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Working Paper

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Poverty and Welfare Measurement on the Basis of Prospect Theory

Markus Jäntti¹, Ravi Kanbur², Milla Nyyssölä³, and Jukka Pirttilä⁴

December 2012

Abstract

This paper examines the measurement of social welfare, poverty and inequality taking into account features that have been found to be important welfare determinants in behavioural economics. Most notably, we incorporate reference-dependence, loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity—aspects emphasized in prospect theory—to social welfare measurement. We suggest a new notion of equivalent income, the income level with which the individual would be as well off, evaluated using a standard concave utility function, as he or she actually is, evaluated with a reference-dependent utility function. We examine the differences between standard poverty and inequality measures based on observed income and measures that are calculated based on equivalent income. These differences are illustrated using household-level panel data from Russia and Vietnam.

Keywords: prospect theory, poverty, inequality, welfare measurement, vulnerability

JEL classification: I32, O12
Acknowledgements

We are grateful to seminar audiences at UNU-WIDER Conference on Poverty and Behavioural Economics, the CESifo Behavioural Economics Area Conference and the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition for useful comments. We are also grateful to Brian McCaig, Andy McKay and Emilie Perge for their valuable advice with VHLSS data.

Figures and tables appear at the end of the paper.
1 Introduction

Economists now believe that in many cases non-standard, behavioural economic models help in better predicting how people behave. However, welfare measurement is still mainly conducted using tools that are not informed by these new developments. It is worth asking whether the key results in welfare measurement still remain valid if some of the tenets of behavioural economics are taken onboard in welfare analysis. This paper is a contribution to a new research area that tries to bring these two strands of literature together.

In particular, we examine welfare and poverty measurement and inequality analysis based on reference-dependent utility, as suggested by prospect theory. This theory, developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), is now a prime alternative to the expected utility approach for decision-making under uncertainty, and it has garnered a lot of empirical support. While it was originally developed as a tool for understanding decision-making under uncertainty, its key tenets are also relevant for deterministic frameworks. The main ingredients of prospect theory are (i) reference-dependence, the idea that welfare depends more on deviations from a reference level than on actual levels, (ii) loss aversion, the observation that in real-life situations, losses are felt more strongly than gains of equal size, (iii) the principle of diminishing sensitivity, which implies that preferences could be convex in the loss area, and (iv) subjective probability assessments.

Since prospect theory deals with changes in well-being and it is silent on the level of well-being, whereas all conventional poverty and inequality measurement starts from income or utility levels, there is a need to encompass welfare levels in prospect theory. Köszegi and Rabin (2006) develop a hybrid form of preferences, where well-being depends on the utility from current income and the deviation of current income from base income (or reference income). Günther and Maier (2008) use the formulation of Köszegi and Rabin (2006) and build multi-period poverty and vulnerability (forward-looking poverty) indices based on it. They also discuss the axiomatic properties of the indices they develop and highlight their properties based on numerical examples.

The current paper continues the analysis of prospect theory based poverty measurement in following ways. We first propose a new tool for analysis, a new kind of equivalent income, which is defined as the income level with which the individual would be equally well off, evaluated using a standard concave utility function, as he or she actually is, evaluated with a reference-dependent utility function. All the standard measures of poverty, including the often-used headcount index and FGT class of poverty measures, can then be defined on the domain of this equivalent income. In addition, the tool can also be utilized in inequality analysis—for example, the Gini and the Atkinson indices can be calculated based on it. We also examine forward-looking measures of well-being and combine reference-dependent measurement with a social welfare function approach. The benefits and limitations of the social welfare function based approach to poverty and inequality measurement therefore apply in our context as

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1 For a survey, see Camerer and Loewenstein (2003). A recent paper by Booij et al. (2009) provides support for a prospect theory type of behaviour in a representative survey of individuals.
well, and they are discussed in more detail in the theoretical section. The reference income in the analysis is in most cases determined by the individual’s past income (for realized poverty and inequality) or current income (for forward-looking measures), and we will present some evidence for why the earlier income level matters for individual well-being in the theoretical section.

In addition to these theoretical considerations, a main contribution of our paper is to offer an empirical illustration of the differences between conventional poverty and inequality measurement and indices that are based on reference-dependent utility. For this, we utilize household-level panel data from Russia and Vietnam. Russia is a good case to illustrate some of the potential differences because of the large swings in inequality and the heavy losses some individuals suffered during the transition process. In the Vietnamese case, conventionally measured poverty and inequality have dropped in the period we examine, and it is interesting to see whether reference-dependent measures convey a different message.

Political economy considerations provide one particular motivation for our research. For example, the views of official organisations on the one hand—including economists working for them—and the general public and NGOs on the other hand often clash on the societal welfare consequences of key policy changes. These disagreements, while by no means uniquely so, are in many cases more prevalent in a developing country context. Economists may, for example, point out that there have been reductions in poverty as measured by the head count rate and economic policy has, by and large, been a success, whereas those operating in the field say that they have seen increases in poverty among the people they work with or even absolute increases in the number of the poor. One possible source for these disagreements is the phenomenon of ‘churning’ that is the movement of people across the poverty line in both directions. Another reason might be that people feel increasingly insecure regarding the risks they face and some of these uncertainties are not fully covered by conventional economic analysis. The incorporation of the features emphasized in prospect theory may help to explain these possible disagreements and tensions. A completely different set of issues arises regarding the normative grounds of using reference-dependent preferences in poverty and inequality measurement. These issues are discussed towards the end of our theoretical analysis and in the concluding section, but it is worth stressing already here that we do not want to take a strong stand on the normative side. Our point is to highlight what happens to poverty and inequality measurement if, for instance, loss aversion is taken into account. The message from such measures can then be contrasted and pondered against the picture that emerges from conventional measurement.

In addition to the paper by Günther and Maier (2008), our paper is also related to several earlier works from three broad strands of literature. First, a number of papers have examined backward- or forward-looking welfare and poverty measurement taking changes in individual’s income level into account. Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2011) allow for loss aversion when building a backward-looking economic insecurity index while Bellani and D’Ambrosio (2011) examine the connections between self-reported life (dis)satisfaction and the deprivation measures suggested by the economic literature. Turning to forward-looking (vulnerability) measures, Calvo and Dercon (2005) suggest

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2 See Kanbur (2001, 2005) for a more detailed discussion of these disagreements.

3 See Dutta et al. (2011) for a list of references of the early work on vulnerability.
an individual vulnerability measure, with downside risk at its core. Dutta et al. (2011) take into account the possibility for reference dependence in their suggested vulnerability measures. An interesting feature of their analysis is that they require that the reference line (current standard of living) to have a monotonic relationship with vulnerability: a higher current living standard can either reduce or increase vulnerability, but it should not be allowed, in their view, to enable both relations at the same time. While the two papers discussed above are mostly theoretical, the study by Gaiha and Imai (2009) proceeds to quantify vulnerability using a variety of measures available in the literature using Indian panel data.

Although the reference income in our analysis will be the individual’s own earlier income, another strand of literature that is relevant for our paper is the work on relative income concerns (social comparison), which can also influence the reference point in a prospect theory type of measure. Castilla (2012) offers an application of poverty analysis that is based on reference-dependent utility formulations. The idea in her paper is to explain subjective poverty reported by individuals in a Mexican cross-sectional survey with three candidates for reference-dependence: the income level of the individuals three years ago, the income level they aspired to acquire, and the contemporaneous income level of a reference group.

Finally, since the poverty and inequality calculations conducted in our paper use panel data, our study is also related to earlier analyses of poverty and inequality that draws on panel data. This literature includes, first, material on chronic poverty measurement that separates poverty into chronic and transient components either based on the length of spells of poverty (as in Baulch and McCulloch 1998) or based on over-time mean income and the within-individual variance (as in Jalan and Ravallion 1998). Calvo and Dercon (2009) offer an axiomatic treatment of chronic poverty measures and Foster (2009) extends the FGT class of poverty measures to an intertemporal setting. The literature on income mobility—see Shorrocks (1978) for an influential early reference—is also related to our work as it uses longitudinal data. Notice that while income changes are typically seen as positive features in the study of both chronic poverty and income mobility, in the prospect theory based poverty measurement undertaken here, income fluctuations tend to lower welfare, since losses weigh more than gains of equal size.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical basis for our analysis. It also discusses to what extent prospect theory based measurement satisfies the standard normative properties set out in the poverty measurement literature. Section 3 presents the empirical applications. Section 4 concludes.

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4 For a treatment of welfare measurement that is based on relativity concerns, see Van Praag (2011).
5 In addition, Christiaensen and Shorrocks (2012) review the papers that appear in a recent special issue on dynamic poverty measurement.
6 Notice that what is common in all the earlier mentioned vulnerability literature is that vulnerability is seen as an undesirable feature. This is a viewpoint which is challenged by Basu and Nolen (2008), who argue that a flipside of vulnerability is that, with a constant overall poverty, an increase in vulnerability also means that fewer people are chronically poor. They also argue that a society is better off when, for example, unemployment is more evenly spread across people than concentrated among a subset of the population.
2 Theoretical framework

The purpose of this section is to derive poverty and welfare measures that are inspired by prospect theory. But it will be useful to start by briefly stating the principles for conventional welfare analysis to provide a comparison point to prospect theory based measures.

In conventional welfare analysis, an individual has utility $u(y)$ of consumption $y$, and one normally assumes that $u' > 0$ and $u'' < 0$. This function both predicts his behaviour and measures his well-being. Assuming it to be cardinal and interpersonally comparable, we can get a social welfare function of the type $SWF_i = \sum_i u(y_{it})$, where $i$ refers to the individual and $t$ to the period when income or consumption is measured. The key in the analysis that follows will be the measurement of well-being over time, and the difference in welfare over two consecutive periods will be

$$\Delta SWF_i = \sum_i [u(y_{it}) - u(y_{i,t-1})].$$

For valuation under uncertainty, one simply replaces the standard utility function with expected utility.

2.1 Preliminary considerations

Now let us contrast this conventional approach with prospect theory. The key tenets in it are the following:

1. Reference-dependence. Welfare measurement is not based on levels of income, but on changes from a reference point. The reference point could e.g. be one’s past consumption level or perhaps also the poverty line in the economy.

2. Loss aversion. Negative changes have a greater impact on welfare than gains of equal magnitude.

3. Diminishing sensitivity. This means that the value function could be convex in the loss area. There are doubts as to what extent this feature is relevant for losses of significant size.

4. Use of subjective instead of objective probability distributions. The probabilities of very rare outcomes are overweighted.

The discussion is divided so that we first deal with a deterministic framework, in other words, welfare measurement without income uncertainty. While prospect theory was developed to describe decision making under uncertainty, features 1-2 and possibly 3 are also relevant for choices in a deterministic framework. We then extend the model to the case with income uncertainty, which means that we also discuss the last property.

In prospect theory, the utility function is replaced by a value function that is determined over changes in income levels from a reference point. Denote the value function with
$v(c)$, where $c_i = y_i - \bar{y}_i$ is the change in income from the reference point, denoted by $\bar{y}_i$. The shape of the value function is governed by the following properties:

(i) $v' > 0$

(1)  
(ii) $v'(-c) \geq v'(c)$

(iii) $v^* > 0$ for $c < 0, v^* < 0$ for $c > 0$.

Assumption (ii) captures the principle of loss aversion: ‘losses loom larger than corresponding gains’ (Tversky and Kahneman 1992: 303). Assumption (iii) refers to ‘diminishing sensitivity for losses and gains’, i.e. a diminishing marginal utility for losses and diminishing marginal disutility for losses. The specification in (ii) allows for a non-differentiability in $v(c)$ at $c=0$. In other words, there is a kink at the point where the income change is zero.

In what follows, we often work with a specified functional form that captures the essential features of prospect theory. This is because we want to relate the analysis to welfare indices that also use specific functional forms. The functional form also offers the basis for our empirical application. An often-used welfare measure is one based on the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) class of utility functions

(2)  
$SWF = \sum \frac{y_i^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} \text{ if } \eta \neq 1 \text{ and } \sum \ln(y_i) \text{ otherwise.}$

This is the basis of, for example, the Atkinson (1970) inequality index.

Suppose we replace this functional form with

(3)  
$\sum \frac{c_i^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} \text{ for } c_i > 0$

$0 \text{ for } c_i = 0$

$-a\sum \frac{(-c_i)^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} \text{ for } c_i < 0$

and accordingly for $\eta = 1$. Here $a > 1$ refers to a loss aversion parameter.

This captures features 1-3 of prospect theory, including diminishing sensitivity since the second derivative is positive in the loss area. One possibility is to abandon the idea of diminishing sensitivity, for which the evidence is not as strong as for loss aversion. In that case, the function above would be replaced with a simple linear function ($-ac_i$) in the loss area. This specification would then satisfy features 1-2 of prospect theory.

One basic property of welfare measurement along the lines of prospect theory is the following. Consider a change where $c_i = -c_j$ and both $i$ and $j$ are at the same income
level. Then a standard welfare measure would remain unchanged. However, because of the presence of loss aversion parameter \( a \), the drop in the well-being for those who suffer the loss matters more than the gain, and the overall well-being is reduced. Although we come back to the formal definition of poverty below, if the persons subject to this income change are both located below the poverty line, well-being among the poor declines. This feature is summarized below.

**Proposition 1**

When welfare measurement takes into account loss aversion, reshuffling of income among households holding overall income constant reduces well-being and tends to increase poverty.

### 2.2 The basic framework

Prospect theory based measurement is, in its purest form, only related to changes in welfare, it is silent about the level of welfare. This leads to immediate problems for both poverty and welfare measurement, since both are specified in terms of levels. Building on the reference-dependent utility function formulation of Köszegi and Rabin (2006), we therefore adopt the following hybrid form:

\[
(4) \quad h(y_{it}) = u(y_{it}) + v(y_{it} - y_{it}^*) .
\]

In other words, an individual’s well-being is a sum of the utility from current income plus departures from the reference income. The reference income is often determined by the earlier income/consumption level of the individual (habit formation) or some measure of relative income concerns (such as mean income in society). While relative-income concerns are no doubt important as well, in this paper we assume for brevity that the reference income is determined by the individual’s own past consumption. Bartolini et al. (2011) provide evidence on the importance of past income level for individuals’ well-being using well-known SOEP data from Germany, and Graham et al. (2004, Table 4) show the same using data from one of the countries we consider, Russia.

Notice that from this we can calculate an equivalent income function \( y^* \) defined by

\[
(5) \quad u(y_{it}^*) = h(y_{it}) = u(y_{it}) + v(y_{it} - y_{it}^*) ,
\]

which tells how much the actual income plus the change in income is worth in terms of the level of current income. To understand the conceptual basis for this formulation, consider first the case where income remains constant over time, i.e. \( u(y_{it}^*) = h(y_{it}) = u(y_{it}) \). Then the equivalent income and the actual income are the same, and thus the conventional utility function \( u \) is a special case of \( h \). When income fluctuates, \( y_{it}^* \) gives the constant income equivalent of the actual income \( y_{it} \) and the income change that generates the utility. This idea of ‘steady income equivalent’ creates a theoretical basis for the use of the notion of equivalent income.
Once we assume that the function $v$ has the properties outlined in the formulae in (1),
the equivalent income for those who experience a loss is less than the actual income, in
other words $u(\hat{y}_{i,t}^*) < u(y_i)$ for all $y_i < y_{i-1}$.

Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) suggest that the utility function could take a form where
$h(y_{i,t}) = u(y_{i,t}) + \mu [u(y_{i,t}) - u(\overline{y}_{i,t})]$, in which $\mu$ is a function that satisfies the
properties of prospect theory, such as those in the formulae in (1). The idea is that one
uses the same utility function within the gain/loss part as in the conventional, level, part.
One way to parameterize the hybrid function, which comes close to the formulation in
Günther and Maier (2008) is

$$
\begin{align*}
\hat{h}(y_{i,t}) &= \frac{y_{i,t}^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} + \left[ \frac{y_{i,t}^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} - \frac{\overline{y}_{i,t}^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} \right]^\beta \\
&\quad \text{for } y_{i,t} \geq \overline{y}_{i,t} \\
\hat{h}(y_{i,t}) &= \frac{y_{i,t}^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} - \left[ \frac{y_{i,t}^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} - \frac{\overline{y}_{i,t}^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} \right]^\beta \\
&\quad \text{for } y_{i,t} < \overline{y}_{i,t}
\end{align*}
$$
(6)

Here, the ‘conventional part’ of the utility representation is of the CRRA form, loss
aversion is again represented by the parameter $a > 1$, and $0 < \beta < 1$ gives the relative
weight of the loss or gain part in overall utility. These parameter restrictions imply that
the gain/loss part satisfy the properties of loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity. For
$\eta$ equal to unity, the CRRA function is just the log function. Finally, one can also
consider a model without diminishing sensitivity at the loss side, i.e. where $\beta = 0$ when
$\overline{y}_{i,t} < \overline{y}_{i,t-1}$.

The use of ‘steady income equivalent’ type of measure clearly implies that any poverty
or inequality metric will depend on the chosen functional form that is used to generate
the equivalent income. Our analysis therefore belongs to the strand of work that uses
(social) welfare functions in examining poverty/inequality, such as the Atkinson
inequality index. This approach has certain drawbacks (it is not entirely desirable to
impose a functional form to capture people’s perceived well-being), but it is difficult to
see how one might otherwise capture the features suggested by prospect theory in
welfare measurement. The equations in (6) are a way to model the requirements implied
by the theory regarding the utility function, and the signs and strengths of the impact of
income changes from the reference level on people’s well-being. In addition, the step to
equivalent income is a practical way to incorporate the features of reference-dependent
preferences on poverty and inequality measurement. It is clearly desirable to examine
the sensitivity of the derived measures against changes in the functional form and
parameter choice, and we explore some of these sensitivity checks in our empirical
applications.

Assuming $h()$ to be cardinal and interpersonally comparable, we can get a social
valuation function of the type:

$$
SVF_i = \sum h(y_{i,t})
$$
(7)
The use of social valuation/welfare function is a logical continuation of the fact that individuals’ well-being is assessed using a utility function—then the social welfare function is then just an aggregation device. This requires that interpersonal comparisons need to made, but as Sen (1997: 14) argues: ‘If the approach of using social welfare functions is to give us any substantial help in measuring inequality, or in evaluating alternative measures of inequality, then the framework must be broadened to include interpersonal comparisons.’ Our approach necessitates that interpersonal comparisons can also be made when individuals’ utility depends also on gains and losses; we can see no a priori reason why this extension could not be made.

The benefit of the notion of equivalent income is that it allows poverty and inequality measurement (in levels) that nevertheless take into account the features of prospect theory. This type of welfare analysis becomes poverty measurement if for all $i$, the equivalent income level is below the poverty line, $y_i^* < z$, where $z$ is the poverty line. The notion of equivalent income $y^*$ allows the calculation of different types of poverty indices, including the simple headcount index or the poverty gap index. One additional possibility is to calculate a utility-based index PTPI (for Prospect Theory Poverty Index) of the type

$$PTPI = 1 - \sum \frac{u(y^*_i)}{u(z)},$$

which is defined to be zero for all whose equivalent income is above the poverty line, $z$, and which resembles the multi-period poverty index in Günther and Maier (2008). The idea is that the numerator takes into account loss aversion and that is compared to the conventional utility (in the denominator) that people would experience, if they received income equal to the poverty line.

One can ask why past income is included in static poverty measures. Multi-period poverty indices could be calculated as well, but the key point is that even these multi-period indices would depend on one additional past income level, which would be the reference income for the first period that is included in the poverty measure. If, for example, poverty would be measured from period $y_t$ to $y_{t+n}$, this $n$ period poverty index would also depend on income at period $y_{t-1}$. Working with static poverty/inequality measures is therefore mainly a simplification that delivers the same basic insights about the impact of reference dependence as do multi-period indices.

Inequality measurement can also be based on social-welfare based measures, as was shown in an influential paper by Atkinson (1970). He proposed an inequality index of the type $I_A = 1 - \frac{\zeta}{\mu}$, where $\mu$ is the mean income and $\zeta$ depicts equally distributed equivalent income—the i.e., the income level that, if received equally by all individuals, would generate the same level of welfare as does the actual income distribution. With a CRRA type of social welfare function, it is defined so that $\sum \frac{y_i^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} = n \frac{\zeta^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta}$, where $n$ refers to the number of individuals in the economy. With the definition of $y^*$, one can calculate the equally distributed equivalent income $\zeta^*$ as
\[\sum \frac{(y^*)^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} = n \frac{(\xi^*)^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta}.\]

The discussion above can be summarized as follows:

**Proposition 2**

Welfare-based measurement of inequality and poverty that takes into account loss aversion can be conducted based on standard poverty and inequality indices using the notion of equivalent income, defined in equation (5), as the argument.

### 2.3 Changes in social welfare

The discussion so far provides measures for inequality and poverty at a given point in time. The difference in social welfare over time using the hybrid measure of utility is given by

\[\Delta SVF_t = \sum_i [h(y_{i,t}) - h(y_{i,t-1})] = \sum_i [u(y_{i,t}) - u(y_{i,t-1}) + v(y_{i,t} - \bar{y}_{i,t}) - v(y_{i,t-1} - \bar{y}_{i,t-1})].\]

The difference to conventional measurement is, of course, that the functional forms inherent in \(u\) and \(v\) are different, and the reference income is taken into account.

Determining what happens to the reference income becomes complicated when there are multiple time periods. To illustrate this, consider a three-period example, starting from period 0. For the change from period 1 to period 2, the reference income of the individual can either remain fixed at period 0 level (this would be the case of no adaptation) or it can follow current consumption, i.e. income at period 1 (full adaptation), or it can also be a combination of the two. In the empirical illustration below, we concentrate on the two polar cases and calculate the fast adaptation case and the no adaptation case. Extension to cases with more than three periods would remain logically the same, but the reference income can in principle be a function of the entire income history.

### 2.4 Relation to axioms on poverty measurement

The purpose of this section is to investigate to what extent the prospect theory based poverty measures that are calculated for equivalent income in (5) fulfil the desirable criteria for poverty measures proposed by Sen (1976) and also discussed by e.g. Sen (1997). These axioms are:

1) The focus axiom (income of the non-poor should not count).

2) The monotonicity axiom (a loss of income among the poor should raise poverty).
3) The weak transfer axiom (a regressive transfer among the poor should raise poverty).

4) Symmetry (switching the income between any two persons leaves poverty unaltered).

5) Scale invariance (multiplying income and the poverty line with a positive constant leaves poverty unaltered).

6) Replication invariance (multiplying the number of persons at each income level leaves poverty unaltered).

Of course, these axioms would hold by construction in the space of equivalent income. The interesting question is whether measures based on equivalent income would continue to satisfy these axioms in the space of observed income.

Whether the focus axiom is satisfied or not depends on how we define those who are poor. If the poor should only include persons whose current income is below the poverty line, i.e. \( y_{it} < z \), prospect theory based poverty measures do not necessarily satisfy the focus axiom. This stems from the possibility that even if \( y_{it} > z \), the gain-loss part reduces equivalent income if the person has experienced a loss. Then \( y_{it} < z \) and focus axiom are not satisfied. However, if the analysis is confined to the case where the poor are directly defined by the condition \( y_{it} < z \), then the focus axiom holds by definition.

The monotonicity axiom holds, even in a strengthened sense, since income losses are heavily weighted because of the presence of loss aversion.

The weak transfer axiom is not always satisfied, however. Consider a shift of income from a person who is very poor, i.e. whose income \((y_t)\) is already well below the reference point, to another person who is closer to a poverty line but whose income \((y_h)\) is still below the same reference point (such as the poverty line). Then the change in sum of their welfare is \( [u'(y_h) - u'(y_t)] + [v'(y_h - \bar{y}) - v'(y_t - \bar{y})] \). With concave \( u \) the first bracket is negative, whereas with convex \( v \) at the area below the reference point the second bracket is positive, and the sign of the overall effect on welfare (which also enters a poverty measure such as that of equation [6]), is ambiguous. Therefore, reference dependence can lead to situations where the weak transfer axiom does not hold.\(^7\)

The symmetry argument does not necessarily hold either, because of the same type of argument as above. If there are two persons with the same income level but different reference points, and income is reshuffled between the two of them, the \( v \) function is evaluated at different points, so the overall effect need not add up to zero.

The scale invariance axioms hold if the reference income is changed in the same proportion as incomes. Likewise, the replication axiom holds if the replicated individuals' reference income remains the same.

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\(^7\) Of course, this requires that real-world preferences exhibit diminishing sensitivity in the loss area, which may or may not happen.
These remarks are collected to the result below.

**Proposition 3**

A suitably defined prospect theory based poverty measure satisfies the focus axiom, scale and replication invariance and the monotonicity axioms, but not the weak transfer axiom and symmetry axiom in the space of observed income.

We also briefly discuss axioms related to inequality measurement if inequality is measured on the basis of equivalent income, for example as in (9). The mean independence axiom (that inequality should remain the same if everyone’s income is multiplied by the same factor) holds if reference income is also multiplied. Likewise, the replication axiom holds if the replicated persons have the same reference income as the original ones. The weak transfer principle and symmetry requirements do not necessarily hold if income changes are made among people who are in the loss area (see the discussion above in the context of poverty measurement). Decomposability does not hold for many original inequality measures, such as the original Atkinson index without a corrective term (Sen and Foster 1997: 155), and if the equivalent income formulation enters these as an argument, decomposability does not, clearly, follow.

The failure to satisfy the weak transfer axiom is understandable since prospect theory implies that individuals are risk-loving in the loss area. If this phenomenon is accepted by society, then societal preferences could be inequality-loving among those whose income drops. We do not necessarily want to argue that this is an ethically desirable viewpoint. Rather, the point is to emphasize the implications for welfare measurement of taking prospect theory seriously. If the reference income is not individual’s own income, but rather an income level across other members of society, then one needs to decide if relative income concerns should be allowed to enter social welfare. When analysing transition and developing economies this may not be such an important issue; Clark et al. (2008) argue that relative concerns increase as one moves from poorer to rich countries. This claim, however, rests on a quite limited literature from poor economies. Yet, Senik (2004) and Carlsson et al. (2007) indicate that relative income comparisons do not pose significant negative concerns in post-Soviet Russia or rural Vietnam. Another problematic feature, from a normative perspective, is the role of adaptation: if the impact of changes in income on well-being is relatively more important than the income level itself, then the low absolute income level of the poor would not count much in poverty measurement, and such analysis of deprivation is not necessarily ethically desirable. However, evidence in Clark et al. (2008), Layard and Nickell (2009), and Bartolini et al. (2011) suggest that while much adaptation clearly occurs, adaptation is not at all complete. This implies that both the level and the changes of income matter for well-being. Using the German SOEP data, Di Tella et al. (2010) indicate that strong adaptation takes place among the richer half of the German population in four years from an income shock. However, the poorer half of the population does not adapt as quickly to income changes. Moreover, Germans earning

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8 See Cowell (2011, Ch. 3.4) for an introduction of an axiomatic approach to inequality measurement.

9 Senik finds that relative income has even a positive impact on life satisfaction in Russia. This finding is in line with the ‘tunnel’ effect hypothesis, where reference income is seen as a source of information for forming expectations about future economic prospects.
income below the median are clearly still much richer than most of the sample populations studied in our paper. And again, our point is not to suggest that only reference-dependent preferences should be used: they are likely to be useful, we would argue, as complementary tools to conventional analysis.

2.5 Forward-looking measures

In the simple case of no uncertainty about future income, the forward-looking counterpart of expression (5) is

\[
(11) \quad u(y_{i,t+1}^*) = h(y_{i,t+1}^*) = u(y_{i,t+1}^*) + v(y_{i,t+1}^* - y_{i,t}) ,
\]

where the reference income is already defined to be equal to the income in the previous period, which is from the point of view of future income just the current income. Now \( y_{i,t+1}^* \) is defined to be the future income level that gives the same utility level, valued by a conventional concave utility function, as the actual future income gives via the reference-dependent utility function \( h \).

Now consider an extension to the case with uncertainty about future income. Then a standard welfare measure would be based on expected value of the form

\[
E[u(y_i)] = \int_0^{\infty} u(y_i)p(y)dy , \text{ where } p(y) \text{ is the (objective) probability density function of income.}
\]

A prospect theory based welfare measure in the income uncertainty case is the expected value of the right-hand side of (11). Then

\[
(12) \quad u(y_{i,t+1}^{**}) = E[h(y_{i,t+1}^{**})] = E[u(y_{i,t+1}^*)] + E[v(y_{i,t+1}^* - y_{i,t})] ,
\]

and now \( y_{i,t+1}^{**} \) is a variant of the certainty equivalent of the actual expected value of the next period welfare. Suppose a standard certainty equivalent was denoted by \( u(y_{i,t+1}^*) = E[u(y_{i,t+1}^*)] \). Then \( y_{i,t+1}^{**} \) is a combination of \( y_{i,t+1}^* \) and a part that encapsulates the expected effect of loss-gain utility on welfare. Simple forward-looking poverty measures used in vulnerability analysis are often based on the idea that someone is considered to be vulnerable if his or her expected future income is below the future poverty line. In our case, similar analysis can be conducted for the modified certainty equivalent income, \( y_{i,t+1}^{**} \). The simplest case is again a headcount vulnerability index, which is the share of persons or households for whom \( y_{i,t+1}^{**} < z_{i,t+1} \), where \( z_{i,t+1} \) is the poverty line in the following period. Other vulnerability indices (such as the FGT class of measures) can be calculated similarly. This leads to the result below:

**Proposition 4**

Welfare-based measurement of future poverty or vulnerability that takes into account loss aversion can be conducted based on standard vulnerability indices using the notion of equivalent income, defined in equation (12), as the argument.
In addition, a forward-looking counterpart of equation (7) would be

\begin{equation}
E(PTPI) = 1 - \sum \frac{u(y^*)}{u(z)},
\end{equation}

when there is no uncertainty regarding the poverty line and the associated utility with it. A vulnerability measure based on \( y_{t+1}^{*} \) is closely linked to the notion used by Ligon and Schechter (2003), who define vulnerability as \( V = U(z_{t+1}) - EU(y_{t+1}^{*}) \), in other words as the difference between utility from a certain income equal to the poverty line and the expected value of future income. The key difference in our measure is that vulnerability does not only depend on the actual future income level, but also on the current income which forms the individual’s reference point. If the expectation of future income is smaller than current income, vulnerability tends to increase relative to the case with no income change because of the presence of loss aversion.

Finally, one central feature in prospect theory is the use of subjective probability weighting that affects the expected value of future well-being: people tend to overestimate the probability with which rare events take place (small probability events) and underestimate the probability of common events. The consequences of subjective probability weighting on the expected welfare out of future income in the gain-loss utility case are complicated. To understand this, notice that in comparison to standard expected utility, two changes take place at the same time: both probability weighting and the valuation function of realized income change. The valuation function in the case of prospect theory is, in addition, a non-concave transformation of the conventional utility function, which implies that the changes in valuation at a given income level depend on whether the person is in the gain or the loss area.

While the joint impact of loss aversion and overweighting of small probabilities is ambiguous in principle, the possibility remains that individuals’ perceived future welfare can be smaller in the case of large negative shocks, the occurrence of which they overvalue. These remarks help in understanding the different viewpoints of economists and representatives of different societal groups or NGOs on the likely implications of economic policy decisions. If NGOs accept the subjective probability estimations that tend to overestimate large losses, they may not be convinced on economists’ assurances on the overall potentially beneficial impacts of the policies.

Finally, note that one possibility is, of course, that the social planner does not accept all features of prospect theory, i.e. it takes a non-welfarist stance (a possibility that is discussed in detail in Kanbur et al. 2006). The government may want to override, for example, the use of subjective probabilities or the idea of risk-loving in the area of losses. Then the government’s and the people’s evaluations on socially desirable policies would clearly differ.

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10 Delevande et al. (2011) argue that subjective probabilities are often reasonably reliable and could and perhaps also should be incorporated into economic analysis. Ligon and Povel (2011) examine how accurately subjective probabilities predict adverse events experienced by households using panel data from Thailand and Vietnam.
3  Empirical applications

3.1  Russia

This section uses household-level panel data from the Russian Living Standard Measurement Survey\(^{11}\) to illustrate the potential differences between conventional poverty and inequality measures and those based on prospect theory. The Russian panel provides an interesting setting for income and vulnerability analysis, as only few countries in history have experienced such drastic political economic and social changes as Russia has over the past two decades. It is also one of the few transition and developing countries for which high-quality panel data (which is needed for prospect theory analysis) is available.

Economic background

As we know by now, the transition to a market economy was accompanied by extreme macroeconomic turbulence. Russia continued the transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy during the period of the two different waves studied in this paper: the tumultuous years before the millennium (1995-98) including the downturn in 1998 as well as the years of rapid recovery (1999-2002).

In the first period, Russia was more or less on the verge of economic collapse. Russia’s production declined and the early 1990’s saw some extremely high inflation rates. Some stabilization efforts took place in 1996-97, but the results soon faded, as the country slipped into a financial crisis in August 1998. In the downturn, mean income fell dramatically, employee compensation and public transfers were paid irregularly, inflation rose to over 80 per cent per annum, and the rouble devalued strongly. After the crisis, the economy rebounded strongly. Economic growth averaged over six per cent annually in 1999-2003 and inflation stayed relatively low (from 10 to 20 per cent). The political situation stabilized and Russia became one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Inflation was relatively low, the exchange rate of the rouble fully predictable, the state budget in surplus and the currency reserves were bloating.

Sample and variables

The RLMS is an annually collected panel dataset with detailed information on income, expenditures, household demographics and poverty. The survey is conducted by the Higher School of Economics and ZAO ‘Demoscope’ together with Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina and the Russian Institute of Sociology, RAS. Our panel includes data on eight waves during 1995-2002 and is further divided into two parts. Depending on the wave, there are 8,342–10,636 individuals who answered the adult questionnaire and they are from 3,750–4,718 households. The RLMS sample is a multi-stage probability sample. The households are allocated in 38 different raions (similar to counties) of which 35 were drawn using method of probability proportional

\(^{11}\) Source: ‘Russia Longitudinal Monitoring survey, RLMS-HSE’, conducted by HSE and ZAO ‘Demoscope’ together with Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Institute of Sociology RAS.
to size and the remaining 3 were selected with certainty as they were already self-representing raions (Moscow city, Moscow oblast, St. Petersburg city). All statistics reported in this paper are weighted using the RLMS sample weights that adjust for the sample design factors and for the deviations caused by panel attrition from the census characteristics.

Table 1 depicts some standard measures on poverty and inequality in Russia using the RLMS data. These are in line with earlier findings, e.g., in Gorodnichenko et al. (2010). Poverty went up until the 1998 turnaround in the economy. Inequality first rose and then declined.

The RLMS also contain a question on individual’s happiness (scale 1-5). Graham et al. (2004) explain changes in happiness by changes in log income, and confirm that income changes are associated with increased happiness over the period 1995-2000. Our own analysis using the same data suggests, in addition, that individuals’ happiness is affected negatively by losses of income, lagged from one to three years. 12

Inequality and poverty analysis based on prospect theory

Table 2 provides first comparisons between standard measures of poverty (upper panel) and poverty measures drawing on prospect theory based equivalent income (lower panel) in Russia. Equivalent income in 1998 is calculated based on the functional form in (6) and it is given by $\ln(y_{98}) - 2 \times [\ln(y_{95}) - \ln(y_{98})]^{\beta}$ for those who have experienced an income loss and as $\ln(y_{98}) + [\ln(y_{98}) - \ln(y_{95})]^{\beta}$ for the gainers, with $\beta$ set to 0.5, and in a similar way for 2002. In other words, these are calculated for a CRRA utility with $\eta$ set to unity and the loss aversion parameter to 2. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) estimated the loss aversion to be 2.25 based on experimental data, and recent work based on field data by Engström et al. (2011) estimate the loss aversion parameter to be very close to the same figure. We set the parameter to 2 for simplicity. We also carry out sensitivity checks with respect to all these parameter values. The lag length in the illustrations is chosen from the relatively recent past13, and so that the first period coincides with a recession and the latter period with a boom to highlight possible differences between conventional and reference-dependent measurement in different times.

For comparison purposes, conventional poverty measures are for the log of income14 instead for the level of income directly; these measures are therefore on the utility scale. In one of the examples below, the conventional measures are based on levels of income.

12 This is revealed by ordered regression analysis where happiness is explained by current income and a loss dummy variable, which is equal to one if income change has been negative. The finding is robust to including a set of demographic control variables.

13 Using a reference income in the fairly recent past ensures that complete adaptation has not taken place and income change still plays a role in utility.

14 The poverty line used in the illustration is set for simplicity so that we use in all periods the same poverty line (2004 roubles) which roughly corresponds to the relative poverty line (one half of median income) that applied in 2002. We thus ‘anchor’ poverty a specific year, a not unusual approach that compromises between the fully relative and absolute views of poverty.

15
directly, and to compare prospect theory utility at the same scale, we take the exponent of the prospect theory utility.

The results in Table 2 show that prospect theory based poverty is at a higher level in 1998 and in 2002 than the conventional measures would suggest. In particular, the poverty rates are extremely high for those who have experienced income losses. Figure 1 also demonstrates how there is more mass in the income distribution at low income levels in prospect theory equivalent income than for the log of income directly.

Tables 3 and 4 convey the same message; the difference is that Table 3 is on the income scale (The exponent of prospect theory equivalent income is taken and compared to income-based measures directly). Table 4 is on the utility scale, and income is in logs in conventional measures.

The main point here is the following: Suppose we measured inequality in 1998 using the Atkinson index with $\eta$ set to one. Then inequality increased from 1998 to 2002 using conventional measures—the Atkinson index decreased from 0.280 to 0.234 (see Table 3). However, if we compare the prospect theory based measure in 2002 (0.592), it is higher than the conventional measure in 1998. Therefore, one can reach different conclusions regarding the direction of inequality changes. The same does not necessarily happen for poverty, since while standard poverty measures declined from 1998 to 2002, prospect theory based poverty headcount (although higher than conventional measures in 2002) is still lower than conventional measures in 1998.

We next report results from robustness checks. With a higher value of the loss aversion parameter (3 instead of 2), poverty and inequality tend to increase. Small changes in the $\beta$ parameter (0.3 or 0.8 instead of 0.5) leave all qualitative results unchanged. Finally, changes in $\eta$, the risk aversion parameter, lead to small changes in different directions; the reason for this probably being that this parameter affects valuation both in the conventional utility, $u$, and the gain-loss part, $v$.

In our last illustration of realized prospect theory measures of well-being for Russia, we examine the change in poverty from 1995 to 1998 and further from 1995 to 2002, that is, six periods. For prospect theory measures, there are 2 options (again with $\eta$ set to unity):

- **option 1** Poverty in 2002 calculated as $\ln(y_{02}) - 2 \cdot [\ln(y_{02}) - \ln(y_{99})]^\beta$ for losers (immediate adaptation)
- **option 2** Poverty in 2002 calculated as $\ln(y_{02}) - 2 \cdot [\ln(y_{05}) - \ln(y_{95})]^\beta$ for losers (no adaptation)

The results on applying these two approaches are presented in Table 5. Since conventionally measured poverty in 1999 was at a somewhat smaller level than in 1995, there is more scope for downwards income movement during the period from 1999 to 2002 than from 1995 to 2002. That is why poverty measured using the longer time span

15 For brevity, these are not reported in table format, but detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
(no adjustment to the interim income level) is also lower than poverty based on the shorter comparison for the population as a whole.

Finally, in Table 6 we report results for the forward-looking measure. We have estimated inequality and poverty measures for expected future well-being based on prospect theory as follows. First, we estimate two different models to predict future income in 2006 based on data until 2002. One model uses demographic variables (sex, age, education) to predict future income, whereas another model also estimates individual-specific trends (both allow for autocorrelated disturbances). Next, we use the estimated models to predict income for each individual for the future year. We then apply Equation (12) to generate the forward-looking measure of well-being, and estimate the distributional measures associated with it. The estimated results are compared to the standard expected utility case (where the value of the $v$ function is set to zero).

According to the results, the estimated poverty and inequality levels are higher when the reference-dependent part is taken into account. Inequality and poverty are also at a higher level in the case where the predictions are based on individual-specific trends. Quite why this is the case is unclear, but one reason is perhaps the following: if individual-specific factors are taken into account, and the person is at a downwards trend in 2002, the scope for an income loss is greater in comparison to the case where individual trends are not taken into account. This shows how differences in the way expectations are formed can influence the aspiration levels and perceived vulnerability. This opens up the debate on whether public policy should address the way people form expectations to e.g. facilitate useful economic reforms.

3.2 Vietnam

This section presents some of the same analysis for Vietnam in 2002-06. Vietnam has taken considerable steps in poverty reduction during the 2000’s and thus provides us an interesting setting for poverty and vulnerability analysis.16

Economic background

Vietnam is a country where economic growth has been able to reduce income poverty with a particular strength relative to many other rapidly growing economies. It has a beneficial economic composition and structure for generating broad-based growth (Arndt et al. 2012). Moreover, it has been cited as an example of successful economic liberalization and trade opening, which has improved household welfare. As a result of its good growth performance Vietnam gained lower middle income country status in 2009. However, the remarkable aggregate poverty reduction hides significant variation in progress in poverty reduction across different segments of the society. Moreover, vulnerability has become an increasingly important issue in Vietnam (Nguyen et al. 2006).

16 Because the data is more limited (it has three waves) and the gist of the results resembles the message from the analysis on Russia, some of the sensitivity analyses have been skipped and the results are discussed quite briefly.
Sample and variables

We use data from the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS). VHLSS is a rotating household survey that is conducted nationwide every two years covering a rich set of questions. For our analysis three datasets were merged together to form one panel 2002-2004-2006. The final sample size for our illustration consists of a total of 7048 individuals. In this analysis, expenditure17 data has been used in the place of income for two reasons. First, according to checks done by several users of VHLSS data, the expenditure data is of better quality than income data. This is often the case with yearly income questions in survey data, especially in poor or rural areas. Second, as expenditures are often more stable than income, they are to measure changes in welfare in poor contexts well. All statistics reported in this paper are weighted using the sample weights that adjust for the sample design factors and for the deviations caused by panel attrition from the census characteristics.

The inequality and poverty in Table 7 reveal the Vietnamese success in reducing poverty and also to some extent inequality during the period we study when poverty and inequality are measured using conventional tools.

Results

Figure 2 depicts the distribution of income and equivalent income (the basic parameterization behind equivalent income calculations is the same as above: \( \eta \) is set to unity, \( \beta \) to two and \( a \), the loss aversion parameter, to 2). As in the Russian case, the mass of the equivalent income is more concentrated to the lower end of the distribution, in comparison to the distribution of ordinary income. The upper panel of Table 8 reveals the reason for this: Although the great majority of the population has benefitted from the economic growth, the average losses among those who have experienced a drop in income are sizable. Panel B of Table 8 also confirms how poverty rates are clearly higher among those who have seen their income decline.

The main results of the comparison between conventional and prospect theory based measurement of poverty and inequality for the Vietnamese case are presented in Table 9. The results suggest, first, that according to all measures that are calculated on the basis of equivalent income, poverty and inequality are at a higher level than standard measurement would indicate. Second, inequality, measured by the Gini index, has risen from 2004 to 2006 if calculated on the basis of equivalent income, although the conventionally measured Gini has declined during the same period. This further underscores the point that even in a growing economy, well-being measured based on reference-dependent preferences does not necessarily increase. This raises the question on whether losses are compensated to a sufficient degree.18

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17 The expenditure survey was conducted for a far more limited number of households, which further narrowed down the sample size.

18 According to the sensitivity checks, the rise in equivalent income based inequality is greater if the loss aversion parameter increases, but with a sufficiently small weight on the gain-loss part (small \( \beta \)), inequality drops between 2004 and 2006 even if it is measured based on equivalent income.
4 Conclusion

Lessons from the rapidly expanding field of behavioural economics have become increasingly important. On the other hand, there is a strong tradition of poverty and welfare measurement that is also of key importance to countries rich and poor alike. The purpose of this paper is to provide a contribution to the literature that aims to combine behavioural economics viewpoints and poverty or inequality measurement. The paper focused, in particular, on taking into account features that are key ingredients in prospect theory for poverty and inequality measurement. Poverty and inequality are clearly not only functions of current incomes, but they can also depend on individual past income streams. By the same token, forward-looking poverty or vulnerability measures are not necessarily a function of only future income, but they can also depend on the individuals’ current position and the change in income. Prospect theory is relevant for both backward-looking and forward-looking poverty measurement, as individuals’ perceived poverty can depend on a reference point (which can be income in the previous period) and individuals can also perceive losses as more severe than gains of equal size (this is the phenomenon of loss aversion).

Since prospect theory only concerns changes in income, whereas traditional poverty and inequality measures build on the levels of income, we suggest a new notion of equivalent income, the income level with which the individual would be equally well off, evaluated using a standard concave utility function, as he or she actually is, evaluated with a reference-dependent utility function. In this paper, the reference level is determined by an individual’s own past income level. All the standard measures of poverty and inequality can then be defined in the domain of this equivalent income. In addition to these standard measures that are now evaluated using a different income concept, we also examine forward-looking measures of well-being, which take into account the possibility of subjective probability weighting, inherent in prospect theory. One of the key results of such extensions is that a reshuffling of income among households holding the overall income level fixed, such that conventional poverty measures remain unchanged, raise prospect theory based poverty measures. In addition, the principle of transfers (requiring that a regressive transfer among the poor should raise poverty) does not necessarily hold for prospect theory based poverty measures because of the idea of diminishing sensitivity.

We also examined the differences between standard poverty and inequality measures and measures that are calculated based on the notion of equivalent income for realized income using household-level panel data, first, from the Russian transition period, during which people experienced large gains and losses in income and, second, from Vietnam during a period of rapid income growth. With a large amount of losers in the Russian case and because of the presence of loss aversion, prospect theory based poverty and inequality measures tend to take higher values than conventional measures. In Vietnam especially, the measures examined in this paper and conventional inequality indices can give conflicting views on the direction of inequality changes. All conventional poverty and inequality measures indicate an increase in the well-being of

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19 Examining the case where the reference income would depend on other people’s income in society is left for future research.
the poor, whereas reference-dependent inequality measures, which give a high weight to those who have experienced an income loss, suggest an increase in inequality.

We believe that the prospect theory type of measurement can help us understand many real-world phenomena—for example the political economy difficulties of carrying out economic reforms that on average bring gains to the economy, but create a large number of losers—and it can thereby offer a way to also understand the disagreements between economists and representatives outside of the discipline. However, we do not want to take an ethical stance on whether society should accept prospect theory based measures for social valuation. It can easily be the case that society may want to overrule some of the features of individual behaviour, such as diminishing sensitivity, and adopt in this sense a non-welfarist stance. A worry that the poor could adapt to their circumstances would also speak against accepting perceived poverty at face value in welfare measurement. But even in these cases, it will be helpful to the policymaker to understand the sources of different valuations of societal well-being.

References


Figure 1: Russia: Density of income and prospect theory utility—prospect theory utility as defined, income in logs

Source: Authors’ calculation based on RLMS data.
Figure 2: Vietnam: Density of expenditure and prospect theory utility—prospect theory utility as defined, income in logs

Source: Authors’ calculation based on VHLSS data.
Table 1: Inequality and poverty in Russia 1995-2002—total income per equivalent adult in longitudinal sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Poverty</th>
<th>Atkinson</th>
<th>Gini</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Head count</td>
<td>Poverty gap</td>
<td>eta=1</td>
<td>eta=2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td>0.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>0.499</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The poverty line is fixed at 2004 roubles, which roughly corresponds to one half of median income in 2002.

Source: Authors' estimation.
Table 2: Comparison of winners and losers—proportions, mean income change, and poverty

A. Winners and losers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distribution (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainer</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average income in year 0</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>4928.8</td>
<td>6114.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainer</td>
<td>2277.2</td>
<td>3086.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average income in year 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>2338.3</td>
<td>3365.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainer</td>
<td>4854.4</td>
<td>6300.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average income change (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>-73.7</td>
<td>-58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainer</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B. Poverty among winners and loser

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Head count</th>
<th>Poverty gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ln(income)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all</td>
<td>0.3393</td>
<td>0.1338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainer</td>
<td>0.1863</td>
<td>0.0754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>0.5000</td>
<td>0.2804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pt eq. income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all</td>
<td>0.4699</td>
<td>0.2432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainer</td>
<td>0.0404</td>
<td>0.0084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>0.9208</td>
<td>0.8325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ estimation.
Table 3: Inequality and poverty in Russia 1998 and 2002 using income and prospect theory income (log exponent)—measured on the income scale (exp of pt utility compared to income in levels); $\beta = 0.5$, $a = -2$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Equivalent income</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inequality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>0.603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atkinson (eta=1)</td>
<td>0.749</td>
<td>0.592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atkinson (eta=2)</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>0.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head count poverty</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>0.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty gap</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ estimation.
Table 4: Inequality and poverty in Russia 1998 and 2002 using income and prospect theory income (log exponent)—measured on the utility scale (pt utility vs. ln income); $\beta = 0.5$, $a = -2$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Equivalent income</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inequality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atkinson (eta=1)</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atkinson (eta=2)</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head count poverty</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>0.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty gap</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors' estimation.
Table 5: Poverty among winners and losers in 1998 and 2002 using 1995 and 1999 to measure income change for prospect theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Head count</th>
<th>Poverty gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ln(income)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all</td>
<td>0.1392</td>
<td>0.1392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainer</td>
<td>0.0842</td>
<td>0.0540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>0.2804</td>
<td>0.3901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pt eq. income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all</td>
<td>0.2401</td>
<td>0.2280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainer</td>
<td>0.0085</td>
<td>0.0068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>0.8349</td>
<td>0.8791</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ estimation.
Table 6: Inequality and poverty vulnerability in Russia 2002-06 using forward-looking prospect theory income (log exponent)—measured on the utility scale; $\beta = 0.5$, $a = 0$ along with traditional utility measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>No ind. trend</th>
<th>Individual trend</th>
<th>No prosp. part</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inequality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atkinson (eta=1)</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atkinson (eta=2)</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head count poverty</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty gap</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Forward-looking prospect theory income is based on income in the base year (1998 and 2002) and predicted income four years later based on random growth rate models estimated on data on the two four-year periods preceding the base years.

Source: Authors’ estimation.
Table 7: Inequality and poverty in Vietnam—average expenditure in longitudinal sample (monthly per capita expenditure in VND/Vietnamese Dong)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Poverty</th>
<th>Atkinson</th>
<th>Gini</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HC (VN pov. line)</td>
<td>Head count</td>
<td>Poverty gap</td>
<td>eta=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-1</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-1</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Poverty lines for the first column (VN pov.line) are 159.788, 172.5, and 213.3 in 2002, 2004, and 2006, respectively, and the next two use 159.788 in all years.

Source: Authors’ estimation.
### Table 8: Comparison of winners and losers—proportions, mean expenditure change, and poverty

#### A. Winners and losers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004-1</th>
<th>2006-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distribution (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainer</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average expenditure in year 0</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>339.1</td>
<td>462.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainer</td>
<td>298.2</td>
<td>275.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average expenditure in year 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>263.9</td>
<td>348.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainer</td>
<td>348.1</td>
<td>469.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average expenditure change (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>-22.0</td>
<td>-24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainer</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Panel B. Poverty among winners and loser

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Head count</th>
<th>Poverty gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ln(expenditure)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all</td>
<td>0.1701</td>
<td>0.0692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainer</td>
<td>0.1471</td>
<td>0.0536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>0.3371</td>
<td>0.1660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pt eq. expenditure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all</td>
<td>0.1882</td>
<td>0.0957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainer</td>
<td>0.1065</td>
<td>0.0053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loser</td>
<td>0.7841</td>
<td>0.6556</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors' estimation.
Table 9: Inequality and poverty in Vietnam using expenditure and prospect theory expenditure (log exponent)—measured on the expenditure scale (exp of pt utility compared to expenditure in levels); $\beta = 0.5$, $a = -2$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Equivalent expenditure</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inequality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atkinson (eta=1)</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atkinson (eta=2)</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poverty</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head count poverty</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty gap</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors' estimation.