

Separations at the firm level*

Pieter A. Gautier [†]
Gerard J. van den Berg [‡]
Jan C. van Ours [§]
Geert Ridder [¶]

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the determinants of lay-offs, job-to-job movements and total separations with a unique data set that combines information on individual firms and their workers. We are in particular interested in whether the lay-off policy of firms can explain the relatively high level of unemployment amongst lower educated workers and the relatively strong sensitivity of their unemployment rate to the business cycle. We find that lay-off rates decrease with education but that the change over the cycle in the lay-off rate of workers with a lower level of education compared to that of workers with a higher level of education can not explain the stronger cyclicity of the unemployment rate for lower educated workers. We conclude that this stronger cyclicity is not due to the personnel policy of firms.

Keywords: unemployment, mobility, layoffs

JEL codes: J21, J23, J6

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[†]Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, Tinbergen Institute and Department of Economics, Free University Amsterdam; gautier@tinbinst.nl

[‡]Department of Economics, Free University Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute and CEPR; gjvdberg@xs4all.nl

[§]Department of Economics, Tilburg University, CentER for Economic Research and CEPR; vanours@kub.nl

[¶]Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, gridder@jhu.edu

1 Introduction

In labor economics one may distinguish between theories that focus only on the stocks of employment and unemployment and theories that view unemployment as the result of continuous labor turnover.

In the dynamic flow theories of unemployment, worker turnover plays a key role in explaining the equilibrium level of unemployment (see e.g. the models with search frictions like those of Pissarides (1990), and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)). The transition rates are in general determined by information arrival rates, and shocks that influence the profitability of the job. Whereas most empirical labor market flow studies in the beginning of the nineties focus on aggregate time series (e.g. Blanchard and Diamond 1990), more recent studies benefit from the increased availability of combined worker-firm data sets. The pioneering work of Dunne et al. (1989) and Davis et al. (1992, 1996a) shows that aggregate employment outcomes are only the top of the iceberg and that individual firm data can teach us a lot more about the underlying dynamics of the aggregate employment rates. The information on individual workers was however limited in those studies. For instance, it is known which firms shrank (expanded) but not which workers were laid off or left (were hired).

This paper is an explorative analysis of separation rates at the firm level. The fact that we observe all separations improves on earlier studies that were based on net employment changes, i.e. the difference between the inflow and outflow of workers. Only on the counterfactual assumption that no workers are hired when firm level employment decreases, we can take the rate of net employment change as the separation rate. This not only introduces measurement error, but also gives a highly selective sample, because in that case we only have separation rates for shrinking firms. A second improvement is that we are able to make a distinction between transitions to unemployment, i.e. lay-offs, and direct job-to-job transitions, mostly quits. In some of the search friction models (Pissarides (1990), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)) direct job-to-job transitions do not occur. So an indication of the importance of this flow and its sensitivity to the business cycle is of independent interest. A third improvement is that we can decompose the separation by a number of worker and job characteristics. In this paper we are particularly interested in differences in the lay-off rates of lower and higher educated workers over the business cycle. It is well-known that the unemployment rate of lower educated workers is more sensitive to the level of economic activity than the unemployment rate of higher educated workers (see among others Van Ours and Ridder (1995)). One explanation of this phenomenon is that during a downturn firms lay off lower educated workers before higher educated ones. The reason may be that the firing costs (usually related to the wage) and rehiring costs (inclusive of training costs) when the economic environment improves, are higher for workers with more education (see e.g. Pfann and Palm (1993)). As a consequence, employers hang on to their higher educated workers

during downturns.

We explore this explanation using individual firm data on lay-offs. We find that lay-off rates indeed decrease with education. However, the lay-off rate for higher educated workers in bad years is too large to explain the relatively strong cyclicity of the unemployment rate for lower educated workers. This implies that firm employment policies do not explain the stronger sensitivity of the unemployment rate for lower educated workers to the business cycle. We must look somewhere else for an explanation, e.g. re-employment rates of lower and higher educated workers.

The passive attitude of firms when confronted with a change in the level of economic activity is confirmed by the increase in the direct job-to-job flow rate during an upturn. This increase is even larger for higher than for lower educated workers. If the firing and rehiring costs are indeed larger for higher educated workers, then it is surprising that firms are not interested in or capable of reducing the large job-to-job flow rate of higher educated workers during boom years. It is interesting to note that the total separation rate does not change much with the level of economic activity, but its composition does. Moreover, the total separation rate decreases with education.

To study those issues, we use a relatively new and largely unexplored firm-worker data set that covers the entire Dutch economy. The data were originally collected to obtain information on the development of wage income for different categories of workers and are based on administrative records of individual firms. Important advantages of this data set are that there are very few missing observations and that it contains detailed information on the inflow and outflow of workers.

The main disadvantages are that the two step stratified sampling procedure is rather complex and that we have no information on some firm outcomes like profits, value product, investments and the stock of capital. Also the data only cover four years 1993-1996. Fortunately, 1993 was a year with a lower level of economic activity than 1996, so that we are able to answer some of the questions raised above.

The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the construction of the data set and give some descriptive statistics. In section 3 we study the total separation rate and the lay-off and direct job-to-job transition rates. Section 4 contains some conclusions.

2 Data and descriptive statistics

2.1 Data

For this paper we have used the AVO (Arbeidsvoorwaarden Onderzoek) data set of the Department of Social Affairs and Employment which covers the period

1992-96. The data were collected by means of a two step sampling procedure. In the first step, a number of firms was drawn from the Department of Social Affairs own firm register which is roughly similar to the firm register of the CBS (Statistics Netherlands), using a stratified (by industry and firm size) design.¹ The number of strata changed between surveys. In 1993, the sample consisted of 1682 firms which were drawn from 80 strata, in 1994 of 1563 firms from 280 strata, in 1995 of 1375 firms from 312 strata, and in 1996 of 1548 firms from 328 strata.

At the second stage, a sample of workers was drawn in October of the year of the survey. In the sequel the year in which the sample is drawn is denoted by t . For the workers in the sample, information was collected from the wage administration of the firm, both for years t and $t-1$ (if they were employed at the firm in both years; the information for year $t-1$ is also for October). In addition, the number of workers who had left the firm between October of year $t-1$ and October of year t was registered. To obtain information on workers who had left the firm, a random sample was drawn from these employees. In addition to the information that was collected for all sampled employees, the new labor market position was registered for the employees who had left the firm. The sample size was increased if certain conditions were not met.²

The two-stage sampling design is rather complex. At the firm level it results in random samples from the employees present in October of year t and the workers hired³ in the previous year.⁴ If needed, sampling weights that are obtained by multiplying the inverse of the probability that the firm of the employee is in the sample and the inverse of the probability that the employee is selected from all the employees of this firm, can be used to obtain sample statistics that refer to either the population of employees present in years t and $t-1$, the inflow, or the outflow. For firm variables, the sampling weight is equal to the first factor.

In the AVO the employee and job characteristics that are registered are: gross wages, overtime payments, hours worked, profit shares, education, age, tenure, gender, occupation, type of contract, job complexity level. Some wage related variables and *hours worked* are available for October of year t and year $t-1$. Job characteristics, as the complexity of the job, were only registered in year

¹Firms from the service sector and semi-public sectors were included in all samples. Since the 1993 sample contained no information on public sector workers, we excluded this sector from the other samples as well.

²At least 10 employees had to be covered by a collective bargaining agreement and 10 not; the minimal number of employees present in October of year t and $t-1$, the number of workers hired in this period and the number of workers who separated in this period had to be at least 8. If one of these conditions was not satisfied the sample size was increased.

³However, we do not know the number nor the characteristics of employees who were hired after October of year $t-1$, but left the firm before October of year t .

⁴To be precise: because of the additional requirements, the design results in random samples from subgroups of workers distinguished by presence in October of year t or $t-1$, or both and covered by collective bargaining (or not).

$t - 1$ for separating workers and in t for the other workers. This precludes the study of promotion within the firm. The data also contain information on various separation routes like lay-offs, transitions into other jobs, disability inflow, and early and normal retirement. Remember that this information comes from administrative records of firms, and that it is therefore limited by the scope of the firm's administration. For example, a worker who is given notice of lay-off in the near future may immediately quit and take another job to avoid unemployment. In this case, the worker is most likely to be recorded as a job-to-job mover, without any reference to the lay-off. However, a worker who stays with the firm until the date of lay-off is most likely to be recorded as a laid-off worker. The data do not provide information of the labor market state just after the lay-off. For a detailed description of the job complexity and education levels we refer to the appendix and to Venema (1997).

The main advantage of the AVO data is that we observe both worker and firm characteristics but the AVO also has a number of limitations. The complex sample design results in a large variation in the sampling probabilities and, as a consequence, in the corresponding sampling weights. This may magnify (small) biases in the firm register from which the sample was drawn. Indeed, a comparison of estimated population averages for some worker and firm variables obtained using these weights and the estimated population averages for the same variables obtained from the Dutch labor force survey (EBB) reveals substantial differences (Gautier (1998)). Almost all differences are eliminated if we remove employees with sampling weights that are larger than 500 (about 5% of the sample in each year). These workers are employed in small firms in industries with relatively few firms.⁵

Table 1 gives estimated population averages for some variables. Most averages do not change much over the years. Even after the correction for extreme sample weights, the firm size distribution is still off in 1993. This is a reason to include firm size in all regression equations, on the assumption that the selection is on this variable.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

3 Who separates and why?

As a first pass, we consider the yearly separation rates by level of education for the years 1993-96 (Table 2).⁶ In 1993 the level of economic activity was lower than in 1996. This is confirmed by the lower lay-off rate and the higher job-to-job

⁵An alternative would be to include a full set of industry and firm size dummies in the regression equations. Because of the small number of firms (and workers) in the omitted strata, this gives the same result as omitting the observations in these strata.

⁶We focus on lay-offs and job to job movements. For a discussion of worker displacement in the Netherlands, we refer to Abbring et al. (1998).

transition rate in 1996. The change in the total separation rate over these years is smaller than that of its components, the lay-off rate and the direct job-to-job transition rate. In all years the lay-off rate decreases with the level of education. This is consistent with higher firing and rehiring costs for workers with a higher level of education (Pfann and Palm (1993)). There is abundant evidence that the sensitivity of the unemployment rate to changes in the level of economic activity decreases with the level of education (Van Ours and Ridder (1995)). The concentration of unemployment among lower-educated workers is socially undesirable. A number of explanations have been proposed for this concentration. An explanation that is popular in Europe, but less so in the US, is that during downturns workers with more schooling crowd out workers with less schooling. Employers who receive many applications for their job vacancies order applicants on the basis of easily measurable characteristics as education. Van Ours and Ridder (1995) and Gautier et al. (1998) review the evidence. A second explanation is that during downturns employers hang on to their higher educated workers. If they have to reduce their work force, they lay off lower educated workers. The reason for this behavior may be that the firing costs for higher educated workers are higher, and that employers expect to pay higher rehiring and training costs for these workers, when the economy improves.

To explore whether the lay-off rates in Table 2 can explain the higher volatility of the unemployment rate of lower educated workers, we consider the well-known stock-flow identity for unemployment,

$$U_k(t) = I_k(t) \cdot D_k(t) \quad (1)$$

in which $U_k(t)$ denotes the number of unemployed workers at time t with education level k , $I_k(t)$ denotes the inflow at t of such workers, and $D_k(t)$ denotes the mean unemployment duration at t among such workers. Equation (1) is an identity if the inflow into and outflow out of unemployment are constant and equal up to time t .

More generally, it is a good first-order approximation in a non-stationary environment. It is useful to go into this in some more detail. Suppose for the moment that the inflow into unemployment consists of lay-offs which occur at the rate $\delta_k(t)$, and that the outflow out of unemployment occurs at the rate $\lambda_k(t)$. It is not difficult to see that then, for any given level of education k ,

$$U_k(t) = \int_0^\infty (M_k(t - \tau) - U_k(t - \tau)) \delta_k(t - \tau) \exp\left(-\int_{t-\tau}^t \lambda_k(v)dv\right) d\tau$$

where $M_k(t)$ denotes the size of the labor force at t with level of education k . If $M_k(t)$, $\delta_k(t)$, and $\lambda_k(t)$ are constant over time then a solution to this equation is given by

$$U_k(t) = U_k = [\delta_k(M_k - U_k)] \frac{1}{\lambda_k}$$

which replicates equation (1). Moreover, this outcome is often a good approximation to the true outcome if the rate at which $M_k(t)$, $\delta_k(t)$, and $\lambda_k(t)$ vary over time is much smaller than the value of λ_k itself, for in that case most currently unemployed workers have been in a more or less stationary environment. Now recall that we are concerned with business cycle fluctuations of the inflow into and the outflow out of unemployment, and that we examine lay-offs of previously employed workers. The mean unemployment duration among the latter group is substantially lower than the mean among the population of the unemployed, and is generally much less than a year. This is of course much smaller than the duration of a full business cycle, so that the approximation (1) seems to be justified.

Let us return to the original formulation of equation (1). If we divide this by the number of employed workers at t with level of education k , we obtain

$$\frac{u_k(t)}{1 - u_k(t)} = p_k(t)D_k(t) \quad (2)$$

where, for given t and k , $u_k(t)$ denotes the unemployment rate and $p_k(t)$ denotes the ratio of the number of individuals who flow into unemployment and the number of employed workers (in terms of the above notation, $u_k(t) = U_k(t)/M_k(t)$ and $p_k(t) = I_k(t)/(M_k(t) - U_k(t))$). If we assume for the moment that the inflow into unemployment consists exclusively of lay-offs, we may set $p_k(t)$ equal to the corresponding lay-off rate (i.e., to $\delta_k(t)$).

Suppose we calculate the ratio of the left-hand side of equation (2) for lower (numerator) and higher (denominator) educated workers. This can of course be done for a “good” year (1996) and for a “bad” year (1993). The ratio for 1993 is larger than for 1996, which should be expected given the higher level and the higher degree of cyclicity of unemployment among lower educated workers.⁷ Now consider the corresponding ratios of the right-hand side of equation (2). In fact, we can only quantify the ratios of the lay-off rates (for different years). To separate the effect of the lay-off rate we assume that the average duration of unemployment is constant over the cycle. It turns out that the ratio of the lay-off rates is 1.1 in 1993 and 2.4 in 1996.⁸ Consequently, the latter ratio moves in a direction which is opposite to the direction of the movement of the ratio of the left-hand side of (2). In words, the difference in unemployment cyclicity between higher and lower educated workers cannot be explained by differences in lay-off cyclicity. The number of lay-offs of higher educated workers in bad

⁷Combining the employment figures of the AVO and labor force figures (by education) of Statistics Netherlands, we calculated this ratio to be about 10 % higher in 1993 than in 1996. In Gautier et al. (1998) we give other evidence that 1993 was a relatively bad year in terms of V/U ratio's and employment opportunities, in particular for the workers with only primary education.

⁸If we compare downturns (93,94) with upswings (94,95), the difference in the ratio of lay-off rates for higher and lower educated workers is even larger.

times is simply too large for this. Interestingly, this is in accordance with the empirical evidence based on micro worker data. Imbens and Lynch (1992), Baker (1992), and Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (1998) show that the distribution of the level of education among the inflow into unemployment does not change markedly over the business cycle.

We conclude from the above that the concentration of unemployment among lower educated workers during downturns is not due to the personnel policy of employers. According to equation (2), this means that the difference in unemployment cyclicity between higher and lower educated workers must be explained by differences in cyclicity in their mean unemployment durations.

A weak point in this argument is that part of the inflow into unemployment consists of individuals who did not have a job, but were at school or are re-entrants into the labor force. This inflow is procyclical, but its size is too small (relative to employment) to change the argument. In particular, the lay-off rate of higher educated workers in 1993 is just too large for this inflow to make a difference.

The change over the years in the direct job-to-job flow rate gives indirect support to the hypothesis that employers do not treat higher educated workers differently from lower educated workers during the cycle. One would expect that in boom years employers would like to retain higher educated workers. One way to achieve this would be to raise their wages relative to lower educated workers. Table 2 shows that in boom years firms are not able to retain high skilled workers. Their job-to-job flow rate increases even more than that of low skilled workers.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

As noted in section 2, some of the trends observed in Table 2 may be spurious. The complex two-stage sample design may bias some of the estimates. In particular, the results for 1993 seem to be out of line. To investigate whether the conclusion reached above is affected by these potential biases, we analyze the individual data. In particular, we estimate logit models for the dummy dependent variables being laid off (or not) and making a direct job-to-job transition (or not). The independent variables are a dummy for the years with a low level of economic activity and a dummy for the level of education. In addition we include a number of variables (industry, firm size dummies) that determine the sampling probability in order to eliminate biases due to the sample design. Finally, we include some additional explanatory variables that are of independent interest (age, tenure, gender, part-time job, type of wage contract, job complexity level, occupation). In Table 3 and in the appendix, we give a short description of some of the variables we have used in our regressions

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

From Table 4 we see that the estimates for the year dummies and the levels of education replicate the patterns found in Table 2 and we conclude that these patterns are not spurious. Before we turn to the education estimates, we first discuss the estimates of the coefficients of the other independent variables.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Table 5 gives some simulated probabilities for the mean worker. Those were calculated as follows. First, we use our estimates to compute lay-off, job to job, total separation and conditional lay-off probabilities. We evaluate those probabilities at the estimated parameter values and the mean observed characteristics over the period 1993-96. Next, we vary specific characteristics of workers, jobs and firms and keep the other characteristics constant to get an idea of the partial effects.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

The lay-off probability is highest for male workers with tenure of 2 years, who have a full time contract, have followed a lower education, and have no collective wage agreement. Workers employed at large firms face higher lay-off rates and move more often to a new job than workers employed at small firms.⁹ In addition we see that lay-off and total separation rates for commercial jobs are particular high while managers face the smallest probability of being laid off.¹⁰ It is also interesting to see that job complexity levels hardly contribute to the explanation of separation rates. All job complexity level dummies are statistically insignificant. Hence, lower educated workers face higher lay-off rates at all job levels.

The current successful performance of the Dutch economy has sometimes been attributed to the fact that wage bargaining takes place at an aggregate level and that therefore many appropriability problems are internalized.¹¹ Our results show that workers with a collective wage agreement face a smaller probability to be laid off and move less often to a new job. A possible explanation for this fact is that firms and workers with a collective wage contract invest more in firm specific capital than workers with a bilaterally bargained wage contract and will therefore stay together as long as possible. On the other hand, it can be caused by the fact that workers with a collectively bargained wage are employed in strongly unionized sectors. Burgess (1986) also finds evidence for Britain that unions can impose costs on firms wishing to lay off workers. Turning to the education estimates we see that workers with a lower education still face higher lay-off probabilities but the differences with higher educated workers are small now.

We also tested whether our findings that lay-off rates for lower educated workers are not more cyclical than for higher educated workers and that firms do not try (or are not able) to keep their higher educated workers in good times, still

⁹This should not be interpreted as evidence for the "conventional wisdom" that small firms are the engines of job growth because regression-to-the-mean-effects cause large firms to shrink on average and small firms to grow on average, see also Davis et al. (1996b).

¹⁰Those results are not changed when gross hourly wages are included as explanatory variables in the regressions. Low wage workers face much higher layoff rates than high wage workers.

¹¹For a clear discussion of the macroeconomic implications of appropriability problems and specificity, see e.g. Caballero and Hammour (1996).

holds after we control for other factors, which is the case.¹² Hence, the earlier conclusion regarding the role of personnel policy in the concentration of unemployment among lower educated workers during downturns is confirmed.

The analysis also confirms the well-known fact that job-to-job-movements are strongly pro-cyclical. In addition we find that having a university degree, being male, having little (but more than 1 year) tenure, and being employed at a large firm increases the probability to move to a new job.

4 Concluding remarks

This paper analyzes the factors that determine lay-offs, job to job movements and total separations with a data set that combines information on both individual firms and workers. The advantage of using combined information on firms and workers is that we can study the partial effects of factors which are believed to be important in explaining separations. We find that workers with a lower level of education face higher lay-off probabilities both in good times and in bad times. We did not find evidence that the lay-off rate for lower educated workers is more cyclical than for higher educated workers. Therefore, the concentration of unemployment among lower educated workers during downturns is not due to the lay-off policy of employers. In addition we found that having a collectively bargained wage contract and/or having been on the job for a long time (which is of course partly endogenous) strongly decreases the lay-off probability, and to a lesser extent, the probability to directly move to a new job. The effects of macro-economic conditions is also quite large. In particular, the conditional lay-off rate is almost 4 times as high during downturns as during booms.

¹²In the lay-off estimate, the cross-effect-dummy of an economic downturn and years of education is even positive (0.03 (0.02)) but statistically not significant. Job-to-job movements fall relatively strongly for higher educated workers during cyclical downturns. The estimate of a downturn*years of education dummy is -0.02 (0.01).

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AVO data

The AVO data were collected by the Dutch "Labor inspection" (AI) which is part of the department of Social Affairs and contains administrative data from workers employed in both the private and the public sector. For our analysis we only used workers who were employed in the private sector. Below we give a more detailed description on the construction of some of the key variables, see also Venema (1997).

Job complexity levels

- f1** Very simple activities which do not change over time. No schooling is necessary and only limited experience. The activities are under direct supervision.
- f2** Simple activities which are in general repeating. Some (lower) administrative or technical knowledge and experience is required. In general the activities take place under direct supervision.

Intermediate

- f3** Less simple activities which do not repeat themselves continuously. Administrative or technical knowledge is required and the activities are partly without direct supervision.
- f4** More difficult (non-repeating) activities for which an intermediate level of education is required. In general the activities take place without direct supervision.

High

- f5** Activities within a certain field which require a higher level of knowledge and experience. The activities take place without direct supervision.
- f6** Managing activities of an analytical, creative or contact nature, which are undertaken independently and require an university or comparable level.
- f7** Managers of intermediate companies or comparable plants, departments etc. who also participate in decision making.
- f8** Managers of large companies or comparable plants or departments.

In this paper we merged f7 and f8 and when reported f6-8 because of the few observations in f8 and f7

Education

We have information on 7 types of schooling (total years, including the required schooling to enter a particular type of education, between brackets):

Lower: primary (6), lower general (10) and lower vocational (10)

Intermediate: intermediate general (12), intermediate vocational (14)

Higher higher vocational (15) and university (16).

separation

Workers not older than 60 years who left a firm because of (early) retirement, disability, and of test-period, lay-off, reported to have found a new job or initially hired from a temporary employment office. We do not observe movements between jobs within firms.

inflow

Workers who enter a new firm. Again, we do not observe within firm labour flows.

tenure:

Measured in years (difference between starting and sampling date).

wage

Monthly wages (including over-time payments, profits shares etc.) and hours worked are measured very accurately. We calculated nominal gross hourly wages for each worker and deflated the wage by the consumer price index to obtain real wages.

occupation

We have information on the following occupations : (1) simple technical activities, (2) administrative, (3) information technology, (4) commercial, (5) service orientated, (6) creative. (7) management.

sector

Although the AVO data contain information on the public sector we restricted our analysis to the private sector. We distinguish 12 sectors. (1) agriculture and fishing, (2) food, (3) chemical, (4) metal, (5) other industry, (6) construction, (7) trade, (8) hotels, restaurants catering, (9) transport, communication, (10) banking and insurance, (11) other services, (12) health care

firm size

We have used the following size classes. (1) 1-9 , (2) 10-19, (3) 20-49 (4), 50-99, (5)100-199, (6) 200-499, (7) ≥ 500 employees.

A Tables

Table 1: AVO data: weighted means 1993–96

variable	93	94	95	96
workers employed at shrinking firm (%)	30.6	30.4	24.6	26.5
workers employed at growing firm (%)	33.2	39.0	44.8	41.6
female (%)	37.1	35.6	37.7	36.0
inflow (% of total employment)	11.8	10.8	13.4	13.8
separation (% of total employment)	11.0	8.7	9.6	10.0
(semi) collective wage agreement (%)	74.1	78.7	77.0	76.4
age (years)	35.8	35.9	36.0	36.0
completed education (years)	11.2	11.2	11.3	11.5
real gross hourly wage (Dutch guilders)	25.9	24.1	26.7	27.2
tenure (years)	7.5	8.0	7.5	7.8
firm size (1-19 employees)	87.8	79.7	80.8	81.0
firm size (20-49 employees)	7.1	12.5	11.4	11.1
firm size (50-99 employees)	2.2	4.3	4.4	3.3
firm size (100-199 employees)	1.1	1.9	1.7	1.6
firm size (200-499 employees)	0.8	1.1	1.0	1.1
firms (> 500 employees)	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7
# workers	24053	31250	26059	36380
# firms	1682	1563	1375	1548

Note: source: Labor Inspection, AVO 1997. Individual records are weighted by individual*firm weights, firm records are weighted by firm weights

Table 2: Yearly outflow rates by level of education (in %)

education			
	lower	intermediate	higher
lay-off			
93	8.3	7.2	7.7
94	2.6	1.4	1.2
95	2.1	1.5	2.1
96	2.4	1.4	1.0
to other job			
93	1.5	0.9	0.8
94	4.4	3.9	4.2
95	5.8	5.1	6.0
96	5.8	6.0	6.3
total separation			
93	12.7	10.2	10.5
94	10.4	7.6	7.7
95	11.3	9.0	10.0
96	11.4	9.7	9.4

Source: Labor Inspection AVO 1997

Table 3: Short description of variables used in the regressions.

job complexity level	Job complexity levels are based on the complexity of the activities and the amount of supervision required.
wage agreement	We distinguish 3 types of wage contracts. Most workers have a collective wage agreement (CAO) which is determined by sectoral level bargaining. The minister of social affairs has the right to force all firms within a sector to pay the same collectively bargained wage (AVV) and finally there are workers who have a bilaterally bargained wage contract. Those workers are in general employed at higher positions.
part/full time	Part-time refers to working less than 100% of the regular number of hours.
cyclical downturn	Periods in which employment shrinks (93, 94)

Note: See also the appendix

Table 4: Regression coefficients (standard errors) logit model lay-off and direct job to job transition (N=116378)

	lay-off	direct job-to-job
constant	1.45 (2.36)	0.09 (2.10)
downturn (93,94)	1.02 (0.04)	-0.73 (0.03)
log (age)	-2.91 (1.30)	-0.24 (1.20)
log ² (age)	0.38 (0.19)	-0.12 (0.17)
log (tenure)	0.53 (0.04)	0.99 (0.04)
log ² (tenure)	-0.42 (0.02)	-0.46 (0.01)
female	-0.23 (0.05)	-0.16 (0.04)
part time	-0.27 (0.05)	-0.36 (0.04)
wage contract		
collective (CAO)	-0.20 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)
extended (CAO)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.07)
education		
primary	0.40 (0.16)	-0.23 (0.12)
lower general	0.26 (0.15)	-0.41 (0.11)
lower vocational	0.28 (0.15)	-0.47 (0.11)
interm. general	0.10 (0.15)	-0.53 (0.11)
interm. vocational	0.12 (0.15)	-0.54 (0.10)
higher vocational	0.08 (0.14)	-0.35 (0.10)
job complexity		
f1	0.29 (0.72)	0.35 (0.36)
f2	0.78 (0.71)	0.06 (0.35)
f3	0.62 (0.71)	0.01 (0.35)
f4	0.48 (0.71)	0.02 (0.35)
f5	0.82 (0.71)	-0.23 (0.34)
f6	0.93 (0.71)	-0.20 (0.34)
occupation		
simple technical	0.26 (0.15)	-0.22 (0.10)
administrative	0.27 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.11)
management	-0.29 (0.18)	0.20 (0.12)
service oriented	0.16 (0.15)	-0.10 (0.11)
commercial	0.46 (0.16)	0.07 (0.11)
creative	-0.10 (0.23)	0.01 (0.16)
firm size		
10-19	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.05)
20-49	-0.13 (0.05)	-0.23 (0.05)
50-99	-0.28 (0.06)	-0.34 (0.06)
100-199	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.37 (0.06)
200-499	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.27 (0.06)
> 500	0.28 (0.06)	0.18 (0.05)
-2 log likelihood	31334.3	38767.2

Note:Source Labor Inspection, AVO 1997. Including industry dummies. Age and tenure are measured in years. Reference groups: no collective wage agreement, full time, male, university, job complexity level 7,8, IT , agriculture/mining, firm size smaller than 10.

Table 5: AVO data: Simulated probabilities (in %)

variable	lay-off	direct job to job
total population	3.90	5.92
downturn (93-94)	6.33	4.18
upswing (95-96)	2.38	8.31
job complexity level		
simple (f1, f2)	4.08	6.67
intermediate (f3,f4)	3.70	5.95
complex (f5-f8)	4.41	4.92
education		
lower	4.20	5.96
intermediate	3.54	5.37
higher	3.51	5.75
age (years)		
20	4.86	9.91
40	3.80	5.07
60	3.87	3.21
tenure (years)		
1	4.25	3.76
2	4.98	5.86
5	3.39	5.52
10	1.60	3.22
female	3.38	5.39
male	4.22	6.27
collective (CAO)	3.71	5.91
extended (CAO)	4.04	5.57
no collective wage agreement	4.49	6.01
firm size (1-99)	3.50	5.57
firm size (> 100)	4.22	6.11

Note: All simulations are based on simple logit estimates evaluated over the average characteristics of the labor force over the period 1993-96. When cells are merged (i.e. f1,f2 and primary, lower general, lower vocational), we weight by average cell size. The estimations also included sector and occupation dummies, see Table 4