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Africa-Brazil co-operation in social protection

Drivers, lessons and shifts in the engagement of the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development

Iara Costa Leite,1 Bianca Suyama2 and Melissa Pomeroy3

March 2013

Abstract

The Brazilian Ministry of Social Development’s co-operation with sub-Saharan Africa has shifted from an initial engagement in cash transfers to a recent engagement in food and nutritional security. This paper aims at understanding the main drivers for such shift considering lessons drawn from first initiatives and from growing involvement in South-South Development Co-operation, as well as changes in the mobilization of domestic coalitions in Brazil. By doing so this paper aims at contributing to the international debate on the effectiveness of South-South Development Co-operation, unpacking challenges and opportunities faced by developing countries when allocating growing domestic human and financial resources to promote international development.

Keywords: South-South development co-operation, social protection, food and nutritional security, Brazil, sub-Saharan Africa

JEL classification: F35, H53, I30, Q18
Acknowledgements

We thank the outstanding support received from our colleague Elisa Camarote during the research.
# List of Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Brazilian Co-operation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>Brazilian Continuous Cash Benefits</td>
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<td>BPF</td>
<td>Brazilian Bolsa Família Programme</td>
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<td>CAISAN</td>
<td>Brazilian Inter-ministerial Board on Food and Nutritional Security</td>
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<td>CGFome</td>
<td>Brazilian General Co-ordination for International Action against Hunger</td>
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<td>CNAS</td>
<td>Brazilian Social Assistance National Council (CNAS)</td>
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<td>CONAB</td>
<td>Brazilian National Food Supply Company</td>
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<td>CONSEA</td>
<td>Brazilian Food and Nutritional Security National Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPLP</td>
<td>Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries</td>
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<td>CRAS</td>
<td>Brazilian Social Assistance Reference Centres</td>
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<td>CSOS</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC/OECD</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee/Organization for Co-operation and Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>United Kingdom’s Department for International Development</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FNAS</td>
<td>Brazilian National Fund for Social Assistance</td>
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<td>FNDE</td>
<td>Brazilian National Fund of Education Development</td>
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<td>FNS</td>
<td>Food and Nutritional Security</td>
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<td>HGSF</td>
<td>Home Grown School Feeding</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBSA</td>
<td>India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPEA</td>
<td>Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research</td>
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<td>IDC</td>
<td>International Development Co-operation</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<td>IPC</td>
<td>International Poverty Center, renamed International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG)</td>
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<td>LEAP</td>
<td>Ghanaian Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty</td>
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<td>LOAS</td>
<td>Brazilian Social Assistance Organic Law</td>
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<td>LOSAN</td>
<td>Brazilian Food and Nutritional Security Organic Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Development</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MDS</td>
<td>Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>P4P/WFP</td>
<td>Purchase for Progress</td>
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<td>PAA</td>
<td>Brazilian Food Purchase Program</td>
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<td>PETI</td>
<td>Brazilian Child Labour Eradication Programme (PETI)</td>
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<td>PNAE</td>
<td>Brazilian National School Feeding Programme</td>
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<td>PNAS</td>
<td>Brazilian Social Assistance National Policy</td>
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<td>SAGI</td>
<td>MDS’s Department of Evaluation and Information Management</td>
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<td>SAIP</td>
<td>MDS’s Department of Productive Inclusion</td>
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<td>SISAN</td>
<td>Brazilian National System of Food and Nutritional Security</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<td>SSC</td>
<td>South-South Co-operation</td>
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<td>SSDC</td>
<td>South-South Development Co-operation</td>
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<td>SENARC</td>
<td>MDS’s Department of Citizenship Income</td>
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<td>SESAN</td>
<td>MDS’s Department of Food and Nutritional Security</td>
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<td>SNAS</td>
<td>MDS’s Department of Social Assistance</td>
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<td>SUAS</td>
<td>Brazilian Social Assistance Unified System</td>
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<td>TCDC</td>
<td>Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>United Nations World Food Programme</td>
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1 Acronyms referring to Brazilian institutions are maintained in Portuguese.
1 Introduction

South-South co-operation (SSC) has re-emerged in the 2000s as a multifaceted force in international relations. Its modalities include multiple-geometry coalitions among developing countries, such as the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) and the G20, South-South trade and investments, technological and scientific co-operation, regional and inter-regional integration and South-South Development Co-operation (SSDC), to mention a few.

SSDC, which will be the modality of SSC focused here, has been boosted by several factors, including disappointment towards economic globalization and the social impacts of neoliberalism; the emergence of progressive governments in several southern countries; efforts made by traditional donors to reconstruct their legitimacy in international development co-operation (IDC); and a global convergence around the belief that the transfer of experiences, knowledge and policies among southern countries would be more effective in the promotion of international development (Morais 2009).

Although many studies point to distinctive tendencies of SSDC in its current phase, calling the attention to its more pragmatic character (e.g. Abdenur 2009; Yassine 2008; Morais 2009), its political rhetoric is still influenced by the normative approaches of the 1970s, assuming horizontality common interests, and mutual and equitable distribution of its gains.

Scholars, international organizations (IOs), and journalists have been converging in the view that SSDC is also influenced by political and economic interests (e.g. ECOSOC 2008; Rowlands 2008; Glennie 2012), but there still predominate widespread narratives of: assuming that the degree of effectiveness is inversely proportionate to the incidence of donors’ interests over co-operation; treating states as anthropomorphic units, thus not capturing the influence of domestic drivers over SSDC; presuming that, in facing similar development challenges, policies adopted by developing countries can be transferred to other southern regions.

Such narratives have been feeding a process of technification of Southern experiences and policies, through which results are disconnected from their legal, institutional, social, economic and political background. Moreover, global and domestic stimuli for SSDC have not been necessarily backed, in southern donors, by constituencies and by capacities to implement actions in an effective way. These all risk the potential for the distinctive aspects of SSDC, the elements of inspiration and trust, to actually contribute to international development.

The case of Africa-Brazil SSDC is a good illustration not only of the challenges related to the current phase of SSDC, but also of how they have been faced in search for sustainability and

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2 Although in parts this paper will refer to technical co-operation among developing countries (TCDC), there was a preference for the use of the term SSDC, since Brazilian TCDC is increasingly intertwined with other modalities, such as contributions to international organizations, financial co-operation and humanitarian assistance.

3 Treating states as anthropomorphic units also predominates in literature on IDC. For an exception, see Lancaster (2007).
mutual gains. Although Brazilian engagement in SSDC dates back to the 1970s,\textsuperscript{4} it was only during the Lula administration that it became a bulwark of the country’s foreign policy. Presidential diplomacy played a leading role in the exponential expansion of international demands for Brazilian experiences, but it was not the only driver of it. National macroeconomic recovery and advances in social inclusion have allowed Brazilian foreign policy to be more active, while at the same time the country became a reference for governments, IOs, and other actors engaged in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly the first one which is the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger. Brazil’s involvement in SSDC has also caught international attention for its narratives of solidarity, demand-drivenness, non-conditionality, non-incidence of economic interests and non-interference in partners’ domestic affairs.\textsuperscript{5}

One of the mostly internationally recognized Brazilian experiences was the Bolso Família Program (BPF), which is co-ordinated by the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS) as part of the country’s system of social protection. International and domestic drivers have led to attempts to export the BPF to SSA, and the MDS was directly involved in that process from 2007 onwards through the Africa-Brazil Program on Social Development, supported by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and by the International Poverty Center (IPC). After a few years, the programme has experienced a demobilization, and the main channel for MDS’s co-operation with SSA, from 2012 onwards, became the Africa Food Purchase Program (PAA Africa), partnered by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ General Co-ordination for International Action Against Hunger (CGFome), by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), by the World Food Programme (WFP), and by the DFID.

This paper aims at understanding the international and domestic drivers of such a shift, as well as how lessons learnt by the MDS and the Brazilian government during the Lula administration have influenced the design and institutional framework of PAA Africa. By doing so, the paper intends to contribute to broader discussions on the challenges and opportunities for SSDC to be effectively implemented. Effectiveness, here, is not interpreted through the lenses of the Organization for Co-operation and Economic Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC/OECD), but through the lenses of SSC’s mutual gains. This means that the paper presumes that the effectiveness of SSDC depends on it bringing benefits to both partners, although lessons learnt by traditional donors, as well as co-ordination with them, are still extremely valuable and should be considered by emerging donors.

This paper starts by offering an overview of social protection policies in Brazil, analysing its main domestic drivers and focusing on the policies that are co-ordinated by the MDS. The third section will explore shifts in the sectorial involvement of MDS in SSA and in its methodology of work by drawing on lessons learnt from the Africa-Brazil Program on Social Development, on responses to challenges faced by Brazilian SSDC in general and on shifts in the Brazilian domestic coalitions engaged in SSDC. The fourth section is focused at

\textsuperscript{4} For more information on the history of Brazilian engagement in TCDC, see Valler Filho (2007); Cervo (1994); and Leite (2011).

\textsuperscript{5} The principles of Brazilian SSDC are listed in Abreu (2012). Such principles result mainly from the Brazilian government’s self-perceptions as a receiver of co-operation. The discourse on solidarity, by its turn, gained ground with the emergence of the Workers’ Party in the Presidency, from 2003 onwards, but it has also been influenced by the mobilization of civil society organizations in foreign policy issues.
understanding the main drivers of PAA Africa, also trying to capture to which extent lessons drawn from MDS’s previous co-operation in SSA have influenced the programme’s design.

The findings presented here were based on literature review, discourse and data analysis, informal conversations and semi-structured interviews, mainly with MDS’s staff involved in SSDC. The second part of this research will include fieldwork in two countries included in PAA Africa in order to capture domestic dimensions of partner countries and to analyse main factors contributing or hindering the scalability of PAA to SSA.

2 Social protection processes and policies in Brazil: domestic drivers

Just like in the case of traditional co-operation, Brazil’s official engagement in social protection initiatives in SSA cannot be simply treated as a pure technical endeavour. Social protection, as every social policy, represents a field in which diverse conceptualizations, interests, perspectives and traditions compete against each other (Sposati 2009: 15). The boundaries of policies and programmes that are defined as social protection vary between countries, and change over time.

In Brazil, as first instituted by the 1988 Constitution, social protection encompassed social security, health and social assistance. Recently, the centrality of food and nutritional security (FNS) policies to ensuring comprehensive social protection has been gaining ground. Nonetheless, the social protection system in Brazil is, in many ways, a work in progress and still faces many challenges. Increasing demands for sharing experiences with other countries has actually contributed to shift reflections on the drivers of Brazilian experiences themselves.

This section aims at exploring key domestic determinants that are currently perceived as the building blocks of Brazilian social protection system: the 1988 Constitution, social participation and accountability, political co-ordination allowing the rationalization and integration of services and policies and institutional and legal frameworks.

2.1 Main definitions and the evolution of the social protection system in Brazil

Social protection is the collective of public, or public regulated, initiatives that provide services and benefits to tackle social risk and deprivation (Jaccoud 2009: 58). It is often argued that the focus on risk and vulnerability relates not only to a more dynamic understanding of poverty, capabilities and resilience (Cook and Kabeer 2009), but also frames the issue without creating the ‘victimization of the poor’ (Sposati 2009). Additionally,

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6 The list of interviewees is available at Annex I. The interviews were mainly focused on literature gaps, lessons, challenges and opportunities for a more effective co-operation among Brazil and SSA. Interviewees’ particular speeches and opinions have not been identified in the course of the paper in order not to compromise them vis-à-vis their respective institutions and externally.

7 Social protection systems are not automatic and mechanic responses to the needs presented in a society. They represent historical forms of political consensus, which are constantly being negotiated, to respond to the following questions. Who should be protected? How should they be protected? How much protection should they receive? (Silva et al. 2004).

8 In the Brazilian case, we use the term ‘system’ due to the fact that comprehensive and permanent policies and programmes were created, catalysing stable institutions, and human and financial resources (Jaccoud 2009: 61).
it emphasizes the need to a contextualized understanding of the realities faced by various
groups within a country and to develop appropriate responses to permanent or temporary
shocks and vulnerabilities.

Social protection programmes in Brazil encompass both vulnerability and poverty
dimensions. Jaccoud (2009) points out that even though there is often an understanding that
the main objective of social policies is tackling poverty, they should be seen as part of the
consolidation of the Brazilian welfare state. Nonetheless, there are still debates in the country
on whether social protection should be linked to poverty, as thus targeted, or based on rights
that entail universal policies and services tackling specific needs (Sposati 2009).

Poverty and vulnerability alone did not motivate the establishment of social protection
policies in Brazil, but the social and political threat that resulted from the contradiction
between an economic system that reproduces poverty and a political system that affirms
equality between citizens (Jaccoud 2009: 66).

This section focuses on non-contributory social protection; that is, services and benefits that
the beneficiary does not directly make contributions to (as is the case in social security or
pensions). It can be seen as a redistributive policy, as it uses collected taxes to provide for
those in situation of risks and vulnerability. In particular, we will explore social assistance
and food security policies and programmes, focusing on the ones that are co-ordinated by the
MDS.

The Brazilian model of non-contributory social protection has five main characteristics: it has
social assistance as a rights and citizenship-based policy; it involves co-ordination and
integration between municipal, state and federal levels; it operates through a unified and
decentralized system; it relies on social participation and accountability mechanisms; and it is
based in a division of responsibilities between different federative agents framed by
legislation and implemented by managers and commissions that include civil society and the
private sector (Sposati 2009: 46-7).

The foundation of the social protection system in Brazil is the 1988 Constitution, which
established the provision of human and social rights as a responsibility of the state and
represented a milestone in guaranteeing universal rights in social security. The promulgation
of the Constitution was followed by a process of re-organization and re-definition of the
country’s social policies in the 1990s, but due to the impact of the structural adjustment
policies the social protection system was focalized and sub-financed, thus denying the
universalist agenda in certain social areas. After the macroeconomic stabilization, social
financing was recovered, but with a focus in poverty (Vaitsman et al. 2009: 734).

Although decentralization of the social protection system advanced in the 1990s, the
implementation of the policies and services did not change radically in the way it operated.
Non-profit organizations and the private sector continued to be the main service providers
and the state played the role of a philanthropy provider instead of incorporating social
assistance as a public police (Vaitsman et al. 2009; IPEA 2007).

In the 2000s, a new cycle of social assistance starts with significant changes, such as the
promulgation of different laws and norms, the creation of co-ordinating agencies, increased
resources invested in social programmes and the unification of cash transfer programmes,
which rationalized the management of social protection policies and allowed them to achieve
national coverage. Another important initiative was the creation of the Social Assistance Reference Centres (CRAS), which encompasses federal units offering social protection services, preventing vulnerability and risk situations and forwarding the public to other services in the most vulnerable areas of every Brazilian city.

The fight against hunger became an object of public policy in 2003, when the Zero Hunger strategy was launched to articulate public policies, programmes and actions to ensure access to food, especially to the poorest people. The strategy articulates policies and programmes under four main axes: access to food, family farming promotion, income generation, and social accountability and mobilization.

In 2004, a definition of FNS was formulated by the Brazilian FNS Forum, approved by the II National Conference of FNS and incorporated in the FNS Organic Law (Losan) in 2006. It is defined as ‘the fulfilment of the right of all to access regular and permanent quality food in sufficient quantity without compromising access to other essential needs, based on health-promoting food practices that respect cultural diversity and that are socially, economically and environmentally sustainable’ (CONSEA, cited in Costa and Bógus 2012).

In 2004, the network of social protection has been expanded having FNS at its core and in articulation with social assistance and cash transfer programme (MDS 2008). The main actions to promote FNS are: the Food Purchase Program (PAA), the *Bolsa Família* Program (BPF), family farming strengthening, the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE), the Cisterns Program, food and nutrition education, urban and periurban agriculture and public equipment of such as low-cost restaurants, collective kitchens, and food banks.

In 2011, the Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan was launched aiming to reach the extremely poor households that had not been included in the government’s social programmes. The plan is developing tools to find and reach those families so they can have access to cash transfer programmes and to public services in education, health, social assistance, electricity, sanitation and productive inclusion. The main facts related to the evolution of the Brazilian system of social assistance and food security are summarized in Box 1.

The creation of the Ministry of Social Development and the Fight Against Hunger (MDS) in 2004 set the conditions to integrate and streamline national policies related to social development, social assistance, FNS and cash transfer. Besides co-ordinating those policies, the MDS was entitled to articulate with all federal units and with civil society for the establishment of policy and programme guidelines, as well as for integrating all the initiatives, headed by official or non-official entities, in Brazil.9

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9 The following MDS’s Departments implement policies and programmes: Citizenship Income (SENARC), Food and Nutritional Security (SESAN), Social Assistance (SNAS), Evaluation and Information Management (SAGI), and Productive Inclusion (SAIP).
Box 1: Social assistance and food security legal framework and main programmes

1988 – Promulgation of the Constitution. New federative pact defines roles and responsibilities of the three levels of government, paving the way for municipalities to assume a central role in managing and implementing social policies. Fulfilment of human rights established as a responsibility of the state.

1993 – Establishment of the Food and Nutritional Security National Council (CONSEA)

1993 – Endorsement of the Social Assistance Organic Law (Loas), an integrated and decentralized policy that delineates planning, management, financing and social accountability mechanisms. Creation of the National Fund for Social Assistance (FNAS) and of the Social Assistance National Council (CNAS).

1995 – Creation of Solidarity Community Program, extinction of the CONSEA, creation of Ministry of Social Security and Assistance (MPAS) and, linked to it, of the National Council on Social Assistance (CNAS).

1996 – Launching of the Continuous Cash Benefits (BCP), providing a minimum wage to the elderly and people with disabilities, and of the Child Labour Eradication Programme (PETI), which sets inter-sectorial actions aimed at eradicating child labour.

2001 – Creation of the Fund to Fight and Eradicate Poverty, the federal sectorial cash transfer programme (education, health and energy) and the Unified Registry for Social Programs.

2003 – Creation of the Social Assistance Ministry, the Extraordinary Ministry of Food Security (MESA), the Zero Hunger Program, and reinstatement of CONSEA. Creation of PAA (aiming at strengthening family farming by establishing local food supply chains, public networks of food and nutrition facilities and social assistance institutions, and food stocks), of the food banks (aiming at reducing wastes in the food chain), and of the Cisterns Program (aiming at providing clean water for population living in the semi-arid region).

2004 – Creation of the MDS, Publication of the Social Assistance National Policy (PNAS), expanding the guarantees regarding citizens’ access to social assistance, instituting a hierarchical organization of the policy in the territory and ensuring a single entry door to the user. It also goes beyond the social protection programme and it emphasises the role of social accountability and the defence of rights. Launching of the BPF, which unified all federal cash transfer programmes. Creation of the Social Assistance Unified System (SUAS), which promoted decentralized assistance, integrating the levels of government to standardize various services and creating a new financing logic.

2005 – Basic Operational Norm (NOB-SUAS) is approved, organizing the social protection system in two social protection levels, basic and special, and recognizing three management levels for the municipalities, each one associated with responsibilities and incentives.

2006 – Food and Nutritional Security Organic Law (LOSAN) approved, creating the National System of Food and Nutritional Security (SiSAN).

2008 – Establishment of the Inter-ministerial Board on FNS (CAISAN).

2010 – Decree establishing the National Policy of FNS.


2011 – Brazil Without Extreme Poverty Plan is launched targeting extremely poor households. The State becomes responsible for finding these households and to provide them with public services and social programmes.

2.2 The role of social participation, accountability and managing capacities

The Brazilian social protection system cannot be understood without exploring the role of citizen participation and the establishment of social accountability mechanisms. Since the 1970s, numerous social movements have proliferated in the country pressuring for democratization and the defence of human rights. These movements have deeply influenced the elaboration of the 1988 Constitution. Additionally, the labour movement and left-wing political parties were key actors since the 1960, demanding the creation of a social security legislation (Pochmann 2004).
In 1993 the Action against Hunger and Poverty and for Life Campaign was launched under the leadership of Hebert de Souza. The action was decentralized, autonomous and spread across the country, with around 3,000 committees and mobilizing three million people. It sparked a broad debate on the relationship between economy and rights, social policy and quality of life. In the same year the CONSEA was created.

In 1993, the Social Assistance Organic Law (LOAS) instituted municipal, state and federal-level councils with deliberative powers, with 50 per cent of seats to be filled by civil society representatives. The municipal and state councils were entitled to discuss, propose and approve Social Assistance Plans and to plan and oversee the Social Assistance Fund. National conferences on social assistance started taking place every two years (except during 1997-2001), and were always preceded by broad local mobilizations.

The reactivation of CONSEA in 2002 and the II National Conference on Social Assistance in 2004 had an important role in affirming FNS as part of the Brazilian system of social protection. The conferences have been pivotal in consolidating different social policies, creating new consensus and ensuring social pressure to the continuous expansion of social protection policies.

Another essential feature of the evolution of social protection in Brazil was the development of knowledge, data, and methodologies to better understand risks and vulnerabilities improving the state’s planning capacity and ensuring social policies legitimacy through evidence-based information.

The Unified Registry for Social Program, which was created in 2001 as a tool to identify poor families and manage federal cash transfer programmes, was later revised with the unification of such programmes under the PBF. The tool allows socioeconomic analysis of households and identification of potential beneficiaries. Georeference systems are also used as a tool to understand the vulnerabilities of specific areas, integrating data and maps for the construction of indicators and crossing over information on MDS’ actions and programmes, thus improving the effectiveness of decision-making.

The MDS has conducted several actions to improve PBF management, among them the Decentralized Management Index (IGD), which monitors municipal administrations’ performance and sets the basis for fund transfers to municipalities. A National Social Assistance Information System was also created to institutionalize, monitor and evaluate practices and ensure multi-dimensional knowledge. Finally, a Department of Evaluation and Information Management (SAGI) was created in the MDS to develop and implement monitoring and evaluation activities (Paes 2009).

3 The Africa-Brazil co-operation in social development: evolution and lessons

Brazil’s development trajectory in the last decade, which led to a decrease in poverty and inequality levels, has drawn the world’s attention to the country’s social protection policies. As a result, the MDS, whose creation represented a milestone in the construction of social development in Brazil, started being increasingly demanded to engage in SSDC.

According to the MDS, the international community has expressed interest in knowing in depth the BFP, the Program for the Eradication of Child Labour (PETI), the Zero Hunger
Strategy, the PAA, the Cisterns Program, the Public Equipment for Food Security, the National Policy for Social Assistance (PNAS), especially the actions aimed at children, adolescents and the elderly, and Monitoring and Evaluation.

International demands, however, are not the only element determining which technical co-operation initiatives are later implemented. The institutional dispersion of Brazilian official engagement in SSDC, as well as the inexistence of a public database on the sectorial and geographic evolution of expenses made by several agencies, actually hinders a more complete account on the domestic drivers of Brazilian engagement in SSDC, and on how initiatives in social protection in SSA stand as part of it.11

This section aims at exploring domestic and international drivers of the evolution of MDS’s engagement in SSA. It starts with an attempt to consolidate and briefly analyse available data on Brazil’s engagement in technical co-operation in social development, as well as the particular profile of the MDS. Then it assesses how lessons drawn from the Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development and from broader Brazilian official engagement in SSDC during the Lula and the current administrations, have influenced the emergence of new priorities and methodologies in MDS.

3.1 The profile of MDS’s engagement in SSDC

According to diplomat Carlos Puente, who has analysed initiatives in Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries (TCDC) implemented under the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Agency of Co-operation (ABC) during 1995-2005, co-operation in social development has experienced an increase during 2001-05. Counting the whole period (1995-2005), initiatives in the sector represented 6.1 per cent of total projects, ranking 6th, and 9 per cent of total activities, ranking 4th (Puente 2010: 161).13

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10 For more information on the institutional dispersion of Brazilian co-operation, see Vaz and Inoue (2008).
11 By means of a partnership among the Presidency’s Chief of Staff Office, the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and the ABC, the Brazilian government took unprecedented steps towards collecting and systematizing data on the country’s official engagement in international co-operation. The result of this effort came in 2010 with the publication of the report *Brazilian Co-operation for International Development: 2005-2009*, which gathered data on the central government’s expenses with humanitarian assistance, scholarships for foreign students, technical and multilateral co-operation (IPEA and ABC 2010). However, as the report’s database is not open to public access, it is not possible to rely on data on expenses made by specific ministries. Only data from technical co-operation initiatives co-ordinated by the ABC can be accessed thanks to increasing national and international interest in the agency’s work. So, this section will focus on the number of initiatives and expenses made by the ABC, as well as in systematization of data related to the number of initiatives engaging the MDS.
12 ABC’s internal database does not have a specific entry for social protection. According to Puente, Brazilian co-operation in social development includes the following areas: poverty reduction, social inclusion, human rights, protection of minorities, reduction of child mortality, elimination of child labour, gender policies, enhancement of local capacities, income and employment programmes, and promotion of social integration through the practice of sports, among others. Although actions in social development have traditionally been partnered by Brazilian NGOs, such as Pastoral da Criança and Missão Criança, the Bolsa Família Program (BFP), which is co-ordinated by the MDS, became the flagship of Brazilian co-operation in social development during the Lula administration (Puente 2010: 165).
13 An isolated activity is defined as ‘an instrument created with a well-defined and specific objective, which is complete in itself, a precise undertaking, which aims to meet one single demand, with a reduced budget. It is not linked to any other activity, is less complex, on a small scale and lasts a short period of time’. A project is defined as ‘an operational working unit of co-operation activities, by which means external funding is
Updated data referred to ABC’s budgetary allocation shows that social development represented only 3 per cent of expenses made between 2003 and August 2012 (Figure 1). Breaking data by region, only 2 per cent of initiatives undertaken in Africa during the same period referred to social development, while in other regions that percentage was of 5 per cent (Annex II).

Figure 1: ABC’s budgetary distribution by sector (2003-August/2012)

![Diagram showing ABC’s budgetary distribution by sector]

Source: Based on Abreu (2012).

The MDS does not work solely with initiatives classified as ‘social development’ by the ABC, neither is the agency the only budgetary source for the ministry’s involvement in TCDC. MDS’s engagement in TCDC is as diversified as its domestic competencies, which include the national policies of Social Development, FNS, Social Assistance and Citizenship Income. Actually, initiatives in FNS, many of which are classified by the ABC under the sector ‘agriculture’, are predominant (Figure 2).

In terms of modalities, MDS’s engagement in SSC involves knowledge exchange (such as these happening in the IBSA initiative, which are beyond the strict scope of SSDC), technical assistance, construction (involved in the Cisterns Programs), internships, field visits in Brazil, training activities, seminars, workshops and informational materials. Due to limited human and financial resources, there is a tendency to concentrate activities in Brasília, with the support of traditional donors, gathering international delegations for seminars and field visits, some of which are followed by pairing individuals from international delegations to individuals in MDS, so they can accompany the ministry’s daily work.

Traditional donors are important partners in MDS’s engagement in SSDC. Main partners include FAO, WFP, IPC-IG and DFID. According to the MDS, these organizations play multiple roles: promoting Brazilian experiences abroad; mediating demands; funding SSDC; transformed into a joint fund to be used for a single objective, organized and programmed to meet previously identified requirements’ (MRE 2007: 7, footnote).
partnering in multi-country projects; giving technical advice; monitoring and evaluation; and supporting learning and research. Also in face of limited Brazilian human and financial resources to plan, implement and evaluate actions, there is a growing tendency to partner triangular and multi-stakeholder initiatives.

In terms of regional allocation, most of MDS’s initiatives are targeted at Latin American and Caribbean countries, where its sectorial profile is also more diversified (Figure 2). The predominance of the region as the main destiny of MDS’s co-operation is related to the existence of regional arrangements and networks, as well as to the Brazilian leadership in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

Figure 2: MDS’s SSDC by regions and sectors

![Figure 2: MDS’s SSDC by regions and sectors](image)

Source: Based on MDS internal documentation/data.

In the case of Africa, the region from which the MDS mostly receives demands, only two initiatives have been registered in the ministry’s internal documentation: one in cash transfer

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14 One example of regional social protection network is the Inter-American Social Protection Network, created in 2009 under the OAS. In the case of food and nutritional security, the main initiative is the FAO-supported Latin America and the Caribbean without Hunger, which was launched in 2005. In the case of Evaluation and Monitoring, a brokering mechanism for identifying demands from countries integrating the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) is currently being designed.

15 The concentration of the provision of technical co-operation in post-conflict countries, mainly Portuguese speaking ones, is related to Brazilian efforts to show the international community that sustainable peace depends on initiatives promoting development.

16 This figure is based on data provided by MDS referring to concluded and on going projects, from 2007 to 2012. Paper authors created the categories. Projects under FNS include cisterns construction, technical assistance on FNS initiatives and the Food Purchase Program. Cash transfer category includes projects related to Bolsa Família and the Unified Register (as support to cash transfer). Under Social Protection System, Management and Program Monitoring and Evaluation category we included all other knowledge exchange projects based on MDS institutional experience oriented to support partners’ social protection institutions and practices.

17 According to the MDS, communication difficulties with counterparts in African countries hinder an adequate response to demands from SSA. Working in partnership with traditional donors and with the Brazilian embassies are seen as supportive.
with Ghana (2007-09) and another in FNS being implemented in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal (PAA Africa).

3.2 Main drivers for the emergence of the agenda of social protection in the Africa-Brazil relations

Co-operation in social protection became one of the main flagships of South-South and Triangular co-operation. It was particularly fed by the realization of the World Summit of Social Development (1995), the launching of the MDGs (2000) and the global consensus on the need to align economic growth with social policies (Andrade 2008).

IOs, such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United Nations Development Programme’s Special Unit on South-South Co-operation (SUSSC/UNDP), IPC and FAO (Andrade 2008), as well as foreign development agencies, especially the DFID (Barros 2011), played an important role in the diffusion, advocacy and funding SSDC in social protection. The launching of cash transfers programmes in Latin America in the second half of 1990s and the first half of the 2000s\(^1\) have attracted the attention of such organizations, which increasingly supported the establishment of similar programmes in other Latin American countries and in Africa (Andrade 2008; Morais 2011).

In the case of Brazil, such push fed and was fed by the Brazilian turn to Africa during the Lula administration, expanding the focus in Latin America, particularly in the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), that had dominated the country’s relations with other Southern regions during the 1990s.\(^1\) Closer links were expressed in the economic domain as well as in TCDC. In the last case, as data on ABC’s budgetary allocation points, African countries were the main destiny of Brazilian TCDC between 2005 and 2010 (Figure 3).\(^2\)

It is important to stress, however, that available data from previous years show that, in terms of ABC’s budgetary allocation, Africa had already started ranking first in the period that goes from 1997 to 2001 (Puente 2010), during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) administration. Although relationships with the continent as a whole were not a priority to Brazilian foreign policy, the creation of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) in 1996 has opened spaces for the diffusion of Brazilian experiences and for catalysing technical co-operation with SSA.

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\(^1\) Cash transfers programmes in Latin America were pioneered by the *Progrexa* in Mexico (1997), the Chile Solidario (2002) and initiatives that culminated with the establishment of the *Bolsa Escola* in Brazil (2001).

\(^2\) The importance of Africa to Brazilian foreign policy is expressed, for instance, by the fact that Lula visited 21 countries during his 8-year administration and received visits of representatives of 27 African countries (World Bank and IPEA 2011). For more information on the history of Brazil-Africa relations; see Saraiva (2012), and World Bank and IPEA (2011).

\(^2\) Regional priorities, however, have shifted in the ABC with the emergence of the Dilma administration. According to data presented by the new director of ABC, Ambassador Fernando José Marroni de Abreu, the agency’s budgetary allocation for the 2012-15 period point to a greater focus in Latin America (US$40 million budget and a focus in TCDC activities), followed by African countries, notably Portuguese-speaking ones (US$36 million budget, and a focus on structuring projects), and finally Asia, Oceania and Middle East (US$4.5 million budget) (Abreu 2012). Official arguments for the renewed distribution of ABC’s budget, however, have not been published.
In sectorial terms, Brazilian engagement in TCDC during the FHC administration has experienced a shift in terms of it being increasingly used as an instrument to strengthen domestic support to specific coalitions and ideas. Such a shift was clear in the domain of social protection and cash transfers. By claiming to have directly influenced the establishment of similar initiatives in Latin America and in Africa, domestic coalitions supporting Bolsa Escola and minimum income programmes have used the promotion of their ideas abroad as an instrument to earn legitimacy at home (Morais 2011).

In the case of the PBF, despite the role played by Lula’s presidential diplomacy in catalysing the signing of international agreements in technical co-operation in social development and poverty reduction, the programme was politically strong in Brazil. Its promotion abroad responded to requests that arose exponentially due to the programme’s rich documentation in international literature and to its international diffusion by organizations such as the World Bank, which funded exchanges and financed the creation of similar initiatives in other countries (Morais 2011).

Next section will analyse more deeply such process by focusing the case of Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development. It will also explore lessons drawn from the implementation of this programme.

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21 In the case of Bolsa Escola, the creation of the NGO Missão Criança, headed by Senator Cristovam Buarque, supported pilot programmes in Africa and Latin America. Advocates of the minimum income were headed by Senator Suplicy, who promoted his proposals abroad aiming at strengthening them in Brazil (Morais 2011).
3.3 The Africa-Brazil programme on social development and the case of Ghana: overview, drivers and lessons

In January 2006, the Africa-Brazil Program on Social Development was launched during a study tour organized by the MDS and the DFID that gathered delegations from African countries (Ghana, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, South Africa, Nigeria, and Zambia) in Brasília to exchange experiences in Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (Barros 2011). This programme was both preceded and proceeded by contacts among the MDS and African delegations, facilitated and supported by the DFID, as well by the publication of documents by the latter recognizing the role of PBF and of SSC as relevant to tackle poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa and as a means to achieve the MDGs.22 The chronology of the Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development is described in Annex III.

Such contacts resulted in the formalization of an agreement among the MDS and the DFID in February 2007, to implement the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) in Ghana. Its execution encompassed three missions of ten days each composed by Brazilian technicians specialized in registry design, policies against child labour and evaluation and monitoring.23

In terms of results, the success of the Brazil-Ghana co-operation has been attested by the fact that the LEAP has been implemented after the co-operation project was finished (Barros 2011). The political commitment of the Ghanaian government has been pointed as crucial.24 The inspiration offered by internationally recognized achievements made in another developing country, Brazil, was seen by the Ghanaian government as having helped to legitimize the LEAP in Ghana (Andrade 2008; Souza 2007).

From the point of view of the MDS, engagement in technical co-operation with Ghana has contributed to leveraging the Ministry’s experience in social protection and in other country’s realities (Souza 2007). The contact among the MDS and the DFID has also contributed to professionalize MDS’s International Unit25 in terms of planning, monitoring and evaluation (Barros 2011), and developing co-ordinating mechanisms that allowed it to liaise with MDS’s line units (Souza 2007).

23 The Ghanaian Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment demanded a cash transfer specialist with experience in designing implementation modalities and payment systems; an economist specialized in social security issues; a social development expert with background experience in orphan and vulnerable children and people living with HIV/AIDS. Relying on the Ghanaian National Social Protection Strategy Paper, on the official demand and on the Brazilian expertise, the MDS proposed sending experts in Bolsa Família, child labour and instruments in Brazil’s Conditional Cash Transfers (unified registry, conditionalities and M&E) (Souza 2007).
24 Political commitment was expressed by the fact that Ghana’s Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment deputy minister has attended the January 2006 study tour in Brasília, as well as by the fact that the LEAP was planned as part of a National Social Protection Strategy, which by its turn integrates a broader strategy (the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II).
25 Since the creation of MDS, in 2004, its structure counts with an International Unit (Assessoria Internacional), which is entitled to: advise the Minister’s Cabinet and other units in international actions in the bilateral and multilateral domains, in co-operation and in fulfilling international agreements; co-ordinate, follow and supervise the international actions related to the Ministry’s units, including the execution of international co-operation initiatives; devise and propose bilateral and multilateral agreements with international organizations, entities and foreign governments aimed at social development of economic, social and strategic relevance to Brazil; and analyse and issue technical opinions on invitations, communications and other international documents received by the Ministry’s authorities (MDS 2012, 10th Article).
By strengthening each involved institution’s goals and strategies, including the fulfilment of missions of the financing institution, the DFID, and the operational and advisory one, the IPC, both of which aimed at enhancing SSC in poverty reduction, the Ghanaian case is pointed as representing a ‘typical win-win situation’ (Souza 2007).

In terms of processes, however, the Ghanaian case posed important challenges. The first one was related to the unavailability of MDS’s experts to work as consultants to the LEAP, something that had been considered by the Ghanaian team as necessary, and initially agreed with the MDS, to speed up the programme’s activities. Although MDS’s technical support was later evaluated as positive by Ghana’s counterparts, the challenges of it being understaffed, absorbed by domestic demands and unfamiliar with the Ghanaian reality and language (Souza 2007) point that there was a gap among decisions made by high-level authorities and implementing capacities. Just like in other areas concerning Brazil’s engagement in SSDC, it had not been accompanied by the design of a clear strategy matching will with an adequate structure and institutional alignment in implementing agencies, which is expectable given the novelty of the theme in Brazil.

After the experience with Ghana, the continuance of the Africa-Brazil Program depended on periodical meetings of the Steering Committee composed by the three stakeholders (MDS, DFID, IPC), which did not happen in the proposed timeline because the MDS was overwhelmed with the tasks of both managing the committee and directly delivering technical assistance. One possible avenue was that the MDS facilitated co-operation instead of directly delivery it, following the Brazilian Ministry of Health’s strategy in HIV/AIDS co-operation, where implementation involved NGOs and experts (Andrade 2008).

Co-ordination among eleven different partners and unclearness of specific roles since the beginning of the programme was also pointed as challenging (Souza 2007). Such diagnosis converges with findings made by other studies on triangular co-operation calling the attention to its high transaction costs, but also to poor involvement of beneficiary countries in the planning and execution of co-operation.

One of the main lessons learnt by the MDS was that something working in Brazil would not be a guarantee for it to automatically work in Africa. Effectiveness would depend on both partners understanding each other’s particular realities. One of the difficulties Brazilian government experts met was to refine demands and guarantee ownership, since the Ghanaian programme was being designed not by public servants, as in the case of Brazil, but by consultants mainly hired by IOs supporting the MDGs. One of the alternatives that has been presented in one of the programme’s follow-up workshops was that co-operation initiatives

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26 IPC’s involvement has been suggested by Saul Morris (DFID’s headquarters) when he visited Brasilia in order to help DFID Brazil identify means to support the MDS in expanding its technical assistance to Africa. Since the MDS’s International Unit lacked staff, Mr Morris suggested that the IPC, then linked to the Brazilian governmental think tank IPEA, assumed the dialogue with the Brazilian government, gathered programme documentation and provided administrative support for travels and events (Souza 2007).
27 The Committee was firstly managed by the IPC, and from September 2008 onward by the MDS.
28 As a result of this learning process, the IPC has established a roster to identify Brazilian experts in social protection.
29 DFID Brazil, DFID UK, the IPC, then headed both by IPEA and by the UNDP’s headquarters, which had to co-ordinate with UNDP Brazil office, and five MDS’s departments.
30 See, for instance, Fordelone (2009).
were preceded by the exchange of missions and study tours among African and Brazilian delegations in order to present each other’s policies and realities (Souza 2007).

Later, in 2008 the advocacy process undertaken under the African Union with the support of the DFID called to the need to integrate social transfer plans within National Development Plans as a means to promote social protection as a right in contexts marked by poor institutionalization. Promoting exchanges among African countries themselves was also seen as an avenue for facilitating adaptation (Andrade 2008).

Working with the support of traditional donors was confirmed as an avenue to bridge gaps of knowledge, operationalization, financial and human resources. The Brazilian team involved in co-operation with Ghana has indeed found the participation of both DFID and IPC as contributing to better results vis-à-vis the case of Peru, a country with which MDS was bilaterally co-operating (Andrade 2008; Souza 2007).

After the co-operation project with Ghana was concluded, the Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development continued in 2008 through the realization of another study tour of African delegations to Brasília and the involvement of MDS’s representatives in Regional Events in Social Protection in preparation for the First African Union Ministerial Meeting of Social Protection (Andrade 2008).

Andrade points that MDS’s participation in those events, firstly thought of as an instrument to fostering technical assistance, was later valued as an advocacy tool, going beyond pure technical assistance and grounding co-operation in high-level political alliances. By doing so it would have contributed to foster both Brazil’s strategy of expanding relations with other Southern countries and DFID’s new strategy of becoming more politically-advocacy-oriented and less programme-based in SSDC (Andrade 2008).

Disseminating experiences to partners, to a global audience and to Brazilian domestic actors was also learnt as crucial to enhance capacity-building, to promote synergies and to guarantee the sustainability of co-operation initiatives. It was carried out under the Africa-Brazil Program through the elaboration of international training materials targeted at audiences of managers, launching the Programme’s webpage, issuing newsletters and engaging Brazilian civil society’s representatives in the Seminar Social Protection in African Countries, which opened the August 2009 study tour (Andrade 2008).

There was also an attempt to expand the DFID-MDS partnership in order to promote technical co-operation with other four African countries: Angola, Kenya, Mozambique and Zambia. The project with Kenya was the only one that was advanced under the Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development. As part of lessons learnt, a consultant has been hired to adapt MDS’s experiences in Cash Transfers, but the co-operation was not implemented as

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31 However, such materials have not been used by the MDS due to communication problems among its departments and foreign audiences.

32 Although it was expected that the countries would be identified by a mapping study financed by the DFID and contracted out by the IPC (Souza 2007), the list ended up being defined by high-level decision makers considering personal contacts MDS’s individuals already had with counterparts in Africa (Angola and Mozambique), and two countries that were expressing interest in receiving MDS’s co-operation (Kenya and Zambia).
fast as in the case of Ghana. Follow-ups are currently being undertaken through monthly videoconferences, but the initiative is not included in MDS’s internal documentation.

Despite having been considered the major initiative in the area, the Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development was not given a mandate to co-ordinate all MDS’s co-operation with Africa (Andrade 2008). Independent talks ended up being undertaken with Mozambique with the support of the World Bank. According to the MDS, although missions have indeed been exchanged, the Mozambican government has never formalized a demand for co-operating with Brazil in cash transfers. The same happened with Angola.

Therefore, the initial expectation that the Africa-Brazil Program in Social Development would encompass technical co-operation with other African countries has not been totally fulfilled. While, despite particular institutional goals, the convergence of interests among the DFID, the UNDP and the MDS in fighting poverty in Africa had set a favourable scenario for the creation of the programme (Souza 2007), the convergence around the means for it to be accomplished has change afterwards.

With the launching of the PAA Africa in 2012, the main Brazilian strategy engaging MDS in Africa has shifted to FSN, also counting with the support of the DFID but replacing the IPC’s operational support by the WFP’s Centre of Excellence against Hunger. Still, as the next section will show, lessons drawn from the Africa-Brazil Program have partially influenced the renewed engagement of the MDS in Africa and in its SSDC in general.

### 3.4 Shifts in the MDS’s engagement in South-South development co-operation

Even though many of the obstacles faced by the MDS are intrinsic to the Brazilian engagement in TCDC in general, and thus depend on more structural changes to be surpassed, the MDS has been making incremental changes to respond to growing demands for sharing the policies it co-ordinates in a context of limited human and financial resources. Those changes have been partially influenced by lessons drawn from the implementation of the Africa-Brazil Programme in Social Development, but it is important to mention that they also responded to shifts in the mobilization of Brazilian domestic coalitions, including the ones holding particular views about social protection.

On the one hand, understanding that the African contexts were a lot different from the Brazilian one, the PBF coalition decided to back up, leading to a demobilization of co-operation in Cash Transfers in SSA. As seen earlier, such engagement had mainly been a reactive one, and not grounded in a clear strategy and in the availability of the instruments needed to do so. The PBF’s team decided to prioritize working the programme in Brazil (Morais 2011), a decision that has been strengthened during the Dilma administration.

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33 In fact, the MDS’s co-operation with Ghana is the one that has presented an exceptional character in terms of timing. According to data raised by Puente, the average for the execution of projects under co-ordination of ABC between 1995 and 2005 was of two years (Puente 2010).

34 For more information of the initiatives undertaken in partnership with the World Bank, see World Bank (2010).

35 While recognizing macroeconomic and social advances in Brazil, the Dilma administration has prioritized facing domestic problems, extreme poverty among them. Her government’s motto is ‘a rich country is a country without poverty’. According to the MDS, due to the renewed priority in eradicating extreme poverty, SENARC was absorbed with the domestic agenda.
On the other hand, there was a remobilization of coalitions that had been weakened in face of PBF’s positive impacts and popularity in Brazil. One of them was the social assistance coalition, which claims that social assistance services must be at the core of the policy of social protection and is currently defended by the SNAS and supported by municipal governments’ departments of Social Assistance (Cotta, cited in Morais 2011). The SNAS has been mobilizing itself to gain access to international co-operation, including SSDC, and hiring consultancies to support the internationalization the experience of the Unified System of Social Assistance (SUAS). What is interesting about that process is that the SNAS has been trying to carefully plan its engagement relying in gathering and systematizing data and lessons from MDS’s previous and current engagement in SSDC.36

The second and strongest coalition at the moment is the one that has also been the strongest during the first year of the Lula administration: the one supporting the Zero Hunger Program. Including the MDS’s SESAN, but also backed by Brazilian CSOs, this coalition claims that FNS should be the focus of social protection in Brazil (Cotta, cited in Morais 2011). The current force of such coalition in SSDC is related to the fact that it is backed by other coalitions permeating the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

With a restricted team, and one mainly dedicated to the domestic agenda,37 the MDS started working with consultants in the delivery of SSDC, as well as promoting periodic seminars gathering international delegations in Brasília. The hiring of consultants results from the learning that working with public servants delays the implementation of SSDC, something that converges with findings made by Puente (2010) when analysing the reasons for delays in the implementation of Brazilian TCDC in general. Also, differently from public servants, consultants have the availability to stay in field and understand better each partner’s circumstances and demands.

Receiving international delegations for periodical seminars held in Brasília has also been faced as a way to deal with the unavailability of staff to receive particular delegations and to send MDS’s staff to missions abroad, as well as for them to get in contact with Brazilian policies and the complexities of their background. There is currently a great interest of multiple Brazilian agencies engaged in TCDC in emulating MDS’s model because of budgetary cuts in ABC (Annex IV), as well as cuts in national budget in 2011 and 2012, mainly targeted at expenses with allowances and tickets.38

In 2012, the MDS organized five seminars, which were entitled ‘Social Policies for Development’, having received 30 delegations from 25 countries (Annex V). The events encompassed three types of activities, respectively: a series of lectures delivered by Brazilian programmes’ managers that addressed the main programmes co-ordinated by the MDS,

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36 Four products were produced as a result of the consultancies hired by the SNAS: a scoring system aiming at guiding the prospection of demands; a publication about SUAS for foreign audiences; a mapping of challenges the SNAS needs to face, matched with the mapping of what other countries could offer the SNAS in terms of professionalization; an analysis of multilateral debates in social assistance accompanied by a strategy of action for promoting SNAS’s engagement in them. A fifth product was previewed, but was not produced. It was about a systematization of what each particular country could learn from SNAS. Relying on those products, the SNAS is elaborating a strategy to guide its internationalization.

37 The MDS has 200 employees, whereas the Oportunidades Programme alone, in México, has 1,000 employees (Morais 2011).

38 See Brasil (2011a); and Brasil (2012).
opened up by a lecture on socio-political organization in Brazil and the strategic role of the Ministry in the country’s social development; field visits aimed at showing foreign delegations how Brazilian policies are operationalized; and, a novelty of the last seminar, the design of action plans by the visiting delegations aiming at exploring how Brazilian experiences seen during the seminar could be adapted to their respective countries.39

The themes presented and field visits varied from seminar to seminar, reflecting particular demands from delegations, but also the mobilization of different coalitions in Brazil aiming at playing a more active role in SSDC. There was also an increasing recognition by the MDS, which was fed by the transversal character of the policies it co-ordinates, on the need to engage other national actors in the face of increasing international demands for Brazilian social policies.

Those changes actually converge with broader lessons drawn from Brazilian SSDC in general. On the one hand, insufficient human resources in federal implementing agencies that were mostly demanded during the Lula administration has favoured the involvement of other national agents, including local governments and CSOs, which were many times the origin of national demanded policies. On the other hand, CSOs and local governments have formed coalitions in order to play a proactive role in the design and delivery of SSDC. Both processes have converged with the growing consensus on the need to ground Brazilian engagement in SSDC in a strong domestic constituency, as well as to strengthen the voice of Brazilian CSOs and subnational governments in the country’s foreign policy.

The main narrative presented during the last seminar converges with those shifts. The social impact of the policies co-ordinated by the MDS is attributed to the participation of civil society in the design of the 1988 Constitution, which has launched a system of rights in health, education and social assistance and the basis for decentralization of public policies and responsibilities to municipal governments. During the presentations, the role of civil society and the inter-sectorial approach of social protection were emphasized. There was also a tendency to conciliate disputes among economic and social development (mainly agribusiness and family agriculture) by recognizing that both, which have all been demanded by SSA countries, are complementary and have played an important role in Brazilian development.

39 The last seminar included speeches made by managers of the National System of Food and Nutritional Security, the National Program of School Feeding (PNAE/FNDE), politics of promotion of family farming led by the MDS, the BFP, the SUAS, the PAA, and Technical Assistance and Rural Extension for Family Agriculture. Field visits were undertaken to the following programmes: the CRAS, a popular restaurant, the PAA, the PNAE, and technical rural assistance. A novelty of the October seminar was that it was realized in partnership with the WFP, its Centre of Excellence Against Hunger and supported by the ABC and the National Fund of Education Development (FNDE). Tasks were distributed the following way: the MDS was responsible for delivering the lectures and offering the meeting room; the WFP has financed the coming of a delegation from Bangladesh, besides having been responsible for the logistics of the seminar; the Centre of Excellence Against Hunger was responsible for facilitating intercultural dialogue and for proposing the methodology of the action plans, which aimed at matching Brazilian experiences with those of each partners’ in order to design short, medium- and long-term objectives considering the following elements: legal and political framework; institutional structure and management capacity; how their respective programmes were designed and implemented; how Brazil could support them; financial capacity and political will; social participation in the programmes. Bilateral meetings of two hours were held with each delegation for them to present their respective plans of action. According to the MDS, this document will fundament requests for technical co-operation with Brazil, which should be addressed through diplomatic channels, and not directly to its International Unit.
What those narratives show is that, instead of technifying Brazilian development programmes, there was a tendency of public managers delivering speeches during the seminar to go beyond Brazil’s engagement in SSDC as an expression of best-practice transfer and to explore the complexity and historical evolution of the various policies and programmes in Brazil. As we will see in the following section, those narratives have also been influencing the practice of Brazilian co-operation in SSA.

4 Africa-Brazil co-operation in food and nutritional security: the case of PAA Africa

This session aims to elucidate the main drivers of the shift of MDS’s co-operation with SSA to FNS based on PAA, as well as how lessons learnt during the implementation of Cash Programs have influenced the design of PAA Africa. To do so we will first analyse how PAA takes part on Brazilian FNS Strategy, emphasizing its institutional arrangement and implementation design. Second, we will briefly analyse how such strategy has been elevated to the international domain and how it stands vis-à-vis challenges and opportunities to sustainable social protection in Africa. Third, we will explore how PAA Africa stands in the Africa-Brazil Co-operation framework on FNS. Finally, we will explore PAA’s design, highlighting elements that respond to challenges faced not only by the MDS, but also by the Brazilian official engagement in SSA in general.

4.1 The role of PAA in the Brazilian system of food and nutritional security

The right to food was included at the Brazilian Constitution in 2010, but, as shown in Section 2, it was the culmination of strong social mobilization in the 1990s and of several institutional and legal advances in the 2000s. The National FNS System (SISAN) was created in 2006, and, in 2007, its co-ordination was entitled to an Inter-ministerial Board on FNS (CAISAN), encompassing 19 ministries that are also members of CONSEA. Led by the MDS, that transversal and participatory arrangement has enabled advances in regulation and inter-sectorial policy formulation, as recognized in 2012-15 National Food and Nutritional Security Plan.40

The policies formulated by CAISAN are characterized by a concerted action targeting at agricultural value chain’s supply and demand dimensions, including family farming strengthening, credit lines, technical assistance, agriculture insurance, price guarantee and public purchase. The nodal programmes are the More Food Program (MFP), the School Feeding Program (PNAE) and the PAA (Patriota and Pierri forthcoming).

Launched in 2008, at the onset of the food crisis, the MFP is a credit line provided by Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) to raise family agriculture production through infrastructure modernization and technical assistance. Credits, which are provided under preferential terms, are destined to purchase equipment and machinery at subsidized prices.

PNAE’s main objective is to guarantee school meals for all students enrolled in public basic education.41 It is implemented through the Ministry of Education’s National Fund for Educational Development (FNDE), allowing financial resources to be transferred from the Brazilian federal government to states and municipalities. In 2009, with the determination

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40 See Brasil (2011b).
41 Basic education in Brazil includes kindergarten, elementary, and high school.
that at least 30 per cent of programme purchases should be of family farming products (Law.
11.974), PNAE became a cornerstone for the implementation of SISAN and PAA.\textsuperscript{42}

Finally, the PAA was instituted in 2003, and along with PNAE, constitutes an important
bastion of the Zero Hunger Strategy. Through the PAA, family farming products are
purchased for distribution to social assistance networks and populations in food insecurity
and for the establishment of public stocks and price regulation.\textsuperscript{43} The programme is executed
with resources from both MDS and MDA in partnership with states, municipalities and the
National Food Supply Company (CONAB), and its legislation ensures multi-level
participatory and social accountability mechanisms (including the National CONSEA,
decentralized Food Security councils, Social Assistance Municipal Councils, Sustainable
Rural Municipal Councils and School Feeding Councils).

Patriota and Pierri (forthcoming) point out that those programmes were crucial to the
reduction of food insecurity and of rural poverty in Brazil. They also highlight their role in
the increasing recognition of family farming as a national development actor,\textsuperscript{44} contributing
to the achievement of goals beyond FNS, such as inflation control, balance of payments
equilibrium, sustainable rural development and reducing rural exodus.

4.2 Brazilian position in international food and nutritional security and in the social
protection debates in Africa

The increase of commodities’ prices that culminated on the 2007/08 world food crisis and the
perspective of population growth have contributed to the re-emergence of food security at the
top of the international agenda (Patriota and Pierri, forthcoming). Brazil’s achievements in
FNS have put the country at the centre of global discussions, thus contributing to the
international promotion of its FNS paradigm. Relying on its Zero Hunger Program, Brazil
defends a new paradigm on food assistance that articulates emergency measures with the
promotion of social sustainable development, hence promoting sustainable humanitarian
assistance (MRE 2006).

In the case of SSA, public investments in Agriculture are insufficient and have been mainly
oriented to large-scale agriculture. Since most poverty in SSA is concentrated among
smallholder families there is a growing recognition of the potential of actions targeted at FNS
and family farming as effective tools to promote poverty reduction and productivity gains
(Devereux 2012).

Growing interest of SSA in the Brazilian agricultural models have been accompanied by a
dissatisfaction with the dominance of co-operation in social development by cash transfer
programmes, which, despite evidences of positive impacts, are perceived as costly, as
demanding a complex delivery structure and as a donor-driven agenda (Devereux and White
2008).

\textsuperscript{42} The law determines priority should be conferred to purchases from agrarian reform beneficiaries, indigenous
people and traditional communities.
\textsuperscript{43} Public stocks are also allocated for international food aid.
\textsuperscript{44} Data from the National Agriculture Census shows that family farming responds for 84 per cent of all
Brazilian agriculture and livestock farms and occupies a quarter of total area used to production nowadays. It
also responds for 75 per cent of employments in the sector. Data indicates the 70 per cent of the domestic food
consumption is supplied by family agriculture (IBGE 2009).
Contemporary studies point out three important shifts on the analysis and comprehension of social protection in SSA that can contribute to guide Brazilian engagement in Africa in FNS. The first one refers to the passage from the paradigm of emergency aid to the paradigm of sustainable social protection. Investments on medium- and long-term productivity are recognized as having a potential to contribute to strengthen states’ capacities to fund social insurance institutions that could evolve to social protections systems. They also respond to African elites concerns on economic growth as the main strategy for national development (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2010; Devereux and Cipryk 2009).

Second, dialogue between foreign proposals and domestic political processes are seen as crucial. Political constituencies, ownership and political will are pointed as important as financing development (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2010; Behrendet 2008). Strategies promoting the role of states as bearing the main responsibilities for social protection initiatives are seen as more effective than depoliticized policy transfers (Devereux and Cipryk 2009).

Finally, the importance of social participation and community management of social protection is widely recognized as an alternative to states’ limited capacity on designing, delivering and evaluating social protection. Civil society engagement is also important to hold states accountable, to contest power relations and to claim rights. This rights-based approach cannot be accomplished when social protection initiatives are politically headed by international donors and NGOs (Devereux and Cipryk 2009).

4.3 The Africa-Brazil co-operation on food and nutritional security

The Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fight against Hunger and Rural Development, which convened more than 40 African ministers in Brasília in May 2010, established areas for future dialogue and co-operation. They included the implementation of ten pilot-projects on public food purchase, broader coverage of existing school meal programmes and the support to family farming modernization.

The search for a more articulated and comprehensive co-operation strategy to cover the supply and demand sides of SSA’s agriculture value chains has been favouring multi-stakeholder arrangements involving both the MDS and the MDA, but also FAO, WFP and DFID, such as Purchase for Progress (P4P) and Home Grown School Feeding Initiative (HSFG) (Souza and Klug 2012).

An important lesson of the Brazilian FNS Strategy is precisely that, for it to be effective, multiple components must be addressed and co-ordinated. Currently, Brazilian co-operation initiatives in SSA incorporate, on the supply side the More Food Program Africa, which: (a) provides agricultural machinery and equipment items through an export finance concessional loan under preferential terms;45 (b) facilitates technical assistance during fields visits; and (c)

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45 The Brazilian Foreign Trade Chamber (CAMEX)’s Council of Ministers approved a credit line to finance Brazilian exports of family agriculture machinery and equipment to Africa amounting at US$240 million for 2011 and US$400 million for 2012. The credit line, which has a concessional character, was approved under the Export Finance Program (PROEX)’s buyer’s credit. CAMEX has established the following conditions for the allocation of the More Food Africa Program’s budget: reimbursement in 15 years, which can be extended to 17 years for Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) recipients; 3-year grace period, which can be extended to 5 years for HIPC recipients; 2 per cent interest rate (or Libor, if this rate is below 2 per cent at the time of
embraces a price negotiation between MDA and the Brazilian industrial sector. On the demand side, there is the Food Purchase Program (PAA), which: (a) provides direct purchases from smallholder farmers to supply people in food and nutritional insecurity through food assistance programmes; and (b) facilitates knowledge strengthening for longer-term local food purchase strategies within national policy frames.

Efforts to articulate initiatives respond to the growing comprehension of the need to complement and co-ordinate technical and financial co-operation between agencies, partners and donors in order to promote sustainable agricultural development in SSA. As we can see in Table 1, nine out of ten countries participating of PAA (shaded in grey) are also involved in, at least, another FNS co-operation initiative: More Food Africa, the HGSF and P4P.

Table 1 Intersection of PAA and other FNS programmes in SSA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PAA</th>
<th>More Food Africa</th>
<th>P4P</th>
<th>HGSF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Principe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkin Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Patriota and Pierri (forthcoming); MDA (2011); WFP N/D.

approval); each country will receive the credit in three six-month tranches, each of which will rely on a particular financing contract (Patriota and Pierri, forthcoming; and MDA 2011).

Together with the Brazilian organizations representing industrial sector, MDA has elaborated a detailed methodology encompassing eliminatory and classificatory variables in order to certificate and rank firms which produce machinery and equipment for family farming in Brazil. Firms which offer machine and equipment following the FINAME code (at least 60 per cent of the product’s market value and weight must be produced in Brazil) are ranked according to their capacity to export to the demanding country and to guarantees such as convergent technological quality, first-aid repair kits and after-sale services. Certificated and ranked firms must also inform their three-monthly production capacity for each product, so that offering capacities are matched with African demands for machinery and equipment. A unique price for each item, regardless of brand, is collectively negotiated, and items must be bought from a minimum number of different companies to ensure fair market access (MDA 2011).

Eight African countries have formally requested to be included on the More Food Africa Program (Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Senegal, Kenya, Cameroon, Namibia and Tanzania), five of them have signed Technical Co-operation Projects with Brazil (Ghana, Zimbabwe, Senegal, Kenya and Mozambique), and, by 2012, three of them had export credits approved by the CAMEX’s Council of Ministers: Ghana (US$95.4 million), Zimbabwe (US$98.6 million) and Mozambique (US$97.59 million) (Leite forthcoming).
4.4 The PAA Africa

PAA Africa targets ten pilot projects in SSA, half of them undertaken through a partnership among ABC, MDA and FAO and the remaining undertaken through a partnership among MDS, CGFome, FAO, WFP and DFID. Because of ABC’s budgetary cuts (Annex IV), the execution of the first has been delayed.48

The pilots in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal started at mid-2012 as a three-year initiative. Responsibilities were distributed the following way: the Brazilian government funds the project through contributions to both the FAO (US$1.55 million) and the WFP (US$800,000); and shares expertise drawn from PAA; FAO mobilizes Brazilian expertise, provides seeds and fertilizer and supports small-scale farmers’ capacities to grow, associate, process and sell their products; WFP organizes food purchase and delivery to schools and vulnerable groups (FAO 2012); DFID supports learning and knowledge exchange and consolidation through the promotion of seminars. A consultant based in Brasília also supports PAA Africa, co-ordinating the programme and acting like a communication bridge among partners. Drawing on multi-stakeholder arrangements, as we saw in section 3, reflects recognition of Brazil’s limited structure to plan, deliver, monitor and evaluate SSDC.

A key determinant for the success of PAA in Brazil was the social accountability and mobilization exercised by CONSEA and local actors, such as decentralized participatory spaces, farmers, school directors, students, parents, nutritionists, and supply agencies (Chmielewska and Souza 2011). Differently from PBF, that requires solid bureaucratic and institutional structures, PAA is seen as more scalable to SSA for fostering local development networks, for which social mobilization in partner countries is seen as crucial.

From this perspective PAA Africa also presents an opportunity to strengthen articulation between Brazilian and partner countries’ civil society in FNS and family farming. In parallel to the launching of PAA Africa, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has started financing engagement of Brazilian CSOs in humanitarian assistance. Linking itself to other Brazilian fronts acting in SSDC is not only a promising avenue to reinforce PAA Africa’s implementation, but also to foster the elevation of partner countries’ civil society as a political actor in policy-making.49

Including Brazilian CSOs in co-operation also responds to their pressures for more participation in the country’s foreign policy and relies in lessons drawn from MDS’s and other national agents’ previous engagement in the region, as shown in section 3.4. The same can be said concerning the hiring of consultants to work in field, in an attempt to understand each partner’s realities in order to promote articulated co-operation initiatives, besides providing an alternative to restricted teams and the predominance of domestic issues in Brazilian public servants’ agenda.50 Consultants are expected to foster adaptability,

48 The countries included in the ABC-MDA-FAO partnership were Ghana, Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Rwanda.
49 Since 2012, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs counts with a budgetary action (20RE) financing Brazilian CSOs’ participation in international humanitarian assistance, in international dialogue and in negotiation forums in the area of FNS. The CONSEA has also been invited to present its experience during the International Conference that launched PAA Africa in Brasília in July 2012.
50 The consultants have been selected jointly by FAO, MDS and WFP. One of the consultants has grown in a Brazilian agrarian reform settlement, one is Senegalese and the other three are Brazilian agronomists.
ownership and sustainability by dialoguing with national policies and working side-by-side with partner countries’ representatives in designing mid and long-term strategies for public purchases.

Brazilian FNS system relies upon a multi-dimensional, multi-sectorial, multi-stakeholder and multi-tier design (Souza 2012). National initiatives aiming at tackling food insecurity and poverty in SSA cannot be transferred in pieces. Deep knowledge of each partner’s particular context and co-ordination among Brazilian actors engaged in the region, as well as with other donors, will be crucial to promote an effective adaptation of Brazilian experiences to SSA.

5 Conclusion

MDS’s engagement in SSA has shifted from an initial involvement in Cash Transfers to a focus in FNS. Several factors have contributed to that shift, including technical as well as political dimensions: a more encompassing understanding of Brazilian programmes themselves and of the multiple and complex drivers of their advances, which were not found as already operating in African counterparts; a perception that initiatives in FSN would be more appropriate to SSA’s reality and would deal more effectively with the urgency of fighting hunger; shifting coalitions related social protection and to SSDC in Brazil; a passage from a reactive to a more assertive position vis-à-vis traditional donors.

Brazilian activism in SSDC is new and the country has been learning by doing. The PAA Africa’s design has incorporated some of the lessons drawn from MDS’s and other Brazilian agents previously engaged in SSDC. Working with consultants in field is seen as an instrument to deal with insufficient human resources in the Brazilian government, but also responds to the awareness that sometimes having worked in Brazil is not a guarantee that it will automatically work in other contexts. Having deepened knowledge of partners’ conditions and multi-level demands in order to better adapt Brazilian experiences will certainly be crucial to effectiveness. Without this, other lessons learnt, such as dissemination and grounding co-operation in high-level political alliances, will be useless. Co-ordinating actions in field with other co-operating partners is a promising avenue for PAA Africa to benefit from knowledge accumulated them and to complement actions in field.

Effectiveness also depends on understanding the multiple factors that have allowed the social protection system, including the FNS one, to be built in Brazil. Civil society participation was a fundamental building block in that process, and promoting closer ties among Brazilian CSO’s and their African counterparts is a promising avenue not only for grounding partners’ development in a rights-based approach, but also to strengthen FNS policies in Brazil. This is indeed one of PAA Africa’s goals, thus the expectation of mutual benefits is present at the initiative. Engaging a growing number of Brazilian CSOs is also fundamental for broadening domestic constituencies supporting the allocation of public resources to promote international development.

However, demands put by the civil society will only be met by their respective governments if they hold a political will towards social development and if they count with a tax structure to do so. Economic development is crucial for the latter, as it has been in Brazil. The priority conferred by the Rousseff administration to economic co-operation with Africa has a great potential of matching Africa-Brazil co-operation in social protection with initiatives that promote economic development. Doing so, however, will demand balancing incentives to the
internationalization of the Brazilian private sector, including agribusiness, with initiatives aiming at promoting awareness on corporate responsibility. Without doing so Brazil risks breaking social expectations of mutual and equitable gains, thus compromising the inspiration it has been bringing to SSA.

Concerning official SSDC, one of the main lessons drawn from MDS’s and other Brazilian actors involved in SSA is that merely responding to high decision-making instances does not guarantee sustainable engagement. Implementing capacities need to be considered and built upon relying on strong intra-institutional and inter-institutional alignment. As development is a long-term and multi-faceted process, co-operation needs to be implemented in a co-ordinated and multi-annual basis. Risking suboptimal engagement due to discordances among Brazilian partners, and disengagement due to political and economic turns, is not desirable.

Besides still being a developing country, Brazil has also experienced low historical levels of internationalization, which hinder not only the existence of sufficient capacities to engage in SSDC, but also a non-conditioned incorporation of international experiences and policies in the domestic realm. Just like in any other country, policies for development need to be constantly innovating in face of renewed challenges, and international exchanges are crucial. Externalizing domestic disputes does not leave space neither for such innovation to take place nor for recognizing how complex development is and how crucial partnerships among state, society and markets are. Engagement in SSDC, as well as in international forums, will favour Brazilian institutions as long as they are aligned around how important their internationalization is to forward domestic development.

References


Annex I: List of interviewees

- Aline Ribeiro Dantas de Teixeira Sousa, Head of International Affairs Unit/MDS
- Ivone Alves de Oliveira, technical advisor, International Affairs Unit/MDS
- Luis Gabriel Dupret Carvalhal, technical advisor, International Affairs Unit/MDS
- Carmem Priscila, Monitoring Co-ordinator of Food and Nutrition Security, SESAN/MDS
- Leonardo Prudente, International Co-operation focal point, SNAS/MDS
- Cristiane Godinho, Advisor and International Co-operation focal point, SAGI/MDS
- Fabio Veras, Co-ordinator of IPC-IG’s Research Program on Cash Transfer.
### Annex II: Sectorial allocation of Brazilian TCDC by region, 2005-August/2012, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector/region</th>
<th>North, South and Central America and the Caribbean</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia, Oceania, Europe and the Middle East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational training and education</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social development</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public security</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban development</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical cooperation</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil defense</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Abreu (2012).
Annex III: The history of the Africa-Brazil programme in social development

May 2005: With DFID’s support, MDS makes a study tour to South Africa, Nigeria and England to present the BPF in meetings organized by the African Union.

September 2005: Minister Patrus Ananias (MDS) and Mrs. Miranda Munro (director of DFID Brazil) meet to discuss the possibility of co-operation among MDS and DFID.

October 2005: DFID finances the participation of a representative of South Africa’s government in the seminar ‘Bolsa Família: Two Years of Successfully Fighting Hunger and Poverty in Brazil’, held in Brasilia; Publication of DFID’s practice paper ‘Social transfers and chronic poverty: emerging evidence and the challenge ahead’.

January 2006: Representatives of Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia take part at a study tour in Brazil on Conditional Cash Transfer Programs. Ghana declares its interest in receiving technical co-operation from Brazil in social grants.

March 2006: With the support of DFID, two representatives of the MDS take part in the ‘Workshop on Social Protection: a transformative agenda for the twenty-first century’, held in Zambia. The meeting, which gathered representatives of 13 African countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe), of Brazil, of UN agencies, of development partners and of NGOs, results in the ‘Livingstone Call for Action’, through which member states of the African Union committed themselves to implement social protection initiatives, including cash transfers, in the following three years.


October 2006: Three representatives of the MDS take part in the ‘Regional Workshop on Cash Transfers’ in Johannesburg.

February 2007: MDS-DFID co-operation with African countries is officially agreed upon during the visit of DFID’s Statistical Advisor, Saul Morris, to Brasilia. It is decided that its first initiative would be providing technical assistance to Ghana in the implementation of the LEAP, with the support of the IPC.

2-6 July 2007: Technicians from MDS’s National Department on Citizenship Income go to Ghana to provide co-operation in Single Registry for Social Programs (First mission).

13-24 August 2007: Technicians from MDS’s Department on Evaluation and Information Management go to Ghana to provide co-operation in Monitoring and Evaluation (Second Mission).

16 August-3 September 2007: Technicians from MDS’s National Department on Citizenship Income go to Ghana to provide co-operation in Single Registry (Second Mission).

25 August-3 September 2007: Technicians from MDS’s National Department on Social Assistance go to Ghana to provide co-operation in Child Labour (Second Mission).

2-17 September 2007: Technicians from MDS’s National Department on Citizenship Income go to Ghana to provide co-operation in Conditionalities Management and Single Registry (Third Mission).

March 2008: the LEAP starts in Ghana as a 5-year pilot experience in which the main components are conditional and unconditional cash transfers to orphans and vulnerable children, the elderly above 65 years old and the disabled. MDS and DFID agree to include four other African countries in the Africa-Brazil Program.

April 2008: experts from MDS take part in the Regional Meeting of Experts in Social Protection from the African Centre-South Region in Uganda, in preparation for the First African Union’s Ministerial Meeting in Social Protection. The regional meetings were organized with the funding of DFID and the assistance of Help Age International.

June 2008: experts from MDS take part in the Regional Meeting of Experts in Social Protection from the African Western Region in Senegal.

August 2008: Delegations of Angola, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique and Namibia and representatives of the African Development Bank, the New Economic Partnership for African Development and the
African Union take part at another study tour in Brasília. Brazil initiates bilateral dialogues to identify demands of each country.

October 2008: the Brazilian Minister of Social Development, Patrus Ananias, takes part at the Conference ‘Towards a Sustainable Social Development Agenda for Africa’, held in Namibia under the African Union.

August 2009: the seminar ‘Social Protection in African Countries’ opens another Study Tour in Brasília, gathering an audience of 220 people.

May 2011: The Kenyan government and representatives of the ABC, MDS and DFID sign a co-operation work plan to structure their partnership, set a schedule and agree responsibilities of each party. A delegation of 14 permanent secretaries and civil servants from five ministries visit Brazil to learn about Brazilian social protection policies and systems and assess how Brazil could support Kenya in designing and implementing an integrated social protection single registry.

Annex IV: Progression of ABC budget execution per region, 2003-August 2012

Source: Based on Abreu (2012).
Annex V: MDS’s social policies for development seminars in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of the seminar</th>
<th>Representatives that took part on it</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 17-20 January       | South Africa, Egypt, India, Kenya, Palestine and Tunisia  
Also attended by representatives of the UNDP, the DFID, the Federal District’s Department of Social Development and Cash Transfer (SEDEST) and IPC-IG |
| 27-29 March         | Cape Verde, El Salvador, Honduras, Uganda, and Venezuela  
Also attended by representatives of ABC, the Brazilian Ministry of Education, Social Security, Health and Defense, and SEDEST |
| 7-10 May            | Guinea Conakry, Indonesia, Niger, Nigeria, Peru  
Also attended by representatives of the WFP’s Centre of Excellence Against Hunger |
| 27-30 August        | Belize, China, Ghana, Guiana, Haiti, Honduras, Nigeria and Suriname |
| 8-11 October        | Niger, Bangladesh, Congo, Haiti, South Africa and Italy |

Source: Based on MDS internal documentation.