

Søby Kristensen, Kristian

Working Paper

Greenland, Denmark and the debate on missile defense: A window of opportunity for increased autonomy

DIIS Working Paper, No. 2004:14

Provided in Cooperation with:

Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen

Suggested Citation: Søby Kristensen, Kristian (2004) : Greenland, Denmark and the debate on missile defense: A window of opportunity for increased autonomy, DIIS Working Paper, No. 2004:14, ISBN 8776050319, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/84548>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.



DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

STRANDGADE 56 • 1401 COPENHAGEN K • DENMARK

TEL +45 32 69 87 87 • diis@diis.dk • www.diis.dk

**GREENLAND, DENMARK
AND THE DEBATE ON MISSILE DEFENSE**

A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
FOR INCREASED AUTONOMY

Kristian Soby Kristensen

DIIS Working Paper no 2004/14

© Copenhagen 2004

Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS

Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark

Ph: +45 32 69 87 87

Fax: +45 32 69 87 00

E-mails: diis@diis.dk

Web: www.diis.dk

Cover Design: Carsten Schiøler

Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi as

ISBN: 87-7605-032-7

Price: DKK 25.00 (VAT included)

DIIS publications can be downloaded

free of charge from www.diis.dk

Contents

Abstract.....	1
Introduction	2
The History of Greenland in Danish Security Policy: From Bargaining Chip to (uneasy) Partnership	4
The Upgrade Debate	10
The American and Danish positions.....	10
The Greenlandic Arguments and the Danish-Greenlandic debate.....	12
Conclusion.....	23
References	25

Abstract

This paper investigates the debate leading up to the joint Danish-Greenlandic decision to allow the US to upgrade its radar at Thule Air Base, ensuring its integration in the American missile defense. By analyzing how this debate is structured in the Danish Realm, the paper argues that the contentious history of the Air Base strengthens the moral position of the Greenlanders and provides them with valuable argumentative assets in the debate. This debate, the paper concludes, presents the Greenlanders with a window of opportunity facilitating negotiations with the Danish Government, the effect of which is further Greenlandic independence and increasing Greenlandic influence on security policy.

Dette working paper undersøger den dansk-grønlandske debat, der ledte op til beslutningen om at tillade USA at opgradere den amerikanske radar på Thule, således at den kan indgå i det amerikanske missilforsvar. Ved at analysere, hvordan debatten i Rigsfællesskabet er struktureret, viser paper'et, hvordan Thule basens historie styrker grønlændernes moralske position, og giver dem værdifulde argumenter i debatten. Paper'et konkluderer, at debatten om missilforsvar har givet grønlænderne en god mulighed for, igennem forhandlinger med den danske regering, at opnå både udvidet indflydelse på sikkerhedspolitikken og således også øget selvstændighed i Rigsfællesskabet.

Introduction

The increasingly concrete American plans for deployment of a missile defense system have internationally been a contentious subject both in political and academic circles, and the consequences of missile defense have been widely debated.¹ Equally, in both Greenland and Denmark there has for some time been interest in the possible role of the US- airbase at Thule in north-western Greenland in the American missile defense plans. This interest was by no means lessened when on December 18, 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell finally made a public request to upgrade the radar at Thule Air Base, ensuring that it could be integrated in the radar architecture on which the missile defense system depend.² The issue of missile defense thereby became a hot political topic in Denmark. While the formal authority to decide in which way to answer the United States is in the hands of the Danish Government, politically the issue was not entirely straightforward.

The large island of Greenland is the home of a small Inuit community, which since 1979 has enjoyed extensive independence from the central Danish authorities. Accordingly any answer on missile defense to the United States had to be negotiated with the Home Rule Government in Nuuk if it was to have any legitimacy.

These negotiations, however, were not going to be easy. The American presence in Greenland, dating back to WWII, is a contentious issue in the Danish-Greenlandic relationship. For the Inuit of Greenland, the experiences relating to the American defense areas stand out as symbols of past maltreatment by the colonial masters in Denmark. Especially the history of Thule Air Base epitomizes the past wrongdoings by the Danish state. Consequently the potential role of Thule Air Base in the American missile defense becomes a heated subject of debate in the Greenlandic – Danish relationship.

This debate is the topic of this paper. It is my basic argument that the American request to upgrade the radar at Thule presents the Greenlanders with a window of opportunity to further their strive towards independence. By referring to the embarrassing colonial past in the debate on missile defense, the Greenlanders put the Danish Government in an awkward and morally untenable position wherein it has difficulties denying the Greenlanders further

self-determination. The Greenlanders make the politics of embarrassment;³ by referring to embarrassing historical incidents the Greenlanders pave the way for future political gains.

As 'History' plays an important part in the Greenlanders' arguments in the debate, the paper will begin with a rather detailed account of the historical basis for the current situation. This will be followed by the actual empirical analysis of the missile defense debate. In the analysis I show how the Greenlandic politicians skillfully apply the history to question and thus undermine the morality of the Danish Government in the missile defense debate. Secondly I explain how the moral issues in the debate help the Greenlanders advance their own demands. The paper will illustrate that although the debate touches upon most of the issues related to missile defense, and is to a large extent orientated towards the global aspects of missile defense, the fundamental issue is neither the American bases in Greenland nor the international consequences of missile defense. These arguments play only an auxiliary role as tools with which to attack the opposition on the central issue; how to share authority between the Government of Denmark and the Home Rule Government.

In the end, the Greenlanders were rather successful and on the basis of their argumentative strategy negotiate substantial concessions from the Danish Government, changing the internal relationship in the Danish Realm and setting the stage for future developments.

The History of Greenland in Danish Security Policy: From Bargaining Chip to (uneasy) Partnership

The German occupation of the southern part of Denmark in 1940 marked the beginning of a change in Greenland's geopolitical position from one at the absolute periphery to a more central position. As the United States became more involved with the war effort in Europe, the need for an American presence in Greenland became more and more apparent. This led to the signing of an agreement between the United States and the Danish diplomatic representation in Washington in 1941, allowing the United States unlimited rights to establish military bases in Greenland.⁴

DANISH AND AMERICAN COLD WAR POLICIES

In the first years after WWII, the gut-feeling in Copenhagen was that Greenland would once more move to the periphery of the geopolitical atlas. The issue of immediate concern was thus to assert Danish sovereignty, and in due time put an end to – or at least minimize – the American presence in Greenland.⁵

The geopolitical realities of the Cold War however underscored the strategic importance of Greenland. First, the existing bases in the southern part of Greenland would play an important role in the case of major conflict between East and West in Europe. Second, the importance of the Arctic region increased, both as a staging area for retaliatory nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union, and as an important early warning site.⁶ This Arctic strategy of the United States emphasized the geostrategic importance of especially the northern part of Greenland. This new strategy resulted in 1951 in the construction of Thule Air Base, soon to be the most important of the United States bases in Greenland.⁷ Simultaneously, bilateral – though formally within the new NATO-framework – negotiations between Denmark and the United States were undertaken concerning the future arrangement of the defense of Greenland and a renegotiation of the 1941 agreement.

The result of these negotiations was the new so-called '1951 Agreement'.⁸ It gave the United States free movement "for its public vessels and aircrafts and its armed forces and

vehicles...between the defense areas through Greenland, including territorial waters, by land, air and sea”.⁹ The only limitation being “that every effort will be made to avoid any contact between United States personnel and the local population which the Danish authorities do not consider desirable”.¹⁰ Concerning the actual defense areas the rights conceded to the United States were considerable. The limitations are mostly of symbolic value, but nonetheless partake in maintaining formal Danish sovereignty.¹¹ Apart from that, the United States is more or less free to act as they see fit in the defense areas.¹²

The 1951 agreement is still in effect and outlines the legal framework regulating the United States defense activities in Greenland today. Formally speaking, the agreement gives extensive rights to the United States. In reality though, a working relationship has developed in which consultations and negotiations with Denmark are conducted before any major changes in the scope and function of the defense areas take place.¹³

The actual purposes of the defense areas have of course changed since 1951, and both their number and size have been reduced. This is even true of Thule Air Base, the only remaining defense area, which today functions as a radar facility – in essence the same function it would fulfill when incorporated in the missile defense. This is not to say that the base is of no importance. Thule Air Base has played, and continues to play, an important and integrated role in the early warning and space surveillance systems of the United States.¹⁴

Accordingly, Greenland and Thule possess a strategic value for Denmark. There is general consensus on the fact that Greenland was an important bargaining chip for Copenhagen in the alliance policies of the Cold War, which in principle is still the case.¹⁵ By ‘playing the Greenland card’ Copenhagen has been able to achieve concessions from the United States in areas where the political will in Denmark to follow suit with the rest of NATO has been lukewarm at the least.¹⁶

COLONIAL POLITICS: HOME RULE AND ‘DOUBLE POLICIES’

During the Cold War, developments in the status of Greenland within the Danish Realm took place as well – eventually questioning whether authority concerning foreign and security policies are located exclusively in Copenhagen. In fact, the American defense areas became a central and controversial issue in the relationship between Nuuk and Copenhagen. These

developments make it increasingly difficult for Copenhagen to independently formulate security and defense policies for Greenland.

The intimately intermingled histories of Home Rule and the consequences of the American defense areas to the Greenlandic population both take their beginning in the early 1950's. In 1953 as a consequence of an enlargement of Thule Air Base, a small community of *Inughuit* (Polar eskimoes) was, against their will, removed from their traditional settlement and hunting grounds and relocated further up the coast. No one paid much attention to this at the time, but it is an issue that recurrently has come back to haunt the Greenlandic-Danish relationship. Simultaneously in 1953, the status of Greenland within the Danish Realm changes. With an amendment to the Danish constitution, the colony of Greenland was incorporated into Denmark proper by attaining municipal status as a county in line with counties in southern Denmark.¹⁷

The change of status on the part of Greenland, also expressed a change in how Denmark deals with the indigenous Inuit community, until now living a very isolated and traditional life. Great effort was undertaken by the Danish authorities to modernize the Greenlandic society, to confer the material benefits of the modern Danish welfare state such as housing, social security, education opportunities etc. to the inhabitants of the island. The rationality of the Danish Government in effect changed from the one expressed in the 1951 Agreement, focusing on protection and isolation from external influences, to instead concentrating on accelerated integration and assimilation of the Inuit population into the Danish welfare state.¹⁸

Over time, and partly as a result of the modernization process, an increased political consciousness developed in Greenlandic society and together with that consciousness the wish for greater self determination. The push for self determination resulted in 1979 in the passing of the Home Rule Act, transferring substantial policy areas to the new Greenlandic authorities.

One of the few major policy areas where authority continued to be entirely located in Copenhagen was that of foreign policy. But even in this area an understanding developed that the Greenlandic community had a legitimate claim to participate in the formulation of foreign policy issues of importance for Greenland, and have their say in matters the Greenlanders deem important. In effect this incrementally led to a generally cooperative relationship between the Greenlandic and Danish authorities, where Greenlandic politicians participate in

the formulation and execution of, formally speaking, Danish foreign policy.¹⁹ This, however, is only the case in 'soft' foreign policy areas. In the case of security policy, the history of the relationship is quite different.

As noted earlier, Greenland's geopolitical position makes it important for the United States. This in turn makes it a valuable bargaining chip in Danish security policy, but nonetheless the American engagement in Greenland has sometime been felt as a liability in Copenhagen, initially in Denmark's relationship with other major powers (i.e. the Soviet Union) and in relation to the domestic opinion.²⁰ But the political self-awareness in Greenland increasingly makes the American presence on the island an issue between Greenland and Denmark.

During the Cold War, Denmark in effect secretly led two policies regarding nuclear weapons, publicly stating that there were no such weapons on Danish territory, including Greenland, while tacitly allowing the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in Thule.²¹ The Danish Government had secretly played the 'Greenland card', without the knowledge or consent of either the Danish Parliament or the Greenlanders. In 1968 this 'double policy'²² was in effect questioned when an American B-52 bomber carrying nuclear weapons crashed near Thule.

Understandably, this policy did not go well with the emerging Greenlandic political opinion. It led to mistrust and suspicion towards the Danish authorities, probably also in part contributing to the wish for further self determination.

Furthermore, in the 1980's, after the establishment of the Home Rule, the consequences of the American presence again were on the agenda. First, political discussions in Denmark concerning the possible role of the radar facilities at Thule Air Base in the SDI- project of the Regan-administration came to the forefront of the agenda. This debate quickly grew to concern itself with the more general role of Thule Air Base in the American war-fighting strategy towards the Soviet Union.²³ A central issue was whether its role as an early warning site would not in fact make it a likely target in an eventual superpower conflict, and thus jeopardize the safety of the Greenlandic population, again with neither their implicit nor explicit consent. This discussion offered for the first time the Home Rule Government a legitimate opportunity to express its demands to be consulted on and integrated into the security policy of Denmark, when of importance for Greenland.²⁴ Second, a book published in 1987 seriously challenged the official version of the story regarding the movement of the

Inughuit from Thule in 1953.²⁵ Officially the inhabitants willfully consented to the relocation, as a result of a decrease in wildlife and hunting opportunities, caused by activities at the base, but, as the book argues, in reality the inhabitants were forced to move by the Danish colonial authorities. In addition, persistent efforts have apparently been taken by the Danish authorities, both at the time of the relocation, and in the following decades to cover up the actual circumstances.²⁶

UNEASY PARTNERSHIP: THE PAST, POLITICS OF EMBARRASSMENT AND SELF DETERMINATION

The issue of the relocation of the Thule inhabitants has since the mid-80's been an issue in both the Danish political and judicial systems,²⁷ and has been an embarrassing subject for consecutive Danish governments. It, together with the other cases, shows how Denmark, from a Greenlandic point of view, has maliciously used Greenland as a bargaining chip, without the knowledge of the Greenlandic people, to please Denmark's alliance partners. And how this policy has in fact brought the Thule inhabitants unacknowledged hardship, and perhaps put the indigenous Greenlandic population as a whole in danger. This of course puts strain on the relationship between Nuuk and Copenhagen, as the Greenlanders feel they have borne the burden, whereas Denmark has reaped the fruits of the Danish Cold War policies.

These historical cases do not fit the profile Denmark wishes to present of itself to the world.²⁸ Therefore they become important tools for the Greenlandic politicians in various negotiations with Denmark, especially concerning self determination. Seen from Greenland the only way to avoid past incidents being repeated in the future, is to try to achieve the greatest possible degree of self determination, thus bringing themselves into a position where it is possible to influence or de facto veto Danish policy.

The politically most effective strategy for achieving this goal is by referring to past injustices, to make politics of embarrassment,²⁹ when dealing with Copenhagen. "[T]he use of the media, political lobbying and public relations campaigns to highlight the abuses of the state – has been effectively applied by...indigenous organizations in order to encourage government recognition of indigenous peoples distinct claims".³⁰ Accordingly, by referring to how Denmark acted towards its indigenous population in the past, in a way which presently is viewed by all parties as both embarrassing and unjust, and then equating the past with the present, the Greenlanders forcefully strengthen their argumentative position in discussions

with the Danish Government. This strategy is especially effective in relation to any aspect of Thule Air Base. The maltreatment of the *Inughuit* is indeed widely seen in Denmark as the blackest chapter in the history of Danish colonialism. Past maltreatment has been and continues to be a weighty argument for future self-determination. By using the history and making politics of embarrassment, the Greenlanders effectively use their moral authority³¹ in the negotiations with the Danish Government.

A lot of changes have thus taken place since 1951 in relation to the American defense areas in Greenland. At that time negotiations took place between two parties only; Denmark and the United States. The negotiations were in essence straightforward. Both parties had something the other wanted, and a workable solution was reached. Only later in the course of events do problems arise, mostly for the Danish Government, as the dubious morality of its double policy concerning the stationing of nuclear weapons and of its real course of action towards the *Inughuit* showed themselves. These incidents put the Danish state in a morally inferior position vis-à-vis the emerging Home Rule Government in Nuuk, who now is in a position to apply the Cold War history to achieve further self determination and further concessions from the Danish state, among others the right to participate in security policy decisions.

The negotiations concerning the American defense areas in Greenland, and their possible role in a missile defense, are thus not only conducted between Denmark and the USA. A third party, Greenland, has now a legitimate claim to participate in the negotiations as well. Denmark has to reach an agreement with both the United States and Greenland. The potential upgrade of the radar facilities at Thule naturally becomes a very important issue for the Greenlandic community.

In essence it is now no longer exclusively Denmark who has a Greenlandic card to play. Instead the Greenlanders, as a consequence of the history and their own political empowerment, are in possession of the Greenlandic card. And this is a card they can easily play in a negotiation situation where their opponent is in an ambivalent position. Denmark is interested in maintaining a working relationship with the Home Rule, but the government also has a strong wish to maintain its close relationship with the United States. These potentially conflicting goals create room for the Greenlanders to pursue the politics of embarrassment. How this is concretely done by the Greenlandic politicians, and with what purpose, the following analysis will show in detail.

The Upgrade Debate

The potential role of the radar facilities at Thule Air Base in relation to missile defense has been on the agenda, both in Denmark and in Greenland since 1999 when President Clinton decided to “deploy as soon as technologically possible.”³² The debate has often been rather speculative, as a formal request only arrived on December 18, 2002. And even after the request has actually been made, it was not entirely clear what role the airbase in Thule was going to play in the missile defense system, or indeed how the final missile defense system as such would look. It is certain, that at the moment at least, the physical consequences will be minor, in essence only a change of software.³³ Even though important international events have taken place since 1999,³⁴ the general structure of the debate in and between Denmark and Greenland has not fundamentally changed. The upgrade debate, or so my argument goes, is not about missile defense as such, nor is it about the role of the American presence in Greenland. It is essentially about the Danish – Greenlandic relationship. The public debate and subsequent negotiations give the Greenlanders an opportunity to forcefully state their claim for further self determination.

THE AMERICAN AND DANISH POSITIONS

Before the debate is analyzed in detail from the Greenlandic perspective, the following will shortly present the overall positions of the United States and Denmark. The United States followed the cooperative and consensual principles that have developed on how to interpret the 1951 Agreement, and the US formally asked permission from the Danish Government to make the necessary upgrades. The request was made public, and although the United States did not try to hide the fact that the sooner the answer (in anticipation of a positive one) would be given the better, the US fully appreciated the wish for a thorough public and democratic debate in Denmark and Greenland before any answer could be given.³⁵ The United States thus effectively withdrew from the debate, in essence making the issue a domestic one that had to be solved within the Danish Realm.

The Danish Government opened the debate by stating that any decision concerning the upgrade of radar facilities would be taken only after a thorough and public debate, and in full cooperation with the Home Rule Authorities, thus following the practice of other foreign policy areas.³⁶ To form the point of departure for the debate, the government produced a so-

called White Paper.³⁷ The stated purpose of the White Paper was to inform, in an impartial way, both the public and the decision makers about issues of importance in relation to missile defense and the possible consequences of an upgrade of the radar facilities at Thule.³⁸

The Danish Government argued on the basis of the White Paper that there were no costs associated with a positive reply. The White Paper in large parts follows the American arguments for missile defense. It states that both WMD and missile technology are indeed proliferating into the hands of actors against whom traditional diplomacy and deterrence are not viable political strategies – the magnitude of the threat is increasing – and a possible countermeasure is missile defense. The threat stems exclusively from irrational rogue states, with only a few missiles at their disposal, thus not threatening the inhabitants near Thule Air Base.³⁹ The actual architecture of the system will of course reflect the threat, and the system will thereby not in itself pose a threat to the strategic stability of the deterrence-based relationship between the major powers, indeed Russia even to some extent participates.⁴⁰ Missile defense accordingly makes sense from the American point of view.

The threat is, however, not exclusively directed towards the United States. Europe and Denmark are also potential targets, and therefore missile defense is in time supposed to cover ‘friends and allies’ as well. It is thus obviously, according to the White Paper, in Denmark’s narrow self interest to facilitate the construction of the defense system. Missile defense accordingly makes sense from the Danish point of view as well.⁴¹

These arguments were, however, not allowed to stand unopposed. Several elements of the White Paper were criticized or questioned: Will a missile defense lead to an arms race? Will an upgrade of Thule Air Base make it a likely bomb target? Will the US missile defense system work? These and other questions are not easily answered. But that is exactly the point, as the White Paper laid the foundation for the government’s arguments, and as the White Paper did not give an adequate explanation on the above-mentioned issues, that in turn made the government position open for attacks. Especially from Greenland, whose acceptance was publicly made an a priori condition for an acceptance of the American proposal by the Danish Government.

The Greenlandic Arguments and the Danish-Greenlandic debate

The government position on missile defense was indeed questioned by the Greenlandic politicians. The Greenlandic arguments in the debate, I will argue, can in fact be analyzed from two distinct but overlapping and mutually reinforcing dimensions, which together forcefully question and undermine the position of the Danish Government. The arguments of both dimensions draw upon the past by employing politics of embarrassment.

Analytically separating the arguments of the Greenlanders in the debate into these two dimensions serves a number of purposes and structures the actual empirical analysis. First, what I call the moral dimension show how the Greenlanders aptly apply and try to monopolize morally imbued concepts as ‘world peace’ and ‘democracy’ in their arguments. By monopolizing these concepts they attain the moral high ground in the debate. Second, the other dimension of the debate; the political dimension, contain the concrete political demands of the Greenlanders: Renegotiation of the 1951 Agreement, increased political influence on foreign and security issues in general, and financial compensation.

The strength of this approach is that, in addition to show *what* was important in the debate, it helps conceptualize *how* the end result came to be. Actually the Greenlanders got a fairly good result in the negotiations with the Danish state. The basic claim of the analysis is that this result became possible because the moralistic and historically based Greenlandic arguments succeeded in gaining them a speech-position in the debate from where a number of their more mundane political demands were difficult to turn down.⁴² How that came to be is the subject of the following.

A fundamental and initial concern in Greenland in relation to the possible integration of Thule Air Base into a missile defense system is to avoid a reenactment of the past in the form of double policy, secrecy and colonialism on the part of Copenhagen. It is an absolute conditionality for an upgrade of the radar facilities that the process leading up to any decision reflects Greenland’s status as a partner in the Danish Realm. Greenland wants to participate in the negotiations, and these negotiations are to be preceded by a thorough democratic debate – the only way to reach a decision that reflects the wishes of the Greenlandic people.⁴³ Both

parties thus agree that any decision only should be reached after a thorough democratic debate. By analyzing this debate, it is possible to find the major Greenlandic concerns in relation to the upgrade of the radar and to explore how they simultaneously play a role in the ongoing struggle for self-determination.

THE MORAL DIMENSION

The moral dimension of the Greenlandic arguments takes its point of departure by portraying the distinct identity and history of the Greenlandic indigenous population. The Inuit of Greenland have always lived an isolated life on the periphery of the political atlas, and consequently have neither participated in nor witnessed armed conflict on their territory. War and armed conflict are, it is argued, as such alien to the Inuit identity.⁴⁴ But now, suddenly, the Greenlandic community has to take part in a decision that very much has to do with war and armed conflict. It is a decision that they would rather not have to take, but as missile defense involves and affects the security of Greenland, and as history shows the Greenlanders that the government in Copenhagen can not always be trusted to manage the security of Greenland, the Greenlanders have to participate in the decision making process and tackle the issue of missile defense themselves.⁴⁵

With reference to this pacifist Inuit culture, a central demand from the Greenlandic politicians is, in the words of Hans Enoksen, Home Rule Chairman, that “the upgrade of the radar in no way may threaten world peace, nor initiate a new arms race”.⁴⁶ This view is also reflected by the Chairman for the Home Rule Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, Jensine Bertelsen, who states that Greenland will not allow the use of Greenlandic territory for any activity that might result in heightened military tension.⁴⁷ Greenland accordingly does not make the upgrade dependent upon its eventual narrow consequences for Greenland and Greenlandic security; instead, what is deemed important is “World Peace”. Thus, the Greenlanders take the moral high ground, they “assume our responsibility – not only towards ourselves, but also towards the rest of the world, a responsibility that commits us to seek the best possible answers.”⁴⁸ Bluntly put, the politicians argue that Greenland has to play its part in making the world safe and help avoid conflict and confrontation. If that includes opposing the American request for the use of the radar at Thule, then it will be opposed. Now the question is, how does this collide with the Danish position in the debate? At first glance there should to a large extent be symmetry between the Danish position, as for example expressed in the White Paper, and the concerns of the Greenlandic politicians.

In the first case the central question is of course, what will in fact be the consequences for “world peace” if the American missile defense plans becomes reality? As we have seen, the position of the Danish Government is clear, missile defense will have no negative consequences, and in fact the Danish Prime Minister has been quoted calling the American missile defense plans “a Project for Peace”.⁴⁹ But as stated earlier, during the debate, both in Denmark and in Greenland, the question whether the American missile defense plans can in fact be characterized as a peaceful project is raised. Both the intentions behind missile defense and the possible consequences are to a great length debated and discussed.

By the Danish Government, the missile defense project is pictured as a purely defensive system, focused on countering the threat from proliferation of both missile technology and WMD into the hands of unpredictable actors. Consequently missile defense will contribute to both peace and stability.⁵⁰ Some commentators, however, present the American missile defense plans as less benign, seeing them as part of a more or less hegemonic strategy aimed at maximizing American freedom of action,⁵¹ and thus not necessarily promoting neither peace nor stability. Others see the missile defense plans as only the first step towards a more comprehensive system entailing the militarization of space.⁵² Furthermore, the United States are currently testing a range of missile defense technologies, and together these technologies could potentially provide substantial protection against many more missiles than just the few presently contained in the arsenals of any given rogue state. If that is the case, it is argued that especially China and maybe also Russia would have to upgrade their strategic capability to ensure the continued credibility of their deterrence.⁵³ Following this logic, missile defense, instead of promoting peace, facilitates an arms race, either directly between the ‘old’ nuclear powers or indirectly a regional arms race in South-east Asia.

Whether these critical arguments are more in line with reality than the ones presented by the Danish Government is not the issue at stake here. What is important is that these arguments challenge the case made by the government: It is not certain that missile defense will not lead to a new arms race, neither is it certain that it will not threaten world peace. What, on the contrary, is certain is the fact that the information and the arguments presented by the Danish Government are easily questioned. This in turn opens up room for questioning the truthfulness of the Danish Government by the Greenlandic politicians.

The Greenlandic politicians are very unsatisfied with the information they receive from the Danish Government. A Greenlandic member of the Danish parliament calls, on the basis of the above-mentioned criticisms, the White Paper “feeble propaganda...without documentation, but filled with assertions”.⁵⁴ The criticism is furthermore aimed at the Danish civil service, who are accused of filtering information to the Home Rule Authorities and even passing on untrue information.⁵⁵ The dissatisfaction with the honesty of the Danish Government makes it a more central issue in the debate than that of missile defense proper, and thus how to respond to the American request.

To turn the debate from the issue of missile defense to the issue of honesty in the Danish administration and government is a powerful argumentative move by the Greenlandic politicians. First of all it questions whether the Danish Government truly intended to reach a decision in cooperation with the Home Rule Authorities on the basis of a genuine democratic debate.⁵⁶ This further strengthens the moral dimension of the Greenlandic position in the debate vis-à-vis the Danish Government by picturing the Greenlandic politicians as the only part actually seeking democratically to reach a decision. The Greenlanders come to stand out as being concerned with world peace and democracy, whereas the Danish Government is presented as immoral, only seeking to please the United States by securing an affirmative answer to the American request.

Secondly, this representation of the Danish Government fits very well with how the Danish Government is seen to have acted in the past. As stated earlier, the issue of Thule Air Base during the Cold War is still a sensitive issue. Accordingly, by presenting the actions of the present Danish Government as comparable with the actions of past governments, the Greenlanders have further reinforced their moral superiority. As argued by President of the ICC(Inuit Circumpolar Conference) and former member of the Home Rule Parliament, Aqqaluk Lyngø: “We should not go back to the conditions Greenland experienced during Hans Hedtoft and H.C. Hansen.”⁵⁷ On the contrary, in the case of information, the Greenlandic politicians should be on equal terms with Danish politicians, which is not the case today”.⁵⁸ This is what the politics of embarrassment is about. By apparently not giving the Greenlandic politicians adequate information, the Danish Government is pictured as obstructing the democratic debate, and thus continuing the unjust policies of the Cold War. And precisely by equating the embarrassing past with the present, the morality of the Danish Government is undermined. The past was undemocratic and thus unjust: “It is widely known,

that in 1953 [the] people [of Thule] were moved, in 1957 nuclear weapons were deposited, in 1968 an airplane crashed if not on them then around them and polluted the area. So it is these people that face the risk.”⁵⁹ And as it is already known that they faced the risk without being asked, Lars Emil Johansen can forcefully ask “Do they have something to say in this?”, implying that by not taking careful notice of the Greenlandic concerns in general and of the *Inughuit* in particular, the Danish Government is actually again practicing its unjust, undemocratic and embarrassing Cold War policies.

In sum, the Greenlandic politicians forcefully engage the Danish Government by employing moral arguments circling around the concepts of world peace, democratic debate, and unjust past, which each strengthen and complement each other, together making up the moral dimension of the Greenlandic position in the missile defense debate. What characterizes these concepts is that they all contribute to undermine morally both the arguments and the procedure of the Danish Government in the missile defense debate. By challenging the truthfulness of the Danish Government statements about world peace, the democratic character of the debate in general can be questioned, which in turn makes it possible for the Greenlanders to frame the debate as parallel to the unjust – and for the Danish Government embarrassing – past. The Danish Government is pictured as immoral, whereas the Greenlanders emerge as the only moral actor. Thus their position in the debate is strengthened.

This moral dimension is, however, complemented by a political dimension, comprised of some very down-to-earth political arguments. The central effect of the moral argumentation is thus to strengthen the moral authority and thus the argumentative power of the Greenlanders in the political dimension.

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

Whereas the positions of the Greenlandic politicians in the above referred to some abstract concepts like world peace and genuine democracy, the issues at stake in the political dimension are more concrete. This dimension contains unambiguous political goals, as demanded by the Greenlanders in the negotiations with the Danish Government in relation to the American request. However, these issues attain their validity and legitimacy through the moral arguments and are thus to a large degree dependent on the moral dimension.

Parallel to the development of the moral dimension, the most central issues are not missile defense as such, or whether permission for upgrading the radar facilities should be given, but rather how the decision is reached, who is involved, and in what way. Again the relationship between Greenland and Denmark is what is important. The missile defense debate works as a window of opportunity for the Greenlandic politicians to discuss and debate more general issues within the Danish Realm. Issues that for some time have been on the mind of the Greenlanders, but not on the political agenda in the rest of the Realm. This is an opportunity to discuss the role of the Home Rule Authorities in the foreign and security political arrangement within the Danish Realm, and in particular in relation to the American presence in Greenland.

Of paramount importance for the Greenlandic politicians is the renegotiation of the 1951 Defense Agreement. During the whole of the debate, it has been a demand from the entire political spectrum in Greenland, that the agreement “should reflect the real conditions”, the real conditions being that things have changed since 1951.⁶⁰ Accordingly, a condition for a Greenlandic consent to the upgrade initially depends on “a denouncement of the Defense Agreement of 1951 between Denmark and the USA and the signing of a new agreement in which the Greenlandic Home Rule Authorities participate as an equal partner”.⁶¹

There are two general motives behind this strong wish for a renegotiation of the 1951 Defense Agreement. First, Greenland plays absolutely no role in the text of the treaty; it dates back to when Greenland was still a colony. Thus participation in the formulation of security policy in general, and specifically in the 1951 Agreement, is seen as a big leap forward in the push for increased self determination and even independence. Secondly, the 1951 Defense Agreement carries a huge symbolic value. It marks the beginning of the American Cold War presence on the island, and is thus seen as the foundation for the Danish Cold War policies. For these reasons, a renegotiation of the agreement would, in the perspective of the Greenlandic politicians, definitely mark the end of both Greenland’s status as a colony, and the end of possible secret Danish security policies in Greenland.

The Greenlandic strategies for attaining this goal in the negotiations with the Danish Government work well within the concepts already outlined in the moral dimension. Again Lars Emil Johansen presents the Greenlandic position well: “Today we write 2002 and Denmark works to introduce free parliamentary conditions around the world. It is due time

that Denmark begins work on this issue inside its own borders by democratizing the foreign and security policy in relation to Greenland. The 1951 Agreement does not concern the rest of Denmark, only Greenland”.⁶² In the quote, democracy is equaled with Home Rule. Therefore it follows that Denmark is acting undemocratically when not agreeing with the Greenlandic demands. The only way for the Danish Government to act democratically is thus to let the Home Rule Authorities participate fully, requiring a renegotiation of the 1951 Defense Agreement. Again the argument gains its power by questioning the democratic intentions of the Danish Government. This argument presenting the Danish policies as undemocratic is further underlined by accusing the government of not supplying all relevant information.⁶³ In short, to be genuinely democratic, the Danish Government has to renegotiate the 1951 Defense Agreement, thereby making Greenland an equal partner.

In addition, as long as Denmark does not recognize the legitimacy of the Greenlandic demand to be an equal partner in issues concerning security policy, nothing has, it is argued essentially changed since 1951. Seen from Greenland, Denmark is still in principle in a position to decide single-handedly how to handle important issues such as missile defense, without either the knowledge or the consent of the Greenlanders: “We do not have full knowledge of the agreements Denmark has made, concerning us and our country...It is due time that we require full insight into all agreements instantly”, further: “The case of the Defense Agreement...is about the fact that we are still a colony, and that is the core of the problem”.⁶⁴ Precisely by equating the conditions during the Cold War with the present, nothing guarantees that episodes similar to the ones of the Cold War could not happen again. Denmark could in principle have played the Greenlandic card in relation to missile defense without the knowledge of the Greenlanders. Therefore it is of vital importance for the Greenlanders to participate in the negotiations concerning the upgrade of Thule Air Base. It is the only way they can be certain that the future will not be a reenactment of the past. Thus, by arguing that nothing has changed since 1951, the Greenlandic politicians present the Greenlandic-Danish relationship as one still characterized by colonialism. An argument that again fit into the general political strategy of embarrassment.

A further political aspect concerning the possible upgrade is the risk associated with the upgrade. Will Thule Air Base become a likely bomb target in the future, as a result of its role in the missile defense architecture, and thus also make the Greenlanders a target? The position of the Danish Government is clear. As the potential aggressors are rogue states, only in

possession of a very limited number of missiles, it would make no sense to target the radar facilities at Thule. Their purpose is to terrorize the American population, and they would accordingly not waste one of their missiles on Thule Air Base.⁶⁵ This argument is however challenged as well. It builds upon the assumption that missile defense is only a reply to the threat from rogue states, and that these states will continue to be in possession of a limited number of missiles only. This is by no means certain, and an actor with a larger number of missiles, it is argued, would indeed target Thule to circumvent the defense system, potentially making Thule a likely target.⁶⁶ Again the information presented by the Danish Government is questioned. This makes it possible for the Greenlandic politicians to question the intentions of the government. Is the Danish Government in fact trying to fool the Greenlanders by supplying biased or not entirely true information? The fact that it is possible to question the intentions of the Danish Government is enough to draw a parallel between the present and the Cold War practices of the past. The fact that it is the Greenlanders who face the risk make it imperative that it is them who in some way are compensated, not southern Denmark.⁶⁷ A central demand, in addition to the renegotiation of the 1951 Agreement, is thus that the Greenlanders should be compensated for the risk they run by allowing the upgrade of the Thule radar.⁶⁸

Summing up, the political dimension of the Greenlandic missile defense debate is comprised of three demands: Further independence in issues of security policy, further influence in the actual negotiations and increased compensation for the risk associated with the radar facilities. These demands are primarily to be reached by a renegotiation of the 1951 Defense Agreement, with the explicit goal of making Greenland an equal partner with the state of Denmark. The argumentative strategies for attaining this goal depend upon the strategies of the moral dimension. The actions of the Danish Government are framed as immoral and undemocratic, in line with the embarrassing colonial past. This in turn pictures the Greenlanders as illegitimately denied their democratic right to participate in decisions with important consequences to them. Presented this way, it accordingly becomes a political imperative and a moral necessity for Greenland to increase its independence and influence, if the Greenlandic politicians are to consent to the radar upgrade. Further, in case of an affirmative answer, it is the Greenlanders who morally are entitled to any political side payments, not the Danish state. It is the Greenlanders who should decide how and when to play the Greenlandic card and for what price.

THE END RESULT

In the debate, the Greenlandic politicians skillfully employ both the moral and political dimensions, their argument in practice follow these general lines: First, the moral superiority of the Greenlanders is established. This is achieved by monopolizing value- laden concepts, in particular ‘world peace’ and ‘democracy’. By successfully describing one’s own position as democratic and concerned with world peace, it follows that the same cannot be true of the opponent – the Danish Government. On the contrary, the Danish Government is framed as undemocratic and interested in cheap political trade-offs by playing the Greenlandic card. The immorality of the Danish Government is then further underlined by embarrassing accusations against the Government, implying that its present actions are more in line with how it acted as a colonial power during the Cold War than with what could be expected of a modern democratic state.

Second, this superior moral position becomes the point of departure for the negotiations with the Danish state. By presenting their claims as a way to rectify the situation, and giving the Danish Government an opportunity to act democratically, to once and for all “kill an old ghost from the colonial past”,⁶⁹ it becomes very difficult for the Danish Government not to concede to the Greenlandic demands.

Hence, the Greenlandic requests for increased influence, independence and financial reimbursements are demands not easily dishonored by the Danish Government, which the negotiations indeed reflect. Even though a genuine renegotiation of the 1951 Defense Agreement was not achieved,⁷⁰ Greenland got several concessions from the Danish state. Most importantly the two sides agreed upon a Declaration of Principle, wherein Denmark agrees to work for the realization of most of the Greenlandic demands. The declaration stipulates that in issues of foreign and security policy of importance to Greenland, “it is considered natural that Greenland be co-involved and maintain a contributory influence”, further, this influence is “intended to attribute equality to both parts of the Realm”. In addition to this, the agreement secures Greenlandic participation in international negotiations of interest for the Home Rule Authorities. Finally the declaration states that, where consistent with international law, Greenland can be co- signatory with the Danish Government with binding effect.⁷¹

Additionally, a statement by the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Premier of the Greenland Home Rule Government at the announcement of the Declaration states that the two sides agree on a joint proposal to be negotiated with the United States including a wish for the “renewal of the Defense Treaty of 1951” and the signing of an “agreement on economic and technical cooperation intended to meet Greenland’s wishes to increase its relations with the US”. Furthermore it is stated that “The intention is of course to make the Greenland Home Rule Government a co-signatory of these agreements”.⁷²

The statement and the Declaration to a large degree meet the Greenlandic demands. First of all they state that Greenland is to be treated as an equal partner in the areas of foreign and security policy when of importance to Greenland, and bestow the Home Rule Government the right to be co-signatory on international agreements, thus increasing Greenland’s formal independence from Copenhagen. In addition they show the political will in Copenhagen to increase the influence of the Greenlanders in general, and in relation to the American defense areas in particular. Finally a path is opened, whereby the Greenlanders themselves can negotiate an “agreement on economic and technical cooperation”, in effect meaning that it is up to the Greenlanders bilaterally, but with Danish support, to negotiate with the United States any eventual side payments for the upgrade of the radar at Thule.

The stage was thus set for a new round of negotiations. This time between Greenland and the United States, giving the Greenlanders an immediate opportunity to test their new rights to participate in international negotiations. The ultimate realization of the Greenlandic demands is up to the Greenlanders themselves – they have become recognized as a legitimate actor. The value of this actor-hood was to be tested in direct negotiations with the Americans. Only after a year of long and hard negotiations was an agreement reached. On May 26, 2004 the parties were able to publicize a number of agreements setting the stage for the future Greenlandic-American relationship.⁷³ The agreements to a large extent fulfill the Greenlandic demands. Most importantly an amendment to the 1951 Agreement was signed that gives the Greenlanders increased influence on matters concerning Thule Air Base; and further, Greenland figures as a cosignatory on the amendment, formally guaranteeing future Greenlandic influence on the base. Second, an agreement on economic and technical cooperation between Greenland and the United States was signed. What tangible benefits this agreement will entail for the Greenlanders is still to be seen, but it nevertheless holds the promise of reducing the Greenlandic economic dependency on Denmark.

Taken together the agreements are easily seen as a victory for the Greenlanders. First they hold the promise of reducing dependency on Denmark. Second, and more importantly, the Greenlanders are now guaranteed influence on the regulations guiding the activities at Thule. Thus a reenactment of past Danish colonial secrecy and double policy in the future is made impossible. Greenland has now become an actor in security policy that has to be taken into account by both Denmark and the United States.

Conclusion

The missile defense debate in Denmark was thus not about the general consequences of missile defense, neither was it about the American presence on Danish territory. In essence these were not the important questions. The US is an important ally of the Danish State, thus it would have been almost inconceivable that Denmark would not have accepted the American request. The same can be said about Greenland; if the Americans were to leave Thule it would arguably be a catastrophe for the Greenlanders. Economically, Thule Air Base contributes substantially to the budget of the Home Rule Government. But equally important the American base is maybe the best asset of the Greenlanders in the ongoing political effort vis-à-vis the Danish State for further Greenlandic self determination, which is exactly what the debate was about.

The history associated with the American presence on Greenland, and Thule Air Base especially, gives the Greenlanders powerful arguments legitimizing the wish for an independent Greenlandic role also in matters of security policy. When the American presence becomes a subject of public debate in Denmark, it gives the Greenlanders a window of opportunity to forcefully make the politics of embarrassment. Not towards the Americans – and the American wishes to use Greenlandic territory in what is by many seen as a dubious military project with potentially destabilizing effects – but towards the Danish Government.

The central topic thus becomes the Danish handling of the American request for upgrading the radar. Because of the history associated with Danish action towards the indigenous population of Greenland during the Cold War, any aspect relating to the American defense areas immediately becomes a subject suited for the politics of embarrassment. As the analysis has shown the history makes it easy for the Greenlanders to undermine the morality of the Danish Government. By referring to the unjust past and comparing the present activities with past government action, it becomes very difficult for the Danish Government not to give in to the Greenlandic demands.

In sum, the missile defense debate in Denmark/Greenland was not about missile defense, it was about Greenlandic self-determination. Every argument concerning missile defense was not only applied on its merit in relation to missile defense, a much more important aspect was

what part it played in the Danish-Greenlandic relationship. For example, will missile defense lead to an arms race? Will Thule become a bomb target? Both are in themselves important questions in relation to missile defense proper. However, in the Danish – Greenlandic debate, the primary function of these subjects was to provide ammunition in the fight about the moral high ground and the credibility of the Danish Government, turning the politics of embarrassment into an effective strategy. Thule Air Base, when on the political agenda, functions as a perfect window of opportunity for furthering the wish for self-termination. But as the subsequent negotiations with the United States have shown, there are limits to the effectiveness of the politics of embarrassment. The American role in the history of Greenland is perceived much more ambiguously by the Greenlanders.⁷⁴ Consequently, the Greenlandic strategy does not hold the same promise in these negotiations. The value of the Greenlandic card is not the same in relation to the US as it is in relation to Denmark.

Nevertheless, as the preceding analysis has shown, the window of opportunity presented to the Greenlanders by the upgrade debate and the following negotiations strengthen their political position vis-à-vis the Danish State in matters of security policy. This is an important development internally in the Danish Realm. On the one hand, the Danish Government has transferred or shared sovereignty in this traditionally important policy area with the Home Rule Government, thus greatly increasing its autonomy. On the other hand however, this sharing of authority on security policy might make things easier in the future between the Danish Government and the Home Rule Government. The 25 year old agreements regulating the autonomy of Greenland are soon to undergo substantial revisions. Perhaps by “killing an old ghost from the colonial past” the Danish Government has indeed made this process easier. In any case, by alleviating the Greenlanders concerns regarding Thule, and by giving them the right to negotiate bilaterally with the United States, making the politics of embarrassment will not be as easy in the future.

References

I gratefully acknowledge that the research for this paper is funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Nordic Ministries of Defense through the Nordic Security Policy Research Program. Under its heading I had the luck of being part of the research network ‘The Role of Armed Forces in the New Security Order’ and I would like to thank the other participants for valuable advice, the same goes for my colleges in the Department of Conflict and Security Studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies.

1. Questions concerning for example the transatlantic relationship, the global strategic stability or regional arms race dynamics are all important issues that come into play as a result of the American missile defense plans. See for example Richard L. Russel, ‘Swords and Shields: Ballistic Missile Defenses in the Middle East and South Asia’, *Orbis*, 3(2002), pp. 483-498, Colin Gray, ‘European Perspectives on US Ballistic Missile Defense’, *Comparative Strategy*, 4(2002) pp. 279-310, James M. Lindsey & Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Missile Defense after the ABM Treaty’, *The Washington Quarterly*, 3(2002) pp. 163-176, Wyn Q. Bowen, ‘Missile Defence and the Transatlantic Security Relationship’, *International Affairs*, 3(2001), pp. 485-507, Philip H. Gordon, ‘Bush, Missile Defense and the Atlantic Alliance’, *Survival*, 1(2001), pp. 17-36, and Jianxiang Bi, ‘Uncertain Courses: Theatre Missile Defense and Cross- Strait Competition’, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 3(2002), pp.109-160.
2. ‘Secretary Powell Meets with the Foreign Minister of Denmark and the Minister for Economic Affairs and Vice Premier of the Greenland Home Rule Government’ Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, December 18, 2002, accessed at <http://state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16104.htm>.
3. Ronald Niezen, ‘Recognizing Indigenism: Canadian Unity and the International Movement of Indigenous Peoples’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1 (2000), p. 128.
4. During the war Greenland became an important stepping stone in the transfer of men and equipment to Europe, and a series of army, navy and air force bases together with meteorological stations were build especially in the southern part of the island. See Clive Archer, ‘The United States Defence Areas in Greenland’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 23 (1988), pp. 123-125.
5. Nikolaj Petersen, ‘Negotiating the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement: Theoretical and Empirical Aspects’, *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 21 (1998), p. 2.
6. DUPI (Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut), *Grønland under den kolde krig: Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945-68* (Copenhagen, DUPI, 1997), pp. 114-17.

7. There are some uncertainties concerning the initial purpose of the base; whether it was only to be a staging base for strategic bombers, or if it in itself should be a strategic airbase. In either case the construction of the base was a major undertaking, including runways, radars, hangars and housing for more than 5000 personnel. For a thorough account of the construction and initial purpose of Thule Air Base se: DUPI, *Grønland under den kolde krig*, pp. 219-39.
8. The full title of the agreement is: “Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, concerning the defense of Greenland.”, it can be accessed at:
<http://yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/denmark/den001.htm>.
9. *1951 Defense Agreement*, Art. V. The actual number and scope of the defense areas were agreed upon in a secret protocol attached to the agreement, see DUPI, *Grønland under den kolde krig*, pp. 539-40.
10. *1951 Defense Agreement*, Art. VI.
11. *1951 Defense Agreement*, Art. II. The Agreement maintains that the United States are only assisting Denmark in the defense of Greenland, both the Danish and American flag should fly the over the defense areas, and a liaison officer is to be appointed to each area “with whom the United States...shall consult on all important local matters affecting Danish interests.”
12. DUPI, *Grønland under den kolde krig*, p.161.
13. Statement by Nikolaj Petersen, during a conference held by the Foreign Policy Committee of the Danish Parliament, in *Det Udenrigspolitiske Navns høring om missilforsvar den 25. april 2001* (Copenhagen, Folketinget, Udenrigspolitisk Sekretariat, 2001), p. 45. This is reflected in the fact that a number of amendments to the original agreement has been made over the years. And indeed the request to integrate the radar in the missile defense architecture in it self reflect this working relationship. Formally speaking the US request was unnecessary.
14. Archer, *The United States Defense Areas*, pp. 131-4.
15. Clive Archer, ‘Greenland, US Bases and Missile Defense: New Two-Level Negotiations?’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 2(2003), p. 133, DUPI, *Grønland under den kolde krig*, pp.273-75, Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold. Danmark. NATO og den kolde krig. Et studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949-1961* (Copenhagen, Eirene, 1995), p. 390, and Petersen, *Negotiating the 1951 Agreement*, p. 23.
16. The most cited example is the continuous lower than NATO average Danish defense spending. Se for example Archer, *New Two-Level Negotiations*, p. 133
17. This of course also implies that the Greenlandic population receives rights as Danish citizens etc.
18. DUPI, *Grønland under den kolde krig*, pp.32-37, this is actually a fundamental change in Danish policies towards Greenland. Before WWII, Greenland was totally closed territory, and access was only given on a case to case basis by the Danish administration.

19. Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Friis Arne Petersen, 'Rigsfællesskabet og det internationale arbejde for oprindelige folk', *Udenrigs*, 2(2001), pp. 75-83.
20. As a frontline state in the Cold War, a certain amount of caution and maintaining of a low profile towards the USSR was the preferred strategy of Denmark, which is somewhat at odds with the American activities in Thule, see Hans Mouritzen, 'Thule and Theory: Democracy vs. Elitism in Danish Foreign Policy' in Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen (eds.) *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1998* (Copenhagen, DUPI, 1998), p. 81.
21. This is extensively covered in DUPI, *Grønland under den kolde krig*, especially pp. 277-302
22. Mouritzen, 'Thule and Theory' pp. 82-83.
23. See for example P. Claesson (ed.), *Grønland, Middelhavets Perle. Et indblik i amerikanske Atomkrigsforberedelse*, (Copenhagen, Eirene, 1983).
24. Archer, 'The United States Defence Areas', pp. 138-39.
25. Jens Brøsted & Mads Fægteborg, *Thule – fangerfolk og militæranlæg*, (Copenhagen, Akademisk Forlag, 1987), pp. 50-64.
26. Jens Brøsted & Mads Fægteborg, 'Invasjonen af Thule og befolkningens fordrivelse', *Tidsskriftet Grønland*, 7(1995), pp. 318-20.
27. The issue was not settled in the judicial system until November 2003, when the Danish Supreme Court gave its ruling on the issue – acknowledging the unjust treatment by the Danish State, but according to the plaintiffs not providing an adequate compensation. Thus this is in itself not the end of the story, as the case is being appealed to the European Courts of Human Rights. See *Politiken*, 30 December 2003, 1 sec. p. 5. & *Politiken*, 24 May 2004, 1 sec. p. 2.
28. For further aspects in general about a distinct Danish liberal moralistic foreign policy profile see for example: Christine Ingebritsen, 'Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 1 (2002), pp. 11-23, Lene Hansen, 'Sustaining Sovereignty: The Danish Approach to Europe' in Lene Hansen & Ole Wæver (eds.) *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*, (London, Routledge, 2002) and finally Peter Lawler, 'Scandinavian Exceptionalism and European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 4 (1997), pp. 565-594.
29. Niezen, 'Recognizing Indigenism', p. 128.
30. Niezen, 'Recognizing Indigenism', p. 143.
31. On the strength of moral arguments and moral authority in international relations in general see: Rodney Bruce Hall, 'Moral Authority as a Power Resource', in *International Organization*, 4 (1997), especially p. 594.
32. President William J. Clinton, 'Statement Announcing the President's Signature of the National Missile Defense Act of 1999', (White House Press Release, July, 1999), accessed at <http://www.clw.org/coalition/whnmd072399.htm>.

33. Statement by J. Dyer Crouch II, US Assistant Secretary of Defense, during 'Conference on Missile Defense and its Implications for the Global Order', 23 April, at the Danish Parliament.
34. One probably can not underestimate the importance of 9-11, also in relation to missile defense. Effectively making it less costly to abolish the ABM- treaty, and in general supporting the American position. See for example James M. Lindsay & Michael E. O'Hanlon, 'Missile Defense after the ABM Treaty', *Washington Quarterly*, 3(2002), p. 163.
35. 'Secretary Powell Meets with the Foreign Minister of Denmark and the Minister for Economic Affairs and Vice Premier of the Greenland Home Rule Government', Press Statement, US Department of State, Released 18 December 2002 accessed at <http://state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16104.htm>.
36. Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller, quoted in the web edition of *Politiken*, 17 December 2002, accessed at <http://politiken.dk/VisArtikel.sasp?PageID=247938>.
37. 'Missilforsvar og Thule-radaren, Redegørelse fra regeringen', (Copenhagen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2003).
38. *Missilforsvar og Thule-radaren*, p. 8.
39. *Missilforsvar og Thule-radaren*, p. 30.
40. *Missilforsvar og Thule-radaren*, pp. 26-28.
41. *Missilforsvar og Thule-radaren*, p. 33.
42. It should be noted that these two dimensions primarily are analytical tools. In the actual debate they will mostly be found intermingled in the same argumentative chains. Accordingly, there is no temporal dependence between the two implying for example that the moral dimension always precludes the political. The two dimensions are simply two analytical constructions, with the simple aim of conceptualizing the various processes that *together* structure the outcome of the debate. Furthermore, it should be noted that the use of these dimensions do not imply that separating and joining their arguments in this particular way is the expression of a planned and instrumental Greenlandic grand strategy aimed at maximizing their influence. Greenlandic reference to moral issues is not necessarily part of an overall conscious strategy; it serves a strategic purpose, which is not the same. The dimensions express only the function of the argument, not necessarily intent of the actor stating it.
43. See for example Hans Enoksen, Home Rule Premier, in *Thule radaren og missilforvaret*, information paper delivered to all households in Greenland, (Nuuk, Grønlands Hjemmestyres Informationskontor, March 2003), p. 2.
44. Aqqaluk Lynge, chairman of the ICC, states that the "Greenlanders are proud because they have never been to war", quoted in *Information*, 10 April 2003, p. 5, further in the same article, a former mayor in Greenland Henrik Lund states that "This basic[*pacifist*]attitude means that the Greenlander feels no

affiliation to the modern military and to the way of life that the military apparatus is an expression of'. All following quotes from Danish sources are translated by the author.

45. "We neither can nor should hide, but as citizens of the World we shall take our position, demand our right, take on our responsibility and make our contribution. Therefore we have to make a decision in relation to this project." Enoksen, in *Thule radaren og missilforsvaret*, p. 2.
46. Enoksen, in *Thule radaren og missilforsvaret*, p. 2.
47. Jensine Bertelsen in *Information*, 25 April 2003, 2. sec., p 8, and Bertelsen in *Thule radaren og missilforsvaret*, p. 23.
48. Kuupik Kleist, Greenlandic member of the Danish parliament for Greenland, in *Information*, 25 april 2003, 2. sec., p. 8.
49. Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, quoted among others in *Politiken*, 23 January 2003, 1. sec., p. 2.
50. See note 40, furthermore Speech by Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen during a debate (forespørgselsdebat) in the Danish parliament, 29 April, 2003.
51. Ole Wæver in *Information*, 14 May 2003, 1. sec., p. 8.
52. Forcefully presented by Jørgen Dragsdal in *Information*, 25 April 2003, 2. sec., p. 10, see also Greenlandic member of the Danish parliament, Kuupik Kleist, during a debate in the Danish parliament, 29 April 2003.
53. *Politiken*, 24 April 2003, 1. sec., p. 7.
54. Lars Emil Johansen, quoted in *Politiken*, 5 March 2003, 1. sec., p. 5.
55. Lars Emil Johansen, quoted in *Jyllands-Posten*, 11 December 2002, 1. sec., p. 2.
56. As expressed on numerous occasions for example by Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller during a debate in the Danish Parliament, 29 April 2003, se also Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen in *Jyllands-Posten*, 18 December 2002, 1. sec., p. 4.
57. Hans Hedtoft was Danish Prime Minister from 1950 to 1955. As Greenland was located under the portfolio of the Prime Ministers office, it was he who was ultimately responsible for the forced movement of the *Inughuit* from Thule. He was followed as Prime Minister by H. C. Hansen, who in 1957 negotiated the secret agreement tacitly allowing the US to station nuclear weapons in Thule.
58. Quoted in *Jyllands-Posten*, 14 November 2002, 1. sec., p. 2.
59. Lars Emil Johansen, debate in the Danish Parliament, 29 April 2003.
60. Lars Emil Johansen quoted in *Jyllands-Posten*, 5 March 2003, 1. sec., p. 4.
61. Joint Statement by the Foreign and Security Committee of Home Rule Authorities, issued 15 November 2002, accessed at <http://dk.nanoq.gl/udskriv.asp?page=nyhed&objno=41050>.
62. Lars Emil Johansen, quoted in *Politiken*, 20 November 2002, 1. sec., p.8.

63. Joint Statement by the Foreign and Security Committee of Home Rule Authorities, 15 November, 2002.
64. Speech by spokesman Josef Motzfeld, Member of the Greenlandic parliament for IA, 14 May 2002, accessed at <http://dk.nanoq.gl/udskriv.asp?page=tema&objno=30148>.
65. See *Missilforsvar og Thule-radaren*, p. 30, furthermore Statement by Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller during a debate in the Danish parliament, 29 April 2003.
66. See for example David Wright from the Union of Concerned Scientists quoted in *Information*, 11 March 2003, 1. sec., p. 4 and Sir Timothy Garden “if a missile defense system is developed, then it is obvious that these places [Fylingdales and Thule] will be important targets for an aggressor against the USA. Normally, the first thing you do is to remove the eyes of the system” Statement during public hearing conducted by the Foreign Policy Committee of the Danish Parliament, 25 April, 2001.
67. According to some Greenlandic politicians Denmark should already have received ‘payment’ for making Thule Air Base available for the American missile defense plans, ranging from promises of subcontracts to Danish companies to the inclusion of Denmark in the coverage of the defense free of charge. Se Lars Emil Johansen in *Jyllands-Posten*, 23 November 2002, 1. sec., p. 9 and statement by Greenlandic member of the Danish Parliament Kuupik Kleist during a debate in the Danish parliament, 29 April, 2003.
68. The actual compensation demands range from direct payment, better access to the American market for Greenlandic products such as fur, to scholarships at American Ivy League universities.
69. Member of the Greenlandic Home Rule Parliament, Augusta Salling, quoted in *Jyllands-Posten*, 15 November 2002, 1. sec., p. 5.
70. Mostly because of American opposition, apparently concerned with the prospect of getting a renegotiated agreement through Congress. Apart from that, the United States in principle expressed understanding for the need to discuss the principles regulating the American presence in Greenland, and appeared willing to discuss these issues with the Greenlandic Home Rule Authorities, se Deputy Minister for Defense JD Crouch II, quoted in *Politiken*, 7 May 2003, 1. sec., p. 4.
71. Joint Declaration in Principle between the Danish Government and the Greenlandic Home Rule Government on the Involvement of Greenland in Foreign Policy and Security Policy. Accessed at <http://dk.nanok.gl/nyhed.asp?page=nyhed&objno=54781>.
72. Announcement by the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Premier of the Greenland Home Rule Government. Accessed at <http://dk.nanok.gl/nyhed.asp?page=nyhed&objno=54781>.
73. The agreements can be accessed at:
<http://www.um.dk/da/menu/Udenrigspolitik/FredSikkerhedOgInternationalRetsorden/Missilforsvar/Thule-radarensRolle/AftalekompleksitilknytningtilopgraderingafThuleradaren.htm>
74. Ulrik Prams Gad, ‘*Danske sprogede grønlanderes plads i et Grønland under grønlandisering og modernisering*’, (unpublished thesis, University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Science, 2004), pp. 130-31