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Political Dynasties

(Preliminary - comments welcome)

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Abstract

We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the self-perpetuation of political elites, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We find that the percentage of dynastic legislators is decreasing over time and that dynastic legislators have been significantly more prevalent in the South, the Senate and the Democratic party. While regional and party differences have largely disappeared over time, the difference across chambers has not. We document differences and similarities in the profile and political careers of dynastic politicians relative to the rest of legislators. We also find that legislators that enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. Finally, we find that increases in political competition are associated with fewer dynastic legislators, suggesting that dynastic politicians may be less valued by voters.

JEL codes: D70, J45, N41, N42.

Keywords: Political elites, dynasties, self-perpetuation, political selection, legislatures.

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1 Introduction

A recent article in *The Economist* complained that the last two presidential elections in the United States have been dominated by descendants of former presidents or Senators. President Bush is the son of a president and grandson of a Senator, Mr. Gore is the son of a Senator and the exception is John Kerry, who, according to the article, is “thanks to a rich wife, the richest Senator in a Senate full of plutocrats.”¹ Political dynasties are present in other democracies as well, such as India, where the Gandhi dynasty has spanned three generations and four different national leaders. The main concern over political dynasties is that inequality in the distribution of political power may reflect imperfections in democratic representation.² However, the classic elite theorists Pareto, Mosca, and Michels held that the domination of large societies by small elites is inevitable (see Michels 1962 [1915] Ch. 6.2, and Putnam, 1976). According to Michels (1962 [1915]), even under democracy, forces operate that necessarily lead to oligarchy. Furthermore, Mosca thought that the rule of elites is beneficial. The concentration of political power may simply reflect inequality in the distribution of abilities.

We begin by documenting the evolution of political dynasties in the Congress of the United States by using biographical data on legislators for the period 1789 to 1996. We find that the percentage of dynastic politicians among legislators has significantly decreased over time. (A “dynastic” legislator is one who belongs to a family that has placed a member in Congress before). Dynastic legislators have been significantly more prevalent in the South and in the Senate, consistent with the notion of the South displaying lower social mobility and openness, and the notion of the Senate as a more exclusive body. However, the regional difference has disappeared after World War II while the difference across chambers remains. We also show that political dynasties have been significantly more prevalent in the Democratic party in the first hundred years of congressional life, but not afterwards. We also

¹See *The Economist* article “Meritocracy in America: Ever higher society, ever harder to ascend,” December 29th 2004.

²Conventional wisdom considers that access to resources, key people, or name recognition—rather than merit—boost the chances of a particular person to attain political power. For instance, a *Time* South Pacific article (“Rallying the masses”; 09/13/99) reported on why members of the National Congress party thought Sonia Gandhi was a good candidate: “The Congress Party thinks the Gandhi name is a vote winner.” In a similar vein, an article in *The Economist* (“Sonia, of course”; 11/18/2000) noted that “The party has better politicians than she but none with her star quality (more an emanation of her pedigree than her personality).”

document that dynastic legislators enter Congress at a similar age, have tenures of similar length, are more educated, are less likely to have previous public office experience, are more likely to be women, and are more likely to enter Congress directly through the Senate. We then address two basic questions that go to the heart of classic elite theory: first, does the presence of political dynasties imply that political elites are self-perpetuating, in the sense that holding political power increases the probability that one's heirs attain political power in the future? Second, does self-perpetuation hinder delegation to the politicians most valued by voters?

We find evidence compatible with self-perpetuation in that legislators with longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress after them. Holding legislative power for more than one term is associated with a 40% increase in the likelihood that a politician will have a relative entering Congress in the future. The fact that longer tenures predict dynastic permanence in power is consistent with the idea that a longer hold on legislative power augments a dynasty's posterior attainment of power. However, the association could be driven by unobserved heterogeneity between families. Original dynasty traits (old money, genetic endowments, etc.) may explain both why a person had a long career and his relatives gained legislative seats later on.³ To establish a causal relationship between tenure length and posterior dynastic success, we use two instrumental variables approaches. Our first approach uses a regression discontinuity design relying on the outcome of close elections as an instrument for tenure length (see Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw 2001, and Lee, Moretti and Butler 2004 for an application of regression discontinuity to elections). We find that legislators that barely won their first reelection have a significantly higher chance of having a relative entering Congress later in time than legislators that barely lost their first reelection. This implies that holding power augments family asymmetries that affect the access to political power. In the second approach we instrument for whether a legislator's first reelection attempt is successful using the reelection rate of fellow party Representatives in the same state and year. The second approach corroborates our findings.

In addition, we provide some evidence that the presence of political dynasties does not reflect delegation to politicians that are of most value to voters. We find that political

³The fact that dynastic legislators do not have longer tenures and have previous public experience less often may be cautiously taken as an indication that they may not have superior skills or public service vocation.

competition is negatively associated with dynastic prevalence: dynastic legislators are less frequent in delegations from states and times where the control of the state legislature is more evenly divided between parties. This is compatible with the idea that the family traits helping dynastic perpetuation are less effective in more competitive environments. One possible explanation is that when a party safely controls a state, those in control of a party can afford to favor candidates to whom they are connected by family or social ties. Under more severe competition, party elites cannot afford strategies other than fielding the best possible candidates, regardless of family connections. The fact that dynastic politicians are less prevalent under stronger competition suggests that dynastic self-perpetuation in the US Congress may get in the way of delegating power to the most valuable politicians.

Our results shed some light on the channels through which the dynastic transmission of political power takes place. We show that superior original endowments (in terms of genes, for instance) cannot be the whole explanation for political dynasties in the US Congress, because exogenous shocks to dynastic power have an effect on dynastic permanence. This is the definition of the self-perpetuating force we detect. Various channels could contribute to this self-perpetuation effect. For example, a longer tenure may affect the preferences of a legislator's family: for example, they may embrace a vocation for public service. However, dynastic politicians are less likely to have previous public office experience, suggesting that dynastic politicians may not necessarily be characterized by a stronger vocation for public service. Another possibility is that a longer tenure allows a legislator to accumulate an asset that he then bequests—like financial, human, or political capital (name recognition, contacts). In this paper we do not attempt to fully disentangle the role of each of these possibilities. However, recall the fact that political competition and the prevalence of dynastic politicians are negatively correlated. This fact suggests that dynastic transmission may be more related to advantages such as superior contacts with party machines than to features valued by voters, such as higher human capital.

Our results have implications for the equalizing role we expect democracy to play, and for theories of the origins of modern democracy. Democratic societies may be expected to mitigate inherited asymmetries in political power. However, if the very job of running an equalizing democracy amplifies some of those asymmetries, equalization may be hindered. Regarding the origins of modern democracy, recent work argues that because promises of future redistribution from a King have no binding power, the introduction of democratic

institutions may have acted as a credible guarantee of continuing redistributive policies (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). The assumption that democratic institutions have binding power is most probably a realistic one, but a fundamental question is how do constitutions create commitment. A royal decree granting higher redistribution—a simple piece of paper—can be repealed by the King on the basis of sheer power. But the entire constitution—just another piece of paper—may also be repealed through the sheer exercise of power. An important implication of the self-perpetuation result is that even transitory shocks affecting the political power enjoyed by a family will have persistent effects. Therefore, institutions spreading political power to new groups (and possibly endowing some of their members with fame and connections) may have long term effects and become self-sustaining.

Work on the link between family connections and political power is to our knowledge scarce. Camp (1982) documents that high percentages of Mexican political leaders between 1935 and 1980 belonged to politically established families. Clubok, Wilensky and Berghorn (1969) use biographical data of US legislators and look at the percentage of congressmen belonging to politically connected families. They describe the evolution of that magnitude over time and across regions of the US until 1961, and argue that the observed decrease cannot simply be explained by population growth. In their view, the decrease reflects modernization. Brandes Crook and Hibbing (1997) look at the impact of the election mode of Senators on a number of dimensions, including the percentage of Senators coming from families that had placed a legislator before. Hess (1997) provides a detailed history of sixteen American political dynasties. Our work is also related to recent progress on the theory and evidence of legislative careers (Diermeier, Keane and Merlo 2005, Merlo and Mattozzi 2005, and Snyder and Padró i Miquel 2006) and the composition of the political class (Caselli and Morelli 2004, Dal Bó and Di Tella 2003, Dal Bó et al. 2006, Besley 2005, and Besley et al., 2005).

Finally, our work is also related to a vast empirical literature measuring within family income correlations across generations (see for instance Solon 1999, and references therein), and to a vast literature in sociology that has measured intergenerational mobility across occupations and status levels (see Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991 for a survey).⁴

⁴There is also a large theoretical literature on the intergenerational transmission of income (see, *inter alia*, Becker and Tomes 1979, Loury 1981, Galor and Zeira 1993, Fernández and Rogerson 2001; for a network-based perspective, see Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2005).

Our inquiry is analogous but focused on correlations in political power attainment within families (although our approach contains intragenerational effects as well). Dynastic self-perpetuation represents a way in which (political) inequality across families is reproduced over time. Although our results do not necessarily imply that the reproduction of political inequality contributes to the reproduction of economic inequality, our paper does expand the study of the reproduction of inequality to a new dimension. Going beyond the measurement of correlations, we also show that shocks affecting the political power of a person will have a causal effect spilling over to family members (see Currie and Moretti 2003 for how education shocks have intergenerational spillover effects).

The next section describes our data and documents patterns in the evolution and profile of dynastic legislators. Section 3 presents the basic findings regarding the connection between tenure length and the chance of having posterior relatives entering Congress. Section 4 presents the instrumental variables results. Section 5 presents our analysis of dynastic political prevalence in connection with political competition. Section 6 concludes.

2 Political dynasties: sources of data, historical evolution and some characteristics

2.1 Sources of data

The data for this project come from multiple sources. First, the Congressional Biographical Database (ICPSR study 7803) contains data on every Congressman from 1789 to 1996. This dataset contains basic biographical information such as year of birth, prior experience, and whether or not a legislator had relatives that were also in Congress. These data were checked against the Congressional Biographical Directory, which has detailed information on the relatives that any legislator had that were ever members of Congress. We observe that almost 95% of all the family relationships can be categorized as close, see Table A1 in the appendix.

We create two indicator variables to characterize political dynasties: Postrelatives and Prerelatives. The former is equal to one whenever a legislator has a relative entering Congress after he did, and zero otherwise. The latter is equal to one whenever a legislator had a relative enter Congress before he did, and zero otherwise. Approximately 8.7% of Congressmen had

previous relatives in office (Prerelatives) and 8.5% had relatives entering Congress later (Postrelatives) –see Table A2 in the appendix. Table A2 also shows that 65% of legislators stay in Congress for more than one term. A term for House Representatives is one congress (two years), and three congresses (six years) for a Senator. The average tenure length (in congresses) is 3.73. We now define two variables that will be used frequently: *Longterm_i* is a dummy variable equal to one if congressman *i* stayed in Congress for more than one term, and *Total tenure* is a variable recording the total number of congresses served by a legislator.

In order to instrument for tenure length in our study of self-perpetuation in Section 4.1, we merged the biographical data with data from the Candidate and Constituency Statistics of Elections in the United States (ICPSR study 7757). Since these two databases do not have common individual identifiers, we employed a complex merging procedure which is detailed in the appendix. For the universe of House elections we were able to match 28,560 elections out of the possible 30,028 that occurred.⁵

Finally we merged in an additional data set that was used to construct the measure of political competition used in Section 5. This dataset contains the party affiliations of members of the state House and state Senate from 1878 until the present and was merged by state and congressional term.⁶

2.2 Historical evolution

We start by reporting on some of the most conspicuous congressional dynasties in American history in Table A3. The Breckinridge family is the ‘largest’ political dynasty in terms of both the number of members placed in Congress (17) and the total number of congresses served (72). Its presence in Congress spans the period from 1789 to 1978. Other notable families in Congress include the Aldrich, Frelinghuysen, Hiester, Kennedy and Lodge.

Our next step is to document the presence of political dynasties in Congress across time, regions, chambers of Congress and the two main political parties. Consistently with Clubok,

⁵We only found minor differences among observables between elections that merged and those that did not, save for the fact that elections that did not merge correctly seemed to occur earlier in our sample. This is consistent with the quality of recording being poorer early in time. Otherwise the missing elections appear to be random. We restrict our sample to House elections only. This is done mainly because before 1910 very few Senators were directly elected, they were selected into office. Thus for the most part including them in our sample would add only a few data points and create substantial heterogeneity.

⁶This data set was generously provided by Rui De Figueiredo.

Wilensky and Berghorn (1969), we find that the percentage of legislators with relatives (previous or posterior) in Congress has significantly decreased over time (see Figure 1A). We also find that this decrease has continued in the second half of the twentieth century, driven by a decrease of dynastic prevalence in the South (the level of dynastic prevalence in the Non-South has stayed fairly constant since the late nineteenth century). The general decrease of dynastic prevalence is also true when looking at legislators with either previous or posterior relatives in office (see Figure 1B and 1C). As shown in Figure 1B and Table 1 the decrease over time in the presence of dynastic legislators is statistically significant: while 12% of legislators were dynastic between 1789 and 1858, only 6% were dynastic after 1966.

There are regional differences in the presence of dynastic legislators. Dynastic legislators were more prevalent in the South than in the rest of the country. This difference is significant before the Civil War and between the end of the Reconstruction period and World War II (see Figure 2A and first panel of Table 1). Contrary to the trends portrayed by Clubok, Wilensky and Berghorn (1969), we find that regional differences in the presence of dynastic legislators have disappeared over time. The first panel of Table 1 shows that regional differences in the presence of dynastic legislators is not significant after World War II. However, the differences across regions regarding the *entrance* to Congress of dynastic politicians only disappeared after the civil rights movement in the early sixties -see the second panel of Table 1.

There are important differences across chambers of Congress. The Senate has a statistically significant greater share of dynastic politicians than the House and this difference has not disappeared with time (see Figure 2B and Table 1). Finally, dynastic legislators were significantly more prevalent in the Democratic party than in the Republican party until the end of the Reconstruction, but there are no significant differences across parties since then (see Figure 2C and Table 1).

2.3 Personal characteristics and political careers of dynastic politicians

In this section we study how the personal characteristics and the political careers of dynastic legislators differ from those of other legislators. We study the following characteristics. *House* is an indicator variable equal to one if the legislator first enters Congress through the House. *Age of entry* is just the age of the legislator in the year of entry to Congress. *Previous public*

experience is an indicator variable equal to one if the legislator had public experience at the time of entry to Congress. *College degree* is an indicator variable equal to one if the legislator had a college degree. *Outsider* is an indicator variable equal to one if the legislator was from a different state than the one he represents. *Female* is an indicator variable equal to one if the legislator is a woman.

Given the difference across regions and times on the number of dynastic politicians, simple comparisons of means of the previous variables may be misleading. It is necessary to control for the state the legislator comes from, and for the year of entry to Congress. Table 2 reports OLS regressions on the association of legislator characteristics with having a previous relative in Congress, controlling for state and year fixed effects. We find that dynastic politicians are less likely to start their career in the House, suggesting they have the ability or means to enter directly through the Senate, a much smaller and prestigious body. This difference cannot be attributed to a later entry into Congress: dynastic legislators enter Congress at about 44 years of age, just like non-dynastic legislators. Dynastic legislators are not more likely to come from a state different than the one they represent and are significantly less likely to have previous public experience, although they are more likely to have a college degree. Interestingly, dynastic legislators with a college education are significantly more likely to have attended an Ivy League school than the rest of the college educated legislators. It may be interesting to note that dynastic legislators are significantly more likely to be female. In other words, dynastic membership seems to have facilitated the difficult progress of female political representation. In addition, we find that dynastic legislators do not have longer careers in Congress. Table 3 shows that dynastic politicians are equally likely to stay in Congress for more than one term and have similar tenure lengths to those of other legislators.

3 Tenure and the probability of having relatives in power in the future

In this section we estimate whether tenure in Congress increases the probability of having relatives in Congress in the future. We estimate the following equation:

$$Postrelative_i = \delta + \theta Longterm_i + \lambda X_i + \varphi_s + \psi_y.$$

$Postrelative_i$ is a dummy variable equal to one if congressman i has a relative in Congress in the future, and as said before, $Longterm_i$ is a dummy variable equal to one if congressman i stayed in Congress for more than one term and X_i is a vector of legislator i 's personal characteristics. The coefficients φ_s and ψ_y are state and year fixed effects that are used in certain specifications.⁷⁸

Table 4 column (1) shows that 7.1% of the legislators that were in Congress for only one term had a relative entering Congress after them while it increases to 9.3% if the legislator stayed in office for more than one term; the difference is significant at the 1% level. Columns (2) and (3) show a similar comparison when we eliminate people born after 1910 and those who die in office. We eliminate people born after 1910 so as to account for the censoring that occurs because legislators at the end of the sample period have less time to establish dynasties. We omit individuals who died in office to ensure that our results are not driven by the convention that when an individual dies in office a relative might step in to take his place. The coefficient estimates remain largely unchanged and are statistically equivalent.

Column (4) reports a regression controlling for state and year fixed effects. The fixed effects do not change the results markedly. When further controls are added in column (5) the estimate of θ does not change. This suggests that omitted variables are unlikely to bias upwards our estimate of the effect of tenure on having relatives in future congresses.

Other personal characteristics correlate with having relatives in future congresses. Legislators with Prerelatives are 16% more likely to have Postrelatives. Senators and legislators whose chamber of entry was the House and then eventually moved to the Senate have a 5% and 6.8% higher probability, respectively, of having a relative follow them into office than legislators who remained in the House. These findings suggest that more successful career patterns (politicians who are always Senators or who start as Representatives but eventually

⁷The “year” effects are in fact entering congress effects, so they are a dummy for every two years corresponding to the same congress. The first one corresponds to the years 1789 and 1790. For brevity, we refer to congress effects as year effects throughout.

⁸The use of binary outcome variables would suggest that non-linear maximum likelihood methods would be desirable. However, the consistency of these estimators is dubious in the analysis of panel data; this is the well known incidental parameters problem (see Neyman and Scott, 1948, or Lancaster, 2000). Therefore we focus on the analysis using ordinary least squares; however, the results are robust to using a potentially inconsistent probit estimator.

ascend to the Senate) are associated with a higher likelihood of starting or continuing a dynasty.

We obtain similar results if we focus on the total number of congresses served, total tenure, instead of an indicator variable for more than one term. Figure 3 shows the proportion of congressmen with Postrelatives by the number of terms they served. There is a clear positive relation between total tenure and Postrelatives with the impact of terms decreasing with the number of terms served. Table 5 presents the regression estimates which are similar to those in Table 4. Starting in column (6) we also run the results using a quadratic term of total tenure. The quadratic term is negative and significantly different from zero, reflecting the fact that there are decreasing marginal returns to tenure in terms of future relatives in office. The marginal impact on the probability of a relative entering congress in the future of going from one term to two terms is between 1.3% and 3%.

4 Does a longer tenure increase the chance of having a relative holding power in the future?

The fact that congressmen with longer tenures are more likely to have relatives in future congresses could be due to unobserved family characteristics. In this section we employ two strategies to determine whether tenure in office has a causal impact on the probability of a congressman's relative being elected into a future congress. First, we focus on House Representatives that attempted a reelection and compare those that barely won their first reelection with those that barely lost, that is, we use a regression discontinuity approach. Second, we use the re-election rates of a legislator's cohort as an instrument for his re-election.

4.1 Close elections

To identify the causal impact of tenure we start by using a very simple approach that relies on a comparison between congressmen who barely won their first reelection with those who barely lost. The identifying assumption in this regression discontinuity analysis is that close elections provide a random assignment of legislators across the categories of winners and losers, instead of being driven by family characteristics. This assumption could be criticized if elections were rigged such that winning could depend on personal characteristics that are

also correlated with having Postrelatives. Snyder (2005) finds evidence consistent with the idea that the vote counting process is biased in favor of incumbents in the U.S. House with more than two terms. However, there is no evidence of such manipulation taking place in first re-election attempts, which is the focus of this study. It could also be argued that legislators with relatives previously in Congress may be more able to rig election tallies. To eliminate this possibility we focus on congressmen without Prerelatives for the rest of this section. We also exclude congressmen who died in office or were born after 1910 as in the previous section.

Table 6 shows the percentage of Congress members with Postrelatives conditional on the results of the first reelection attempt (barely lost vs. barely won). Of the congressmen that lost by less than a 2.5% margin of the vote, 2.8% have Postrelatives in Congress. Instead, of those that won by up to a 2.5% margin, 7.12% have Postrelatives in Congress. A similar increase is observed for the 5% window and both differences are statistically significant (p-values of 0.024 and 0.01 respectively).

We argue that in such a small window winners and losers are identical so that any difference in Postrelatives should be attributed to the different outcome in the first reelection and not to personal or family characteristics. The data support this assumption. As Table 6 shows, at the 2.5% and 5% windows, only one characteristic out of 11 is significantly different at the 10% level between winners and losers. This suggests that it is not an unobserved family characteristic that causes both long tenures and Postrelatives for congressmen in close reelections, but that staying in power for longer increases the probability of forming a dynasty.

However, the previous analysis fails to consider that not all losers of a first reelection were one-term congressmen: some ran again and reentered Congress after losing their first reelection attempt. Therefore, the differences in Table 6 underestimate the effect of being a long term legislator on the chance of having relatives in Congress later in time. To solve this problem we implement an IV regression in which we estimate the probability of serving more than one term in Congress as a function of the first reelection outcome in the first stage. In a second stage, we estimate the effect of Longterm on Postrelative using the predicted value of Longterm from the first stage.

We estimate the following equation in the first stage:

$$Longterm_i = \alpha + \beta Win_i + \gamma X_i (1 - Win_i) + \varphi_r (1 - Win_i) + \psi_d (1 - Win_i),$$

where $Longterm_i$ is an indicator equal to one if congressman i was in Congress for more than one term, Win_i is an indicator equal to one if the congressman won his first reelection attempt and X_i is a vector of personal characteristics. The coefficients φ_r and ψ_d are region and decade fixed effects. All controls including the region and decade fixed effects are interacted with losing. This is done to adjust for the fact that all winners of the first reelection attempt had long term careers; in other words, controls are used to explain variation across losers.⁹ The default decade is the 1880s and the default region is the North-East (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, Delaware, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania). The coefficient on Win_i measures the average impact of winning on the probability of being a long term legislator conditional on region and decade effects.

Table 7 shows the estimated coefficients for the first stage. Winning the first reelection and its interactions are a good predictor of staying in Congress for more than one term at the 2.5% and 5% windows, after controlling for various legislator characteristics. The explanatory variables of the first stages are jointly significant with F statistics always greater than 60: the instruments are strong.

The equation we estimate in the second stage is as follows:

$$Postrelative_i = \delta + \theta \widehat{Longterm}_i + \lambda X_i + \varphi_r + \psi_d,$$

where $\widehat{Longterm}_i$ is the estimated probability of having more than one term in office as predicted by the first stage. In these regressions we use region and decade fixed effects in order to minimize problems with statistical power. We do however incorporate state and year fixed effects in subsequent specifications with more observations.

Table 8 shows the estimated coefficients for the second stage. Being in Congress for more than one term has a significant effect on the probability of having a Postrelative in Congress. This is the case for both the 2.5% and 5% margin of votes windows and whether or not we control for observable characteristics or we include legislators with Prerelatives.

⁹Since all the winners have $Longterm = 1$ and all the personal characteristics and fixed effects are interacted with losing, $\alpha + \beta = 1$.

The magnitude of the effect ranges from 3.1% to 5.2%.

We obtain similar results if we use the total number of terms and its square. In the first stage we estimate the following equations:

$$\begin{aligned} Totaltenure_i &= \alpha + \beta Win_i + \gamma X_i(1 - Win_i) + \varphi_r(1 - Win_i) + \psi_d(1 - Win_i) \\ Totaltenure_i^2 &= \alpha' + \beta' Win_i + \gamma' X_i(1 - Win_i) + \varphi'_r(1 - Win_i) + \psi'_d(1 - Win_i), \end{aligned}$$

where $Totaltenure_i^2$ is the square of $Totaltenure_i$. We present the estimates from the first stage in Table 9. The explanatory variables of the first stages are jointly significant with F statistics always greater than 20: the instruments are strong.

In the second stage we estimate the following equation:

$$Postrelative_i = \delta + \theta \widehat{Totaltenure}_i + \theta' \widehat{Totaltenure}_i^2 + \lambda X_i + \varphi_r + \psi_d.$$

Table 10 shows the estimated coefficients from the second stage. The linear effect of an extra term in power on the probability of having a Postrelative ranges from 3.9% to 6.3%. The marginal effect of a second term in power (denoted as TE(2-1) in Table 10) is positive, ranging from 2.8% to 4.2%, and always significant at the 10% level.

The results presented this far are based on congressmen within a small window of victory or defeat in their first reelection (vote margins of 2.5% or 5%). We include next more congressmen (within 25% margin of victory or defeat).¹⁰ This sample includes legislators that won or lost by large margins and therefore the reelection outcome cannot be thought to be random. We then control for the direct effect that the margin of votes may have on whether a legislator has Postrelatives by including a high order polynomial in the margin of votes. In other words, we apply the global polynomial estimation technique developed by Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw (2001) (see also Van der Klaauw 2002).

Figure 4 shows the proportion of congressmen with Postrelatives in Congress depending on the margin of votes by which they won or lost their first reelection attempt. The figure also shows the estimated quartic polynomial on vote margin with a 95% confidence interval allowing for a discontinuity at 0% margin of votes. There is a clear discontinuity at that

¹⁰We focus on the 25% window since a large fraction of the observations fall in this interval and data with extreme vote margins seem less reliable. However, the results that follow are robust to considering all the data.

value: winners are more likely to have relatives coming into Congress later on even when the polynomial is absorbing any direct effect that the margin of votes (or the variables that cause it) may have on Postrelatives.

However, Figure 4 fails to control for other observable characteristics and the fact that not all losers had only one term. To solve this problem we utilize, as before, the result from the first reelection to estimate the probability of being a long term legislator. Figure 4 shows the relationship of *Longterm* and *Total tenure* with the margin of votes legislators obtain in their first reelection attempt. The figure also shows the estimated quartic polynomial with a 95% confidence interval. There is a clear discontinuity at 0%: winners are more likely to serve a longer tenure. We can use the result from the first reelection attempt as an instrument for tenure and are able to identify the effect of tenure on Postrelatives as before.

The equation we estimate in the first stage is as follows:

$$Longterm_i = \alpha + \beta Win_i + \gamma X_i (1 - Win_i) + \sum_{s=1} \phi_s Marginvote^s (1 - Win_i) + \varphi_r (1 - Win_i) + \psi_d (1 - Win_i).$$

Table 11 shows the estimated coefficients. Win predicts becoming a long term legislator in the 25% window when controlling for the margin of votes. This is robust to including state and year fixed effects, congressmen with Prerelatives and larger margin of vote windows. Again, the F statistics for joint significance are large.

In a second stage we estimate the following equation:

$$Postrelative_i = \delta + \theta \widehat{Longterm}_i + \lambda X_i + \sum_{s=1} \rho_s Marginvote^s + \varphi_r + \psi_d.$$

The second stage results in Table 12 show a clear positive effect of Longterm on Postrelatives. In the 25% window Longterm is significant with a magnitude ranging from 4.7% to 6.6%. In the 40% window the effect of Longterm is also significant and with similar magnitude.

These results are robust to considering Total tenure instead of Longterm –see tables 13 and 14. The linear effect of an extra congress in power on the probability of having a Postrelative ranges from 2.2% to 4.9%. The marginal effect of a second term in the House is positive, ranging from 1.6% to 3.7%, and always significant.

These results suggest that the longer one’s tenure, the more likely one is to establish a

political dynasty, and that this relationship is causal. The identifying assumption in our analysis is that close elections provide a random assignment of legislators across the categories of winners and losers. We provided evidence of this for small windows in Table 6. To provide further evidence in support of this assumption, we estimate the relationship between tenure and all personal characteristics using the regression discontinuity design. The estimated model always includes a quartic polynomial on vote margin.¹¹ We present the estimates in Table A4 with region and decade fixed effects. First, we find that the estimates of the impact of Longterm on Postrelatives are robust to considering large windows (in small windows the coefficients remain high but the much higher standard errors damage significance). Second, for some windows one out of nine observables appears unbalanced. However, such lack of balance is not robust to using larger windows. Another robustness check is to introduce state and year fixed effects (instead of region and decade fixed effects). Table A5 presents the estimates with state and year fixed effects. While the effect of Longterm on Postrelative continues to be significant for most vote margin windows with many observations, the imbalances in predetermined observables disappear almost completely. Overall, the effect of a long term career on having posterior relatives in office appears fairly robust and not the result of noisy data in a particular vote margin window. On the contrary, the imbalances in the predetermined observables of our sample are few and not robust.¹²

4.2 Using the reelection rates of a legislator’s cohort

In this section we implement an alternative instrumental variables strategy to estimate the causal effect of congressional tenure on having a relative attaining legislative office. We use the reelection probabilities of any given congressman’s current cohort, by state and party, as an instrument for his reelection probabilities.¹³ For example, consider a House member going for his first reelection in California in the year 1892. The instrument for this congressman’s

¹¹The exercise can be explained thus. If, say, the military are much more prevalent among winners (indicating that the assignment may not be random), then the close connection between winning and Longterm should make Longterm as instrumented by Win a significant variable in a model where Military is the dependent variable. A similar picture emerges using state and year fixed effects.

¹²Going beyond our default sample, the examination of Prerelatives across winners and losers does suggest an imbalance. Legislators with prerelatives tend to be overrepresented among winners. The regressions ran to check that the results are robust to including legislators with prerelatives control for that characteristic, however, suggesting that it does not drive the result in those regressions.

¹³A similar strategy was used by Levitt and Snyder (1998) to examine the impact of federal spending on electoral outcomes.

first reelection is the reelection rates of congressmen of the same party in California in the year 1892. The idea is that there is an underlying common shock to all of the individuals in this cohort that is independent of the characteristics of the individual attempting to get reelected. We use this common shock as a source of exogenous variation in congressional tenure to identify the impact of tenure on having relatives follow into office. In our preferred specification we include fixed effects by state-decade combinations, so we identify the reelection shock relative to a given state-decade.¹⁴ In the example of the congressman from California in 1892, we would only compare the shock in California in 1892 to other shocks in California in the 1890's.

The identifying assumption is that the current electoral shocks to an individual's cohort will affect his probability of having a relative coming into office only through the channel of whether the congressman stays in office or not.

We use the following formula to construct the instrument for congressman i within a state/year/party with a cohort of size N :

$$Electinstrument_i = \frac{[\sum_{j=1}^N(reelect_j)] - (reelect_i)}{N - 1},$$

where $reelect_j$ is a dummy variable equal to one if j , in the same state/year/party, was reelected. This formula gives the probability of an individual in the cohort being reelected.¹⁵ In our preferred specification, we estimate the first stage equation:

$$Longterm_i = \alpha + \beta Electinstrument_i + \lambda X_i + \varphi_{sd},$$

where φ_{sd} captures state-decade fixed effects. Thus we obtain the impact of the instrument on Longterm only within a given state-decade group. In general the first stage is quite strong (Table 15). We find a highly significant impact of the reelection instrument on Longterm. We then proceed to estimate the second stage equation with the instrumented Longterm:

$$Postrelative_i = \delta + \theta \widehat{Longterm}_i + \lambda X_i + \varphi_{sd}.$$

We include the state-decade effects to restrict identifying variation to that in small region-

¹⁴One specification looks at state-quarter pairs. We do not have enough observations so as to try state-year fixed effects.

¹⁵This of course subtracts out the result of the individual for whom the instrument is being created.

time groups. Table 16 presents the second stage estimates. Across all of the specifications we find that the estimate of Longterm is largely consistent with estimates from the regression discontinuity design approach. In column (1) we use state-quarter effects while in column (2) we use our preferred specification with state-decade effects. We find that in both specifications the results are positive, significant, and of the same order of magnitude as our previous regression discontinuity estimates. However somewhat surprisingly in column (3) we find that when we exclude individuals with previous relatives the results become weaker and the estimate becomes insignificant. This stands in contrast to our previous regression discontinuity specification. However we can not refute that any of the estimates differ within Table 16 or across the different approaches. Column (4) reports our overall preferred specification, which excludes individuals whose Postrelatives entered within ten years of the first individual’s first reelection. This exclusion attempts to rule out cases where the shock to a legislator’s reelection could have a direct effect on the entry of a posterior relative through a channel other than the legislator’s tenure. For example, if shocks are serially correlated, it could be that a high rate of reelections for Democrats in California in 1892 is associated with more power accruing to Democrats in general in the immediate years. Therefore, the Postrelative of a democrat legislator, being likely to be a democrat in California himself, may be more likely to attain power soon afterwards. When we focus on relatives that enter more than a decade after the first reelection attempt occurred, we sever that potential channel. The result in column (4) is significant at the 5%. Finally in column (5) we exclude legislators with previous relatives and exclude entry of posterior relatives within ten years and find a weaker, though significant result. Taken together, these results are consistent with those obtained from the regression discontinuity approach.

5 Dynastic prevalence and political competition

In this section we study the impact of political dynasties on the quality of politicians. To do so we examine whether dynasties thrive when political competition increases. If political competition promotes the selection of legislators who are more valuable to voters, and dynasties are not valued by voters, we should observe that political dynasties are less prevalent when competition increases. We find that increases in political competition are associated with fewer political dynasties, suggesting that political competition reduces the dynastic

transmission of political power and that political dynasties are not valued by voters.

For this analysis we use a political competition index constructed upon party dominance of state legislatures. This index has a minimum value of -0.5 when 100% of the seats in the state legislature in a given year belong to the same party. This index increases as the percentage of seats held by a majority party decreases. The maximum value of the index is zero, corresponding to the case when the total number of seats (including the two chambers) held by the two largest parties is split 50-50 between these two parties. More formally, the political competition index for state i and year j is given by $PC_{ij} = -\left|\frac{LHD_{ij}+UHD_{ij}}{LHD_{ij}+UHD_{ij}+LHR_{ij}+UHR_{ij}} - 0.5\right|$, where LHD_{ij} (LHR_{ij}) and UHD_{ij} (UHR_{ij}) represent the number of seats that Democrats (Republicans) hold in the lower and upper chambers of the state legislature, respectively, during year j .

Table 17 presents estimates from a regression of the percentage of legislators with Prerelatives representing state i and who enter congress in year j on the political competition in state i and in year j . The first two specifications, in columns (1) and (2) respectively, capture the political competition index through a quadratic polynomial. Political competition is a highly significant predictor of the prevalence of dynastic politicians. A graphical representation of the political competition polynomial indicates that as the index moves from -0.5 to 0 (i.e., as political competition increases) the percentage of politicians coming from politically connected families decreases—see Figure 6.

In columns (3) and (4) we report estimates from a regression of the percentage of legislators with Prerelatives on dummy variables for each quintile of political competition. The omitted dummy is the one corresponding to the first, or less competitive, quintile. The dummy corresponding to the highest degree of state level political competition is not always significant, although it is not significantly different from the coefficient for the dummy corresponding to the fourth quintile, either. These estimates suggest that increases in political competition are associated with decreases in dynastic politicians at a decreasing rate, consistent with the results in columns (1) and (2).

One possible explanation of our findings is that when a party safely controls a state, the state and national leadership of the party can afford to favor “elite” candidates with whom they are connected by family or social ties. Because these candidates may not always be the best, favoring them costs the party leadership some extra probability of not winning a seat. In very safe states, this cost is negligible, however, while the private returns to favoring

friends and family may be substantial. The party leadership at the state and national level can favor particular legislative candidates in various ways, such as by directing resources to those candidates at the primary campaign stage. Under more severe competition, the party leadership may not be able to afford any strategy other than fielding the best possible candidates, regardless of their family connections. Doing otherwise may cost the party too much in terms of a larger likelihood of losing seats in Congress, which damages the party's power both at the state and national level.

6 Conclusion

We document patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties in the Congress of the United States since its inception in 1789. We then explore the dynastic transmission of political power with a focus on the presence of self-perpetuation, a force that theorists such as Pareto, Michels, and Mosca thought to play a significant role. We show that the tenure length of legislators is correlated with the probability of their having a relative entering Congress in the future. This probability increases by roughly three percentage points when gaining reelection at least once, which entails a 40% increase over the baseline probability. While this correlation could be due to unobserved family characteristics, two different IV strategies allow us to determine that there is an important causal component: having a long tenure in Congress increases the probability of establishing a dynasty. In other words, a dynasty's longer experience with power at one point in time increases its chances of holding power later in time, implying that a self-perpetuating force affects the composition of political elites. Put differently, shocks to political power have persistent effects. Finally, we study the connection between dynastic prevalence and political competition. We ask whether the advantages of elite politicians stem from features that are valuable to voters. Since political competition should promote the success of politicians that are more valuable to voters, the fact that dynastic politicians are less prevalent under stronger competition suggests that dynastic politicians are not the most valued by voters. Hence, the dynastic self-perpetuation effect we detect in the US Congress may have hindered voters' will to delegate to the most valuable politicians.

Our results shed some light on the channels through which the dynastic transmission of political power takes place. First, the fact that there is a causal relationship between tenure

length and the probability of starting or continuing a dynasty shows that superior original endowments (in terms of genes, for instance) cannot fully explain the observed political dynasties. Second, the fact that dynastic politicians are less likely to have previous public office experience suggests that dynastic politicians may not be characterized by a stronger vocation for public service. This is contrary to the idea that relatives of successful politicians may develop a vocation for public service. Finally, the fact that more political competition is associated with less dynastic politicians suggests that dynastic transmission may be more related to advantages such as superior contacts with party machines than to features valued by voters, such as valuable experience or superior human capital. We leave for future research a more detailed study of the different channels through which political power is transmitted.

7 Appendix

7.1 Merging

We merged the biographical dataset and the Candidate and Constituency Statistics of Elections in the United States, 1788-1990 (ICPSR study 7757) by matching each candidate/Congressional term observation in the Biographical Database with the subsequent reelection attempt from the elections data. For example when Newton Gingrich served in the 96th Congress we would attempt to merge that observation with a reelection attempt to enter into the 97th Congress. Unfortunately the data from the elections database is not comprehensive and many elections are missing. Additionally merging between the Congressional Biographical database and the elections database is complicated by the fact that they only common identifiers between both data sets are the year, state, and names of the candidates. After removing elections where there are multiple winners¹⁶ and elections where no names were associated with the candidates¹⁷ we are left with 30,028 house elections.¹⁸ This stands in contrast with the 34,271 House member/Congress observations in the Biographical Database.

To merge the data sets we employed a multi-stage merging procedure. We first merged on state/Congressional term/last name and kept all of the merges that were unique. For the remaining unmerged observations we then merged on state/Congressional term/last name/first letter of first name¹⁹ and kept all of the unique merges. Finally we iterated the same process for state/Congress/last name/first and second letter of the first name. At this point the merging yield a mere 55 unique matches. After these merges we were able to match 23,016 observations from the elections database and the biographical database. Beyond the fact that many elections were not recorded, this gap can be substantially attributed to the fact that many candidates decided not to run for reelection, which would make a merge impossible since they would not show up in the elections data set. For instance had Newton Gingrich

¹⁶Historically there have been elections where the top two or more candidates were elected to Congress. Upon inspection we found that these elections tend to have results that are confusing and do not match with results from other sources. For the time being we have decided to drop these elections out.

¹⁷This makes merging on candidate name quite difficult.

¹⁸We have decided to focus on House elections since for our purposes the Senate will not add a substantial amount of data since Senators were not elected until the beginning of the twentieth century, are much less in number than House members, and have less frequent election cycles.

¹⁹We only merged on the first letter of the first name because the first names in the elections dataset were often garbled and incomplete.

decided to retire after serving in the 96th Congress no entry would appear in the elections database. Not surprisingly, the data that failed to merge disproportionately comes from the earlier years where recording was markedly more sporadic.

To further assess the efficacy of the merge, we merged the data again, but by matching the Biographical data with the election prior to entry. For example when Newton Gingrich served in the 96th Congress we would attempt to merge that observation with the election in 1978 to enter into the 96th Congress. Despite the fact that this is not the type of merge that we use in the paper, it is informative since it will enable us to conduct a diagnostic of whether there are systematic biases in the sample.²⁰ When conducting the merge in this manner we were able match 28,560 elections out of the possible 30,028. To analyze whether our sample is systematically biased we regress the probability that there is a successful merge on a large set of Congressmen characteristics as well as fixed effects for each state and decade (i.e. a California 1890 fixed effect). In the unreported analysis we find suggestive evidence that there is little systematic bias in the sample, with some notable exceptions. We find that elections where women won are 7% less likely to be matched to results. Individuals who go onto to further civic service are also 1.5% less likely to be matched to election results. However important variables such as whether an individual has family members in Congress do not appear to be systematically biased in the sample, conditioning on the state-decade fixed effect. As mentioned above, while merges are markedly more successful in later years, conditional on the year we do not see systematic differences in many of the variables of interest, which suggests that much of the omitted data is random. These merge considerations only apply to the analysis in Section 4.2 where we use the elections data as an instrument.

²⁰The problem with analyzing the the data that was merged as above is that characteristics of politicians (such as gender, age, etc.) would be correlated with the decision to retire from office. Thus if we observed women were much less likely to have a successful merge it would be impossible to determine if that was due to data being less likely to be recorded or women being less likely to choose to run for re-election. This problem does not occur in the alternative merging technique.

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Table 1: Sample Means of Proportion of Legislators With Previous Relatives

Stocks: Proportion of legislators with previous relatives. Each legislator is counted in every congress he/she is in office.

	Totals	South	Non-South	Difference	Senate	House	Difference	Democrats	Republicans	Difference
Overall	.08824 [.00371]	0.11722 [.00744]	0.07386 [.00412]	0.04336 [.00851]***	0.13499 [.01052]	0.07674 [.0035]	0.05825 [.0107]***	0.08311 [.00611]	0.0733 [.00595]	0.00981 [.00852]
1788-1859	0.12065 [.0075]	0.14581 [.01395]	0.10309 [.00812]	0.04272 [.01614]***	0.12678 [.01699]	0.119 [.00763]	0.00778 [.01742]			
1860-1865	0.10128 [.01436]	0.07407 [.03541]	0.10565 [.01567]	-0.03158 [.03871]	0.14595 [.03671]	0.0874 [.0874]	0.05855 [.03961]			
1866-1879	0.10675 [.00105]	0.13334 [.02]	0.09422 [.01227]	0.03911 [.02346]*	0.20096 [.03178]	0.08081 [.00946]	0.12015 [.0327]***	0.15254 [.01881]	0.06905 [.01177]	0.08349 [.02219]***
1880-1939	0.089 [.00619]	0.13496 [.01367]	0.06773 [.06723]	0.06723 [.01509]***	0.15945 [.01868]	0.0722 [.00565]	0.08725 [.01889]***	0.09415 [.00913]	0.08355 [.00846]	0.0106 [.0106]
1940-1965	0.0673 [.00753]	0.08315 [.01537]	0.0602 [.00846]	0.023 [.02295]	0.09532 [.02075]	0.06048 [.00766]	0.03584 [.02175]*	0.06311 [.00957]	0.07285 [.07285]	-0.00974 [.01544]
1966-1996	0.06178 [.00751]	0.06917 [.0126]	0.0584 [.00932]	0.01076 [.01567]	0.10564 [.02335]	0.0517 [.00725]	0.05394 [.02418]**	0.06577 [.01046]	0.05402 [.0103]	0.01175 [.01175]

Flows: Proportion of freshman legislators with previous relatives. Each legislator is only counted in congress of entry

	Totals	South	Non-South	Difference	Senate	House	Difference	Democrats	Republicans	Difference
Overall	0.08677 [.00263]	0.11805 [.00548]	0.07316 [.00291]	0.04489 [.00571]***	0.12998 [.0095]	0.08146 [.00271]	0.04852 [.00841]***	0.08055 [.00443]	0.06934 [.00424]	0.01121 [.00614]*
1788-1859	0.1098 [.00518]	0.13766 [.00969]	0.095 [.00601]	0.04266 [.01086]***	0.12834 [.01732]	0.10768 [.00542]	0.02066 [.01707]			
1860-1865	0.09384 [.01581]	0.04167 [.02915]	0.10239 [.01774]	-0.06072 [.04542]	0.21951 [.06545]	0.07667 [.01539]	0.14284 [.04808]***			
1866-1879	0.08588 [.00817]	0.10837 [.01544]	0.07403 [.00944]	0.03435 [.01717]**	0.2 [.03522]	0.0717 [.00798]	0.1283 [.02561]***	0.1173 [.01436]	0.05919 [.00932]	0.05811 [.01436]***
1880-1939	0.08025 [.00436]	0.12382 [.01013]	0.06396 [.0046]	0.05986 [.00974]***	0.13044 [.01657]	0.07427 [.00445]	0.05617 [.0141]***	0.07893 [.00605]	0.08251 [.00643]	-0.00358 [.00882]
1940-1965	0.06726 [.00713]	0.1051 [.01733]	0.05435 [.00748]	0.05075 [.01632]***	0.08523 [.02111]	0.06427 [.00713]	0.02096 [.0204]	0.07456 [.01005]	0.05667 [.0099]	0.01789 [.01431]
1966-1996	0.05627 [.00673]	0.06789 [.01287]	0.05063 [.00781]	0.01725 [.01435]	0.09244 [.02666]	0.05218 [.00685]	0.04025 [.02228]*	0.06187 [.00986]	0.0507 [.00918]	0.01117 [.0135]

Standard errors in brackets (clustered at legislator level in first table). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Party differences shown after 1866 when the modern two party system emerged.

Table 2: The effect of previous relatives on personal characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	House	House	Age of entry	Age of entry	Pre. public off.	Pre. public off.	College degree	College degree	Outsider	Outsider	Female	Female
Previous Relative	-0.07503 [0.01842]***	-0.0764 [0.01780]***	-0.50866 [0.35166]	-0.34821 [0.29524]	-0.05641 [0.01849]***	-0.05611 [0.01734]***	0.14033 [0.01805]***	0.12945 [0.01718]***	-0.03102 [0.02218]	-0.02571 [0.02038]	0.02492 [0.00795]***	0.02566 [0.00771]***
House				-4.98911 [0.32099]***		-0.00657 [0.01575]		-0.05303 [0.01784]***		-0.02909 [0.01412]**		0.00884 [0.00438]**
Age of entry		-0.00619 [0.00078]***				0.00559 [0.00058]***		-0.00762 [0.00047]***		0.00543 [0.00080]***		0.00071 [0.00019]***
Pre. public office		-0.00351 [0.00819]		2.40951 [0.26049]***				0.00453 [0.01136]		-0.0788 [0.01192]***		-0.00191 [0.00421]
College degree		-0.02606 [0.00757]***		-3.01501 [0.17918]***		0.00417 [0.01042]				-0.08569 [0.01593]***		0.00314 [0.00207]
Outsider		-0.01264 [0.00594]**		1.90007 [0.27805]***		-0.06401 [0.01059]***		-0.07575 [0.01417]***				0.0085 [0.00385]**
Female		0.05167 [0.02664]*		3.33733 [0.76922]***		-0.02092 [0.04658]		0.03731 [0.02341]		0.11441 [0.04944]**		
Constant	1.05567 [0.00278]***	1.25058 [0.02223]***	27.32269 [0.06347]***	34.84151 [0.40889]***	-0.03379 [0.00401]***	-0.16729 [0.02506]***	0.8865 [0.00311]***	1.16926 [0.02570]***	0.24887 [0.00431]***	0.20351 [0.02953]***	0.0088 [0.00094]***	-0.02484 [0.00846]***
Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	8765	8765	8765	8765	8765	8765	8765	8765	8765	8765	8765	8765
R-squared	0.1	0.13	0.15	0.22	0.04	0.05	0.16	0.19	0.19	0.22	0.09	0.09

Sample: Individuals who did not follow a relative's death and born after 1800.

Robust standard errors clustered at the state level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 3: The effect of previous relatives on tenure length

	(1) longterm	(2) longterm	(3) totaltenure	(4) totaltenure
Previous Relative	0.00995 [0.01974]	0.02084 [0.02001]	0.0706 [0.14075]	-0.04164 [0.13742]
House		0.2181 [0.02055]***		-1.03206 [0.14718]***
Age of entry		-0.00663 [0.00058]***		-0.08639 [0.00657]***
Pre. public office		0.05972 [0.01084]***		0.52768 [0.08598]***
College degree		0.03864 [0.01351]***		0.17706 [0.06927]**
Outsider		-0.01875 [0.01073]*		-0.15024 [0.07615]*
Female		-0.02124 [0.03688]		-0.35644 [0.22569]
Constant	0.92853 [0.00358]***	0.85211 [0.03266]***	2.53806 [0.02882]***	5.88934 [0.23957]***
Year	Y	Y	Y	Y
State	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	8765	8765	8765	8765
R-squared	0.1	0.14	0.17	0.22

Sample: Individuals who did not follow a relative's death and born after 1800.

Robust standard errors clustered at the state level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 4: Tenure length and Postrelatives

	Dependent Variable: Postrelatives				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Longterm	0.02144	0.01835	0.02667	0.02901	0.02892
	[0.00491]***	[0.00409]***	[0.00459]***	[0.00431]***	[0.00454]***
Constant	0.07125	0.06598	0.07174	0.36106	0.24623
	[0.00772]***	[0.00694]***	[0.00756]***	[0.05319]***	[0.08778]***
Prerelative					0.16892
					[0.02601]***
Female					-0.05281
					[0.02537]**
College degree					0.01241
					[0.00861]
Outsider					-0.00039
					[0.00818]
Previous public office					-0.00125
					[0.00772]
Military					0.01498
					[0.00688]**
Lawyer					-0.00048
					[0.00583]
Farmer					0.00974
					[0.01010]
Senate only					0.05005
					[0.01182]***
House to Senate					0.06844
					[0.02305]***
Senate to House					0.0877
					[0.06448]
Age of entry decade	N	N	N	N	Y
Death age decade	N	N	N	N	Y
Year Effects	N	N	N	Y	Y
State Effects	N	N	N	Y	Y
Died in office excluded	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Born before 1910	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Observations	11455	10379	8812	8812	8490
R-squared	0	0	0	0.09	0.13

Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910

Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;

*** significant at 1%

Table 5: Tenure length and Postrelatives

Dependent Variable: Postrelatives

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Total tenure	0.0041 [0.00084]***	0.00231 [0.00074]***	0.00439 [0.00101]***	0.00763 [0.00105]***	0.00561 [0.00095]***	0.0081 [.00198]***	0.0069 [.00191]***	0.01345 [.00231]***	0.0158 [.00232]***	0.01362 [0.00208]***
Total tenure^2						-0.00035 [-.00012]**	-0.00035 [.0012]***	-0.00068 [.00014]***	-0.00061 [.0013]***	-0.00058 [0.00011]***
Constant	0.06993 [0.00765]***	0.06958 [0.00732]***	0.07399 [0.00817]***	0.35418 [0.05201]***	0.24198 [0.08755]***	0.060612 [.00475]***	0.06061 [.00475]***	0.05742 [.00014]***	0.07422 [.02421]***	0.01392 [0.03074]
Prerelative					0.16876 [0.02575]***					0.16821 [0.02586]***
Female					-0.04936 [0.02473]*					-0.05073 [0.02301]*
College degree					0.01269 [0.00877]					0.00976 [0.00899]
Outsider					-0.00013 [0.00830]					-0.00056 [0.00791]
Previous public office					-0.00181 [0.00764]					-0.00284 [0.00737]
Military					0.01481 [0.00691]**					0.01322 [0.00702]
Lawyer					0.00004 [0.00590]					-0.00117 [0.00639]
Farmer					0.01047 [0.00999]					0.00884 [0.00981]
Senate only					0.03655 [0.01136]***					0.03831 [0.01320]***
House to Senate					0.04998 [0.02342]**					0.04788 [0.02262]*
Senate to House					0.08485 [0.06249]					0.00032 [0.06029]
Age of entry decade	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
Death age decade	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
Year Effects	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y
State Effects	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y
Died in office excluded	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Born before 1910	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Observations	11455	10379	8812	8812	8490	11455	10379	8812	8812	8490
R-squared	0	0	0	0.09	0.13	0	0	0	0.09	0.13

Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 6: Characteristics of close winners versus close losers in first re-election attempt

	2.5% window			5% window		
	Win	Lose	Difference	Win	Lose	Difference
Posterior relative in office	0.071 [.016]	0.028 [.01]	0.043 [.019]**	0.067 [.01]	0.031 [.008]	0.035 [.013]**
Year	1885.48 [2.04]	1887.00 [2.14]	-2.41 [2.96]	1885.01 [1.42]	1888.88 [1.65]	-3.87 [2.16]*
Age at entry	43.88 [.55]	44.68 [.6]	-0.8 [.81]	43.82 [.37]	44.72 [.44]	-0.90 [.57]
Age at death	71.18 [.75]	71.00 [.78]	0.18 [1.08]	71.51 [.48]	70.90 [.57]	0.61 [.74]
Female	0.007 [.005]	0.008 [.006]	-0.001 [.008]	0.005 [.003]	0.004 [.003]	0.001 [.004]
College degree	0.607 [.03]	0.633 [.03]	-0.027 [.043]	0.600 [.02]	0.606 [.022]	-0.006 [.03]
Outsider to state	0.449 [.03]	0.422 [.031]	0.027 [.044]	0.422 [.02]	0.436 [.023]	-0.014 [.031]
Previous public office	0.783 [.025]	0.869 [.021]	-0.086 [.033]**	0.803 [.016]	0.826 [.017]	-0.023 [.024]
Military	0.300 [.028]	0.295 [.029]	0.005 [.04]	0.316 [.019]	0.281 [.021]	0.035 [.028]
Lawyer	0.663 [.029]	0.596 [.031]	0.067 [.043]	0.611 [.02]	0.567 [.023]	0.044 [.031]
Farmer	0.042 [.012]	0.065 [.016]	-0.023 [.02]	0.062 [.01]	0.062 [.011]	0.000 [.015]
Business	0.272 [.028]	0.318 [.03]	-0.046 [.041]	0.292 [.019]	0.329 [.022]	-0.037 [.027]
Observations	251	267		477	588	

Sample: Individuals with no pre-relatives, who did not die in office, and who were born before 1910

Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 7: IV-RD First Stage

	Dependent Variable: Longterm					
	(1) 2.50%	(2) 2.50%	(3) 2.50%	(4) 5%	(5) 5%	(6) 5%
Win	0.85671 [0.08332]***	0.54542 [0.36102]	0.48855 [0.34155]	0.90842 [0.05078]***	0.56498 [0.16343]***	0.53381 [0.15742]***
Female*(1-Win)		-0.28485 [0.16346]*	-0.30062 [0.16208]*		-0.25325 [0.12338]**	-0.25486 [0.12287]**
College degree*(1-Win)		0.02928 [0.06800]	0.02143 [0.06610]		0.04147 [0.04448]	0.03663 [0.04367]
Outsider*(1-Win)		-0.0457 [0.06241]	-0.05481 [0.05523]		0.03192 [0.04400]	0.01537 [0.04465]
Previous public office*(1-Win)		0.0271 [0.09011]	0.00535 [0.09849]		-0.00656 [0.06727]	-0.02861 [0.06795]
Age at entry*(1-Win)		-0.00736 [0.00351]**	-0.00659 [0.00345]*		-0.00755 [0.00288]**	-0.00708 [0.00278]**
Age at death*(1-Win)		0.00001 [0.00247]	0.00051 [0.00237]		0.00033 [0.00134]	0.00054 [0.00122]
Military*(1-Win)		-0.02747 [0.06738]	-0.04003 [0.06389]		-0.00022 [0.04710]	-0.01112 [0.04447]
Farmer*(1-Win)		0.06941 [0.32986]	0.08244 [0.32392]		-0.07103 [0.13973]	-0.06207 [0.13991]
Lawyer*(1-Win)		-0.04137 [0.27508]	-0.03353 [0.26778]		-0.0623 [0.09118]	-0.05129 [0.09285]
Business*(1-Win)		0.01067 [0.29249]	-0.01011 [0.28394]		-0.05102 [0.10052]	-0.04707 [0.10104]
Prerelative*(1-Win)			-0.16462 [0.10055]			-0.13851 [0.08176]*
Constant	0.14329 [0.08332]*	0.45458 [0.36102]	0.51145 [0.34155]	0.09158 [0.05078]*	0.43502 [0.16343]**	0.46619 [0.15742]***
Region	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Decade	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Includes Members with Previous Relatives	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Observations	518	506	551	1065	1047	1127
R-squared	0.65	0.66	0.67	0.68	0.69	0.69
F statistic	171.72	332.5	69.61	2996.79	5397.38	6170.15

Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910

Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;

*** significant at 1%

Table 8: IV-RD Second Stage

	Dependent Variable: Postrelative					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	5%	5%	5%
Longterm	0.04866 [0.02120]**	0.05235 [0.02297]**	0.04645 [0.02484]*	0.04214 [0.01220]***	0.04024 [0.01252]***	0.03086 [0.01781]*
Female		0.02772 [0.04288]	-0.0514 [0.07404]		0.0181 [0.02115]	-0.03367 [0.04819]
College degree		0.0608 [0.01870]***	0.04973 [0.01763]***		0.03954 [0.01450]***	0.03352 [0.01390]**
Outsider		0.01845 [0.02417]	0.01741 [0.02396]		-0.00996 [0.01694]	-0.01255 [0.01533]
Previous public office		0.01996 [0.01986]	0.00238 [0.02126]		-0.01095 [0.01936]	-0.01046 [0.02055]
Age at entry		-0.00089 [0.00130]	-0.00074 [0.00122]		-0.00053 [0.00088]	-0.0006 [0.00090]
Age at death		0.0003 [0.00103]	0.00029 [0.00100]		0.00013 [0.00069]	-0.00015 [0.00077]
Military		0.00157 [0.02297]	-0.016 [0.02584]		0.01881 [0.01594]	0.00958 [0.01508]
Farmer		0.02417 [0.04588]	0.04953 [0.04894]		-0.01533 [0.03819]	-0.0154 [0.03894]
Lawyer		0.0687 [0.03875]*	0.0725 [0.03831]*		0.00206 [0.02962]	0.00124 [0.03051]
Business		0.10496 [0.04554]**	0.10257 [0.04499]**		0.01457 [0.02894]	0.00613 [0.03034]
Prerelative			0.13129 [0.07202]*			0.16203 [0.05041]***
Constant	0.0072 [0.04453]	-0.11938 [0.05730]**	-0.08128 [0.07374]	0.00228 [0.02385]	-0.00489 [0.05694]	0.04613 [0.06501]
Region	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Decade	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Includes Members with Previous Relatives	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Observations	518	506	551	1065	1047	1127

Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910

Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;

*** significant at 1%

Table 9: IV-RD First Stage

Dependent Variable: Longterm

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	2.5%		2.5%		2.5%		5%		5%		5%	
	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2
Win	0.91952	2.46301	2.09578	13.5333	2.14543	14.57344	1.55957	8.60396	0.88745	-8.7073	0.99698	-5.46495
	[0.37192]**	[3.29757]	[1.56576]	[16.14467]	[1.39629]	[15.28721]	[0.51354]***	[8.12704]	[1.39486]	[20.07919]	[1.39669]	[19.94512]
Female*(1-Win)			-0.85346	-2.47058	-0.18697	-0.26698			0.25157	18.29888	0.65911	17.69107
			[1.63394]	[18.17377]	[1.17766]	[14.40721]			[1.04577]	[15.19806]	[0.65042]	[9.97511]*
College degree*(1-Win)			-0.62977	-6.17468	-0.62398	-6.04478			-0.36366	-5.81533	-0.3064	-4.85652
			[0.37345]*	[3.97209]	[0.35523]*	[3.72070]			[0.22388]	[3.05807]*	[0.21969]	[2.93595]
Outsider*(1-Win)			0.19076	3.98504	0.11378	2.75672			0.45536	5.24759	0.38827	4.5581
			[0.47036]	[4.76448]	[0.42911]	[4.33027]			[0.36312]	[4.61614]	[0.32137]	[4.05981]
Previous public office*(1-Win)			-0.15446	-3.50687	-0.1689	-3.53089			-0.22921	-3.546	-0.33236	-4.56012
			[0.63461]	[9.48908]	[0.59487]	[8.66078]			[0.52572]	[7.27936]	[0.47787]	[6.60084]
Age at entry*(1-Win)			-0.01071	-0.23684	-0.0079	-0.21231			0.00047	0.10852	0.00072	0.09938
			[0.04168]	[0.49932]	[0.03870]	[0.46495]			[0.02773]	[0.42919]	[0.02567]	[0.40092]
Age at death*(1-Win)			0.00748	0.16224	0.0062	0.14196			-0.00734	-0.22054	-0.00529	-0.17494
			[0.01841]	[0.24962]	[0.01741]	[0.22882]			[0.01603]	[0.29628]	[0.01363]	[0.25666]
Military*(1-Win)			-0.38675	-8.44015	-0.30961	-7.00552			-0.36919	-4.93085	-0.40479	-5.44864
			[0.39069]	[5.23155]	[0.37282]	[4.82890]			[0.34357]	[4.35722]	[0.32930]	[4.16933]
Farmer*(1-Win)			2.31832	22.46085	2.11063	20.72462			-0.13025	-8.97806	-0.0139	-7.1373
			[1.76125]	[20.39928]	[1.70489]	[19.71728]			[0.93313]	[13.77190]	[0.90811]	[13.58363]
Lawyer*(1-Win)			1.94874	20.92147	2.05275	22.11254			0.28962	0.50258	0.32886	1.25326
			[1.37282]	[16.65534]	[1.35515]	[16.25085]			[0.80417]	[12.78674]	[0.82947]	[13.02907]
Business*(1-Win)			1.68579	19.4187	1.73311	20.06529			0.3067	2.09792	0.39328	3.33354
			[1.38873]	[15.50333]	[1.38288]	[15.43970]			[0.83700]	[11.89180]	[0.85748]	[12.09588]
Prerelative*(1-Win)					0.35082	3.75454					0.43939	6.88265
					[0.38440]	[4.41980]					[0.39856]	[4.49652]
Female			-0.8899	-17.1264	-1.53744	-18.8361			-1.62782	-32.48608	-1.97315	-31.0128
			[1.26464]	[13.67318]	[0.63574]**	[7.94717]**			[0.86762]*	[13.61543]**	[0.48382]***	[8.66274]***
College degree			0.72488	6.83562	0.70863	6.75522			0.4128	5.08273	0.37316	4.50663
			[0.20222]***	[1.81987]***	[0.20445]***	[1.88637]***			[0.17086]**	[2.44652]**	[0.16308]**	[2.25009]*
Outsider			0.04178	-0.91903	0.06283	-0.40667			-0.09626	-1.03868	-0.12783	-1.41325
			[0.30117]	[2.75092]	[0.27336]	[2.50683]			[0.19387]	[2.51324]	[0.17940]	[2.27444]

Table 9 Continued: IV-RD First Stage

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	2.5%		2.5%		2.5%		5%		5%		5%	
	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2
Previous public office			0.32412	1.85593	0.31081	2.13175			0.4166	5.59844	0.40282	5.50927
			[0.24994]	[3.17701]	[0.22773]	[2.88226]			[0.23680]*	[3.73079]	[0.21001]*	[3.31148]
Age at entry			-0.04134	-0.40763	-0.04045	-0.39362			-0.07056	-0.97713	-0.06659	-0.91794
			[0.02665]	[0.30756]	[0.02473]	[0.28638]			[0.01542]***	[0.29048]***	[0.01410]***	[0.26915]***
Age at death			0.02064	0.25298	0.02022	0.24051			0.03914	0.66051	0.03602	0.59596
			[0.00998]**	[0.11881]**	[0.00964]**	[0.11478]**			[0.01162]***	[0.25427]**	[0.01032]***	[0.22442]**
Military			0.18733	4.06673	0.11984	3.06974			0.32076	4.19063	0.33917	4.68407
			[0.24334]	[3.07953]	[0.23488]	[2.88691]			[0.24411]	[3.29040]	[0.23506]	[3.12650]
Farmer			-2.09107	-21.57529	-1.83526	-19.51768			-0.25056	3.26882	-0.28007	2.37507
			[1.63213]	[20.35181]	[1.62287]	[20.05031]			[0.75909]	[12.46443]	[0.72241]	[12.15183]
Lawyer			-1.91417	-19.80559	-1.9923	-20.76657			-0.52406	-2.6361	-0.52518	-3.08716
			[1.27856]	[16.81483]	[1.29756]	[16.75531]			[0.71841]	[12.29849]	[0.72058]	[12.26489]
Business			-1.64618	-18.55955	-1.70171	-19.05244			-0.63366	-6.31587	-0.63442	-6.52715
			[1.25950]	[16.06092]	[1.27524]	[16.04406]			[0.64879]	[10.81173]	[0.64749]	[10.78996]
Prerelative					-1.04683	-9.99006					-0.83141	-9.74565
					[0.25083]***	[2.55438]***					[0.24496]***	[3.53353]***
Constant	1.3957	4.20446	1.4961	4.59122	1.59236	5.02575	1.44662	7.31738	2.3512	16.20704	2.30761	15.10713
	[0.31205]***	[3.15680]	[1.05083]	[9.03070]	[1.00779]	[8.96907]	[0.37006]***	[5.53817]	[0.80260]***	[10.17198]	[0.77121]***	[9.75853]
Region	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Decade	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Includes Members with Previous Relatives	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	518	518	506	506	551	551	1065	1065	1047	1047	1127	1127
R-squared	0.23	0.13	0.31	0.23	0.3	0.22	0.18	0.07	0.25	0.15	0.25	0.14
F statistic	50.59	22.54	63.1	69.11	87.52	82.23	81.45	63.19	107.92	41.79	148.86	23.93

Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910

Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 10: IV-RD Second Stage

Dependent Variable: Prerelative

	(1) 2.5%	(2) 2.5%	(3) 2.5%	(4) 5%	(5) 5%	(6) 5%
Total tenure	0.04389 [0.02056]**	0.04008 [0.01670]**	0.04649 [0.01724]***	0.06265 [0.02024]***	0.03874 [0.01634]**	0.04362 [0.02629]
Total tenure^2	-0.00412 [0.00301]	-0.00317 [0.00183]*	-0.00457 [0.00199]**	-0.00677 [0.00281]**	-0.00363 [0.00207]*	-0.0049 [0.00346]
Female		0.02296 [0.04431]	-0.07036 [0.08466]		-0.00584 [0.03148]	-0.07419 [0.06235]
College degree		0.05733 [0.01884]***	0.04972 [0.01838]***		0.03995 [0.01574]**	0.03586 [0.01550]**
Outsider		0.01515 [0.02406]	0.01417 [0.02365]		-0.00893 [0.01731]	-0.0113 [0.01549]
Previous public office		0.01238 [0.01938]	-0.00395 [0.02151]		-0.0081 [0.01974]	-0.00387 [0.02074]
Age at entry		-0.00091 [0.00137]	-0.00115 [0.00135]		-0.00134 [0.00111]	-0.00214 [0.00137]
Age at death		0.0004 [0.00109]	0.00067 [0.00102]		0.00079 [0.00074]	0.00094 [0.00089]
Military		0.00023 [0.02132]	-0.01702 [0.02411]		0.02081 [0.01631]	0.01502 [0.01629]
Farmer		0.02856 [0.04984]	0.04378 [0.05355]		-0.00764 [0.03467]	-0.00691 [0.03568]
Lawyer		0.07741 [0.04232]*	0.07252 [0.04210]*		0.00728 [0.03106]	0.0049 [0.03544]
Business		0.11033 [0.04282]**	0.10067 [0.04473]**		0.01313 [0.02985]	0.00111 [0.03441]
Prerelative			0.12829 [0.07201]*			0.1552 [0.04828]***
Constant	-0.02254 [0.04935]	-0.14825 [0.06506]**	-0.11686 [0.08224]	-0.03573 [0.03402]	-0.04263 [0.05987]	0.00393 [0.07102]
Region	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Decade	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Includes Members with Previous Relatives	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
TE(2-1)	0.03153	0.03057	0.03278	0.04234	0.02785	0.02892
TE(2-1) p-value	0.0196	0.0166	0.0136	0.0014	0.0117	0.0844
Observations	518	506	551	1065	1047	1127

Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910

Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;

*** significant at 1%

Table 11: IV First Stage

	Dependent Variable: Longterm					
	(1) 25%	(2) 25%	(3) 25%	(4) 25%	(5) 40%	(6) 40%
Win	0.79903 [0.05702]***	0.61653 [0.12186]***	0.61233 [0.11532]***	0.61633 [0.11800]***	0.81931 [0.04735]***	0.63553 [0.11639]***
Female*(1-Win)		-0.02087 [0.15393]	-0.01643 [0.15376]	0.02805 [0.15530]		-0.02881 [0.15354]
College degree*(1-Win)		0.04484 [0.02479]*	0.04312 [0.02435]*	0.02182 [0.03032]		0.04749 [0.02213]**
Outsider*(1-Win)		0.0039 [0.02535]	-0.00692 [0.02501]	0.01159 [0.03176]		-0.00573 [0.02557]
Previous public office*(1-Win)		-0.00114 [0.03426]	-0.01717 [0.03270]	-0.02243 [0.03318]		0.0019 [0.03380]
Age at entry*(1-Win)		-0.007 [0.00188]***	-0.00619 [0.00184]***	-0.00652 [0.00184]***		-0.00673 [0.00178]***
Age at death*(1-Win)		0.00181 [0.00108]	0.00168 [0.00102]	0.00211 [0.00099]**		0.00187 [0.00113]
Military*(1-Win)		-0.01028 [0.02851]	-0.01155 [0.02789]	-0.02141 [0.02620]		-0.01219 [0.02569]
Farmer*(1-Win)		-0.02759 [0.07866]	-0.00965 [0.07747]	-0.04892 [0.08458]		-0.05809 [0.07530]
Lawyer*(1-Win)		-0.03565 [0.05404]	-0.03083 [0.05226]	-0.04182 [0.04743]		-0.05588 [0.05357]
Business*(1-Win)		-0.00991 [0.06924]	-0.0082 [0.06660]	-0.01791 [0.06536]		-0.01894 [0.07036]
Prerelative*(1-Win)			-0.06206 [0.04538]			
Constant	0.20097 [0.05702]***	0.38347 [0.12186]***	0.38767 [0.11532]***	0.38367 [0.11800]***	0.18069 [0.04735]***	0.36447 [0.11639]***
Region	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Decade	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Margin of votes quartic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Includes Members with Previous Relatives	N	N	Y	N	N	N
State	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Year	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Observations	3095	3034	3295	3034	3605	3537
R-squared	0.77	0.77	0.78	0.81	0.78	0.78
F statistic	2134.44	9427.11	17234.85	11678.95	2790	10522.46

Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910

Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;

*** significant at 1%

Table 12: IV-RD Second Stage

	Dependent Variable: Postrelative						
	(1) 25%	(2) 25%	(3) 25%	(4) 25%	(5) 25%	(6) 40%	(7) 40%
Longterm	0.06428 [0.02092]***	0.06244 [0.02144]***	0.05028 [0.02590]*	0.05425 [0.02378]**	0.04669 [0.01572]***	0.05154 [0.02179]**	0.04661 [0.02025]**
Female		0.05354 [0.06678]	0.0244 [0.06347]	0.02568 [0.06390]	0.04652 [0.06903]		0.04601 [0.05927]
College degree		0.01261 [0.00895]	0.01251 [0.01013]	0.01247 [0.01008]	0.00974 [0.00862]		0.01086 [0.00862]
Outsider		-0.00002 [0.00776]	-0.00051 [0.00823]	-0.00054 [0.00824]	0.00284 [0.00698]		0.00104 [0.00649]
Previous public office		0.00405 [0.00798]	0.00513 [0.00838]	0.00509 [0.00837]	-0.00139 [0.00868]		0.00002 [0.00826]
Age at entry		0.00035 [0.00044]	0.00017 [0.00048]	0.00016 [0.00049]	0.00035 [0.00046]		0.0001 [0.00038]
Age at death		-0.00007 [0.00039]	0.00001 [0.00042]	0.00002 [0.00042]	-0.00003 [0.00035]		-0.00026 [0.00037]
Military		0.00124 [0.00914]	-0.00874 [0.00942]	-0.00891 [0.00939]	-0.00129 [0.00864]		-0.00028 [0.00806]
Farmer		-0.01667 [0.02462]	-0.01936 [0.02303]	-0.01872 [0.02313]	-0.01809 [0.02549]		-0.01933 [0.02122]
Lawyer		0.00569 [0.01686]	0.00172 [0.01711]	0.0015 [0.01722]	0.00915 [0.01649]		0.00683 [0.01386]
Business		0.00656 [0.01498]	-0.00028 [0.01664]	-0.00025 [0.01671]	0.00964 [0.01390]		0.00809 [0.01266]
Prerelative			0.12522 [0.02491]***	0.1586 [0.04298]***			
Longterm*Prerelative				-0.04286 [0.05414]			
Constant	0.00378 [0.01795]	-0.02199 [0.03033]	-0.00047 [0.04052]	-0.00301 [0.04026]	-0.05288 [0.03321]	0.01557 [0.01973]	0.02078 [0.03417]
Region	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Decade	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Margin of votes quartic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Includes Members with Previous Relatives	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
State	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
Year	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
Observations	3095	3034	3295	3295	3034	3605	3537

Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910

Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;

*** significant at 1%

Table 13: IV-RD First Stage

	Dependent Variable: Total Tenure											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	25%	25%	25%	25%	25%	25%	25%	25%	40%	40%	40%	40%
	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2
Win	1.12002	3.33391	1.04425	-2.88729	1.19229	0.0549	0.51033	-8.20437	0.94211	-0.88898	0.4789	-10.64449
	[0.30023]***	[3.18625]	[1.06768]	[15.42783]	[1.00530]	[14.53174]	[1.27449]	[18.03092]	[0.32513]***	[4.58743]	[0.90433]	[12.12421]
Female*(1-Win)			0.92848	19.5052	1.40967	22.91289	-0.91441	-8.47021			0.66582	13.88848
			[0.75933]	[10.14804]*	[0.69656]**	[8.42555]***	[1.04060]	[14.02170]			[0.71404]	[9.28755]
College degree*(1-Win)			0.10332	0.21104	0.13719	1.03087	-0.55806	-7.90334			0.04939	-0.23922
			[0.13182]	[1.94227]	[0.12502]	[1.93594]	[0.18957]***	[2.68442]***			[0.10712]	[1.55552]
Outsider*(1-Win)			0.04393	1.19729	0.00174	0.71249	0.12279	1.66126			-0.09507	-0.75447
			[0.19837]	[2.99195]	[0.18422]	[2.80373]	[0.18463]	[2.39974]			[0.19408]	[2.73228]
Previous public office*(1-Win)			-0.35738	-5.45879	-0.4624	-6.42205	-0.46656	-6.46503			-0.32983	-4.77777
			[0.23893]	[3.26835]	[0.22754]**	[3.03956]**	[0.23406]*	[3.05024]**			[0.23424]	[3.07280]
Age at entry*(1-Win)			0.03657	0.79053	0.04194	0.85544	0.01781	0.56789			0.04507	0.91587
			[0.01281]***	[0.21829]***	[0.01220]***	[0.21590]***	[0.01266]	[0.21160]***			[0.01188]***	[0.20507]***
Age at death*(1-Win)			-0.03231	-0.68966	-0.03136	-0.66385	-0.04145	-0.81812			-0.0396	-0.77991
			[0.00865]***	[0.14965]***	[0.00828]***	[0.14680]***	[0.00912]***	[0.15976]***			[0.00789]***	[0.13937]***
Military*(1-Win)			-0.0896	-1.38218	-0.0914	-1.15266	-0.19128	-2.21984			-0.03411	-0.62992
			[0.18837]	[3.27875]	[0.18125]	[3.12115]	[0.21971]	[3.36035]			[0.17054]	[2.91888]
Farmer*(1-Win)			1.28372	17.01584	1.39736	17.68231	1.78375	24.15491			1.19345	16.76935
			[0.58780]**	[9.83604]*	[0.55086]**	[9.33838]*	[0.64861]***	[10.51682]**			[0.57410]**	[9.08138]*
Lawyer*(1-Win)			0.7956	11.4737	0.86948	11.9149	1.64754	22.87222			0.60765	9.54785
			[0.47761]	[9.00211]	[0.46468]*	[8.73447]	[0.53926]***	[9.81558]**			[0.48160]	[8.23452]
Business*(1-Win)			0.84773	11.12923	0.95854	12.43353	1.47012	19.28411			0.70488	9.88851
			[0.48871]*	[9.13164]	[0.47324]**	[8.83351]	[0.54948]**	[9.76624]*			[0.49519]	[8.24582]
Prerelative*(1-Win)					-0.09516	-0.77686						
					[0.30175]	[4.52873]						
Female			-1.35529	-24.40739	-1.80573	-27.51341	-0.01088	-7.05415			-1.1617	-19.50442
			[0.69797]*	[9.97567]**	[0.59275]***	[8.25808]***	[0.90207]	[11.28379]			[0.67219]*	[9.21990]**
College degree			0.05566	0.86696	0.03237	0.18584	0.6019	7.78092			0.14139	1.61836
			[0.11182]	[1.86618]	[0.10772]	[1.88530]	[0.13589]***	[2.29553]***			[0.09850]	[1.57842]
Outsider			-0.01284	-0.92412	-0.01586	-0.84388	-0.1612	-2.48309			0.11924	1.12285
			[0.12755]	[2.44334]	[0.12365]	[2.31839]	[0.12134]	[1.97521]			[0.12057]	[2.16540]

Table 13 Continued: IV-RD First Stage

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	25%		25%		25%		25%		40%		40%	
	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2	Total tenure	Total tenure^2
Previous public office			0.46234	6.82349	0.4998	7.30712	0.40571	5.84932			0.42784	6.04679
			[0.11253]***	[1.50055]***	[0.10854]***	[1.43852]***	[0.14264]***	[1.78927]***			[0.11459]***	[1.63251]***
Age at entry			-0.0825	-1.33253	-0.08388	-1.35478	-0.0628	-1.09115			-0.08828	-1.42257
			[0.00805]***	[0.16998]***	[0.00829]***	[0.17506]***	[0.00798]***	[0.16226]***			[0.00753]***	[0.15876]***
Age at death			0.05473	0.97525	0.05229	0.93218	0.0665	1.12853			0.06036	1.04288
			[0.00793]***	[0.15184]***	[0.00785]***	[0.15047]***	[0.00825]***	[0.16129]***			[0.00701]***	[0.13977]***
Military			0.07414	1.61234	0.06902	1.30025	0.16762	2.88342			0.04199	1.144
			[0.11777]	[2.52643]	[0.11365]	[2.35266]	[0.13830]	[2.30482]			[0.09730]	[2.13886]
Farmer			-1.18179	-16.2942	-1.23419	-16.57487	-1.72143	-23.70934			-1.21722	-16.93752
			[0.46817]**	[8.94043]*	[0.44454]***	[8.54781]*	[0.48422]***	[9.12760]**			[0.42558]***	[8.00515]**
Lawyer			-0.75476	-10.48146	-0.82566	-10.96774	-1.56607	-21.25185			-0.68838	-9.65186
			[0.41298]*	[8.39051]	[0.40086]**	[8.11800]	[0.45133]***	[8.83872]**			[0.36447]*	[7.35326]
Business			-0.68735	-9.06667	-0.77162	-10.08823	-1.27576	-16.94754			-0.66748	-9.07383
			[0.41163]	[8.38764]	[0.39750]*	[8.09490]	[0.43788]***	[8.84076]*			[0.36932]*	[7.21795]
Prerelative					-0.11535	-1.15917						
					[0.21605]	[3.99911]						
Constant	1.5023	5.1262	1.76935	6.85696	1.72701	6.1971	1.73492	4.9365	1.51652	6.4568	1.87354	8.99958
	[0.23154]***	[2.35501]**	[0.45416]***	[4.84678]	[0.40923]***	[4.43035]	[0.65027]**	[7.69299]	[0.23795]***	[2.91926]**	[0.46880]***	[4.80306]*
Region	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Decade	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Margin of Votes quartic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Includes Members with Previous Relatives	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
State	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Year	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Observations	3095	3095	3034	3034	3295	3295	3034	3034	3605	3605	3537	3537
R-squared	0.24	0.11	0.3	0.17	0.3	0.17	0.27	0.15	0.26	0.12	0.33	0.19
F statistic	26.66	13.57	37.6	24.99	49.04	25.3	250000	11571.8	37.51	34.66	54.55	42.93

Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910

Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 14: IV-RD Second Stage

	Dependent Variable: Postrelative						
	(1) 25%	(2) 25%	(3) 25%	(4) 25%	(5) 25%	(6) 40%	(7) 40%
Total tenure	0.04981 [0.01673]***	0.0334 [0.01372]**	0.02905 [0.01688]*	0.0303 [0.01560]*	0.02428 [0.01166]**	0.03942 [0.01692]**	0.02231 [0.01157]*
Total tenure^2	-0.00414 [0.00149]***	-0.00224 [0.00111]**	-0.00217 [0.00143]	-0.00229 [0.00134]*	-0.00182 [0.00092]*	-0.00376 [0.00147]**	-0.00194 [0.00087]**
Female		0.04914 [0.06253]	0.01999 [0.05911]	0.02061 [0.05887]	0.03946 [0.06644]		0.03743 [0.05502]
College degree		0.01258 [0.00914]	0.01203 [0.01049]	0.01211 [0.01051]	0.0096 [0.00881]		0.01104 [0.00868]
Outsider		-0.00126 [0.00812]	-0.00165 [0.00832]	-0.00191 [0.00813]	0.00312 [0.00729]		0.00053 [0.00687]
Previous public office		0.00368 [0.00779]	0.00603 [0.00870]	0.00584 [0.00897]	-0.0015 [0.00874]		0.00145 [0.00799]
Age at entry		0.00018 [0.00068]	-0.00022 [0.00069]	-0.00028 [0.00069]	0.00007 [0.00058]		-0.00055 [0.00067]
Age at death		0.00017 [0.00049]	0.00038 [0.00049]	0.00043 [0.00050]	0.00026 [0.00043]		0.00026 [0.00050]
Military		0.0023 [0.00874]	-0.00786 [0.00901]	-0.00803 [0.00903]	-0.00089 [0.00858]		0.00095 [0.00769]
Farmer		-0.01674 [0.02569]	-0.0209 [0.02452]	-0.02073 [0.02481]	-0.01979 [0.02684]		-0.02404 [0.02229]
Lawyer		0.00624 [0.01785]	0.0015 [0.01824]	0.00102 [0.01842]	0.00868 [0.01699]		0.00457 [0.01573]
Business		0.00755 [0.01568]	-0.00033 [0.01726]	0.00001 [0.01778]	0.00802 [0.01421]		0.00627 [0.01425]
Prerelative			0.12615 [0.02468]***	0.11709 [0.03007]***			
Prerelative*Total tenure				0.05075 [0.07630]			
Prerelative*Total tenure^2				-0.00979 [0.02365]			
Constant	-0.03229 [0.02825]	-0.04693 [0.03545]	-0.02364 [0.04562]	-0.02628 [0.04439]	-0.06578 [0.03958]	-0.01285 [0.03282]	0.00786 [0.03823]
Region	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Decade	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Margin of votes quartic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Includes Members with Previous Relatives	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
State	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Year	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
TE(2-1)	0.03739	0.02668	0.02254	0.02343	0.01882	0.02814	0.01649
TE(2-1) p-value	0.0046	0.0173	0.0881	0.0557	0.0484	0.0331	0.086
Observations	3095	3034	3295	3295	3034	3605	3537

Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910

Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;

*** significant at 1%

Table 15: IV First Stage for External Shocks Instrumental Variables Approach

	Dependent Variable: Longterm				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Re-Election Instrument	0.37946 [.02054]***	0.3351 [.02198]***	0.33607 [.023]***	0.3315 [.02236]***	0.33372 [.02326]***
Constant	0.54733 [.11524]***	0.49868 [.22981]***	0.49785 [.22912]**	0.50138 [.23029]**	0.49971 [.22964]**
State/Quarter Interaction	Y	N	N	N	N
State/Decade Interaction	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Includes Members with Previous Relatives	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Relatives Only Enter 10 Years or More Later	N	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	7359	7359	6734	7182	6639
F-Stat	179	90	98	88	95
R-Squared	0.127	0.161	0.173	0.16	0.172

Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910

Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;

*** significant at 1%

Table 16: IV Second Stage for External Shocks Instrumental Variables Approach

	Dependent Variable: Postrelative				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Longterm	0.05863 [.02618]**	0.07286 [.03319]**	0.03923 [.02874]	0.05779 [.02734]**	0.04374 [.02393]*
Constant	0.26487 [.02128]***	0.19535 [.02489]***	0.22058 [.02156]***	0.20666 [.02051]***	0.21272 [.01795]***
State/Quarter Interaction	Y	N	N	N	N
State/Decade Interaction	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Includes Members with Previous Relatives	Y	Y	N	Y	N
Relatives Only Enter 10 Years or More Later	N	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	7359	7359	6734	7182	6639
R-Squared	0.091	0.121	0.242	0.111	0.112

Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910

Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;

*** significant at 1%

Table 17: The Impact of Political Competition

	Dependent Variable: Prerelative			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Political Competition	0.1851 [.074]**	.1986 [.0747]***		
Political Competition ^ 2	.535 [.1639]***	.5464 [.1667]***		
20th-40th Percentile of Political Competition			-.0181 [.0174]	-.0179 [.0186]
40th-60th Percentile of Political Competition			-.0378 [.016]**	-.0383 [.017]**
60th-80th Percentile of Political Competition			-.0351 [.0167]**	-.0347 [.0176]*
80th-100th Percentile of Political Competition			-.0303 [.0174]*	-.0286 [.019]
Year Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Excluding first 30 years of statehood	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	6417	6139	6374	6096

Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910

Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;

*** significant at 1%

Table A1: Sample of the major types of family relationships

Relationship	Count	Percent	Cumulative
Parent	267	16.29	16.29
Child	398	24.28	40.57
Grandparent	45	2.75	43.32
Grandchild	81	4.94	48.26
Uncle / Aunt	101	6.16	54.42
Nephew / Nice	149	9.09	63.51
Brother / Sister	293	17.88	81.39
Cousin	148	9.03	90.42
Husband	34	2.07	92.5
Wife or Widow	32	1.95	94.45
Other	90	5.55	100
Total	1,639	100	

Table A2: Summary statistics—all data

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Previous relative in office	11455	0.087	0.28	0	1
Posterior relative in office	11455	0.085	0.28	0	1
Long term	11455	0.651	0.48	0	1
Total tenure	11455	3.73	3.54	1	29
Age at death	10205	69.98	12.78	27	103
Age at entry	11455	43.87	9.25	21	86
Previous public office	11455	0.806	0.40	0	1
College degree	11455	0.651	0.48	0	1
Female	11455	0.015	0.12	0	1
Outsider to state	11455	0.392	0.49	0	1
House (vs. Senate)	11455	0.891	0.31	0	1
Military	11455	0.356	0.48	0	1
Lawyer	10950	0.594	0.49	0	1
Farmer	10950	0.072	0.26	0	1

Table A3: Notable Families in Congress

Family Name	Year Enter	Year Leave	Number of Congresses	Number of Members	Notable Members
Adams	1803	1862	16	3	John Quincy Adams
Aldrich	1876	Present	32	5	Nelson Wilmarth Aldrich
Breckinridge	1789	1978	72	17	Henry Clay
Bryan	1895	1976	15	3	William Jennings Bryan
Burr	1791	1806	4	2	Aaron Burr
Bush	1951	1970	8	2	George H.W. Bush
Du Pont	1905	1928	9	2	Henry Algernon Du Pont
Frelinghuysen	1793	Present	25	6	
Gore	1939	1992	24	2	Albert Arnold Gore Jr.
Harrison	1793	1968	24	8	William Henry Harrison
Hearst	1885	1906	5	2	William Randolph Hearst
Hiester	1789	1880	38	12	
Houston	1823	1942	12	3	Samuel Houston
Kennedy	1895	Present	37	6	John Fitzgerald Kennedy
Lodge	1887	1952	37	4	Henry Cabot Lodge
Monroe	1789	1840	4	2	James Monroe
Morris	1789	1802	4	2	Robert Morris
Pelosi	1939	Present	10	2	Nancy Pelosi
Roosevelt	1949	1966	9	2	Franklin Delano Roosevelt Jr.

Note: Sometimes the family names are not consistent within families. For example Henry Clay came from a family where the predominant last name was Breckinridge. For ease of exposition we chose the modal last name.

Table A4: IV-RD Estimates for Longterm on Each Observable at the Region Decade Level

	Window size - margin of votes								
	(1) 2.5%	(2) 5%	(3) 10%	(4) 25%	(5) 40%	(6) 55%	(7) 70%	(8) 85%	(9) 98%
Postrelative	0.07995 [0.06499]	0.05133 [0.04153]	0.04352 [0.02601]	0.06279 [0.02182]***	0.0457 [0.02035]**	0.0427 [0.01547]***	0.03628 [0.01535]**	0.03685 [0.01483]**	0.03021 [0.01174]**
Lawyer	0.00245 [0.02687]	0.01926 [0.03013]	0.02399 [0.01878]	0.01315 [0.01514]	0.01886 [0.01543]	0.01518 [0.01445]	0.01439 [0.01404]	0.0171 [0.01328]	0.0183 [0.01241]
Previous public office	-0.13921 [0.08105]*	-0.16214 [0.05324]***	-0.15942 [0.06247]**	-0.0751 [0.03887]*	-0.06215 [0.02976]**	-0.03797 [0.02871]	-0.02758 [0.02522]	-0.03022 [0.02434]	-0.02964 [0.02659]
Female	0.00439 [0.01732]	0.01287 [0.01422]	0.00077 [0.01084]	0.0026 [0.00745]	0.00599 [0.00647]	0.00316 [0.00520]	0.00205 [0.00466]	0.0014 [0.00446]	-0.00005 [0.00396]
Outsider	0.07295 [0.12040]	0.10164 [0.08714]	0.01957 [0.08995]	-0.05671 [0.05570]	-0.0451 [0.05083]	-0.07267 [0.04571]	-0.05589 [0.04135]	-0.07351 [0.04027]*	-0.0638 [0.03769]*
Age at entry	-0.20201 [1.71396]	0.60739 [1.02209]	0.16625 [0.76202]	0.47087 [0.56419]	0.21818 [0.57378]	0.05975 [0.54186]	0.04388 [0.56528]	-0.04264 [0.47285]	-0.29942 [0.45359]
College graduate	-0.2218 [0.10237]**	-0.07546 [0.08851]	-0.11612 [0.07317]	-0.01058 [0.04784]	0.01645 [0.03805]	0.04328 [0.03221]	0.04063 [0.03113]	0.01915 [0.03181]	0.01328 [0.02785]
Military	-0.03016 [0.13702]	-0.00517 [0.08989]	0.00164 [0.06760]	0.03332 [0.03698]	0.0474 [0.03527]	0.03963 [0.03697]	0.03769 [0.03586]	0.02438 [0.03454]	0.03712 [0.03381]
Farmer	-0.00246 [0.03015]	-0.01365 [0.02571]	-0.00221 [0.02089]	-0.00318 [0.01581]	0.00053 [0.01481]	0.00197 [0.01182]	-0.00248 [0.01163]	0.00244 [0.01089]	0.0059 [0.01075]
Business	-0.03016 [0.13702]	-0.00517 [0.08989]	0.00164 [0.06760]	0.03332 [0.03698]	0.0474 [0.03527]	0.03963 [0.03697]	0.03769 [0.03586]	0.02438 [0.03454]	0.03712 [0.03381]
Region	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Decade	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Margin of votes quartic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	505	1048	1807	3042	3545	3774	3885	3928	4041

Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910

Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A5: IV-RD Estimates for Longterm on Each Observable at the State Year Level


	Window size - margin of votes								
	(1) 2.50%	(2) 5%	(3) 10%	(4) 25%	(5) 40%	(6) 55%	(7) 70%	(8) 85%	(9) 98%
Postrelative	0.05895 [0.05952]	0.02305 [0.03960]	0.02925 [0.02431]	0.04684 [0.01579]***	0.02796 [0.01614]*	0.02747 [0.01457]*	0.02139 [0.01481]	0.02416 [0.01389]*	0.01735 [0.01021]*
Lawyer	0.0021 [0.01302]	0.00888 [0.01971]	0.01533 [0.01898]	0.01709 [0.01613]	0.0136 [0.01784]	0.01341 [0.01506]	0.0137 [0.01352]	0.01649 [0.01269]	0.01676 [0.01229]
Previous public office	-0.13623 [0.09432]	-0.07336 [0.05633]	-0.10989 [0.05188]**	-0.03618 [0.03318]	-0.03126 [0.02812]	-0.02261 [0.02865]	-0.00967 [0.02636]	-0.01507 [0.02691]	-0.01642 [0.02720]
Female	-0.00119 [0.01529]	0.00843 [0.01236]	-0.00038 [0.01095]	0.00084 [0.00863]	0.00409 [0.00690]	0.00316 [0.00526]	0.00227 [0.00474]	0.00176 [0.00443]	0.00076 [0.00400]
Outsider	0.03347 [0.08564]	0.1192 [0.07269]	0.05337 [0.06739]	-0.03462 [0.05070]	-0.03067 [0.04428]	-0.05222 [0.04054]	-0.04546 [0.03716]	-0.0574 [0.03658]	-0.04878 [0.03323]
Age at entry	-3.30137 [2.62545]	-0.44272 [1.34836]	-2.14305 [0.78641]***	-0.46352 [0.71851]	-0.29597 [0.64041]	-0.22054 [0.57228]	-0.15511 [0.57079]	-0.42819 [0.51280]	-0.57877 [0.45808]
College graduate	-0.0191 [0.06165]	-0.01422 [0.07095]	-0.10707 [0.06387]	0.00469 [0.04383]	0.02973 [0.03551]	0.04302 [0.02980]	0.04186 [0.03022]	0.02328 [0.03260]	0.0182 [0.02945]
Military	-0.05183 [0.12290]	0.02975 [0.07440]	0.01847 [0.06208]	0.02917 [0.03900]	0.04457 [0.03254]	0.04296 [0.03376]	0.04343 [0.03043]	0.03399 [0.02919]	0.04612 [0.02908]
Farmer	0.00704 [0.02071]	-0.02115 [0.01705]	-0.00584 [0.02195]	0.00457 [0.01683]	-0.00056 [0.01610]	0.00233 [0.01243]	-0.00244 [0.01158]	0.00304 [0.01091]	0.00525 [0.01129]
Business	-0.01106 [0.01188]	-0.01179 [0.01923]	0.00338 [0.01852]	0.0069 [0.01707]	0.00646 [0.01748]	0.00443 [0.01396]	0.0067 [0.01235]	0.00879 [0.01122]	0.00907 [0.01056]
State	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Margin of votes quartic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	505	1048	1807	3042	3545	3774	3885	3928	4041

Sample: Individuals who did not die in office and who were born before 1910


Standard errors clustered at state level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Figure 1: Trends in Congressmen with Relatives

A: Proportion of Legislators with Relatives



B: Proportion of Legislators with Previous Relatives



C: Proportion of Legislators with Posterior Relatives






Figure 2: Trends in Congressmen with Previous Relatives

A: Proportion of Legislators with Previous Relatives by Region



B: Proportion of Legislators with Previous Relatives by Chamber



C: Proportion of Legislators with Previous Relatives by Party






Figure 3: Impact of Total Tenure on the Probability a Legislator has a Posterior Relative

A: Unconditional Data

B: Predicted Values



Note: Figure 3B gives the predicted values from specification 10 in Table 5. Values of 10 or greater are replaced with ≥ 10 . This is done given the small number of observations greater than 10.

Figure 4: The Discontinuous Impact of Victory on Having Posterior Relatives






Figure 5: The Impact of the Vote Margin in First Reelection on Long Term and Total Tenure

A: Long Term



B: Total Tenure



Note: Quartic polynomial interacted with Margin Vote>0 used for interpolation.

Figure 6: Impact of Political Competition on Predicted Proportion of Individuals with Previous Relatives in Congress

