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German Exchange Rate Exposure at DAX and Aggregate Level, International Trade, and the Role of Exchange Rate Adjustment Costs

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German Exchange Rate Exposure at DAX and Aggregate Level, International Trade, and the Role of Exchange Rate Adjustment Costs

Horst Entorf, Gösta Jamin

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German Exchange Rate Exposure at DAX and Aggregate Level, International Trade, and the Role of Exchange Rate Adjustment Costs

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Summary: This article analyses value changes of German stock market companies in response to movements of the US dollar. The approach followed in this work extends the standard means of measuring exchange rate exposure in several ways (e.g. by using multi-factor modelling instead of augmented CAPM, application of moving window panel regressions, orthogonalization of overall market risk vis-à-vis currency risk). The main innovation lies in testing implications of exchange rate adjustment costs (hedging costs) for firm values and exposure. Based on time series data of German DAX companies, DM/ dollar rates and macroeconomic factors, we find a rather unstable, time-variant exposure of German stock market companies. Dollar sensitivity is positively affected by the ratio of exports/GDP and negatively affected by imports/GDP as well as by significant deviations of the dollar price from its long-run median. The first two findings are in line with the presumption that exporting corporations benefit from dollar price increases, whereas importing corporations benefit from dollar price decreases. The last finding can be explained by higher exchange rate adjustment costs in case of substantial deviations from the long-run median level. Furthermore, there is indication of asymmetric adjustment costs as effects from appreciations of domestic currency appear to be smaller than from depreciations.

JEL classification: G15, F31, C23

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1. Introduction

Are German stock values vulnerable to exchange rate movements? Classical financial theory implies that stock market values of firms should be affected by foreign exchange rate risk (Dufey 1972, Shapiro 1974). However, according to standard international portfolio choice models, optimally allocated world market portfolios hedge against exchange rate risk (Solnik 1974, Adler and Dumas 1983). To the extent that foreign exchange risk represents unsystematic risk, it can be diversified away, provided that investors and owners of equities have the same quality of information about the firm as management – a condition not likely to prevail in practice (Dufey and Giddy, 2003). Tests of predictions derived from such theoretical considerations have been facilitated by the work of Adler and Dumas (1980, 1984), who have shown that exchange rate exposure can be measured as the sensitivity of stock returns to exchange rate movements within the simple framework of linear regression models.

Econometric studies have been of limited success in identifying foreign currency exposure (see Jorion 1990 and 1991, Bodnar and Gentry 1993, He and Ng 1998, Dominguez and Tesar 2001 a,b,c, Koutmos and Martin 2003, inter alia). If found in the data, exchange rate exposure is expected to be related to international trade. However, based on data from eight countries, Dominguez and Tesar (2001 b,c), for instance, conclude that they do not find a strong connection between trade and exposure. Recent studies discuss possible reasons for this lack of significance, as there are, for instance, time-varying risks (De Santis and Gerard 1998, Tai 2000), hedging activities (Allayannis and Ofek 2001, Crabb 2002), neglected issues of competitiveness within industrial sectors (Marston 2001), potential nonlinearities (Bartram 2002) or asymmetric exposure (Koutmos and Martin 2003).

This study takes a fresh look at the subject using German data. Due to its high international dependency, Germany is very well suited for testing the existence of exchange rate exposure. Our approach extends the literature in several ways. The usual way of measuring “residual” exchange rate exposure is choosing a CAPM specification augmented by exchange rate risk. We deviate from this tradition by controlling for other additional potential macroeconomic risks such as inflation and interest rate fluctuations as well, i.e. we follow multifactor-modelling in the spirit of Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) instead of augmented CAPM, thus avoiding some omitted variable bias. We argue that
macroeconomic shocks such as divergent monetary and fiscal policies, as well as asynchronous output movements might drive stock returns and exchange rates in multidimensional ways such that any prediction of the prevailing impact of exchange rates on stock returns is regime-dependent (see Gavin, 1989). Following further along these lines, we take account of time-dependency risks by running moving-window regressions. In order to exploit the longitudinal information within the data of German DAX corporations used, we propose to apply rolling-panel estimation techniques.

The role of second or higher moments caused by exchange rate adjustment costs, although at the heart of uncertainty caused by exchange rate fluctuations, has received surprisingly little attention in the literature (remarkable exceptions being Miller and Reuter 1998, Andren 2001, Bartram 2002, and Priestley and Odegaard, 2002). Theoretical analysis reveals that profits and firm values are a convex function of the exchange rate (see Franke 1991, Sercu and Vanhulle 1992, and DeGrauwe 1994, among others). Several recent research articles have been motivated by the fact that a high percentage of firms use hedging strategies (see Bodnar and Gebhard 1998, and Bartram et al., 2003, for surveys) to circumvent such costs of adjustment, and focus on hedging and reduced risk stemming from the use of forward contracts, options or other hedging strategies. The great bulk of research, however, neglects that there might be substantial costs of hedging, and that hedging costs depend on the exchange rate itself (see Dufey and Giddy, 2003, for strategies of managing corporate foreign exchange risk and related costs). The price of an option, for instance, increases convexly with the expectation for a currency’s volatility because of inherent leverage effects: the more volatile, the higher the price. Our paper takes account of exchange rate adjustment costs by modelling exposure in dependence of exchange rate variation. Grounded on theoretical arguments (see Franke 1991, for instance) and empirical evidence (see Engel and Hamilton, 1990, and succeeding research), both stressing the importance of mean-reverting exchange rates, we analyse the impact of substantial current deviations from expected long-run benchmarks.

We estimate exchange rate exposure and test our hypotheses using performance indices from the German DAX corporations of the time 1977 to 1995, which was a period without adjustment processes following the breakdown of the Bretton Wood system in 1973 (Bartov et al. 1996), and without anticipatory distortions in the face of the forthcoming introduction of the euro in 1999.
Our primary intention is to derive conclusions with respect to aggregate exchange rate exposure of the German economy. We thus focus on a macroeconomic (macrofinancial) point of view, although we draw our conclusions on returns observed for individual stock companies. We find a rather unstable exposure of German stock market companies. In general (on average), German exposure is well described through the role of a net exporter, who benefits from the depreciation of domestic currency. Accordingly, estimations of time-varying exposure based on DM/US-dollar risks have a positive sign with the exception of the first half of the 1980ies, when a relatively high import dependency and a strong US dollar changed the situation. Persistent deviations of exchange rates from their long-run values have a significant impact on exposure. We find that the larger the distance of current exchange rates from their long-median is, the lower company values are. Moreover, there is evidence that impact curves are nonlinear and asymmetric. Results are in accordance with long-run mean (median) reversion and asymmetric adjustment costs.

This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present previous research. Section 3 describes our econometric specification, and in Section 4 we introduce the data sets employed. Section 5 informs about estimation results, and in Section 6 results are briefly summarized.

2. Previous Research

Most studies have been of limited success in identifying foreign currency exposure. Jorion (1990) analysed the exposure to exchange rates of 287 U.S. multinationals and found that only 15 of them are significantly affected by exchange rates. Bodnar and Gentry (1993), who provided evidence based on industry data for Canada, Japan and the U.S, reported that between 20 and 35 percent of industries have statistically significant exchange rate exposures. He and Ng (1998) investigated the exchange rate exposure of Japanese corporations and found that for the period 1979 to December 1993, only 25 percent of the 171 Japanese multinationals have significant exposure. Dominguez and Tesar (2001) examine the extent of firm and industry-level exposure in a sample of industrialized and developing countries for the period 1980-1999. In the pooled eight-country sample, they found that 23 percent of firms and 40 percent of industries are exposed to at least one of their indicators of exchange rate exposure (US
dollar, trade-weighted exchange rate, currency of the country’s major trading partner). Koutmos and Martin (2003) analysed exchange rate exposure in nine aggregate sectors of major economies (Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and confirmed existence of exposure in approximately 40 percent of the country-sector models.

Many recent empirical studies focus their research on factors that determine the extent of exposure. An evident question is whether exchange rate exposure is influenced through the channel of international trade. Previous research in this area was pioneered by Jorion (1990), who showed that a firm’s exchange rate exposure is positively related to the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. This result was extended and confirmed by recent work of He and Ng (1978), Dominguez and Tesar (2001), and Allayannis and Ofek (2001), inter alia. He and Ng (1998) showed that Japanese multinationals with higher exposure levels are related to higher export shares. However, looking at international evidence, Dominguez and Tesar (2001b,c) concluded that they did not find a strong connection between trade and exposure, although there seems to be some evidence that a higher level of foreign sales corresponds to higher exposure for Germany (Dominguez and Tesar, 2001c, Table 10). Marston (2001) has drawn attention to the fact that even a local firm which neither exports nor imports can be exposed to changes in exchange rates, for instance if it competes with foreign firms in the domestic market. Thus, as is known from the related literature on exchange-rate pass-through, an important determinant is the competitive structure of the industry in which a firm operates. Some studies have shown that the use of foreign currency derivatives (FCDs), i.e. a short-term (less than one year) hedging strategy, is related to exchange rate exposure. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) found that the use of FCDs is negatively related to the absolute value of foreign currency exposure. By controlling for hedging activity, Crabb (2002) provided evidence that previous studies often found insignificant effects because hedging mitigated currency risks. Exchange rate exposure seems to be higher when companies operate within a system of liberalized exchange rates. Bartov, Bodnar and Kaul (1996) consider the switch from fixed to floating exchange rates following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 and found increasing risks thereafter, whereas Bartram and Karolyi (2003) showed that the introduction of the euro in 1999 was accompanied by significant reductions in market risk exposures in and outside of Europe.
Due to its high share of sales going to exports and its high share of imported goods, Germany is very well suited for testing exchange rate exposure. Indeed, Bartram (2002), who argued that exchange rate exposure may be partly nonlinear, identified both linear and nonlinear exposure components using data of 447 German corporations. However, at the sector level, Koutmos and Martin (2003) found significant exchange rate exposure for only one out of nine sectors in Germany. Based on returns of 12 sector indexes, Entorf and Kabbalakes (1998) detected significant (positive) exposure for chemicals, motor cars and machinery, steel production, and holdings, suggesting that exposure in Germany is mainly driven by exporting activities. Glaum et. al (2000) showed that total exchange rate exposure is unstable over time. Entorf (2000) estimated a time-varying measure of overall German currency risk and showed that it significantly depends both on German exports and imports.

3. Econometric specification: Orthogonalization issues, APT versus augmented CAPM, and time-varying measurement

As in most studies measuring exchange rate exposure, we follow Adler and Dumas (1984) who showed that the extent of corporate exposure boils down to the slope parameter $b_i$ of a regression

$$ r_i = a_i + b_i d + \varepsilon_i $$

where $r_i$ is the stock market return of company $i$, $i = 1, 2, \ldots, N$, and $d$ is the return of the exchange rate. Most previous econometric studies further control for overall market risk $r_m$ leading to a CAPM specification augmented by exchange rate movements,

$$ r_{it} = a_i + b_i d_{it} + \gamma r_m + \varepsilon_{it}, $$

based on time series observations. The “conditional” or “residual” effect (as it was called by Bodnar and Wong, 2000), i.e. the exposure that is different from general market exposure, measured by $b_i$ in equation (2), is then interpreted as “residual” exchange rate exposure.

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1 Entorf and Kabbalakes (1998) estimated the extent of “total” exchange rate exposure by regressing foreign exchange rates on stock returns without controlling for general market risks, whereas Koutmos and Martin (2003) estimated the “residual” effect by including the overall market factor.
exposure, whereas the slope parameter in equation (1) would imply some measure of “total” exposure (Bodnar and Wong, 2000) that might be disturbed by some spurious effects arising when common market factors drive both exchange rates and (all) stock returns simultaneously (due to unanticipated monetary shocks, for instance).

Sensitivity of individual firm values to overall market risk (i.e. the “beta” of a firm in the context of non-augmented CAPM modelling) is covered by $\gamma_i$. A problem with specification (2) is that overall market exposure $r_m$, which in empirical studies is represented by broad market indices such as the DAX, includes several driving factors, of which exchange rate risk may be particularly important. Thus, insignificance of previous results might arise from the fact that currency risks were already included in overall risk and priced in market risk factors, leading to the misleading statistical result that collinearity between market portfolios and exchange rates prevents significant results. To circumvent a problem such as this, we apply a strategy well known from testing Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). McElroy and Burmeister (1988) introduced the use of the so-called “residual market factor” which implies orthogonalization of overall market risk and other risk factors which only consist of exchange rates in the present case of augmented CAPM. Thus, we first estimate an auxiliary regression to capture that particular fraction of aggregate market risk which was induced by exchange rate fluctuations:

$$
(3) \quad r_m = \bar{a} + \bar{b} d_i + r_{mtr}.
$$

The residual of the regression, $r_{mtr}$, represents the residual market factor, i.e. the overall market risk corrected for the influence of exchange rates. Inserting $r_{mtr}$ from equation (3) into equation (2) gives

$$
(4) \quad r_i = \alpha_i + \beta_i d_i + \gamma_i r_{mtr} + \varepsilon_i,
$$

where $\alpha_i = a_i + \gamma_i \bar{a}$ and $\beta_i = b_i + \gamma_i \bar{b}$. Thus, $\beta_i$ summarizes direct and indirect components of exchange rate exposure, whereas the coefficient $\gamma_i$ on $r_{mtr}$ remains the same as on $r_{mtr}$ in equation (2).

One may argue that it is precisely the incremental effect of exchange rate movements not covered by market risk, i.e. of $b_i$ in equation (2), which is of particular interest here, because it represents the firm-specific component of exchange rate exposure. However,
a firm should be interested in hedging the risk of total potential value changes resulting from exchange rate changes, irrespective of whether these changes affect the common risk of all firms or the risk of the individual firm only. After all, in our study we are, by way of aggregating individual data, primarily interested in exchange exposure faced by the German economy as a whole, not in marginal exposure of particular firms. From these points of view, exposing the relevant currency risk by way of orthogonalization seems to be an adequate strategy which has been followed by some authors before.²

Augmented CAPM specification of exposure estimation regression overlooks the fact that further macroeconomic factors besides exchange rates can influence individual returns. For instance, a depreciation might be related to some expansionary monetary policy that simultaneously could have a positive impact on economic activity of domestic firms (Dornbusch, 1976). From the more general viewpoint of financial and macroeconomic theory, Gavin (1989) provided a framework that shows how exchange rates and stock returns interact, and how they react to changes in interest rates, output, and, in particular, to anticipated and unanticipated changes of monetary and fiscal policy (see also Blanchard, 1981, for a related work).³ From the viewpoint of financial economics, a

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² However, there seems to be some confusion as to what kind of orthogonalization should be used in econometric tests of the Adler-Dumas framework. Most applications we are aware of proceed in the manner described above (Doukas et al. 1999, Aveyannis and Ofek, 2001, Griffin and Stulz, 2001, Bris et al. 2002, Priestley and Odegaard, 2002, among others), whereas Jorion (1991) proposed to orthogonalize exchange rates, i.e. he employed the reverse regression by regressing exchange rates on market portfolios, and he used the residual from this regression as orthogonalized exchange rates which he included in the exposure regression in addition to total market risk. This approach is counterintuitive and does not coincide with the usual way of orthogonalization known from multi-factor APT modelling. It is also misleading as it does not solve the problem of “hidden” exposure covered and priced in overall market risk. The estimated parameter on orthogonalized exchange rates, i.e. estimated exposure, is even identical to estimated exposure of unorthogonalized exchange rates of equation (2) in reversed regressions, whereas the coefficient of market risk would change its value (see (4) and substitute variables accordingly). Motivated by related work of Choi and Prasad (1995), Glaum et al. (2000) followed the way described in Jorion (1991). Not surprisingly, they did not find any significant “residual” exposure for German data. From this, they erroneously draw the conclusion that estimating “total” exchange rate exposure (in the sense of equation (1)) would be a better way of proceeding.

³ It should be noted, however, that there are good reasons for neglecting potential problems of endogeneity in our specification, since left-hand side variables, i.e. corporate returns, are observed at the individual
well known strategy for using controls for such disturbing macroeconomic influences is the application of “Arbitrage Pricing Theory” (APT), pioneered by Ross (1976), and already introduced by Jorion (1991) to the literature on exchange exposure.\(^4\) In our econometric model, we apply the multi-factor equation of the APT model\(^5\), according to which the variation of stock returns is explained by a K-factor model of the form

\[ r = \mu + Bf_k + \varepsilon, \]

where \( r \) is the vector of returns in N stock prices, and \( f_k \) is a vector of K (unanticipated) factors, of which only the (residual) market factor and exchange-rate fluctuations were used in previous augmented CAPM specifications of the exposure regressions.\(^6\) \( B \) is a NxK matrix of factor sensitivities to the K factors.

There is no general rule for selecting relevant macroeconomic risk factors. According to the “discounted cash flow model”, which assumes that prices of assets are determined through their expected discounted dividend payments, factors have to be selected that are potentially responsible for the determination of these payments. Inspired by factors proposed by Chen et al. (1986), who pioneered the empirical approach of estimating the APT, we include a survey indicator of the German business climate, the inflation rate, the term structure, a (residual) market factor, and, in particular, the US dollar, representing the most important source of German exchange rate risk. Since only unexpected components of macroeconomic time series can influence asset returns in efficient capital markets, we calculate unexpected variation of all variables applying ARMA- and ARIMA-filtering techniques. In order to capture the (residual) market risk that is not ex-

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explained by other systematic risk factors, we follow the procedure suggested by McElroy and Burmeister (1988) described above. Therefore we include the residual market factor that is represented by the residual of an OLS-regression of the market return on the unexpected components of macroeconomic variables (which is a generalization of equation (3)). Now equation (4) can be extended to the specification of an APT exposure regression which looks as follows:

\begin{equation}
 r_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i d_t + \gamma_i \bar{r}_{mt} + \delta_i f^u_t + \varepsilon_{it},
\end{equation}

where \( f \) represents a vector of macroeconomic variables, and the superscript \( u \) denotes unexpected components.\(^7\)

We extend previous approaches by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of company firm values using fixed company effects\(^8\) which might arise due to particular features not observable in the data (management, reputation, etc.). With individual DAX companies available, we stack individual time series and run each of presented specifications (1), (2), (4) and (5) as systems of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). SUR considers correlations of disturbances across companies and leads to GLS estimation of the whole system. Stacking companies allows several tests as well as estimation of aggregate exposure: 1) is \( \alpha = \alpha \) for every company \( i \) (test for unobserved heterogeneity)? , 2) the testable restriction \( \beta = \beta \) for every \( i \) gives an estimate of aggregate stock market exposure, 3) if the restriction \( \gamma = \gamma \) holds, then the universe of all German DAX companies would share a common overall market risk, and 4) if \( \delta = 0 \) for every \( i \), then APT could be restricted to augmented CAPM.

Even after controlling for macroeconomic risks, unobservable macroeconomic and financial changes may result in unstable currency exposure. Moreover, exposure reflects expectations of investors which do not depend on the whole history of financial markets,

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\(^7\) Not surprisingly, testing ARIMA models for the DM/dollar rate as well as for market risk factors has led to the conclusion that their (short-term) time series behaviour is well described by a random walk. Thus, we treat returns of the DM/dollar rate and of the market factors as unexpected components. Note missing superscripts in equation (5).

\(^8\) We do not test for random effects because our primary goal is to achieve consistent results of the exposure parameters needed in the second stage of the estimation procedure (to be discussed below).
but rather on limited information sets. Thus, estimations should be time-varying, and they should give much more weight on recent observations. Accordingly, we estimate equation (5) using moving window regressions, with each additional rolling sample giving a new estimate $\beta_i$. \(^9\)

Most applications of exchange rate exposure models are based on two-stage procedures, pioneered by the work of Jorion (1990). In the standard first stage, by running N time series regressions, the stock returns of a sample of N companies are regressed on the exchange rate within an augmented CAPM discussed above (see equation (2)). Second-stage specifications then consist of regressing exchange rate exposure $h_i$ on indicators of foreign involvement, or other determinants of exposure discussed above. We extend this procedure by performing moving APT multifactor models, thereby employing panel information of company returns. Disposing of resulting time-varying exposures $\beta_i$ (instead of $\beta_i$ or $h_i$) in second-stage regressions allows us to focus on panel data and time series instead of cross sections to analyse the (macro-)economic determinants of exchange rate exposure.

### 4. Data

Our sample of stocks includes 28 leading German corporations comprising the DAX (the leading index of the Frankfurt stock exchange) on the 31\(^{\text{st}}\) of March 1995.\(^{10}\) They represent about 70 % of total turnover in German stocks during the sample period.\(^{11}\)

Monthly returns for the period from January 1977 through March 1995 are adjusted for dividends, capital increases and splits according to adjustment factors obtained from

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\(^9\) As only unanticipated realizations enter the APT multifactor model, unexpected components of all explanatory variables are calculated using residuals from ARIMA models for each rolling sample.

\(^{10}\) In order to take advantage of a balanced panel, VIAG and Henkel had to be excluded as their returns were not available for the whole estimation period.

KKMDB, i.e the “Karlsruhe Data Base for Financial Time Series” (“Karlsruher Kapital- marktdatenbank”).\textsuperscript{12}

Macroeconomic risks are based on the following variables:

- **Business climate**: Monthly change rate of the “ifo business climate” ("ifo-Geschäftsklimaindex"), an acknowledged German leading business cycle indicator published by CESifo (Munich).

- **Inflation**: Monthly rate of change in the German consumer price index ("Lebenshaltungskostenindex") calculated by the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt).

- **Term structure**: Difference between the 10-year rate on German government bonds and the 1-month money market rate, both calculated by Deutsche Bundesbank (Frankfurt).

- **Exchange rate**: We use closing prices of the “Deutsche Mark (DM)/ US dollar” exchange rate at the Frankfurt foreign exchange market. As our objective is to examine the particular importance of the US dollar for German stock companies, we refrain from using trade-weighted averages of different currencies, as was proposed by Jorion (1990, 1991), and applied by Bodnar and Gentry (1993) and others.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} KKMDB was supported by the German National Science Foundation (DFG, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) to provide a file of German stock prices and performance indices for scientific use. For further information see \url{http://finance.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de/Forschung/kkmdb.html}.

\textsuperscript{13} The use of trade-weighted indices was proposed by Jorion (1990, 1991) who analysed US exposure. In the US, however, there is no single currency which is as important as the US dollar for German or European economies. In Germany, the US dollar clearly is the centre of investors’ attention, as can be seen from perpetual and recurrent comments in newspapers, even very recently, i.e. at a time when a majority of German contracts are factorized in domestic currency, i.e. in euro: “Up or down, euro leaves exporters complaining” (International Herald Tribune, May 9, 2003), “Anleger verkaufen Exportwerte. Aufwertung von Yen und Euro trüben Gewinnaussichten japanischer und europäischer Firmen” (“Investors sell shares of export-oriented companies. Appreciation of yen and euro obscure expected profit of Japanese and European firms” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 23, 2003). From this quotations, note the relevance of US dollars as "euro" always refers to US-dollar/euro. Moreover, note the high relevance of the DM/dollar rate for the euro, as it was the key currency in Europe, and its share amounted to 33.07 percent (second largest share: French Franc, 20.28 percent) of the basket of currencies constituting the ecu, i.e. the “synthetic” currency preceding the euro.
The overall German market risk is based on the DAFOX (“Deutscher Aktien-Forschungs-Index”), which is a Laspeyres performance index including all 30 DAX corporations as a subset (see Göppl and Schütz, 1993, for details). It was generated for scientific research purposes in order to dispose of a broader index of overall German stock market portfolio than the one provided by the DAX, which only consists of German blue chips (source: KKMDB).

Indicators of foreign involvement are available as shares of exported and imported goods and services in German GDP (West Germany, source: Statistisches Bundesamt). This allows us to consider the burden of (imported) input costs as well, an issue that is often neglected in empirical studies which mainly limit their focus to foreign sales.

5. Results

5.1. Direction and Magnitude of Exposure

We compare exposure estimates of augmented CAPM and APT-based models for different periods of time in Tables 1 to 3. Our sample consists of monthly returns of 28 DAX companies for the time period January 1977 to March 1995, leading to 6132 observations. The sample period lies well beyond the beginning of floating exchange rates in 1973 and well ahead the introduction of the euro in 1999. This selection avoids potentially misleading results due to adjustment problems after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system described by Bartov, Bodnar and Kaul (1996), or because of anticipating investment decisions in the face of a forthcoming introduction of the euro (see Bartram and Karolyi, 2003).

In Table 1, column (1), estimates of the augmented CAPM reveal that company-specific effects turn out to be insignificant. Evidently, observed heterogeneity measured by company-specific exposure \( h_i \) and company-specific influences from market factors render control for unobserved heterogeneity meaningless. All company estimates of exchange rate exposure have a positive sign, and 12 of them are significant. As regards market betas, individual estimates of overall market influences range between 0.79 (RWE, a former energy utility) and 1.32 (Daimler, car production).

In Table 1, column (2), we test for common exposure, identical to all DAX companies. This hypothesis is not rejected. Exposure is highly significant and estimated to be 0.172.
Thus, for the period 1977 to 1995, an increase of the DM/US dollar-exchange rate by 10 percent (i.e. a depreciation of domestic, i.e. German, currency) on average increased stock market values of German companies by 1.7 percent.

Table 1, column (3), additionally restricts individual coefficients of overall market portfolio risk to be identical for all companies. The aggregate estimate is 1.072, indicating overall offensive behaviour of German DAX companies in the long run. However, testing the restriction shows that the hypothesis of a common parameter has to be rejected (see footnote of Table 1 for details of hypothesis testing). The estimate of exchange rate exposure remains almost unchanged (0.168 instead of 0.172).

Finally, specification (2) is replicated using the overall market factor $r_m$ instead of the residual market factor $\tilde{r}_m$. Indeed, for reasons discussed in Section 3, using this specification leads to insignificance of exchange rate exposure. Thus, we can conclude that exchange rate exposure is an important determinant of German stock values, but that it would not show up in standard residual exposure models based on overall market risk.

General market risk presumably has more than one dimension. Table 2 controls for further macroeconomic factors within the framework of an APT-based multifactor model. Table 2, column (1), presents unrestricted\textsuperscript{14} estimates. At a first glance, results do not differ much from corresponding column (1) of Table 1: Now 26 out of 28 company exposures have a positive sign (and 8 of them are significant instead of 12 in Table 1), and the range of market betas is almost the same as before (ranging between RWE’s 0.79 and Daimler’s 1.34).\textsuperscript{15} However, inspecting column (2) shows that the aggregate estimate of exchange rate exposure is only 0.139 (instead of 0.172), indicating some omitted variable bias of the augmented CAPM specification, i.e. when other macroeconomic factors were ignored.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} As before, tests show insignificance of company-specific fixed effects.

\textsuperscript{15} Company-specific exposures and sensitivities to overall market factors are presented in Tables C,D of the Appendix.

\textsuperscript{16} The bias will be become more conclusive when different estimation periods are considered (see Table 3 discussed below).
Table 2, column (3), shows that sensitivity to overall market risk remains almost unchanged compared to CAPM in Table 1. In column (4), company-specific sensitivities to other macroeconomic factors are restricted to be identical to some aggregate estimate. Estimated parameters are highly significant, indicating that restricting APT to CAPM would not be justified by the data. Directions of influence are in line with usual economic reasoning. First, (non-anticipated) inflation has a negative impact on stock market returns. This might imply that investors expect a negative impact of increasing money depreciation on company profits. The negative parameter of changes of the term structure is in line with the rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure, as an increase in the term structure implies the expectation of increasing future interest rates, and therefore a heavier discounting of future profits. The parameter estimate of the ifo business climate indicator has a positive sign, confirming its role as acknowledged leading economic indicator for German companies.

Table 3 reveals that exchange rate exposure is not stable over time. To show changing parameter estimates, we divide our sample into four different, rather heterogeneous subperiods. The situation of the first period, 1977 to 1979, is characterized by a well-performing German economy and appreciation of the Deutsche Mark. The DM/dollar-exchange rate fell from 2.40 at the beginning of 1977 to 1.70 in December 1979. The next six years, 1980 to 1985, are predominated by the second oil price shock and the recession in 1981/82, and a sustainable depreciation of the Deutsche Mark against the dollar, reaching its peak in March 1985, when the DM/dollar rate was 3.36. After the so-called Plaza Agreement reached in September 1985 by the G-5 countries (France, Japan, West Germany, the UK and US), on a need to adjust current exchange, the time span 1986 to 1990 was characterised by a now strongly depreciating dollar. The DM/dollar rate fell to 1.50 at the end of 1990. The final period, 1991 to 1995, includes the time after German unification with a relatively stable but low DM/dollar rate (fluctuating around 1.60, maximum: 1.82, minimum: 1.37).

Table 3 shows aggregate exposure\textsuperscript{17} to DM/dollar movements estimated from statistically preferred specifications of previous tables, i.e. along column (2) of Tables 1 and 2. For reasons of comparison, we also include measurements of total exposure based on

\textsuperscript{17} Company-specific estimates are presented in Tables C,D (Appendix).
bivariate regression (1). Looking at APT-based specifications, estimated exposure varied intensely from -0.308 in 1980/1985 to 0.447 during the time period 1991 to 1995. The estimate of the period 1980 to 1985, i.e. the period of a very strong dollar and deep recession, was the only period with a negative exposure. The estimate (−0.308) indicates that a 10 percent increase of the DM/dollar exchange rate has led to a 3.1 percent fall of DAX stock returns. Thus, it seems as if further depreciation of the Deutsche Mark against the US dollar shied away investors during the space of 1980 and 1985, whereas other analogous times of a relatively strong dollar (or weak DM) had stimulating effects on the German economy.

Table 1: Estimation of exposure using augmented CAPM, 1977-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(2')</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Test of common alpha 1)</td>
<td>0.0081** (0.0005)</td>
<td>0.0081** (0.0005)</td>
<td>0.0081** (0.0005)</td>
<td>0.0005 (0.0005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;α_i = α&quot; not rejected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test of common exposure 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test of common market risk 3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of r_m instead of ( \bar{r}_m )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of companies with positive exposure: 28 (significant: 12),</td>
<td>0.172** (0.014)</td>
<td>0.168** (0.014)</td>
<td>- 0.002 (0.014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of companies with negative exposure: 0 &quot;β_i = β&quot; not rejected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \beta )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>company specific, range: 0.79 (RWE) - 1.32 (Daimler)</td>
<td>1.071** (0.010)</td>
<td>company specific, range: 0.79 (RWE) - 1.32 (Daimler)</td>
<td>&quot;γ_i = γ&quot; rejected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \gamma )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \bar{R}^2 )</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>0.529</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Sample: 28 DAX companies, 1977:01-1995:03, (6132 observations). See the text for estimation details. **) denotes significance at 1 percent level. Restrictions are tested using F-Tests: 1) test for unobserved company effects, 2) (2) is tested against (1), 3) (3) is tested against (2). Corresponding F-statistics: 1) F = 0.79, 2) F=1.10, 3) F = 5.36. Critical values: F(27, ∞, 5%) =1.46, F(27, ∞, 1%) = 1.69.
Table 2: Estimation of exposure using APT multifactor model, 1977-1995

Model: $r_t = \alpha + \beta_1 d_t + \gamma_1 \bar{r}_m + \delta_1 \lambda_i + \delta_2 i_t + \delta_3 c_t + \varepsilon_t$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.0083** (0.0005)</td>
<td>0.0083** (0.0005)</td>
<td>0.0083** (0.0005)</td>
<td>0.0083** (0.0005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; $\alpha_i = \alpha $&quot; not rejected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>number of companies with positive exposure: 26 (significant: 8)</td>
<td>0.139** (0.014)</td>
<td>0.136** (0.014)</td>
<td>0.135** (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number of companies with (insignificant) negative exposure: 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>company specific, range: 0.79 (RWE) - 1.34 (Daimler)</td>
<td>company specific, range: 1.072** (0.010)</td>
<td>1.073** (0.010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; $\gamma_i = \gamma $&quot; rejected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_1, \delta_2, \delta_3$</td>
<td>company specific</td>
<td>company specific</td>
<td>company specific</td>
<td>$\hat{\delta}_1 = -2.06 **, \hat{\delta}_2 = -1.78 **, \hat{\delta}_3 = 0.33 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{R}^2$</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>0.522</td>
<td>0.519</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 28 DAX companies, 1977:01-1995:03 (6132 observations). See the text for estimation details. ** denotes significance at 1 percent. Restrictions are tested using F-Tests: 1) test for unobserved company effects, 2) (2) is tested against (1), 3) (3) is tested against (2), 4) (4) is tested against (3). Estimated F-statistics: 1) $F = 0.76$, 2) $F = 1.21$, 3) $F = 5.07$, 4) $F = 1.39$. Critical values 1)-3) $F(27, \infty, 5\%) = 1.46, F(27, \infty, 1\%) = 1.69$, specification (4): $F(91, \infty, 5\%) = 1.27$. 

17
Table 3: Comparison of exposure models for different sample periods

Estimates of exchange rate exposure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total exposure (^1)</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.114*</td>
<td>-0.180*</td>
<td>0.401**</td>
<td>0.224*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual exposure:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augmented CAPM (^2)</td>
<td>0.172**</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>-0.268**</td>
<td>0.526**</td>
<td>0.263**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APT-based (^3)</td>
<td>0.139**</td>
<td>0.057**</td>
<td>-0.308**</td>
<td>0.296**</td>
<td>0.447**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Estimation models: \(^1\) Based on equation (1), \(^2\) based on equation (4), restriction as Table 1, col. (2), \(^3\) based on equation (5), restriction as Table 2, col. (2). *, **) denote significance at 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
Table 3 allows us to compare “total” exposure with “residual” exposure either from multi-factor specifications or from augmented CAPM modelling. As macroeconomic factors are significantly different from zero in specification (5), we may conclude that estimates both for total exposure and for estimates based on augmented CAPM suffer from omitted variable biases. The bias can be substantial, as can be seen, for instance, from the time period 1980 - 1985, when total exposure was -0.18, whereas multi-factor exposure was -0.31, or from the period 1986 - 1990, when exposure from augmented CAPM was 0.53, whereas the APT-based estimate amounts to 0.30.

Figure 1 displays aggregate time-varying exposures from moving window regressions. The specification is based on equation (5), where company-specific exposures and company-specific macroeconomic effects are restricted to be identical to corresponding aggregate parameters (as presented in Table 2, column (4)). These estimates do not differ significantly from statistically superior results without such a restriction (compare columns (2) and (4) of Table 3). Rolling samples cover a time span of 48 months. Estimated exposures of each rolling regression period are displayed at the month of the midterm period. Thus, the first observation in Figure 1 presented for December 1978 represents estimated exposure of the estimation period 1977:01 – 1980:12, the last observation dated March 1993 covers the period 1991:04 – 1995:03 (note that this last period almost coincides with the last period analysed in Table 3). Figure 1 illustrates previous estimates from Table 3 in more detail. The graph nicely exhibits the time-varying nature of the German “dance with the dollar” which implies, for instance, that an appreciating dollar (relative to Deutsche Mark) temporarily entails decreasing company returns (as in 1980 to 1985), and at other times implied increasing values of German companies. A noticeable drop of exchange rate exposure not detectable in estimations of longer time periods happened around 1990, i.e. the time of the fall of the Iron Curtain.

Before we analyse the determinants for the time-varying exposure in more detail, we may conclude that the assumption of a stable currency exposure is not justified. This result

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18 Attempts to estimate individual parameters for each company and for each rolling sample turned out to be unfeasible due to convergence problems of sample-specific ARIMA modelling and singularity problems.

19 This finding confirms previous results based on total exposure put forward independently of each other by Glaum et al. (1990) and Entorf (2000). The general time pattern of exposure presented there roughly coin-
does not necessarily come as a surprise, as currency exposure interacts with overall market portfolio in augmented CAPM or APT-based specifications of which we already know the stylised fact that market betas (i.e. $\gamma$ in our notation) are not stable over time.\textsuperscript{20}

Figure 1: Time-varying exchange rate exposure in Germany

Note: Estimates are based on moving window regressions of APT-multifactor specifications, see equation (5) and Tables 2, 3. See the text for estimation details.

cides with the one presented in Figure 1, but levels differ and curves appear to be more erratic when they are based on total exposure.
\textsuperscript{20} Early evidence on beta-instability dates from the 1970s (see, for instance, Blume 1975). More recent evidence using more sophisticated tests is reported in, e.g., Bos and Newbold (1984) and Gonzales-Rivera (1997). See Table D (Appendix) for company-specific variations in our sample.
5.2. Determinants of Exposure

Costs and benefits of a weakening dollar differ between firms. Exporters like car producers suffer from appreciation of domestic currency relative to the dollar, whereas companies which ground their production on a high share of inputs factorized in US dollars (like energy utilities) would realize unexpected windfall profits. Studies analysing determinants of exposure, in particular when they are based on data at the company level, focus on foreign sales but often ignore exchange-rate dependent costs from importing inputs. As we are interested in estimating and analysing the aggregate role of exposure in Germany, we use both export shares and import shares of (West) German GDP in order to analyse the dual and ambivalent role of exchange rate movements for the German economy. From the viewpoint of a representative firm operating in a world-wide economy, we expect that in situations dominated by the interests of foreign sales (German exporters), there will be a positive impact from depreciation of the domestic (German) currency on the firm value, whereas the opposite would apply in situations which are characterized by a relative strong dependency on the costs coming from imports. Thus, we expect exposure to have a positive sign in situations of dominating exports, and to be negative during periods of relatively high imports. As Germany for the most part had a surplus in its trade balance, it is well described by the situation of a net exporter, and we expect a positive sign for exports and a negative sign for imports in second-stage regressions devoted to the analysis of determinants of exposure.

Firm values are affected by costs of adjustment. The role of adjustment costs caused by the order of magnitude of exchange rate movements has received surprisingly little attention in the literature.21 Theoretical analysis shows that profits and firm values may be a

21 Only a few articles test and estimate nonlinearities in exposure models. Whereas Miller and Reuer (1998) and Andren (2001) tested for exposure of quadratic and cubic macro-price changes with insignificant or weak results, Bartram (2002) performed several tests for nonlinearities with and without structure and confirmed the need to model nonlinear exposure by referring to significance of cubic terms. Results by Priestley and Odegaard (2002) point to the conclusion that exporters are subject to nonlinear exposure but importers are not. Our testing strategy differs from that of quoted articles in various aspects and is based on different data sets. Closest to our approach, Miller and Reuer (1998), Andren (2001) and Koutmos and Martin (2003) focus on asymmetric adjustment to depreciations and appreciations, but performed one-stage estimations based on (linear) dichotomous indicators of asymmetry make it necessary to analyse 9 possible outcomes for ex-
convex function of the exchange rate (see Franke 1991, Sercu and Vanhulle 1992, and DeGrauwe 1994, among others). Convexities can arise because of costly adjustments of international portfolios, or when volatile exchange rates affect uncertainty of future prices of exported or imported goods, among others. For instance, underestimating the risk of an exchange rate change might facilitate over-expansion of foreign indebtedness exposing firms to high costs when exchange rates do change. Moreover, marketing investments in foreign markets (German car producers in the US, for instance) and other entry costs might become sunk costs when a future appreciation of the domestic currency undermines the competitiveness of exporting corporations. Motivated by the fact that a high percentage of firms use hedging strategies to circumvent such costs of adjustment, several recent papers focus on hedging and reduced risk stemming from the use of forward contracts, options or other hedging strategies, but they neglect to say that there might be substantial costs of hedging, and that the cost of hedging depends on the exchange rate itself (see Giddy and Dufey, 2003, for strategies of managing corporate foreign exchange risk and related costs). The price of an option, for instance, increases convexly with the expectation for a currency’s volatility because of inherent leverage effects: the more volatile, the higher the price.

Our paper takes account of exchange rate adjustment costs by modelling exposure in dependence of exchange rate variation. Moreover, in line with Franke (1991), who assumed the exchange rate to be mean reverting, and motivated by confirming empirical evidence found by Engel and Hamilton (1990), Frankel and Rose (1996), Sweeney (2001), inter alia, we test the hypothesis that firm values are influenced by the absolute distance of the exposure such that structural interpretations are difficult to derive. Koutmos and Martin (2003) also employed conditional heteroskedasticity of error terms of estimated sector stock market returns, but they do not consider higher moments in their CAPM augmented market model.

Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) report that in comparative samples of US and German firms, 78% of German firms compared to 57% of US firms make use of derivatives in risk management. More recently, Bartram et al. (2003) present international evidence on financial derivatives usage for a sample of 7,292 non-financial firms. Across all 410 German firms in the sample, there were only 44.9 percent using derivatives in general, while 36.8 percent use currency derivatives. Corresponding international numbers for all firms of the sample from 48 countries, 59.8% and 43.6%, respectively, show that such practices seem to be less widespread in Germany than elsewhere.
change rate from its long-run mean. More precisely, based on previous considerations on adjustment costs and convexities, we expect that a growing absolute distance between exchange rates (levels) and their expected long-run mean (or median) \( |D_t - m(D_t)| \) would lead to increasing costs and reduced corporate values, respectively. If this hypothesis is true, exchange rate exposure, which measures the extent of changed firm values with respect to changes in exchange rates, should decrease with rising \( |D_t - m(D_t)| \), possibly in a non-linear functional form.

Table 4 shows estimation results of the second-stage regressions. According to previous considerations, estimated exposures \( \beta_{it} \) are regressed on aggregate export and import shares of GDP and on the relative distance between the dollar and its expected long-run value. \(^{23} \) \(^{24} \) Corporate-specific fixed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity (management strategies such as individually different hedging practices, for instance). \(^{25} \) We stack individual time series and base second stage regressions on specification (6), i.e.

\[
\beta_{it} = \lambda_{i0} + \lambda_{i1} \text{exs}_t + \lambda_{i2} \text{ims}_t + f_1(D_t - m(D_t)) + \epsilon_{it},
\]

---

\(^{23} \) Companies are exposed to exchange rate risk when \( \beta_{it} \) is different from zero. At first thought, it seems natural to use absolute exposures \( |\beta_{it}| \) and regress them on potential explanatory factors of exposure. However, in order to interpret results in a meaningful way, it is necessary to analyse channels of influence of, for instance, increasing exports on company returns via the impact of \( \beta_{it} \). As is obvious from Table 3, a higher \( \beta_{it} \) does not automatically translate into higher company returns, as during 1980 - 1985 exposure was estimated to be negative. Thus, the sign of \( \beta_{it} \) is likewise important. Using absolute values instead of unchanged exposure would mask the possible result that during the period at the beginning of the 80ies some increasing export performance would have led to diminishing firm values, whereas in “normal” times (i.e. during all other time periods) German (average) company values would go up. Indeed, estimation results based on absolute values show switching signs for exports and imports during 1980 to 1985 (results available on request).

\(^{24} \) Table 4 is based on quarterly observations. Data on volumes of exports and imports for the whole estimation period are available only on a quarterly basis. Monthly observations on exposure and exchange rates are transformed to quarterly observations by merging last observations. Alternative frequency conversion by averaging monthly observations left parameter estimates almost unchanged.

\(^{25} \) Company-specific effects are significant for all specifications presented in Table 4.
which we use as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions, where \( \text{exs} \) and \( \text{ims} \) represent export share and import share, respectively. Individual \( \beta_i \) are obtained from moving-window first-stage panel regressions which consider company-specific APT factors (see equation (5)). As exposures \( \beta_i \) are estimated from moving windows, point estimates are allocated midway of each window, as displayed in Figure 1 (hence explanatory variables are matched to the same centre point of each window).

Imposing the restrictions \( \lambda_{1i} = \lambda_1 \) and \( \lambda_{2i} = \lambda_2 \) for all companies \( i \), column (1) of Table 4 confirms the hypothesis that an increasing importance of exports ceteris paribus leads to rising exposure, whereas a relative growth of imports diminishes it. Column (2) shows that estimated parameters do not arise as a statistical artefact due to some collinearity between export and import shares. Estimated parameters are surprisingly high at first glance: Looking at the estimate 6.84 for export share in column (1), an increase of the export share by one percentage point would lead to an increase of exposure by almost 0.07 on average. However, exports and imports almost always move in the same direction (both positively depend on fluctuations of world trade and the German integration in global business cycles; the correlation coefficient amounts to 0.54), such that the usual “ceteris paribus condition” has limited appeal in historical situations. Confirming results for \((\text{exs}-\text{ims})\) dispel potential doubts that the signs of exports and imports might arise as a spurious result of collinearity between both variables. Table 3, column (3), informs about the effect of aggregate foreign involvement, calculated as the sum of exports and imports in German GDP. In line with other results found in the literature, it can be concluded that the higher total foreign involvement is, the higher aggregate exposure of firms is.

\[ \text{exs} \text{ and } \text{ims} \]

\[ \beta_i \text{ are obtained from moving-window first-stage panel regressions which consider company-specific APT factors (see equation (5)). As exposures } \beta_i \text{ are estimated from moving windows, point estimates are allocated midway of each window, as displayed in Figure 1 (hence explanatory variables are matched to the same centre point of each window).} \]

\[ \text{Imposing the restrictions } \lambda_{1i} = \lambda_1 \text{ and } \lambda_{2i} = \lambda_2 \text{ for all companies } i, \text{ column (1) of Table 4 confirms the hypothesis that an increasing importance of exports ceteris paribus leads to rising exposure, whereas a relative growth of imports diminishes it. Column (2) shows that estimated parameters do not arise as a statistical artefact due to some collinearity between export and import shares. Estimated parameters are surprisingly high at first glance: Looking at the estimate 6.84 for export share in column (1), an increase of the export share by one percentage point would lead to an increase of exposure by almost 0.07 on average. However, exports and imports almost always move in the same direction (both positively depend on fluctuations of world trade and the German integration in global business cycles; the correlation coefficient amounts to 0.54), such that the usual “ceteris paribus condition” has limited appeal in historical situations. Confirming results for } (\text{exs}-\text{ims}) \text{ dispel potential doubts that the signs of exports and imports might arise as a spurious result of collinearity between both variables. Table 3, column (3), informs about the effect of aggregate foreign involvement, calculated as the sum of exports and imports in German GDP. In line with other results found in the literature, it can be concluded that the higher total foreign involvement is, the higher aggregate exposure of firms is.} \]
The next step is to test whether exposure observed for cross-sections of time series is line with the hypothesis of nonlinear adjustment costs, caused by departing from expected long-run dollar values. Trials not documented in Table 4 reveal that estimations based on the mean value of the sample period (which was 2.083 DM/ $) were statistically inferior to results based on the sample median (1.895). Thus, if taken literally, Table 4, cols (4) to (6), refer to results on “median reversion” instead of “mean reversion”. The use of $|D_t - m(D_t)|$ implies a piecewise linear dependence of exposure on the distance between the dollar and its long-run median, with the effect being symmetric around the median. Indeed, Table 4, column (4), shows a negative sign which implies that departing from the long-run median leads to a smaller $\beta$. Conditional on corresponding average long-run results (see Table 2), which show positive exposure estimates, this effect further implies a reduction of firm values, confirming the hypothesis of adjustment costs which increase with rising distance to expected long-run fundamentals.

Asymmetries and nonlinearities are accounted for in Table 4, cols (5) and (6). In addition to $|D_t - m(D_t)|$, a polynomial in $(D_t - m(D_t))$ of 5th order is fitted to the data (column (5)). The curvatures of $f(D_t - \text{median}(D_t))$ from Table 4, column (5) (incl. $|D_t - m(D_t)|$ ), and from Table 4, column (4), i.e. $-0.529|D_t - m(D_t)|$, are depicted in Figure 2. Effects are calculated for DM/dollar ratios $D_t$ ranging from 1.39 to 3.36, i.e. between extreme values of the sample period. We observe that assuming linear effects symmetric to the median fails when $D_t$ either becomes very small or very high. This conclusion is confirmed by a nonparametric approach presented in Table 4, column (6). Using dummy variables, estimations show that when the DM/dollar rate exceeds 2.70, then exposure values (and firm values) would be reduced by -0.545 with respect to the median reference dummy ($1.60 < $ \leq 2.00$), whereas the linearity assumption would predict a much more profound downward reaction. Analogous linear reactions holds for $D_t$ smaller than 1.60.
Table 4: Determinants of German Dollar Exposure, 1979-1992

Model: $\beta_{it} = \lambda_{it} + \lambda_{i} \text{exs}_i + \lambda_{i} \text{ims}_i + f_{i}(D_{it} - m(D_{i})) + \varepsilon_{it}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory determinants</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports/GDP (exs)</td>
<td>6.84**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7.68**</td>
<td>5.53**</td>
<td>5.41**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports/GDP (ims)</td>
<td>-10.47**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-8.52**</td>
<td>-4.17**</td>
<td>-4.33**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exs - ims</td>
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<td>7.26**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.20)</td>
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<tr>
<td>exs + ims</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>0.30**</td>
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<td>(0.06)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$f(D_{it} - m(D_{i}))$:</td>
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<td>$[D_{it} - \text{median}(D_{i})]$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.529**</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$&lt;$1.60</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>-0.119**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.033)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.00 &lt;$S \leq$ 2.30</td>
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<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>-0.216**</td>
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<td>2.30 &lt;$S \leq$ 2.70</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.365**</td>
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<tr>
<td>$&gt;$ 2.70</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.545**</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.029)</td>
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<td>Nonlinear component</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>$\sum_{j=2}^{S} \theta_j (D_{ij} - m(D_{i}))^j$</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>0.587</td>
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</table>

Notes: All estimates include fixed-company effects and are based on seemingly unrelated regressions. Estimation period: 1979:1 – 1992:4 (1568 quarterly observations). (Asymptotic) standard errors are given in parentheses. **) denotes t-values above 2.58 (conventional 1% significance level).
However, responses appear to be asymmetric. Effects from appreciations of domestic currency seem to be smaller than from depreciations. Koutmos and Martin (2003) argue that exporting firms (with net long positions, i.e. foreign currency receivables) may be inclined to hedge against domestic currency appreciations yet remain unhedged against domestic currency depreciations, whereas importers (with net short positions, i.e. with foreign currency payables) may be inclined to hedge domestic currency depreciations yet remain unhedged against domestic currency appreciations. Under the assumption that this reasonable description also holds for German companies, it seems as if German exporters were more successful in curbing losses from strong appreciations than importers in cutting losses from substantial depreciations.

**Figure 2: Departure from median values, piecewise linear and nonlinear effects**

![Chart](chart.png)

Note: Effects refer to \( f(D_t - \text{median}(D_t)) \), Table 4, cols (4), (5). See the text for details.
6. Conclusions

This article analyses value changes of stock market companies in response to exchange rate movements, with special focus on exposure of the German stock market in the face of variations of the US dollar. Due to its high involvement in international trade, the German case should be very well suited for testing the presence of currency exposure. The approach followed in this work extends the standard way of measuring exchange rate exposure in several ways (e.g. by using multi-factor modelling instead of augmented CAPM, application of moving window panel regressions, orthogonalization of overall market risk vis-à-vis currency risk), but the main innovation lies in testing implications of exchange rate adjustment costs for firm values and exposure. This issue is important, as reducing currency risks by implementing hedging strategies like use of forward contracts or options is costly, and costs increase with rising distance to benchmark values, which we test to be related to long-run expectations.

Based on time series data for German DAX companies, DM/dollar rates and macroeconomic factors, we find a rather unstable, time-variant exposure of German stock market companies. Linking estimated exposure to German trade, we arrive at results in line with previous outcomes known from the literature. We may conclude that in general (on average), German exposure is well described through the role of a net exporter, who benefits from the depreciation of domestic currency. Accordingly, estimations of time-varying exposure based on dollar risks have a positive sign with exception of the first half of the 1980ies, when a relatively high import dependency and a strong US Dollar changed the situation.

Our results confirm the hypothesis of significant adjustment costs. Estimates are in accordance with long-run mean (median) reversion and asymmetric adjustment costs. Deviations of exchange rates from their long-run values have a significant impact on exposure. We find that the larger is the distance of current exchange rates from their long-median, the lower are company values. Moreover, there is evidence that impact curves are nonlinear and asymmetric. Following arguments of Koutmos and Martin (2003), who reason that exporting firms may be inclined to hedge mainly against domestic currency appreciations (yet remain unhedged against domestic currency depreciations), whereas importers may be inclined to hedge domestic currency depreciations (yet remain unhedged against domestic currency appreciations), our results indicate that German exporters were more suc-
cessful in curbing losses from strong appreciations than importers in cutting losses from substantial depreciations.
7. References


Bris, A., Y. Koskinen, and V. Pons (2002), Corporate financial policies and performance around currency crises, mimeo, Yale School of Management and Stockholm School of Economics.


Engel, C. and J.D. Hamilton (1990), Long swings in the Dollar: Are they in the data and do markets know it?, American Economic Review 80, 689-713.


Table A: Descriptive Statistics: Stock values, returns and macroeconomic factors, monthly data, 1977:01 – 1995:03

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DAX company returns ($r_p$)</th>
<th>Average company returns ($\bar{r}_p$)</th>
<th>DM/US-$ (\bar{r}_p)$</th>
<th>DM/US-$, returns (\bar{r}_p)$</th>
<th>Interest rate term structure</th>
<th>Inflation</th>
<th>Business Climate (ifo)</th>
<th>Market risk (DAFOX)</th>
<th>DAFOX, returns</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.006855</td>
<td>0.006855</td>
<td>2.034474</td>
<td>-0.002287</td>
<td>0.009337</td>
<td>0.030984</td>
<td>0.930831</td>
<td>402.4090</td>
<td>0.007517</td>
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<td>Median</td>
<td>0.007217</td>
<td>0.009790</td>
<td>1.874063</td>
<td>-0.003938</td>
<td>0.014100</td>
<td>0.029400</td>
<td>0.940000</td>
<td>396.8200</td>
<td>0.009532</td>
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<td>Maximum</td>
<td>0.319689</td>
<td>0.141223</td>
<td>3.356831</td>
<td>0.103722</td>
<td>0.036000</td>
<td>0.074600</td>
<td>1.079000</td>
<td>809.7240</td>
<td>0.137507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>-0.411905</td>
<td>-0.249551</td>
<td>1.393340</td>
<td>-0.090260</td>
<td>-0.037600</td>
<td>-0.010000</td>
<td>0.745000</td>
<td>132.3030</td>
<td>-0.245858</td>
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<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>0.070578</td>
<td>0.052028</td>
<td>0.435809</td>
<td>0.034898</td>
<td>0.017685</td>
<td>0.016935</td>
<td>0.075759</td>
<td>215.0022</td>
<td>0.048610</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
<td>6132</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                | $\beta_{it}$ | $\overline{\beta}_{it}$ | $|\beta_{it}|$ | EX / GDP | IM / GDP | EX / GDP - IM / GDP | DM / $ |
|----------------|--------------|--------------------------|----------------|----------|----------|---------------------|--------|
| Mean           | 0.144        | 0.144                    | 0.312          | 0.332    | 0.292    | 0.050               | 2.083  |
| Median         | 0.120        | 0.118                    | 0.247          | 0.331    | 0.293    | 0.056               | 1.895  |
| Maximum        | 1.258        | 0.803                    | 1.258          | 0.388    | 0.327    | 0.077               | 3.357  |
| Minimum        | -0.897       | -0.514                   | 0.000          | 0.271    | 0.251    | -0.009              | 1.393  |
| Std. Dev.      | 0.375        | 0.313                    | 0.252          | 0.029    | 0.019    | 0.021               | 0.468  |
| Observations   | 1568         | 56                       | 1568           | 56       | 56       | 56                  | 56     |
### Table C: Exchange Rate Exposure of German DAX companies

<table>
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<tbody>
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<td>ALLIANZ AG</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
<td>-0.379*</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASF AG</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>-0.242*</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.283*</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAYER AG</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>-0.254**</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.190</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMW AG</td>
<td>0.197*</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.452*</td>
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<td>BAYER, VEREINS-BANK AG</td>
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<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.328**</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.148</td>
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<td>0.128</td>
<td>-0.589**</td>
<td>0.540**</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
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<td>-0.240</td>
<td>-0.310</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.260</td>
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<td>DAIMLER-BENZ AG</td>
<td>0.278**</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>-0.333**</td>
<td>0.559**</td>
<td>0.612**</td>
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<td>DEGUSSA AG</td>
<td>0.368**</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>-0.236</td>
<td>0.738**</td>
<td>0.632**</td>
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<td>0.065</td>
<td>-0.400**</td>
<td>0.580**</td>
<td>0.139</td>
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<td>DRESDNER BANK AG</td>
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<td>0.224*</td>
<td>-0.681**</td>
<td>0.225</td>
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<td>DEUTSCHE BAB-COCK AG</td>
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<td>0.029</td>
<td>-0.363</td>
<td>0.659**</td>
<td>0.361</td>
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<td>0.030</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.383**</td>
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<td>0.529*</td>
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Note: Estimations according to specification (5), unrestricted version (see Table 2, column (1)).
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Note: Estimations according to specification (5), unrestricted version (see Table 2, column (1)).