

Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule*

Dan Anderberg[†] and Carlo Perroni[‡]

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Abstract

We consider renegotiation of social earnings insurance arrangements by majority voting in an economy where ex-ante identical individuals make unobservable private investments in education. We show that voting-based renegotiation can result in a higher expected level of investment in comparison to the case where social insurance is determined by an appointed social planner. We also find that, with voting-based renegotiation, the availability of costly ex-post information about private investment can help overcome commitment problems. These findings call into question the practice of using a representative-consumer approach when modelling dynamic policy problems in large economies.

KEYWORDS: Social Insurance, Education, Redistribution, Policy Commitment.

JEL Classification: H2, J2, D8.

Correspondence to Dan Anderberg, Department of Economics, Heriot-Watt University, Riccarton, Edinburgh EH14 4AS, United Kingdom. E-mail: D.Anderberg@hw.ac.uk

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[‡]Warwick University.

1 Introduction

In spite of the recent literature stress on political mechanisms of collective choice, the traditional social planning approach to the analysis of policymaking is still widely employed as an analytical short-cut for studying environments where individuals are homogeneous, or where heterogeneity can reasonably be abstracted from. In this paper we argue that, when applied to the study of dynamic situations, the social planning/representative-agent paradigm may not be an innocuous short-cut. Specifically, we show that, when compared to a scenario where policy is chosen by a social planner, explicit renegotiation of collective choices by majority rule in a homogeneous economy can yield markedly different conclusions with respect to the effects of a lack of policy commitment.

We consider an environment where individuals face idiosyncratic earnings risk—which they can insure against by means of a collectively agreed social insurance scheme—and where the probability of experiencing favourable earnings outcomes can be increased by means of private, costly investment in education. In such setting, the provision of social insurance runs against a moral-hazard problem: if full earnings insurance is provided, individual incentives to invest are eliminated. Then, if social insurance can be pre-committed to—before individuals make their investment choices—the standard response to moral hazard would be to strike an appropriate balance between the two goals of inducing efficient educational efforts and providing efficient risk sharing: in the interpretation of a progressive income tax as earnings insurance, incomplete insurance would translate into a marginal income tax of less than one-hundred percent.¹ However, the fact that returns to education appear with long lags opens up a problem of a very different nature: it leaves ample time for renegotiation of social insurance arrangements. The renegotiation problem arises from the fact that the ex-ante efficient policy requires ex-post inefficient risk-sharing, i.e. less-than-full insurance; but once investments are completed there may no longer be any reason for providing incomplete insurance. Thus, a social planner, unan- imously appointed ex ante to select insurance after private education choice are completed but before earnings uncertainty is resolved, would always opt for full insurance, which would then drive education investments to zero.

But while in an economy where policy commitment is possible and where agents are homo- geneous the policy chosen by a social planner is the same as that favoured by a majority, such equivalence is lost when the social contract can be renegotiated. This is because, even though individuals are identical ex ante, heterogeneity in investment choices can arise at the interim stage, both in equilibrium and out of equilibrium. Then, if interim renegotiation takes place by majority voting, with individuals voting over anonymous insurance schemes, it will be in

¹See Sinn (1996) for a recent discussion of the tradeoff, in income tax design, between providing social insurance and maintaining appropriate incentives to invest in education.

the majority's interest to exploit any interim heterogeneity and vote for a scheme that entails a transfer of resources to themselves. This, in turn, will affect individual incentives *ex ante*, and hence the outcomes that can be supported when pre-commitment is not feasible.

Whether or not public information can be valuable also depends on how renegotiation takes place. When interim social insurance choices are made by a social planner, information about private choice is of little consequence. For example, a utilitarian planner selecting a social insurance scheme at the interim stage would condition taxes and transfers on effort, when observable *ex post*, only to the extent that effort affects an individual's *ex-post* marginal utility of income; such conditioning would, however, not generally induce efficient investment choices. Since *ex post* the planner will not have any reason to punish an agent who has failed to take a desired action, whether or not the action can be observed has little bearing on individual incentives.² Consequently, a social planner would not be willing to incur a cost in order to acquire information, at neither the *ex-ante* nor the interim stage.

On the other hand, with voting-based renegotiation a majority's ability to affect a transfer to themselves through the social insurance scheme, and the implications this has for *ex-ante* incentives, will depend on the degree of *ex-post* observability of private choices; it may therefore be in the majority's interest to procure public information even when it is costly to do so. This conclusion may also apply to scenarios where pre-commitment to an information technology is infeasible and where the collective choice to invest in public information must be made concurrently with social insurance choices. Although in this case investment in public information can no longer be used strategically to support an *ex-ante* desirable outcome, it may still be in the interest of the interim majority to invest in information, which can in turn help support more effort in comparison with a social planning outcome. Thus, with voting-based renegotiation, the mere availability of technologies for enhancing the public observability of private choices can help overcome commitment problems.

There is a small but growing literature on dynamically consistent redistributive taxation in the presence of private education choices. Most contributors to this literature have focused on the problems that arise when policy is chosen by a benevolent government.³ By our focus on

²In general, there is no presumption that public information about private choices is a substitute for commitment; on the contrary, it can be the source of the problem. For example, the investment hold-up problem associated with capital taxes (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; more recently, Boadway and Keen, 1998) would not be present if investments were not observable (and therefore not taxable).

³Boadway, Marceau, and Marchand (1996) have considered the dynamically consistent policy choice of a benevolent government in a model with *ex-ante* heterogeneous individuals and productivity-enhancing human capital investments. They show that an inability to commit to an income tax system may lead to serious inefficiencies, which may make an education policy useful. Konrad (1999) examines a moral-hazard model with *ex-ante* homogeneous individuals; an individual's wage rate is uncertain, but the probability of a favourable realization can be increased by human capital investment. Konrad argues that incomplete information on the

interim determination of insurance in a moral-hazard environment our paper is also related to the literature on renegotiation in dynamic contract theory.⁴

The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our model. In Section 3 we analyze social insurance choices made by a utilitarian social planner. In Section 4 we examine the case where collective choices are made by majority voting, considering, in turn, the case where pre-commitment to an investment in information is feasible and the case where it is not. Section 5 discusses some extensions and concludes. Proofs of results (unless outlined in the text) are provided in an appendix.

2 Education, Social Insurance, and Information Structures

Consider an economy with a continuum of agents (of unit measure) living for two periods. In the first period—the *ex-ante* stage—each agent chooses an education or *effort* level $h \in \{h^1, h^2\}$, where $h^2 > h^1$. In the second period—the *ex-post* stage—agents work, inelastically supplying one unit of labour. Earnings in the second period are a random variable $w \in W \equiv \{w_1, w_2\}$, with $w_2 > w_1$, whose probability distribution is independent across consumers but is conditional on first-period effort. Specifically, denoting the probability of a realization w_i given effort h^k by $\pi_i^k \in (0, 1)$, $i, k = 1, 2$, we shall assume that $\pi_2^2 > \pi_2^1$, i.e. a higher level of first-period effort raises the probability of a favourable second-period earnings outcome. One possible interpretation of this assumption is as follows: with h representing education investment, a higher level of education could reveal information about an individual’s suitability to certain occupations and reduce the probability of an occupational mismatch. Henceforth, an agent’s *type* in the second period will refer to her first-period effort choice, i.e. a type- k agent is an agent who has exerted effort h^k , $k = 1, 2$.

Even if all agents exert high effort, there will be residual idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty, which in principle can be eliminated by putting in place a social insurance scheme before

part of the government can be instrumental in preserving incentives for investment in human capital. A related paper is Andersson and Konrad (2000) which considers how globalization and tax competition can restrict redistributive taxation and thereby boost incentives for human capital investments, when there is a potential time-inconsistency problem. Poutvaara (1999) considers a moral-hazard model where individuals vote for a proportional income tax after human capital investments are completed but prior to the individuals learning the outcome of their investment. He shows that the effect of taxation on education, in comparison with a situation with no taxation, is ambiguous. Another related paper is Pearce and Stacchetti (1997); their analysis does not consider human capital investment, but it does consider the choice of redistributive taxes in the presence of moral hazard in labour contracts.

⁴Our paper is especially related to the type of problem described in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), who demonstrate that the possibility of renegotiation in a standard moral-hazard/principal-agent problem can create an endogenous adverse-selection problem by inducing the agent to randomize over actions. See Dewatripont and Maskin (1990) for a survey.

any uncertainty is resolved. Typically, social insurance will consist of a set of earnings-based redistributive taxes and transfers, although for the purpose of our analysis it is convenient to represent social insurance directly in terms of state-contingent consumption levels. Under such a scheme, consumption can be conditioned on earnings, which are assumed to be fully observable, as well as any other observable signals which are received ex post along with earnings realizations, and which may be correlated with effort. Such signals can be formalized as a *signal structure* $\sigma \equiv (S, f, q)$, where S is a finite signal space, f_j^k is the probability that a type- k agent sends the signal $s_j \in S$, and $q \geq 0$ (hereafter denoted as q_σ) is the per-capita cost of having the signal structure in place. We shall also write $S(h)$ to denote the support of the signal distribution given effort h for a given σ —i.e. the smallest subset of S that has probability one given effort h . Signal structures can be thought of as being exogenous, or, alternatively, as being the result of a costly investment in collective infrastructure, put in place in order to provide public information about private education choices.⁵ The set of feasible signal structures, or the economy’s *information technology*, denoted Σ , is assumed to contain the ‘uninformative’ or *null* signal structure σ_0 —the no-information case—which can be represented by a signal space containing a single signal sent with probability one irrespectively of the agent’s type; σ_0 is assumed to be costless, i.e. $q_{\sigma_0} = 0$, while all other signal structures are assumed to have strictly positive cost.

For a given signal structure, an *insurance contract* can be described as a mapping $C : W \times S \rightarrow R_+$, assigning a consumption level $C(w_i, s_j) \equiv c_{ij}$ to each possible earnings/signal combination (w_i, s_j) .⁶ In principle, more than one contract may be offered as part of a social insurance scheme, with each agent choosing which contract to underwrite; a *social insurance system* can thus be generally described as a menu of contracts, $\mathcal{C} \equiv (C^1, \dots, C^t, \dots)$. Since the social insurance system is put in place before any signals are received or earnings outcomes are realized—when agents are indistinguishable from each other—we shall require that the scheme be anonymous: all agents must be offered the same menu of contracts.

Also, in order to be feasible, a social insurance system must satisfy an aggregate resource constraint. Since the economy is large and all risk is idiosyncratic, there is no aggregate uncertainty; thus, we can simply require that the economy’s resource constraint must hold in expectations. Let $\bar{w}^k \equiv \sum_i \pi_i^k w_i$ denote the expected income for a type- k agent. In the subsequent analysis all agents of the same type will always pick the same contract. Then, if θ^k denotes the fraction of type- k agents in the economy and C^k is the contract picked by type- k

⁵Public monitoring mechanisms such as public testing of educational attainments can be thought of as a special case of this more general specification.

⁶Although our analysis will assume that consumption is bounded from below, the nonnegativity constraint is largely arbitrary. One may alternatively assume that consumption can never be less than a certain given level $\underline{c} \neq 0$.

agents, the resource constraint can be written as

$$(1) \quad \prod_k \theta^k \bar{w}^k - \prod_j \prod_i f_j^k \pi_i^k c_{ij}^k \geq 0.$$

Agents derive utility from consumption and disutility from effort and from the cost associated with any signal structure in place: given consumption c , effort h^k , and a signal structure σ , an agent obtains utility $u(c) - g^k - q_\sigma$, where $u' > 0$ and $u'' < 0$, and where g^k denotes the cost associated with effort h^k . Preferences are thus assumed to be fully separable both in the cost of effort and in the per-person cost of adopting a signal structure.

Agents' choices in this model consist of individual choices—over effort—and collective choices—over the adoption of signal structures and social insurance schemes.⁷ If policy choices could be made before private education choices, then the manner in which collective choices are made would not matter: individuals could appoint a social planner or vote directly over policy (or indeed bargain in some other way as long as the bargaining process satisfies anonymity). In all cases, the chosen policy would maximize the expected payoff of the representative individual, and, in all cases, the outcome would be optimal given the available information technology. It is unclear, however, how the individuals could commit *ex ante* (when young) to a certain social insurance scheme that will apply when old. But if private choices precede insurance choices, the procedure through which collective choices are made matters. This is because, even when individuals are *ex-ante* identical, after private choices are made—at the *interim* stage—individuals can be of different types. Consequently, the way in which heterogeneous preferences are reconciled at the interim stage determines which equilibrium outcomes can be supported. In the next section, we start by briefly considering the scenario where collective choices are made by a social planner. The subsequent sections will turn to the case where collective choices are made by majority voting.

3 Renegotiation under Social Planning

Suppose that a utilitarian social planner is appointed at the *ex-ante* stage (before the agents choose effort) to select a social insurance system at the interim stage (after the agents have exerted efforts but before any uncertainty is resolved). This scenario comprises two subcases: the planner may either be able to commit to a signal structure at the *ex-ante* stage (*ex-ante adoption*), or be unable to do so, implying that the signal structure will have to be determined at the interim stage along with the social insurance system (*interim adoption*). As we shall see, although the analysis of the two cases differ slightly the outcome is the same: in equilibrium all

⁷We choose to focus on social insurance as an example of a social contract that may be vulnerable to renegotiation, abstracting from the question of whether earnings insurance could be provided by private markets.

agents choose low effort, the planner does not invest in any costly signal structure and provides all agents with full insurance.⁸

Throughout our analysis, we shall restrict our attention to scenarios where neither low nor high effort is a dominant action for the individuals irrespectively of social insurance arrangements; specifically, we shall assume that

$$(2) \quad u(\bar{w}^2) - g^2 > u(\bar{w}^1) - g^1 > \prod_i \pi_i^2 u(w_i) - g^2.$$

An efficient outcome thus involves full insurance and high effort, but agents prefer low effort with full insurance to high effort with no insurance. This generates a moral-hazard problem since insurance reduces the agents' incentives to exert effort.

Since agents are ex-ante identical we will focus on symmetric equilibria. Agents may, however, randomize over effort levels, choosing effort level h^k with probability θ^k . Since the economy is large, θ^k will also represent the fraction of type- k individuals present in the economy at the interim stage.⁹

Consider first the case where the social planner can commit to a signal structure at the ex-ante stage. The planner first chooses a signal structure $\sigma \in \Sigma$, which is observed by everyone, after which agents choose effort; then the planner—without observing private choices—chooses a social insurance system; finally, signals and earnings are realized and taxes and transfers are carried out. Since there are at most two agent types, we can without loss of generality restrict the number of contracts in a menu to two, one for each type.

Let

$$(3) \quad v^k(C) \equiv \prod_j \prod_i f_j^k \pi_i^k u(c_{ij})$$

denote the expected utility of consumption for a type- k agent given the contract C . The planner's objective can then be written as

$$(4) \quad \prod_k \theta^k (v^k(C^k) - g^k) - q_\sigma,$$

where C^k is the contract intended for type- k agents. The set of relevant constraints for the planner's problem always includes the budget constraint (1); interim participation constraints

⁸The planner could in principle randomize over signal structures, but this will not affect the outcome; to keep the analysis simple we will ignore random signal structures in this section.

⁹Symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria in this context can equivalently be interpreted as asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria (note that since individuals must be indifferent between any two effort levels adopted with non-zero probability in equilibrium, ex-ante expected welfare in equilibrium will be the same across individuals independently of which interpretation we choose). Moreover, Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) show that a mixed-strategy equilibrium of the type considered here, where the agents randomize over effort levels, can be 'purified' by allowing the agents to have some small amount of private information about their effort costs.

if the agents can opt out of social insurance,

$$(5) \quad v^k(C^k) \geq \prod_i \pi_i^k u(w_i);$$

and interim self-selection constraints requiring that each agent type opt for the contract that is meant for her type:

$$(6) \quad v^k(C^k) \geq v^k(C^{k'}), \quad k \neq k'.$$

To characterize subgame perfect equilibria of this game, we can proceed by backward induction, considering first a subgame in which σ is given. Since the planner has no information about private choices when deciding on a social insurance system, the appropriate equilibrium concept to apply to such subgame is, strictly speaking, Nash equilibrium. Note, however, that when the distribution of types is degenerate, menus containing ‘extreme’ contracts can be optimal since these have no direct effect on the planner’s maximand and resource constraint; this in turn can give rise to nonintuitive equilibria which rely on the planner playing a weakly dominated strategy.¹⁰ Such equilibria are degenerate in the sense that they are not robust to small deviations from the individuals’ equilibrium strategies, and can be ruled out by applying a simple perfection argument whereby each agent is required to adopt each possible effort level with an arbitrarily small but positive probability ε ;¹¹ a Nash equilibrium of the unconstrained game equilibrium is then said to be *perfect* if it is the limit of a sequence of Nash equilibria for the constrained game as ε approaches zero.

Lemma 1 *Conditional on any ex-ante adopted signal structure $\sigma \in \Sigma$, the unique perfect Nash equilibrium in the continuation game involves the utilitarian social planner choosing a single full-insurance contract, $c_{ij} = \bar{w}^1$ for all i, j , and all agents choosing low effort with probability one.*

Given Lemma 1 it is trivial to see that the planner will have no reason to invest in a costly signal structure at the ex-ante stage; hence the unique equilibrium of the game involves all agents choosing low effort and the planner adopting the null signal structure with probability one and providing full insurance.

¹⁰In particular, if the planner believes that no agent has chosen low effort, then her best response is to offer full insurance; however, she can offer a low consumption level on any signal that is not compatible with high effort. If σ is such that a low-effort agent sends a distinct signal with a sufficiently high probability (i.e., if σ is sufficiently *revealing* for type-1 individuals in the terminology introduced in the next section) then the agents’ best response is to choose high effort. Hence there may exist, conditional on σ , a Nash equilibrium where all agents choose high effort. But this nonintuitive equilibrium relies on the planner being absolutely ‘confident’ that no agent has chosen low effort.

¹¹This corresponds to the notion of an ‘ ε -constrained’ equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1989), except that we do not require the planner to play a mixed strategy.

What then if the planner could not commit to a signal structure at the ex-ante stage, but were only able to adopt one at the interim stage along with the social insurance system? In this case, as in previous one, the planner’s objective when choosing social insurance would be to equalize consumption levels across agents—which it can do without having any information on private choices—and make this common consumption level as large as possible; hence, again, the planner would always offer a single full-insurance contract and would never adopt any costly signal structure in the interim because this would only reduce the available resources to be distributed. Given that no information about private choices will be procured and that full insurance will be provided, no agent has any incentive to exert any effort. In other words, the outcome is the same irrespectively of whether the social planner can commit to a signal structure or not. The agents know that the planner will always want to equalize consumption ex post and hence any threat to condition consumption on signals will be empty.

Proposition 1 *If a utilitarian social planner selects a signal structure, either ex ante or in the interim along with a social insurance system, the unique perfect Nash equilibrium involves the planner choosing the uninformative signal structure, σ_0 , all agents choosing low effort, h^1 , with probability one, and the planner offering a single full-insurance contract with $c_{ij} = \bar{w}^1$ for all i, j .*

4 Renegotiation by Majority Rule

As previously noted, even starting from a scenario with identical individuals, after private effort choices have been made there may be population heterogeneity. Then, how different preferences are reconciled in the interim may be relevant for individual incentives to exert effort, and hence for the level of private effort that can be supported in equilibrium.

Note that the insurance-based interpretation of social-welfare-maximizing planning choices will cease to apply in the presence of interim renegotiation; if a planner is appointed before private effort choices are made but is to make social insurance choices at the interim stage, the relevant objective for the planner at that stage will not coincide with the expected utility of the representative agent, but will feature as its argument the interim *expected* utilities of the (possibly heterogeneous) individuals. There may be no disagreement among the ex-ante identical individuals about which form this objective should take—although utilitarianism would no longer be a natural choice—but it is hard to imagine a scenario where collective choices should follow this route: if pre-commitment is possible with respect to the identity and objective of a planner, then it should also be possible to directly pre-commit to a certain social insurance scheme. Interim majority voting over social insurance schemes seems to be a more natural

procedure in a large economy where bargaining is infeasible.¹²

Independently of whether or not commitment to a signal structure is feasible, in order to study individual voting choices we shall need to characterize the contract menu that maximizes the continuation utility of each agent type for each possible distribution of effort types and each $\sigma \in \Sigma$. Since there are at most two voter types present at the interim stage, each voter can do no better than by voting for the menu that maximizes her own continuation utility; in other words, *sincere* voting is always a weakly undominated strategy.¹³ It follows that the contract menu selected by majority rule in the interim will always be one that is favoured by the majority type.

We can again, without loss of generality, assume that each agent votes for a menu consisting of two contracts—one intended for her own type and one intended for the other type. Let the menu favoured by type- k agents be denoted by $C^k \equiv (C^{kk}, C^{kk'})$ (the first superscript indicates the type casting the vote and the second superscript the type the contract is intended for). Since effort is private information—no signals have yet been observed—the menu that is optimal for type- k individuals must induce agents to self-select according to their effort type. For the time being we shall assume that individuals cannot opt out of social insurance—the effects of participation constraints will be discussed later. Given a certain signal structure σ and beliefs $\theta = (\theta^1, \theta^2)$ concerning the composition of the population, the optimal menu from the point of view of a type- k agent is then a solution to

$$(7) \quad \max_{C^k} v^k(C^{kk}) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad (1) \quad \text{and} \quad v^{k'}(C^{kk'}) - v^{k'}(C^{kk''}) \geq 0, \quad k' \neq k''.$$

The latter set of constraints state that each type k' , $k' = 1, 2$ should prefer the contract meant for her type, $C^{kk'}$, to that intended for the other type, $C^{kk''}$. Note that nonsatiation implies that the budget constraint will always be binding at an optimum.¹⁴ The problem is one of provision of insurance under adverse selection with two risk groups. The case of a monopolistic insurer facing two risk groups has been studied by Stiglitz (1977) and the corresponding competitive markets case by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). The structure of the problem here differs from that in a buyer-seller relationship in that agents are voting directly over a menu of contracts that apply to themselves, each agent type aiming at maximizing utility for her own type; indeed, Problem (7) can be viewed as characterizing a particular constrained Pareto-efficient

¹²In a representative democracy, social insurance choices could be made in the interim by a previously appointed policymaker, but there is no reason to believe that such a policymaker would formulate her interim choices on the basis of a social planning objective.

¹³For simplicity, the rest of our discussion will focus on strategies featuring sincere voting, even when such behaviour is only an undominated best response in equilibrium (as is the case for minority-type voters).

¹⁴Nonsatiation implies that it is always possible to use any additional resources to raise everyone's level of consumption without tightening any of the self-selection constraints.

allocation, the allocation that maximizes the utility for type k . Denote such a solution by $C^k(\theta; \sigma) = (C^{kk}(\theta; \sigma), C^{kk'}(\theta; \sigma))$.

Two observations can immediately be made about the solution to Problem (7). First, pooling is not optimal $C^{kk'} \neq C^{kk}$; this follows from the fact that the two types have, for any σ , different probability distributions over earnings/signal combinations. Second, the self-selection constraint for type $k' \neq k$ is binding at an optimum: if it were not, then type k' would be offered zero consumption.

In general, voters will trade off consumption risk for higher expected consumption. However, as the fraction of any one type approaches unity, the optimal insurance contract that type would choose for themselves approaches full insurance. This can be seen by considering Problem (7) for k as θ^k approaches unity, i.e. when almost all agents have chosen effort h^k . The reason why type- k agents would choose for themselves a contract featuring consumption risk is that doing so can relax the other type's self-selection constraint and allow them to obtain a higher expected consumption; but as the fraction of type- k agents approaches unity the gain to doing so vanishes. Thus, as θ^k approaches unity, the contract that type- k individuals choose for themselves must approach a full-insurance contract. Moreover, because of the resource constraint (1), the expected consumption for type- k agents must also converge to their expected earnings, \bar{w}^k . Thus $\prod_{s_j \in S(h^k)} c_{ij}^{kk}(\theta; \sigma)$ indeed approaches \bar{w}^k for all j s.t. $s_j \in S(h^k)$.

Let $\phi_{k'}^k(\sigma) \equiv \prod_{s_j \in S(h^k)} f_j^{k'}$, for $k' \neq k$. In words, $\phi_{k'}^k(\sigma)$ is the probability that a type- k' agent sends a signal that is also sent with positive probability by a type- k agent. Since an agent is revealed as being of type k' if she sends a signal that is never sent by a type- k agent, we say that the signal structure σ is *at least as revealing as $\hat{\sigma}$ for type k'* if $\phi_{k'}^k(\sigma) \leq \phi_{k'}^k(\hat{\sigma})$. Given that an optimal contract for type k involves $c_{ij}^{kk}(\theta; \sigma) = 0$ whenever $s_j \notin S(h^k)$ —a choice of $c_{ij}^{kk}(\theta; \sigma) > 0$ for any such signal would have no direct effect on type k 's continuation utility but would only tighten the other type's self-selection constraint—it then also follows that $v^{k'}(C^{kk'}(\theta; \sigma))$ approaches $\phi_{k'}^k(\sigma)u(\bar{w}^k) + (1 - \phi_{k'}^k(\sigma))u(0) \equiv \bar{v}^{kk'}(\sigma)$ as θ^k approaches unity. Furthermore, it will always be optimal for type- k agents to offer a full-insurance contract to the other type, since a less-than-full insurance contract would again tighten the corresponding self-selection constraint for any given level of expected consumption by type k' . Thus, as θ^k approaches unity, the contract offered to k' will feature $c_{ij}^{kk'}(\theta; \sigma) = \bar{c}^{kk'}(\sigma)$ for all i, j , where $\bar{c}^{kk'}(\sigma)$ is implicitly defined by

$$(8) \quad u(\bar{c}^{kk'}(\sigma)) = \bar{v}^{kk'}(\sigma).$$

When θ^k is exactly one, all agents will vote for full insurance on all signals compatible with effort h^k . The 'own' contract C^{kk} , on the other hand, is indeterminate for signals that are never sent by type- k individuals (i.e. for $s_j \notin S(h^k)$); neither is a contract for the absent type, type k' , determined. It is still useful, however, to assume that, when $\theta^k = 1$, the agents vote for a menu of contracts that coincides with the limit of $C^k(\theta; \sigma)$ as θ^k approaches unity, and features $c_{ij}^{kk} = \bar{w}^k$ whenever $s_j \in S(h^k)$, $c_{ij}^{kk} = 0$ otherwise, and $c_{ij}^{kk'} = \bar{c}^{kk'}(\sigma)$, for all i, j .

The menu $\mathcal{C}^k(\theta; \sigma)$ induces continuation utilities $v^{kk'}(\theta; \sigma) = v^{k'}(C^{kk'}(\theta; \sigma))$ (for $k' = k$ and for $k' \neq k$; as a convention, the first superscript in $v^{kk'}(\theta; \sigma)$ will refer to the type casting the vote and the second superscript to the type affected). Certain properties of continuation utilities will be relevant for our subsequent analysis. First, each type k will always vote for a menu that provides a higher continuation utility to her own type than to the other type:

Lemma 2 $v^{kk}(\theta; \sigma) - v^{kk'}(\theta; \sigma) > 0$ for all $\theta^2 \in (0, 1)$ and all $\sigma \in \Sigma$, $k = 1, 2$, and $k' \neq k$.

Second, how effectively a contract menu can discriminate between effort types clearly depends on the extent to which private choices are observable ex post. Note that the ‘at least as revealing’ criterion cannot rank two information structures σ and $\hat{\sigma}$ that are equally revealing ($\phi_k^{k'}(\sigma) = \phi_k^{k'}(\hat{\sigma})$) but differ in the relative frequency with which a certain signal s_j is sent by the two effort types. A more general (and well-known) measure of informativeness is the Blackwell criterion:

Definition 1 The signal structure $\sigma = \{S, f, q\}$ is (Blackwell) more informative than $\hat{\sigma} = \{\hat{S}, \hat{f}, \hat{q}\}$ if there exists a Markov matrix $[\beta_{jj}]$ such that, for each $s_j \in \hat{S}$, we have $\hat{f}_j^k = \prod_{s_j \in S} \beta_{jj} f_j^k$, for $k = 1, 2$.¹⁵

If σ is more informative than $\hat{\sigma}$, it is also at least as revealing as $\hat{\sigma}$ for both types, although the converse is not necessarily the case. It can then be shown that the more informative is the signal structure (in the sense just described) the higher is the continuation utility that the type selecting the contract menu can secure for herself:

Lemma 3 If σ is more informative than $\hat{\sigma}$, then $v^{kk}(\theta; \sigma) \geq v^{kk}(\theta; \hat{\sigma})$ for all $\theta^2 \in (0, 1)$, $k = 1, 2$.

4.1 Voting with Commitment to Signal Structures

We will start by considering the case where the agents can commit, at the ex ante stage, to a (possibly degenerate) randomization over signal structures; we shall denote such a randomization by $\omega \in \Omega(\Sigma)$, where $\Omega(\Sigma)$ is the space of probability distributions over Σ , and where $\omega(\sigma)$ represents the probability that $\sigma \in \Sigma$ is adopted. The expected cost of adopting a randomization ω is then $q_\omega \equiv \prod_{\sigma \in \Sigma} \omega(\sigma) q_\sigma$, and continuation utilities given ω can be written (slightly abusing the notation) as $v^{kk'}(\theta; \omega) \equiv \prod_{\sigma \in \Sigma} \omega(\sigma) v^{kk'}(\theta; \sigma)$, $k, k' = 1, 2$. The probability of a type- k' agent sending a signal that is also sent by a type- k ($k' \neq k$) agent given a randomization ω is $\phi_{k'}^k(\omega) \equiv \prod_{\sigma \in \Sigma} \omega(\sigma) \phi_{k'}^k(\sigma)$.

¹⁵A Markov matrix is a matrix with non-negative elements whose column sums equal unity. Note that the binary relation ‘more informative than’ is also generally not complete.

The main results for the ex-ante adoption case can be summarized as follows. If agents commit ex ante to a randomization ω that reveals a low-effort agent sufficiently often, then there exists, conditional on ω , a perfect pure-strategy high-effort equilibrium with full insurance. Furthermore, there may exist, conditional on any randomization $\omega \in \Omega(\Sigma)$, mixed-strategy equilibria in which a majority of agents choose high effort, although there will also always exist a pure-strategy low-effort equilibrium. In general, the more informative is the adopted signal structure the more effort can be supported. Consequently, the individuals may have a common strategic incentive to pre-commit to an informative signal structure as long as it is not too costly. Furthermore, with ex-ante adoption, an improvement in the economy's information technology (represented by an expansion of the set of available signal structures, Σ) can only be welfare improving as long as agents are able to coordinate on a Pareto-undominated equilibrium.

The timing of choices is as follows. Individuals first vote over randomizations $\omega \in \Omega(\Sigma)$ and the winning ω is observed by everyone. The agents then choose education efforts, over which they also can randomize. Next, the winning randomization ω is used to select a signal structure σ , which is put in place and is observed by everyone. After observing σ and their own effort realizations, individuals vote over social insurance schemes. Finally, earnings and signals are realized and taxes and transfers are carried out. The game can be solved backwards by first considering outcomes conditional on a certain randomization ω . In the continuation game each agent first chooses a randomization over effort levels, and then, after observing her own actual effort choice and a selected signal structure σ , votes for a social insurance system. A behavioural strategy for an agent in this continuation game consists of a probability of choosing high effort, θ^2 (with $\theta^1 = 1 - \theta^2$), together with a rule describing how the agent will vote in dependency of the combined realization of her own effort and of the signal structure. As before, the relevant equilibrium concept is Nash (since there are no further proper subgames): in equilibrium each agent holds correct beliefs about the other agents' actions and chooses a strategy which is a best response to the other agents' behavioural strategies. And, as before, we can apply a perfection refinement (although in this case the refinement has no effect on the set of equilibrium outcomes).

We can start by noting the following:

Proposition 2 *Conditional on any randomization over signal structures $\omega \in \Omega(\Sigma)$:*

1. *There exists a perfect pure-strategy Nash equilibrium where all agents choose low effort, $\theta^2 = 0$.*
2. *There does not exist any Nash equilibrium where $\theta^2 \in (0, 1/2)$.*

Part 1 says that a pure-strategy low-effort equilibrium always exists, but does not rule out the possibility of other equilibria being simultaneously present. Part 2 rules out a non-zero size, high-effort minority in equilibrium. The reason for this is that a low-effort majority

would vote for a social insurance system that leaves them with a higher continuation utility in comparison with high-effort individuals; since effort is costly, this would also imply that low effort dominates high effort from an ex-ante perspective, which in turn is inconsistent with randomization between effort levels.

Next, we want to consider the possibility of a mixed-strategy continuation equilibrium where $\theta^2 \in (1/2, 1)$ and of a pure-strategy high-effort equilibrium, $\theta^2 = 1$. For there to be an equilibrium where the agents randomize over effort levels, they must be indifferent between high and low effort. This is compatible with $\theta^2 > 1/2$, since when the high-effort agents are a majority, the winning contract menu induces a larger continuation utility for high-effort agents than for low-effort agents. Suppose then that all agents choose high effort with some probability $\theta^2 \in (1/2, 1)$. Holding correct beliefs about the distribution of types, high-effort agents vote for $\mathcal{C}^2(\theta; \sigma)$ when σ is selected; given the randomization ω , this will induce continuation utilities $v^{22}(\theta; \omega)$ and $v^{21}(\theta; \omega)$ for high- and low-effort agents respectively prior to the selection of σ . Then, if $v^{22}(\theta; \omega) - v^{21}(\theta; \omega) = g^2 - g^1$, there exists, conditional on ω , a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where each agent exerts high effort with probability θ^2 . Since agents randomize over efforts, this equilibrium is also perfect:

Proposition 3 *With interim voting over social insurance, any symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium with $\theta^2 \in (1/2, 1)$ is a perfect equilibrium.*

Thus, there may exist continuation equilibria where agents randomize over effort levels. Is it then also possible that there exist pure-strategy high-effort equilibria? This is possible, but requires that a low-effort agent be ‘revealed’ sufficiently often. Note the intuition behind this: if all agents choose the high effort, they will vote, in the interim, for full insurance over all signals that are compatible with high effort. However, they can credibly vote for a very low consumption level over all signals that are *not* compatible with high effort (and they will find it optimal to do so). This discourages an agent from choosing low effort if the probability of sending such signals is sufficiently high. Note that, if such an equilibrium exists, it is also perfect, since a majority places no weight on the welfare of a minority.

Proposition 4 *With interim voting over social insurance, there exists, conditional on a given randomization over signal structures, $\omega \in \Omega(\Sigma)$, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which all agents choose high effort with probability one ($\theta^2 = 1$) if and only if*

$$(9) \quad (u(\bar{w}^2) - u(0))(1 - \phi_1^2(\omega)) \geq g^2 - g^1.$$

If the above inequality is strict, then this equilibrium is also perfect.

Thus, with commitment to signal structures, three types of symmetric continuation equilibria are possible: a low-effort equilibrium, a mixed-strategy equilibrium where individuals

choose high effort with a probability greater than $1/2$, and a high-effort equilibrium. The symmetric high-effort equilibrium requires that low-effort agents be sometimes fully revealed, i.e. it requires quite a lot of observability.

These results suggest that the maximum amount of effort (measured as the fraction of agents choosing high effort) which can be supported by a signal structure is related to its level of informativeness. Suppose that the more informative is the adopted signal structure the larger is the difference in the continuation utilities of the type choosing the contract menu and of the other type, i.e. suppose that $v^{kk}(\theta; \sigma) - v^{kk'}(\theta; \sigma)$ is weakly increasing (for each k and θ) in the informativeness of σ .¹⁶ Consider then two signal structures σ and $\hat{\sigma}$, where σ is more informative than $\hat{\sigma}$. From Proposition 4, $\hat{\sigma}$ supports a high-effort equilibrium if and only if $u(\bar{w}^2) - u(0) \geq 1 - \phi_1^2(\hat{\sigma}) \geq g^2 - g^1$. Also, recall that when σ is more informative than $\hat{\sigma}$ it is also at least as revealing for type 1 ($\phi_1^2(\sigma) \leq \phi_1^2(\hat{\sigma})$). Hence if $\hat{\sigma}$ supports a pure-strategy high-effort equilibrium, σ does so too. On the other hand, if $\hat{\sigma}$ does not support any high effort at all, then σ cannot support less effort. Finally, suppose that $\hat{\sigma}$ supports a mixed strategy equilibrium with $\theta > 1/2$. Then, as shown in Figure 1 (where $\Delta v^2(\theta; \sigma) \equiv v^{22}(\theta; \sigma) - v^{21}(\theta; \sigma)$, and $\Delta g \equiv g^2 - g^1$), σ will either support a mixed-strategy equilibrium with a larger fraction of high-effort agents or a pure-strategy high-effort equilibrium.




Figure 1: If a more informative signal structure shifts the locus $\Delta v^2 \equiv v^{22}(\theta; \sigma) - v^{21}(\theta; \sigma)$ upwards, it supports more effort.

¹⁶Since type- k agents are voting to maximize their own continuation utility with no direct concern for type- k' agents, this is plausible. Note, however, that it is not implied by Lemma 3.

This conclusion generalizes to random signal structures in a straightforward manner: as more weight is placed on the more informative signal structure σ and less on $\hat{\sigma}$, the largest θ^2 that can be supported in equilibrium will not decrease.

Let us now move back to the first stage of the game, where the choice of a signal structure (or a randomization over signal structures) is made. Although there can be multiple symmetric continuation equilibria for any given ω , in each of these equilibria utility is the same across individuals. Then, being identical ex ante, they will unanimously select a randomization over signal structures for which the expected continuation utility is maximal (which may or may not be the randomization that induces the largest effort). If the agents can coordinate on undominated continuation equilibria for any given σ , a given expected level of equilibrium effort will always be induced in the cheapest possible way through an appropriate choice of ω . For example, if a uniform choice of low effort is to be induced, the null signal structure will be adopted; on the other hand, if a uniform choice of high effort is to be induced, then the agents will choose an ω which just supports a pure-strategy high-effort outcome but minimizes cost (e.g., by placing some positive weight on σ_0).

We close our discussion of the case with commitment to signal structures by noting that an improvement in the economy's information technology—which can be represented by an expansion in the set of available signal structures, Σ —can never decrease welfare provided that agents can coordinate on Pareto-undominated equilibria. The result follows from the fact that the agents commit to a signal structure while they are still identical: an expansion of the set of available signal structures from Σ to Σ' , $\Sigma \subset \Sigma'$, increases the agents' choice set at the adoption stage; if, for any given σ , they can coordinate on a Pareto-undominated continuation equilibrium, then, being identical at the ex-ante stage, they will unanimously select a randomization $\omega \in \Omega(\Sigma)$ which maximizes ex-ante welfare; then, an enlargement of the set of available signal structures must be (weakly) welfare improving.¹⁷

Proposition 5 *With interim voting over social insurance and commitment to signal structures at the ex ante stage, an improvement in the economy's information technology weakly increases welfare.*

¹⁷Formally, let $\Theta(\omega)$ denote the set of effort distributions that can be supported in a continuation equilibrium given ω ; then the maximum ex ante expected utility that can be achieved in equilibrium through an appropriate choice of ω is $\max_{\omega \in \Omega(\Sigma)} \max_{\theta \in \Theta(\omega)} \int_{\sigma \in \Sigma} \omega(\sigma) v^{k(\theta)k^0}(\theta; \sigma) - g^{k^0} - q_\omega$ where $k(\theta)$ is the majority type, i.e. $k(\theta) = 1$ if $\theta^2 < 1/2$ and $k(\theta) = 2$ otherwise. Then we conclude that this maximum utility can only be increased when Σ is expanded to Σ' , $\Sigma \subset \Sigma'$, and thus the choice set is expanded from $\Omega(\Sigma)$ to $\Omega(\Sigma')$.

4.2 Voting without Commitment to Signal Structures

The previous analysis leaves us with the doubt that commitment to signal structures may simply serve as a substitute for commitment to social insurance. Can signal structures play a positive role even if they cannot be committed to prior to the agents exerting effort? Or stated slightly differently, is commitment to information crucial when commitment to insurance is not feasible?

We shall show that without commitment to signal structures there cannot exist a pure-strategy high-effort equilibrium. However, as in the case of ex-ante adoption of signal structures, there may exist, depending on the information technology, symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria that dominate the pure-strategy low-effort equilibrium. Thus, the availability of information about private effort choices may help support more efficient outcomes even when the decision to procure such information is made concurrently with the choice of a social insurance system at the interim stage. Nevertheless, although equilibrium effort with commitment to signal structures can be more or less than without commitment, welfare without commitment can be no larger than welfare with commitment. Finally, unlike in the ex-ante adoption case, with interim adoption an improvement in the information technology may increase or decrease welfare.

The timing of choices is as follows. First, agents choose effort, where they may randomize. After observing their own effort realizations, they vote over policy ‘packages’—or a randomization over such packages—where each package consists of a social insurance scheme and an accompanying signal structure. Finally, a policy package, selected using the winning randomization, is implemented, whereafter earnings and signals are realized and taxes and transfers are carried out.¹⁸ A behavioural strategy for an agent consists of a probability, θ^2 , of choosing high effort, and a rule for how to vote for a policy package (or for a randomization over packages) contingent on her own realized effort type. The relevant solution concept is again Nash equilibrium, possibly perfected.

It is easy to see that there can never exist a symmetric pure-strategy high-effort equilibrium. If all agents did choose high effort, then each agent would, holding correct beliefs about the other agents’ effort choices and voting sincerely, vote for full insurance, and no agent would favour adopting any costly signal structure. Hence the uninformative signal structure σ_0 would be selected and each agent would be offered a constant consumption level \bar{w}^2 ; but then low effort would dominate high effort for all agents. The problem is that in order to uphold a high-effort equilibrium, costly information is needed to detect deviators; but if all agents actually do choose high effort, then in the interim they will not have any incentive to procure information. This is

¹⁸ Alternatively, voting could be assumed to be sequential with voting taking place first over signal structures and then over social insurance.

a very general observation: if an equilibrium is going to be upheld by costly information, there has to be, in that equilibrium, a return to actually procuring the information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Such a return only exists when there is interim heterogeneity; hence, equilibria in which costly information is procured must be mixed-strategy equilibria.

Proposition 6 *With interim voting over signal structures and social insurance, there never exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium where all individuals choose high effort, $\theta^2 = 1$.*

In parallel to the case with commitment, we can show the following:

Proposition 7 *With interim voting over signal structures and social insurance:*

1. *There exists a perfect Nash equilibrium where all agents choose low effort, $\theta^2 = 0$;*
2. *There never exists a Nash equilibrium with $\theta^2 \in (0, 1/2)$.*

Thus, if any agent is going to exert high effort, there will have to be a mixed-strategy equilibrium where the majority of agents at the interim stage are of the high-effort type. Such an equilibrium has to satisfy two conditions: first, any adopted policy package has to be optimal in the interim from the point of view of the high-effort agents, and second, all agents must be ex-ante indifferent between high and low effort.

Given a signal structure $\sigma \in \Sigma$ and beliefs θ about the distribution of effort types, the menu of contracts that maximizes the high-effort type's continuation utility is $\mathcal{C}^2(\theta; \sigma)$, and the continuation utility achieved by the high-effort agents is $v^{22}(\theta; \sigma)$. When voting sincerely to maximize her own continuation utility, a high-effort individual will therefore vote for a randomization $\omega \in \Omega(\Sigma)$ which maximizes $v^{22}(\theta; \omega) - q_\omega$. Consider then a combination of randomization over efforts $\tilde{\theta}$, with $\tilde{\theta}^2 \in (1/2, 1)$, and randomization over signal structures $\tilde{\omega}$ satisfying

$$(10) \quad (i) \quad \tilde{\omega} \in \arg \max_{\omega \in \Omega(\Sigma)} v^{22}(\tilde{\theta}; \omega) - q_\omega, \quad \text{and} \quad (ii) \quad v^{22}(\tilde{\theta}; \tilde{\omega}) - v^{21}(\tilde{\theta}; \tilde{\omega}) = g^2 - g^1.$$

With agents holding consistent beliefs about the interim distribution of types, condition (i) guarantees that it is optimal for high-effort agents to vote for the policy package $\sigma, \mathcal{C}^2(\theta; \sigma)$ to be adopted with probability $\tilde{\omega}(\sigma)$; this in turn will induce continuation utilities $v^{22}(\tilde{\theta}; \tilde{\omega})$ and $v^{21}(\tilde{\theta}; \tilde{\omega})$. Given (ii) each agent is then indifferent between choosing high and low effort at the ex-ante stage, and it is therefore an optimal response to choose high effort with probability $\tilde{\theta}^2$. As in the ex-ante adoption case, this Nash equilibrium is also perfect since agents are strictly randomizing over effort levels:

Proposition 8 *With interim voting over signal structures and social insurance, any symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium with $\theta^2 \in (1/2, 1)$ and $\omega \in \Omega(\Sigma)$ is a perfect equilibrium.*

Absent commitment to signal structures, there can be two types of equilibria; there always exists a symmetric pure-strategy low-effort equilibrium, but there may also exist mixed-strategy equilibria with a high-effort majority. Since agents are ex-ante identical, if there are multiple equilibria, they will all agree on which one is the best for them (just as in the case with commitment to signal structures); we will therefore assume that if there are multiple equilibria, agents are able to coordinate on a Pareto-undominated equilibrium.

Thus, ex-ante commitment to a costly signal structure is not crucial in order for interim majority voting over social insurance schemes to be effective as an enforcement mechanism and support an effort choice in excess of $\theta^2 = 0$. Commitment to an information technology will nevertheless always be desirable in the sense that expected welfare will always be at least as high with it as without it. To see this, note that a lack of commitment with respect to signal structures can be thought of as imposing the additional renegotiation constraint that the selected signal structure be optimal for the majority group in the interim. It then trivially follows that whatever outcome obtains without commitment can also be obtained with commitment: the agents simply need to commit to the same signal structure at the ex-ante stage.

The pro-interim-majority bias in the selection of signal structures must be met, in equilibrium, by an adjustment in the level of effort. In general, as will be illustrated in the numerical examples below, the effect of this bias on equilibrium effort is ambiguous:

Proposition 9 *With interim voting over social insurance, lack of commitment to a signal structure can increase or decrease expected effort compared to the case with commitment. However, welfare without commitment to a signal structure is no larger than welfare with commitment.*

Given the additional renegotiation constraint that the signal structure must be optimal for the majority type in the interim, we can no longer conclude that an improvement in the economy's information technology (represented by an expansion of Σ) will unambiguously improve welfare, unless it takes a special form. For example, a general decrease in the cost of information which reduces q_ω for all $\omega \in \Omega(\Sigma)$ will necessarily be good for welfare as long as the cost reduction for the randomization initially adopted in equilibrium is at least as large as that for the other feasible randomization (which will be always the case for example, with an equi-proportional reduction in all q_σ s). This condition guarantees that there is still, after the cost reduction, an equilibrium with the same expected effort and where the same signal structure is adopted (though this equilibrium need not be Pareto-undominated after the cost reduction).

4.3 Opting out of Social Insurance

So far we have only required social insurance contracts to guarantee a nonnegative consumption level to each agent in every state. However, it may be that the contracts on offer leave some

agents worse off than if they were to ‘go it alone’ without any insurance. Since the mechanism through which effort can be supported by interim majority voting relies crucially on the majority’s ability to redistribute resources in their own direction via the social insurance scheme, one might conjecture that the possibility of opting out of the scheme will restrict the power of ‘enforcement’ and hence the effort that can be sustained in equilibrium.¹⁹ In this section we will examine how the results of our previous analysis are affected by the introduction of participation constraints.

At the interim stage, after effort choices are realized, the (reservation) expected continuation utility for a type- k agent who opts out of social insurance is $\hat{v}^k \equiv \mathbb{P}_i \pi_i^k u(w_i)$, $k = 1, 2$, where by assumption $\hat{v}^2 > \hat{v}^1$.²⁰ It is easy to show that a type- k majority can never gain from inducing type k' to opt out:

Lemma 4 *It is never optimal for any type k , $k = 1, 2$, to induce the other type, k' , to opt out; furthermore, when a type- k majority chooses social insurance, her continuation utility exceeds the corresponding interim reservation value, i.e. $v^{kk}(\theta; \sigma) > \hat{v}^k$, for all $\theta^2 \in (0, 1)$, $\sigma \in \Sigma$ and $k = 1, 2$.*

Then, if agents can opt out of social insurance, we must incorporate the following participation constraints into problem (7):

$$(11) \quad v^{k'}(C^{kk'}) \geq \hat{v}^{k'}, \quad k' \neq k.$$

Note that this also implies that no agent will opt out at *any* stage of the game.

The immediate effects of adding participation constraints is that we can no longer be sure about whether it will be the self-selection constraint or the participation constraint for type k' that will be binding in an optimal contract menu. Furthermore, we cannot be sure that the continuation utility that type-1 agents intend for themselves, $v^{11}(\theta; \sigma)$, exceeds that which they intend for type 2, $v^{12}(\theta; \sigma)$. This, however, will not affect our results in any substantial way because a weaker version of Lemma 2 still holds:

Lemma 5 *If the participation constraint (11) is incorporated into Problem (7), continuation utilities satisfy the following inequalities (when $k = 1$ and $k = 2$ respectively):*

¹⁹It could be argued that when opting out at the interim stage is infeasible, the enforcement power of voting-based renegotiation goes beyond what can be rationalized on the basis of individual incentives to voluntarily participate in a social insurance arrangement. Thus, regardless of whether or not it may be realistic to assume that agents can opt out of social insurance, whether high-effort equilibria can be supported with interim opting out appears to be a theoretically relevant question.

²⁰For simplicity we assume that an agent can never avoid the cost associated with the adopted signal structure, q_σ , by opting out.

1. $v^{11}(\theta; \sigma) - v^{12}(\theta; \sigma) > g^1 - g^2$ for all $\theta^2 \in (0, 1)$ and $\sigma \in \Sigma$,
2. $v^{22}(\theta; \sigma) - v^{21}(\theta; \sigma) > 0$ for all $\theta^2 \in (0, 1)$ and $\sigma \in \Sigma$.

Invoking this result in place of Lemma 2—and re-writing the condition in Proposition 4 as $u(\bar{w}^2) - \max\{u(\bar{w}^2)\phi_1^2(\omega) + u(0)(1 - \phi_1^2(\omega)), \hat{v}^1\} \geq g^2 - g^1$ —all of our previous results generalize to the case where opting out is possible. Thus, the possibility of opting out of social insurance does not alter our main conclusion that interim renegotiation of social insurance through majority voting *can* help support higher level of effort in comparison with social planning—even when individuals are ex-ante identical.

This does not mean, however, that the participation constraints will have no effect. For example, achieving a pure-strategy high-effort equilibrium (Proposition 4) relies on a low-effort ‘deviator’ being revealed sufficiently often and, if revealed, being provided with a low level of consumption. But if opting out is possible, the deviator’s continuation utility must be at least \hat{v}^1 no matter how revealing the adopted signal structure is. This clearly imposes restrictions on the set of signal structures that can support a pure-strategy high-effort equilibrium under ex-ante adoption: high effort cannot be induced by adopting a ‘very revealing’ signal structure with a low probability. What is needed is that sufficiently revealing signal structures are adopted with a larger probability. Also, by restricting the difference $v^{22}(\theta; \sigma) - v^{21}(\theta; \sigma)$, participation constraints may affect the expected level of effort that can be supported in a mixed-strategy equilibrium. But one can easily think of scenarios where participation constraints will have little or no effect on the outcome. For example, in a scenario where $w_1 = 0$, π_1^1 is close to unity, and individuals are infinitely risk averse, the participation constraint for low-effort types will never be binding.

Even though one may suspect that participation constraints may be bad for welfare because they restrict the power of the interim majority, this cannot be shown to hold in general. In the case with commitment to signal structures we cannot immediately conclude that the outcome with participation constraints can be replicated by a suitable ex-ante choice of signal structures when the participation constraints are removed. In the case where there is no commitment, the power of the interim majority cannot be harnessed by an appropriate ex-ante choice of signal structures, and interim participation constraints that restrict this power may be good for welfare.

4.4 An Illustration

The implications of renegotiation by majority rule, and the various equilibria that can arise depending on the signal structures available and the timing of their adoption, are best illustrated by means of a parameterized example.

Let $u(c) = \ln c$, $w_1 = 1$, $w_2 = 10$, $g^1 = 0$, $g^2 = 1$, $\pi_1^1 = 0.8$ and $\pi_1^2 = 0.2$. Since $\ln 0$ is not defined, we shall assume the minimum level of consumption \underline{c} to be equal to 0.001 rather than

0. One can verify that this parameterization satisfies the assumption in (2).

Under social planning, the unique equilibrium (irrespective of the set of available signal structures and of the timing of the adoption of signal structures) involves uniform low effort, $\theta^2 = 0$, a constant level of consumption 2.8, and a level of ex-ante expected welfare equal to 1.03.

With interim voting, consider first a scenario where, besides the uninformative signal structure, σ_0 , there is a signal structure σ' consisting of two informative, but not revealing, signals: a signal s_1 , sent by low-effort agents with probability 0.8 and by high-effort agents with probability 0.2, and a signal s_2 being sent by low-effort agents with probability 0.8 and by high-effort agents with probability 0.2 (the reverse pattern from s_1); the cost of σ' is $q_{\sigma'} = 0.05$. In this scenario the undominated Nash equilibrium with commitment involves $\omega(\sigma') = 0.72$, which supports a mixed-strategy effort choice $\theta^2 = 0.92$. The associated level of ex-ante expected welfare is equal to 1.24.²¹ With no revealing signals, a pure high-effort equilibrium is not feasible. In equilibrium, if the informative signal structure is adopted, the interim high-effort majority selects a menu of contract which relies on the informative signals: it provides full-insurance for the low-effort type with a constant consumption level of 2.17, while the high-effort agents select for themselves a contract with $c_{11}^{21} = 1.23$, $c_{12}^{22} = 8.37$, $c_{21}^{22} = 8.01$, $c_{22}^{22} = 8.46$. Note that the high-effort agents choose to face some residual consumption uncertainty in order to induce low-effort agents to self-select. If the null signal structure is adopted, screening can still take place: the low-effort minority is offered a full-insurance contract with a constant consumption level of 6.47, and the high-effort majority again choose partial insurance for themselves, with $c_1^{22} = 6.08$ and $c_2^{22} = 8.31$. In this example the interim participation constraint for the low-effort type is slack in equilibrium whether or not the informative structure is adopted.

In the same scenario, absent commitment to signal structures, there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium where σ' is adopted with probability one ($\omega(\sigma') = 1$) and effort is $\theta^2 = 0.89$. The associated social insurance scheme exhibits the same pattern as for the ex-ante adoption case: full insurance for the low-effort type, and less-than-full insurance for the high-effort type. This equilibrium, however, is dominated: ex-ante welfare is 0.98, less than in a pure-strategy low-effort equilibrium.

Consider next an alternative scenario where σ' is not available, but where there exists another signal structure, σ'' , having the same cost $q_{\sigma''} = 0.05$ but featuring fully revealing signals s_3 and s_4 , each sent, with probability 0.2, exclusively by low- and high-effort agents respectively; in addition there is an uninformative signal, s_5 , sent by both types with probability 0.4; the two informative but non-revealing signals s_1 and s_2 are also present: s_1 is now sent by low-effort agents with probability 0.3 and by high-effort agents with probability 0.1, and s_2 is sent by low-effort agents with probability 0.1 and by high-effort agents with probability 0.3. In

²¹All numerical results have been obtained using iterative methods in conjunction with numerical optimization.

this case, the undominated Nash equilibrium with commitment to signal structures involves all agents choosing high effort, $\theta^2 = 1$, with σ'' being adopted with probability $\omega(\sigma'') = 0.61$, which results in a level of ex-ante welfare equal to 1.07. The equilibrium contract menu in the presence of the informative signal structure makes use of the revealing signals: in their ‘own’ contract, high-effort agents attach the minimum consumption level \underline{c} to signal s_3 (which is never sent by a high-effort agent), and a constant consumption level of 8.21 to all other outcomes. Potential low-effort deviators are offered a full-insurance contract with a constant level of consumption of 1.59, which leaves them at their interim reservation utility level.

For the same parameterization but without commitment to signal structures, there exists a mixed-strategy outcome with $\omega(\sigma'') = 1$, $\theta^2 = 0.93$, and a level of ex-ante welfare equal to 1.02. Again, this equilibrium is dominated by the pure-strategy low-effort equilibrium. As in the commitment case, low-effort agents are offered a full-insurance contract with a constant consumption level of 1.59. However, since there is now a fraction $\theta^1 = 0.07$ of low-effort agents in the interim, the high-effort majority can profit from providing insurance to them, and achieve for themselves a full-insurance outcome with a consumption level equal to 8.23—higher than in the ex-ante adoption case. Note that even if there is a non-zero fraction of low-effort agents in the interim, the presence of a fully revealing signal s_3 makes it possible for the high-effort majority to force low-effort agents down to their reservation utility without having to impose any consumption risk on themselves.

If only the null signal structure is available, there exists a dominated mixed-strategy equilibrium with $\theta^2 = 0.54$, yielding a level of ex-ante welfare equal to 0.96. Thus it is still possible, albeit not desirable in this example, to support an effort choice in excess of $\theta^2 = 0$ even when no informative signals are available.

In all of the above examples, the availability of an informative signal structure alongside the null structure, σ_0 , raises welfare only in scenarios where commitment to an information technology is feasible. If, on the other hand, the cost of adoption is small enough, welfare increases in all cases. For example, if we reduce the cost of σ' and σ'' from 0.05 to 0.01, welfare in equilibrium exceeds 1.03 in all scenarios.

5 Discussion

The results of the preceding analysis show that renegotiation of a social contract by majority rule can help overcome the problems that arise from a lack of policy commitment. This is because, when there is interim heterogeneity, a majority will support a choice that entails a transfer of resources to themselves, which makes belonging to the interim majority type more attractive ex ante. Public information about private choices can play a key supporting role in this respect: the more observable private choices are, the easier it is for the majority to extract a surplus from the minority by conditioning taxes and transfers on signals that are correlated

with actions. Because of the value of public information in this context, both from the ex-ante point of view of a representative individual and from the point of view of an interim majority, it may be worthwhile for agents to invest in costly information technologies if such option is open to them, independently of whether the choice to invest in information takes place before or after private effort choices are made. Thus, voting-based interim renegotiation can make it possible to support high levels of effort even when pre-commitment to a signal structure is not feasible. These results are in stark contrast to those obtained when the social contract is determined by a social planner, where a lack of policy commitment eliminates any incentive to exert effort.

The mechanism we have described relies centrally on the ‘quasi-dictatorial’ nature of majority voting, whereby the minority’s preferences are given no weight in collective choices. This is the very feature that makes majority voting a potentially inefficient procedure in a static context; in the renegotiation scenario we have described, this flaw becomes a virtue. The ‘enforcement’ role played by majority rule in the presence of renegotiation bears some conceptual similarity to the idea of social norms promoting conformism (Akerlof, 1980); what makes it distinct is that with voting-based renegotiation the pressure to conform to the choices of others does not come from an exogenous norm, but is channelled through the very social contract that is the source of the inefficient private behaviour, a contract to which participation may be fully voluntary.

Although our analysis has focused exclusively on direct democracy, a mechanism similar to the one we have described would also be at work under a representative democratic system. To see why, consider a setting where a policymaker is elected at the ex-ante stage after effort choices but before individuals learn about their effort type, and suppose that the elected policymaker can commit to social insurance at that stage. Then she will commit to a contract menu that maximizes her own expected welfare given her own mixed-strategy; but in a symmetric equilibrium her effort choice will coincide with everyone else’s strategy, and the result will be a (constrained) efficient arrangement. Suppose instead that the policymaker, still elected at the ex-ante stage, cannot commit to social insurance at that stage but selects a contract menu after observing her own effort type. Then, again, a renegotiation problem arises, the structure of which, however, will be closer to the majority voting case than to the social planning case. Depending on her interim realized effort type, the elected policymaker will behave either like a low-effort majority or like high-effort majority; if θ^2 is large, the latter outcome will be relatively more likely, which in turn will make it relatively more attractive to choose high effort—analogously to what takes place in the direct democracy case. A similar story could also be told with reference to a scenario where the policymaker is elected at the interim stage.²²

²²A form of the mechanism described here would also be present in a setting with ex-ante heterogeneity; the analysis of the heterogeneous case, however, adds a number of complications and is beyond the scope of the

The general conclusion from our analysis is thus that the welfare implications of renegotiation, and the related implications for the desirability of public information under a democratic procedure—be it direct democracy or representative democracy—can be quite different from those under bargaining or social planning. Given that the policy choices for which commitment has been described in the literature as being problematic are typically based on democratic procedures, we feel that this divergence is worth stressing.

Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1. Note first that agents cannot randomize over effort levels in equilibrium; if they did, the planner's best response would be to offer a single full-insurance contract, $c_{ij} = \theta^1 \bar{w}^1 + \theta^2 \bar{w}^2$ for all i, j . But the ex-ante expected utility from choosing low effort would then exceed that from choosing high effort, which is inconsistent with randomization. There do, however, exist Nash equilibria in which all agents choose low effort. To see this, note that if all agents choose h^1 , the planner's best response is to offer a single contract with $c_{ij} = \bar{w}^1$ whenever $s_j \in S(h^1)$ (for $s_j \notin S(h^1)$ the contract is indeterminate); then h^1 is indeed a best response for all agents. We shall show that this equilibrium is also perfect. Require each agent to choose each action with at least some (small) probability ε , and suppose that each agent then chooses $\theta^1 = 1 - \varepsilon$; the planner's best response is then a single full-insurance contract $c_{ij} = (1 - \varepsilon)\bar{w}^1 + \varepsilon\bar{w}^2$ for all i, j ; given this contract it is indeed a best response for each agent to make the probability of choosing h^1 as large as possible. These choices constitute the unique Nash equilibrium in the perturbed economy; moreover, as ε goes to zero, the Nash equilibrium in the perturbed economy converges to the Nash equilibrium in the original economy where all agents choose h^1 with probability one and the planner offers $c_{ij} = \bar{w}^1$ for all i, j . Finally, it can be shown that if σ is sufficiently revealing for type 1, then there also exist pure-strategy Nash equilibria in which agents choose h^2 ; but from the above analysis it is clear that such an equilibrium cannot be perfect. \square

Proof of Lemma 2. For concreteness let the type selecting the menu be $k = 1$ (the case with $k = 2$ is fully symmetrical). Note first that the self-selection constraint for type 2 must bind at an optimum, otherwise type 2 would be offered zero consumption on all earnings-signal combinations—a direct contradiction. The self-selection constraint for type 1 will always be slack at an optimum. To see this, suppose that σ offers no revealing signals ($S(h^1) = S(h^2) = S$), and solve problem (7) ignoring the self-selection constraint for type 1. The solution will then have the following features: (i) type 2 is provided with a full-insurance contract, $c_{ij}^{12} = \bar{c}^{12}$ for all i, j (whereby $v^2(C^{12}) = v^1(C^{12}) = u(\bar{c}^{12})$), and (ii) type 1 is provided with an incomplete

present paper.

insurance contract which offers relatively large consumption on earnings-signal combinations that are relatively likely for type 1, $c_{ij}^{11} \geq c_{ij}^{12}$ if and only if $(\pi_i^1 f_j^1)/(\pi_i^2 f_j^2) \geq (\pi_i^1 f_j^1)/(\pi_i^2 f_j^2)$. Note that some of these inequalities will be strict since the two types' earnings-signal distributions differ. From this and the fact that the self-selection constraint is binding on type 2, it follows that type 1 strictly prefers C^{11} to C^{12} , $v^1(C^{11}) > v^1(C^{12}) = u(\bar{c}^{12})$, i.e. the self-selection constraint is automatically slack. Combining these observations then gives the desired result: $v^{11}(\theta; \sigma) \equiv v^1(C^{11}) > u(\bar{c}^{12}) = v^2(C^{12}) \equiv v^{12}(\theta; \sigma)$. Finally, if σ is such that some signals are revealing, then type 1 will offer $c_{ij}^{11} = 0$ whenever $j \notin S(h^1)$, while it is still optimal to offer type 2 a full-insurance contract, $c_{ij}^{12} = \bar{c}^{12}$ for all i, j . The same argument then applies. \square

Proof of Lemma 3. The argument follows Grossman and Hart (1983) (see also Holmström, 1979). Since σ is more informative than $\hat{\sigma}$, there exists a Markov matrix $[\beta_{jj}]$ such that for all $s_j \in \hat{S}$, $\hat{f}_j^k = \prod_{s_j \in S} \beta_{jj} f_j^k$, $k = 1, 2$. The solution to problem (7) given $\hat{\sigma}$ involves one contract, \hat{C}^{kk} , which provides consumption \hat{c}_{ij}^{kk} on (w_i, s_j) , and a second contract, $\hat{C}^{kk'}$, which offers constant consumption, \bar{c} . Suppose then that when σ is available, type k votes for a menu $(C^{kk}, C^{kk'})$, where, conditional on (w_i, s_j) , C^{kk} offers consumption \hat{c}_{ij}^{kk} with probability β_{jj} , and $C^{kk'}$ offers a constant consumption \bar{c} on all earnings and signals. If a type- l agent, $l = 1, 2$, picks C^{kk} , she obtains \hat{c}_{ij}^{kk} with probability $\pi_i^l \prod_{s_j \in S} \beta_{jj} f_j^l = \pi_i^l \hat{f}_j^l$, while if she picks $C^{kk'}$ she receives the guaranteed consumption \bar{c} . This means that by using stochastic contracts the allocation chosen by type k when the less informative signal structure $\hat{\sigma}$ is adopted can be perfectly replicated when the more informative signals structure σ is adopted. Consequently, $v^k(\theta; \sigma) \geq v^k(\theta; \hat{\sigma})$. The outcome can be further improved whenever C^{kk} involves stochastic contracts, i.e. when C^{kk} maps realizations (w_i, s_j) into lotteries with expected utility $\prod_{s_j \in \hat{S}} \beta_{jj} u(\hat{c}_{ij}^{kk})$: if C^{kk} is replaced with a non-stochastic contract \mathcal{E}^{kk} that offers the same utility on each realization, $u(\hat{c}_{ij}^{kk}) = \prod_{s_j \in \hat{S}} \beta_{jj} u(\hat{c}_{ij}^{kk})$ for all i, j , type k 's utility is unchanged (while keeping the self-selection constraint satisfied), but expected consumption is less; this relaxes the budget constraint, which in turn allows for a further improvement. \triangleright From this, we can also conclude that adopting stochastic contracts as just described can never be optimal. \square

Proof of Proposition 2. Part (1). Suppose all agents choose h^1 and that σ is adopted. Holding correct beliefs, each agent then optimally votes for the menu $\mathcal{C}^1((1, 0); \sigma)$ and obtains an ex-ante expected payoff $u(\bar{w}^1) - g^1 - q_\sigma$. An agent who deviates and chooses h^2 obtains the guaranteed consumption $\bar{c}^{12}(\sigma)$ defined in (8) (the full-insurance contract C^{12} induces the deviator to self-select) and thus an ex-ante expected payoff $u(\bar{c}^{12}(\sigma)) - g^2 - q_\sigma$. But from (8) it follows that $\bar{c}^{12}(\sigma) \leq \bar{w}^1$; moreover $g^2 > g^1$; hence the agent is better off not deviating. Since this holds for every σ , there is, conditional on any $\omega \in \Omega(\Sigma)$, a Nash equilibrium where all agents choose h^1 with probability one and vote for $\mathcal{C}^1((1, 0); \sigma)$ when σ is adopted. This equilibrium is also perfect. Require each agent to choose each effort level with at least some small probability ε , and suppose that each agent chooses $\theta^1 = 1 - \varepsilon$. A type- k agent then

optimally votes for $\mathcal{C}^k((1 - \varepsilon, \varepsilon); \sigma)$ when σ is adopted. Since ε is small, low-effort agents are in majority, and by Lemma 2 the induced continuation utility for a low-effort agent exceeds that for a high-effort agent, $v^{11}((1 - \varepsilon, \varepsilon); \sigma) > v^{12}((1 - \varepsilon, \varepsilon); \sigma)$. Since this holds for every $\sigma \in \Sigma$, the ranking of continuation utilities extends to any $\omega \in \Omega(\Sigma)$; moreover, since $g^2 > g^1$ it also extends to ex-ante utilities. Hence it is a best response for each agent to make the probability of choosing h^1 as large as possible. These choices constitute a Nash equilibrium for the perturbed economy; moreover, as ε approaches zero, this Nash equilibrium in the perturbed economy approaches the symmetric low-effort equilibrium in the original economy.

Part (2). Suppose the agents randomize over effort levels with $\theta^1 \in (0.5, 1)$, and suppose that σ is adopted. In the interim, a type- k agent voting sincerely then optimally votes for $\mathcal{C}^k(\theta; \sigma)$, whereby $\mathcal{C}^1(\theta; \sigma)$ is the winning menu. The continuation utility for a low-effort agent then exceeds that for a high-effort agent, $v^{11}(\theta; \sigma) > v^{12}(\theta; \sigma)$ (Lemma 2). Since this holds for every $\sigma \in \Sigma$, the ranking extends to every $\omega \in \Omega(\Sigma)$; moreover, since $g^2 > g^1$ it also extends to ex-ante utilities; but this contradicts that the agents optimally randomize over effort levels. \square

Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose all agents choose h^2 with probability one. Each agent then optimally votes for $\mathcal{C}^2((0, 1); \sigma)$ when σ is adopted, which generates ex-ante utility $u(\bar{w}^2) - g^2 - q_\sigma$ for each agent. An agent who instead deviates and chooses h^1 obtains the guaranteed consumption $\bar{c}^{21}(\sigma)$ defined in (8) (which by design induces the deviator to self-select). Straightforward calculations then show that, prior to the selection of σ by the randomization ω , an agent is better off not deviating if and only if (9) holds. To see that this equilibrium is also perfect, suppose all agents choose high effort with maximum probability, $\theta^2 = 1 - \varepsilon$. Each type- k agent then votes for $\mathcal{C}^k((\varepsilon, 1 - \varepsilon); \sigma)$ when σ is adopted. When (9) is satisfied with inequality, the continuation utilities conditional on ω , by continuity, satisfy $v^{22}((\varepsilon, 1 - \varepsilon); \omega) - v^{21}((\varepsilon, 1 - \varepsilon); \omega) > g^2 - g^1$; hence it optimal for each agent to make the probability of choosing h^2 as large as possible. Moreover, as ε approaches zero, this Nash equilibrium in the perturbed economy approaches the Nash equilibrium in the original economy. Finally, noting that \mathcal{C}^{21} is the contract that is least likely to induce deviations from a symmetric high-effort equilibrium (since it assigns zero consumption on signals that are not compatible with high effort) it follows that when (9) fails, no symmetric high-effort equilibrium can be sustained. \square

Proof of Proposition 7. Part (1). Suppose all agents choose h^1 with probability one. Each agent, holding correct beliefs and voting sincerely, then optimally votes for σ_0 to be adopted with probability one (in order to avoid signal costs), and for the menu $\mathcal{C}^1((1, 0); \sigma_0)$ to be implemented, which simply offers all agents the guaranteed consumption \bar{w}^1 . This is a Nash equilibrium, which is also perfect: suppose all agents make the probability of choosing low effort as large as possible, i.e. $\theta^1 = 1 - \varepsilon$; given that ε is arbitrarily small, in the interim, all low-effort agents optimally vote for σ_0 to be adopted (since it is not worthwhile to adopt a costly signal structure in order to better identify the few high-effort agents) and for the menu $\mathcal{C}^1((1 - \varepsilon, \varepsilon); \sigma_0)$;

this gives a higher continuation utility to low-effort agents, $v^{11}((1-\varepsilon, \varepsilon); \sigma_0) > v^{12}((1-\varepsilon, \varepsilon); \sigma_0)$ (Lemma 2), and, since $g^2 > g^1$, also a higher ex-ante utility; thus it is indeed optimal for each agent to make the probability of choosing h^1 as large as possible. As ε approaches zero, this Nash equilibrium in the perturbed economy converges to the Nash equilibrium in the original economy.

Part (2). The argument is the same as in Proposition 2: if there is, in the interim, a low-effort majority, they will vote, sincerely, for a menu of contracts that gives them a higher continuation utility than it does to high-effort agents (Lemma 2), no matter which σ is adopted. But, since $g^2 > g^1$, this implies that the ex-ante utility from choosing low effort exceeds the ex-ante utility from choosing high effort, which is inconsistent with randomization over effort levels. \square

Proof of Lemma 4. Consider first type 1. If type 2 opts out, type 1 can at best achieve the continuation utility $u(\bar{w}^1)$; but this can also be achieved while ensuring that type 2 do not opt out, e.g. by offering the following two contracts: full insurance at the level \bar{w}^1 and a ‘no-insurance’ contract, $c_{ij} = w_i$ for all i, j ; type 2 then opts in and type 1 achieves utility $u(\bar{w}^1) > \hat{v}^1$ no matter which contract type 2 selects. Consider then type 2. Note first that, $v^{22}(\theta; \sigma)$ must always exceed \hat{v}^2 : type-2 agents can offer type 1 full insurance at their reservation level \hat{v}^1 , while offering themselves a contract with no insurance at all, $c_{ij} = w_i$ for all i, j ; all agents then participate and self-select; type 2 achieve their reservation utility \hat{v}^2 , and the budget constraint slack remains slack. The same argument shows that type 2 can never gain by inducing type 1 to opt out: type 1 opts out if the contract(s) currently offered give them a lower continuation utility than \hat{v}^1 ; type 2 can then offer type 1 full insurance at their reservation level. This induces type 1 to participate and generates a budget surplus without violating self-selection. \square

Proof of Lemma 5. Consider first $k = 1$. We can focus on the case where the participation constraint for type 2 is binding at an optimum, $v^{12}(\theta; \sigma) = \hat{v}^2$ (or else the argument in Lemma 2 applies). By Lemma 4, $v^{11}(\theta; \sigma) \geq u(\bar{w}^1)$; the result then follows immediately from assumption (2) (which states that $u(\bar{w}^1) - g^1 > \hat{v}^2 - g^2$). Consider then $k = 2$. Focusing on the case where the participation constraint binds for type 1, $v^{21}(\theta; \sigma) = \hat{v}^1$, we need only note that, from Lemma 4, $v^{22}(\theta; \sigma) \geq \hat{v}^2$; the result then follows immediately from the ranking $\hat{v}^2 > \hat{v}^1$. \square

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