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The Futile Quest for a Grand Explanation of Long-Run Government Expenditure

Dick Durevall and Magnus Henrekson
Abstract: This paper carries out a critical reappraisal of the two contending theories purporting to explain long-run government spending: Wagner’s Law and different variants of the ratchet effect. We analyze data spanning from the early 19th century until the present day in Sweden and the United Kingdom. Hence, in contrast to previous studies, we evaluate the validity of Wagner’s Law and the ratchet effect hypothesis over a very long time period, starting at the beginning of industrialization. Cointegration analysis is used to investigate the long-run relationships between government expenditure and GDP, focusing on sub-periods and parameter stability. Moreover, we test the ratchet effect hypothesis by estimating models which allow for asymmetric adjustment. According to our main results, Wagner’s Law does not hold in the long run, although the data are consistent with Wagner’s Law between roughly 1860 and the late 1960s in Sweden, and the 1970s in the UK. This can be traced to the formation of the modern public sector, including the introduction of public education, health care, and so forth. Yet Wagner’s Law did not hold during the initial industrialization phase (before 1860), or during recent periods. Finally, we find some evidence of asymmetric adjustment, particularly in the post WWII period in the UK: Public expenditure grows more during bad times than it decreases during good times. However, the ratchet effect is only a short to medium-term phenomenon.

JEL Classification: H1; H55; I38.

Keywords: Displacement effect; Government expenditure; Growth of government; Public sector; Ratchet effect; Wagner’s Law.

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1. Introduction

The relative size of the public sector differs greatly across countries, even among those at similar income levels. For instance, the US, Japan and the Scandinavian countries are very similar in terms of per capita income, but the share of government spending was some 20 percentage points higher in the Scandinavian countries a few years into the new millennium. This suggests that the size of the public sector does not evolve in a subscribed pattern during the course of economic development, at least not within today’s group of wealthy countries.

Nevertheless, the view that the public sector tends to grow in the long run relative to national income has become an accepted fact in public economics among many influential observers, including Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 326) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993), and in mainstream textbooks (e.g., Hindriks and Myles 2006, p. 79–80). According to Lindert (1996, p. 5) “[t]he notion that income growth will raise taxes and government spending, including social spending, is the most durable black box in the whole rise-of-the-state literature.” This accords with 19th century German social scientist Adolph Wagner’s proposition (1893) that a positive relationship exists between level of economic development and scope of government. Indeed, Wagner’s proposition has increasingly gained the status of “law”. In addition to casual empiricism, Wagner’s Law has been tested empirically in both a time-series and cross-section framework; until the early 1990s, it received strong support with few exceptions.

Much fewer studies, however, analyze the major competing hypotheses seeking to explain any long-run tendency for increased government spending share: the displacement effect of Peacock and Wiseman (1961) and the ratchet effect of Bird (1971, 1972). An alternative version of the ratchet effect is developed by Buchanan and Wagner (1978). It has the same implications as Bird’s hypothesis, although the authors do not purport to explain the growth of government. As we will explain in Section 2, these hypotheses are in fact very similar, at least observationally, and can be treated as variants of the same hypothesis. They share one central idea: relative government spending ratchets upward in times of crises (wars, social upheavals, recessions), and then remains at the new, higher level after society and the economy normalize.

This paper carries out a critical reappraisal of Wagner’s Law and the ratchet/displacement hypothesis by analyzing data spanning from the early 19th century to the present day in the Sweden and United Kingdom. In contrast to previous studies, we evaluate the validity of
Wagner’s Law from the beginning of industrialization until the present. Moreover, we compare two countries that have in many respects developed quite differently; Sweden can be regarded as the archetypal welfare state while the UK has become more of a “liberal market economy”, following the example set by the US (Kitschelt et al. 1999). Government expenditure as a share of GDP differs a great deal; in 2006 it was 54.3% in Sweden and 43.5% in the UK, while in 1980 it was 60% in Sweden and 43% in the UK.

Complemented by graphical analysis, we use cointegration analysis to investigate the long-run relationships between government expenditure and GDP. Cointegration analysis is standard in recent literature, but in contrast to most other studies, we focus explicitly on sub-periods and parameter stability. Moreover, we test for the rival ratchet hypothesis by testing for asymmetric adjustment using a version of the approach developed by Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004), which allows for long-run growth in the government expenditure share.

Our study differs from virtually all others in that we analyze a very long time span. Furthermore, in contrast to some recent papers like Shelton (2007), for example, we focus on within-country factors, rather than on those that mainly affect cross-country variations in the size of the public sector. Since the share of public expenditures in GDP varies between less than 10% to more than 60% in our data, variables such as the relative size of a country, ethnic and linguistic fractionalization and the type of constitution do not appear to be major causes of public sector growth.

Our main findings are similar for both countries: Wagner’s Law does not hold in the long run. During both the major part of the 19th century and the years since the mid-1980s, the public sector as a share of GDP shrunk or changed little, even as economic growth increased. There are, however, two time periods during which data are consistent with Wagner’s Law: approximately 1860–1913 and 1920–1965 (World War I makes the period of 1914–1919 difficult to evaluate). Hence, Wagner’s Law seems to have been irrelevant during both the initial industrialization phase, 1800–1860 in Sweden and 1830–1860 in the UK, and during

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1 One important exception is Lindert (2004a, 2004b) who focusses on explaining the long-term evolution of one major part of total spending, namely social spending. A further difference between our approach and Lindert’s is that his approach is broader, relying on a mixture of econometric and careful institutional analyses, while we rely solely on time-series techniques, testing two influential and competing hypotheses purporting to explain the evolution of total relative government spending.
recent periods, roughly since the 1970s. As a consequence, Wagner’s Law is of little use for making predictions on the future growth of the public sector.

We also find that changes in the age structure of the population explain why Wagner’s Law does not hold after the mid-1980s. The decline in expenditure shares coincides with lowered dependency ratios in both countries. This finding corresponds with Shelton (2007), although his results indicate that it is the share of people aged 65 or older that creates a positive correlation between income and government size, as social expenditure on retirees is larger in rich countries, while we find that the share of school-age children also is important.

Despite that controlling for the dependency ratio reveals a stable relationship between government expenditure and GDP over the period 1922–2006, this fact alone cannot salvage Wagner’s Law. Instead, it shows that the main implication of the Law is undermined by its own dynamics, as dependency on age structure follows automatically when the public sector supplies services that are age-dependent, such as free education, child care, child allowances, and pensions. Moreover, age structure is to a large extent dependent on GDP per capita, as demonstrated by the theory of demographic transition (Caldwell 1976). In fact, the current old-age boom in the developed world is a result of demographic transition.

Although there is no consistent evidence of a ratchet effect in either country, there is some evidence of asymmetric effects in both countries in the post-war period: recessions generate increases in government spending as a share of GDP, while expansions have little impact. The effects are short-run, since over time the asymmetry is removed by lagged responses to recessions and expansions.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main competing theories of long-run public expenditure. Section 3 provides a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 tests for Wagner’s Law, and Section 6 tests for asymmetric adjustment/ratchet effects. Section 7 contains a discussion of our results and Section 8 concludes.
2. Potential causes of the growth of government expenditure

Wagner (1883, 1893) saw three main reasons for increased government involvement. First, in an increasingly complex society, the need for public protective and regulative activity would grow. In addition, the urbanization and greater division of labor accompanying industrialization would require higher expenditures on contractual enforcement and law and in order to guarantee the efficient performance of the economy.

Second, Wagner argued that growth in real income would facilitate the relative expansion of income-elastic “cultural and welfare” expenditures. Education and culture were cited by Wagner in particular, noting that collective producers were in general more efficient than private ones.

Finally, he asserted that economic development and changes in technology required government to assume the management of natural monopolies in order to enhance economic efficiency. Similarly, the required scale of investment was in some cases so large (such as in railroads) that financing could not be handled appropriately within private joint stock companies.

Up until the early 1990s, Wagner’s Law received strong support with few exceptions. Since that time, however, almost forty studies have been published, with very mixed results: about 35% fail to find evidence for Wagner’s Law, while 30% obtain support by controlling for other variables or focusing on specific types of expenditures, and 35% obtain unqualified support for the hypothesis. As it happens, three recent papers illustrate these disparate results quite nicely: Shelton (2007) finds that demographic change in combination with social policy—not income—explains the share of government in GDP, while Akitoby et al. (2006) and Zaghini, and Lamartina (2008) find support for Wagner’s Law. Clearly, it has become necessary to determine why the results differ so much.

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2 See also Biehl (1998).
3 Much the same ideas have been expounded by more recent authors. See, for example, Kuznets (1967) and North and Wallis (1982).
4 Wagner’s proposition cut against the prevailing view at the time. It was widely believed that the need for government activity and public interference into the private sphere would diminish as a result of man’s moral and economic progress (Tarschys 1975).
5 Appendix C contains a listing of these studies and the main finding(s) of each study. See also Henrekson (1992, Ch. 2), Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Shelton (2007) for surveys.
Lindert (1996) focuses on explaining the growth of social spending (≈ half of total spending) in the early postwar period in 19 OECD countries. He finds that “the Wagner’s Law idea barely survives” (p. 10). His main finding is that growth is mainly driven by two factors: (i) an aging population, but only up to a point—when the share of 65+ exceeds a certain threshold the effect is weakened and eventually reversed, (ii) the degree to which the income distribution is more dispersed in the upper half relative to the lower half of the income distribution.6

The first alternative to Wagner’s Law was proposed by Peacock and Wiseman (PW) (1961) in their study of long-run government expenditure in the United Kingdom. PW observed that the expenditure likened a series of plateaus separated by peaks, and that these peaks coincided with periods of war and preparations for war. Based on this observation, they developed the "displacement effect" hypothesis.

PW assumed that taxation remains fairly stable in peacetime. As a consequence, the limited revenue capacity of the government prevents major increases in expenditure. In peacetime, desired government expenditure and the limits of taxation are likely to diverge. During periods of social upheaval such as war, this divergence is likely shrink, permanently displacing the burden of taxation upward. The end result is a higher expenditure plateau than before the onset of the upheaval. Formerly unacceptable revenue-raising methods are tolerated in times of crisis, and (it is claimed) the higher tax tolerance will persist even after the crisis subsides, thus enabling the government to implement expenditure programs that it previously desired but could not finance. Hence, the displacement effect asserts that the (horizontal) trend line will shift upward in discrete steps over time; these shifts are likely to be infrequent but fairly large.

Before long, other scholars proposed that the upward ratchet effect occurs more often than suggested by PW. Bird (1971, 1972) argues that economic downturns tend to affect the share of government spending, resulting in upward ratcheting. As it takes time to adjust government spending plans downwards, a declining GDP or slower GDP growth increases the spending ratio. Buchanan and Wagner (1978) claim that such upward ratcheting can be explained by the Keynesian prescription of a countercyclical fiscal policy. In theory, the budget should be

6 This idea has been refined in the “social affinity” theory (Kristov et al. 1992), which predicts that government redistribution will be greater, the wider the pre-tax income gaps above median and the lower the gaps below median income.
balanced over the business cycle; yet in practice, democratic politics give rise to secular deficits in the absence of a binding fiscal constitution that demands that surpluses in booms are as large as deficits in recessions. Politicians strive to be reelected, and the direct benefits of government spending are easily identified while the indirect costs of deficit financing are far more diffuse and imperfectly understood. Since Buchanan and Wagner’s hypothesis is based on Keynesianism, it precludes any ratcheting before WWII.

Very few studies test directly for displacement or ratchet effects. Diamond (1977), for example, fails to find support for the displacement effect. Goff (1998) analyzes the degree of persistence of government expenditure to shocks on US data for 1889–1995 and finds support for a displacement/ratchet effect, particularly after 1930 and the beginning of “the New Deal era”. Nevertheless, his results depend on the factors determining persistence, an issue he does not address in detail.

During recent years, however, a number of studies have analyzed the relationship between government expenditure and income during business cycles. In developed economies, public spending has been found to be countercyclical (Alesina et al. 2008) or procyclical or unrelated to business cycles (Talvi and Végh 2005). A few studies test for asymmetries in the line with the displacement and ratchet effect, finding that spending increases more during expansions than it decreases during contractions (Gavin and Perotti 1997; Hercowitz and Strawczynski 2004). Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004), who analyze a panel of developed countries for a recent period, interpret their finding as support for the Buchanan-Wagner hypothesis. However, they make clear that asymmetries only have a temporary effect on government expenditure shares.

3. Theoretical framework for Wagner’s Law and the ratchet effect
Several functional forms have been used when testing for Wagner’s Law (see, for example, Ram 1987 and Peacock and Scott 2000). But as suggested by Michas (1975), Mann (1980) and Henrekson (1993), the following specification seems to capture the hypothesis:

$$gs = \alpha + \beta(ypc).$$

(1)

where $gs$ is the log of nominal public expenditure as a share of nominal GDP, $ypc$ is the log of real per capita GDP, and $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are coefficients. The coefficient of interest is $\beta$, which should be larger than zero according to Wagner’s Law.
Eq. (1) is used by Shelton (2007) and is probably the most common formulation of Wagner’s Law (e.g., Bohl 1996; Kwan and Sahni 1996; Islam 2001; Chow et al. 2002). Most other equations are reformulations of Eq. (1). There is one alternative specification, used by Ram (1987), Goff (1998) and Ghate and Zak (2002), which consists of the relationship between real government expenditure and real GDP. By excluding population, however, it overlooks that increases in real income per capita—not GDP—are expected to generate a proportionally larger increase in the demand for public services. Moreover, the use of real government expenditure is questionable; Wagner’s Law is a hypothesis describing the evolution of the government spending share, including the effect emanating from differences in productivity growth of government and private sector production. In addition, changes in public sector wages are not captured when real expenditure is used, since they are treated as price changes (Hercowitz and Strawczynski 2004).

It is important to interpret Eq. (1) as a long-run relationship between $gs$ and $ypc$. This means that the equation is not expected to hold at all times, but rather on average over a given time period. Moreover, for Wagner’s Law to hold, $ypc$ has to determine $gs$. This does not preclude that government expenditure affects $ypc$, as Peacock and Scott (2000) make clear, although it seems unlikely that it would determine per capita GDP in the long run even if there could be a link via public investment. Fiscal policy, or using government expenditure to influence GDP growth, is not inconsistent with Wagner’s Law either, although some claim it is (Biswal et al. 1999; Ziramba 2008). The reason is that the growth effects of fiscal policy are merely short to medium term.

Fiscal policy in combination with asymmetric responses can potentially generate a ratchet effect, which is a competing explanation for the growth of government. This hypothesis implies that the evolution of the expenditure share is merely the accumulated effect of short-run asymmetric responses of government expenditures to temporary changes in output (Bird 1971, 1972; Diamond 1977). The hypothesis can be formulated as,

$$gs_t = \alpha_0 gs_{t-1} + \alpha_1 (ypc - \tau)^P_t + \alpha_2 (ypc - \tau)^N_t$$

(2)

where $(ypc - \tau)$ is deviation from trend, or the business cycle; $\tau$ is the trend in GDP per capita; $P$ and $N$ stand for positive and negative deviations from trend, or expansions and
recessions. Thus, the hypothesis states that given $g_{t-1}$, the expenditure share grows over time because recessions increase $g_{t}$ more than expansions reduce it because of the asymmetry. A necessary requirement for the hypothesis to hold is that $\alpha_{1} > \alpha_{2}$, (or, if fiscal policy is countercyclical, $|\alpha_{2}| > |\alpha_{1}|$), which is testable given that we have an estimate of the trend, $\tau$. Note that $\alpha_{1}$ and $\alpha_{2}$ should be negative because of countercyclical fiscal policy, although procyclical policy cannot be ruled out; it seems to be common in developing countries (Alesina et al. 2008).\footnote{A body of literature exists that analyzes fiscal policy and how it affects government expenditures (Talvi and Végh 2000; Hercowitz and Strawczynski 2004; Alesina et al. 2008). However, it focuses on business cycles and is not concerned with the long-run growth of government expenditure. This is made very clear in the model developed by Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004).}

The displacement effect is related to the ratchet effect since it also implies that temporary increases in government expenditure have long-run effects, although there the focus lies on wars and other major social disturbances.\footnote{Diamond (1977), Tussing and Henning (1979) and Henrekson (1990) test the displacement effect econometrically.} We use graphs in Section 4 to illustrate that this effect is unlikely to explain the growth of government expenditure. Goff (1998), who tests the hypothesis on US data for 1889–1995, provides a more general interpretation of the displacement effect: any temporary shock to government expenditure could have a permanent or a highly persistent effect. With this interpretation, the empirical representation of the displacement effect is similar to Eq. (2):

\[ g_{t} = \alpha_{0}g_{t-1} + \mu_{t}, \]  

(3)

where $\mu$ is a stationary process measuring all sorts of shocks and $\alpha_{0}$ is equal or close to one. Hence, according to Eq. (3), an increase in $\mu_{t}$ raises $g_{t}$ for a long period ($\alpha_{0}$ is close to one) or permanently ($\alpha_{0} = 1$).

Goff finds that the displacement effect explains the evolution of government expenditure in the US. To account for the long-run growth in the government expenditure share, however, positive shocks have to be more common or larger than negative shocks. This is not captured by the models usually estimated; only the persistence of the shocks is tested. Furthermore, the tests are carried out in models with only one variable, so the observed persistence could be due to persistence in the excluded variables. Goff conducts some additional tests of
persistence by estimating models that include real GDP, carrying out decompositions between long and short-run effects. However, population growth, as well as other factors, is ignored.

To test the hypotheses, we first estimate Eq. (1) and test for Wagner’s Law. We then expand the equation by including population structure, which has been neglected in most studies on Wagner’s Law. One exception is Shelton (2007). Thereafter, we use graphs to describe the data based on Eq. (3). This simple approach makes it possible to cast serious doubt on the validity of the displacement hypothesis. In order to test the ratchet effect hypothesis, we estimate models based on Eq. (2) and test the hypothesis $\alpha_1 > \alpha_2$.

4. The Data
We use annual time series data that comprise the years 1800–2006 for Sweden and 1830–2006 for the United Kingdom. (The data are described in detail in Appendix B.) When analyzing data over a long historical period, data quality becomes an issue. Although there is little we can do to improve quality, historical macro data have been used in a number of earlier studies with some success (e.g., Englund et al. 1992 and Bergman et al. 1992 for Sweden, and Castle and Hendry 2009 for the UK).

With exception for Sweden before 1914—a time period during which no data on transfer spending exist—we use total government gross expenditure, including military expenditures. Although many researchers have preferred to analyze non-military expenditures, we do not advocate this. First, non-military expenditures are not independent of spending on military goods and services (Wiseman and Diamond 1975). Second, during periods without war or imminent threats of war, decisions for both military and non-military spending are probably based on the same information or generated by similar mechanisms. Third, military expenditures do not seem to dominate the long-term growth of total expenditures when we test with available data. Finally, short-term increases in military expenditures due to war do not generally influence the interpretation of econometric results, since we focus on the long run. The exceptions are World War I and World War II, particularly for the UK. However, these wars would affect the results even if military expenditures were excluded.

Figures 1 and 2 depict the development of the ratio of government expenditure to GDP in Sweden and the UK. The data are reported separately for 1800–1913 and 1920–2006 because
the Swedish series on government expenditure does not include transfers before 1914, and because the increase in UK expenditure during WWI was so large that it affects the interpretability of the graph.

Figure 1 shows government expenditure for Sweden (1800–1913) and the UK (1830–1913) as a share of GDP. It declines during most of the 19th century in both countries, but starts to increase in the latter third of that 1800s. The evolution of the two series is thus quite similar. The major differences are probably due to wars: the sharp drop in Sweden in 1810 can be traced to reduced government expenditures and rapid economic growth after the peace treaty with France in 1807 and the end of the war with Russia in 1809; the sharp decline in the UK in the mid-1850s follows the termination of the Crimean War (1852–1856), while the upsurge in expenditure at the turn of the century is largely the result of the Boer War (1899–1902). Note also that in both countries the expenditure shares are lower in the 1910s than in the first half of the 19th century.

Figures 1–8 about here

Figure 2 depicts the same series for 1920–2006. Again, the overall development is quite similar. In both countries, the expenditure shares show a positive trend until the 1980s, although there are large deviations due to WWII, particularly in the UK. The trend growth peters out in the 1980s, even turning sharply negative in Sweden in 1992–2006. Sweden had a higher average growth rate than the UK over the whole period, but the expenditure ratio was markedly higher in the UK until the mid-1950s. In 2006, the ratio was roughly 15 percentage points higher in Sweden than in the UK.

Figures 3 to 8 depict government expenditure as a share of GDP and real GDP per capita. The series are in logs and show potential relationships indicated by Eq. (1). It is evident from Figures 3 and 5 that Wagner’s Law did not hold during most of the 19th century. The share of government expenditure declined during the first half of the 1800s in Sweden, remained stable for about 30 years, and then grew slowly 1880–1913; at the same time, GDP grew almost continuously. Although the UK data is only available from 1830, the pattern is similar.

In an oft-cited paper, Oxley (1994) finds that Wagner’s Law holds in Britain in 1870–1913. Oxley limits his analysis to 1870–1913 for two reasons: a) economic growth was rapid during this period, making Wagner’s Law more likely to hold; and b) WWI caused a structural break
that is econometrically hard to handle. The first motivation is doubtful because GDP per capita growth in Britain was higher in 1931–1969 (0.9%) than in 1870–1913 (0.8%); furthermore, picking a favorable period is likely to bias the test of the hypothesis. Nevertheless, by highlighting 1870–1913, Figures 4 and 6 give reason to believe that Wagner’s Law is likely to hold in both countries during this period.

Figures 7 and 8 depict the period 1920–2006. There are large deviations between the series in both countries, casting doubt on a long-run relationship. Nonetheless, in the period beginning after WWII, the expenditure share and real GDP per capita seem to grow at the same speed. This development ends roughly in the mid-1980s. During recent years, the expenditure share has been stable in the UK and declined in Sweden, while per capita GDP has increased in both countries, indicating clearly that Wagner’s Law does not hold in recent decades.

5. Cointegration analysis
To verify that the conclusions from the visual inspection of Figures 1–8 hold, we test for the presence of long-run relationships. All series are highly persistent, and we treat them as integrated of order one. Dickey-Fuller (1981) unit root tests, reported in Table 1A in Appendix A, indicate that this is a reasonable assumption. The existence of a long-run relationship can thus be tested with cointegration analysis. Yet, acceptance or rejection of Wagner’s Law does not hinge on whether the series contain unit roots or not. If the series are trend stationary with structural breaks—which is the most likely alternative hypothesis—Wagner’s Law could still hold, given that they have common breaks and that government expenditure grows faster than GDP when real GDP per capita grows, and vice versa. Combined with cointegration analysis, the descriptive analysis in the previous subsection indicates that assuming that the series are stationary around structural breaks would not have affected our findings.

We report cointegration tests using the Engle-Granger procedure, which requires that at most one cointegrating vector exists and that the common factor restriction on the dynamics holds (Ericsson and MacKinnon 2002). These requirements seem to be fulfilled: we only have two variables, so there cannot be more than one cointegrating vector; furthermore, autoregressive distributed lag models, which include dynamics, give similar long-run solutions as the Engle-Granger (1987) procedure. Testing for cointegration with Fully Modified OLS, which corrects
for bias in case ypc is not weakly exogenous, produces practically the same long-run relationships.

Since there are a number of potential outliers in the series, we initially used the dummy saturation procedure in *Autometrics*. This is a computer-automated general-to-specific modeling approach, which in principle tests all possible reduction paths and eliminates insignificant variables while keeping the chosen significance level constant. Dummy saturation is a procedure that tests for outliers by including a dummy for each observation (Castle and Hendry 2009; Santos 2008). The significant dummies were then aggregated and used in the cointegration tests. Only WWII outliers in the UK model turned out to affect the results substantively, so we report Engle-Granger tests without dummy variables for all the other time periods.

Table 1 reports the estimates of Eq. (1), namely the cointegration test statistics for Sweden (1800–1913) and the UK (1830–1913). The estimated roots are also reported since they provide some additional information. The tests are insignificant; the elasticity, $\beta$, is negative in both countries, $-0.16$ and $-0.03$, and the roots are close to $0.9$. Hence, there is no support for Wagner’s Law. We then split the samples in two parts to verify Oxley’s finding. There is cointegration over the period 1860–1913 in both countries. The elasticities are $0.17$ for Sweden and $0.40$ for the UK. There also seems to be cointegration when testing the period before 1860. However, $\beta$ is negative so the expenditure share decreases as GDP grows.

We then turn to the 1920–2006 data (Table 2). The test is clearly significant for Sweden in 1920–2006, providing support for Wagner’s Law. However, if we split the sample into the two periods 1920–1964 and 1965–2006, it becomes evident from both the $t_{ADF}$-values and the estimated roots that the two variables are cointegrated over the first period but not the second. Furthermore, when we examine the 1985–2006 period, $\beta$ is actually negative.

Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 9 and 10 about here

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10 We report the results for 1960–1913 because then there is cointegration in Sweden as well. The test for 1970–1913 is close to being significant at the 5% level though.
The results for the UK differ somewhat, but not much. We fail to find cointegration for 1920–2006, although, as in Sweden, Wagner’s Law seems to hold for 1920–1964 but not for 1965–2006, and $\beta$ is negative for the period 1985–2006.

Figure 9 shows the deviations from the long-run relationship in Sweden for 1920–2006. They are highly persistent during certain periods; even if Wagner’s Law holds in the long run according to the cointegration test, it is hardly useful for understanding the growth of government expenditures for 1965–2006. Figure 10 shows that the pattern in the UK is similar.

### 5.1 Wagner Law and population structure

The literature on Wagner’s Law rarely considers the age structure of the population, despite that it should affect expenditure. One exception to this is Shelton (2007), who, after analyzing cross-country panel data for 1970–2000, concludes that Wagner’s Law is driven by demographics, particularly the share of population aged 65+. This means that the coefficient on income is positive and significant in his version of Eq. (1), but becomes insignificant when the demographic variable is included.

Since a number of policy reforms have been implemented during the last 60 years that should have substantially strengthened the link between government expenditure and the age structure, we evaluate the role of the dependency ratio. It is defined as those aged 0–19 and 65+, divided by those aged 20–64. This measure should capture spending on child care, schooling and pensions, as well as other expenditures. Figures 11 and 12 depict the deviation from the long-run relationship for 1965–2006 (based on the estimates for 1920–2004 in Table 2) and the dependency ratio in Sweden and the UK. There seems to be a tight relationship. The definition of the dependency ratio and the year 1965 are ad hoc; using 0–14 instead, for example, works better for the 1950s, but worse for the 1990s. Hence, the reduction in the dependency ratio could potentially explain the decline in expenditure as a share of GDP during recent years.

Figures 11 and 12 about here

Table 2 reports cointegration tests for the periods 1965–2006 and 1920–2006 with the dependency ratio included. The tests are clearly significant in both periods for the UK. We
have already established cointegration for 1920–2006 for Sweden, so dependency is only added for consistency. The \( H_0 \) of no cointegration is not rejected for 1965–2006, although the \( t_{ADF} \)-value is quite high. However, adding the dependency ratio substantially reduces the estimated root from 0.95 to 0.72, indicating that the lack of significance is likely due to the small sample (see also Figure 11).

To check whether the dependency ratio is of consequence for other periods, we use the ratio of people 0–14 and 65+ to people aged 15–64, since this definition should be more relevant in the past. However, it is not significant for the period 1800–1913 in Sweden and 1841–1913 in the UK, as reported in Table 1. Entering the dependency ratio in the models for 1920-2006 makes the cointegrated in the UK; in Sweden we have already established cointegration during this period, so the only effect is a reduction in the value of the estimated root (see Table 2).

To conclude, we find long-run relationships for 1920–2006 in both Sweden and the UK, where real per capita GDP enters with a significant and positive coefficient (0.73 in Sweden and 0.56 in the UK). However, this is true only after controlling for the dependency ratio. Even though we find cointegration for Sweden without the dependency ratio, the relationship between government expenditure and GDP can hardly be characterized as stable. It is therefore incorrect to interpret this finding as support for Wagner’s Law—-it still only holds in 1860–1913 and from 1920 to sometime about the 1970s. Instead, the finding shows that Wagner’s Law is undercut by its own dynamics, since dependency on the age structure follows automatically when the public sector supplies services that are age-dependent, such as free education, child care, child allowances, pensions, and so forth. Furthermore, the age structure is to a large extent dependent on GDP per capita in the long run, as demonstrated by the theory of demographic transition (Caldwell 1976). This interpretation of the role of demographics differs from Shelton (2007), who argues that it is the age structure in combination with social security spending that generates the relation between \( gs \) and \( ypc \). However, this result probably arises from Shelton’s relatively short sample period (1970–2000).

6. Testing for the displacement and ratchet effect
In this section we first use graphs to illustrate that the originally suggested displacement effect (Peacock and Wiseman 1961) has little empirical support. Then we test the more general
version of the displacement effect, namely the ratchet effect of Bird (1971, 1972) and Buchanan and Wagner (1978).

We present three figures to illustrate the relevance of PW’s displacement effect, plotting the government expenditure share of GDP and its past peak value. A minimum requirement for the effect to be valid, and thus substantively important, is the existence of occasional sharp increases in gs which are not followed by commensurate declines.

Figure 13 depicts data for Sweden in 1800–2006; we have combined the two series in 1921 by scaling up the 1800–1920 spending ratio by the difference between the series in 1921. No displacement effect can be detected before WWI, but government spending during WWI seems to have created displacement since it did not return to its pre-war level. After WWII, the rapid and continuous expansion of expenditure in the 1950s and 1960s swamped any sign of displacement. There are two peaks after WWII, in 1982 and 1993, both of which related to economic crises. They did not, however, generate any discernible displacement effect; rather, the crises were followed by a reduction in the spending share.

Figures 13, 14 and 15 about here

Figure 14 shows the evolution of gs in the UK in 1830–2006. There is clearly displacement in connection to WWI, but such an effect can only be detected after WWII when the underlying trend is ignored (see also Henrekson 1990). This evidence of displacement is not surprising, since the wars inspired Peacock and Wiseman to form their hypothesis in the first place. Because the sharp increase in the expenditure share during WWI so dominates the picture, Figure 15 depicts the period 1950–2006. The expenditure share grows from the late 1950s until 1981–82 and then drops to the level of the mid-1970s. Hence, the data do not indicate that the displacement effect drove growth in relative public spending after WWII.

The ratchet effect can be interpreted as a generalized version of the displacement effect (Goff 1998). For the ratchet effect to act as an alternative explanation to Wagner’s Law, however, the evolution of the expenditure share should merely result from the accumulated effect of short-run asymmetries. The writings of Bird (1971, 1972) and Diamond (1977) do not clearly elucidate this fact. The finding of cointegration, albeit with the inclusion of the dependency ratio, therefore casts doubts on the ratchet effect as the major driver of the growth of government expenditure. Both Bird and Buchanan-Wagner were looking to explain the
evolution of government spending in the richest countries during the first quarter century following WWII. But can the pattern they (casually) observed be expected to apply over longer periods and highly varying conditions, or were the first decades of the postwar period unique in this respect? This is an interesting question that we now address below.

When testing the ratchet effect hypothesis, Goff (1998) focuses on the persistence of shocks to government expenditures. We prefer to explicitly model the impact of recessions and expansions on the growth of government expenditure, following Diamond (1977) and the literature on business cycles and fiscal policy (see Hercowitz and Strawczynski 2004). We estimate the following model,

\[
\Delta g_s = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \Delta g_{s,-1} + \alpha_2 \Delta g_{s,-2} + b_{1p} (ypc - \tau)^{p} + b_{2p} (ypc - \tau)^{p}_{t-1} \\
+ b_{1n} (ypc - \tau)^{N}_{t} + b_{2n} (ypc - \tau)^{N}_{t-1} + \nu_t
\]

where \(\alpha_0\) is a constant, \(\tau\) potential output, \((ypc - \tau)^{p}\) a measure of periods of high income per capita relative to trend (good times) and \((ypc - \tau)^{N}\) a measure of periods of low income per capita relative to trend (bad times). Two lags of \(\Delta g_s\) and some dummies, as described below, are included to ensure that the error term, \(\nu_t\), is roughly white noise.

The model differs from Diamond (1977) in two ways. First, we allow for dynamics by including lags in line with Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004), while Diamond estimates a static model. Second, we calculate \(\tau\) using the Hodrick-Prescott filter; the adjustment parameter is set to 6.25 as recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2001). Diamond (1977) uses the growth rate of output as a measure of business cycles, while our approach is a common way to measure cyclicality (Lane 2003; Alesina et al. 2008).

The ratchet effect hypothesis implies that government expenditure is on average asymmetric over the business cycle; accordingly, the decline in the expenditure ratio, \(g_s\), is smaller during good times than the increase during bad times. Using Eq. (4), we can evaluate the hypothesis by calculating the steady-state solution

\[
\Delta g_s = a/(1-\alpha_1 - \alpha_2) + [(b_{1p} + b_{2p})/(1-\alpha_1 - \alpha_2)](ypc - \tau)^{p} \\
+[(b_{1n} + b_{2n})/(1-\alpha_1 - \alpha_2)](ypc - \tau)^{N} \\
= a + \beta_p (ypc - \tau)^{p} + \beta_n (ypc - \tau)^{N}
\]

\[
(5)
\]
where the terms in brackets are the coefficients of interest, summarized as $\beta_p$ and $\beta_N$. For the ratchet effect to hold, it is necessary that $\beta_p > \beta_N$. The hypothesis is easiest to understand if fiscal policy is assumed to be countercyclical, for then both coefficients are negative.

According to Eq. (4), business cycle fluctuations can generate immediate (within a year) adjustments in government expenditures; this is usually considered an adequate measure of fiscal policy (Alesina et al. 2008). In this case, the hypothesis would be $[b_p/(1-\alpha_1-\alpha_2)] > [b_N/(1-\alpha_1-\alpha_2)]$. However, it is possible that the adjustment process is slow or that the initial response is corrected the following year, so lags of $(ypc-\tau)^P$ and $(ypc-\tau)^N$ could also influence government expenditure. This is allowed for in the model estimated by Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004).

A potential problem with Eq. (4) is that the measure of business cycles, $(ypc-\tau)$, could be a proxy for a cointegrating relation where $\tau$, the trend, captures $gs$ combined with other variables. If this is the case, and if $gs$ adjusts when output deviates from its trend, then $(ypc-\tau)_{t-1}$ would function as an error correction term and have a positive coefficient. The term $(ypc-\tau)$ would not measure business cycles and fiscal policy would appear to be procyclical, even though we are only observing adjustment back to long-run equilibrium. Moreover, if $(ypc-\tau)_{t-1}$ has a strong positive effect on government expenditure, then there is evidence that short-run fiscal policy only has a temporary impact even if there is asymmetric adjustment.

We divide the samples into two major time periods: 1803–1913 (1833–1913 for the UK) and 1923–2006; and four sub-periods 1803–59 (1832–1959 for the UK), 1860–1913, 1922–1937, and 1950–2006. The division of the samples is partly based on the results of the cointegration tests in Table 1 and partly on Buchanan and Wagner (1978), who argue that the ratchet effect is the result of Keynesian active fiscal policy after WWII. The models have dummies for large outliers due to the termination of the Russian War 1809 (Sweden), the Crimean War 1854–1856 (UK), and World War II. Some other observations can also be considered outliers, but

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11 Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) use the growth rate of GDP net of trend as their measure of business cycles, so their analysis does not have this problem. We de-trend the log-level of GDP since this is consistent with the ratchet hypothesis.
we prefer to report specifications without them. Nonetheless, the results do not hinge on correcting for outliers, except for WWII.

Tables 3 and 4 report the estimates of Eq. (4) for Sweden and the UK in different sub-periods. We also report some estimates of restricted versions of Eq. (4), when either contemporaneous or lagged \((y_{pc} - \tau)^p\) and \((y_{pc} - \tau)^N\) are excluded. The tables show estimates and \(t\)-values for the \(\beta_s\) and the steady state values \(\beta_p\) and \(\beta_N\).

The estimates of Eq. (4) show that the error correction term interpretation of \((y_{pc} - \tau)_{t-1}\) seems to be valid. All estimates of the coefficients on \((y_{pc} - \tau)^p\) and \((y_{pc} - \tau)^N\) are positive, and one or both are significant in all regressions. The coefficients measuring the immediate impact, i.e., those on \((y_{pc} - \tau)^p\) and \((y_{pc} - \tau)^N\), are all negative or insignificant. Moreover, most of the steady state estimates are insignificant, and none is significant and negative. Hence, Eq. (4) does not provide any evidence of the ratchet effect where decreases in the expenditure ratio, \(g_s\), are smaller during good times than increases during bad times.

There is some evidence of short-run asymmetric adjustment, but the differences in the coefficients are in general not significant. There is no significant instantaneous response to expansions in Sweden, but the coefficients on contractions in the models for 1923–2006 and the sub-periods 1923–37 and 1950–2006 are negative and significant. The results for the UK are similar, but the asymmetric instantaneous response is stronger there than in Sweden. There is also some evidence of asymmetry in the coefficients on the “error correction terms”, \((y_{pc} - \tau)^p\) and \((y_{pc} - \tau)^N\), in all specifications for Sweden; adjustment back to long-run equilibrium seems to be faster during recessions than during expansions. In the UK the pattern is less systematic.

The specifications that exclude either contemporaneous or lagged \((y_{pc} - \tau)^p\) and \((y_{pc} - \tau)^N\) are reported for the periods 1923–2006 and 1803–1913/1833–1913. It is clear that they provide the same information as the general model, Eq. (4): the contemporaneous impact is
negative or zero and the lagged responses are positive and usually significant, with the exception for expansions in Sweden 1803–1913.

Although the results have only been tentatively interpreted, they do not speak in favor of the ratchet effect, as this implies that fiscal policy should be countercyclical and asymmetric on average. Instead, the results support the hypothesis that other factors drive the growth of the public sector in the long run, including output per capita. This is in line with our findings in Section 3. There is indeed asymmetry in the short run during several periods, particularly in the UK, but this is offset by the adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium.

7. Discussion
An obvious question to ask is why Wagner’s Law holds in some periods only, notably the 40–50 years preceding WWI and the first 30–40 years after WWII. The late 19th century is an era of increased political enfranchisement. Meltzer and Richard (1983) and Lindert (1994, 2004a) propose that government grows when the franchise is extended to include more voters below the median income (the decisive voter), when the growth of incomes provides revenues for increased redistribution and when the income distribution becomes more uneven. Government continues to grow because there is a difference between the political and the market processes. The market produces a distribution of income less equal than the distribution of votes, so those with the lowest incomes use the political process to implement redistributio nal programs in their own favor. This idea has been further refined in the “social affinity” theory (Kristov et al. 1992), which predicts that government redistribution will be greater, the wider the pre-tax income gaps above median and the lower the gaps below median income. Lindert (1996) finds support for this theory in the 1960–81 period in the OECD.

The strong growth in the late 19th century in both countries also made it possible for the governments to introduce a system of income tax collection around the year 1900, which, once introduced, is far more cost-efficient than a system based on customs and excise taxes (Levi 1988). It therefore allows an expansion of government that is not possible under a more primitive tax collection regime. This can either be seen as a supply side explanation (Holcombe 2005), or as a factor that eases the financing constraint for the government so that they can more easily cater to the demand of their citizens.
The greatest expansion of the spending share takes place after WWII, lasting until 1980 in the UK and until the early 1990s in Sweden. Wagner’s Law receives strong support during this period in both countries. Real income expands rapidly and government spending relative to GDP increases by roughly 20 and 40 percentage points, respectively. This development is abruptly reversed, and the decline in the spending ratio is particularly large in Sweden, where the spending share declines by almost 10 percentage points. This coincides with rapid real income growth.

Many observers—e.g., Cameron (1978), Lindbeck (1976), Rodrik (1998) and Ram (2009)—stress the importance of the open economy for the growth of government. However, our findings are not fully consistent with this proposition. Although it applies in the first era of increased economic integration (1860–1913), it does not hold for the most recent period of increased integration (post 1990).

Although our regressions show that a decline in the dependency ratio can "explain" why the government spending ratio did not grow in the UK and Sweden recently, it is still true that if Wagner’s Law really holds then the spending share should grow when per capita income rises, irrespective of demography. But over time structural and technological changes have increased the scope for non-government production of social services, and private agents can use insurance and financial markets to handle many desired redistributions across individuals and over the life cycle. Countries have also chosen different institutional arrangements. Esping-Andersen (1990) identifies three broad welfare models: the Scandinavian, the Continental European and the Anglo-Saxon one.

Historical chance has often determined who has become responsible for the financing and provision of a certain service (the individual, her employer, the government or a non-government organization such as the church or the trade unions). Moreover, this can be changed by political decisions such as the Swedish pension reform in the early 1990s, which greatly reduced the government’s share of pension payments by capping payments at a fairly low level and making outgoing pensions directly related to the current aggregate wage-sum in

12 Several mechanisms are proposed: Openness is said to result in a high industrial concentration, which fosters a climate where unions can thrive and have a decisive influence on government, and government expenditure may serve as a form of insurance against external risk.
13 Bergh (2005) calculates that 75% of all redistributive transfers in Sweden concern life cycle redistributions for the same individual. Large part of such transfers can be handled in other ways, notably by private agents or through mandatory personal savings accounts (Fölster 1997).
the economy (Palme 2005). More generally, the effects of different historical choices regarding financing and provision on relative government spending are likely to be particularly large with respect to services where demand is highly income-elastic and when the services suffer from Baumol’s Cost Disease. Higher education, child care and care of the elderly are good cases in point.\(^{14}\) In fact, this is broadly consistent with Wagner’s own writings, where he distinguishes between two purposes of the State: “law and power” and “culture and welfare”. In the latter domain, according to Wagner (cited from Biehl 1998, p. 108–109) “there does not exist the same need for uniformity, concentration and centralization of the provision of services by public authorities; in this sphere partly the opposite is true. Here, other public bodies are providing services jointly with or instead of the State. … Nevertheless, this expansionary tendency [of the State] too has the character of a development law.”

Disincentive effects of a large government sector will set in sooner or later, and according to many observers such effects were apparent in both countries by the mid 1970s, but severe structural crises were required before relative government spending was lowered.\(^{15}\) Since the early to mid 1990s there has been a great deal of deregulation of product markets, and globalization has strongly increased the competitive pressure both on firms and tax bases (Sinn 1998, Bergh and Karlsson 2010). Moreover, as emphasized by Lindert (2004a), high-tax societies in general, and Sweden in particular, have been able to design the tax and transfer systems more efficiently than low-tax countries, thereby reducing the deadweight costs that is expected to arise from higher relative spending.\(^{16}\)

**8. Conclusion**

We have tested existing theories purporting to explain the long-run evolution of government expenditure as a share of income. There are two main rival theories: Wagner’s Law, which is a demand-side explanation, and ratchet effect hypotheses, which emphasize either larger crises (wars and other social upheavals) or shorter crises (recessions and economic downturns) in claiming that relative government spending ratchets upward during a crisis and

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\(^{14}\) See also Thomsson (2009) who discusses why the US has a comparatively small government sector, but instead a large “private welfare state” with employment-based benefits. OECD (2007) provides extensive comparisons of systems for child care and parental leave.


\(^{16}\) Lindert (2004a) pushes this point hard, making the controversial claim that given the astute design of tax and spending policies in many large government countries the welfare state has turned out to be ”a free lunch”.


stays at a higher level when the economy recovers. The latter effect has been motivated by reference to path dependence, *status quo* bias, and public choice mechanisms involving politicians and bureaucrats taking advantage of the opportunity to increase the size of government. If the ratchet effect exists, it is thus an empirical regularity that can be explained by referring to both supply and demand side factors.

Innumerable studies test Wagner’s Law, while a few test for the ratchet effect as well. But in contrast to these earlier studies, we use extremely long time series: 207 years for Sweden and 177 years for the UK. We also emphasize the instability of the estimated models and use charts to support our findings.

It is evident that neither Wagner’s Law nor the ratchet effect hypotheses receive general support. There are two distinct episodes of growth in relative government spending: some 40–50 years preceding WWI and a period of 25–35 years following the end of WWII. The latter period was especially characterized by a rapid expansion of the spending ratio that cannot be traced to any permanent ratcheting.

There is no consistent evidence of a ratchet effect in either country. There is some evidence of an asymmetric effect in both countries in the post-war period, but this is reversed in subsequent periods. Hence, there is no clear evidence that the government exploits recessions and crises to permanently shift the government spending ratio upwards.

So, is Holcombe (2005) correct in his pessimistic and cynical conclusion that citizens are manipulated by politicians and government bureaucrats who would like to increase their power over our incomes and garner resources for themselves? The answer is no. It is clear that demand plays a significant role, but so does the agendas of politicians and bureaucrats. We know from other research that the opportunity to tax is restrained by the negative incentive effects that set in, particularly at high levels of government spending. Moreover, politicians are forced to consider what the electorate wants in order to legitimate the taxes levied and their own positions and entitlements.17 Thus, there are no simple explanations for the long-run evolution of relative government spending, an argument made already by Wagner and Weber.

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17 See Royed (1996) for the UK and Naurin (2009) for Sweden, and for the discussion in Lindert (2004a) on the many mechanisms used in high-tax countries to reduce the negative incentive effects.
(1977). Rather, the evolution is governed by a complex interplay between supply and demand factors, and deep-seated changes in underlying structural conditions over time.

To conclude, Wagner’s Law is not a stylized fact for how economies behave in the long run, although it seems to hold reasonably well over a period when the economy goes through a process of modernization. Neither does the ratchet hypothesis provide an adequate explanation for the long-term evolution of the government spending ratio. More complex explanations are called for, and our study suggests that these explanations are likely to vary strongly both over time and across countries.
Appendix A: Complementary table

Table 1A: Dickey-Fuller unit root tests

<table>
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<th>t_{ADF}</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>gs</td>
<td>−3.02</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1802–1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ypc</td>
<td>−1.44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1803–1913</td>
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<td>Δgs</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1801–1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δypc</td>
<td>−9.33***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1802–1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gs</td>
<td>−3.14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1922–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ypc</td>
<td>−2.06</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1922–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δgs</td>
<td>−6.38***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1922–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δypc</td>
<td>−7.00***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1922–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gs</td>
<td>−2.29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1832–1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ypc</td>
<td>−3.46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1832–1913</td>
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<td>1832–1913</td>
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<td>ypc</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δgs</td>
<td>−5.31***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1922–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δypc</td>
<td>−7.76***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1922–2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The equations in log-levels contain a constant and a trend and the equations in first differences contain a constant. ** indicates rejection at 1% level and * * rejection at 5% level.

Appendix B: Data sources and definitions

**Sweden (1920–2006)**


Data for the years 1960–2006 are from OECD Economic Outlook, OECD Main Economic Indicators (retrieved on-line from the SourceOECD database).

**United Kingdom (1920–2006)**

All data for the period 1920–60 are from Feinstein (1972). Data for the years 1961–2006 come from OECD Economic Outlook, OECD Main Economic Indicators (both retrieved on-line from the SourceOECD database). Population statistics for the calculation of the age dependency ratios from UK National Statistics.

**Data for 1800–1930**

Except where otherwise indicated, the source is Mitchell (2007). Text in *italics* refers to the specific headline where the statistics may be found in that book.
**Sweden (1800–1930)**


Dependent population: Defined by the entire population younger than 15 or 65 and older. Own calculations from *Population of Countries by Sex and Age Groups*.


**United Kingdom (1830–1930)**


Dependent population: Defined by the entire population younger than 15 or 65 and older. Own calculations from *Population of Countries by Sex and Age Groups*. England + Wales and Scotland aggregates.

Government expenditure: Total central government gross expenditure in current prices, capital items (including debt redemption) is excluded. As far as possible, all kind of government expenditure are included in this table. *Total Central Government*.


Real GDP: Gross domestic product in constant (1900) prices at factor cost. Estimates constructed from expenditure sources. *National Account Totals*.

**Appendix C: Classification of studies since 1990 testing Wagner’s Law (updated through October 2009)**

**Studies finding support for Wagner’s Law**


**Studies finding qualified support for Wagner’s Law**


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18 We classify studies as providing qualified support for Wagner’s Law if they need to include additional variables to find cointegration or if the hypothesis only holds for some types of expenditures or countries.


**Studies not finding support for Wagner’s Law**


**References**


Figure 1. Government expenditure as a share of GDP in Sweden, 1800–1913, and the UK, 1830–1913

Figure 2. Government expenditure as a share of GDP in Sweden and the UK, 1920–2006
Figure 3. Government expenditure as a share of GDP and real GDP per capita in Sweden, 1800–1913 (in logs)

Note: GDP per capita has been mean and variance adjusted.

Figure 4. Government expenditure as a share of in GDP and real GDP per capita in Sweden, 1870–1913 (in logs)

Note: GDP per capita has been mean and variance adjusted.
Figure 5. Government expenditure as a share of in GDP and real GDP per capita in the UK, 1830–1913 (in logs)

Note: GDP per capita has been mean and variance adjusted.

Figure 6. Government expenditure as a share of in GDP and real GDP per capita in the UK, 1870–1913 (in logs)

Note: GDP per capita has been mean and variance adjusted.
Figure 7. Log of the share of government expenditures in GDP and the log of real GDP per capita in Sweden, 1920–2006

Note: GDP per capita has been mean and variance adjusted.

Figure 8. Log of the share of government expenditures in GDP and the log of real GDP per capita in the UK, 1920–2006

Note: GDP per capita has been mean and variance adjusted.
Figure 9. Cointegrating vector: Sweden, 1920–2006 (1st row in Table 2)

Figure 10. Cointegrating vector: the UK, 1920–2006 (1st row under UK in Table 2)
Figure 11. Cointegration relation and dependency ratio: Sweden, 1965–2004

Note: The dependency ratio is variance and mean adjusted and lagged two years and the CI-vector is $g_s + 9.53 - 0.73y_{pc}$.

Figure 12. CI-vector and dependency ratio: the UK, 1965–2004

Note: The dependency ratio is variance and mean adjusted and lagged two years and the CI-vector is $g_s + 5.43 - 0.48y_{pc} - 0.48w_{wardum}$.
Figure 13. Actual and peak values of $gs$: Sweden, 1800–2006

Figure 14. Actual and peak values of $gs$: the UK, 1830–2006
Figure 15 Actual and peak values of $g_s$: the UK, 1950–2006
### Table 1: Cointegration tests, 1800–1913

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>t&lt;sub&gt;ADF&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>Lags</th>
<th>Root</th>
<th>Time period</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -1.14 - 0.16 ypc$</td>
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<td>1800–1913</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.48</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -4.41 + 0.17 ypc$</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1860–1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -2.55 - 0.10 ypc - 0.92 dep$</td>
<td>-2.96</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1800–1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -0.67 - 0.03 ypc$</td>
<td>-2.46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1830–1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = 0.53 - 0.82 ypc$</td>
<td>-3.98**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>1830–1859</td>
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<tr>
<td>$gs = -4.12 + 0.40 ypc$</td>
<td>-3.53**</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1860–1913</td>
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<tr>
<td>$gs = -2.06 - 1.17 ypc - 4.15 dep$</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* The asterisks indicate significance at 10% = *, 5% = **, and 1% = ***. The variables are defined as follows: $gs$ is the log of government expenditure as a share of GDP, $ypc$ is the log of per capita real GDP, and $dep$ is the dependency ratio, measured as those aged 0–14 and 65+ divided by those 15–64, with a mean of zero.

### Table 2: Cointegration tests, 1920–2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>t&lt;sub&gt;ADF&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>Lags</th>
<th>Root</th>
<th>Time period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -9.53 + 0.73 ypc$</td>
<td>-4.78***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>1920–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -8.17 + 0.61 ypc$</td>
<td>-4.55***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1920–1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -8.32 + 0.63 ypc$</td>
<td>-1.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1965–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = 5.07 - 0.45 ypc$</td>
<td>-2.71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1985–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -10.20 + 0.78 ypc + 7.90 dep$</td>
<td>-3.29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1965–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -9.60 + 0.72 ypc + 7.72 dep$</td>
<td>-6.25***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>1920–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -5.43 + 0.48 ypc + 0.48 wardum$</td>
<td>-2.37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1920–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -6.42 + 0.59 ypc + 0.69 wardum$</td>
<td>-4.50**</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1920–1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -2.45 + 0.16 ypc$</td>
<td>-2.80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1965–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -0.25 - 0.06 ypc$</td>
<td>-1.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1985–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -5.47 + 0.49 ypc + 2.04 dep$</td>
<td>-3.97**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1965–2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$gs = -6.09 + 0.56 ypc + 0.69 wardum + 2.3 dep$</td>
<td>-4.71**</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1920–2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* The asterisks indicate significance at 10% = *, 5% = **, and 1% = ***. The variables are defined as follows: $dep$ is the dependency ratio, measured as those aged 0–19 and 65+ divided by those 20–64 for 1965–2006, and zero for 1920–1964. Its mean is zero. In the UK, the third lag of $dep$ is used. The $wardum$ is the war dummy based on estimates with Autometrics. It is one in 1940–1945, 0.4 in 1946, 0.25 in 1947, and zero otherwise.
Table 3: Test of asymmetric response, Sweden

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spec.</th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Good times</th>
<th>Bad times</th>
<th>Steady state coefficients $\beta_j$</th>
<th>Good times</th>
<th>Bad times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$b_{1P}$</td>
<td>$b_{2P}$</td>
<td>$b_{1N}$</td>
<td>$b_{2N}$</td>
<td>$\beta_P$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1923–2006</td>
<td>$-0.576$</td>
<td>$1.443$***</td>
<td>$-1.385$**</td>
<td>$2.428$***</td>
<td>$1.326$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($-1.35$)</td>
<td>(3.40)</td>
<td>($-2.62$)</td>
<td>(5.42)</td>
<td>(1.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1923–2006</td>
<td>$-0.267$</td>
<td>$-0.587$</td>
<td>$-0.266$</td>
<td>$-0.585$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($-0.51$)</td>
<td>($-0.94$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1923–2006</td>
<td>$1.430$***</td>
<td>$1.994$***</td>
<td>$2.685$***</td>
<td>$3.743$***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.41)</td>
<td>(4.57)</td>
<td>(2.69)</td>
<td>(2.62)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1923–1937</td>
<td>$-0.203$</td>
<td>$1.290$**</td>
<td>$-2.760$***</td>
<td>$2.305$***</td>
<td>$1.279$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($-0.31$)</td>
<td>(2.16)</td>
<td>($-3.38$)</td>
<td>(4.09)</td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1950–2006</td>
<td>$-0.128$</td>
<td>$0.673$</td>
<td>$-2.760$***</td>
<td>$2.124$**</td>
<td>$1.253$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.869)</td>
<td>($-2.33$)</td>
<td>(2.48)</td>
<td>(0.532)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1803–1913</td>
<td>$0.051$</td>
<td>$0.363$</td>
<td>$0.079$</td>
<td>$0.916$***</td>
<td>$0.348$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(3.00)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1803–1913</td>
<td>$0.188$</td>
<td>$0.133$</td>
<td>$0.157$</td>
<td>$0.110$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.434)</td>
<td>(0.419)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1803–1913</td>
<td>$0.379$</td>
<td>$0.921$***</td>
<td>$0.313$</td>
<td>$0.761$***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.956)</td>
<td>(3.05)</td>
<td>(0.945)</td>
<td>(2.88)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1803–1859</td>
<td>$0.306$</td>
<td>$0.699$</td>
<td>$0.409$</td>
<td>$1.487$**</td>
<td>$0.799$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.445)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(0.724)</td>
<td>(2.57)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1860–1913</td>
<td>$-0.663$</td>
<td>$0.178$</td>
<td>$-0.276$</td>
<td>$0.764$***</td>
<td>$-0.562$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>($-1.38$)</td>
<td>($-0.91$)</td>
<td>(2.53)</td>
<td>($-0.82$)</td>
<td>(1.19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $t$-values in parentheses. The asterisks indicate significance at 10% = *, 5% = **, and 1% = ***. The coefficients and standard errors reported are from the solved static state of Eq. (4). All models are estimated with two lags of the dependent variable. The regressions have war impulse dummies in 1809 and 1939–45. Detailed regression results are available on request. The de-trending of GDP per capita was done with the Hodrick–Prescott filter. The adjustment parameter was set to 6.25, following the recommendation of Ravn and Uhlig (2001).
Table 4: Test of asymmetric response, United Kingdom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Coefficients $b_{ij}$</th>
<th>Steady state coefficients $\beta_j$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good times</td>
<td>Bad times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1923–2006</td>
<td>$b_{1P}$ = –0.970 (–1.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1923–2006</td>
<td>$b_{1P}$ = –0.347 (–0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1923–2006</td>
<td>$b_{1P}$ = 1.757*** (2.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1922–1937</td>
<td>$b_{1P}$ = 0.072 (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1950–2006</td>
<td>$b_{1P}$ = –0.871* (–1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1833–1913</td>
<td>$b_{1P}$ = –0.338 (–0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1833–1913</td>
<td>$b_{1P}$ = –0.701 (–0.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1833–1913</td>
<td>$b_{1P}$ = 2.054*** (2.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1833–1859</td>
<td>$b_{1P}$ = 0.104 (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1860–1913</td>
<td>$b_{1P}$ = –0.321 (–0.29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $t$-values in parentheses. The asterisks indicate significance at 10% = *, 5% = **, and 1% = ***. The coefficients and standard errors reported are from the solved static state of Eq. (4). All models are estimated with two lags of the dependent variable. The regressions have war impulse dummies 1854–1856 and 1938–1945. Detailed regression results are available on request. The de-trending of GDP per capita was done with the Hodrick–Prescott filter. The adjustment parameter was set to 6.25, following the recommendation of Ravn and Uhlig (2001).