Carneiro, Pedro; Hansen, Karsten; Heckman, James

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Estimating distributions of treatment effects with an application to the returns to schooling and measurement of the effects of uncertainty on college choice


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Estimating distributions of treatment effects with an application to the returns to schooling and measurement of the effects of uncertainty on college choice

Pedro Carneiro
Karsten Hansen
James Heckman
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Postal address: P.O. Box 513, 751 20 Uppsala
Visiting address: Kyrkogårdsgatan 6, Uppsala
Phone: +46 18 471 70 70
Fax: +46 18 471 70 71
ifau@ifau.uu.se
www.ifau.se

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Estimating Distributions of Treatment Effects with an Application to the Returns to Schooling and Measurement of the Effects of Uncertainty on College Choice

Pedro Carneiro, 1 Karsten T. Hansen, 2 and James J. Heckman 3

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Abstract

This paper uses factor models to identify and estimate distributions of counterfactuals. We extend LISREL frameworks to a dynamic treatment effect setting, extending matching to account for unobserved conditioning variables. Using these models, we can identify all pairwise and joint treatment effects. We apply these methods to a model of schooling and determine the intrinsic uncertainty facing agents at the time they make their decisions about enrollment in school. Reducing uncertainty in returns raises college enrollment. We go beyond the “Veil of Ignorance” in evaluating educational policies and determine who benefits and loses from commonly proposed educational reforms.

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Pedro Carneiro  
Department of Economics, The University of Chicago  
1126 E. 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637  
Telephone: (773) 256-6268  
Fax: (773) 256-6313  
E-mail: pmcarnei@midway.uchicago.edu

Karsten T. Hansen  
Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University  
2001 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60208  
Evanston, Illinois 60657  
Telephone: (847) 491-7098  
E-mail: karsten-hansen@kellogg.northwestern.edu

James J. Heckman  
Department of Economics, The University of Chicago, and The American Bar Foundation  
1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637  
Telephone: (773) 702-0634  
Fax: (773) 702-8490  
E-mail: jjh@uchicago.edu
1 Introduction

The recent literature on evaluating social programs finds that persons (or firms or institutions) respond to the same policy differently (Heckman, 2001). The distribution of these responses is usually summarized by some mean. A variety of means can be defined depending on the conditioning variables used. Different means answer different policy question. There is no uniquely defined “effect” of a policy.

The research reported here moves beyond means as descriptions of policy outcomes and determines joint counterfactual distributions of outcomes for alternative interventions. From knowledge of the joint distributions of counterfactual outcomes it is possible to determine the proportion of people who benefit or lose from making a particular policy choice (taking or not taking particular treatments), the origin and destination outcomes of those who change states because of policy interventions and the amount of gain (or loss) from various policy choices by persons at different deciles of an initial prepolicy distribution. Our work builds on previous research by Heckman and Smith (1993, 1998) and Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997) that uses experimental data to bound or point-identify joint counterfactual distributions. We extend the analysis of Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2003) who use factor models to identify counterfactual distributions to consider indicators for unobservables, implications from choice theory and to exploit the benefits of panel data.

From the joint distribution of counterfactuals, it is possible to generate all mean, median or other quantile gains, to identify all pairwise treatment effects in a multi-outcome setting, to determine how much of the variability in returns across persons comes from variability in destination distributions and how much comes from variability in opportunity distributions, and to evaluate the option value created by social programs. Using the joint distribution of counterfactuals, it is possible to develop a more nuanced understanding of the distributional impacts of public policies, and to move beyond comparisons of aggregate overall distributions induced by different policies to consider how people in different portions of an initial distribution are affected by public policy. We extend the analysis of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) to consider self-selection as a determinant of aggregate wage and earnings distributions.

Using our methods, we reanalyze the model of Willis and Rosen (1979), who apply the Roy model (1951) to the economics of education. We extend their model to account for uncertainty in the returns to education. We also distinguish between present value income maximizing and utility maximizing evaluations of schooling choices and we estimate the net non-pecuniary benefit of attending college. We use information on the choices of agents to determine how much of the \textit{ex post} heterogeneity in the return to schooling is forecastable at the time agents make their schooling choices. This procedure extends the analysis of Flavin (1981) to a discrete choice setting. This allows us to identify the effect of uncertainty on schooling choices. \textit{Ex ante}, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the returns to schooling (in utils or dollars). \textit{Ex post}, 8% of college graduates regret going to college.

The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the essential idea underlying the identification strategy used in this paper and how our approach is related to previous work. Section 3 presents a general policy evaluation framework for counterfactual distributions with multiple treatments followed over time. The strategy pursued in this paper is based on using low dimensional factors to generate distributions of potential outcomes. We show how our methods generalize the method of matching by allowing some or all of the variables that generate the conditional independence assumed in matching
to be unobserved by the analyst. Section 4 introduces the factor models used in this paper. Section 5 presents proofs of semiparametric identification. Section 6 applies the analysis to extend the Rosen-Willis model of college choice to account for uncertainty and to estimate the information about future earnings available to agents at the time schooling decisions are made. Section 7 reports estimates of the distributions of returns to schooling, the components unforecastable by the agent at the time schooling decisions are made, and the nonpecuniary net benefits from attending college. Section 8 applies our estimates to evaluate a reform to the U.S. educational system. It illustrates the power of our method to lift the commonly invoked Veil of Ignorance and move beyond aggregate distributions of outcomes to understand the distributional consequences of public policies. Section 9 concludes. We first provide a brief introduction to the literature to put this paper in context.

2 Estimating Distributions of Counterfactual Outcomes

In order to place the approach used in this paper in the context of an emerging literature on heterogeneous treatment effects, it is helpful to motivate our work by a two outcome, two-treatment cross section model. For simplicity, in this section it is assumed that the outcomes are continuous random variables. The analysis in the rest of this paper is for multiple treatments and multiple outcomes followed over time and the outcomes may be discrete, continuous or mixed discrete-continuous.

The agent has two possible counterfactual states \((Y_0, Y_1)\). The states are schooling levels in our empirical analysis. \(X\) is a determinant of the counterfactual states \((Y_0, Y_1)\), \(S = 1\) if \(Y_1\) is observed; \(S = 0\) otherwise. Observed \(Y = SY_1 + (1 - S)Y_0\). There may be an instrument (or set of instruments) \(Z\) such that \((Y_0, Y_1) \perp Z \mid X\) and \(Pr(S = 1 \mid Z, X)\) depends on \(Z\) for all \(X\) (i.e., it is a nontrivial function of \(Z\)) and \(Z\) is in the choice probability but not the outcome equation. We show below that such a \(Z\) is not strictly required in our approach. The standard treatment effect model assumes policies \((Z)\) that affect choices of treatment but not potential outcomes \((Y_0, Y_1)\). General equilibrium effects are ignored.5

The goal of our analysis is to recover \(F(Y_0, Y_1 \mid X)\). As noted in Heckman (1992), Heckman and Smith (1993, 1998) and Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), from this joint distribution it is possible to estimate the proportion of people who benefit (in terms of gross gains) from participation in the program \((Pr(Y_1 > Y_0 \mid X))\), gains to participants at selected levels of the no treatment, \((F(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid Y_0 = y_0, X))\), or treatment distribution \((F(Y_1 - Y_0 \mid Y_1 = y_1, X))\), the option value of social programs, and a variety of other questions that can be answered using distributions of potential outcomes including conventional mean treatment effects and quantiles of the gains \((Y_1 - Y_0)\) for those who receive treatment.

The problem of recovering joint distributions arises because we observe \(Y_0\) if \(S = 0\) and \(Y_1\) if \(S = 1\). Thus we know \(F(Y_0 \mid S = 0, X), F(Y_1 \mid S = 1, X)\) but not \(F(Y_0 \mid X)\) or \(F(Y_1 \mid X)\). In addition, we do not observe the pair \((Y_0, Y_1)\) for anyone. Thus we cannot directly obtain \(F(Y_1, Y_0 \mid S, X)\) from the data. Additional information is required to identify the joint distribution.

There are two separate problems. The first is a selection problem. From \(F(Y_1 \mid S = 1, X)\) and \(F(Y_0 \mid S = 0, X)\), under what conditions can one recover \(F(Y_1 \mid X)\) and \(F(Y_0 \mid X)\), respectively? The second problem is how to construct the joint distribution \(F(Y_0, Y_1 \mid X)\) from the two marginals.

Assuming that the selection problem can be surmounted, classical probability results due to Fréchet (1951) and Hoeffding (1940) show how to bound \(F(Y_1, Y_0 \mid S, X)\) using the marginal distributions. In practice these bounds are very wide, and the inferences based on the bounding distributions are often not useful.6
The traditional (pre-1985) approach to program evaluation assumed that $F(Y_0, Y_1 \mid X)$ is degenerate because conditional on $X$, $Y_1$ and $Y_0$ are deterministically related:

$$Y_1 = Y_0 + \Delta(X).$$

This is the “common effect” assumption that postulates that conditional on $X$, treatment has the same effect on everyone.

From the means of $F(Y_0 \mid S = 0, X)$ and $F(Y_1 \mid S = 1, X)$ corrected for selection, one can identify $E(\Delta(X)) = E(Y_1 \mid X) - E(Y_0 \mid X)$. (See Heckman and Robb, 1985; 1986 (reprinted 2000) for a variety of estimators for this case and for discussion of more general cases.) Heckman and Smith (1993, 1998) and Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) relax this assumption by assuming perfect ranking across the counterfactual outcome distributions. Assuming absolutely continuous marginal distributions, they postulate that quantiles are perfectly ranked so $Y_1 = F_{1,X}^{-1}(F_{1,X}(Y_0))$ where $F_{1,X} = F_1(y_1 \mid X)$ and $F_{0,X} = F_0(y_0 \mid X)$. This assumption generates a deterministic relationship which turns out to be the tight upper bound of the Fréchet bounds. An alternative assumption is that people are perfectly inversely ranked so the best in one distribution is the worst in the other: $Y_1 = F_{1,X}^{-1}(1 - F_{0,X}(Y_0))$. This is the tight Fréchet lower bound. More generally, one could associate quantiles across distributions more freely. Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997) use Markov transition kernels which stochastically map quantiles of one distribution into quantiles of another. They define a pair of Markov kernels $M(y_1, y_0 \mid X)$ and $\tilde{M}(y_0, y_1 \mid X)$ such that

$$F_1(y_1 \mid X) = \int M(y_1, y_0 \mid X) dF_0(y_0 \mid X)$$

$$F_0(y_0 \mid X) = \int \tilde{M}(y_0, y_1 \mid X) dF_1(y_1 \mid X).$$

Allowing these operators to be degenerate produces a variety of deterministic transformations, including the two previously presented, as special cases of a general mapping. Different $(M, \tilde{M})$ pairs produce different joint distributions. These stochastic or deterministic transformations supply the missing information needed to construct the joint distributions.

A perfect ranking (or perfect inverse ranking) assumption is convenient. It generalizes the perfect-ranking, constant-shift assumptions implicit in the conventional literature. It allows us to apply conditional quantile methods to estimate the distributions of gains. However, it imposes a strong arbitrary dependence across distributions. Our empirical analysis shows that this assumption is at odds with data on the returns to education.

An alternative approach to constructing joint distributions due to Heckman and Honoré (1990), Heckman (1990) and Heckman and Smith (1998) uses the economics of the model by assuming that

$$S = 1(\mu_s(Z) \geq e_s)$$

where $\mu_s(Z)$ is a mean net utility, $Z \perp e_s$, and “1” is a logical indicator $= 1$ if the argument is valid; $= 0$ otherwise. In
addition they assume that

\[ Y_1 = \mu_1(X) + U_1, \quad E(U_1) = 0 \]
\[ Y_0 = \mu_0(X) + U_0, \quad E(U_0) = 0 \]

where \((U_1, U_0) \perp \perp X, Z\).\(^9\) In the special case where \(S = 1\) (\(Y_1 \geq Y_0\)) (the Roy model), Heckman and Honoré (1990) present conditions on \(\mu_1, \mu_0\) and \(X\) such that \(F(U_1, U_0)\) and \(\mu_1(X), \mu_0(X)\) and hence \(F(Y_0, Y_1 | X)\) are identified from data on choices \((S)\), characteristics \((X)\) and observed outcomes \(Y = SY_1 + (1 - S)Y_0\). Buera (2002) extends their approach to non-separable models with weaker exclusion restrictions.

Heckman (1990) and Heckman and Smith (1998) consider more general decision rules of the form (2) under the assumption that \((Z,X) \perp \perp (U_0, U_1, e_s)\) and the further conditions that (i) \(\mu_s(Z)\) is a nontrivial function of \(Z\) conditional on \(X\) and (ii) full support assumptions on \(\mu_1(X), \mu_0(X)\) and \(\mu_s(Z)\), they establish nonparametric identification of \(F(U_0, e_s), F(U_1, e_s)\) up to a scale for \(\rho_s\) and \(\mu_1(X), \mu_0(X)\) and \(\mu_s(Z)\).\(^10\) Hence, under their assumptions, they can identify \(F(Y_0, S | X, Z)\) and \(F(Y_1, S | X, Z)\) but not the joint distributions \(F(Y_0, Y_1 | X)\) or \(F(Y_0, Y_1, S | X, Z)\) unless the \(U_0, U_1, e_s\) dependence is restricted.

Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2003) build on Heckman (1990) and Heckman and Smith (1998) by postulating a factor structure connecting \((U_0, U_1, e_s)\). Our work builds on their analysis so we describe its essential idea. Suppose that the unobservables follow a factor structure:

\[ U_0 = \alpha_0 \theta + \epsilon_0, \quad U_1 = \alpha_1 \theta + \epsilon_1, \quad e_s = \alpha_s \theta + \epsilon_s \]

where \(\theta \perp \perp (\epsilon_0, \epsilon_1, \epsilon_s)\) and the \(\epsilon\)’s are mutually independent. In their setup, \(\theta\) is a scalar. \(\theta\) can be an unobservable trait like ability or motivation that affects all outcomes. Because the factor loadings, \(\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_s\), may be different, the factors may affect outcomes and choices differently. Recall that one can identify \(F(U_0, e_s)\) and \(F(U_1, e_s)\) under the conditions specified in Heckman and Smith (1998) and generalized in Theorems 1-3 below. Thus, one can identify \(COV(U_0, e_s) = \alpha_0 \alpha_s \sigma^2_\theta\) and \(COV(U_1, e_s) = \alpha_1 \alpha_s \sigma^2_\theta\) assuming finite variances and assuming \(E(\theta) = 0, E(\theta^2) = \sigma^2_\theta\). With some normalizations (e.g., \(\sigma^2_\theta = 1, \alpha_s = 1\)), under conditions specified in Section 4.1, we can nonparametrically identify the distribution of \(\theta\) and the distributions of \(\epsilon_0, \epsilon_1, \epsilon_s\) (up to scale of the standard deviation of \(e_s, \sigma_{e_s}\)). Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) also present alternative identifying assumptions. With the \(\alpha_1, \alpha_0, \alpha_s\), and the distributions of \(\theta, \epsilon_0, \epsilon_1, \epsilon_s\) in hand, we can construct the joint distributions of \(F(Y_0, Y_1 | X)\).

This paper builds on this basic idea and extends it to a more general setting. We consider a model with multiple factors, multiple treatments and multiple time periods. Outcome measures may be discrete or continuous. We follow the psychometric literature by adjoining measurement equations to outcome equations to pin down the distribution of \(\theta\). With this framework we can estimate all pairwise treatment effects in a multiple outcome setting. We also consider the benefits for identification of having access to measurements on vector \(\theta\) which are observed for all persons independent of their treatment status. This model integrates the LISREL framework of Jöreskog (1977) into a model of discrete choice and a model of multiple treatment effects. We develop this model in Section 4 after presenting a more general framework for counterfactuals and treatment
effects in a multi-outcome, possibly dynamic setting.

3 Policy Counterfactuals for the Multiple Outcome Case

This section defines policy counterfactuals for the multiple treatment case. For specificity, think of states as schooling levels and different ages as periods in the life cycle. Associated with each state \( s \) (schooling level) is a vector of outcomes at age \( a \) for person \( \omega \in \Omega \) (a set of indices) with elements:

\[
Y_{s,a}(\omega) \quad s = 1, ..., \tilde{S}, \ a = 1, ..., \tilde{A}
\]

where there are \( \tilde{S} \) states and \( \tilde{A} \) ages. Associated with each person \( \omega \) is a vector \( X(\omega) \) of explanatory variables. These may be different at different ages and in different states.

The *ceteris paribus* effect (or individual treatment effect) of a change from state \( s \) at age \( a \) to state \( s' \) at age \( a'' \) is

\[
\Delta((s,a), (s',a'')) = Y_{s,a}(\omega) - Y_{s',a''}(\omega).
\]

Since it is usually not possible to observe the same person in both \( s \) and \( s' \), analysts often focus on estimating various population level versions of these parameters for different conditioning sets. In this paper, we estimate distributions of potential outcomes and parameters derived from these distributions, including the *Average Treatment Effect*

\[
ATE((s,a), (s',a''), x) = E(Y_{s,a} - Y_{s',a''} | X = x)
\]

and the *Marginal Treatment Effect*, the average gain from moving from \( s \) to \( s' \) for those on the margin of indifference between \( s \) and \( s' \). We are interested in determining the joint distributions of the counterfactual distributions of \( \Delta((s,a), (s',a''), x) \) for different conditioning sets.

Associated with each treatment or state (schooling choice) is a choice equation associated with a level of lifetime utility: \( V_s(\omega), \ s = 1, ..., \tilde{S} \). Utilities are assumed to be absolutely continuous. Agents select treatment states (schooling levels) \( \tilde{s} \) to maximize utility:

\[
\tilde{s} = \arg\max_s \{V_s(\omega)\}^\tilde{S}.
\]

Associated with choices are explanatory variables \( Z(\omega) \). A distinctive feature of the econometric approach to program evaluation is that it evaluates policies both in terms of objective outcomes (the \( Y_{s,a}(\omega) \)) and in terms of subjective outcomes (the utilities of the agents making the choices). Both subjective and objective evaluations are useful in evaluating policy. Choice theory is also used to guide and rationalize specific choices of estimators. It enables us to separate out variability from intrinsic uncertainty, as we demonstrate below.

This framework is sufficiently general to encompass a variety of choice processes including sequential dynamic programming models\(^{12}\) and the ordered choice models,\(^{13}\) as well as more general unordered choice models. We let \( D_s = 1 \) if treatment \( s \) is
selected. Since there are \( \bar{S} \) mutually exclusive states, \( \sum_{s=1}^{\bar{S}} D_s = 1. \)

In this notation, the marginal treatment effect for choices \( s \) and \( s' \) is

\[
MTE_{V_s \to V_{s'}}(a, \{V_{s,s'}\}_{s'=1,s'\neq s}^{\bar{S}}) = E(Y_{s,a} - Y_{s',a} | V_s = V_{s'} = V_{s,s'} \geq V_j, \ j \neq s, s').
\]

It is the average gain of going from \( s' \) to \( s \) at age \( a \) for persons indifferent between \( s \) and \( s' \) given that \( s \) and \( s' \) are the best two choices in the choice set.

Aggregating over choices \( s' = 1, \ldots, \bar{S}; s' \neq s \), we may define the marginal treatment effect over all origin states as

\[
MTE_s(a, \{V_{s,s'}\}_{s'=1,s'\neq s}^{\bar{S}}) = \frac{\sum_{s'=1}^{\bar{S}} MTE_{V_s \to V_{s'}}(a, \{V_{s,s'}\}_{s'=1,s'\neq s}^{\bar{S}})(f(V_s, V_{s'} | V_s = V_{s'} = V_{s,s'} \geq V_j, \ j \neq s, s')/\psi)}{\psi}
\]

the weighted average of the pairwise marginal treatment effects from all source states to \( s \) with the weights being the density of persons at each relevant margin for each possible value of utility, where

\[
\psi = \sum_{s'=1}^{\bar{S}} f(V_s, V_{s'} | V_s = V_{s'} = V_{s,s'} \geq V_j, \ j \neq s, s')
\]

is a normalizing constant (the population proportion of people at all margins), assumed positive.

We next present a framework for estimating the distributions of the treatment effects and the parameters derived from them, which allows us to estimate the parameters defined in this section as well as other parameters. To simplify notation, we suppress the \( \omega \) argument in the rest of the paper.

4 Factor Structure Models

The strategy adopted in this paper identifies the distribution of counterfactuals by postulating a low dimensional set of factors \( \theta \) so that, conditional on them, and the covariates \( X \) and \( Z \), the \( Y_{s,a} \) and \( V_s \) are jointly independent. The distributions of the \( \theta \) are nonparametrically identified under conditions specified below. With these distributions in hand, it is possible to construct the distribution of counterfactuals. Under the conditions specified in Section 5, it is possible with low dimensional factors to nonparametrically identify the counterfactual distributions and to estimate all of the treatment effects in the literature suitably expanded to multidimensional versions.

Throughout this paper we analyze a separable-in-the-errors system. Thus preferences can be described by

\[
V_s = \mu_s(Z) - e_s \quad s = 1, \ldots, \bar{S}.
\]

It is conventional to assume that \( \mu_s(Z) = Z' \beta_s \) with \( s = 1, \ldots, \bar{S} \). Linear approximations to value functions are advocated
by Heckman (1981), Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and developed systematically in Geweke, Houser and Keane (2001). Our approach does not require linearity but critically relies on separability between the deterministic portion of the model and the errors $e_s$. Following Heckman (1981), Cameron and Heckman (1987, 1998), and McFadden (1984), write

\begin{equation}
    e_s = \alpha_s' \theta + \varepsilon_s
\end{equation}

where $\theta$ is a $K \times 1$ vector of mutually independent factors ($\theta_\ell \perp \perp \theta_{\ell' \neq \ell}$) and define $\varepsilon^s = (\varepsilon_1, \ldots, \varepsilon_{S})$

\begin{equation}
    \theta \perp \perp \varepsilon^s \ \ \ v\varepsilon_s \perp \perp \varepsilon_{s'} \ \ \ \forall s, s' = 1, \ldots, S \text{ and } s \neq s'
\end{equation}

$E(\theta) = 0; \ E(\varepsilon^s) = 0; \ D_k = 1$ if $V_k$ is maximal in $\{V_s(Z)\}_{s=1}^S$.14

Potential outcomes at age $a$, $Y^*_s,a$, are stochastically dependent among each other and the choices only through their dependence on the observables $X,Z$ and the factors $\theta$:

\begin{equation}
    Y^*_s,a = \mu_s,a(X) + \alpha_{s,a}' \theta + \varepsilon_{s,a}
\end{equation}

where $E(\varepsilon_{s,a}) = 0$.

Potential outcomes are separable in observables and unobservables. A linear-in-parameters version writes $\mu_{s,a}(X) = X'\beta_{s,a}$. Define $\varepsilon^Y = (\varepsilon_1, \ldots, \varepsilon_{1,A}, \ldots, \varepsilon_{S,1}, \ldots, \varepsilon_{S,X}, \ldots, \varepsilon_{S,A})$

\begin{equation}
    \theta \perp \perp \varepsilon^Y
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
    \varepsilon_{s,a} \perp \perp \varepsilon_{s',a''}; \ \ \ \forall s \neq s', \ \ \ \forall a, a''
\end{equation}

and

\begin{equation}
    \varepsilon_{s,a} \perp \perp \varepsilon_{s'}; \ \ \forall s', s = 1, \ldots, S; \ \ \forall a = 1, \ldots, A.
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
    (Z, X) \perp \perp (\theta, \varepsilon^Y, \varepsilon^s)
\end{equation}

The $Y^*_s,a$ may be vector valued.

When the outcome is continuous, the observed value corresponds to the latent variable ($Y_{s,a} = Y^*_s,a$). When the outcome is discrete ($e.g.$, employment status), we interpret $Y^*_s,a$ in (11) as a latent variable. In that case, $Y_{s,a}$ is an indicator function $Y_{s,a} = 1(Y^*_s,a \geq 0)$. Tobit and other censored cases can be accommodated. Other mixed discrete-continuous cases can be handled in a conventional fashion.15

One motivation for the factor representation is that agents may observe $\theta$ (or variables that span $\theta$) and act on it ($e.g.$,
choose schooling levels), while the econometrician does not observe \( \theta \). Below, we present methods for testing whether agents observe \( \theta \). Conditional on \( \theta \) and \( X \), the potential outcomes are independent. If (12)-(14) accurately describe the data generating process, we obtain the conditional independence assumptions used in matching (see, e.g., Cochran and Rubin, 1973; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).

In matching it is assumed that \( Y_{s,a} \perp \perp D_s \mid X = x, Z = z, \theta = \theta \) for all \( s \). From this assumption, we can identify ATE from the right hand side terms which are observed outcomes if \( \theta \) is observable:

\[
E(Y_{s,a} - Y_{s',a} \mid X, Z, \theta) = E(Y_{s,a} \mid X, Z, D_s = 1) - E(Y_{s',a} \mid X, Z, D_{s'} = 1)
\]

and treatment on the treated, ATE and MTE are the same parameter conditional on \( \theta \), \( X \) and \( Z \) (Heckman, 2001; Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2003). Our framework differs from matching by allowing the factors that generate the conditional independence that underlies matching to be unobserved by the analyst. In this sense, our approach is more robust than matching. The price for this robustness is the assumed independence between \( \theta \) and \((X, Z)\).

Factor structure models are notorious for being identified by arbitrary normalization and exclusion restrictions. To reduce this arbitrariness and render greater interpretability to estimates obtained from our model, we adjoin a measurement system to choice equations (8) and outcome system (11). Various measurements can be interpreted as indicators of specific factors (e.g., test scores may proxy ability). Having measurements on the factors also facilitates identifiability under weaker assumptions as we demonstrate in Section 5. However, measurements are not strictly required for identifiability. Outcome, measurement, and choice equations are interchangeable sources of identifiability in a sense that we make precise in Section 5.

Consider a system of \( L \) measurements on the \( K \) factors, initially assumed to be for continuous outcome measures:

\[
M_1 = \mu_1(X) + \beta_1\theta_1 + \ldots + \beta_K\theta_K + \varepsilon_1^M \\
\vdots \\
M_L = \mu_L(X) + \beta_L\theta_1 + \ldots + \beta_L\theta_K + \varepsilon_L^M
\]

\( \varepsilon^M = (\varepsilon_1^M, \ldots, \varepsilon_L^M) \), \( E(\varepsilon^M) = 0 \) and where we assume \( \theta = (\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_K) \perp \perp (\varepsilon_1^M, \ldots, \varepsilon_L^M) \), \( \theta \perp \perp \varepsilon^M \), \( \theta \perp \perp \varepsilon^s \), \( \varepsilon^s \perp \perp \varepsilon^M \), \( \varepsilon_i^M \perp \perp \varepsilon_j^M \) \( \forall i \neq j \), and \( i, j = 1, \ldots, L \). For interpretability, we assume \( \theta_i \perp \perp \theta_j, \forall i \neq j, i, j = 1, \ldots, K \). We develop the case with discrete measurements on latent continuous variables in Section 5. One can think of the outcome measures as an \( s \)-dependent measurement system. The measures (16) are the same across all \( s \).

Measurement system (16) allows for fallible measures of outcomes. Thus in our schooling choice analysis, we are not committed to the infallibility of test scores as measurements of ability. Measurement system (16) allows us to proxy unobservables accounting for measurement error using the replacement function concept of Heckman and Robb (1985) and hence enables us to improve on the proxy procedure of Olley and Pakes (1996) which assumes no measurement error.

**Choice Equations**

Our analysis applies to both ordered discrete choice models and unordered choice models as analyzed by Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2001). In this paper, we focus attention on a new ordered choice model.
Other choice models can easily be accommodated in our framework and richer models are a source of additional identifying information.\footnote{17}

For an ordered discrete choice model, let utility index \( I \) be written as

\begin{equation}
I = \varphi(Z) + \varepsilon_W, \quad \varepsilon_W = \gamma' \theta + \varepsilon_I, \quad \sigma_W^2 = \gamma' \sum_\theta \gamma + \sigma_I^2
\end{equation}

where \( E(\varepsilon_I^2) = \sigma_I^2 \), and \( \sum_\theta \) is the covariance matrix of \( \theta \). A linear-in-parameters version which is the one developed in this paper writes \( \varphi(Z) = Z \eta \). Choices are generated by index \( \varphi(Z) \) falling in various intervals.

\begin{equation}
D_1 = 1 \text{ if } -\infty < I \leq c_1 \\
D_s = 1 \iff c_{s-1} < I \leq c_s \quad s = 2, \ldots, \bar{S} - 1 \\
D_{\bar{S}} = 1 \text{ if } c_{\bar{S}-1} < I < \infty.
\end{equation}

Thus \( c_0 = -\infty \). It is required that \( c_s \geq c_{s-1} \) for all \( s \geq 2 \). This is a special case of random utility model (8) in which states are ordered and pairwise contrasts possess a special structure.\footnote{18}

We can parameterize the \( c_s \) to be functions of state-specific regressors, e.g., \( c_s = Q_s \rho_s \) where we restrict \( c_s \geq c_{s-1} \). We could also follow a suggestion in Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) and incorporate one sided shocks \( \nu_s \) and work with stochastic thresholds \( \tilde{c}_s \) in place of \( c_s : \tilde{c}_s = c_s + \nu_s, \quad s = 1, \ldots, \bar{S} - 1 \) where \( \nu_s \geq \nu_{s-1} \) and \( \nu_s \geq 0 \).\footnote{19}

Conditioning on \( Q_s = q_s, s = 1, \ldots, \bar{S} \), and assuming that the \( \text{Support}(Z \mid Q_s = q_s, s = 1, \ldots, \bar{S}) = \text{Support}(\varepsilon_W) \), we can apply the conditions presented in Cameron and Heckman (1998) to identify the distribution of \( F_{\varepsilon_W, \eta, c_1, \ldots, c_{\bar{S}-1}} \) up to scale \( \sigma_W \). We can nonparametrically identify \( c_s(Q_s) \) over the support of \( Q_s \) under conditions specified in Theorem 2 below. Unlike the case of the more general unordered discrete choice model (see Elrod and Keane, 1995; Ben Akiva et al., 2001), without further restrictions on the distribution of \( \varepsilon_W \), we cannot identify the factors generating \( \varepsilon_W \) using only choice data. Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2003) present an analysis parallel to the one given here for a multinomial probit model. In that model, the distributions of factors can be identified from choice data.

\subsection{Models for Factors}

Factor models are notorious for being identified through arbitrary assumptions about how factors enter outcome and choice equations. This led to their disuse after their introduction into economics by Jöreskog and Goldberger (1972), Goldberger (1972), Chamberlain and Griliches (1975) and Chamberlain (1977a, b).

The essential identification problem in factor analysis is clearly stated by Anderson and Rubin (1956). If there are \( L \) measurements on \( K \) mutually independent factors arrayed in a vector \( \theta \), we may write outcomes \( G \) in terms of latent variables \( \theta \) as

\begin{equation}
G = \mu + \Lambda \theta + \varepsilon
\end{equation}

where \( G \) is \( L \times 1 \), \( \theta \perp \perp \varepsilon \), \( \mu \) is an \( L \times 1 \) vector of means, which may depend on \( X \), \( \theta \) is \( K \times 1 \), \( \varepsilon \) is \( L \times 1 \) and \( \Lambda \) is \( L \times K \).
\( \varepsilon_i \perp \varepsilon_j, \ i, j = 1,..,L, i \neq j. \) At this point, \( \varepsilon \) is a general notation which will be linked to specific \( \varepsilon \)'s in Section 5. Even if \( \theta_i \perp \theta_j, \ i \neq j, i,j = 1,..,K, \) the model is underidentified. As we shall see, the \( G \) in this paper is a more general system than the system based solely on measurements invariant across states \( M \) so we distinguish (16) and (19). It will include \( M \) as well as state dependent outcomes \( (Y^*_{n,a}) \) and the indices generating choice equations.

Using only the information in the covariance matrices, as is common in factor analysis,

\[
COV(G) = \Lambda \Sigma_{\theta} \Lambda' + D_{\varepsilon}
\]

where \( \Sigma_{\theta} \) is a diagonal matrix of the variances of the factors, and \( D_{\varepsilon} \) is a diagonal matrix of the “uniqueness” variances. We observe \( G \) but not \( \theta \) or \( \varepsilon \), and we seek to identify \( \Lambda, \Sigma_{\theta} \) and \( D_{\varepsilon} \). Without some restrictions, this is clearly an impossible task. Conventional factor-analytic models make assumptions to identify parameters. The restriction that the components of \( \theta \) are independent is one restriction that we have already made, but it is not enough. The diagonals of \( COV(G) \) combine elements of \( D_{\varepsilon} \) with parameters from the rest of the model. Once those other parameters are determined, the diagonals identify \( D_{\varepsilon} \). Accordingly, we can only rely on the \( \frac{L(L-1)}{2} \) non-diagonal elements to identify the \( K \) variances (assuming \( \theta_i \perp \theta_j, \ \forall i \neq j \)), and the \( L \times K \) factor loadings. Since the scale of each \( \theta_i \) is arbitrary, one factor loading devoted to each factor is normalized to unity to set the scale. Accordingly, we require that

\[
\frac{L(L-1)}{2} \geq \frac{(L \times K - K)}{K} + K
\]

so

\[
L \geq 2K + 1
\]

is a necessary condition for identification.

The strategy pursued in this paper is transparent and assumes that there are two or more measurements devoted exclusively to factor \( \theta_1 \), and at least three measurements that are generated by factor \( \theta_1 \), two or more further measurements devoted only to factors \( \theta_1 \) and \( \theta_2 \), with at least three measurements on \( \theta_2 \), and so forth in blocks of at least two. This strategy is motivated by our access to psychometric and longitudinal data. Test scores may only proxy ability (\( \theta_1 \)). Other measurements may proxy only (\( \theta_1, \theta_2 \)). Measurements on earnings from panel data may proxy (\( \theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3 \)), etc.

Order \( G \) under this assumption so that we get the following pattern for \( \Lambda \) (we assume that the displayed \( \lambda_{ij} \) are not zero):

\[
\]
\[
\Lambda = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & \ldots & 0 \\
\lambda_{21} & 0 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & \ldots & 0 \\
\lambda_{31} & 1 & 0 & 0 & \ldots & \ldots & 0 \\
\lambda_{41} & \lambda_{42} & 0 & 0 & \ldots & \ldots & 0 \\
\lambda_{51} & \lambda_{52} & 1 & 0 & \ldots & \ldots & 0 \\
\lambda_{61} & \lambda_{62} & \lambda_{63} & 0 & \ldots & \ldots & 0 \\
\lambda_{71} & \lambda_{72} & \lambda_{73} & 1 & \ldots & \ldots & 0 \\
\lambda_{81} & \lambda_{82} & \lambda_{83} & \lambda_{84} & \ldots & \ldots & 0 \\
\ldots & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots \\
\lambda_{L,1} & \lambda_{L,2} & \lambda_{L,3} & \ldots & \ldots & \ldots & \lambda_{L,K}
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

Assuming nonzero covariances

\[COV(g_j, g_l) = \lambda_{j1} \lambda_{l1} \sigma^2_{\theta_1}, \quad l = 1, 2; \quad j = 1, \ldots, L; \quad j \neq l.\]

In particular

\[COV(g_1, g_l) = \lambda_{l1} \sigma^2_{\theta_1},\]
\[COV(g_2, g_l) = \lambda_{l1} \lambda_{21} \sigma^2_{\theta_1}.\]

Assuming \(\lambda_{l1} \neq 0\), we obtain

\[\frac{COV(g_2, g_l)}{COV(g_1, g_l)} = \lambda_{21}.\]

Hence, from \(COV(g_1, g_l) = \lambda_{21} \sigma^2_{\theta_1}\), we obtain \(\sigma^2_{\theta_1}\), and hence \(\lambda_{i1}, \ell = 1, \ldots, L\). We can proceed to the next set of two measurements and identify

\[COV(g_l, g_j) = \lambda_{l1} \lambda_{j1} \sigma^2_{\theta_1} + \lambda_{l2} \lambda_{j2} \sigma^2_{\theta_2}, \quad l = 3, 4; \quad j \geq 3; \quad j \neq l.\]

Since we know the first term on the right hand side by the previous argument, we can proceed using \(COV(g_l, g_j) - \lambda_{l1} \lambda_{j1} \sigma^2_{\theta_1}\) and identify the \(\lambda_{j2}, j = 1, \ldots, L\) using the previous line of reasoning (some of these elements are fixed to zero). Proceeding in this fashion, we can identify \(\Lambda\) and \(\Sigma_{\theta}\) subject to diagonal normalizations. This argument works for all but the system for the \(K^{th}\) and final factor. Observe that for all of the preceding factors there are at least three measurements that depend on \(\theta_j, j = 1, K - 1\), although only two of the measurements need to depend solely on \(\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_j\). (This argument is obvious when \(K = 1\).) To obtain the necessary three measurements for the \(K^{th}\) and final factor, we require that there be at least three outcomes with measurements that depend on \(\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_K\). Knowing \(\Lambda\) and \(\Sigma_{\theta}\), we can identify \(D_\varepsilon\). Use of dedicated
measurement systems for specific factors and panel data helps to eliminate much of the arbitrariness that plagued factor analysis in its 1970’s introduction in economics. While many other restrictions on the model are possible, the one we adopt has the advantage of simplicity and interpretability in many contexts.\textsuperscript{20}

Our analysis uses a version of (19), coupled with the exclusion restrictions exemplified in (21), to identify the joint distributions of counterfactuals. We extend conventional factor analysis in three ways. First, following Heckman (1981) and Muthen (1984), we allow the \( G \) to include latent index functions like \( I \) (associated with the choice equations) or like \( Y_{s,a}^* \) as well as their manifestations. Thus the \( G \) may include discrete or censored random variables generated by latent random variables. We can identify components associated solely with the discrete case only up to unknown scale factors – the familiar indeterminacy in discrete choice analysis. Choice indices, measurements and state contingent outcomes are all informative on \( \theta \). The factor analysis in this paper is conducted on the latent continuous variables that generate the manifest outcomes. Second, we extend factor analysis to a case with counterfactuals where certain variables are only observed if state \( s \) is observed. This extension enables us to identify the full joint distribution of counterfactuals. Third, we prove nonparametric identification of the distributions of \( \theta \) and \( \varepsilon \), and do not rely on any normality assumptions.

5 Identification of Semiparametric Factor Models with Discrete Choices and Discrete and Continuous Outcomes

In order to establish identification, we need to be clear about the raw data with which we are working. For each set of \( s \)-contingent potential outcomes, there is a system like (19): \( G_s = (M_s, Y_s, D_s) \) where \( Y_s \) is a vector of state contingent outcomes. Outcome variables in \( G_s \) are of two types: (a) continuous variables and (b) discrete or censored random variables, including binary strings associated with durations (e.g., unemployment).

Let \( M^c \) denote the continuous measurements, and let \( Y_s^c \) be the continuous counterfactual outcomes. Let \( M^d \) be the discrete components of \( M \), while \( Y_s^d \) are the discrete components of \( Y_s \). Table 1 defines the variables used in our analysis.

Under separability the continuous variables can be written as

\[
M^c = \mu^c_m(X) + U^c_m \\
Y_s^c = \mu^c_s(X) + U^c_s
\]

Associated with the discrete variables are latent continuous variables

\[
M^*d = \mu^d_m(X) + U^d_m \\
Y^*d_s = \mu^d_s(X) + U^d_s
\]

where \( U^d_m, U^d_s \) are assumed to be continuous.\textsuperscript{21} The indicator variable is generated by latent variable \( I \) as defined in (17).\textsuperscript{22}

The data used for the factor analysis are \( M^c, M^*d, Y_s^c, Y^*d_s \) and \( I \). For simplicity, in this paper assume that the “discrete” variables are in fact binary valued. Extensions to censored random variables and to binary strings are straightforward and
are developed in a later paper. We observe \( G_s \) when \( D_s = 1 \). For each \( s \), we have a system of outcome variables. While the outcomes are \( s \)-dependent, the measurements are observed independently of the value assumed by \( D_s \).

The distinction between measurements (\( M \)) whose sampled values do not depend on the value assumed by \( D_s \), and the state contingent outcomes \( Y_s \) depend on the state \( s \) that is observed, is essential. There is no selection bias in observing \( M \) but in general there is selection bias in observing \( Y = \sum_{s=1}^{S} D_s Y_s \).

\( M, Y, \) and \( D_s, s = 1, \ldots, S \) all contain information on \( \theta \). The information from \( M \) is easier to access, and traditional factor analysis is based on such measurements. Nonetheless, the identification of the counterfactual states does not require \( M \). If \( M \) is available, however, the interpretation of \( \theta \) is more transparent.

Before turning to our factor analysis, we first establish conditions under which we can identify the joint distribution of \( M_c, M^{sd}, Y_c, Y^{sd} \), which constitute the data for the factor analysis. To understand the basic ideas, we break this task into three parts: (a) identification of the joint distribution of \( (M_c, \theta) \); (b) identification of the parameters in choice system (17) and (18) and (c) identification of the full joint distribution of \( (M_c, M^{sd}, Y_c, Y^{sd}, I) \), and this distribution is subsequently factor analyzed.

We assume that

\[(A-1) \ U_m^c, U_m^{d}, U_s^c, U_s^{d}, \varepsilon_W \ \text{have distribution functions that are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure with mean or median zero with support } U_m^c \times U_m^{d} \times U_s^c \times U_s^{d} \times \mathbb{R} \ \text{with upper and lower limits being } \bar{U}_m^c, \bar{U}_m^{d}, \bar{U}_s^c, \bar{U}_s^{d}, \varepsilon_W \ \text{and } \underline{U}_m^c, \underline{U}_m^{d}, \underline{U}_s^c, \underline{U}_s^{d}, \varepsilon_W, \ \text{respectively, which may be bounded or infinite. The cumulative distribution function of } \varepsilon_W \ \text{is assumed to be strictly increasing over its full support } (\underline{\varepsilon}_W, \bar{\varepsilon}_W). \ \text{Thus the joint system is measurably separable (variation free).}^{23} \ \text{We assume finite variances.}^{24} \]

\[(A-2) \ (X, Z, Q) \perp (U, \varepsilon_W) \ \text{where } U = (U_m^c, U_m^{d}, U_s^c, U_s^{d}), \ \text{where } Q \ \text{is a vector of state-specific regressors } Q = (Q_1, \ldots, Q_S). \]

We denote by “~” normalized values where the normalizations in our context are usually standard deviations of latent index errors. We first consider identification of the joint distribution of \( M \). Our results are contained in Theorem 1.

**Theorem 1** From data on \( F(M \mid X) \), one can identify the joint distribution of \( (U_m^c, U_m^{d}) \), (the latter component only up to scale) the function \( \mu_m^d(X) \) is identified and \( \mu_m^c(X) \) is identified over the support of \( X \) (up to scale) provided that the following assumptions, in addition to the relevant components of (A-1) and (A-2), are invoked.

\[(A-3) \ \text{Order the discrete measurement components to be first. Suppose that there are } N_{m,d} \ \text{discrete components, followed by } N_{m,c} \ \text{continuous components. Assume Support} \left( \mu_{1,m}^d(X), \ldots, \mu_{N_{m,d,m}}^d(X) \right) \supset \text{Support } \left( U_{1,m}^d, \ldots, U_{N_{m,m}}^d \right). \]

Conditions (A-1) and (A-3) imply that \( \left( \mu_{1,m}^d(X), \ldots, \mu_{N_{m,d,m}}^d(X) \right) \) is measurably separable (variation free) in all of its coordinates when “\( \supset \)” is replaced by “=.”

\[(A-4) \ \text{For each } l = 1, \ldots, N_{m,d} \ \mu_{l,m}^d(X) = X_{\delta_{l,m}^d}^d. \]

\[(A-5) \ \text{The } X \ \text{lives in a subset of } \mathbb{R}^{N_X}. \ \text{There exists no linear proper subspace of } \mathbb{R}^{N_X} \ \text{having probability 1 under } F_X, \ \text{the distribution function of } X. \]
Proof: See Appendix A.

Condition (A-4) is conventional (See Cosslett, 1983, or Manski, 1988). Weaker conditions are available using the analysis of Matzkin (1992, 1993). Support condition (A-3) appears in Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999). The easiest way to satisfy it is to have exclusions: one continuous component in \( \mu_{l,m}^d(X) \) that is not an argument in the others. But that is only a sufficient condition. Even without exclusion, this condition can be satisfied if there are enough continuous regressors in \( X \) and the \( \mu_{l,m}^d(X) \) have a full rank Jacobian - with respect to the derivatives of the continuous \( (X) \) variables. Intuitively, if the rank condition is satisfied, we can hold \( \mu_{l,m}^d(X) \) at \( \bar{\mu}_{l,m}^d \) and vary the other arguments. Formally, this rank condition requires that if we array the coefficients of the continuous variables coefficients of \( \beta_{l,m}^d, \bar{\beta}_{l,m}^d \), into a \( N_{m,d} \times X \) matrix, where \( N_{X} \) is the number of continuous components of \( X \), that \( \text{Rank} \{ \beta_{l,m}^d \}_{l=1}^{N_{m,d}} \geq N_{m,d} \). This requires \( N_{m,d} \) continuous variables. It also requires that the coefficients are linearly independent. If the number of continuous components is \( N_{X} < N_{m,d} \), we can only identify \( N_{X} \) components of the distribution of \( U_{m}^d \). We can trace out the distribution of the latent variables even if the \( X \) are not of full rank, so (A-5) is not strictly required. Observe that we can identify the joint distribution of the \( U_{m} \) even if all components of \( \beta \) are not identified because of a failure of a rank condition. See Cameron and Heckman (1998), Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) or Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2003) for more discussion of this case of identification without conventional exclusion restrictions.

We next turn to identification of the generalized ordered discrete choice model (17). This extends the proof in Cameron and Heckman (1998) by parameterizing the cut points. A more general version of this paper appears in Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2001).

**Theorem 2** For the relevant subsets of the conditions (A-1), and (A-2) (specifically, assuming absolute continuity of the distribution of \( \varepsilon_W \) with respect to Lebesgue measure and \( \varepsilon_W \perp (Z,Q) \)), and the additional assumptions:

(A-6) \( c_s(Q_s) = Q_s \eta_s, s = 1, ..., \bar{s}, \varphi(Z) = Z' \beta \)

(A-7) \((Q_1, Z)\) is full rank (there is no proper subspace of the support \((Q_1, Z)\) with probability 1. The \( Z \) contains no intercept.).

(A-8) \((Q_s, Q_{s-1}, Z)\) are measurably separable (variation free) over their domains of definition for each \( s = 2, \ldots, \bar{s} \). The \( Q \) contain no constants.

(A-9) Support \((c(Q_1) - \varphi(Z)) \supseteq \text{Support} (\varepsilon_W)\)

Then the distribution function \( F_{\varepsilon_W} \) is known up to a scale normalization on \( \varepsilon_W \) and \( c_s(Q_s), s = 1, ..., \bar{s}, \) and \( \varphi(Z) \) are identified up to a scale normalization.

**Proof:** See Appendix A.

Our choice system can be made nonparametric using the type of restrictions introduced in Matzkin, although we eschew that generality here. Matzkin and Lewbel (2002) weaken (A-6) generalizing the analysis of Matzkin (1992) assuming that the \( c_s \) are constants.

We next turn to the identification of the joint system \((M^c, M^{sd}, Y^c_s, Y^{sd}_s, I)\). The data for each choice system (including
the data on choice probabilities) generate the left hand side

\begin{equation}
\Pr (M^c \leq m^c, M^{sd} \geq 0, Y_s^c \leq y_s^c, Y_s^{sd} \geq 0 | D_s = 1, X, Z, Q_s, Q_{s-1}) \Pr (D_s = 1 | Z, Q_s, Q_{s-1})
\end{equation}

\[ = \int_{\mathcal{U}_m} \int_{\mathcal{Z}_d} \int_{\mathcal{U}_c} \int_{\mathcal{Z}_c} \int_{\mathcal{F}_W} \frac{c_s(Q_s)-\phi(Z)}{\sigma_W} f \left( U_m^c, \tilde{U}_m^d, U_c^c, \tilde{U}_c^d, \tilde{Z}_W \right) dU_m^c d\tilde{U}_m^d dU_c^c d\tilde{U}_c^d d\tilde{Z}_W. \]

From Theorem 1 we know \( \mu_m^c(X) = X \beta_m^c \) and \( \mu_m^d(X) = X \beta_m^d \) and the joint distribution of \((U_m^c, U_m^d)\). From Theorem 2, we know \( c_s(Q_s) = \frac{\eta_s - Z^\beta}{\sigma_w} \), \( s = 1, \ldots, S \) and the coefficients \( \eta_s, \beta \) and the distribution \( F_{\tilde{Z}_W} \). Notice that \( c_s(Q_s) \geq c_{s-1}(Q_{s-1}) \) is a requirement of the ordered choice model. We maintain the following assumptions:

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(A-10)] \( \text{Support} \left( -\mu_m^d(X), -\mu_s^d(X), \left( \frac{c_s(Q_s)-\phi(Z)}{\sigma_W} - \frac{c_{s-1}(Q_{s-1})-\phi(Z)}{\sigma_W} \right) \right) \supseteq \text{Support} \left( U_m^d, U_s^d, \tilde{Z}_W \right) = (\mathcal{U}_m^d \times \mathcal{U}_s^d \times \tilde{E}_W). \)
\end{enumerate}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(A-11)] There is no proper linear subspace of \((X, Z, Q_s, Q_{s-1})\) with probability one so the model is full rank.
\end{enumerate}

As a consequence of (A-6) and (A-10) we can find values of \( Q_s, Q_{s-1}, \tilde{Q}_s, Q_{s-1} \) respectively so that

\[ \lim_{Q_{s-1} \to \tilde{Q}_{s-1}} \Pr (D_s = 1 | Z, Q_s, Q_{s-1}) = 1. \]

In these limit sets (which may depend on \( Z \)), under the stated conditions (A-1) – (A-11), we can identify the joint distribution of \((M^c, M^{sd}, Y_s^c, Y_s^{sd})\), \( s = 1, \ldots, S \) using an argument parallel to the one used to prove Theorem 1. These limit sets produce \( S \) different joint distributions (corresponding to each value of \( s \)) but do not generate joint distributions across the \( s \) \( (i.e. \) the joint distribution of \( M^c, M^{sd}, Y_s^c, Y_s^{sd} \) across \( s \) values). However, \( M \) is common across these systems. Using the dependence of \( M \) and \( Y_s, s = 1, \ldots, S \) on a common \( \theta \) we can sometimes identify the joint distribution. See Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2001) for an example. Thus with a measurement system \( M \) we do not strictly require information on the choice index \( I \) to identify the model.

Following an argument of Heckman (1990), Heckman and Honoré (1990) and Heckman and Smith (1998), we can identify \( \mu^c(X) \) up to an additive constant without passing to the limit set where \( \Pr (D_s = 1 | Z, Q_s, Q_{s-1}) = 1 \). This is not possible for the identification of \( \tilde{\mu}^d(X) \) because there is no counterpart to the variation in \( y_s^c \) for the discrete component. This is the content of the following theorem which combines the key ideas of Theorems 1 and 2 to produce an identification theorem for the general case.

**Theorem 3** Under assumptions (A-1), (A-2), (A-4), (A-6), (A-7),(A-8),(A-9),(A-10) and (A-11), \( \mu_m^c(X), \mu_m^d(X), \tilde{\mu}_m^c(X), \tilde{\mu}_m^d(X), \tilde{\phi}(Z), c_s(Q_s) \ s = 1, \ldots, S - 1 \) are identified as is the joint distribution \( F(U_m^c, \tilde{U}_m^d, U_c^c, \tilde{U}_c^d, \tilde{Z}_W) \).

**Proof:** See Appendix A.

As noted in the discussion following Theorem 1, without standard exclusion restrictions we may only be able to identify subcomponents of the joint distribution if \( N_X < N_{m,d} \) where \( N_X \) is the number of continuous regressors. Note that the \( \mu^c_{s,l}, \tilde{\mu}^d_{s,l} \) may only be defined over their supports. Under an additional rank or variation-free condition on the regressors we recover these functions everywhere over the support of \( X \).
5.1 Factor Analysis

The thrust of Theorems 1-3 is that under the stated conditions we know the joint distributions of \((U_s, U_m, \tilde{\varepsilon}_W)\) \(s = 1, ..., S\) where \(U_s = (U_s^d, U_s^c)\). We factor analyze them under assumptions like those invoked in matrix (21) with two or more of these elements dependent solely on \(\theta_1\), an additional two or more elements dependent solely on \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) and so forth but at least three final elements dependent on \(\theta_K\). There are a total of \(\overline{A} \times \overline{R}\) outcomes in each state where \(\overline{R}\) is the number of outcome measures in each state at each age (e.g., wages, employment, occupation), there are \(\overline{M}\) non-state-contingent measurements and \(\tilde{\varepsilon}_W\) is a scalar. Thus \(L\) in (21) is \(\overline{A} \times \overline{R} + \overline{M} + 1\) in dimension for each system \(s, s = 1, ..., S\).

We write the unobservables in factor structure form

\[
U_{s,a} = \alpha_{s,a}^I \theta_s + \varepsilon_{s,a} \quad \text{with} \quad s = 1, ..., S \quad a = 1, ..., \overline{A}
\]

\[
U_m = \alpha_m^I \theta + \varepsilon_m \quad \text{with} \quad m = 1, ..., \overline{M}
\]

\[
\varepsilon_W = \gamma \theta + \varepsilon_I.
\]

The \(\alpha_{s,a}\) may be different across \(s\)-states so that each \(s\) system may depend on different \(\theta\). The \(\alpha_m\) are not, nor is the \(\gamma\). There may be multiple measurements of outcomes so in principle \(\alpha_{s,a}\) may be a matrix and \(\varepsilon_{s,a}\) a vector of mutually independent components. Our empirical analysis is for the vector case.

The choice of how to select the blocks of (21) may appear to be arbitrary, but in many applications there are natural orderings. Thus in the empirical work reported below we estimate a two factor model. We have a vector of five test scores that proxy latent ability \((\theta_1)\). The state contingent outcomes (earnings) equations and choice equations plausibly depend on both \(\theta_1\) and \(\theta_2\). In many applications there are often natural allocations of factors to various measurements. However, to avoid arbitrariness a carefully reasoned defense of any allocation is required. We now formalize identification in this system.

**Theorem 4** Under the normalizations on the factor loadings of the type in (21) for one system \(s\) under the conditions of Theorems 1-3, given the normalizations for the unobservables for the discrete components and given at least \(2K + 1\) measurements \((Y, M, I)\), the unrestricted factor loadings and the variances of the factors \((\sigma_{\theta_i}^2, i = 1, ..., K)\) are identified for all systems.

**Proof:** The proof is implicit in the discussion surrounding equation (21). □

Observe that since the \(\sigma_{\theta_i}^2, i = 1, ..., K\) are identified in one system, normalizations of specific factor loadings to unity only need to be made in that system since we can apply knowledge of these variances to the other systems.25 Thus for the other systems (values of the state other than \(s\)) we do not need to normalize any factor loading to unity.

We can also nonparametrically identify the densities of the uniquenesses and the factors. This follows from mutual independence of the \(\theta_i, i = 1, ..., K\) and an application of Kotlarski’s Theorem (1967). We first state Kotlarski’s Theorem and then we apply it to our problem.

Write \((\{U_m\}_{m=1}^M, \{U_{s,a}\}_{a=1}^\overline{A}, \tilde{\varepsilon}_W)\) in vector form as \(T^s\). Order the vectors so that the first \(B_1\) elements depend only on \(\theta_1\), the next \(B_2 - B_1\) elements depend on \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) and so forth. Let \(T_1^s\) and \(T_2^s\) be the first two elements of \(T^s\). (This is purely a notational convenience). We order the elements of \(T^s\) so that the first block depends solely on \(\theta_1\), (assume that there are
B1 such measurements) the second block depends solely on \( \theta_1, \theta_2 \) (there are \( B_2 - B_1 \) such measurements) and so forth, following the convention established in equation (21). We require \( B_1 \geq 2, B_2 - B_1 \geq 2, \) and \( B_K - B_{K-1} \geq 3. \)

**Theorem 5** If

\[
T_1^a = \theta_1 + v_1
\]

and

\[
T_2^a = \theta_1 + v_2
\]

and \( \theta_1 \perp v_1 \perp v_2, \) the means of all three generating random variables are finite, and the conditions of Fubini’s theorem are satisfied for each random variable, and the random variables possess nonvanishing (a.e.) characteristic functions, then the densities of \( (\theta_1, v_1, v_2), g(\theta_1), g_1(v_1), g_2(v_2), \) respectively, are identified.

**Proof:** Kotlarski (1967). See also Rao (1992). 

Applied to our context, consider the first two equations of \( T \) and suppose that the components depend only on \( \theta_1. \) We use our notation for the factor loadings to write

\[
T_1^a = \lambda_{11}^s \theta_1 + \varepsilon_1^s \text{ where } \lambda_{11}^s = 1
\]

\[
T_2^a = \lambda_{21}^s \theta_1 + \varepsilon_2^s \text{ where } \lambda_{21}^s \neq 0.
\]

Here we use a notation associating the subscript of \( \varepsilon_i \) with its position in the \( T^a \) vector. Applying Theorem 4, we can identify \( \lambda_{21}^s \) (subject to the normalization \( \lambda_{11}^s = 1 \)). Thus we can rewrite these equations as

\[
\frac{T_1^a}{\lambda_{21}^s} = \frac{\theta_1 + \varepsilon_2^{s\ast}}{\lambda_{21}^s},
\]

where \( \varepsilon_2^{s\ast} = \varepsilon_2^s / \lambda_{21}^s. \) Applying Kotlarski’s Theorem, we can nonparametrically identify the densities \( g(\theta_1), g_1(\varepsilon_1^s) \) and \( g_2(\varepsilon_2^{s\ast}). \) Since we know \( \lambda_{21} \) we can identify \( g(\varepsilon_2^s). \) Let \( B_1 \) denote the number of measurements (elements of \( T^a \)) which depend only on \( \theta_1. \) Proceeding through the first \( B_1 \) measurements, we can identify \( g(\varepsilon_i^s), i = 1, ..., B_1. \)

Proceeding to equations \( B_1 + 1 \) and \( B_1 + 2 \) (corresponding to the first two measurements in the next set of equations that depend on \( \theta_1 \) and \( \theta_2 \)) we may use the normalization adopted in Theorem 4 to write

\[
T_{B_1+1}^a = \lambda_{B_1+1,1}^s \theta_1 + \theta_2 + \varepsilon_{B_1+1}^s
\]

\[
T_{B_1+2}^a = \lambda_{B_1+2,1}^s \theta_1 + \lambda_{B_1+2,2}^s \theta_2 + \varepsilon_{B_1+2}^s.
\]

Rearranging, we may write this equation as
\[ T_{B+1}^{s} - \lambda_{B_1+1,1}^s \theta_1 = \theta_2 + \varepsilon_{B_1+1}^s \]
\[ T_{B+2}^{s} - \lambda_{B_1+2,1}^s \theta_1 = \theta_2 + \varepsilon_{B_1+2}^s \]

where \( \varepsilon_{B_1+2}^s = \frac{\varepsilon_{B_1+2}}{\lambda_{B_1+2,2}} \), and the \( \varepsilon_{B_1+1}^s \) and \( \varepsilon_{B_1+2}^s \) are mutually independent. Hence by Theorem 5, we can identify densities \( g(\theta_2), g(\varepsilon_{B_1+1}^s), g(\varepsilon_{B_1+2}^s) \). Exploiting the structure (21), we can proceed sequentially to identify the densities of \( \theta, g(\theta_i), i = 1, ..., K \) and the uniqueness, \( g(\varepsilon_i^s) \) for all the components of vector \( T^s \). For the components of \( \varepsilon_i^s \) corresponding to discrete measurements, we do not identify the scale. Armed with knowledge of the densities of the \( \theta_i \) and the factor loadings for other values of \( s \), we can apply standard deconvolution methods to nonparametrically identify the uniqueness of the \( \varepsilon_i^s \)'s for the other systems. Thus we can nonparametrically identify the error terms for the model. Notice that in principle we can estimate separate distributions of the \( \theta_i \) for each \( s \) system and thus can test the hypothesis of equality of these distributions across systems.

The essential idea in this paper is to obtain identification of the joint counterfactual distribution through the dependence across \( s \) of \( Y_s = (Y^d_s, Y^c_s) \) on the common factors that also generate \( M \) or \( I \). In this sense measurements and choices are both sources of identifying information, and can be traded off in terms of identification. We next apply our framework to a well-posed economic model.

### 6 Generalizing The Willis-Rosen Model

We revisit Willis and Rosen’s application of the Roy model (1979) to the economics of education, adding uncertainty, nonpecuniary net returns to schooling and identifying counterfactual distributions of gross and net returns. In this paper the outcomes are utility outcomes, present value outcomes and rates of return.

Suppose that agents cannot lend or borrow and possess log preferences (utility = \( \ln C \), where \( C \) is consumption). Suppose that agents are choosing between high school and college so \( S = 2 \). The utility of attending college is

\[ V(1) = \sum_{a=0}^{A} \frac{\ln Y^1_a}{(1 + \rho)^a} - \ln P \]

where \( P \) is the “cost” of going to school, expressed as a percentage of utility. These include tuition costs and the psychic benefits from working in sector 1 (relative to sector 0). Thus costs may be negative. \( \rho \) is a subjective time preference rate.

The utility of high school is

\[ V(0) = \sum_{a=0}^{A} \frac{\ln Y^0_a}{(1 + \rho)^a} \]

where \( Y^1_a \) and \( Y^0_a \) are earnings from high school and college, respectively, at age \( a \). The psychic costs or benefits in logs for high school are normalized to zero. We can only identify relative psychic “costs” or benefits.
Latent variables and costs are generated by a factor structure. The equations are:

\[
\ln Y_{ia}^j = \mu_i^j(X) + \left(\alpha_i^j\right)'\theta + \varepsilon_{ia}^j, \quad j = 0, 1, a = 1, ..., A.
\]

\[
\ln P = \mu_p^P(Z) + \left(\alpha_P^P\right)'\theta + \varepsilon^P.
\]

In addition we have measurements on test scores \( M = \mu_M(X) + \alpha_M\theta + \varepsilon^M \), where \( \theta \perp \left( \varepsilon_{i,a}^j \right)_{i=1}^I, \left( \varepsilon_{a}^j \right)_{j=0}^A, \varepsilon^P \).

The agent makes decisions about schooling under uncertainty about different components of the model. \( I_\theta \) is the information set. The expected value \( V \) of going to college is:

\[
V = E \left( V(1) - V(0) \mid I_\theta \right) = E_{I_\theta} \left[ \sum_{a=0}^A \frac{\mu_i^1(X) - \mu_i^0(X)}{(1+\rho)^a} - \mu_p^P(Z) \right] - \left[ \mu_p^I(Z) + \alpha_P^I\theta + \varepsilon^P \right].
\]

If future innovations in earnings \( (\varepsilon_{a}^1, \varepsilon_{a}^0), a = 0, ..., A \) are not known at the time schooling decisions are made but innovations in costs are known, we may write the agent’s preference function as

\[
V = \left( \sum_{a=0}^A \frac{\mu_i^1(X) - \mu_i^0(X)}{(1+\rho)^a} - \mu_p^P(Z) \right) + \left( \sum_{a=0}^A \frac{\alpha_{a}^1 - \alpha_{a}^0}{(1+\rho)^a} - \alpha_P^I \right) E_{I_\theta} (\theta) - \varepsilon^P.
\]

As we shall see, this assumption about agent knowledge of future innovations in earnings is testable. Let \( \sigma_p = \left( Var \left( \varepsilon^P \right) \right)^{1/2} < \infty \). Then

\[
\frac{V}{\sigma_p} = \frac{1}{\sigma_p} \left( \sum_{a=0}^A \frac{\mu_i^1(X) - \mu_i^0(X)}{(1+\rho)^a} - \mu_p^P(Z) \right) + \left( \sum_{a=0}^A \frac{\alpha_{a}^1 - \alpha_{a}^0}{(1+\rho)^a} - \alpha_P^I \right) E_{I_\theta} (\theta) - \frac{\varepsilon^P}{\sigma_p}.
\]

\( D_s = 1 \) if \( \frac{V}{\sigma_p} > 0 \); \( D_s = 0 \) otherwise.

Specifying alternative information sets \( (I_\theta) \) and examining the resulting fit of the model to data, we can determine which information sets agents act on. Exact econometric specifications are presented in Section 7. We test whether agents act on components of \( \theta \) that also appear in outcome equations realized after the choices are made. The estimated dependence between schooling choices and subsequent realizations of earnings enables us to identify the components in the agent’s information set at the time schooling decisions are being made. This extends the method of Flavin (1981) and Hansen, Roberds and Sargent (1991) to a discrete choice setting. If agents do not act on these components, then those components are intrinsically uncertain at the time agents make their schooling decisions unless nongeneric cancellations occur. Because we can identify the joint distributions of unobservables, we can answer questions Willis and Rosen could not such as: (1) How highly correlated are latent skills (utilities) across sectoral choices? (2) How much intrinsic uncertainty do agents face? (3) How important is uncertainty for explaining schooling choices? (4) What fraction of the population regrets its ex ante schooling choice ex post? We can also separate out net psychic components of the returns to schooling (the \( \ln P \)) from monetary components.

Observe that as a consequence of the log specification of preferences (including the additive separability of the \( \theta \) and \( \varepsilon \)), mean preserving spreads in \( \varepsilon_{a}^j, \theta \) and \( \varepsilon^P \) produce no change in mean utility. The probability of selection \( D_s = 1 \) is also
invariant to mean preserving spreads in $\varepsilon^j_a$ but not for $\theta$ and $\varepsilon^P$ since their variance enters the choice probability if these components are known to the agent.

In addition, a mean preserving spread in $\ln Y$ is not the same as a mean preserving spread in $Y$. Mean preserving spreads in $Y$ have an effect on utility since $E(Y) = e^{\mu}E(e^{\varepsilon})$. Define the residual from the mean as $H, H = e^{\mu} e^{\varepsilon} - e^{\nu} E(e^{\varepsilon})$ so $\text{Var}(H) = e^{2\mu} \left( E(e^{2\varepsilon}) - |E(e^{\varepsilon})|^2 \right)$. A mean preserving spread keeps the mean of $Y$ fixed at constant $k = E(Y) = e^{\mu} E(e^{\varepsilon})$.

For a perturbation in the variance of $\varepsilon$ that changes $\varepsilon$ to $\Delta \varepsilon$, and defining $f(\varepsilon)$ as the density of $\varepsilon$, locally $0 = d\mu + \frac{\int e^{\varepsilon} f(e^{\varepsilon}) d\varepsilon}{E(e^{\varepsilon})} d\Delta$ so $d\mu = -\frac{\int e^{\varepsilon} f(e^{\varepsilon}) d\varepsilon}{E(e^{\varepsilon})} d\Delta$. Moreover, because $E(\varepsilon) = 0$ and $\varepsilon e^{\varepsilon}$ is convex increasing in $\varepsilon$, the derivative is positive. In a log normal example, $E(e^{\varepsilon}) = e^{\frac{\sigma^2}{2}}, E(e^{2\varepsilon}) = e^{2\sigma^2}, \text{Var}(H) = e^{2\mu} \left( e^{2\sigma^2} - e^{\sigma^2} \right), k = e^{\mu} e^{\frac{\sigma^2}{2}}, \ln k = \mu + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}, (-d\mu) = \frac{d(\sigma^2)}{2}$ so an increase in the variance is equivalent to a decrease in the mean utility. We consider the effects of mean preserving spreads on both mean log utility and on the probability that $V$ is positive (college is selected). We now turn to the empirical analysis of this paper.

## 7 Empirical Results

We use the NLSY data for white males described in Appendix B (posted at http://lily.src.uchicago.edu/CHH_estimating.html; from now on “the website”) and augmented with the PSID data to estimate the Willis-Rosen Model. Main features of the data are presented in Table 2. We focus on two schooling decisions; graduating from a four year college or graduating from high school. We thus abstract from the full multiplicity of choices of schooling. This is clearly a bold simplification but it allows us to focus on the main points of this paper.

As a measurement system ($M$) for cognitive ability we use five components of the ASVAB test battery (arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph composition, math knowledge and coding speed). We dedicate the first factor ($\theta_1$) to the ability measurement system and exclude the other factors from that system (recall the normalizations in equation (21)). We include family background variables as additional covariates in the ASVAB test equations (the $\mu_M(X)$).

To simplify the empirical analysis, we divide the lifetimes of individuals into two periods. The first period covers ages 19 to 29, and the second covers ages 30 to 65. We compute annual earnings by multiplying the hourly wage by hours worked each year for each individual. We impute missing wages and project earnings for the ages not observed in the NLSY data using the procedure described in Appendix B. The NLSY data do not contain information on the full life cycle of earnings. We project the missing NLSY earnings using estimates of lifetime earnings from the PSID data.

Tables 2a-b present the sample statistics. They show that while college graduates have higher earnings than high school graduates, all of the gain to attending college comes after age 30. College graduates also have much higher test scores and come from better family backgrounds than high school graduates. They are more likely to live in locations where a college is present and where college tuition is lower.

In the notation of Section 5, $\bar{S} = 2$ (two choices), $\bar{R} = 1$ (there is one outcome per person, earnings), $\bar{M} = 5$ (there are five test scores that are generated solely by $\theta_1$) and $\bar{A} = 2$ (there are two periods in the life cycle). In addition, there is utility index $I$. The test scores depend solely on $\theta_1$. The outcomes and index are allowed to depend on ($\theta_1, \theta_2$). Assuming non-zero factor loadings, we satisfy the conditions for identification presented in Theorem 4. Recall that $K = 2$. We have five measurements...
generated solely by $\theta_1$. There are three measurements generated by $\theta_1$ and $\theta_2$ for each schooling level. (Outcomes and choices are defined for each choice system). Exclusion restrictions are given in Table 2c along with specification of the equations. Tuition and family background identify the parameters of the schooling equations. Local labor market variables identify the parameters of utility equations. Assuming that test scores are continuous outcomes, no exclusions are needed for identification of the test score equations.

In this section, to facilitate exposition we denote the college state (choice 1) by $c$, while high school (choice 0) is denoted by $h$. We model log earnings (utility of earnings) at each age as:

\[\ln Y_{a,s} = \delta_{a,s} + X' \beta_{a,s} + \eta_{1,s} \ast \text{experience}_a + \eta_{2,s} \ast \text{experience}_a^2 + \alpha'_{a,s} \theta + \varepsilon_{a,s}\]

where $Y_{a,s}$ is earnings in period (age) $a$ if the schooling level is $s$, $X$ is a vector of covariates, $\theta$ is a vector of factors (two factors, in our application) $\eta_{1,s}$ and $\eta_{2,s}$ are calculated by the procedure described in Appendix B (available on the website).

We compute the present value of log earnings (lifetime utility) in the first period (ages 19 to 29) and in the second period (ages 30 to 65). Let $V_{1,s}$ be the period 1 gross utility of achieving schooling level $s$, and $V_{2,s}$ be the period 2 gross utility of obtaining schooling level $s$. Using (23), we write the gross utilities as

\[V_{1,s} = \bar{\delta}_{1,s} + X' \bar{\beta}_{1,s} + \bar{\alpha}'_{1,s} \theta + \bar{\varepsilon}_{1,s}\]
\[V_{2,s} = \bar{\delta}_{2,s} + X' \bar{\beta}_{2,s} + \bar{\alpha}'_{2,s} \theta + \bar{\varepsilon}_{2,s}\]

These are the outcome equations for the model that we estimate. To see this, notice that

\[V_{1,s} = \sum_{a=19}^{A_1} \frac{\ln Y_{a,s}}{(1 + \rho)^a}\]
\[= \sum_{a=19}^{A_1} \frac{\delta_{a,s} + X' \beta_{a,s} + \alpha'_{a,s} \theta + \varepsilon_{a,s} + \eta_{1,s} \ast \text{experience}_a + \eta_{2,s} \ast \text{experience}_a^2}{(1 + \rho)^a} + \left[ \sum_{a=19}^{A_1} \frac{\alpha'_{a,s}}{(1 + \rho)^a} \right] \theta + \sum_{a=19}^{A_1} \frac{\varepsilon_{a,s}}{(1 + \rho)^a}\]
\[= \hat{\delta}_{1,s} + X' \hat{\beta}_{1,s} + \hat{\alpha}'_{1,s} \theta + \hat{\varepsilon}_{1,s}\]

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where

\[
A_1 = 29 \\
\alpha = 0.03 \text{ (the prespecified discount rate)}
\]

\[
\bar{\delta}_{1,s} = \sum_{a=19}^{A_1} \delta_{a,s} \cdot \text{experience}_a + \eta_{1,s} \cdot \text{experience}_a^2 \\
(1 + \alpha)^a
\]

\[
\bar{\beta}_{1,s} = \sum_{a=19}^{A_1} \beta_{a,s} \\
(1 + \alpha)^a
\]

\[
\bar{\alpha}_{1,s} = \sum_{a=19}^{A_1} \alpha_{a,s} \\
(1 + \alpha)^a
\]

\[
\bar{\epsilon}_{1,s} = \sum_{a=19}^{A_1} \varepsilon_{a,s} \\
(1 + \alpha)^a
\]

and terms for the second period of data (30-65) are defined analogously. The “cost” or psychic net return of going to college is written as:

\[
\ln P = \delta P + Z^\gamma + \alpha P \theta + \varepsilon P
\]

These “costs” can be negative as they entail both psychic and tuition components. The criterion for the choice of schooling is:

\[
V = E(V_{1,c} + V_{2,c} - V_{1,h} - V_{2,h}|X, \theta) - E(\ln P|Z, X, \theta, P)
\]

\[
= \bar{\delta}_{1,c} + X'\bar{\beta}_{1,c} + \bar{\alpha}'_{1,c} \theta + \bar{\delta}_{2,c} + X'\bar{\beta}_{2,c} + \bar{\alpha}'_{2,c} \theta - \bar{\delta}_{1,h} - X'\bar{\beta}_{1,h} - \bar{\alpha}'_{1,h} \theta - \bar{\delta}_{2,h} - X'\bar{\beta}_{2,h} - \bar{\alpha}'_{2,h} \theta - \\
- \delta P - Z^\gamma - \alpha P \theta - \varepsilon P
\]

\[
= (\bar{\delta}_{1,c} + \bar{\delta}_{2,c} - \bar{\delta}_{1,h} - \bar{\delta}_{2,h} - \delta P) + X'(\bar{\beta}_{1,c} + \bar{\beta}_{2,c} - \bar{\beta}_{1,h} - \bar{\beta}_{2,h}) - Z^\gamma + \\
+ (\bar{\alpha}'_{1,c} + \bar{\alpha}'_{2,c} - \bar{\alpha}'_{1,h} - \bar{\alpha}'_{2,h} - \alpha P) \theta - \varepsilon P.
\]

Individuals go to college if \(V > 0\). We test (and do not reject) the hypothesis that at the time they make their college decision agents know their cost function and both factors \(\theta\), but not the uniquenesses in the outcome equations. The test score equations have a similar structure. Let \(T_j\) be test score \(j\):

\[
T_j = X'\omega_j + \alpha_{test,j} \theta + \varepsilon_{test,j}
\]

where \(X\) is the vector of covariates in the test score equation, and \(\omega_j\) is the covariate vector. The distributions of the \(\theta\) and \(\varepsilon\) are nonparametrically identified under the assumptions supporting Theorems 1-5. In this paper, we assume that each factor is generated by a mixture of normals distribution,

\[
\theta_k \sim \sum_{j=1}^{J_k} p_{k,j} \phi \left( f_k | \mu_{j,k}, \tau_{j,k} \right), \quad k = 1, \ldots, K.
\]
Mixtures of normals with a large enough number of components approximate any distribution of $\theta_k$ and the $\varepsilon$ arbitrarily well (Ferguson, 1983). We assume that the $\varepsilon$’s are normal although in principle they are nonparametrically identified from the analysis of Theorem 5.

We estimate the model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods as described in Appendix C (available on the website) for 55,000 iterations, discarding the first 5,000 iterations to allow the chain to converge to its stationary distribution. We retain every 10th of the remaining 50,000 iterations for a total of 5,000 iterations. The Markov Chain mixes well with most autocorrelations dying out at around lag 25 to 50.

We estimate models with one factor and with two factors. The estimated coefficients are presented as Tables A1 through A5 in the supplementary tables on the website. The two factor model specifies that the first factor only appears in test scores and choice equations while the second factor appears in all equations. No additional factors are necessary to fit this data. Additional factors are not required. Thus we conclude that the innovations in the earnings process (the factor loadings are positive in the “cost” function). Therefore, both factors positively influence the likelihood of attending college. There is weaker evidence of selection on factor 2.

Both factors increase returns. While the second factor explains much more of the variance in utility than the first factor does, the first factor explains more of the variance in returns than the second factor. However, it explains only 30% of the variance in returns. We infer that agents know $\theta$ (the factors) based on the superior fit of a model that includes nonzero factor loadings on both factors in the choice equation but not the innovations in outcomes (the $\varepsilon$’s in the outcome equations) at the time they make their schooling decision. Our results indicate that the unpredictability in gross utility gains (i.e. differences) of going to college is much larger than the unpredictability in utility levels. Both factors have a negative impact on “costs” (the factor loadings are positive in the “cost” function). Therefore, both factors positively influence the likelihood...
of going to college since both contribute positively to returns and negatively to costs.

Figure 5 plots the estimated factual and counterfactual gross college utility densities for college graduates and high school graduates, respectively (see Figure A3 on the website for the corresponding figure for high school utility). College graduates have the highest level of gross utility both as high school graduates and as college graduates. They also have the highest gains of going to college as demonstrated in Figure 4. We can also compute gross utility gains as a percentage of the gross utility in high school as:

\[ R = \frac{V_{1,c} + V_{2,c}}{V_{1,h} + V_{2,h}} - 1. \]

see Figure A4 on the website). Figure 5 presents the marginal treatment effect as defined in equation (6) using utils as the outcome. This is the gross gain in utils of going to college as a function of \( \varepsilon_W \), which is an index of variables that increase the likelihood of enrollment in college. It shows that individuals who are likely to enroll in college have higher returns to college than those who are unlikely to enroll in college who have lower values of \( \varepsilon_W \). Figure 5 also shows the distribution of \( \varepsilon_W \) in the populations. Most of the mass of this distribution is at values of \( \varepsilon_W \) around 0. Many individuals have negative gross utility returns (excluding psychic benefits of going to college). Even among those deciding to go to college, 39.53% would have higher utility (ignoring psychic components) had they not gone to college. There is a definite fall off in utility gains as college enrollment is expanded to the less college prone. Table 4 shows that college graduates have higher potential high school and college utility than high school graduates in high school and in college (these are gross utilities). Table 5 shows that the gross returns of going to college are higher for those who choose to go to college (these results are expected given the pattern on Figures 4-5). The returns for attending college for the average high school graduate are negative. The returns to college for the individual at the margin \( (V = 0) \) are about 0.59% of total high school utility. Since these individuals are exactly at the margin, these gains have to correspond exactly to the cost they are facing. Once we account for the nonmonetary costs and benefits of going to college (net returns in the bottom two rows of Table 5) the relative returns of going to college become more negative for high school graduates and more positive for college graduates. Since \( \ln P \) can be allocated as either a cost or a return, there are two ways to compute returns depending on whether \( \ln P \) is treated as a cost (row 2) or a return (row 3). These bound the true returns. We present two sets of net return estimates depending on how “costs” or “gains” (\( \ln P \)) are allocated. The second row treats \( \ln P \) as cost. The third counts it as a psychic benefit. These are bounds since the actual allocation between cost and benefit is indeterminate.

The patterns of Figures 3-5 are essentially the same as the patterns revealed for present value of earnings in Figures 6-8. Table 6 shows that college graduates have earnings 57% higher than they would have had (or $608,372 higher, on average) if they did not go to college. High school graduates have a gross gain of 43% (or $362,987) if they go to college. Notice that even though the utility gains of going to college are negative for high school graduates, the money returns are positive and large. Table 7 shows that even though 39.66% of the persons going to college would have had a higher utility in high school than in college (ignoring psychic gains), only 6.9% of this population had higher earnings in high school than in college. Once we account for psychic benefits, the proportion of college students regretting their decisions is roughly the same whether we measure regret in present value or utils. This shows the importance of accounting for psychic returns in analyzing schooling choices. Among high school graduates, 95.90% do not regret not going to college (measured in utils), but 85.26% regret the decision financially. The marginal treatment effect has the same general shape when present values of earnings are used.
instead of gross utility (see Figure 8).

Table 8 shows the probability of being in decile $i$ of the college potential discounted earnings distribution conditional on being in decile $j$ of the high school potential earnings distribution. (These are gross earnings.) It shows that neither an independence assumption across outcomes, which is the Veil of Ignorance Assumption used in applied welfare theory, (see, e.g., Sen (1973)) or in aggregate income inequality decompositions (DiNardo, Lemieux and Fortin, 1996) nor a perfect ranking assumption, which are sometimes used to construct counterfactual joint distributions of outcomes, (see e.g. Heckman, Smith, and Clements, 1997 or Athey and Imbens, 2002) are satisfied in the data. There is a strong positive dependence between potential outcomes in each counterfactual state, but it is not perfect dependence (there are substantial nonzero elements outside the diagonal). We get similar results for utils (discounted log earnings—see our website).

We have already shown that there is a large dispersion in the distribution of utilities, utility returns, earnings, and earnings returns to college. However, this dispersion can be due to heterogeneity that is known at the time the agent makes schooling decisions, or it can be due to heterogeneity that is not predictable by the agent at that time. Figure 9 plots the densities of the unforecastable component of college gross utilities at the time college decisions are made for fixed $X$ values, under three different information sets. (The $X$ are fixed at their means.) The solid line corresponds to the case where the agent does not know his factor ($\theta$) nor his innovations ($\varepsilon$’s in the outcome equations). The other two lines correspond respectively to the cases where the agent knows $\theta_2$ only, or both $\theta_1$ and $\theta_2$. Knowledge of $\theta_2$ dramatically decreases the uncertainty faced, but knowledge of factor 1 (associated with cognitive ability) has only a small effect on the amount of uncertainty faced by the agent. We obtain a similar figure in terms of gross utility in high school. However, even though knowledge of $\theta_2$ reduces dramatically the amount of uncertainty faced in terms of levels of gross utility in each counterfactual state, it has only a small effect on the uncertainty faced in terms of returns (see Figure 10). Table 9 reports the variances of gross and net utility and gross and net present value of earnings under different information sets of agents. Giving agents more information (factors) reduces the variance in utilities or present values. However, reducing uncertainty barely budges the forecast returns to schooling measured in dollars or utils—the message of Figure 10. Analogous results are obtained for present value of earnings. See the website.

The fact that a two factor model is adequate to fit the data implies that the agents cannot forecast future shocks of log earnings ($\tilde{\varepsilon}_{1,c}, \tilde{\varepsilon}_{2,c}, \tilde{\varepsilon}_{1,h}, \tilde{\varepsilon}_{2,h}$) at the time they make their schooling decision. (If they did, they would enter as additional factors in the estimated model.) Even though the factors ($\theta$) explain most of the variance in levels of utilities, they explain less than half of the variance in returns, which may lead one to conclude that the reason so many college graduates would have higher gross utility in high school than in college (39%) is because they cannot accurately forecast their returns of going to college. However this is not the case. As shown in Table 7 once we account for psychic benefits or costs of attending college ($P$) relative to attending high school, only 8% of college graduates regret going to college. This suggests a substantial part of the gain to college is due to non-pecuniary components. Furthermore, Table 10 shows that if individuals had knowledge of ($\tilde{\varepsilon}_{1,c}, \tilde{\varepsilon}_{2,c}, \tilde{\varepsilon}_{1,h}, \tilde{\varepsilon}_{2,h}$), keeping their average expected earnings the same, very few of them would change their schooling decision. Uncertainty in gains is substantial but knowledge of this uncertainty has a very small effect on the choice of schooling because the variance of gains is so much smaller than the variance of psychic costs or benefits, and it is the latter that drives most of the heterogeneity in schooling decisions. When conducting this experiment, we make sure that the average expected earnings
are the same because a mean preserving reduction in the uncertainty faced by the agents in terms of utility is not the same as a mean preserving change in uncertainty in terms of levels of earnings (see Appendix D on the website). In particular a change in the variance of \((\tilde{\epsilon}_{1,c}, \tilde{\epsilon}_{2,c}, \tilde{\epsilon}_{1,h}, \tilde{\epsilon}_{2,h})\) would not change the expected utility in each schooling level but would certainly change expected earnings in each schooling level. The numbers reported in Table 10 take this into account. When agents know their \((\tilde{\epsilon}_{1,c}, \tilde{\epsilon}_{2,c}, \tilde{\epsilon}_{1,h}, \tilde{\epsilon}_{2,h})\), they face less uncertainty. Knowing these components is equivalent to setting \(\Delta = 0\) in the expression at the end of Section 6. The expected utility at each schooling level increases.

8 Some Evidence on an Educational Reform

Using the estimated model, we evaluate the effect of a full subsidy to college tuition. We move beyond the Veil of Ignorance which is based on an anonymity assumption and evaluates reforms considering only its overall impacts on inequality, to consider which individuals are benefitted by the reform. We consider only partial equilibrium treatment effects and do not consider the full cost of financing the reforms. Table 4 shows the average lifetime gross utility of participants before the policy change and Table 5 shows their pre-policy average return to college. These tables compare these levels and returns with what the marginal participant attracted into schooling by the policy would earn. The marginal person has lower utility in college and lower returns to college than the average person in college. Since the policy affects the schooling decisions of the individuals at the margin, there will be a decline in the quality of college graduates after the policy is implemented, since the new entrants are of lower average quality than the incumbents.

Despite the substantial size of the policy changes we consider, the induced effects on participation are small. The full tuition subsidy only increases graduation from four-year college by 4%. The policies operate unevenly over the deciles of the initial outcome distribution. Figure 11 shows the proportion of high school people in each decile of the high school present value of earnings distribution induced to graduate from four-year college by the tuition subsidy. The figure shows that providing a free college education mostly affects people at the top end of the high school earnings distribution (the same result holds when we consider distributions of utilities instead of distributions of lifetime earnings). The policy does not benefit the poor. A calculation based on the Veil of Ignorance using the Gini coefficient would show no effect of the policy up to two decimal points. Our analysis relaxes the Veil of Ignorance, and lets us study the impact of policies on persons at different positions of the income distribution. It goes beyond the counterfactual simulations used in the inequality literature (see e.g. DiNardo, Lemieux and Fortin, 1996) to account for self selection into sectors in response to policy changes.

9 Summary and Conclusions

This paper uses low dimensional factor models to generate counterfactual distributions of potential outcomes. It extends matching by allowing some of the variables that determine conditional independence to be unobserved by the analyst. Semiparametric identification is established.

We apply our methods to a problem in the economics of education. We extend the Willis-Rosen model to explicitly account for dependence in potential outcomes across potential schooling states, to account for psychic benefits in the return to schooling and to measure the effect of uncertainty on schooling choices. We extend the framework of Flavin (1981) and

Our analysis reveals substantial heterogeneity in the returns to schooling, much of which is unpredictable at the time schooling decisions are made. We also find a substantial non-pecuniary return to college. Although there is substantial uncertainty in forecasting returns at the time schooling decisions are made, eliminating it has modest effects on schooling choices. Nonpecuniary factors play a dominant role in schooling choices. The assumption of perfect ranking of potential outcome across alternative choices is soundly rejected, although potential outcomes are strongly positively correlated.

We simulate a tuition reduction policy to determine who benefits and loses from it. We go beyond the Veil of Ignorance to see which persons are affected by the policy. The policy favors those at the top of the income distribution. This simulation illustrates the power of our method to lift the Veil of Ignorance, and to count the losers and gainers from any policy initiative.
Appendix A : Proofs of Theorems

Proof of Theorem 1: The case where $M$ consists of purely continuous components is trivial. We observe $M^c$ for each $X$ and can recover the marginal distribution for each component. Recall that $M$ is not state dependent.

For the purely discrete case, we encounter the usual problem that there is no direct observable counterpart for $\mu_m^d (X)$. Under (A-1)-(A-5), we can use the analysis of Manski (1988) to identify the slope coefficients $\beta_{l,m}^d$ up to scale, and the marginal distribution of $U_{l,m}^d$. From the assumption that the mean (or median) of $U_{l,m}^d$ is zero, we can identify the intercept in $\beta_{l,m}^d$.

We can repeat this for all discrete components. Thus coordinate by coordinate we can identify the marginal distributions of $U_{m}^c, \tilde{U}_{m}^d, \mu_m^c (X)$ and $\tilde{\mu}_m^d (X)$, the latter up to scale (“~” means identified up to scale).

To recover the joint distribution write:

$$\Pr (M_c \leq m_c, M_d = (0, ..., 0) \mid X) = F_{U_m^c, \tilde{U}_m^d} (m_c - \mu_m^c (X), -\tilde{\mu}_m^d (X))$$

by assumption (A-2). To identify $F_{U_m^c, \tilde{U}_m^d} (t_1, t_2)$ for any given evaluation points in the support of $(U_m^c, \tilde{U}_m^d)$, we know the function $\tilde{\mu}_m^d (X)$ and using (A-3) we can find an $X$ where $\tilde{\mu}_m^d (X) = t_2$. Let $\tilde{x}$ denote this value, so $\tilde{\mu}_m^d (\tilde{x}) = t_2$.

In this proof, $t_1, t_2$ may be vectors. Thus

$$\Pr (M_c \leq m_c, M_d = (0, ..., 0) \mid X = \tilde{x}) = F_{U_m^c, \tilde{U}_m^d} (m_c - \mu_m^c (\tilde{x}), t_2)$$

Let $\hat{m}_c = t_1 - \mu_m^c (\tilde{x})$ to obtain

$$\Pr (M_c \leq m_c, M_d = (0, ..., 0) \mid X = \tilde{x}) = F_{U_m^c, \tilde{U}_m^d} (t_1, t_2)$$

We know the left hand side and thus identify $F_{U_m^c, \tilde{U}_m^d}$ at the evaluation point $t_1, t_2$. Since $(t_1, t_2)$ is any arbitrary evaluation point in the support of $U_m^c, \tilde{U}_m^d$ we can thus identify the full joint distribution. $^36$

Proof of Theorem 2:

$$\Pr (D_1 = 1 \mid Z, Q_1) = \Pr \left( \frac{c_1 (Q_1) - \varphi (Z)}{\sigma_W} > \frac{\varepsilon_W}{\sigma_W} \right)$$

Under (A-1), (A-2), (A-5), (A-6) (A-7) (A-8) and (A-9), it follows that $\frac{c_1 (Q_1) - \varphi (Z)}{\sigma_W}$ and $F_{\varepsilon_W}$ (where $\varepsilon_W = \frac{\varepsilon_W}{\sigma_W}$) are identified (see Manski, 1988 or Matzkin 1992, 1993). Under rank condition (A-7), identification of $\frac{c_1 (Q_1) - \varphi (Z)}{\sigma_W}$ implies identification of $\frac{c_1 (Q_1)}{\sigma_W}$ and $\frac{\varphi (Z)}{\sigma_W}$ separately. Write

$$\Pr (D_2 = 1 \mid Z, Q_1, Q_2) = F_{\varepsilon_W} \left( \frac{c_2 (Q_2) - \varphi (Z)}{\sigma_W} \right) - F_{\varepsilon_W} \left( \frac{c_1 (Q_1) - \varphi (Z)}{\sigma_W} \right).$$

From the absolute continuity of $\varepsilon_W$, we can write

$$\frac{c_2 (Q_2)}{\sigma_W} = F_{\varepsilon_W}^{-1} \left[ \Pr (D_2 = 1 \mid Z, Q_1, Q_2) + F_{\varepsilon_W} \left( \frac{c_1 (Q_1) - \varphi (Z)}{\sigma_W} \right) \right] + \frac{\varphi (Z)}{\sigma_W}.$$ 

Thus we can identify $\frac{c_2 (Q_2)}{\sigma_W}$ and, proceeding sequentially, we can identify $\frac{c_s (Q_s)}{\sigma_W}, s = 2, ..., 3$. Observe that we could use the
final choice \( \Pr(s = \overline{S}) \) rather than the initial choice to identify the model using an obvious change in the assumptions.
Proof of Theorem 3: From (A-2), the unobservables are jointly independent of \((X, Z, Q)\). For fixed values of \((Z, Q_s, Q_{s-1})\), we may vary the points of evaluation for the continuous coordinates \(y^c_s\) and pick alternative values of \(X = \tilde{x}\) to trace out the vector \(\mu^c(X)\) up to intercept terms. Thus we can identify \(\mu^c_{s,l}(X)\) up to a constant for all \(l = 1, ..., N_{c,s}\). (Heckman and Honoré, 1990). Under (A-2), we recover the same functions for whatever values of \(Z, Q_s, Q_{s-1}\) are prespecified as long as \(c_s(Q_s) > c_{s-1}(Q_{s-1})\), so that there is interval of \(\varepsilon_W\) bounded above and below with positive probability. This identification result does not require any passage to a limit argument.

For values of \((Z, Q_s, Q_{s-1})\) such that

\[
\lim_{Q_s \rightarrow Q_s(Z)} \lim_{Q_{s-1} \rightarrow Q_{s-1}(Z)} \Pr (D_s = 1|Z, Q_s, Q_{s-1}) = 1.
\]

where \(\tilde{Q}_s(Z)\) is an upper limit and \(\underline{Q}_{s-1}(Z)\) is a lower limit, and we allow the limits to depend on \((X, Z)\), we essentially integrate out \(\varepsilon_W\) and obtain

\[
\Pr (M^c \leq m^c, \tilde{\mu}^d_m > -U^d_m, U^c_s < y^c_s - \mu^c(X), \tilde{U}^d_s > -\tilde{\mu}^d_s(X))
\]

We know that this probability can be achieved by virtue of the support condition of assumption (A-10).

Then proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 1, we can identify \(\tilde{\mu}^d_s(X)\) coordinate by coordinate and obtain the constants in \(\mu^c_{s,l}(X)\), \(l = 1, ..., N_{c,s}\) as well as the constants in \(\tilde{\mu}^d(X)\). From the assumption of mean or median zero of the unobservables. In this exercise, we use the full rank condition on \(X\) which is part of assumption (A-11).

With these functions in hand, under the full conditions of assumption (A-10) we can fix \(y^c_s, y^c_m, \mu^d_m, \tilde{\mu}^d_m, \frac{e_s(Q_s) - \varphi(Z)}{\sigma_W}, \frac{e_{s-1}(Q_{s-1}) - \varphi(Z)}{\sigma_W}\) at different values to trace out the joint distribution \(F(U^c_m, \tilde{U}^d_m, U^c_s, \tilde{U}^d_s, \varepsilon_W)\).
Appendix B: Description of the Data

We use white males from NLSY79. In the original sample there are 2439 individuals. We consider the information on these individuals from age 19 to age 35. We discard 663 individuals because they have observations missing for at least one of the covariate variables we use in the exercise. Table 1 at http://lily.src.uchicago.edu/CHH_estimating.html contains a description of the number of missing observations per variable. For example, we discard 50 individuals because we do not observe whether they were living in the South when they were 14 years-old or not. Then we discard another 6 for not having information on whether they lived in urban area at age 14, other 5 for not reporting the number of siblings, 221 for not indicating parental education and so on, as described in table 2. We then restrict the NLSY sample to white males with a high school or college degree. We define high school graduates as individuals having a high school degree or having completed 12 grades and never reporting college attendance. We define participation in college as having a college degree or having complete more than 16 years in school. We exclude the oversample of poor whites. Experience is Mincer experience (age-12 if high-school graduate, age-16 for college graduate). The variables that we include in the outcome and choice equations are number of siblings, parental years of schooling, AFQT, year of birth dummies, average tuition of the colleges in the county the individual lives in at 17 (we simulate the policy change by decreasing this variable by $1000 for each individual), distance to the nearest college at 17, average local blue collar wage in state of residence at 17 (or in 1979, for individuals entering the sample at ages older than 17) and local unemployment rate in county of residence in 1979. For the construction of the tuition variable see Cameron and Heckman (2001). Distance to college is constructed by matching college location data in HEGIS (Higher Education General Information Survey) with county of residence in NLSY. State average blue collar wages are constructed using data from the BLS. For a description of the NLSY sample see BLS (2001).

In 1980, NLSY respondents were administered a battery of ten achievement tests referred to as the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) (See Cawley, Conneely, Heckman and Vytlacil (1997) for a complete description). The math and verbal components of the ASVAB can be aggregated into the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores. Many studies have used the overall AFQT score as a control variable, arguing that this is a measure of scholastic ability. We argue that AFQT is an imperfect proxy for scholastic ability and use the factor structure to capture this. We also avoid a potential aggregation bias by using each of the components of the ASVAB as a separate measure.

For our analysis, we use the random sample of the NLSY and restrict the sample to 1161 white males for whom we have information on schooling, several parental background variables, test scores and behavior. Distance to nearest college at each date is constructed in the following way: Take the county of residence of each individual and all other counties within the same state. The distance between two counties is defined as the distance between the center of each county. If there exists a college (2 year or 4 year) in the county of residence where a person lives then the distance to the nearest college (2 year or 4 year) variable takes the value of zero. Otherwise we compute distance (in miles) to the nearest county with a college. Then we construct distance to nearest college at 17 by using the county of residence at 17. However for people who were older than 17 in 1979 we use the county of residence in 1979 for the construction of this variable.

Tuition at age 17 is average tuition in colleges in county of residence at 17. If there is no college in the county then average tuition in the state is taken instead. For details on the construction of this variable see Cameron and Heckman (2001).
Local labor market variables for the county of residence are computed using information in the 5% sample of the 1980 census. For each county group in the census we compute the local unemployment rate and average wage for high school dropouts, high school graduates, individuals with some college and four year college graduates. We do not have this variable for years other than 1980 so, for each county, we assume that it is a good proxy for local labor market conditions in all the other years where NLSY respondents are assumed to be making the schooling decisions we consider in this paper.

We also use the variable $\log(\text{annual labor earnings})$. We extract this variable from the NLSY79 reported annual earnings from wages and salary. Earnings (in thousands of dollars) are discounted to 1993 using Consumer Price Index reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Missing values may occur here for two reasons: First, because respondents do not report earnings for wages/salary, and second, because the NLSY becomes biannual after 1994 and prevents us from observing respondents when they reach certain ages. For example, because NLSY79 was not conducted in 1995, we do not observe individuals born in 1964 when they are 31 year-old. In this case we input missing values.

To predict missing log earnings between ages 19 and 35 and extrapolate from age 36 to age 65 we pool NLSY and PSID data. From the latter, we use the sample of white males that are household heads and that are either high-school or college graduates according to the definition given above. This produces a sample of 3,043 individuals from PSID. To get annual earnings, we multiply the reported CPI-adjusted (1993 =100) hourly wage rate by the annual hours worked and divide the outcome by 1000. Then we take logs to have an NLSY-comparable variable. Similarly to NLSY, we generate the Mincerian Experience according to the rule given above. We also generate dummy variables for cohorts. The first (omitted) cohort consists of individuals born between 1896 and 1905, the second consists of individuals born between 1906 and 1915, and so on up to the last cohort which is made up of PSID respondents born between 1976 and 1985. We pool NLSY and PSID by merging the NLSY respondents in the PSID cohort born between 1956 and 1965.

Let $Y_{it}$ denote log earnings of agent $i$ at age $t$. For each schooling choice $S$, we model the earnings-experience profile as

$$Y_{ia}(S) = \alpha + \beta_0 X_{ia} + \beta_1 X_{ia}^2 + D\gamma + \varepsilon_{ia} \tag{1}$$

$$\varepsilon_{ia} = \eta_i + v_{ia} \tag{2}$$

$$v_{ia} = \rho v_{ia-1} + \kappa_{ia} \tag{3}$$

where $X$ is Mincer Experience, $D$ is a set of dummy variables that indicate cohort, $\eta_i$ is the individual effect, and $\kappa_{it}$ is white noise. In Table 2 we report the OLS estimates for $\alpha, \beta_0, \beta_1, \gamma, \rho$ based on the pooled data set.

Now, let $\hat{\varepsilon}_{it}$ be the estimated residual of the earnings-experience profile. An estimator of the individual effect $\eta_i$ is

$$\hat{\eta}_i = \frac{1}{65} \sum_{a=19}^{65} \phi_{ia} \hat{\varepsilon}_{ia},$$

where $\phi_{ia} = 1$(if individual $i$ is observed at age $a$)
Then, we can obtain an estimator of $v_{ia}$ by computing

$$\hat{v}_{ia} = \hat{\varepsilon}_{ia} - \hat{\eta}_i$$

Now, given $\hat{v}_{ia}$ we can run equation (3) and then compute $\rho$. From this we obtain an estimator of $\kappa_{ia}$ according to

$$\hat{\kappa}_{ia} = \hat{v}_{ia} - \hat{\rho}\hat{v}_{ia-1}$$

We can then predict earnings for missing observations for ages 19 to 35 and perform the extrapolation from 36 to 65 by computing for each individual

$$\hat{Y}_{ia}(S) = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_0 X_{ia} + \hat{\beta}_1 X_{ia}^2 + D\hat{\gamma} + \hat{\varepsilon}_{ia}$$

$$= \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}_0 X_{ia} + \hat{\beta}_1 X_{ia}^2 + D\hat{\gamma} + \hat{\eta}_i + \hat{\rho}\hat{v}_{ia-1} + \hat{\kappa}_{ia}$$

Note that to get $\hat{\varepsilon}_{it}$ we do not set $\hat{\kappa}_{it}$ equal to zero. Instead, we sample ten draws from its distribution and average them for each individual, for each time period.

The next step is to get the present value of log earnings at age 19 for each agent. In order to do it we discount log earnings at each period using a discount rate of 3%. For identification purposes we then break each individual’s working-life in two periods. The first one goes from age 19 to age 29. The second period goes from age 30 all the way to age 65. This produces a panel in which the first observation for each agent is the present value of log earnings from age 19 to 29 and the second is the present value of log earnings from 30 to 65. This means that lifetime present value of log earnings is just the sum of these two components. Table 2b contains descriptive statistics for the present value of log earnings for the entire working-life period and also for the two subperiods used in the analysis.
Appendix C: Markov Chain Monte Carlo Simulation Methods

Due to the complex nature of the likelihood function we will rely on Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques to estimate the model. These are computer-intensive algorithms based on designing an ergodic discrete time continuous state Markov chain with a transition kernel having invariant measure equal to the posterior distribution of the parameter vector \( \psi \), see Robert and Casella (1999) for details. In particular, we will be using the Gibbs sampling algorithm.

We first describe how the Gibbs sampler can be used to estimate models in the general set-up laid out in section 4. Let \( \psi_{s,a} \) be parameters specific to the distribution of outcomes with schooling level \( s \) at age \( a \), let \( \psi_m \) be parameters specific to the distribution of measurements, let \( \psi_c \) be parameters specific to the distribution of schooling choice and let \( \psi_\theta \) be parameters specific to the factor distributions. Let \( n \) be the number of observations. Let the outcome matrix over all ages with schooling level \( s \) be \( Y_{s,i} = (Y_{c,s,i}, Y_{*,d,s,i}) \) and the vector of measurements is \( M \).

The complete data likelihood for completed schooling level \( S = s \) is

\[
    f(M, Y_s, I, \theta | \psi) = \prod_{i; D_{i,s} = 1} f(M_i, Y_{s,i}, I_i, \theta_i | \psi_i)
\]

where \( \psi = [\psi_{s,a}, \psi_m, \psi_c, \psi_\theta] \), “i” denotes a subscript for individual \( i \) and

\[
    f(M_i, Y_{s,i}, I_i, \theta_i | \psi_i) = f(M_i | \psi_m, \theta_i) \times \prod_{a=1}^A f(Y_{s,a,i} | \psi_{s,a}, \theta_i) f(I_i | \theta_i, \psi_c) f(\theta_i | \psi).
\]

The complete data posterior is

\[
    f(M, Y, I, \theta, \psi | \text{data}) \propto \prod_{s=1}^S f(\theta, M, Y_s, I | \psi) f(\psi)
\]

where \( Y = (Y_1, ..., Y_S) \).

In what follows the conditional posteriors that constitute the transition kernel of the Gibbs sampler will be derived.

Choice equations

Conditional on the factors we have

\[
    f(\eta, \gamma, \rho | \psi_{-(\eta,\gamma,\rho)}, \theta) \propto \prod_{i=1}^n f(I_i | Z_i' \eta + \gamma' \theta_i, 1) \\
    \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^{\bar{s}} 1(c_{i,j-1} < I_i < c_{i,j}) D_{i,j} \right\} 1(c_{i1} < \cdots < c_{i\bar{s}}) f(\eta, \gamma) f(\rho)
\]

This marginal can be factored into two conditionals. Conditional on \( \rho \) we

\[
    f(\eta, \gamma | \rho, \psi_{-(\eta,\gamma,\rho)}, \theta) \propto \prod_{i=1}^n f(I_i | Z_i' \eta + \gamma' \theta_i, 1) f(\eta, \gamma).
\]
This is the posterior for a normal regression model with covariates $Z_i, \theta_1$ and precision fixed at one. With $f(\eta, \gamma)$ multivariate normal this is a multivariate normal distribution.

The second conditional (for $\rho$) is

$$f(\rho | \eta, \gamma, \psi_{-(\eta, \gamma, \rho)}, \theta) \propto \prod_{i=1}^{n} \prod_{j=1}^{\bar{s}} 1(c_{i,j-1} < I_i < c_{i,j}) D_{i,j} \prod_{i=1}^{\bar{s}} 1(c_{i,\bar{s}} < \cdots < c_{i\bar{s}}) f(\rho)$$

We sample $\rho_s$ one at a time conditional on the $\rho_1, \ldots, \rho_{s-1}, \rho_{s+1}, \ldots, \rho_{\bar{s}}$. The conditional for $\rho_s$ is

$$f(\rho_s | \rho_{-s}, \eta, \gamma, \psi_{-(\eta, \gamma, \rho)}, \theta) \propto \prod_{i:s_i=s} 1(c_{i,s-1} < I_i < Q_{i,s} \rho_s)$$

$$\times \prod_{i:s_i=s+1} 1(Q_{i,s} \rho_s < I_i < c_{i,s+1}) \prod_{i=1}^{n} 1(c_{i,\bar{s}} < \cdots < c_{i\bar{s}}) f(\rho).$$

As a prior for $\rho$ we choose $f(\rho) = \prod_{s} U(-B, B)$ where $B = 1000$, i.e., a uniform distribution with very large support.

Let $K_s$ be the number of elements in $Q_s$. We sample $\rho_{hs}, h = 1, \ldots, K_s$ one at a time. The conditional for $\rho_{hs}$ is a uniform distribution with boundary points which can be derived from a series of inequalities. Without loss we can assume that $Q_{ihs}$ is positive. From (5) it follows that

$$\rho_{hs} > \max \left\{ \max_{i:s_i=s} \frac{I_i - \bar{c}_i}{Q_{ihs}}, \max_{i} \frac{c_{i,s-1} - \bar{c}_i}{Q_{ihs}}, -K \right\} \equiv g_{hs}$$

$$\rho_{hs} < \min \left\{ \min_{i:s_i=s+1} \frac{I_i - \bar{c}_i}{Q_{ihs}}, \min_{i} \frac{c_{i,s+1} - \bar{c}_i}{Q_{ihs}}, K \right\} \equiv \bar{g}_{hs},$$

where $\bar{c}_i = \sum_{j=1, j \neq h}^{K_s} Q_{ij} \rho_{js}$. Hence $\rho_{hs}$ is uniform with boundaries $(\underline{g}_{hs}, \bar{g}_{hs})$.

Conditional on the factors we have

$$f(I | \psi_{-(\eta, \gamma, \rho)}, \theta) \propto \prod_{i=1}^{n} f(I_i | Z_i' \eta + \gamma' \theta_i, 1) \prod_{j=1}^{\bar{s}} 1(c_{i,j-1} < I_i < c_{i,j}) D_{i,j}.$$ 

This factors into $n$ independent truncated normals,

$$f(I | \psi_{-(\eta, \gamma, \rho)}, \theta) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \text{TN}_{(c_{i,j-1}, c_{i,j})}(I_i | Z_i' \eta + \gamma' \theta_i, 1).$$

So we sample $I_i, i = 1, \ldots, N$, one at a time from truncated normals.

**Measurement equations**

The continuous measurement equations are of the form

$$M_{i,j} = X_{m,i,j} \theta_i + \epsilon_{m,i,j}.$$

Given $X_{m,i,j}, \theta_i$ this is a linear regression model. With multivariate normal priors on $(\beta^e_{m,j}, \alpha^e_{m,j})$ and a gamma prior on the
precision of \( \varepsilon_{m,i,j} \) this is in the form of the standard conjugate Bayesian linear regression model, with a conditional normal distribution for \( \beta_{m,j}^c \) given the precision of \( \varepsilon_{m,i,j} \) and a gamma distribution for the precision conditional on \( \beta_{m,j}^c \).

Let the last \( m - m_1 \) elements of the measurement vector \( M \) be binary indices generated as

\[
M^d_j = 1(M^d_j \geq 0), \quad j = m_1 + 1, \ldots, m.
\]

The parameters in the binary measurements are samples as above with two exceptions. First, a separate step samples the latent measurements, \( M^*_{i,j} \), as

\[
M^*_{i,j} \sim \begin{cases} 
\text{TN}(0, \infty) (M^*_{i,j} | X_{0m,i,j}^c \beta_{m,j}^d + \alpha_{m,j}^d \theta_i, 1) & \text{if } M^d_{i,j} = 1, \\
\text{TN}(-\infty, 0) (M^*_{i,j} | X_{0m,i,j}^c \beta_{m,j}^d + \alpha_{m,j}^d \theta_i, 1) & \text{if } M^d_{i,j} = 0.
\end{cases}
\]

Second, the precision is not sampled but fixed at one.

**Outcome equations**

Let \( Y_{s,a} \) be the outcome vector at age \( a \) with schooling level \( s \). Suppose both employment and wage outcomes are modelled. Let \( Y_{s,a}^c \) be the wage outcome and \( Y_{s,a}^d \) the employment outcome. Also let \( Y^*_{s,a} \) be the latent employment index. By the factor structure assumption we have

\[
f(Y_{s,a}^c, Y^*_{s,a} | \theta) = f(Y_{s,a}^c | \theta) f(Y^*_{s,a} | \theta),
\]

for a person working.

The model for wages is

\[
Y_{s,a,i}^c = X_{1,a,i}^c \beta_{s,a}^c + \alpha_{s,a}^c \theta_i + \varepsilon_{c,s,a,i}^c,
\]

where \( \varepsilon_{c,s,a,i}^c \sim \text{N}(0, \tau_{c,s,a}^c) \). This is in the form of a standard linear regression model under normality and \( (\beta_{s,a}^c, \alpha_{s,a}^c, \tau_{s,a}^c) \) is sampled as above (using multivariate normal and gamma priors).

We can allow for general state dependence by modelling the latent employment transition indices as

\[
Y^*_{s,a,i} = X_{1,a,i}^d \beta_{s,a}^d + \alpha_{s,a}^d \theta_i + \varepsilon_{d,s,a,i}^c,
\]

where \( \varepsilon_{d,s,a,i}^c \) and \( \varepsilon_{d,s,a,i}^d \) are both standard normal.

The conditional of \( (\beta_{2,a,s,0}, \alpha_{2,a,s,0}) \) and \( (\beta_{2,a,s,1}, \alpha_{2,a,s,1}) \) is

\[
f(\beta_{2,a,s,0}^d, \alpha_{2,a,s,0}^d | Y_{s,a,0}^d, \beta_{2,a,s,0}^d, \alpha_{2,a,s,0}^d) \propto f(\beta_{2,a,s,0}^d, \alpha_{2,a,s,0}^d) \prod_{i : Y_{s,a,0}^d = 0} f(Y_{s,a,i}^d | X_{2,a,s,i}^d \beta_{2,a,s,0}^d + \alpha_{2,a,s,0}^d \theta_i, 1)
\]
\[
f(\beta_{a,s,1}^d, \alpha_{a,s,1}^d | \psi_{-\beta_{a,s,1}^d, \alpha_{a,s,1}^d}) \propto f(\beta_{a,s,1}^d, \alpha_{a,s,1}^d) \prod_{i: Y_{s,a,i} = 0} f(Y_{s,a,i} | X_2, \beta_{a,s,1}^d + \alpha_{a,s,1}^d \theta_i, 1)
\]

Both of these are normal regression models with the precision fixed at one. The latent employment indices are sampled as in the usual binary choice framework (see Albert and Chib (1993)).
Factors

The conditional for $\theta$ factors into $n$ conditionals for $\theta_1, \ldots, \theta_n$. To see what the conditional for $\theta_i$ is note that all contributions of $\theta_i$ originate from linear regression models,

$$I_i - Z_i'\eta = \gamma'\theta_i + \varepsilon_{I,i},$$  \hfill (choice model)

$$M_j - X_{m,i,j}'\beta_{m,j} = \alpha'_{m,j}\theta_i + \varepsilon_{m,j},$$  \hfill (measurements)

$$Y_{s,a,i}' - X_{s,a,i}'\beta_{s,a} = \alpha_{s,a}\theta_i + \varepsilon_{s,a,i},$$  \hfill (wages)

$$Y_{d,s,a,i}^{d,s} - X_{d,s,a,i}'\beta_{d,s,a,i} = \alpha_{d,s,a,i}\theta_i + \varepsilon_{d,s,a,i},$$  \hfill (employment).

This equation system is of the form

$$\hat{Y}_i = A_i\theta_i + u_i,$$

where $u_i \sim N(0, \Sigma_i)$, where $\Sigma_i$ is a diagonal precision matrix. The conditional posterior for $\theta_i$ is then

$$f(\theta_i|\psi) \propto \exp\left\{-\frac{1}{2}(\hat{Y}_i - A_i\theta_i)'\Sigma_i(\hat{Y}_i - A_i\theta_i)\right\}f(\theta_i),$$

where

$$f(\theta_i) = \prod_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{j=1}^{J_k} p_{k,j}N(\theta_{ik}|\mu_{k,j}, \tau_{k,j}).$$

We sample $\theta_{ik}|\{\theta_{ij}\}_{j \neq k}$ one at a time from their respective conditionals which can be shown to be a mixture of normals with updated (data dependent) mixture weights and parameters.

Conditional on the factor vector $\theta$, we have

$$\theta_{ik} \sim \sum_{j=1}^{J_k} p_{k,j}N(\theta_{ij}|\mu_{\ell,j}, \tau_{\ell,j}), \quad i = 1, \ldots, n.$$

Conditional on $\theta$ we can treat the factors as known and update the mixture parameters $(p_k, \mu_k, \tau_k)$. We follow the “group indicator” approach in Diebolt and Robert (1994) and augment the parameter vector by a sequence of latent group indicators defined as $g_i = j$ if a $\theta_{i,j}$ originates from mixture component $j$. Conditional on the mixture group indicators the mixture parameters are easily sampled and conditional on the mixture parameters the group indicators are simple multinomials. To preserve identification of intercepts we constrain the mixture to have mean zero using the method proposed in Richardson et al., (2000).

The estimation of the structural models in section 7 are done as above with a few modifications. The choice model is a probit so the cut point is $c = 0$, and no $\rho$ parameters are estimated. The cross equation restrictions are imposed as follows. Let $\check{Y}_1 = (V_{1,h,i}, V_{2,h,i}, V_{1,c,i}, V_{2,c,i}, V_i)$, i.e., the stacked outcomes under high school and college and the choice index. We
can then write the model as

\[ \tilde{Y}_i = W_i \psi + \Gamma \theta_i + \varepsilon_i, \]
\[ i = X_i \omega + \alpha_{\text{test}} \theta_i + \varepsilon_{\text{test}}, \]

where \( \psi = \{ \bar{\delta}_{1,s}, \bar{\delta}_{2,s}, \bar{\gamma}_{1,s}, \bar{\gamma}_{2,s} \}, \) and \( W_i \) and the loading matrix \( \Gamma = \Gamma(\{ \bar{\alpha}_{1,s}, \bar{\alpha}_{2,s} \}, \alpha) \) are defined appropriately. This model is now in the form of the system described above and the required conditionals are derived as above.
Appendix D: Mean Preserving Spread

For the model described in Section 7, assume that $\varepsilon_{a,s}$ are independent and identically normally distributed within each period:

$$\varepsilon_{a,s} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_{s,1}^2) \text{ for ages 19-29}$$

$$\varepsilon_{a,s} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_{s,2}^2) \text{ for ages 30-65}$$

Then:

$$\tau_{1,s} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sum_{a=19}^{29} \frac{\sigma_{s,1}^2}{(1+\rho)^a})$$

$$\tau_{2,s} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sum_{a=30}^{65} \frac{\sigma_{s,2}^2}{(1+\rho)^a})$$

At each age:

$$\ln Y_{a,s} = \delta_{a,s} + X' \beta_{a,s} + \alpha' \theta + \varepsilon_{a,s} + \eta_{1,s} * \text{experience}_a + \eta_{2,s} * \text{experience}_a^2 = \mu_{a,s} + \varepsilon_{a,s}$$

where

$$\mu_{a,s} = \delta_{a,s} + X' \beta_{a,s} + \alpha' \theta + \eta_{1,s} * \text{experience}_a + \eta_{2,s} * \text{experience}_a^2$$

then

$$E(Y_{a,s}|X,\theta) = \exp(\mu_{a,s})E[\exp(\varepsilon_{a,s})]$$

We can do a mean preserving spread at each age $a$ by giving the individual knowledge of $\varepsilon_{a,s}$:

$$E(Y_{a,s}|X,\theta,\varepsilon_{a,s}) = \exp(\mu_{a,s} + \varepsilon_{a,s}) = \exp(\mu'_{a,s})$$

Then,

$$\exp(\mu'_{a,s}) = \exp(\mu_{a,s})E[\exp(\varepsilon_{a,s})]$$

Since the $\varepsilon_{a,s}$ are iid we can drop the age subscript on the $\varepsilon$:

$$\exp(\mu'_{a,s}) = \exp(\mu_{a,s}) E(\exp(\varepsilon))$$

The mean preserving spread is actually a combination of a age by age mean preserving spreads. Finally, compute:

$$\bar{\mu}_{1,s} = \sum_{a=19}^{29} \frac{\mu_{a,s}}{(1+\rho)^a}$$

$$\bar{\mu}_{2,s} = \sum_{a=30}^{65} \frac{\mu_{a,s}}{(1+\rho)^a}$$
\[ \bar{\mu}_{1,s} = \sum_{a=19}^{29} \frac{\mu'_{a,s}}{(1+\rho)^a} \]

\[ \bar{\mu}_{2,s} = \sum_{a=30}^{65} \frac{\mu'_{a,s}}{(1+\rho)^a} \]

Define

\[ V = \bar{\mu}_{1,C} + \bar{\mu}_{2,C} - \bar{\mu}_{1,a} - \bar{\mu}_{2,a} - Z\gamma - \alpha'_p\theta - \varepsilon' \]

\[ V' = \bar{\mu}'_{1,C} + \bar{\mu}'_{2,C} - \bar{\mu}'_{1,a} - \bar{\mu}'_{2,a} + Z\gamma - \alpha'_p\theta - \varepsilon' + \bar{\varepsilon}_{1,C} + \bar{\varepsilon}_{2,C} - \bar{\varepsilon}_{1,a} - \bar{\varepsilon}_{2,a} \]

In the end, the probability of going to college is simply given by

\[ \Pr (V > 0) \]

for the first case and for the second case.

\[ \Pr (V' > 0) \]

The experiment for the case where we remove \( \theta_1 \) from the information set of the agent, keep age by age, when mean earnings is constant is analogous to the one just described.
References


Notes

1. Address: Department of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 E. 59th Street, IL 60637. E-mail: pmcarnei@midway.uchicago.edu. Pedro Carneiro’s research was supported by Fundacao Ciencia and Tecnologia and Fundacao Calouste Gulbenkian.

2. Address: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60657. E-mail: karsten-hansen@northwestern.edu

3. Address: Department of Economics, The University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, and The American Bar Foundation. E-mail: jjh@uchicago.edu. This research is supported by NSF 97-09-873, SES-0099195, and NICHD-40-4043-000-85-261. Heckman’s work was also supported by the American Bar Foundation and the Donner Foundation.

4. Previous versions of this paper were given at the Midwest Econometrics Group, Chicago, October 2000, Washington University St. Louis, May, 2001, the Nordic Econometrics Meetings, May, 2001 and workshops at Chicago August, 2002 and Stanford, January, 2003. A simple version of this paper is presented in Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2001). A version of this paper was presented by Heckman as the Klein Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania, September, 28, 2001 and also at the IFAU conference in Stockholm Sweden, October 2001. We are grateful to all workshop participants. We especially thank Mark Duggan, Orazio Attanasio and Michael Keane for comments on the first draft of this paper. We have benefited from discussions with Ricardo Barros, Richard Blundell, Francisco Buera, Flavio Cunha, Mark Duggan, Lars Hansen, Steven Levitt, Bin Li, Salvador Navarro and Luigi Pistaferri on subsequent drafts. Edward Vytlacil gave especially helpful comments. We are grateful to Flavio Cunha and Salvador Navarro for exceptional research assistance and hard work.


7. Conditions under which \((M, \tilde{M})\) determine the joint distribution are presented in Rozanov (1982).

8. See e.g, Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), or Athey and Imbens, (2002).

9. Median zero assumptions on \((U_0, U_1)\) are also used.

10. See their papers for exact conditions. Heckman and Smith (1998) present the most general set of conditions.

11. Heckman and Smith (1998) and Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) discuss conditions under which it is possible to estimate (4).


14. In the case of ties, use the choice with the lowest index.

15. See Hansen, Heckman, and Navarro (2003) for duration models with general forms of dependence functions generated by this type of model.


18. Specifically, it is assumed for (8) that \(\mu_s(Z)\) is concave in \(s\) for each \(Z\) (Cameron and Heckman, 1998), that
\[ e_s - e_{s-1} = \tau \quad \text{all } s = 2, \ldots, T \]

with \( e_1 \) as an initial condition, that

\[ (*) \quad \mu_s(Z) - \mu_{s-1}(Z) = \varphi(Z) + c_{s-1} \]

with \( \mu_1(Z) \) as an initial condition and that \( c_s \geq c_{s-1} \) for all \( s = 1, \ldots, s \). Changes in utilities across states are independent of \( s \), except for an intercept. Then in (17) \( \varepsilon_W = \tau + e_1 \). If we set all of the iid components of (9) to zero (the uniquenesses) we get the ordered probit model. As noted in the text, and developed in Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2003), we can generalize this model to allow \( e_s - e_{s-1} = \tau + \chi_s \) where \( \chi_s \geq 0 \) is a one sided random variable and still secure identification. The requirement (\( * \)) precludes a strict random utility model because preferences are state specific. (The strict random utility model requires that \( \mu_s(Z) \) be independent of \( s \) but \( Z \) can vary across \( s \). See, e.g., Matzkin, 1993).

Write \( \nu_s = \sum_{j=2}^{s} \rho_j \), where \( \rho_j \perp \rho_j (j \neq j') \), \( \rho_j \perp \varepsilon_W \), \( \rho_j \perp (Z, Q) \), \( \rho_j \geq 0 \), \( \varphi(Z) = Z \cdot \eta \). This model is identified under the assumptions in Cameron and Heckman (1998) even without any exclusion restrictions, so \( Q_s \) can just include an intercept. The proof is trivial. Normalize \( \rho_1 = 0 \). From the first choice we compute,

\[ \Pr(D_1 = 1 | Z) = \Pr(Z \cdot \eta + \varepsilon_W \leq c_1) \]

so we can identify \( f(\varepsilon_W) \), and \( \eta \) up to scale \( \sigma_W \), assuming \( \varepsilon_W \) and the \( \rho_j \) have densities with respect to Lebesgue measure and nonvanishing characteristic function in addition to other standard regularity conditions. We suppress the intercept in \( Z \).

One cannot distinguish the intercept from \( c_1 \). Proceeding to further choices we obtain

\[ \Pr(D_1 + D_2 = 1 | Z) = \Pr(Z \eta + \varepsilon_W \leq c_2 + \nu_2) \]
\[ = \Pr(\varepsilon_W - \nu_2 \leq c_2 - Z \eta). \]

Therefore we can identify \( f(\varepsilon_W - \nu_2) \) and \( c_2 \) up to scale \( \sigma_{\varepsilon_W - \nu_2} \). The scale is determined by the first normalization (relative to \( \sigma_{\varepsilon_W} \)). We can estimate \( \frac{\sigma_{\varepsilon_W - \nu_2}}{\sigma_{\varepsilon_W}} = \left( \frac{\sigma_{\varepsilon_W}^2 + \sigma_{\nu_2}^2}{\sigma_{\varepsilon_W}^2} \right)^{1/2} \) by taking the ratio of the normalized \( \eta \) from the second choice probability to the normalized ratio of \( \eta \) from the first choice probability for any coordinate of \( \eta \). Define \( \psi(X) \) as the characteristic function of \( X \). From the assumed independence of \( \varepsilon_W \) and \( \nu_2 \), \( \psi(\varepsilon_W - \nu_2) = \psi(\varepsilon_W)\psi(-\nu_2) \). Therefore we can identify \( \frac{\psi(\varepsilon_W - \nu_2)}{\psi(\varepsilon_W)} = \psi(-\nu_2) \), and we can determine \( f(-\nu_2) \) from the convolution theorem adopting a normalization for \( \sigma_W \).

Proceeding sequentially, we obtain \( \Pr(D_1 + D_2 + D_3 + \ldots + D_k = 1 | Z) = \Pr(Z \eta + \varepsilon_W \leq c_k + \nu_k) \), and can identify \( c_k \) and \( f(\nu_k) \) up to the normalization given in the first step. From \( f(\nu_k) \), we can use deconvolution to identify \( f(\rho_j), j = 2, \ldots, T \). See Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2001) for further details and extensions to factor models. Nowhere in this analysis do we use the assumption that \( Q_s \) contains regressors.

Other normalizations are possible. All require that there be at least three measurements on each factor, although we can get by with only one dedicated measurement. Consider the following example (due to Salvador Navarro):
Let $L = 5, K = 2$.

\[
g_1 = \theta_1 + \epsilon_1, \quad g_2 = \lambda_{21}\theta_1 + \theta_2 + \epsilon_2 \\
\]
\[
g_3 = \lambda_{31}\theta_1 + \lambda_{32}\theta_2 + \epsilon_3, \quad g_4 = \lambda_{41}\theta_1 + \lambda_{42}\theta_2 + \epsilon_4 \\
\]
\[
g_5 = \lambda_{51}\theta_1 + \lambda_{52}\theta_2 + \epsilon_5
\]

Assuming nonvanishing covariances and factor loadings,

\[
\lambda_{32} = \frac{\text{COV}(g_1, g_5)\text{COV}(g_3, g_4) - \text{COV}(g_3, g_5)\text{COV}(g_1, g_4)}{\text{COV}(g_2, g_4)\text{COV}(g_1, g_5) - \text{COV}(g_1, g_4)\text{COV}(g_2, g_5)}
\]

if $\lambda_{22}\lambda_{42}\lambda_{51} - \lambda_{41}\lambda_{52} \neq 0$.

Then

\[
\lambda_{41} = \frac{\text{COV}(g_3, g_4) - \text{COV}(g_2, g_4)\lambda_{32}}{\text{COV}(g_1, g_3) - \text{COV}(g_1, g_2)\lambda_{32}}
\]

if $\lambda_{31} \neq \lambda_{32}\lambda_{21}$.

\[
\begin{align*}
\lambda_{21} &= \frac{\text{COV}(g_1, g_2)\lambda_{41}}{\text{COV}(g_1, g_4)}, \quad \lambda_{31} = \frac{\text{COV}(g_1, g_3)\lambda_{41}}{\text{COV}(g_1, g_4)}, \quad \lambda_{51} = \frac{\text{COV}(g_1, g_5)\lambda_{41}}{\text{COV}(g_1, g_4)} \\
\sigma^2_{\theta_1} &= \frac{\text{COV}(g_1, g_4)}{\lambda_{41}}, \quad \sigma^2_{\theta_2} = \frac{\text{COV}(g_2, g_4) - \lambda_{21}\lambda_{31}\sigma^2_{\theta_1}}{\lambda_{32}}, \quad \lambda_{52} = \frac{\text{COV}(g_2, g_5) - \lambda_{21}\lambda_{51}\sigma^2_{\theta_1}}{\lambda_{32}}
\end{align*}
\]

21In particular, $U^d_m, U^d_s$ are assumed to have a distribution that is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.

22Under separability, it is straightforward to replace $Z\eta$ by $\varphi(Z; \eta)$, but we do not do so in this paper.

23For a definition of measurable separability, see Florens, Mouchart and Rolin (1990), section 5.2. The key idea is that we can vary each of the coordinates of the vector freely.

24This assumption can be relaxed. It only affects certain normalizations.

25In the discussion of equation (21) we could have normalized the variances of the $\sigma^2_{\theta_i}, i = 1, ..., K$ rather than the factor loadings, although this would require the imposition of certain sign restrictions.

26In principle, the future $(\alpha_0^1, \alpha_0^2)$ can be uncertain at the date decisions are made. Assuming that these factor loadings are independent of $\theta$, we can replace these expressions by $E_{T-s}(\alpha_0^1), E_{T-s}(\alpha_0^2)$ without affecting the identifiability of the $(\alpha_0^1, \alpha_0^2)$, but it affects the identifiability and interpretation of $\alpha_p$. A more general version of this model would postulate two random variables $\theta$ and $\theta^*$. Agents act on $\theta^*$ and $\theta$ is the true value. It would be interesting to identify the joint distributions of $\theta$ and $\theta^*$ under (e.g.) a rational expectations assumption.

27The run time was about 122 minutes on a 1.2Ghz AMD Athlon PC.

28The distributions of the factors by schooling level are shown in Figures A1 and A2 on the website.

29The coefficient estimates for the components of the model are available on request.

30If we consider net gains by subtracting costs the difference between college graduates and high school graduates will even
be higher because costs are lower for college graduates.

31 If the agent knows $\theta_1$, $\theta_2$, $\varepsilon_{\text{college}}$ and $\varepsilon_{\text{highschool}}$ then he faces no uncertainty.

32 These results are available on request from the authors, and are posted on the website.

33 See the numbers posted at the website.

34 We compute the compensation (which can be negative or positive) required by each individual to keep average earnings the same after the uncertainty is reduced. Then we provide the individual with this compensation together with knowledge of $(\bar{\varepsilon}_1,c,\bar{\varepsilon}_2,c,\bar{\varepsilon}_1,h,\bar{\varepsilon}_2,h)$ and finally we compute the percentage of individuals who would change their schooling decision if they had knowledge of $(\bar{\varepsilon}_1,c,\bar{\varepsilon}_2,c,\bar{\varepsilon}_1,h,\bar{\varepsilon}_2,h)$ but had the same present value of earnings in each schooling level. We use the procedure described at the end of Section 4 applied to each period to adjust utility for the effects of mean preserving spreads in earnings (see Appendix D at our website).

35 This comes from a simulation available on request from the authors.

36 We thank Edward Vytlacil for simplifying and clarifying the statements and proofs of all three theorems in this section.
All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.

\[ \text{Utility} = \sum_{a=1}^{s} \frac{1}{(1+0.03)^a} \log(Y_{a,s}) \]

* Normal densities are defined to be normal with same mean and variance as the corresponding \( \theta \). All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.
Figure 3
Density of College Gross Utility

High School*  
---  
College**

* Counterfactual: $E(V_c | \text{Choice=High School})$
** Predicted: $E(V_c | \text{Choice=College})$

All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.

Utility=$\sum_a \frac{1}{(1+0.03)^a} \log(Y_{a,s})$

Figure 4
Density of Gross Utility Differences (College-High School)

High School*  
---  
College**

* $E(V_c-V_h | \text{Choice=High School})$
** $E(V_c-V_h | \text{Choice=College})$

All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.

Utility=$\sum_a \frac{1}{(1+0.03)^a} \log(Y_{a,s})$
Figure 5
Density of $\epsilon_W$ and Marginal Treatment Effect: $(E(\nu_c - \nu_h | \epsilon_W))$

* $\epsilon_W = (\alpha_{1.c} + \alpha_{1.h} - \alpha_{2.h} - \alpha_{2.c} - \rho) \theta - \nu_p$

All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.

Figure 6
Density of Gross Lifetime Earnings Differences (College-High School)

* $E(\nu_c - \nu_h | \text{Choice=High School})$
** $E(\nu_c - \nu_h | \text{Choice=College})$

$\nu_{h,a} = \sum_2 \frac{1}{(1+0.03)^a} Y_{h,a}$

All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.
Figure 7
Density of Relative Gross Earnings Differences (College-High School)

Density(Returns)

High School
College

-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5

0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

Figure 8
Density of $\epsilon_W$ and Relative Marginal Treatment Effect for Present Value of Gross Earnings $E((PV_c/PV_h)-1|\epsilon_W)$

$\epsilon_W = (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 - \theta_1 + \theta_2 - \theta - \epsilon_p)$

All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.

* $E((PV_c/PV_h)-1|\text{Choice}=\text{High School})$
** $E((PV_c/PV_h)-1|\text{Choice}=\text{College})$

$PV_h = \sum a (1+0.03)^a Y_h,a$

All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.
Figure 9
Density of Gross College Utility Under Different Information Sets

Figure 10
Density of Gross Utility Difference (College-High School) Under Different Information Sets

All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.

Utility = \sum_{a,s} \frac{1}{(1+0.03)^{a,s}} \log(Y_{a,s})
Figure 11

Proportion of People Induced Into College by Full Subsidy to College Tuition
When Information Set = {θ₁, θ₂} by Decile of Initial High School Earnings Distribution

Table 1

Components of Jₚ

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<thead>
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<th>Continuous</th>
<th>Discrete</th>
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<td>Jₚ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variables defined for s</td>
<td>Yₚᵣ</td>
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<td>Indicator of state</td>
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## Table 2a
### Descriptive Statistics of Variables

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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>College</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tuition at age 17(Hundreds of Dollars)</td>
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<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban at age 14</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South at age 14</td>
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<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Siblings</td>
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<td>704</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1161</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age in 1980</td>
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<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to College at age 17</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy for Birth in 1957</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy for Birth in 1958</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dummy for Birth in 1959</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
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<td>Dummy for Birth in 1960</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dummy for Birth in 1961</td>
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<td>457</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dummy for Birth in 1962</td>
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<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Status (0 if HS, 1 if College)</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In School at AFQT test date</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arithmetic Reasoning</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word Knowledge (ASVAB 3)</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paragraph Composition (ASVAB 4)</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coding Speed (ASVAB 6)</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math Knowledge (ASVAB 7)</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present Value of Earnings</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Earnings in Thousands of Dollars

---

### Table 2b
### Descriptive Statistics - Present Value of Log Earnings (Discount Rate = 3%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present Value of Earnings (Working Life)*</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present Value of Earnings in Period 1*</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present Value of Earnings in Period 2*</td>
<td>1161</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Earnings in Thousands of Dollars

---

### Table 2c
### Countries Included in Outcome, Choice and Test Equations

Table 3a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
<th>Post-School Utility</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factor Loading</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential First Period</td>
<td>( \theta_1 )</td>
<td>0.1449</td>
<td>0.0324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility in High School</td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Variance</td>
<td>Proportion of Total Variance Explained by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_1 )</td>
<td>0.3460</td>
<td>0.0331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
<td>0.0519</td>
<td>0.8717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Second Period</td>
<td>( \theta_1 )</td>
<td>0.2277</td>
<td>0.0519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility in High School</td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
<td>1.6432</td>
<td>0.0262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Variance</td>
<td>Proportion of Total Variance Explained by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_1 )</td>
<td>0.8951</td>
<td>0.0349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
<td>0.0519</td>
<td>0.8717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential First Period</td>
<td>( \theta_1 )</td>
<td>0.1888</td>
<td>0.0559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility in College</td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
<td>0.9402</td>
<td>0.0976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Variance</td>
<td>Proportion of Total Variance Explained by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_1 )</td>
<td>0.3455</td>
<td>0.0634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
<td>0.0976</td>
<td>0.7718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Second Period</td>
<td>( \theta_1 )</td>
<td>0.3908</td>
<td>0.0979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility in College</td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
<td>1.7217</td>
<td>0.1203</td>
</tr>
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<td>Proportion of Total Variance Explained by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_1 )</td>
<td>1.0860</td>
<td>0.0848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
<td>0.0979</td>
<td>0.8241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total variance for schooling \( s \) in period \( t \) is \( \alpha_s^t \sigma_u^2 + \alpha_s^t \sigma_d^2 + \sigma_s^2 \).

Proportion of total variance explained by factor \( k \) in schooling \( s \) in period \( t \) is \( \alpha_s^t \sigma_u^2 / \sigma_u^2 + \alpha_s^t \sigma_d^2 / \sigma_d^2 + \sigma_s^2 / \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_d^2 \).

Table 3b

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arithmetic Reasoning</td>
<td>( \theta_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Variance</td>
<td>Proportion of Total Variance Explained by ( \theta_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coding Speed</td>
<td>( \theta_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Variance</td>
<td>Proportion of Total Variance Explained by ( \theta_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math Knowledge</td>
<td>( \theta_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Variance</td>
<td>Proportion of Total Variance Explained by ( \theta_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word Knowledge</td>
<td>( \theta_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Variance</td>
<td>Proportion of Total Variance Explained by ( \theta_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total variance for test \( f \) is \( \sigma_f^2 = \alpha_f^2 \sigma_u^2 + \alpha_f^2 \sigma_d^2 + \sigma_f^2 \).

Proportion of total variance explained by factor \( k \) is \( \alpha_f^2 \sigma_u^2 / \sigma_u^2 + \alpha_f^2 \sigma_d^2 / \sigma_d^2 + \sigma_f^2 / \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_d^2 \).

Table 3a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost Function</td>
<td>( \theta_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Variance</td>
<td>Proportion of Total Variance Explained by ( \theta_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice**</td>
<td>( \theta_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Variance</td>
<td>Proportion of Total Variance Explained by ( \theta_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \theta_2 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Cost = \( \mu_3 + \mu_4 \theta_1 + \mu_5 \theta_2 + \mu_6 \).
** Choice = \( \mu_7 + \mu_8 \theta_1 + \mu_9 \theta_2 + \mu_{10} \theta_1 \theta_2 + \mu_{11} \theta_1 + \mu_{12} \theta_2 + \mu_{13} \theta_1 \theta_2 + \mu_{14} \theta_1 \theta_2 + \mu_{15} \theta_1 \theta_2 \).

Total variance of cost is \( \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_d^2 + \sigma_s^2 \).

Proportion of total variance of cost explained by factor \( k \) is \( \alpha_k^2 \sigma_u^2 / \sigma_u^2 + \alpha_k^2 \sigma_d^2 / \sigma_d^2 + \alpha_k^2 \sigma_s^2 / \sigma_u^2 + \alpha_k^2 \sigma_d^2 / \sigma_d^2 + \sigma_k^2 / \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_d^2 / \sigma_d^2 + \sigma_s^2 / \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_d^2 / \sigma_d^2 \).

Total variance of choice is \( \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_d^2 + \sigma_s^2 \).

Proportion of total variance explained by factor \( k \) is \( \alpha_k^2 \sigma_u^2 / \sigma_u^2 + \alpha_k^2 \sigma_d^2 / \sigma_d^2 + \alpha_k^2 \sigma_s^2 / \sigma_u^2 + \alpha_k^2 \sigma_d^2 / \sigma_d^2 + \sigma_k^2 / \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_d^2 / \sigma_d^2 + \sigma_s^2 / \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_d^2 / \sigma_d^2 \).
### Table 4
Average Gross Utility In Different States (Factual or Counterfactual) For Persons Who Go To High School or Who Go to College and for People At The Margin
(Does Not Include Utility "Cost" or Psychic Returns to College)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schooling Level</th>
<th>Utility for People Schooling Level at Margin</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School++</td>
<td>7.8580</td>
<td>0.0604</td>
<td>0.0737</td>
<td>0.1363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College++</td>
<td>7.7262</td>
<td>0.0638</td>
<td>0.0763</td>
<td>0.1413</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1++ \(E(V_k | \text{choice=high school})\) and 1+++ \(E(V_{f|V=0} | \text{choice=high school})\)

We make the distinction between the second and third line in this table because in our framework we cannot separate nonmonetary costs from nonmonetary benefits of going to college, so we allocate \(\ln \chi\) both ways.

### Table 5
Factual and Counterfactual Returns for Persons Who Go To High School, College, or Are At The Margin
(Does Not Include Utility "Cost" in College)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>College</th>
<th>Utility for People at Margin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross Return: College Vs. High School (Relative) +</td>
<td>-0.0180</td>
<td>0.0126</td>
<td>0.0059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>0.1590</td>
<td>0.0178</td>
<td>0.0227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Return: College Vs. High School (Relative) ++</td>
<td>-0.2398</td>
<td>0.3161</td>
<td>-0.0402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>0.2502</td>
<td>0.3178</td>
<td>0.0077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Vs. High School (Relative) +++</td>
<td>-0.4227</td>
<td>0.1892</td>
<td>-0.0416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>0.5770</td>
<td>0.0144</td>
<td>0.0229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 + \(E((V_f/V_k-s) - p)/(V_k+s) | \text{choice=high school})\)

2++ \(E((V_f/V_k-s) - p)/(V_k+s) | \text{choice=college})\)

3++ \(E((V_f/V_k-s) - p)/(V_k+s) | V=0)\)

We make the distinction between the second and third line in this table because in our framework we cannot separate nonmonetary costs from nonmonetary benefits of going to college, so we allocate \(\ln \chi\) both ways.
### Table 6

**Returns to College In Terms of Lifetime Earnings Excluding Tuition For People Who Go To H.S., College, or Are At The Margin**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>College</th>
<th>Earnings for People at Margin³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gross Returns:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College vs. High School¹</td>
<td>0.4379</td>
<td>0.5764</td>
<td>0.5274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>0.0228</td>
<td>0.0365</td>
<td>0.0634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net Returns:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College vs. High School²⁺</td>
<td>0.4162</td>
<td>0.5607</td>
<td>0.5092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>0.0213</td>
<td>0.0366</td>
<td>0.0696</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ $E((PV_f/PV_k)-1|choice=high school)$

² $E((PV_f/(PV_k+PV_{tuition}))-1|choice=college)$

³ $E((PV_f/(PV_k+PV_{tuition}))-1|V=0)$

**Utility Earnings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High School Graduates</th>
<th>College Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross</td>
<td>56.22%</td>
<td>39.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net</td>
<td>13.62%</td>
<td>6.90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Net means net of total cost for utility and net of tuition costs for earnings.

### Table 7

**Percentage of People with Negative Returns to College (Net and Gross)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Utility Earnings</th>
<th>Utility Earnings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduates</td>
<td>95.91%</td>
<td>90.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduates</td>
<td>14.74%</td>
<td>7.28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Earnings are measured in $1000s.
Table 8
Pr(d_i < V_ks | d_j < V_ks) where d_i is the i^{th} decile of the college earnings distribution and d_j is the j^{th} decile of the high school earnings distribution*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High School Deciles</th>
<th>College Deciles</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7436</td>
<td>0.1936</td>
<td>0.0439</td>
<td>0.0121</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1846</td>
<td>0.3799</td>
<td>0.2372</td>
<td>0.1173</td>
<td>0.0503</td>
<td>0.0206</td>
<td>0.0072</td>
<td>0.0022</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0482</td>
<td>0.2219</td>
<td>0.2640</td>
<td>0.2078</td>
<td>0.1337</td>
<td>0.0727</td>
<td>0.0344</td>
<td>0.0131</td>
<td>0.0036</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0154</td>
<td>0.1108</td>
<td>0.1944</td>
<td>0.2172</td>
<td>0.1902</td>
<td>0.1371</td>
<td>0.0806</td>
<td>0.0389</td>
<td>0.0134</td>
<td>0.0021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0055</td>
<td>0.0531</td>
<td>0.1240</td>
<td>0.1781</td>
<td>0.1986</td>
<td>0.1807</td>
<td>0.1372</td>
<td>0.0819</td>
<td>0.0341</td>
<td>0.0065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0019</td>
<td>0.0253</td>
<td>0.0732</td>
<td>0.1274</td>
<td>0.1706</td>
<td>0.1917</td>
<td>0.1826</td>
<td>0.1359</td>
<td>0.0740</td>
<td>0.0175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>0.0103</td>
<td>0.0382</td>
<td>0.0788</td>
<td>0.1271</td>
<td>0.1728</td>
<td>0.2011</td>
<td>0.1926</td>
<td>0.1357</td>
<td>0.0427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0058</td>
<td>0.0171</td>
<td>0.0402</td>
<td>0.0862</td>
<td>0.1300</td>
<td>0.1816</td>
<td>0.2257</td>
<td>0.2173</td>
<td>0.1020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>0.0053</td>
<td>0.0165</td>
<td>0.0379</td>
<td>0.0740</td>
<td>0.1288</td>
<td>0.2082</td>
<td>0.2919</td>
<td>0.2365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>0.0026</td>
<td>0.0079</td>
<td>0.0194</td>
<td>0.0465</td>
<td>0.1015</td>
<td>0.2294</td>
<td>0.5921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The number in the i^{th} column is the probability that a person with potential high school earnings in the j^{th} decile of the high school earnings distribution has potential college earnings in the (i+1)^{st} decile of the college earnings distribution.

Table 9
Agent’s Forecast Variance of High-School-College Returns Under Different Information Sets for the Agents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Set</th>
<th>Gross Utility Variance(Vc)</th>
<th>Net Utility Variance(Vc)</th>
<th>Net Present Value of Earnings Variance(Vc-Tuition)</th>
<th>Gross Present Value of Earnings Variance(Vc-Tuition)</th>
<th>Correlation(Vc, Vc-Tuition)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.566</td>
<td>7.506</td>
<td>7.506</td>
<td>7.506</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.566</td>
<td>7.506</td>
<td>7.506</td>
<td>7.506</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.566</td>
<td>7.506</td>
<td>7.506</td>
<td>7.506</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.566</td>
<td>7.506</td>
<td>7.506</td>
<td>7.506</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.566</td>
<td>7.506</td>
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Table 10
People who choose differently under different information sets compensating for the change in risk

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Original Choice</th>
<th>Fraction that change choice</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I={θ_1, θ_2, θ_3, θ_4}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>0.1181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>0.0159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.0866</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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