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Preference Intensities in Repeated Collective Decision-Making

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Preference Intensities in Repeated Collective Decision-Making*

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Abstract

We study decision rules for committees that repeatedly take a binary decision. Committee members are privately informed about their payoffs and monetary transfers are not feasible. In static environments, the only strategy-proof mechanisms are voting rules which are criticized for being inefficient as they do not condition on preference intensities. The dynamic structure of repeated decision-making allows for richer decision rules that overcome this inefficiency by making use of information on preference intensities. Nonetheless, we show that often simple voting is optimal for two-person committees. This holds for many prior type distributions and irrespective of the agents’ patience.

JEL classification: D72; D82; C61

Keywords: Dynamic mechanism design; Voting; Collective decision making

1 Introduction

Simple voting rules are known to be inefficient when a majority with weak preferences outvotes a minority with strong preferences. For instance, consider a group of three owners of a firm who need to decide whether to expand into a new business area. While one of the owners has a strong desire to take advantage of the opportunity, the other two owners do not have a strong preference but slightly prefer the status quo and decide to vote against the project. The project is not implemented although it might be beneficial for the firm.

Money could be used as a tool to elicit preference intensities and thereby implement the efficient allocation, but in many situations there are moral or other considerations that prevent the use of monetary means. Instead, this paper examines the possibilities of using the dynamic structure of environments where group decisions have to be made repeatedly in order to provide incentives for truthful preference revelation. In fact, repeated decision problems are ubiquitous in everyday life, ranging from examples in parliament to hiring committees. In these environments, it is sensible not to assume that agents will

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go myopically from period to period and vote sincerely. As Buchanan and Tullock (1962) emphasize, “any rule must be analyzed in terms of the results it will produce, not on a single issue, but on the whole set of issues.” Consequently, it is not only reasonable to look at equilibrium behavior in a specific decision rule, but to search for rules that maximize a given objective like, for example, the welfare of the agents.

Consider the following example, which illustrates the possibility of increasing sensitivity to preferences intensities in repeated decision making: Assume that the decision rule prescribes to accept if at least one of two agents is in favor of the project, unless the other agent uses one of his limited possibilities to exercise a veto. In this situation, agents are faced with a trade-off between the current and future periods. If they exercise a veto now, the decision rule decides in their favor, but at the cost of less possibilities to use a veto in the future, which reduces the agent’s continuation value. Intuitively, gents will use their veto right only if their preference against the proposed project exceeds some threshold. This has the effect that more refined information about the agents’ preferences is elicited and possibly a more efficient allocation can be implemented.

With these ideas in mind, the question is why we see so many decision rules that only use simple majority voting in every period, and, more generally, which decision rule is the best in terms of providing the highest welfare to the agents. In this paper, we tackle this question and show that surprisingly, voting rules are optimal among many reasonable decision rules with regard to the latter question. This provides a hint to the answer for the former question on why voting is used so universally.

More specifically, we look at a model with two agents who are repeatedly presented with a proposal that they need to either accept or reject. If the proposal is accepted, each agent derives positive or negative utility from it, which is private information and distributed according to some distribution function. A mechanism is simply a mapping of past actions and decisions, and actions in the current period, into a probability of accepting the current proposal. This allows for the modeling of many conceivable decision rules. We require that decision rules be incentive compatible, in the sense that in the direct revelation mechanism reporting preferences truthfully is a periodic ex-post equilibrium. This means that in any period, given any history, it is a dominant strategy to report the preference truthfully. This requirement renders incentives robust to uncontrolled changes in the information structure as well as deviations of the other player.

We provide a characterization of incentive compatible decision rules in terms of the allocation in a given period and the continuation values a rule promises. Viewing the continuation values as a substitute for money then enables us to treat any given decision rule as a static mechanism which can then be improved upon while preserving incentives. The new continuations of the improved static mechanism can then be implemented by specifying a new dynamic decision rule. As a result, we can show that if the preference distributions satisfy an increasing hazard rate condition, then voting rules are optimal within two classes of mechanisms. First, they are optimal among decision rules that satisfy unanimity, i.e. rules that never prescribe a decision that contradicts the decision that both agents would unanimously agree on. This is a reasonable robustness requirement since one could expect the agents not adhering to the decision rule if they unanimously agree to do something else. Second, if the type distributions are neutral across alternatives, i.e. the density is symmetric around zero, then voting rules are also optimal among all deterministic decision rules.
Therefore, if the type distributions are neutral across alternatives, we get the summarizing result that any decision rule yielding higher welfare than every voting rule has both the weaknesses of not satisfying unanimity and not being deterministic. This provides a strong rationale for the use of voting rules in the setting we consider and also provides hints on why rules other than voting are not considered in settings with more agents either.

Relation to the Literature

Our paper builds upon literature studying decision rules for dynamic settings. (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, page 125) note that

much of the traditional discussion about the operation of voting rules seems to have been based on the implicit assumption that the positive and negative preferences of voters for and against alternatives of collective choice are of approximately equal intensities. Only on an assumption such as this can the failure to introduce a more careful analysis of vote-trading through logrolling be explained.

Buchanan and Tullock (1962) proceed to analyze vote trading. They argue that agents can benefit if they trade their vote on a decision for which they have a weak preference intensity, and in turn get a vote for a future decision. However, it has early been noted that a trade in votes, while being beneficial for the agents involved, might actually reduce aggregate welfare of the whole committee, a fact sometimes called “the paradox of vote trading” (Riker and Brams 1973). A formal analysis of vote trading has been missing until recently, when Casella, Llorente-Saguer and Palfrey (2012) examined in a competitive equilibrium spirit a model of vote trading. They show that vote trading can actually increase welfare in small committees, but is certain to reduce welfare for committees that are large enough.

Instead of relying on agents playing an equilibrium with non-sincere voting so that they can express there preference intensities, one can design specific decision rules that explicitly take intensities into account. Casella (2005) is the first to take this approach in a dynamic setting, in which agents repeatedly decide on a binary choice. He proposes the concept of storable votes: in each period, each agent receives an additional vote and can use some of his votes for the current decision or, alternatively, he can store his additional vote for future usage. By shifting their votes inter-temporally, agents can concentrate their votes on decisions for which they have a strong preference intensity. Casella (2005) shows that this procedure increases welfare of the committee if there are two members and conjectures that this holds true for larger committees in many circumstances.\footnote{Hortala-Vallve (2012) analyzes a similar proposal for a static setting (meaning that agents are completely informed about their preferences in all decision problems when making the first decision), in which agents face a number of binary decisions.}

In contrast to this pragmatic approach that aims at finding superior decision rules for practical applications, one can systematically look for the “best” decision rule. In a seminal paper, Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) take a mechanism design approach to find decision rules for repeated collective decision making. For a static setting, they show that, by linking a large number of independent copies of a decision problem, one
can approximate the efficient outcome even in the absence of money. This result extends
to dynamic settings, where in each period one decision is taken, as long as individuals
are arbitrarily patient. This surprising result hinges critically on a number of strong
assumptions: each decision problem has to be an identical copy, the designer is required
to have the correct prior belief, agents need to be arbitrarily patient and their beliefs
about other agents have to be identical to the common prior. In an attempt to find more
robust decision rules, Hortala-Vallve (2010) characterizes the set of decision rules that are
dominant-strategy implementable in a static problem. Given that strategy-proofness is
a severe requirement in a multi-dimensional setting, it is not too surprising that voting
rules are the only decision rules that satisfy this restriction.

In contrast to the work by Hortala-Vallve (2010), we use a weaker equilibrium concept,
so that on the one hand, the set of implementable decision rules is very rich, but on the
other hand our results are robust and the optimal mechanism is bounded away from
attaining the first-best.

The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we present our model in detail. The
results are presented in Section 3 and discussed in Section 4. Some proofs are omitted
from the main text and relegated to the appendix.

2 Model

Time in our model is discrete and indexed by \( t = 0, 1, \ldots \in T = \mathbb{N} \). The type of an agent
\( i \) in a given period \( t \) is denoted by \( \theta_{it} \) and drawn from the type space \( \Theta_i \) according to
the distribution function \( F \). Type spaces and distribution functions are the same for each
period and each agent, and types are drawn independently across time and agents. We
denote by \( \tilde{\theta}_{it} \) the random variable corresponding to the type of agent \( i \), and by \( \theta_t \) a type
profile which is an element of the product type space \( \Theta \).

In each period, a decision \( x_t \in \{0, 1\} \) has to be implemented. We denote the sequence
of decisions up to period \( t \) by \( x^t \), and similarly for a sequence of types \( \theta^t \). Accordingly,
for an infinite sequence we write \( x^T \).

Mechanisms

In this model a dynamic version of the revelation principle holds (Myerson (1986), for
similar arguments see Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2008)), hence we can focus on truthfully
implementable direct revelation mechanisms.

Definition 1. A mechanism \( \chi \) is a sequence of decision rules \( \chi_t \) that map past decisions
and type profiles into a distribution over decisions in the current period:

\[
\chi_t : \Theta^t \times \{0, 1\}^{t-1} \rightarrow [0, 1]
\]

Preferences

The agents have von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions that are linear and there are
no monetary payments. The utility of an agent \( i \) with type \( \theta_{it} \) in period \( t \) if the decision
in that period is \( x_t \) is therefore \( v_{it}(\theta_{it}, x_t) = \theta_{it}x_t \). The agents discount the future with
the common discount factor $\delta$. Consequently, the utility of an agent $i$ with type sequence $\theta_i$ for the decision sequence $x$ is

$$V_i(\theta_i^T, x^T) = \sum_{t \in T} \delta^t \theta_{it} x_t.$$  

**Equilibrium Concept and Incentive Compatibility**

In every period $t$, agent $i$ learns about his preference type $\theta_{it}$ which is private information and only visible to that agent. After agents learn their preferences, each agent reports his type $r_{it} \in \Theta_i$. The public history $h^t = (x^{t-1}, r^{t-1})$ in period $t$ consists of past decisions and past reports.

Given a mechanism $\chi$, we can write down the value function for an agent $i$:

$$W_i(h^t, \theta_t) = \sup_{r_{it} \in \Theta_i} \theta_{it} \chi_i(h^t, r_{it}, \theta_{-it}) + \delta \mathbb{E}_{\Theta_{i+1}} W_i(h^{t+1}, \hat{\theta}_{t+1})$$  

(1)

Here, $h^{t+1}$ is the history in the next period, consisting of $\chi_i(h^t, r_{it}, \theta_{-it})$ and $(r_{it}, \theta_{-it})$ appended to $h^t$. The valuation function specifies, given any history of decisions $x^{t-1}$ and reports $r^{t-1}$, and the current type profile $\theta_t$, the highest utility the agent can possibly obtain for some report $r_{it}$, assuming that she reports optimally in the future and the other agents report truthfully. Given a specific history $h^t$, the mechanism $\chi$ induces an allocation rule and continuation functions which we will denote

$$x_t(\theta_t) = \chi_t(h^t, \theta_t) \quad \text{and} \quad w_t(\theta_t) = \delta \mathbb{E}_{\Theta_{t+1}} W_i(h^{t+1}, \hat{\theta}_{t+1}),$$

where $h^{t+1}$ is understood as above. If the current period is clear from the context, we will also drop the subscript $t$. The pair $(x_t, w_t)$ is called the *stage mechanism after history $h_t$* and we say that $w_t$ is *generated* by the mechanism $\chi$. A stage mechanism is *admissible* if it is generated by some mechanism $\chi$.

**Definition 2.** A mechanism is periodic ex-post incentive compatible (IC) if for every period $t$ and for all histories $h^t$ the following holds: For every $\theta_{-i}$ and every $\theta_i$ we have that

$$\theta_{it} x(\theta_{it}, \theta_{-it}) + w_{it}(\theta_{it}, \theta_{-it}) \geq \theta_{it} x(r_{it}, \theta_{-it}) + w_{it}(r_{it}, \theta_{-it})$$  

(2)

for all reports $r_i \in \Theta_i$.

See, e.g., Athey and Miller (2007), Bergemann and Välimäki (2010). The definition in particular states that if a mechanism is incentive compatible, then every stage mechanism for all histories is incentive compatible. The following lemma can be proved using the Envelope Theorem (which is a standard exercise in the mechanism design literature).

**Lemma 1.** A mechanism is IC if and only if for each agent $i$ the following two conditions hold:

1. Monotonicity of $x$: $x(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) \leq x(\theta_i, \theta'_{-i})$ for $\theta_i \leq \theta'_i$. 

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2. Payoff equivalence: Let \( \hat{\theta}_i \in \Theta_i \) be given. Then

\[
\theta_i x(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) + w_i(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}) = \hat{\theta}_i x(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_{-i}) + w_i(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_{-i}) + \int_{\hat{\theta}_i}^{\theta_i} x(\beta, \theta_{-i}) d\beta.
\] (3)

Since the term \( \hat{\theta}_i x(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_{-i}) + w_i(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_{-i}) \) is independent of \( \theta_i \), we will write \( h_i(\theta_{-i}) \) for it. Note, however, that \( h_i(\theta_{-i}) \) does depend on the particular choice of \( \hat{\theta}_i \).

Objective

For a given stage mechanism we can write down the expected welfare going forward from period \( t \) as

\[
U_{h^t}(\chi) = U_{h^t}(x, w) := \mathbb{E}_{\Theta_t} \left[ (\theta_1 + \theta_2)x_t(\theta) + w_{1t}(\theta) + w_{2t}(\theta) \right].
\]

This is the period-\( t \)-ex-ante discounted welfare that the agents receive after history \( h^t \).

The aim of this paper is to identify optimal mechanisms, that is, mechanisms \( \chi \) that solve

\[
\max_{\chi} U(\chi) := U_{h^0}(\chi), \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \chi \text{ is IC.}
\]

Lemma 2 in the appendix provides a useful way to rewrite the objective function in terms of the allocation rule \( x \) and \( h_i(\theta_{-i}) \).

3 Results

The aim of this section is to identify mechanisms that are optimal in the above stated sense. We need the following conditions on \( F \) in order to derive our results:

Condition 1 (Monotone Hazard Rate). The hazard rate \( \frac{f(\theta_i)}{1-F(\theta_i)} \) is non-decreasing in \( \theta_i \).

Condition 2 (Log-Concavity). \( \frac{F(\theta_i)}{f(\theta_i)} \) is non-decreasing in \( \theta_i \).

A voting rule \( x \) is a rule where \( x(\theta) \) only depends on \( \{\text{sgn}(\theta_i)\}_{i=1,2} \). A voting mechanism is a mechanism where the allocation rule after all histories is a voting rule.

Proofs in this section will proceed as follows: First, we show that under the appropriate stage mechanisms consisting of a voting rule and promising the same continuation payoffs for all type profiles are weakly welfare-superior to all other stage mechanisms. Then we make use of the following proposition to deduce that also the best dynamic mechanism uses a voting rule in every period. In fact, for this step to work it is helpful that optimal stage mechanisms are of as simple a form as voting mechanisms.

Proposition 1. Assume that for every history \( h^t \) and admissible stage mechanism \((x_t, w_t)\) in period \( t \), there exists an admissible stage mechanism \((\hat{x}_t, \hat{w}_t)\), where \( \hat{x}_t \) is a voting rule and \( \hat{w}_t \) is constant, and such that

\[
U_{h^t}(x_t, w_t) \leq U_{h^t}(\hat{x}_t, \hat{w}_t).
\]

Then a voting mechanism is among the optimal mechanisms.
Proof. We start with any dynamic mechanism \( \chi \) and transform it into a mechanism that uses a voting rule in every period and such that \( U \) weakly increases. Start with \( t = 0 \). The assumption states that there exists a voting stage mechanism \((\hat{x}_0, \hat{w}_0)\) with constant \( \hat{w}_0 \) and such that \( U(\hat{x}_0, \hat{w}_0) \geq U(x_0, w_0) \). Since the voting stage mechanism is admissible and promises constant continuations, these continuations can be generated by a mechanism that is independent of \( h^1 \). Denote by \( \chi' \) this new dynamic mechanism. Since \( x_1^1 \) and \( w_1^1 \) are independent of \( h^1 \), we know (gain by the assumption) that there exists a voting stage mechanism \((\hat{x}_1, \hat{w}_1)\) with constant \( \hat{w}_1 \) and such that \( U_{h^1}(\hat{x}_1, \hat{w}_1) \geq U_{h^1}(x_1^1, w_1^1) \) for all \( h^1 \). Again, \( \hat{w}_1 \) can be generated by a mechanism that does not condition on histories \( h^2 \). Now if we let \( \chi'' \) be the mechanism that arises if one exchanges the stage mechanism \((x_1^1, w_1^1)\) in \( \chi' \) for \((\hat{x}_1, \hat{w}_1)\), we know that \( \chi'' \) is still incentive compatible: All promised continuations in period 0 change by the same amount, independent of the history \( h^1 \) and in particular independent of \( \theta_0 \). Repeating this argument inductively for \( t \geq 2 \) completes the proof. \( \square \)

3.1 Unanimity

The restriction of unanimity requires the mechanism to always adhere to a decision to which both agents agree. For example, if both types in some period are positive the mechanism has to choose \( x_t = 1 \) for sure. Formally, the condition is defined as follows:

Definition 3. A mechanism is called unanimous if, for every period and all possible histories, \( x(\theta) = 1 \) if \( \theta > 0 \) and \( x(\theta) = 0 \) if \( \theta < 0 \).

Note that mechanisms not satisfying this requirement will probably have legitimacy problems: Although all parties involved in the decision process opt in favor of the proposal, the mechanism forces its rejection. Furthermore, if agents are not able to collectively commit to the decision prescribed by the mechanism, then mechanisms satisfying unanimity are the only feasible mechanisms. It is therefore no surprise that all mechanisms used in practical committee decision making satisfy unanimity. Also note that mechanisms proposed in the literature are not excluded by this assumption (see, e.g., Jackson and Sonnenschein 2007, Casella 2005). In the next subsection we will see that even when relaxing this restriction, for certain distribution functions only non-deterministic decision rules can yield a higher expected welfare than voting rules.

Theorem 1. Suppose \( F \) satisfies Conditions 1 and 2. Then a voting mechanism is optimal among all unanimous mechanisms.

Proof. The proof consists of establishing the preconditions of Proposition 1. So let \((x, w)\) be a stage mechanism after some history \( h^t \) (since we are only concerned with unanimous mechanisms, \( x \) satisfies unanimity). Set \((\theta_1, \theta_2) = (0, 0)\) and let \( h_t \) be the resulting redistribution functions implied by Lemma 1. Let \( \theta^* \in \arg \max_{\theta \in \Theta} h_1(\theta) + h_2(\theta) \). We first show that setting \( h_1(\theta_2) = h_1(\theta^*) \) and \( h_2(\theta_1) = h_2(\theta^*) \) does not decrease \( U_{h^t}(x, w) \).

Since so far we have not changed \( x \), by Lemma 2 it is enough to show that the terms involving the redistribution functions do not decrease in this step. But this follows from

\[
\int_{\Theta_1} h_2(\theta_1)dF(\theta_1) + \int_{\Theta_2} h_1(\theta_2)dF(\theta_2) = \int_{\theta} \left[ h_2(\beta) + h_1(\beta) \right]dF(\beta) \\
\leq \int_{\theta} \left[ h_2(\theta^*) + h_1(\theta^*) \right]dF(\theta^*).
\]
Next we show that changing \( x \) to a voting rule does not decrease welfare. It is enough to consider the regions where \( \theta_1 \leq 0, \theta_2 \geq 0 \) and \( \theta_1 \geq 0, \theta_2 \leq 0 \) because the mechanism is unanimous. But by Lemma 3 and the choice of \((\hat{\theta_1}, \hat{\theta_2})\), we know that the first term in (4), which for the region \( \theta_1 \leq 0, \theta_2 \geq 0 \) amounts to

\[
\int_0^0 \int_0^\theta \left[ -\frac{F(\theta_1)}{f(\theta_1)} + \frac{1 - F(\theta_2)}{f(\theta_2)} \right] x(\theta_1, \theta_2) dF(\theta_2) dF(\theta_1),
\]

is maximized by setting \( x \) to either 0 or 1, as soon as Conditions 1 and 2 hold. Hence the voting stage mechanism we constructed is weakly welfare superior to the old stage mechanism.

Let \((x', w')\) denote the new stage mechanism. The proof is complete if we can show that \( w' \) is constant and can be generated. Constancy of \( w' \) holds for any stage mechanism where \( x' \) is a voting rule and the functions \( h_i' \) are constant. More specifically, \( w'_i \) is equal to \( h_i(\theta^*) \). Since the old mechanism was unanimous, \( w_i(\theta^*, \theta^*) = h_i(\theta^*) \). Because \( w_i(\theta^*, \theta^*) \) could be generated, it follows that \( w' \) can be generated.

\[ \square \]

### 3.2 Neutrality of Alternatives

In this section, we show that in some situations we can dispense the focus on unanimous mechanisms and still get optimality of voting mechanisms. This shows that the restriction imposed in the previous section does in many cases not reduce welfare.

We assume that the distribution of types is neutral across alternatives, i.e. it is symmetric around 0. This is an important special case of our general model analyzed, for example, by Carrasco and Fuchs (2011). For instance, this assumption is satisfied if a committee has to decide among two proposals that are valued equally ex ante. Specifying one alternative as the default, the distribution of valuations for changing from the default to the alternative proposal is symmetric around 0.

**Theorem 2.** Suppose \( F \) satisfies Conditions 1 and 2 and is neutral across alternatives. Then a voting mechanism is optimal among all deterministic mechanisms.

The proof of Theorem 2 is presented in the appendix. Similar arguments as in the last subsection can be provided for restricting attention to deterministic mechanisms: First, stochastic mechanisms are difficult to implement and face serious legitimacy problems in practice. It is barely conceivable that a parliament would introduce decision protocols that involve random elements. Second, all proposed mechanisms in the literature and mechanisms observed in practice are usually deterministic and therefore not excluded from our analysis. Numerical simulation also suggests that expected welfare can be improved only slightly using stochastic mechanisms. The following corollary combines Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 and shows all properties one has to give up in order to improve upon voting rules.

**Corollary 1.** Assume \( F \) satisfies Conditions 1 and 2 and is neutral across alternatives. Then every decision rule that is strictly welfare-superior to any voting rule is stochastic and does not satisfy unanimity.
4 Discussion

We have seen that despite the absence of money as a means for implementing rules other than majority voting, the possibility to condition decision rules on the past gives us the possibility to design dynamic decision rules that take preference intensities into account. However, we have shown that for committees consisting of two players the welfare maximizing dynamic decision rule nonetheless conducts simple majority voting in every period. This holds unless desirable properties of the decision rules are given up. We therefore provide a possible explanation on why majority voting is used almost universally in practice.

A major open problem is the question as to what extent our results generalize to more than two agents. We believe that a substantial difficulty towards progress in this direction is to understand in how far continuation values can be redistributed among the agents.

A Helpful Lemmata

Lemma 2. Let $\chi$ be an incentive compatible mechanism and define

$$
\psi(\theta_i) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{-F(\theta_i)}{f(\theta_i)} & \text{if } \theta_i \leq \hat{\theta}_i, \\
1 - \frac{-F(\theta_i)}{f(\theta_i)} & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
$$

Then for every history $h^t$ we have

$$
U_{h^t}(\chi) = \int_\Theta \left[ \psi(\theta_1) + \psi(\theta_2) \right] x(\theta) dF(\theta) + \int_{\theta_1} h_2(\theta_1) dF(\theta_1) + \int_{\theta_2} h_1(\theta_2) dF(\theta_2). \tag{4}
$$

Proof. First note that

$$
U_{h^t}(\chi) = \int_\Theta \int_\Theta \left[ \int_\Theta \left[ \theta_1 x(\theta) + \theta_2 x(\theta) + w_1(\theta) + w_2(\theta) \right] dF(\theta_2) dF(\theta_1), \tag{5}
$$

and by Lemma 1

$$
w_i(\theta) = \int_{\hat{\theta}_i}^\theta x(\beta, \theta_{-i}) d\beta - \theta_i x(\theta) + h_i(\theta_{-i}). \tag{6}
$$

Using integration by parts, we first rewrite the term

$$
\int_\Theta \left[ \int_{\hat{\theta}_i}^\theta x(\beta, \theta_{-i}) d\beta \right] f(\theta_i) d\theta_i
$$

as

$$
= \left[ \int_{\hat{\theta}_i}^\theta x(\beta, \theta_{-i}) d\beta \frac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} - \int_{\hat{\theta}_i}^\theta x(\beta, \theta_{-i}) d\beta \frac{F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} \right] - \int_{\theta_i}^\theta x(\theta, \theta_{-i}) F(\theta_i) d\theta_i
$$

and

$$
= \int_{\hat{\theta}_i}^\theta \frac{1 - F(\theta_i)}{f(\theta_i)} x(\theta) dF(\theta_i) + \int_{\theta_i}^\theta \frac{F(\theta_i)}{f(\theta_i)} x(\theta) dF(\theta_i). \tag{7}
$$

Now plug (6) into (5), use (7) to complete the proof. \qed
Lemma 3. Suppose that \( \psi(\theta_1, \theta_2) \) is decreasing in \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) and that \( \int \psi(\theta)dF(\theta) < \infty \). Then the problem

\[
\max_x Q(x) = \int_a^b \int_c^d \psi(\theta) \cdot x(\theta) dF_2(\theta_2) dF_1(\theta_1)
\]

s.t. \( x \) is increasing in \( \theta \)

\[
0 \leq x(\theta) \leq 1
\]

is solved optimally either by setting \( x^*(\theta) = 1 \) or \( x^*(\theta) = 0 \).

Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a function \( \hat{x}(\theta) \) that achieves a strictly higher value. Define \( x'(\theta) := \frac{1}{F(d) - F(c)} \int_c^d \hat{x}(\theta) dF(\theta_2) \). This function is feasible for the above problem given that \( \hat{x} \) is feasible and, by Chebyshev's inequality, for all \( \theta_1 \),

\[
\int_c^d \psi(\theta) \hat{x}(\theta) dF(\theta_2) \leq \int_c^d \psi(\theta) dF(\theta_2) \frac{1}{F(d) - F(c)} \int_c^d \hat{x}(\theta) dF(\theta_1) = \int_c^d \psi(\theta) x'(\theta) dF(\theta_2)
\]

Defining \( x''(\theta) = \frac{1}{F(b) - F(a)} \int_a^b x'(\theta) dF(\theta_1) \) and again applying Chebyshev’s inequality, we get for all \( \theta_2 \),

\[
\int_a^b \psi(\theta) x'(\theta) dF(\theta_1) \leq \int_a^b \psi(\theta) dF(\theta_1) \frac{1}{F(b) - F(a)} \int_a^b x'(\theta) dF(\theta_1)
\]

Since the objective function is linear in \( x \), the constant function \( x'' \) is weakly dominated by either \( x \equiv 1 \) or \( x \equiv 0 \), contradicting the initial claim.

\[\square\]

B Proof of Theorem 2

Proof of Theorem 2. We establish the preconditions of Proposition 1. Fix an arbitrary history \( h_t \) and consider the stage mechanism \((x, w)\) employed after this history. Let \( \overline{w} := \max_{\theta} \{w_1(\theta) + w_2(\theta)\} \) and let \( \theta_w \) be an optimizer. We normalize \( w \) such that \( w_1(\theta_w) = w_2(\theta_w) = 0 \) by decreasing \( w_i \) by \( w_i(\theta_w) \) for all \( i \). After the normalization we have

\[
w_1(\theta) + w_2(\theta) \leq 0.
\]

We start with some preliminaries where we derive a set of inequalities that are satisfied by every incentive compatible stage mechanism for which the above inequality holds.

Preliminaries:

Set \( (\bar{\theta}, \bar{\overline{\theta}}) := (\bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta}) \), let \( h_i \) denote the resulting redistribution functions implied by Lemma 1 and define \( g_i(\theta) := \theta_i x(\theta) - \int_{\theta_i}^{\theta} x(\beta, \theta_{-i}) d\beta \). It follows from Lemma 1 that \( w_i(\theta) = -g_i(\theta) + h_i(\theta_{-i}) \). Let \( \theta^* := \max_{\theta} \{h_1(\theta) + h_2(-\theta)\} - \bar{\theta} \) and \( \theta^* \) be a maximizer. Normalize
$h$ such that $h_1(\theta^*) = h^* + \theta$ and $h_2(-\theta^*) = 0$ by increasing $h_1(x_2)$ and decreasing $h_2(x_1)$ by $h_2(-\theta^*)$. The definition of $h^*$ implies

$$h_1(\theta) + h_2(-\theta) \leq h^* + \theta$$
for all $\theta$, \hfill (8)

and $w_1(\theta, -\theta) + w_2(\theta, -\theta) \leq 0$ implies

$$h_1(\theta) + h_2(-\theta) \leq g_1(-\theta, \theta) + g_2(-\theta, \theta)$$
$$= -\int_{-\theta}^{\theta} x(\beta, \theta)d\beta - \int_{-\theta}^{\theta} x(-\theta, \beta)d\beta$$
$$\leq \int_{-\theta}^{\theta} x(\beta, \theta)d\beta \leq \theta + \theta.$$ \hfill (9)

By plugging $\theta^*$ into (9) and using the definition of $h^*$, it follows that $h^* \leq \theta^*$. Define $a := \min\{\theta_1 \mid x(\theta_1, h^*) = 1\}$. If there does not exist $\theta_1$ such that $x(\theta_1, h^*) = 1$, set $a := \theta$. Without loss we can assume that $a \geq -h^*$, since otherwise we can “mirror” the mechanism on the dotted line shown in Figure 1. Let $\theta_1 \geq a$. Then expanding and rearranging $w_1(\theta_1, \theta^*) + w_2(\theta_1, \theta^*) \leq 0$ yields

$$h_2(\theta_1) \leq -(h^* + \theta) + g_1(\theta_1, \theta^*) + g_2(\theta_1, \theta^*)$$
$$= -h^* - \theta + \theta_1 - \int_{-\theta}^{\theta_1} x(\beta, \theta^*)d\beta + \theta^* - \int_{\theta_1}^{\theta} x(\theta_1, \beta)d\beta$$
$$= h^* + \theta^* - \theta^* + h^* - \int_{\theta}^{h^*} x(\theta_1, \beta)d\beta$$

Let $(x^#, w^#)$ be the mirrored mechanism, then $x^#(\theta_1, \theta_2) = 1 - x(-\theta_2, -\theta_1)$, $w_i^#(\theta_1, \theta_2) = w_i(-\theta_1, -\theta_1)$. The new mechanism is IC iff. the old mechanism is IC and by our symmetry assumptions the mirrored mechanism yields the same welfare.
\[ - \int_\theta^{h^*} x(\theta_1, \beta) d\beta. \quad (10) \]

Define \( b := \inf\{x_2 \mid x(-h^*, x_2) = 1\}\) (if there is no \( x_2 \) such that \( x(-h^*, x_2) = 1 \), set \( b := \overline{\theta} \)) and let \( \theta_2 \leq b \). Then \( w_1(-\theta, \theta_2) + w_2(-\theta, \theta_2) \leq 0 \) implies

\[
 h_1(\theta_2) \leq g_1(\theta_2) + g_2(\theta_2)
 = 0 - \int_{-\theta^*}^\theta x(\beta, \theta_2) d\beta - \int_{\theta}^{\theta_2} x(-\theta^*, \beta) d\beta
 = \int_{-\theta^*}^{\theta_2} x(\beta, \theta_2) d\beta. \quad (11)
\]

Since by Lemma 3 an incentive compatible stage mechanism is completely determined by \( x \) and \( h \), we will in the following change \( x \) and \( h \) in a number of consecutive steps while making sure that \( x \) stays monotone and we never decrease the welfare \( U^{h^*}(x, w) \). First, we increase \( h_2(\theta_1) \) for \( \theta_1 \geq a \) and \( h_1(\theta_2) \) for \( \theta_2 \leq b \) until (10) and (11) hold with equality since this trivially weakly increases welfare.

\textbf{Step 1:}

In this step we will change the variables \( x(\theta) \) with \( \theta \in A := \{(\theta_1, \theta_2) \mid \theta_1 \geq a, \theta_2 \leq h^*\} \), \( h_2(\theta_1) \) with \( \theta_1 \geq a \) and \( h_1(\theta_2) \) with \( \theta_2 \leq h^* \). If we change \( h_1 \) and \( h_2 \) such that (11) and (10) continue to hold with equality, we can express changes of all the variables in terms of changes of \( x \). Making use of the fact that for \( \theta_2 \leq h^* \), (11) is equivalent to

\[
h_1(\theta_2) = \int_a^{\theta_2} x(\beta, \theta_2) d\beta,
\]

and by substituting (11) and (10), we can rewrite the the part of \( U^{h^*} \) that depends on changes of the variables \( x(\theta) \) for \( \theta \in A \) as

\[
\int_a^{\theta_2} \int_{\theta}^{h^*} \left[ \frac{1 - F(\theta_1)}{f(\theta_1)} + \frac{-F(\theta_2)}{f(\theta_2)} \right] x(\theta_1, \theta_2) dF(\theta_2) dF(\theta_1).
\]

Lemma 3 implies that this term is maximized by setting \( x(\theta) = 0 \) or 1 for \( \theta \in A \). To see that we cannot gain by setting \( x(\theta) = 1 \) we bound

\[
U^{h^*}(1) = \int_a^{\theta_2} \int_{\theta}^{h^*} \left[ \frac{1 - F(\theta_1)}{f(\theta_1)} + \frac{-F(\theta_2)}{f(\theta_2)} \right] dF(\theta_2) dF(\theta_1)
\]

\[
= \int_{-a}^{\theta} \int_{\theta}^{h^*} \left[ \frac{F(\theta_1)}{f(\theta_1)} + \frac{-F(\theta_2)}{f(\theta_2)} \right] dF(\theta_2) dF(\theta_1)
\]

\[
= \int_{-a}^{\theta} \int_{-a}^{\theta} \left[ \frac{F(\theta_1)}{f(\theta_1)} + \frac{-F(\theta_2)}{f(\theta_2)} \right] dF(\theta_2) dF(\theta_1)
\]

\[
\leq 0 = U^{h^*}(0).
\]

Here, symmetry yields the second and third equality, and log-concavity of \( F \) and the fact that \(-a \leq h^* \) yield the inequality. Hence, we weakly increase welfare by setting \( x \equiv 0 \) in \( A \) and \( h_1 \) and \( h_2 \) according to (11) and (10), respectively.
Step 2:

For this step define the set $B = \{ \theta_1 > -h^*, \theta_2 > h^* \mid x(\theta_1, \theta_2) = 0 \}$. Set $x(\theta) = 1$ for $\theta \in B$ and $h_1(\theta_2) = h^* + \overline{\theta}$ for all $\theta_2$ for which there is a $\theta_1$ such that $(\theta_1, \theta_2) \in B$. We claim that this does not decrease $U_{h^*}$. Since allocative efficiency improved in this step, we only need to check that the sum of promised continuations increased. First, let $(\theta_1, \theta_2) \in B$. Then (11) is equivalent to

$$h_1(\theta_2) = \int_{-h^*}^{\overline{\theta}} x(\beta, \theta_2) d\beta$$

Continuations before this change are given by

$$h_2(\theta_1) + h_1(\theta_2) + \int_{\overline{\theta}}^{\theta_1} x(\beta, \theta_2) d\beta = h_2(\theta_1) + \int_{-h^*}^{\overline{\theta}} x(\beta, \theta_2) d\beta + \int_{\overline{\theta}}^{\theta_1} x(\beta, \theta_2) d\beta = h_2(\theta_1).$$

After the change we get:

$$h_2(\theta_1) + h^* + \overline{\theta} - \theta_1 + \int_{\overline{\theta}}^{\theta_1} x(\beta, \theta_2) d\beta - \theta_2 + \int_{h^*}^{\theta_2} x(\theta_1, \beta) d\beta = h_2(\theta_1).$$

The claim can similarly be shown for the points $(\theta'_1, \theta_2)$ and $(\theta_1, \theta'_2)$ where $\theta'_2 > \theta_2$.

Step 3:

We claim that setting $x(\theta) = 1$ or $x(\theta) = 0$ for $\theta \in [\theta, -h^*] \times [h^*, \overline{\theta}]$ increases $U_{h^*}$. This follows from the fact that, since, ignoring the part which depends on $h_i$, the objective function in the area where we change $x$ has the form required by Lemma 3. Symmetry implies that $x(\theta) = 0$ gives the same welfare as $x(\theta) = 1$.

Step 4:

Note that the original mechanism satisfied

$$h_1(-\theta) + h_2(\theta) \leq h^* + \overline{\theta}.$$  

Therefore, welfare is not decreased by setting $h_2(\theta) := 0$ and $h_1(-\theta) = h^* + \overline{\theta}$ for $\theta \leq -b$.

Note that the changed mechanism satisfies $w_1(\theta, -\theta) + w_2(\theta, -\theta) \leq 0$: For $a \leq \theta$ this holds as we assumed (10) and (11) to be binding in Step 1, hence $g_1(\theta, -\theta) = g_2(\theta, -\theta) = h_1(\theta) = h_2(\theta) = 0$. For $-h^* \leq \theta \leq a$, this holds as continuations weren’t changed for these values (changed Pivot payments were offset by changes in the $h$ functions, as (11) was assumed to hold with equality in Step 1). For $-b \leq \theta \leq -h^*$ this holds as constraints were assumed to bind in Step 2. For $b \leq \theta \leq -b$ this holds as $h_1(-\theta) + h_2(\theta) \leq h^* + \overline{\theta} = g_1(\theta, -\theta) + g_2(\theta, -\theta)$.

The fact that $w_1(\theta, -\theta) + w_2(\theta, -\theta) \leq 0$ implies that $h_1(-\theta) + h_2(\theta) \leq g_1(\theta, -\theta) + g_2(\theta, -\theta)$. We can increase $h$ so that equality holds, thereby again improving the mech-
anism, ending up with the following stage mechanism:

\[
x(\theta) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \theta_1 \geq h^* \\
0 & \text{else},
\end{cases}
\]

\[
h_1(\theta_2) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } \theta_2 \leq h^* \\
h^* + \theta & \text{else},
\end{cases}
\]

\[
h_2(\theta_1) = 0.
\]

We call this class of mechanisms \textit{phantom dictatorship with parameter } h^*.

\textit{Step 5:}

So far we have shown that every stage mechanism can be modified until it is a phantom dictatorship while weakly improving welfare. To prove that for every stage mechanism there is a simple voting stage mechanism with weakly higher welfare, we show that simple voting weakly welfare-dominates every phantom dictatorship: Indeed, the optimal phantom dictatorship is given by the parameter \( h^* = E[\theta] \). Therefore, symmetry around 0 implies that the optimal phantom dictatorship is characterized by \( h^* = 0 \), which has the same aggregate welfare as unanimity voting.

The voting stage mechanism we have constructed so far has the continuations profile \( w_1(\theta) = w_2(\theta) = 0 \) for all \( \theta \). It remains to show that this mechanism is admissible. But this follows from the fact that (0,0) was an implementable continuation profile of the original mechanism (namely, at the type profile \( \theta_w \)). We therefore established the conditions for Proposition 1 which completes the proof of the theorem.

\textbf{References}


