing EU integration shifted its origins from Italy, Spain and Portugal to Turkey and Morocco; large proportions of the south European immigrants have returned. Third, flows of applicants for refugee status became sizable after the mid-1980s. After 1961, the Netherlands shifted to a positive immigration surplus. At that time, the sizable emigration flows of the early 1950’s to the world’s traditional immigration countries had dwindled to very modest levels. Economic integration through the EU has led to sizable worker flows in both directions (about 30,000 annually, half a percent of the labour force), with an immigration surplus close to zero. In 2000, 17.5% of the population in the Netherlands either is born abroad or has at least one parent who is born abroad.

The flow of immigrants from Indonesia with Dutch citizenship status has been
accommodated quite smoothly. However, Moluccan immigrants, for decades fully focussed on a return to their islands, have faced poor labour market conditions during the 1970’s and 1980’s and have sought violent political confrontations. One might suspect this attitude to be responsible for their economic disadvantage; however, ethnic minorities experiencing economic success were not at all oriented towards the Dutch social environment (Van Ours and Veenman, 1999, 16).

The guest workers have not survived the economic structuring and the skill upgrading of the Dutch economy. They ended up massively in unemployment, early retirement and disability benefit programs. Their children still have a disadvantage in education and labour market accomplishments, especially second generation Turks and Moroccans. Immigrants from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles have only modestly benefited from their acquaintance with Dutch language and culture, Antilleans more so than Surinamese.

The refugees that succeeded the guest workers as a dominant immigrant group are higher educated, have more human capital, have by expectation better social and economic prospects than guest workers. However, little is known about the actual economic integration. Little is known also about undocumented workers, a group that naturally grows as a consequence of tight migration rules. They may come directly, or they may have been refused refugee status and not be effectively expelled. Whatever their origin, we do not know much about their economic position.

Increased EU integration has also raised migration flows between member states. EU immigration plus EU emigration jointly amount to 0.4% of the Dutch population. Residential moves between cities amount to 4% of the population. Thus, EU mobility is only a fraction of intra-national mobility.

We know very little of the wider economic impact of immigration in the Netherlands. There is good reason to believe that the immigration of guest workers has effectively exerted downward pressure on the unskilled male wage in the 1960’s. In later periods, this pressure may have been restrained by the social minimum, thus referring additional labour supply to the pool of unemployed. However, analytic empirical studies of this hypothesis are lacking.

We do have some novel evidence that non-EU immigrants are substitutes for low skilled and complements to high skilled Dutch workers. Also, EU immigrants seem to have no effect on
the labour market position of native Dutch.

Given the paucity of empirical economic research on the effect of immigration on the Dutch labour market, there are many avenues for further research that should be travelled. This not only holds for the guest workers, for whom we present much interesting evidence\textsuperscript{14}, but it certainly holds for the impact of refugees. In fact, for refugees themselves we barely know how they fare, let alone that we know anything about the wider implications.

\textsuperscript{14} Much will be published in Zorlu’s dissertation, late 2001.
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Migration and immigrants: the case of the Netherlands

Table 3. The composition of population in the Netherlands in 1996 and 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Western countries</th>
<th>non-Western countries</th>
<th>Dutch</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Western</td>
<td>non-European</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>first generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>second generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>first generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>second generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS Statline (2001)

Table 4. Labour force by ethnicity, age and education level, 1992-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Labour force (LF)</th>
<th>Employed Labour F.</th>
<th>Regist. Unempl., %</th>
<th>U-rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LF x1000</td>
<td>Non-LF x1000</td>
<td>Age, %</td>
<td>Education level, %</td>
<td>Age, %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 A B C D</td>
<td>A B C D</td>
<td>1 2 3 A B C D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>1992/94</td>
<td>9337</td>
<td>3522</td>
<td>16 58 26</td>
<td>9 24 44 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996/98</td>
<td>9427</td>
<td>3245</td>
<td>13 58 29</td>
<td>7 21 45 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996/98</td>
<td>1138</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>11 64 25</td>
<td>18 23 35 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>1992/94</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>29 60 11</td>
<td>53 28 16 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996/98</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>17 71 10</td>
<td>41 29 24 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>1992/94</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>26 59 15</td>
<td>58 22 15 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>1992/94</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>15 68 17</td>
<td>20 31 32 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996/98</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10 70 21</td>
<td>18 28 37 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antill./Arubans</td>
<td>1992/94</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12 69 19</td>
<td>11 26 39 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996/98</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12 62 27</td>
<td>12 27 35 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1992/94</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13 57 30</td>
<td>28 34 27 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996/98</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9 67 22</td>
<td>20 28 33 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A: Primary school, B: Extended primary (VBO/MAVO), C: Secondary school (MBO/HAVO/VWO), D: High Vocational/University (HBO/WO)
1: 15-24 year, 2: 25-44 year, 3: 45-64 year. Others refers to the rest of the people belonging to the target groups.
Table 5. Asylum applications and refugee status determination, 1982-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>82</th>
<th>83</th>
<th>84</th>
<th>85</th>
<th>86</th>
<th>87</th>
<th>88</th>
<th>89</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>91</th>
<th>92</th>
<th>93</th>
<th>94</th>
<th>95</th>
<th>96</th>
<th>97</th>
<th>98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applications</td>
<td>1353</td>
<td>1806</td>
<td>2785</td>
<td>5644</td>
<td>5865</td>
<td>13460</td>
<td>7486</td>
<td>13900</td>
<td>21210</td>
<td>21620</td>
<td>20350</td>
<td>35400</td>
<td>52570</td>
<td>29260</td>
<td>22170</td>
<td>34440</td>
<td>45220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisions</td>
<td>12980</td>
<td>14200</td>
<td>25180</td>
<td>51380</td>
<td>42700</td>
<td>58210</td>
<td>57410</td>
<td>84070</td>
<td>49140</td>
<td>47820</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional status</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>1067</td>
<td>1131</td>
<td>1504</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>10340</td>
<td>6650</td>
<td>7980</td>
<td>8810</td>
<td>6630</td>
<td>2360</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitary status</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>6890</td>
<td>4670</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>10520</td>
<td>14780</td>
<td>10360</td>
<td>12740</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total admitted %</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock of refugees</td>
<td>27200</td>
<td>28500</td>
<td>21300</td>
<td>26900</td>
<td>33200</td>
<td>30800</td>
<td>72000</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Migration from/to the Netherlands, 1900-1998

Source: CBS Statline (2001)
In Figure 2, until 1963 including Dutch New Guinea. In Figure 3. The Dutch Antilles including Aruba from 1986 onwards.

Source: CBS Statline (2001). For Figure 2, 3 and 4.
Figure 5. Migration to/from the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa

Source: CBS Statline (2001)

Figure 6. Migration from/to EU countries, 1958-1998

For 1958-1974 Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and Luxemburg

Source: CBS Statline (2001)