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Model of Hypothecated tax on Information goods

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Abstract:
Information or knowledge, which can be incorporated in tangible objects at the same time in an unlimited number of copies at different locations anywhere in the world, constitutes Intellectual Property (IP) of an information producer. Intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation was created to optimize social welfare and to promote production of information by granting producers a temporary monopoly in return for a disclosure of their works. However, current IPR regimes are overprotective in terms of monopoly that is granted to a producer but they are underprotective against piracy and unauthorized use. Nowadays, the main effort is made to secure information in order to forbid unauthorized use, and thus this approach creates high barriers for information diffusion. The aim of the current work is to look for alternative solution of the IPR problem which can be defined as: how to profit from production of information without reduction its natural non-excludability and transferability. One of the possible solutions of IPR problem could be introduction of hypothecated tax on information goods. A theoretical model which describes exchange and production of the information goods was developed in support of the suggested solution. The case when production of the information goods is subsidized from the tax proceeds is also compared with the case when the information goods are sold on the market for unlimited flat rate. It was found that under assumption of homogeneous wealth and cost distributions the both cases result in the same consumption levels and the same condition on production costs.

Keywords: Information good; Intellectual property rights; Hypothecated tax

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Introduction

Information goods are such goods for which knowledge is more critical for production than other economic resources such as land, natural resources, or manpower. Producers of information goods usually face high fixed costs of production with low (or even zero) marginal costs. This creates conditions for natural monopoly with almost unlimited resources, where the problem of allocation of resources is not relevant any more. Moreover, many of information goods can be characterized by a strong network effect, when benefits to a single user increase with the number of others agents using the same good. It means that public welfare increases when information is disseminated and widely used, both in the production of goods and in the production of further information. However, problem arises when we are looking for optimal pricing of information goods. Zero marginal cost of production implies that optimal price of the good is also zero, thus there is no private incentive for production. Intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation was created to optimize social welfare and to promote production of information by granting producers a temporary monopoly in return for a disclosure of their works. The IPR can be divided in two categories: (i) rights to derive financial reward from the use of the works by others and (ii) rights to authorize or prevent certain acts in relation to a work. These rights take form of “Industrial property” or “Copyrights”. The most prominent difference between these two forms is that the industrial property protects the ideas, while copyright protects only the form of expression, but not the idea itself. It results in different duration of protection, which is essentially shorter for industrial property than for copyrights. Duration of patents for inventions in most cases around 20 years, while copyrights usually issued for the life of the author plus not less than 50 years after his death [WIPO].

However, analysis of the key reasons for patenting inventions, statistics on usage of patents and patent litigation revealed that the current patent system failed to fulfill its goal to stimulate diffusion of innovation and to contribute to market order. Canonical theories of patent law are not justified by reality. The idea “that a lone genius can solve problems that stump the experts, and that the lone genius will do so only if properly incented” is opposed by historical facts that the most of new technologies are invented nearly simultaneously by independent inventors [Lemley_2011]. Empirical evidence suggests that between 90 and 98% of modern patent lawsuits are against independent inventors, not copiers [Cotropia_2009], [Lemley_2011]. The theory that patents are important for the information they disclose is opposed by the fact “that companies primarily rely on patent protection to protect self-disclosing inventions: those that the inventor could not maintain as a trade secret after putting it into commercial practice. If an invention can be kept secret, inventors are more likely to forego patent protection and keep it secret” [Lemley_2011], [Arora_2008], [Cohen_2002]. It was also found that patents and copyright publications are almost the least important source for firm’s learning in order to acquire technical knowledge. The study of Arundel [Arundel_00] showed that IPR regimes are mainly used as strategic means to block competitors from developing of rival technologies and to prevent infringement suits by competing firms. These uses are beyond the original intention of IPR legislation and outside of traditional rationalization of it. “Theory of patent law doesn’t seem to explain the way we actually
implement that law...If patent law in its current form can be saved, we need an alternative justification."[Lemley_2011].

Other studies focus on optimizing the parameters of the existing IPR legislation. For example, Pollock [Pollock_2007] uses theoretical model to prove several propositions about the optimal level of protection. He demonstrates that (a) optimal copyright is likely to fall as the production costs of ‘originals’ decline and that (b) the optimal level of copyright will, in general, falls over time. He also found that an optimal copyright term should be around fifteen years. This is substantially shorter than any current copyright term and implies that existing copyright terms are too long.

It also should be mentioned that costs which companies pay for security and control against unauthorized use and distribution generally increases with time in two ways. First, the fee for patent renewal increases with time - in some European countries annual fees are relatively small in the early years and become more expensive with patent aging [Spencer_03]. Second, more sophisticated methods of security should be used to maintain control under unauthorized use on same level. This trend can be easily seen on the support of software security. Thus it is hard to say if the results of IPR application are negative or positive.

Current IPR regimes are often criticized as being both over- and under-protective. They are over-protective in terms of monopoly that is granted to a producer but they are under-protective against piracy and unauthorized use. Information goods can be considered as quasi-public goods. To a large extent they are intangible and non-rivalrous. They face the same problem of “free rider” as any public goods. Nowadays, the main effort is made to secure information goods in order to forbid unauthorized use and distribution using IPR legislation. Although IPR can somehow solve the “free rider” problem, the downside of such effort is obvious: current IPR imply private monopoly power and thus are not Pareto-optimal. Due to the limits of price discrimination, those who are unwilling or unable to pay a profit-maximizing price do not get access to the good. Current IPR legislation creates barriers for information diffusion, which otherwise can occur at no cost, and wastes a lot of resources on keeping information excludable.

An extensive research on information goods, computer mediated transactions, IPR and their impact on public welfare was done by Hal R. Varian, who states a necessary condition for Pareto efficient pricing of information goods: “the marginal willingness to pay must equal marginal cost” [Varian_1996] and formulates “the third and fourth welfare theorems of welfare economics:

3) a perfectly discriminating monopolist can capture all surplus for itself and therefore produce Pareto efficient output,
4) competition among perfectly discriminating monopolists will transfer this surplus to consumers, yielding the same outcome as pure competition.” [Varian_2001]. He also discusses inefficiencies which society faces due to monopolistic production [Varian_2001], when resources are wasted on creation of low-quality versions, on control of artificial excludability of the goods and on the duplication of the efforts in the innovation. “From the viewpoint of competing for a monopoly, promotional pricing or adopting inferior technology are both costs to the firms, but they may have very important differences for consumer welfare calculations. Designing an environment in which competition results in transfers to consumers, rather than wasteful rent dissipation, is clearly an attractive policy goal.” [Varian_2001].
He also wrote that “universal access to all the world’s information is technologically possible now; the missing piece is the legal infrastructure that will provide the incentives to make such access economically viable”[Varian_2005].

Thus creation of a new system, which promotes the knowledge diffusion and does not suffer from distortions caused by monopoly rights, is a task of a high importance. Taking at account “public” attributes of information as non-rivalry and natural non-excludability it is natural to think about financing of information production from the tax proceeds. Assuming that willingness to pay for information is increasing function of income, proportional taxation of income can be a natural choice for hypothesized tax on information goods. Redistribution of the tax proceeds between IPR holders creates a reimbursement for information. A received share should be dependent on the usage of information. In exchange, information should be available for free public usage on equal basis.

This can create a self-regulating system. Availability of advanced technologies increases productivity of economy. This is automatically reflected in increase of the tax proceeds shared between producers and thus higher incentives for research and development. Additionally, a disclosure of knowledge promotes innovation, which results in more advanced technologies. This system will be incompatible with monopoly pricing and it will remove restriction in the choice of technology together with an incentive to adopt a low-efficient technology. As result, a probability for society to be locked in a low-efficient technology will be reduced. It also makes information available for poor people for smaller “price” than for rich people. Under assumption that willingness to pay is increasing function of an income, IPR holders in this system can be considered as discriminating monopolists competing among themselves. Thus conditions of the 3rd and the 4th welfare theorems [Varian_2001] would be satisfied, the same outcome as pure competition can be expected.

A theoretical model in support of the suggested solution is presented in the next section.

Model description and discussion

The model describes situation with 2 decision makers A & B, which produce and consume 2 information goods $i_1, i_2$. The information goods $i_1, i_2$ are produced with positive fixed costs $FC_1 > 0, FC_2 > 0$ and zero marginal costs $MC_1 = 0, MC_2 = 0$, respectively.

The information goods $i_1, i_2$ are public goods. Their production is subsidized from the tax proceeds

$$TP = t(w_a + w_b),$$

where $w_a, w_b$ are A’s and B’s initial wealth, respectively, and $t$ is a tax rate on the wealth.

The tax proceeds $TP$ are shared between producers according to relative usage of their products:

- A produces $i_1$ which is consumed by B.
- B produces $i_2$ which is consumed by A.
A’s profit from production $i_1$ is $\pi_A = \frac{\hat{i}_1}{\hat{i}_1 + i_2} - t(w_A + w_B) - FC_1$.

B’s profit from production $i_2$ is $\pi_B = \frac{i_2}{\hat{i}_1 + i_2} - t(w_A + w_B) - FC_2$.

The information goods are produced only if profit is nonnegative

$$\pi_A \geq 0, \pi_B \geq 0$$

and if the after tax wealth is sufficient to cover the production costs:

$$(1-t)w_A - FC_1 \geq 0, (1-t)w_B - FC_2 \geq 0.$$  (2)

There is also a unique physical good which is used for production of the information goods as well as for direct consumption. Price of physical good is normalized to 1. The decision makers A & B have positive initial endowments of the physical good and zero initial endowments of the information goods. Thus, A’s and B’s initial wealth $w_A, w_B$ are A’s and B’s initial endowments of the physical good, respectively. Amount of the physical good consumed by A and B is denoted by $x_A$ and $x_B$, respectively.

The decision maker utilities depend on consumption of the physical good as well as on consumption of the information good:

A’s utility function: $u_A(x_A, i_2) = \ln x_A + \ln i_2$

B’s utility function: $u_B(x_B, i_2) = \ln x_B + \ln i_2$

Solving the utility maximization problem for the decision maker A (UMPA) :

$$\text{max } \ln x_A + \ln i_2$$

s.t. $x_A \geq 0; i_2 \geq 0;$

$$x_A \leq (1-t)w_A + \frac{\hat{i}_1}{\hat{i}_1 + i_2} - t(w_A + w_B) - FC_1;$$

$$\pi_A = \frac{\hat{i}_1}{\hat{i}_1 + i_2} - t(w_A + w_B) - FC_1 \geq 0; \quad (1-t)w_A - FC_1 \geq 0;$$

$$\pi_B = \frac{i_2}{\hat{i}_1 + i_2} - t(w_A + w_B) - FC_2 \geq 0; \quad (1-t)w_B - FC_2 \geq 0$$

we can find the optimal consumption levels of the physical and information goods for A

$$x_A^* = (1-t)w_A;$$

$$i_2^* = \frac{\hat{i}_1}{\hat{i}_1 + i_2} \left[ t(w_A + w_B) - FC_1 \right] \frac{1}{FC_1}.$$  (5)

Note, that in case of the information good the consumer A optimized the ratio $\frac{i_2}{\hat{i}_1}$, not the absolute level of $i_2$. 
Further, the tax rate $t$ and the ratio $\frac{i_2}{i_1}$ should also satisfy the following conditions:

\[
t \geq \frac{(FC_1 + FC_2)}{w_d + w_b}, \tag{6}
\]

\[
t \leq \min \left\{ \frac{w_d - FC_1}{w_d}, \frac{w_b - FC_2}{w_b} \right\}, \tag{7}
\]

\[
\frac{FC_2}{FC_1} \leq \frac{i_2}{i_1}; \tag{8}
\]

\[
\frac{t(w_a + w_b)}{t(w_d + w_b) - FC_1} \geq \frac{FC_1}{(1-t)w_d}. \tag{9}
\]

Similarly, solving the utility maximization problem for the decision maker B (UMP$_B$):

\[
\max \ln x_B + \ln i_2
\]

s.t. $x_B \geq 0$; $i_2 \geq 0$;

\[
x_B \leq (1-t)w_B + \frac{i_2}{i_1 + i_2} t(w_d + w_b) - FC_2;
\]

\[
\pi_B = \frac{i_2}{i_1 + i_2} t(w_d + w_b) - FC_1 \geq 0; \quad (1-t)w_B - FC_2 \geq 0;
\]

\[
\pi_A = \frac{i_2}{i_1 + i_2} t(w_d + w_b) - FC_1 \geq 0; \quad (1-t)w_A - FC_1 \geq 0
\]

we can find the optimal consumption levels of the physical and information goods for B and the conditions for the tax rate $t$ and the ratio $\frac{i_2}{i_1}$:

\[
x_B^* = (1-t)w_B; \tag{11}
\]

\[
i_2^* = \frac{t(w_d + w_b) - FC_1}{FC_2}; \tag{12}
\]

\[
t \geq \frac{(FC_1 + FC_2)}{w_d + w_b}; \tag{13}
\]

\[
t \leq \min \left\{ \frac{w_d - FC_1}{w_d}, \frac{w_b - FC_2}{w_b} \right\}; \tag{14}
\]

\[
\frac{FC_1}{FC_2} \leq \frac{i_2}{i_1}; \tag{15}
\]

\[
\frac{t(w_a + w_b)}{t(w_d + w_b) - FC_2} \geq \frac{FC_2}{(1-t)w_b}. \tag{16}
\]
Combining the solution (4)-(9) of UMP\(_A\) (3) and the solution (11)-(16) of UMP\(_B\) (10) we obtain the following conditions for the consumption levels and the tax rate \(t\):

\[
\begin{align*}
    i_1^* &= \frac{FC_1}{FC_2}, \\
    i_2^* &= \frac{FC_2}{FC_1}, \\
    t &= \frac{w_d + FC_1}{w_d + FC_2}, \\
    t &\leq \min \left\{ \frac{w_d - FC_1}{w_d}, \frac{w_B - FC_2}{w_B} \right\}, \\
    x_d^* &= (1-t)w_d, \\
    x_B^* &= (1-t)w_B.
\end{align*}
\]  

In a symmetric case, when \(w_d = w_B = w\) and \(FC_1 = FC_2 = FC\), the Eqs. (17)-(21) imply

\[
\begin{align*}
    i_1^* &= i_2^*, \\
    t &\leq \frac{1}{2}; \\
    FC &\leq \frac{w}{2}; \\
    x_d^* &= x_B^* = w - FC.
\end{align*}
\]  

It is useful to compare received results (22)-(25) with the situation when the information goods \(i_1, i_2\) are sold on the market for prices \(p_1\) and \(p_2\), respectively.

Solving the utility maximization problem for the decision maker A (UMP\(_A\)) in this case

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{max } & \ln x_d + \ln i_d \\
\text{s.t. } & x_d \geq 0; \ i_d \geq 0; \\
& x_d + p_2 i_d \leq w_d + p_1 i_d - FC_1; \\
& x_d + p_2 i_d \leq w_d + p_1 i_d - FC_1; \\
& \pi_d = p_1 i_d - FC_1 \geq 0; \\
& \pi_B = p_2 i_d - FC_2 \geq 0
\end{align*}
\]

we can find the optimal consumption levels

\[
x_d^* = p_1 i_d^* = \frac{1}{2} \left( w_d + p_1 i_1 - FC_1 \right). 
\]

Similarly, solving the utility maximization problem for the decision maker B (UMP\(_B\))

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{max } & \ln x_B + \ln i_B \\
\text{s.t. } & x_B \geq 0; \ i_B \geq 0; \\
& x_B + p_2 i_B \leq w_B + p_1 i_B - FC_2; \\
& x_B + p_2 i_B \leq w_B + p_1 i_B - FC_2; \\
& \pi_B = p_2 i_d - FC_2 \geq 0;
\end{align*}
\]
\[ \pi_A = p_A^* - FC_1 \geq 0 \]

we can find the optimal consumption levels

\[ x_h^* = p_A^* = \frac{1}{2} (w_h + p_2 i_2 - FC_1) \] (39)

Combining the solution (27) of UMP_A (26) and the solution (29) of UMP_B (28) we obtain the following conditions for consumption levels

\[ x_i^* = p_2 i_2^* = \frac{2}{3} \left( w_i - FC_1 + \frac{1}{2} (w_h - FC_1) \right) \] (30)

\[ x_h^* = p_A^* = \frac{2}{3} \left( w_h - FC_2 + \frac{1}{2} (w_h - FC_1) \right) \] (31)

Note, that the information goods \( i_1, i_2 \) are sold on the market for unlimited flat rate.

From the assumption (1) we obtain the following conditions on the production costs:

\[ FC_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} \left( w_h - FC_2 + \frac{1}{2} w_h \right) \] (32)

\[ FC_2 \leq \frac{1}{2} \left( w_h - FC_1 + \frac{1}{2} w_h \right) \] (33)

In the symmetric case, when \( w_A = w_B = w \) and \( FC_1 = FC_2 = FC \), Eqs. (30)-(33) imply

\[ FC \leq \frac{w}{2} \] (34)

\[ x_i^* = x_h^* = p_A^* = p_2 i_2^* = w - FC \] (35)

Comparing (34)-(35) with (22)-(25) we can conclude, that the case when production of the information goods \( i_1, i_2 \) is subsidized from the tax proceeds and the case when the information goods \( i_1, i_2 \) are sold on the market for unlimited flat rate are equivalent. Both cases result in the same consumption levels and the same condition on production costs. It is necessary to mention, that the model, where no monopoly power can be applied at pricing of information, was used as benchmark.

The both cases capture only one aspect of information production, which is zero marginal cost, and ignore the network effect and effect of "free riding". These effects will be incorporated in the model in future.

**Conclusions**

The hypothesized tax on information goods, when production of the information goods is subsidized from the tax proceeds according to relative usage of the products can create a private incentive for information production as well as remove barriers for information diffusion and inefficiencies caused by current monopoly rights on intellectual property.
The paper presents an original model, which describes exchange and production of the information goods subsidized from hypothecated tax. This model is compared with the case when the information goods are sold on the market for unlimited flat rate. It was found that under assumption of homogeneous wealth and cost distributions the both cases result in the same consumption levels and the same condition on production costs.

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