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Sustainability and international trade in resources
by Gernot Klepper and Frank Stähler
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JEL classification: F 20, Q 20.

Abstract. This paper discusses environmental policies which aim at a sustainable use of domestic resources which are mobile. It assumes that one country introduces such a policy but the other country does not. If a resource is mobile, strict domestic environmental policies may increase the resource imports from other countries. This paper shows that a unilateral environmental policy may even imply an increased resource use. In this case, a large part of the sustainability objective is met by substituting domestic resource extraction by imports. When sustainability is modelled in an intertemporal, competitive framework, the paper shows that the sustainability rule will not lead to a slower rate of extraction of the resource.
1. Introduction

The impact of environmental policies on international trade has recently received considerable attention. Several papers have dealt with this impact either in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework or a strategic trade theory setting (for an overview, see Ulph, 1994). In a Heckscher-Ohlin world where environmental resources are an intersectorally mobile but internationally immobile factor, strict environmental policies make a country specialize on resource-extensively produced goods. This structural change is the natural consequence of moving from relative resource abundance to relative resource scarcity. If environmental policies substitute for trade policies and markets are oligopolistic, the impact of environmental policies is unclear. Whether a country has an incentive to cut or to exceed the socially optimal regulation level in order to shift rents homewards depends on the parameters of the model and the type of competition. Both approaches assume that environmental resources are internationally immobile.

In some cases, however, environmental deterioration depends on the excessive use of resources which are mobile. The most outstanding example are fossil fuels which are almost never used at their point of production. Mobility of factors is a feature in international trade modelling which has been rarely dealt with in a general equilibrium framework (e.g. Svensson, 1984, Ethier, Svensson, 1986). One reason is that factor trade and goods trade are in many cases perfect substitutes, and trade theory has mainly focused on the structural changes associated with trade. When structural changes may be caused by both features, there is no need to take recourse to factor mobility when the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin model produces the same result. From an environmental policy perspective, however, the impact on trade flows itself deserves attention. If a resource is mobile, strict domestic environmental policies may increase the resource imports from other countries. If the increase of resource imports overcompensates the decrease of the domestic resource extraction, total resource use is increased. This paper shows that this case cannot be ruled out such that a unilateral environmental policy may imply an increased resource use. As we focus on the trade aspect, we employ a simple model of one tradable good, one tradable factor, one non-tradable factor and two countries.

This paper discusses the impacts of environmental policies aiming at a sustainable use of a natural domestic resource which is mobile internationally. It assumes that one country introduces such a policy but the other country does not. As the concept of sustainability is still somewhat vague, we discuss different concepts of sustainability. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
2. The Model

We assume two countries, a home country and a foreign country, which both produce one good $y$ by the use of two factors, resources $R$ and a composite factor $K$. $R$ and $K$ denote the factor endowments of the home country. The composite factor $K$ will sometimes be referred to as capital. Good $y$ is the numeraire in this model. All terms referring to the foreign country will be denoted by a star. Production is based on perfectly competitive market structures. According to the usual Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions, capital is internationally immobile. Resources, however, are assumed to be internationally mobile. Production is determined by the neo-classical, linear-homogeneous production function (1):

$$y = F[K, \tilde{R}], \quad \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K \partial R} > 0.$$  

$\tilde{R}$ denotes the resource use at home which is the difference between domestic resource endowment and net exports of resources. The same production function gives production in the foreign country. Since we assume only one good, it is not necessary to model consumption behavior explicitly. Instead, it is sufficient that both countries maximize their national income in terms of good $y$ subject to their endowment constraints:

$$\max_{\tilde{R}} \{ F[K, \tilde{R}] + \pi_R [R - \tilde{R}] \} \Rightarrow \pi_R = \frac{\partial F}{\partial R} [K, \tilde{R}]$$

$$\max_{\tilde{R}^*} \{ F[K^*, \tilde{R}^*] + \pi_R^* [R^* - \tilde{R}^*] \} \Rightarrow \pi_R^* = \frac{\partial F}{\partial R} [K^*, \tilde{R}^*]$$
(2) demonstrates that both countries maximize their national product by equalizing the resource price \( \pi_R \) or \( \pi_R^* \), respectively, with the corresponding marginal productivity of resource use. Trade without costs or other barriers in \( R \) and in \( y \) can take place. The corresponding market clearing conditions for goods exports \( x (x^*) \) is

\[
(3) \quad x + x^* = 0.
\]

Similarly, clearing of the resource market requires

\[
(4) \quad R - \bar{R} + R^* - \bar{R}^* = 0.
\]

The balance of payments must be zero for both countries, hence

\[
(5) \quad x + \pi_R [R - \bar{R}] = 0 \quad \text{and}
\]

\[
(6) \quad x^* + \pi_R^* [R^* - \bar{R}^*] = 0.
\]

The trade balance conditions (3) and (4) together with the balance of payment equations (5) and (6) and the first order conditions for income maximization (2) make it possible to solve the system. The optimal resource use for the two countries is given by

\[
(7) \quad [R - \bar{R}] \left\{ \frac{\partial F}{\partial K} [\bar{K}, \bar{R}] - \frac{\partial F}{\partial R} [K^*, \bar{R}^*] \right\} = 0.
\]

Equation (7) is fulfilled either if there is no trade in the resource, i.e. \( R - \bar{R} = 0 \), or if factor prices equalize, i.e. \( \pi_R = \pi_R^* \).

As the resource endowment in each period is determined by a decision about the amount of resources extracted from the existing stock, we will investigate how the resource use and resource trade is influenced by changes in the resource extraction decision. One could, e.g., assume that the government restricts domestic resource extraction through appropriate policy measures. The capital endowment of the economies cannot be changed in the short run but government policy might also influence investment through incentives or through public investment, thus increasing the capital stock in future periods. The impact of such policies can be analyzed in this simple model through a comparative static analysis.

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1 Of course, if there is no resource trade in this simple model, there is no trade at all.
Total differentiation of (7) with respect to $\bar{R}$, $R$ and $K$ yields

$$d\bar{R} = \frac{dR}{d\bar{R}^2} \left[ F,[K^*, \bar{R}^*] \right] - dK \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial R \partial K} [K, \bar{R}]$$

(8) describes the impact of changes in the resource extraction $R$ and in the composite factor $K$ on domestic resource use $\bar{R}$.

Endowment changes will also have an impact on real income. The total factor income of the economy is

$$Y = \pi_R R + \pi_K K$$

(9) where $\pi_R$ and $\pi_K$ denote world market prices if there is trade, otherwise they denote domestic factor prices. Total differentiation of $Y$ w.r.t. $R$ and $K$ yields

$$dY = \left[ \frac{\partial \pi_R}{\partial R} R + \pi_R + \frac{\partial \pi_K}{\partial K} K \right] dR + \left[ \frac{\partial \pi_K}{\partial K} K + \pi_K + \frac{\partial \pi_R}{\partial R} R \right] dK$$

(10) together with

$$d\pi_R = \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial \bar{R}^2} [K, \bar{R}] d\bar{R} + \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial \bar{R} \partial K} [K, \bar{R}] dK,$$

$$d\pi_K = \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K^2} [K, \bar{R}] dK + \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial \bar{R} \partial K} [K, \bar{R}] d\bar{R}.$$

With these equations, we can take a first look at the impact of sustainability policies, i.e. of changes in the factor endowments of the economy, on resources and goods trade.

3. Strong sustainability or the case of resource-based variations

Definitions of sustainability are in ample supply. One of the strict notions which mainly applies to renewable resources simply calls for a reduction of the extraction of the natural resource in each period. The more sophisticated criterion of "weak sustainability" (Pearce, Atkinson, 1993) presumes that natural resources are to some extent substitutable by man-made resources such as
physical or human capital. Hence, under such a sustainability criterion resource extraction should be accompanied by an increase in the capital stock. We first look at the impact of "strong sustainability", i.e. just a reduction in resource extraction. The next section then considers the impact of weak sustainability.

Suppose that the home country considers its domestic resource endowment as too abundant to be in line with sustainability. As a consequence, a part of this endowment which reduces the total stock in every period is taken away from economic use. For $dR < 0$, $dK = 0$, (8) reduces to

$$d\bar{R} = \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial R^2} \left[ K^*, \bar{R}^* \right] dR$$

$$\Rightarrow 1 > \frac{d\bar{R}}{dR} > 0.$$  

Assuming that both countries possess the same production technology, i.e. equal production functions, and that these production functions are linearly homogeneous, allows to determine (12) as a function of the capital endowments. In this case, factor price equalization requires equal factor input ratios. Therefore, let

$$\frac{Y}{K} := f(\bar{r}) \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{Y^*}{K^*} := f(\bar{r}^*)$$

where $\bar{r} = \frac{\bar{R}}{K}$ and $\bar{r}^* = \frac{\bar{R}^*}{K^*}$.

Then, $\bar{r} = \bar{r}^*$ because of factor price equalization and consequently

$$\frac{\partial^2 F[.]}{\partial R^2} = \frac{1}{K} \frac{\partial^2 f[.]}{\partial r^2}, \quad \frac{\partial^2 F[.]}{\partial R^*^2} = \frac{1}{K^*} \frac{\partial^2 f[.]}{\partial r^*^2},$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 f[.]}{\partial r^2} = \frac{\partial^2 f[.]}{\partial r^*^2}$$

such that equation (12) becomes
Consequently, a reduction in resource extraction will be absorbed by a reduction in resource exports and resource use in production. The relationship between both adjustments depends on the relative composite factor endowment and on the direction of the resource trade: if the country's capital endowment is relatively low, and the country is an exporter of the resource, then the reduction in the resource extraction will almost entirely lead to a reduction in exports and little change in domestic resource use. A country with a high share of the composite factor relative to the world endowment will, on the other hand, absorb most of the decline in extraction through a reduction of resource inputs in production.

If a country is a resource importer and small, it will substitute almost all of the reduction in resource extraction by imports. A country well endowed with the composite factor will again absorb the fall in resource extraction by reducing domestic resource use with little additional imports. In any case, resource exports will be decreased by a resource-exporting country and imports will be increased by a resource-importing country. If \( K^* = K \), i.e. both countries are equally endowed by the composite factor, exactly half of the reduction will be matched by increased imports or decreased exports, respectively, and the other half by a reduction in the productive use of the resource.

As far as the export or import ratios are concerned, the results are ambiguous. The elasticity of resource use \( \hat{R} \) with respect to resource extraction \( R \) is defined as

\[
(14) \quad \varepsilon_{\hat{R}} = \frac{d\hat{R}}{dR} \frac{R}{\hat{R}} < 1.
\]

For identical linearly homogeneous production functions this means that

\[
(15) \quad \varepsilon_{\hat{R}} = \begin{cases} 
< 1 & \text{if } \frac{\rho}{R} < \frac{K^*}{K^* + K}, \\
= 1 & \text{if } \frac{\rho}{R} = \frac{K^*}{K^* + K}, \\
> 1 & \text{if } \frac{\rho}{R} > \frac{K^*}{K^* + K},
\end{cases}
\]

\( \rho := R - \hat{R} \).
This result can be used to compute the impact of a percentage change in resource extraction on the export ratio, i.e.

\[
\frac{d\left( \frac{p}{R} \right)}{dR} = \frac{\bar{R}}{R^2} \left[ 1 - \varepsilon_R \right].
\]

The export ratio falls through a reduction in resource use if \( \varepsilon_R < 1 \). Under the condition of (15), the export ratio falls further if it was already below \( K^*/(K^*+K) \) and it increases further if it was already above \( K^*/(K^*+K) \).

The impact of a reduction in resource extraction on income is ambivalent since

\[
\frac{dY}{dR} = \frac{d\pi_R}{dR} R + \pi_R + \frac{d\pi_K}{dR} K
\]

with

\[
\frac{d\pi_R}{dR} = \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial \bar{R}^2} \left[ K, \bar{R} \right] d\bar{R} < 0, \quad \frac{d\pi_K}{dR} = \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial \bar{R} \partial K} \left[ K, \bar{R} \right] d\bar{R} > 0.
\]

The first term on the RHS denotes the increase of the scarcity rent of the resource, the second term denotes the marginal loss in earnings and the third term denotes the productivity effect on the composite factor \( K \).

4. Weak sustainability or the case of capital- and resource-based variations

Under the concept of weak sustainability, the increase of resource extraction beyond the reproduction capacity of the stock should only be allowed if other man-made productive factors are increased. A practical rule would require the value of additional resources extracted to be equal to the present value of the compensating investment.

Translating this idea into a comparative-static framework is difficult. In the present model, resource extraction \( R \) denotes the change in the stock of the resource. Modelling a policy change towards sustainability would mean that in general the rate of extraction needs to be reduced and - in addition - the investment needs to be increased to the level required by the remaining resource extraction. The impact of a reduction of resource extraction towards a more sustainable rate has been discussed in the previous section. In this section, the presumption is that the economy is at some desirable level of resource extraction.
and the question arises what the impact of an increase in resource extraction might be if it is compensated by investment in the capital stock of the economy.

The increase of the composite factor $K$ necessary to outweigh the change of the resource extraction is given by:

$$\pi_R dR = \pi_K dK.$$ \hspace{1cm} (18)

Of course, this sustainability policy involves some costs in terms of decreased consumption:

$$dc = -\pi_K dK.$$ \hspace{1cm} (19)

Using (18) in (8) results in the change of domestic resource use as a function of the combined change of domestic factor endowments under weak sustainability:

$$dR = \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial R^2} \left[ K^*, \bar{R}^* \right] - \frac{\partial F}{\partial R} \left[ \cdot \right] \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K \partial R} \left[ K, \bar{R} \right]$$ \hspace{1cm} (20)

\[= \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial R^2} \left[ K, \bar{R} \right] + \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial R^2} \left[ K^*, \bar{R}^* \right] \]

\[= \frac{\partial F}{\partial R} \left[ \cdot \right] \frac{\partial F}{\partial K} \left[ \cdot \right] \]

\[= \frac{\partial F}{\partial K} \left[ \cdot \right] \frac{\partial F}{\partial R} \left[ \cdot \right] \]

\[= \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial R^2} \left[ K^*, \bar{R}^* \right] \]

\[= \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial R^2} \left[ K, \bar{R} \right] \]

\[= \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K \partial R} \left[ K, \bar{R} \right] \]

\[= \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial R \partial K} \left[ K, \bar{R} \right] \]

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\[= \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K \partial R} \left[ K^*, \bar{R}^* \right] \]

\[= \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K \partial R} \left[ K, \bar{R} \right] \]

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\[= \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K \partial R} \left[ K^*, \bar{R}^* \right] \]

\[= \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K \partial R} \left[ K, \bar{R} \right] \]

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\[= \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K \partial R} \left[ K, \bar{R} \right] \]

\[= \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K \partial R} \left[ K^*, \bar{R}^* \right] \]

\[= \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K \partial R} \left[ K, \bar{R} \right] \]

(20) shows that an increase of resource endowment leads unambiguously to an increase of domestic resource use, and that this increase is higher than in the case of solely resource-based variations. Whether the imports do not overcompensate the change of resource endowment, however, is not clear in general. Compared to the case of resource-based variations, it cannot be ruled out that $d\bar{R}/dR > 1$. From (20) it can be seen that $d\bar{R}/dR > 1$ if $\pi_R \bar{R} > \pi_K K$. Thus, the resource use increases faster than resource extraction if the factor income of resources employed domestically is higher than the factor income of the composite factor. From an empirical point of view, this might be found to be
a very unlikely case as it demands that the factor income of employed resources
seizes more than the half of production.

Substituting \( dK \) by (18) in the upper line of (11) demonstrates that the effect on
resource prices is ambiguous unless the relative strength of the cross derivative
is known:

\[
\frac{d\pi_R}{dR} = \frac{d\tilde{R}}{dR} \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial R^2}[K, \tilde{R}] + \frac{\partial F/\partial \tilde{R}}{\partial K}[r] \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial \tilde{R} \partial K}[K, \tilde{R}].
\]

If \( \frac{d\tilde{R}}{dR} > 1 \) is valid, however, the resource price decreases with domestic
endowment:

\[
\frac{d\pi_R}{dR} < 0
\]

shows that an increase of imports which dominates the increase of resource
endowment unambiguously decreases the resource price. In all other cases,
however, the impact remains ambiguous such that an increase of domestic
resource endowments may also increase the resource price. (23) demonstrates
that the impact on the interest rate is also ambiguous unless the strength of the
cross derivative is known:

\[
\frac{d\pi_K}{dR} = \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K \partial \tilde{R}}[K, \tilde{R}] \frac{d\tilde{R}}{dR} + \frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K^2}[K, \tilde{R}] \frac{\pi_R}{\pi_K} = \frac{\tilde{R}}{K^2} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial t^2}[r] \left[ \frac{\pi_R}{\pi_K} - \frac{d\tilde{R}}{dR} \right].
\]

(23) uses (17) to substitute for \( dK \) and
\[
\frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K^2}[.] = \frac{R^2}{K^3} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial r^2}[.].
\]

If both factor incomes are identical which means that both factor shares are 1/2, \((R/K)(\pi_R/\pi_K)\) is one. According to (20), \(dR/dR\) is one as well in this case such that the capital price is not changed if both factor incomes are identical. In all other cases, the effect is ambiguous because both terms are increased (decreased) by an increasing (decreasing) factor share of employed resources, and \(dR/dR\) depends on the relative capital endowment but the first terms does not. Both, the ambiguity of (21) and (23) obviously imply an ambiguous impact on the domestic income as well.

5. Intertemporal trade adjustments

In section 4, it was assumed that the change of factor endowments initiated by sustainability policies occurs in one period. Investment, however, is more appropriately modelled by assuming that a decrease of consumption today adds to the capital stock tomorrow. Therefore, for the analysis of the effects of a sustainability rule such as that of "weak sustainability", we develop a dynamic model. It is a simple version of the classical growth model with exhaustible natural resources by Stiglitz (1974) which is extended to incorporate the sustainability rule and international trade.

The adoption and extension of this model is due to two reasons. Firstly, in order to derive at some conclusions, the fairly general assumption of linear-homogeneous production functions must be given up. Linear-homogenous production functions make no assumption about the behavior of the income factor shares in the course of time, and thereby imply ambiguity at a very early stage of the model which has not addressed trade issues yet. As we are mainly interested in trade effects, we keep the tradition of the Stiglitz-paper and assume constant income factor shares.

Secondly, modelling intertemporal behavior under competitive conditions entails several complications unless the existence of future markets for all goods and factors is assumed. These complications arise because perfect competition assumes that all resource owners base their resource extraction policy on a set of given current and future resource and capital prices in order to maximize the present value of their assets. If such future markets do not exist, an assumption
is at least needed which price resource owners expect in the next period. We find that the lack of future markets is a more realistic assumption, and therefore this paper assumes that resource owners expect resource prices to rise with the current price of capital, i.e. the marginal productivity of capital. This expectation results in adopting the Hotelling Rule for resource price changes. As future markets do not exist, we also assume that trade is balanced at each point in time (for an paper adopting an intertemporal budget constraint, see van Geldrop, Withagen, 1993).

All terms which may change in the course of time will be given as function of $t$. In detail, the domestic economy in each country has the following characteristics:

Output is produced with a Cobb-Douglas production function

$$Y(t) = K(t)^\alpha \bar{R}(t)^{1-\alpha}.$$  

Profit maximization under perfect competition requires as in (2)

$$\pi_R(t) = (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y(t)}{\bar{R}(t)};$$

$$\pi_K(t) = \alpha \frac{Y(t)}{K(t)}.$$

Now define

$$\beta(t) := \frac{Y(t)}{K(t)} \quad \text{and} \quad \gamma(t) := \frac{R(t)}{S(t)}$$

as the output/capital ratio and the share of resource extraction.

Resource owners will extract resources such that the growth rate of the resource prices is equal to the interest rate at each point in time, i.e.

$$\frac{\dot{ \pi}_R(t)}{\pi_R(t)} = \pi_K(t) = \alpha \frac{Y(t)}{K(t)} = \alpha \beta(t).$$

(26) mirrors the Hotelling Rule. The growth rate of output $Y$ is then
\[ g_Y = \frac{\dot{Y}(t)}{Y(t)} = \alpha g_K + (1 - \alpha) g_R \]

where \( g_K \) denotes the growth rate of the capital stock which is determined by the investment rule to be chosen, and \( g_R \) denotes the growth rate of the resource input in production.

From differentiation of the upper line of (25) w.r.t. time and (26) one obtains

\[ \alpha \beta(t) = g_Y - g_R. \]

Free trade leads to factor price equalization such that - given the assumption about the production technology - the factor intensities equalize (\( K^* \) is constant by assumption):

\[ \frac{\bar{R}(t)}{K(t)} = \frac{\bar{R}^*(t)}{K^*}. \]

Solving (29) for \( \bar{R} \) and differentiating \( \bar{R}, \bar{R}^* \) and \( K \) w.r.t. time yields

\[ g_R = g_R^* + g_K. \]

We are assuming that the foreign country does not invest, i.e.

\[ g_{K^*} = 0. \]

Market clearing in the resource market requires

\[ R(t) + R^*(t) = \bar{R}(t) + \bar{R}^*(t). \]

A further assumption is necessary with respect to resource endowment because the Hotelling Rule does only determine the rule for the world supply of resources. We will assume that both economies are equally endowed with resources at the time of introducing sustainability policies. If the two economies possess the same resource stock at time \( t_0 \), then the growth rates of extraction are also equal since they depend on the growth rate of the resource price. Under free trade, factor prices are equal at every point in time, hence their growth rates are also the same.

Differentiating (31) w.r.t. time and using (29) will determine the difference in the growth rates of resource extraction and resource use in production:
Equation (31) shows that $R$ and $\bar{R}$ grow at the same rate if investment is zero, i.e. $g_K = 0$. If the economy invests, $g_K > 0$, then

$$g_R < g_{\bar{R}}.$$ 

This means that in the case of a declining extraction path resource extraction falls faster than resource use. If the resource extraction is increasing over time, resource use will increase even faster.

Let us now turn to the investment rule. If there is no investment at all, both economies remain identical, prices remain the same, and no trade will take place. The growth rate of output will be determined by (27) and (28) such that

$$g_Y = -(1 - \alpha)\beta(t)$$

holds. Similarly, resource extraction and resource use will fall according to

$$g_{\bar{R}} = -\beta(t).$$

Since $g_{\beta} = g_Y - g_K$ and $g_K = 0$, the output/capital ratio is falling as well. The ration of extraction to resource stock, $\gamma(t) = \frac{R(t)}{S(t)}$, will first fall and may become increasing as $\beta$ is falling since $g_{\gamma} = g_R + \gamma(t) = \gamma(t) - \beta(t)$.

If the domestic country switches to a sustainability rule, two cases must be distinguished. A purely extraction-based sustainability rule requires the country to invest as much capital as to equalize the value of domestic resource extraction to the present value of the investment. A purely use-based sustainability rule requires the country to invest as much capital as to equalize the value of domestic resource use to the present value of the investment. The extraction-based sustainability rule which will be referred to as case (a) does not take the trade effects into account. The use-based sustainability rule which will be referred to as case (b) takes the effects on resource imports into account. This rule may be found to represent a less egoistic one as international repercussions influence future investment of the country.

Cases (a) and (b) will be discussed simultaneously in the remainder of this section. The sustainability rules require that
(34a) \( \forall t: \pi_R(t)R(t) = \pi_K(t)K(t) \),

(34b) \( \forall t: \pi_R(t)\tilde{R}(t) = \pi_K(t)\tilde{K}(t) \),

respectively, should hold. When either of these investment rules is introduced, trade in resources and goods will emerge. The sustainability rules (34a) and (34b) amount to

\[
(35a) \quad \dot{K}(t) = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\tilde{R}(t)}{R(t)} K(t) \quad \text{or} \quad g_K = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\tilde{R}(t)}{R(t)},
\]

\[
(35b) \quad \dot{K}(t) = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} K(t) \quad \text{or} \quad g_K = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha},
\]

given the Cobb-Douglas production function. If the country is a net exporter (importer) of the resource, \( \tilde{R}(t)/R(t) \) falls short of (exceeds) unity. Thus, a net exporter (importer) invests less (more) under sustainability rule (a) than under sustainability (b), given that all other terms are identical. The corresponding growth rates of resource use and output become

\[
(36a) \quad g_R = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\tilde{R}(t)}{R(t)} - \beta(t),
\]

\[
g_Y = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\tilde{R}(t)}{R(t)} - [1-\alpha]\beta(t),
\]

\[
(36b) \quad g_R = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \beta(t),
\]

\[
g_Y = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} - [1-\alpha]\beta(t),
\]

respectively. Under the sustainability rules one can also compute from (31) the difference in growth rates of resource extraction and resource use:

\[
(37a) \quad g_R - g_R = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\tilde{R}(t)}{R(t)} \left[ 1 - \frac{\tilde{R}(t)}{R(t) + R^*(t)} \right],
\]

\[
(37b) \quad g_R - g_R = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \left[ 1 - \frac{\tilde{R}(t)}{R(t) + R^*(t)} \right].
\]
Now, define the import quota of the resource as 

\[ m := \frac{\tilde{R} - R}{\tilde{R}}. \]

The growth rate of the import quota \( m \) will be 

\[
g_m = \frac{R(t)}{\tilde{R}(t)} \left( g_R - g_R \right) = g_K \left( 1 - \frac{\tilde{R}(t)}{R(t) + R^*(t)} \right) \frac{R(t)}{\tilde{R}(t)} = \]

\[
\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \left( 1 - \frac{\tilde{R}(t)}{R(t) + R^*(t)} \right) \frac{R(t)}{\tilde{R}(t)},
\]

respectively. Hence, the domestic resource use will be supplied increasingly from imports. The import quota's growth rate under sustainability rule (b) will exceed the one under rule (a) if the country is a net exporter of the resource.

We are now able to compare the growth path of the two economies with and without sustainability rules. All terms referring to sustainability policies will be denoted by the superscript SUST. We omit any superscript for laissez faire policies. For resource extraction we find that 

\[
(39a) \quad g^\text{SUST}_R = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\tilde{R}(t)}{R(t)} \frac{\tilde{R}(t)}{R(t) + R^*(t)} - \beta(t) > g^\text{SUST}_R = -\beta(t)
\]

\[
(39b) \quad g^\text{SUST}_R = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\tilde{R}(t)}{R(t) + R^*(t)} - \beta(t) > g_R = -\beta(t)
\]

is valid. (39a) and (39b) use the result that \( \beta(t) \) does not depend on the policy variant: we observe that \( \beta(0) \) is identical for all cases under consideration. Additionally, determining the growth rate of \( \beta \), i.e. \( g_\beta \), (32), (35a), (35b), (36a) and (36b), respectively, for the different policies shows that \( g_\beta = -(1-\alpha) \beta(t) \) holds for all cases. If \( \beta \) has the same starting-point and the same growth rates under all policies under consideration, \( \beta(t) \) is the same for all cases.
(39a) and (39b) demonstrate that the investment will lead to a further resource extraction in both countries. However, the foreign country will export its increasing extraction such that the domestic increase in extraction does not cover the increase in domestic resource use but imports are increased as well. Note that we cannot rule out that the growth rate of resource extraction becomes positive. In this case, sustainability policies would not only dampen the reduction in resource extraction but result in an increased resource extraction. Given that all other terms are identical, the growth rate of resource extraction is higher (lower) in case (a) than in case (b) if the country is a net resource importer (exporter). Thus, sustainability rule (b) which was found to represent a more comprehensive treatment of sustainable resource use does not unambiguously lead to lower resource extractions. Note also that cases (a) and (b) can be compared only for the time of introducing sustainability policies because all future resource extractions and resource uses depend on the sustainability rule itself.

If one compares a sustainability policy in a country without resource trade with a country engage in resource trade, the resource extraction paths are given by

\[
(40) \quad \dot{e}_R^{\text{AUT}} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} - \beta(t)
\]

The superscript AUT denotes autarky. Comparing (40) with the LHS of (39a) and (39b), an economy with a unilateral sustainability policy can slow down its resource extraction further if it engages in resource trade, i.e. it can "import sustainability".

6. Concluding remarks

This paper has demonstrated the effects of environmental policies aiming at a sustainable use of a natural resource which is traded internationally. It has assumed that one country introduces such a policy but the other country does not. It was shown in a static framework that strict domestic environmental policies will increase the resource imports from other countries if that resource is mobile. This paper has also shown that a unilateral environmental policy may even imply an increased resource use at home. In this case, a large part of the sustainability objective is simply met by substituting domestic resource supply by imports. The larger the country introducing a resource conservation policy is, i.e. the higher its share of the world endowment with the composite factor, the
more of the reduction in resource extraction will be absorbed at home. Hence, the impact on domestic production is larger the larger is the country pursuing the resource conservation. Small countries will be able to either import the needed additional resources or to export less after a reduction in extraction.

The analysis of sustainability policies on resource extraction in a dynamic context first yield the result that compensating investments in the capital stock do not slow down the resource extraction path. The reason comes from the dynamic behavior of the resource extraction decision which depends according to the Hotelling Rule on the interest rate, i.e. the marginal product of capital. But since investment lowers the marginal capital productivity, the path of resource prices increases over time at a lower speed than without a rising capital stock. This is due to the fact that this model has no technical progress which increases the productivity of capital.

Allowing trade in resources then results in the same feature as in the comparative static analysis of resource-based variations: the country following the unilateral sustainability rule can import sustainability, thus preserving its resource stock better than under autarky. However, even with trade it cannot achieve a lower resource extraction path than without any compensating investment rule at all.

There are two escape routes which may reconcile sustainability policies with modest resource extractions. Firstly, one may take the strong sustainability concept which does not allow for substitution between man-made and natural capital. This concept, however, is obviously not apt to deal with problems of non-renewable resources. Secondly, one may define weak sustainability as not adding the value of resource extraction to the value of physical stocks but to another stock the marginal productivity of which does not determine resource extraction. For example, if the value of extracted or used resources is invested into human capital which in turn might influence technical progress, the marginal productivity of physical capital may be increased. As the marginal productivity of physical capital determines the resource price change, resource extraction and resource use are likely to be more modest.

From this discussion, we draw two policy conclusions. Firstly, we find that trade in resources may lead to an import of sustainability at the expense of unsustainability in other countries. Unless the more unsustainable use of resources abroad raises no problem, trade in resources stresses the importance of international policy coordination. Secondly, we find that the concept of weak sustainability should be redefined in order to avoid investment into physical
capital. It is not only useless but even harmful just to accumulate physical capital as resource extraction in all countries and resource imports are likely to be increased. In this sense, increasing physical capital leads to a faster exploitation of resources. The concept of weak sustainability should therefore focus more on the productivity enhancing part of investment decisions. The analysis of this type of investment will be taken up in future research.

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References


