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THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN DISAGREEMENTS AMONG ECONOMISTS A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Thomas Mayer*

How justified is the charge that ideology strongly influences the allegedly objective opinions of economists? An analysis of a new survey of AEA members and of surveys by Fuchs et al of labor economists and public economists shows that value judgments and judgments about the government's efficacy have some influence on the way economists think about what should be purely economic issues. But such influence is not strong enough to explain much of the disagreement among economists.

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Thomas Mayer*

Economics has long labored under the charge that is primarily ideology dressed in the garb of science - or at the least that it is heavily influenced by the ideological preferences of its practitioners. And it is not only outsiders and the heterodox who make this charge. Thus, in discussing stabilization policy Franco Modigliani (1977, p. 10) wrote that: "there is no question, but that value judgments play a major role in the differences between economists ... value judgments end up by playing a role in your assessment of parameters and the evidence we consider." Similarly, according to James Tobin (1976, p. 336): "Distinctively monetarist policy recommendations stem less from theoretical or even empirical findings than from distinctive value judgments". On the other hand, Milton Friedman (1953, p. 5) has argued that disagreements about economic policy among disinterested citizens are predominantly due to disagreements about positive economics, and not to disagreements about values.

It is not irrational for economists to allow their ideological preferences to influence their policy preferences. Economists, like others, may benefit from advocating certain policies because of a prior attachment to them, or because people whose good opinion they value tend to prefer those who agree with their policy preferences, or because advocating certain policies allows them to believe that they are good and caring (or else hard-headed, realistic) persons. And accommodating one's reading of the evidence on certain parameter values sometimes makes it easier to adjust one's policy views. The cost of allowing such considerations to influence one's thinking is the discomfort that accompanies the suppression of the knowledge that one is being less than

honest and forthright. Rational behavior requires that such benefits and costs be balanced at the margin.¹

Recently Victor Fuchs, Alan Krueger and James Porterba (1998) used an opinion survey of labor economists and public economists to study empirically the influence of ideology in economics. They conclude that the relation between value judgments and policy preferences is "much stronger" than is the relation between the relevant economic parameters and policy choices, and that value preferences have a statistically significant, though small, effect on economist's estimates of economic parameters (Fuchs et al, 1998, p. 1401). Like them I show in this paper a small effect of value judgments on parameter estimates, but quantify it in more detail than they do. For example, except when using the variable they construct to measure liberal values, their paper records the correlations and the percentage of significant coefficients without reference to whether the sign of these coefficients corresponds to any expected liberal-conservative distinction. In contrast, this paper uses an explicit liberal -conservative dichotomy, and treats as successes for the ideological- bias hypotheses only those significant coefficients whose signs are consistent with this dichotomy. It also distinguishes a weak version of the ideological-bias hypothesis that the data accept from a strong version that they reject. It further shows that, at least for the questions discussed here, differences in judgments about the efficacy of government policies influence parameter estimates at least as much, if not more, than do value judgments. To do this it uses along with the Fuchs et al data a new opinion survey of academic economists devised specifically (as the Fuchs et al survey was not) to address the question of ideological bias.

But before turning to the new data one needs to see what is meant by calling economics ideological, what testable hypotheses are implied by this charge, and consider some problems in testing them with survey data.

I. Value Judgments and Ideology

There is no need to consider all the ramifications of the complex sociological concept of ideology. The core of the charge that economics is ideological is that in developing their theories and interpreting their empirical evidence economists are if not dominated then at least strongly biased by their extra-scientific value judgments or political judgments. Such value judgments are not limited to the relative weights attached to the utilities of different persons, but include other value judgments, such as the importance of freedom from government control, and the importance of justice relative to economic growth.

Since the adjective "ideological" is often used as the antithesis to "objective and scientific" it is useful to include in it not only value judgments, but also the many broad positive presumptions about the political process that are often needed to select an economic policy.² Many of them are treated rigorously within a sub-field of economics, public choice theory; but even so, these issues are still on the periphery of economics, and if economists cannot agree on them this is not as great a challenge to the claim that economics is a science as is disagreement on more central issues. This also holds for the effect of economic policies on the political and social systems, a problem usually not discussed systematically by economists, because it raises too many issues that belong more to political science and sociology. Hence ideology is defined here in a particular

way that includes propositions that for political science or sociology would be positive, non-ideological statements.

Differentiating between disagreements on positive political issues and on issues that belong entirely to economics has a major benefit. It allows one to see whether the former can explain some of the disagreement among economists about policy issues that has hurt the public reputation of economics. The fact that on many policy issues it is possible to marshal an impressive roster of economists on either side does not speak against the scientific status of economics if their differences are due to disagreements about either positive political issues or normative issues.³

To discuss ideological bias one needs to distinguish between at least two divergent ideological positions, such as liberalism and conservatism. Since these terms are vague I define conservatives as those who are more disposed than liberals to rely on market processes. More specifically, Tables 1 and 2 show for each question which responses are here treated as conservative and which as liberal. Readers who disagree with these classifications can use their own classifications to reinterpret the results shown in the subsequent tables.

II. Testable Implications

One implication of the claim that ideology and not objective evidence determines which economic theories and the empirical evidence economists accept is that those economists who hold liberal (or conservative) opinions on one economic parameter with strong ideological implications, such as the prevalence of market power, also hold liberal (or conservative) opinions on other ideologically charged parameters. This can be tested by

Table 1
Responses to the AEA Survey

	Mean	S.D.	N
1. Suppose technical change would raise the level of output permanently by 2%, but would cause a totally arbitrary 5% redistribution within each income decile, while leaving the distribution between quintiles unchanged. Would you favor this development? [Strongly favor ... Strongly disfavor] ^a	1.9	1.0	142
2. Whether GDP grows at 1.5% or 2% is not nearly as important as enhancing social justice. (C)	3.3	1.4	152
3. The government has a moral right to redistribute income if a majority supports this. (C)	2.9	1.6	156
4. Maintaining or preferably enhancing freedom from government control should be the main goal of economic policy (L)	3.1	1.4	161
5. While it is hard to generalize about the many government programs involved, by and large, if the government adopts a program to help the lowest income quintile I would expect that roughly speaking -- % of the benefits would go to the upper half of the income distribution instead of the lowest quintile. (C)	46.4	24.4	78
6. In general, the law of unanticipated consequences ensures that most programs that are intended to help the poor harm them more than they help them. (L)	03.2	1.3	95
7. Government intervention that would substantially reduce the inequality of the income distribution would have major social and political effects. On the whole, these effects would be [Strongly detrimental .. Strongly favorable] (L)	3.0	1.4	150
8. A \$50 billion rise in government expenditures with no accompanying change in the money supply is more expansionary over a 5 year period than is a \$50 billion increase in the money supply with no change in fiscal policy. (C)	3.2	1.4	119
9. A 10 percent cut across the board in income tax rates would substantially increase work effort. (L)	3.6	1.2	158

10. Product markets in the U.S. are better described as competitive than oligopolistic, (L)	2.5	1.2	164
11. Speculation in foreign exchange markets is beneficial because it is usually stabilizing rather than destabilizing. (L)	2.7	1.2	137
12. Halving the capital gains tax rate would raise the economic growth rate by 0.25 or more. (L)	3.5	1.3	124
13. Financial markets generate serious misallocations of resources because stock prices are dominated by short-term returns, and long-term consequences tend to be neglected. (C)	3.8	1.2	157
14. It is better to aim for a balanced budget over the business cycle rather than yearly. (C)	1.6	.9	157
15. Industrial policy(that is government support for innovative industries) should not be dismissed out of hand, but deserves serious consideration. (C)	3.3	1.4	162
16. An increase in unionization is desirable. (C)	3.6	1.2	161
17. Trade in human organs for transplants should be permitted. (L)	3.0	1.5	150
18. Government spending as a percent of GDP should be reduced. (L)	2.8	1.4	156
19. The prime concern of macropolicy should be to hold down inflation. (L)	2.9	1.3	160
20. Compared to the current situation, the federal government's role in the income distribution should be [Larger .. Smaller] (C)	3.0	1.4	160

Note: Unless otherwise indicated the respondents were presented with five boxes ranging from : "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". The letter in parenthesis indicates whether it is conservatives or liberals who are assumed to assign a high value to this parameter when measured on a scale ranging from "strongly oppose" to "strongly favor".

a. Responses cannot be classified as conservative or liberal.

Table 2

Condensed Versions of the Questions in Surveys of Specialists

A. Values - Labor Economists and Public Economists

Does the government play too large or too small a role in income redistribution? (L) [1-v]

Same as the previous question on the assumption that redistribution would have no distortionary effects. (L) [2-v]

Should policy place more weight on equity or on efficiency than it does now? (C) [3-v]

Should policy give more weight to individual or to social responsibility than it does now? (L) [4-v]

B. Economic Parameters - Labor Economists

Total wage elasticity of labor demand? (C) [1-l]

Output constant wage elasticity of labor demand? (C) [2-l]

Percent impact on earnings of youths of JTPA job training? (L) [3-l]

Percent impact on earnings of adult males of JTPA job training? (L) [4-l]

Percent impact on earnings of adult females of JTPA job training? (L) [5-l]

Uncompensated elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [6-l]

Uncompensated elasticity of labor supply for women aged 25-54? (C) [7-l]

Compensated elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [8-l]

Compensated elasticity of labor supply for women aged 25-54? (C) [9-l]

Percent impact of unions on the earnings of their members? (L) [10-l]

Percent of male-female wage gap due to employer discrimination? (L) [11]

C. Economic Parameters - Public Economists

Change in the GDP growth rate if all capital income taxes were replaced by a revenue-neutral wage tax? (C) [1-p]

Uncompensated elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [2-p]

Compensated elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [3-p]

Percent of inflows to IRA's that are net additions to saving? (C) [4-p]

Personal saving ratio in the absence of Social Security? (C) [5-p]

Ratio of administrative costs of mandatory private retirement accounts to the administrative costs of Social Security? (L) [6-p]

D. Policy Recommendations- Labor Economists

Increase AFDC benefits financed by a proportional increase in marginal

income tax rates. (L) [12-l]
 Eliminate the OASI cap on taxable wages, offset by a revenue-neutral reduction in payroll tax rates (L) [13-l]
 Eliminate the OFCCP Affirmative Action Program (C) [14-l]
 Increase the minimum wage from \$4.25 to \$5.15 over two years (L) [15-l]
 Eliminate the federal role in job training programs and apply the savings to debt reduction. (C) [16-1]
 Change the law to permit workers to form union if a majority of workers in the bargaining unit sign cards. (L) [17-7]

E. Policy Recommendations - Public Economists

Increase AFDC benefits financed by a proportional increase in marginal income tax rates. (L) [7-p]
 Replace individual and corporate income tax and estate tax with a revenue neutral value-added tax. (C) [8-p]
 Eliminate the cap on taxable wages under OASI with an offsetting reduction in the payroll tax rate. (C) [9-p]
 Raise the maximum IRA contribution to \$5000 and restore "up front" tax deductions of IRA contributions for everyone. (C) [10-p]
 Replace part of the current payroll tax with a mandatory self-directed savings program, annuitized at retirement. (C) [11-p]

NOTE: These are summaries of the questions. For the complete questions see Fuchs et al (1998) The letter in parenthesis indicates whether it is conservatives or liberals who are assumed to assign a high value to this parameter when measured on a scale ranging from "strongly oppose" to "strongly favor" on the policy questions, and from "much less" to "much greater" on the value questions (except for question 4-v where the range is from "individual responsibility" to "public responsibility.") The symbol in brackets is the designation used for this question in the subsequent tables.

a. Choices ranged from "strongly oppose" to "strongly favor".`

Source: Fuchs et al (1998) pp. 1416-23.

looking for correlations in the responses to questions specifically chosen so that -- although there is an ideological connection between them -- neither economic theory nor empirical evidence provide any reason why a respondent who answers one question in a certain way should also answer another question in a certain way. For example, an ideological preference for minimizing government intervention provides an incentive to believe both that speculation in foreign exchange markets is stabilizing, and also that the supply elasticity of labor, and hence the deadweight costs of taxes, are high. If economists form their beliefs about such economic parameters purely objectively, then, ignoring sampling and response errors, the correlation between the responses to these two questions should be zero, while if their responses are entirely dominated by ideology it should be unity. This makes it possible to quantify the degree of objectivity.

A related implication is that respondents' value judgments and judgments about government efficacy can be used to predict their decisions about economic parameters; for example, that those who believe that the government has no right to redistribute income also believe that the elasticity of the labor supply with respect to income-tax rates is high. This allows them to support a ideologically-driven objection to high marginal rates with a positive argument in case their normative argument is questioned, either by themselves or by others.

A third implication of the ideological-bias hypothesis is that through their effects on estimates of economic parameters ideological biases largely determine, or at least heavily influence economists' policy choices. But this implication cannot be readily tested because value judgments and judgments about government efficacy play a legitimate and indeed necessary role in policy choices. As an extreme case suppose that

economics were to achieve such rigor and objectivity that all economists agree on all positive aspects of economic policy. Then, all policy disagreements among economists would have to be due to differences in value judgments or judgments about government efficacy. Hence, the correlation between ideological preferences and policy choices that Fuchs et al (1998) point to is not an adequate test of the objectivity of economics, though it is relevant for other issues.

Few would claim that ideological differences account for all the disagreements among economists, while few would deny that they play at least a trivial role. A meaningful test of the ideological-bias hypothesis therefore needs specific criteria. Accordingly, I test two quantifications of this hypothesis. One, the "weak" version claims that in tests of the just discussed testable implications two conditions hold in the majority of the simple regressions. The first condition is different for the intercorrelations of the economic parameter variables and for the other type of correlations shown in Table 3. For the former it is that at least 7.5 percent of the significant coefficients (at the 5 percent level) have the right sign. For the latter it is that at least 7.5 percent of the significant coefficients have the right sign even when the significant coefficients with the wrong sign are subtracted from those with the right sign.

The second condition is that - when the variables are measured in the same units - the mean absolute value of the correctly signed regression coefficients equals or exceeds 0.15. This second requirement applies only to simple and not to multiple regressions. For the latter it is replaced by the requirement that in more than one third of the regressions at least 67 percent of all the regression coefficients have the right sign. Although it would

be preferable to use only at significant coefficients in this test, there are too few of them for this to be a meaningful test.

All regression coefficients can be significant and exceed 0.15, and yet ideological factors may explain only a small proportion of the disagreement among economists. How much of the disagreement is due to ideological bias is measured by R^2 , and not by t values, which depend in part on the standard error of the coefficients and hence on the sample size. The "strong" version of the ideological-bias hypothesis therefore imposes the additional requirement that in simple regressions R^2 equals or exceeds 0.33, or that in multiple regressions it equals or exceeds 0.50. Essentially, the weak hypothesis is the claim that disagreement on ideological issues plays some role in disagreement among economists, and the strong hypothesis is the claim that it explains a substantial part of the disagreement. These criteria are, of course, arbitrary, but readers who prefer other criteria can see from the data in the subsequent tables whether on their preferred criteria the data support either version.⁴

III. Qualifications

The results shown below are subject to several qualifications. One is that they measure the importance of ideology only by its ability to explain differences in the opinions of economists and ignore any ideological bias that is shared by the entire sample. Presumably all economists agree on the desirability of Pareto improvements. That is a value judgment, and hence ideological, but since it is a shared judgment it explains none of the disagreements. Another problem is that the surveys did not ask about everything that should, in principle, be included in the term "ideology", and hence underestimate its role.

A third problem is that in some cases causation may run from an objective decision about an economic parameter to an ideological choice since ideology includes positive as well as normative elements. For example, someone who is convinced by an objective reading of the evidence that in many cases government intervention has proved inefficient may form the ideological judgment that we should always rely on market processes. But, while this could perhaps be a problem for a few of the questions in the Fuchs et al survey, for the AEA survey this is at most a problem for only one question. And even for that question it is a problem only if a belief that product markets are more oligopolistic than competitive induces someone to believe that the government has a right to redistribute income. In any case, the problem of causality arises only with respect to the second of the two tests for ideological bias used here.

Another set of problems arises from the familiar limitations of sample surveys. Thus, there is no assurance that all respondents thought carefully about their responses, and some may even have marked a wrong box by mistake. Such noise skews the results against the ideological-bias hypothesis. (See Fuchs et al, 1998) On the other hand, the results will be skewed in favor of the ideological-bias hypothesis if those whose thinking is more ideological are more willing to respond to surveys, particularly to surveys that contain questions about ideology. In addition, the samples are relatively small, particularly in the responses to some questions in the Fuchs et al data sets.

But two problems that beset many surveys are less salient here. One is that the beliefs of agents may not correspond to their actions. Since this paper deals only with beliefs, not actions, that is irrelevant. The second is that the effect a regression attributes to a particular regressor may be due to another variable not included in the regression that

is correlated with the included regressor. But in determining whether ideology affects the choice of economic parameters it does not matter if an effect the regression attributes to a particular value judgment is actually due to another value judgment. The excluded-variable" problem matters only if the excluded variable, though correlated with an ideological variable, is itself not ideological.⁵

IV. The Data

The data come from two sources. Although these are not the only available surveys of economists' opinions, the other surveys have few, if any questions on ideology, or do not quantify the disagreements.

1. Survey of AEA Members

One source is a sample of academic economists taken from the 1997 American Economic Association Directory. Use of this source probably means that economists teaching in small institutions are undersampled. A response rate of almost 35 percent yielded 167 usable replies.⁶ Table 1 shows the questions asked and the means and standard deviations of the responses which range from 1 to 5, except for question 5 which is scaled from 0 to 100 percent. Unless otherwise indicated 1 expresses "strong agreement" and 5 "strong disagreement". Nine of the questions come from previous opinion surveys of economists, but were mostly reworded, sometimes substantially so.⁷ Unless otherwise indicated in Table 1 all questions were accompanied by the following line:

"Strongly agree []----[]----[]----[]----[] Strongly disagree, Cannot say []."⁸ Nearly all the respondents used one of these boxes.⁹

Since questionnaire responses can be powerfully influenced by seemingly trivial differences in the wording of a question, it would be futile to try to phrase the type of

question asked here in a neutral way. The subsequent tables should therefore be read with an eye on the exact wording of the questions. For example, if the wording of question 3 had been: "The government has no right to impose a progressive income tax to redistribute income", instead of the actual: "The government has a moral right to redistribute income if a majority supports this", the responses might have been significantly different. Similarly, since question 14 asks whether it is better "to aim for" a budget that is balanced over the business cycle rather than balanced annually, the preponderance of positive answers does not necessarily mean that most economists prefer a cyclically to an annually balanced budget; some might perhaps have answered positively because they think that an annually balanced budget is a counsel of perfection and hence not something to "aim for". Likewise, since it seems dogmatic to say that something should be "dismissed out of hand", question 15, which asks whether industrial policy should be so treated, presumably elicits much less opposition to industrial policy than does the statement that industrial policy should generally be avoided. But this does not matter here. Someone who disagrees with the weak statement is obviously more likely than someone who agrees with it, to disagree also with the stronger statement. Hence, to see whether there is a correlation between ideological preferences and attitudes towards industrial policy it does not matter whether the question about industrial policy is asked in a strong or a weak form.

The questions asked in this survey had to be less precise than those asked by Fuchs et al. Their sample consisted of specialists who are more likely than other economists to be able to estimate specific coefficients in labor economics or public economics, such as the wage elasticity of labor demand. Other economists are more

likely to have formed opinions outside their subfields only about more loosely worded questions, such as whether a 10 percent across-the-board cut in income taxes would raise work effort "substantially". Moreover, in most cases for a question to be precise it would have to specify much detail. For example, question 6 asks whether the law of unanticipated consequences ensures that most programs intended to help the poor harm them as much or more than they help them. To be precise the question would have to specify at the least whether the intention to help the poor is the primary or only a subsidiary purpose of the program, whether it is intended to help all the poor or just a specific group of poor, and whether it is a federal program. It would also have to quantify "most", and specify whether the programs are to be just counted or should be weighted by their dollar values. Lengthening the questionnaire in this way would have greatly reduced the response rate. What helps to offset the vagueness of the questions is that respondents were given five choices. For example, someone who responded with "strongly agree" to the statement that most programs that are intended to help the poor do not help them, might not have done so under all the circumstances just mentioned. But she is more likely to have done so under any specified circumstances than is someone who responded to the general question with "disagree".

Turning to the individual questions, the first four focus on normative judgments. The first asks about the trade-off between horizontal equity and higher income. Although this question cannot be put into a liberal or conservative dichotomy it is interesting for another reason: it provides more insight into pure value judgments than would a question about vertical equity, because vertical equity involves a positive issue, the declining marginal utility of income to a greater extent than does a question about horizontal

equity. Given the way the term "social justice" is usually interpreted, the second question then provides a window into the respondents' concern about vertical equity phrased in a way intended to minimize the influence of the positive step that leads from unequal income to unequal utility levels.

Some economists may believe that less income inequality is desirable, and yet oppose redistributive policies because they also believe that the government lacks the right to redistribute income, in the same way as someone might desire more effective policing, yet oppose giving the police the right to search anyone at will. (See Hausman and McPherson, 1996, Ch. 9) Question 3 deals with this issue. Question 4 then asks about the salience of another value, freedom from government control. Normative judgments and strictly economic judgments in the traditional sense, are not the only judgments required for economic policy-making.¹⁰ One needs to look also at the efficiency with which the government can implement the recommended policy, the subject of questions 5 and 6. The next six questions probe disagreements on issues of positive economics, while the final seven questions ask about policy preferences. The latter combine to varying degrees judgments about economic parameters with normative judgments and judgments about the efficiency of the political system. While the former probably play a lesser role relative to the latter in the responses to questions 14 and 15 the opposite may well hold for questions 10 and 11.

2. Surveys of Specialists

The second source consists of two surveys by Fuchs et al (1998) of specialists in public economics and labor economics "at 40 leading research universities in the United States." (p. 1388).¹¹ Their main purpose appears to be to present the thinking and

parameter estimates of well-informed specialists. Their sample is probably more representative of those academic economists who advise policymakers than is the AEA sample. But to the extent that academic economists stress their own views in the classroom, the AEA sample is probably more representative of what students hear.

Table 2 provides a condensed version of those of the Fuchs et al questions that are used here. Some of their question are excluded because they do not have clear-cut ideological implications, and others because any correlation in the responses could be grounded in economic theory or in empirical evidence, and hence cannot provide evidence of an ideological bias.¹² In addition, many questions in the survey of labor economist, have a large common core, such as questions about the effect of a particular government job training program on (a) youths, (b) adult males, and (c) adult women. To avoid attributing excessive weight to these issues I used as dependent variables only the first questions of such sets.

In using the Fuchs et al data the size of the regression coefficients cannot be use as a test because the estimated parameters are not stated in comparable units, and there are no natural units in which they could be restated. Hence, the size of the regression coefficients is essentially arbitrary.¹³

V. Results

Tables 3 and 4 summarizes the results, while the Appendix Tables show the results for the individual questions.¹⁴ Sections A of Tables 3 and 4 give the correlations among the economic parameters. In the simple regressions the AEA sample unambiguously supports the weak version of the bias hypothesis, with almost three

Table 3
Summary of Results for Simple Regressions

	Percent of Coefficients significant and with sign: ^a		Mean absolute value of significant coefficients with right sign ^a	Mean Adjusted R ² ^b
	right	wrong		
A. Economic parameters regressed on each other:				
AEA sample	73%	0%	.248	.081
Labor economists	2	16	--	.011
Public economists	14	0	--	.028
B. Economic Parameters regressed on ideological variables:				
AEA sample ^c	83	0	.259	.107
Labor economists	29	12	--	.040
Public economists	17	0	--	.026
C. Ideological variables: regressed on each other:				
AEA sample ^c	97	0	.434	.228
Labor economists	100	0	--	.650
Public economists	100	0	--	.444
D. Policy variables: regressed on each other:				
AEA sample	95	0	.413	.181
Labor economists	77	3	--	.144
Public economists	33	22	--	.050

-- denotes not computed because of incommensurability of the variables.

a. Significant at the 5 percent level. For labor and public economists denominator of the ratio excludes coefficients with a t of zero.

b. Excludes simple regressions in which the coefficient has the wrong sign.

c. Excludes question 1, and for the mean of coefficients question 5.

Table 4

Summary of Results of Multiple Regressions

	Percent of regressions in which 67% or more of the coefficients have right signs. ^a	Adjusted R ² ^a
A. Economic parameters regressed on each other:		
AEA sample	67%	.263
Labor economists	9	.093
Public economists	83	.045
B. Economic Parameters regressed on ideological variables:		
AEA sample ^c	67	.202
Labor economists	20	.052
Public economists	17	.090
C. Ideological variables regressed on each other:		
AEA sample	100	.396
Labor economists	100	.650
Public economists	100	.678
D. Policy variables regressed on each other:		
AEA sample	100	.382
Labor economists	50	.407
Public economists	60	.130

- a. Excludes regressions in which more than half the coefficients have the wrong sign.
- b. Excludes coefficients with a t value of less than 0.1.
- c. Excludes question 1.

quarters of the regression coefficients being significant at the 5 percent level, all with the right sign. And their mean is well above the weak version's threshold of 0.15. The multiple regressions, too, support the weak version. And so do both the simple and multiple regressions for public economists. But for labor economists the weak version fails in both the simple and multiple regressions. In the former most of the significant coefficients have the wrong sign, and in the latter only 9 percent of the regressions meet the criterion of the weak version.

All three samples concur in rejecting the strong version in both types of regressions. In all three sets of simple regressions R^2 is less than 0.10, while in the multiple regressions it averages 0.263 in the AEA sample and substantially less in the specialists samples. Apparently - at least for the parameters that the surveys asked about - an inclination to accept ideologically congruous belief is not a major reason for disagreements about economic parameters.

Sections B of Table 3 and 4 show the results for the second test of the bias hypothesis, that economists' choices of economic parameters are correlated with their ideological positions. In the simple regressions the AEA sample firmly supports the weak version but rejects the strong version. The samples of specialists, too, accept the weak but not the strong version. However, the multiple regressions show a different result. Here, although the AEA sample again accepts the weak version, the two specialist samples reject it in more than three quarters of the cases.

In Parts A, B and C of Table 3 the AEA data are more favorable for the weak ideological-bias hypothesis than are the data for the specialists, with none of the significant coefficients having the wrong sign in the AEA data. This could be due to the

specialists being asked narrower, more technical questions, which makes it harder to indulge one's ideological preferences. Moreover, in Parts A and D, while the questions for the AEA sample were selected to avoid any theoretical or empirical connections between them, this is not so for the specialist samples. And in Part A these theoretical and empirical connections may have generated responses that are ideologically inconsistent, and hence show up as wrong signs in Table 3.

In summary, the strong version is rejected in all the cases. The weak version, however does better. When tested by the intercorrelations of economic parameters it is accepted in 4 of 6 cases. And the same is true when it is tested by the correlation between ideological variables and parameter estimates. In terms of the polar versions of the ideological-bias hypothesis in which economists' disagreements about parameters is either entirely uninfluenced by ideology, or else is entirely determined by ideology, the low R^2 's show that the former is much closer to the truth.

VI. Explanations

One reason that might, in principle, account for the weak performance of the bias hypothesis is that the evidence on economic parameters is so compelling that economists cannot indulge their ideological preferences, even if these preferences are strong. But that is implausible. The parameters in question are ones about which there is much disagreement. Another potential reason is that the liberal-conservative dichotomy - as it is defined here - does not reflect accurately the ideological divide among economists, and that if measured more meaningfully ideological differences would account for much more of economists' disagreements about parameters, and show much greater ideological cohesion in parameter choices. But Parts C of Tables 3 and 4 show that the ideological

divide as defined here does exist, and it is doubtful that an alternative measure of ideological differences would show stronger results. (At the same time the R^2 's of Tables 3 and 4 also show that cohesion among the responses to the ideological questions is surprisingly low: contrary to some popular complaints, American economists do not adhere to strict ideological party lines.¹⁵)

A more credible explanation is that economists do not have a powerful incentive to favor parameter estimates that correspond to their ideological preferences, because their parameter choices do relatively little to constrain them in supporting policies that correspond to their ideological predispositions. For example, suppose someone accepts a high estimate of the income elasticity of the labor supply. He or she may still advocate a highly progressive income tax, by attributing great importance to reducing income inequality. Similarly, someone might believe that exchange rate speculation is largely destabilizing, and yet oppose government intervention in this market in the belief that the government cannot intervene efficiently.

Two parameter questions in the surveys have a relatively close link to two policy questions, and can therefore be used to illustrate the independence of policy choices from parameter choices. One, in the AEA survey, asked whether a 10 percent cut in income tax rates would substantially increase work effort. The corresponding policy question asked whether government spending as a percent of GDP should be reduced. R^2 between the responses is only 0.36. The other parameter question (in the public economists survey) asks about the proportion of inflows into IRA's that represent net additions to savings. The corresponding policy question asked about raising the limits on IRA contributions. Here R^2 is even lower, 0.10. A comparison of Parts A and D of Tables 3 and 4 provides

an additional indication that parameter estimates do not strongly constrain policy positions. Except in the multiple regressions for public economists (where the results are equivocal) the positions taken on policy show a more consistent cleavage along the liberal - conservative spectrum than do the positions taken on parameters.

VII. Value Judgments and Judgments about Government Efficacy

Ideology as defined here includes judgments about government efficacy as well as normative judgments. Table 5 shows the relative importance of these two types of judgments by regressing the responses to the economic parameter questions and policy questions on two compound variables, C1 and C2, that represent a conservative ideology. The first is the mean of the value-judgment variables (variables 2, 3 and variable 4 with its sign reversed), and the latter is the mean (with sign reversed) of the efficacy variables (variables 6 and 7). In the simple regressions all regression coefficients are significant with the right sign and their means are 0.480 for C1 and 0.486 for C2. C1 has a mean R^2 of 0.223 and C2 of 0.244. In the 13 multiple regressions C1 has 3 significant coefficient with the right sign and 1 with the wrong sign, while C2 has 8 significant coefficients, all with the right sign. Here the mean of the regression coefficients is 0.208 for C1 and 0.364 for C2. On all the policy questions and on half of the questions about economic parameters C2 has a higher coefficient than C1. Thus C2 has at least as much, if not more explanatory power than C1.¹⁶ R^2 between C1 and C2 is only 0.501, which again shows that economists do not follow an ideological party line.¹⁷

VIII. Conclusions

The glass is neither full nor empty. But it is closer to being full. Whether economists support a liberal or a conservative ideology as defined here by questions on value

Table 5
Regressions of Parameter and Policy Variables on Compound
Values and Political Efficacy Variables - A.E.A. Sample

I. Simple Regressions								
Dependent Variable	Adjusted R2		Regression Coefficients		T Value		Number of Cases	
	C1	C2	C1	C2	C1	C2	C1	C2
A. Economic Parameters								
8	.058	.051	.314	.317	2.5	2.1	102	64
9	.374	.368	-.625	-.612	-9.0	-7.0	135	83
10	.103	.058	-.330	-.259	-4.1	-2.4	139	88
11	.128	.141	-.356	-.333	-3.8	-3.6	116	74
12	.283	.305	-.566	-.543	-6.6	-5.5	108	67
13	.094	.042	.319	.204	3.7	2.2	135	86
B. Economic Policy								
14	.114	.108	.274	.255	3.9	2.9	134	85
15	.156	.243	.472	.577	5.1	5.3	138	87
16	.190	.315	.442	.535	5.6	6.3	136	86
17	.047	.130	-.294	-.456	-2.7	-3.6	129	80
18	.478	.515	-.798	-.810	-11.0	-9.4	133	83
19	.237	.266	-.524	-.516	-6.5	-5.6	135	84
20	.643	.630	.920	.901	15.7	13.0	137	85
II. Multiple Regressions								
C. Economic Parameters								
8	.016	.022	.254	.1	1.0		58	
9	.367	-.330	-.326	-2.5	-2.4		72	
10	.010	-.089	-.114	-.6	-.7		76	
11	.175	-.226	-.169	-1.6	-1.2		64	
12	.363	-.180	-.472	-1.2	-3.0		60	
13	.059	.216	.054	1.4	.4		75	
D. Policy								
14	.163	.039	.302	.4	2.5		74	
15	.201	.047	.518	.3	3.0		75	
16	.285	.053	.486	.4	3.5		74	
17	.128	.437 ^c	-.665	2.4 ^c	-3.5		70	
18	.519	-.299	-.570	-2.2	-4.1		72	
19	.207	-.220	-.271	-1.6	-1.9		72	
20	.690	.490	.535	3.9	4.1	73		

Note: For definitions of the dependent variables see Table 1.

- a. C1 is the mean of variables 2, 3 and variable 4 with its sign reversed.
- b. C2 is the mean of variables 6 and 7 with the signs reversed.
- c. coefficient has the wrong sign.

judgments and government efficacy does tend to influence their estimates of economic parameters and policy choices - with judgments about government efficacy playing at least as large a role as value judgments. But it explains only a very small part of the disagreements among economists about economic parameters, or, at least about the parameters discussed here. This is not surprising for two reasons. First, in their value judgments economists do not rigidly follow a simple conservative or liberal party line. Second, the relation between parameters and policy choices is loose enough, so that economists can advocate a concerted set of liberal or conservative policies without having to do the same with respect to economic parameters. This does not necessarily mean that economists select their parameters entirely, or even largely, on the basis of objective scientific evidence. Other biases, such as a wish to defend one's previously published positions, a general reluctance to change one's mind, loyalty to a graduate school or to friends, a reluctance to read or to accept the work of those on the other side, a preference for using either the latest techniques, or else only those simple techniques that one already knows, could all play a substantial role. But that is another issue that can only be resolved by case studies.¹⁸

Appendix

The following letter was mailed to AEA members. A slightly different version was used in the e-mail message.

Dear Colleague:

I am currently working on a study of the opinions of economists as a follow-up on the Fuchs, Krueger and Poterba paper in the September 1998 JEL. I would therefore greatly appreciate it if you could fill out the enclosed questionnaire. I will, of course, keep all replies confidential. In fact, unless you want receive a copy of the results, there is no need to provide your name. The survey covers only academic economists, so if you do not hold an academic position please check here ☐ and return this letter.

I realize that many of the questions are on topics outside your sub-fields, but even so, I would value your opinion. In any case, each question provides a "cannot say" option.

If you would prefer to receive an e-mail version of the questionnaire please check here ☐ and provide your e-mail address. _____

If you would like to see the results please check here ☐ and provide your e-mail or mail address. _____

Sincerely,

Thomas Mayer
Emeritus Professor of
Economics, University
of California, Davis.
Dear Colleague:

ENDNOTES

* I am indebted for able research assistance to Jeffrey Lynch and Tod Tullis, and for funding to a U.C. Davis Faculty Research Grant.

1. The tensions created by discordant beliefs has been studied extensively in psychology under the name of "cognitive dissonance theory" (see for instance Aronson, 1980)

2. As David Colander (1994) points out for policy choices one needs to go beyond the "science of economics" to what John Neville Keynes called the "art of economics" that takes account of political and administrative considerations.

3. For a general discussion of disagreement in economics see Backhouse (1994), Colander (1994), Mayer (1994) McCloskey (1994), Woo (1994) 4. One of the reasons it is arbitrary is that the number of regressors used is arbitrary and that affects both R² and the t values of the regressors.

5. Another problem is that calculations based on data that ask respondents to report the extent of their agreement with certain statements implicitly imposes linear first degree homogeneity on the responses. For example if a respondent chooses the "strongly agree" option instead of the "agree" option, that receives an equal weight to a respondent choosing the "disagree" option instead of the "strongly disagree" option.

6. Only economists at American institutions were included. Retired economists who listed only a home address were excluded, as were those who listed their current position as teaching assistant, or as a visiting appointment. Economists employed by university research institutions were included. The Appendix reproduces the covering letter. The questions were asked in a different order than is shown in Table 1. A follow-up letter was sent to many of those who did not respond to the initial one. Of those responding to the relevant questions 94 percent hold a Ph.D. degree, with the mean date of receipt being 1981. About half (56 percent) teach in business schools, and close to half (45 percent) teach in departments with a doctoral program. Their distribution across departments is as follows: economics 74 percent, economics and business 3 percent, agricultural economics 4 percent, various business departments 9 percent, other departments, 9 percent. These variables had virtually no explanatory power with respect to the responses to the questions. The highest R² was 0.077.

7. These are questions 3, 9, 12-14, 16-19. See Frey et al (1984); Kearl et al (1979); Alston et al (1992); Ricketts and Shoemith; 1992) Alston et al (undated).

8. Question 1 used "favor" instead of "agree". Question 7 used "detrimental" and "favorable" and Question 20 "larger" and "smaller". Question 5 asked for a numerical answer.

9. A few respondents put marks in between boxes. I recorded these as a value half-way in between, except when the mark seemed to be outside the box only unintentionally; some questionnaires were sent by e-mail which could have led to misplaced marks.

10. The distinction between normative judgments and positive judgments is subtle. (See Fuchs et al, 1998) For example, many economists would probably consider an answer to Question 2 (whether enhancing social justice is more important than whether GDP grows at a 1.5 percent or at a 2 percent rate) to be a straightforward value judgment. But it also involves positive judgments, such as the declining marginal utility of income. 11. I am greatly indebted to Victor Fuchs for making these data available to me, and to Deborah Kerwin-Peck and Alan Kruger for answering numerous questions about them. For some questions about parameters Fuchs et al asked for a best estimate and also for lower and upper limits. I used the best estimate, and also adjusted the Fuchs data by omitting two outliers for labor economists and five outliers for public economists in the responses about economic parameters. These were responses that were either three times greater than the mean of the two next highest responses, or less than one third of the two next smallest responses. It is quite possible that these respondents made errors in checking the questionnaire. Eliminating these outliers should not bias the results since these are outliers in the data used for the regressions presented here, and not outliers in these regressions themselves. Another difference between the data used here and in Fuchs et al (1998) is in the treatment of blanks in the responses. To avoid losing observations Fuchs et al used in their regressions (but not in their Table 2) the mean of the regressors in place of missing observation. I did not. The resulting difference in the results is sometimes far from trivial.

12. I also excluded the question about the effect of minimum wages on employment. A few of the questionnaires showed a positive figure, and it is not clear whether the respondents think that a rise in the minimum wage would raise employment (the question was phrased in terms of employment, not unemployment), or whether they misread the question, or took a minus sign as implied in their response. I also excluded the question about the effect of unions on productivity since from the way the question is worded it is not obvious whether those who think that it is negative used a minus sign. Fuchs et al also asked the respondent's political party affiliation. Although this is related to ideology as defined here, I have not used this variable because party affiliation is often heavily influenced by non-economic issues, such as foreign policy and the legality of abortion.

13. For example, one question asked for the percentage change in GDP if the 1993 Budget Enforcement Act had been allowed to remain in place, and another question asked about the elasticity of the labor supply of men aged 25-45. The regression coefficient between the responses would have been very different had the first question been phrased in tenth of one percent instead of in percentages. By contrast, in the AEA sample respondents were asked to choose between answers ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree", so that all the questions are in comparable units.

14. All regressions are OLS with an (unreported) constant, and were run with TSP 7.0. The t values are adjusted for heteroscedastity if this is indicated at the 10 percent level on

the Arque-Bera test. A warning is in order; most of the variables are not normally distributed. The Arque-Bera test rejects normality at the 5 percent level for the majority of the variables in the Fuchs et al survey and for 90 percent of the variables in the AEA survey.

15. Neither these correlations, nor the policy correlations discussed below can be used to support the ideological-bias hypothesis, since they are consistent with economists being unbiased in their professional work.

16. The variance of C2 trivially exceeds that of C1.

17. It is, of course, possible that some respondents' judgments about government efficacy are merely a device for hiding their value judgments. But the opposite may also be the case.

18. For an attempt to do some of this with respect to the debate about countercyclical monetary policy see Mayer (1998).

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Appendix Table A-1
Simple Regressions of Economic Parameter Variables
A.E.A. Sample

Independent Variables:	8	9	10	11	12	13
Dependent Variable:						
Adjusted R2						
8	--	.000	.053	.000	.031	.128
9	.000	--	.059	.055	.402	.004
10	.053	.059	--	.081	.045	.076
11	.000	.055	.081	--	.049	.227
12	.031	.402	.045	.049	--	.000
13	.128	.004	.076	.227	.000	--
Regression Coefficients:						
8		-.030	-.205	-.078	-.167	.298
9	-.050	--	.248	.244	.638	-.102
10	-.297	.262	--	.081	.225	-.286
11	-.118	.255	.305	--	.262	-.480
12	-.242	.638	.236	.220	--	-.067
13	.456	-.109	-.288	-.485	-.072	--
T Values						
8		-.4	-2.7	-1.0	-2.0	4.2
9	-.4	--	3.3	2.8	9.1	-1.3
10	-2.6	3.5	--	3.5	2.5	-3.6
11	-1.0	2.9	3.4	--	2.2	-6.0
12	-2.1	8.1	2.5	2.3	--	-.7
13	4.4	-1.3	-3.5	-5.9	-.7	--
Number of Cases						
8	--	116	118	104	100	115
9	116	--	156	133	122	149
10	118	156	--	138	122	157
11	104	133	138	--	107	135
12	100	122	122	107	--	117
13	115	149	157	135	117	--

Note: For definitions of the variables see Table 1

Appendix Table A-2
Simple Regressions of Economic Parameter Variables
Labor Economists

Independent Variable:	1-1	3-1	6-1	7-1	10-1	11-1
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Adjusted R2

1-1	--	.000	.001	.133	.005	.005
2-1	(.790)	.000	.037	.143	.020	.063
3-1	.000	--	.160	.000	.000	.051
4-1	.000	(.493)	.094	.000	.000	.000
5-1	.002	(.140)	.000	.000	.037	.021
6-1	.001	.160	--	(.108)	.000	.006
7-1	.133	.000	(.108)	--	.000	.000
8-1	.000	.133	(.236)	(.085)	.000	.010
9-1	.107	.000	(.068)	(.735)	.051	.000
10-1	.005	.000	.000	.000	--	.000
11-1	.005	.051	.006	.000	.000	--

T- Value

1-1	--	1.1	-1.0	-3.1	1.1	1.6
2-1	(12.9)	.9	-2.0	-5.3	1.4	2.1
3-1	1.3	--	2.7	.6	.6	2.0
4-1	1.0	(7.4)	2.4	.8	.6	.6
5-1	1.1	(2.8)	.1	.5	1.7	1.6
6-1	-.7	2.7	--	(2.8)	.2	-1.2
7-1	-1.5	.8	(1.8)	--	-.2	-1.5
8-1	-2.1	2.6	(2.8)	(4.0)	-.4	-1.5
9-1	-1.1	-.2	(2.1)	(7.9)	-1.7	.5
10-1	1.4	.6	.1	-.2	--	-.2
11-1	1.4	1.2	-1.0	-1.2	-.2	--

Number of Cases

1-1	--	49	48	49	51	54
2-1	45	42	41	42	43	45
3-1	49	56	49	50	55	57
4-1	48	56	49	50	54	56
5-1	48	55	48	49	53	55
6-1	48	49	--	54	52	54
7-1	49	50	54	--	52	54
8-1	38	39	43	43	42	43
9-1	37	38	42	42	39	41
10-1	51	55	52	52	--	61
11-1	54	57	54	54	61	--

Notes: For definitions of variables see Table 2. Parentheses indicate questions for which the correlation of responses need not be due to ideological influences.

Appendix Table A-3
Simple Regressions of Economic Parameter Variables
Public Economists

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables					
	1-p	2-p	3-p	4-p	5-p	6-p

Adjusted R2

1-p	--	(.004)	(.008)	(.039)	.002	.003
2-p	(.004)	--	(.411)	.000	.036	.009
3-p	(.008)	(.411)	--	.037	.024	.009
4-p	(.039)	.000	.368	--	.000	.000
5-p	.002	.036	.024	.000	--	.000
6-p	.003	.009	.001	.000	.000	--

T-Values

1-p	--	(1.3)	(1.8)	(-1.8)	1.0	-1.4
2-p	(1.2)	--	(4.1)	1.0	2.0	-1.4
3-p	(1.6)	(3.1)	--	2.2	1.5	-1.6
4-p	(-1.9)	.9	1.5	---	1.0	.8
5-p	1.0	1.6	1.4	.9	--	-.8
6-p	-1.6	-1.7	-2.1	1.0	-.8	--

Number of Cases

1-p	--	50	47	52	55	47
2-p	50	--	52	50	51	46
3-p	47	52	--	46	49	44
4-p	52	50	46	--	56	47
5-p	55	51	49	56	--	49
6-p	47	46	44	47	49	--

Notes: For definitions of the variables see Table 2 Parentheses indicate questions for which a correlation of responses need not be due to ideological influence.

Appendix Table A-4
Multiple Regressions of Economic Parameters
A.E.A. Sample

Adjusted R2	Independent Variables:					
	8	9	10	11	12	13
Dependent Variables	Regression Coefficients					

8	.128	--	.113	-.184	.138	-.310	.394
9	.413	.046	--	-.027	.138	.600	-.094
10	.111	-.141	-.050	---	.125	.190	-.221
11	.215	.076	.183	.089	--	.002	-.424
12	.428	-.144	.668	.115	.002	--	.171
13	.283	.207	-.119	-.151	-.406	.194	--

T Values

8	---	.6	-1.3	.9	-1.9	3.4
9	.7	--	-.3	1.5	7.4	-1.0
10	-1.5	-.3	--	1.0	1.3	-1.7
11	.9	1.5	1.0	--	.0	-4.0
12	-1.9	7.4	1.3	.0	--	1.7
13	2.7	-1.0	-1.7	-4.1	1.7	--

Notes: For definitions of the variables see Table 1. There are 87 cases in all regressions.

Appendix Table A-5 Multiple Regressions of Economic Parameters

A. Labor Economists

Dependent Variables Adjusted R² T Values of Independent Variables: Number of cases

1-1	.068	--	1.4	-.3	-1.5	.8	-.5	42
2-1	.102	--	.8	-.6	-1.1	1.2	.7	38
3-1	.254	1.2	--	2.4	.5	.2	3.5	42
4-1	.117	1.1	--	1.7	1.0	.9	2.2	41
5-1	.060	1.4	--	-.1	1.5	1.3	1.7	41
6-1	.127	-1.1	2.8	--	--	-.6	-2.0	42
7-1	.136	-3.1	1.2	--	--	.2	-1.5	43
8-1	.000	-.6	1.2	--	--	-1.4	-1.2	34
9-1	.179	-1.8	-1.6	--	--	-1.8	.9	32
10-1	.000	.7	.2	-.7	.3	--	-.4	42
11-1	.192	-.4	3.5	-1.6	-1.0	-.4	--	42

B- Public Economists

1-p 2-p 3-p 4-p 5-p 6-p

1-p	.003	--	--	--	--	.9	-1.5	46
2-p	.054	1.3	--	--	--	1.4	-1.8	43
3-p	.075	--	--	--	1.8	1.5	-2.6	40

4-p	.075	--	.0	1.3	--	.0	2.3	40
5-p	.000	.5	.3	.7	-.1	--	-.4	38
6-p	.061	-.9	-.6	-.5	1.9	-.4	--	38

-- denotes variables excluded from the regression.

Note: For the definitions of the variables see Table 2

Appendix Table A-6

Simple Regressions of Economic Parameters on Values and Political-Economy Variables - A.E.A. Sample

Independent Variable:	Dependent Variable:					
	8	9	10	11	12	13
	Adjusted R2					
1	.000	.057	.117	.077	.038	.130
2	.069	.215	.115	.120	.077	.146
3	.051	.179	.104	.054	.168	.033
4	.032	.315	.038	.107	.244	.042
5	.000	.085	.000	.000	.003	.000
6	.046	.298	.064	.060	.299	.000
7	.038	.208	.110	.171	.134	.117
	Regression Coefficients					
1	-.119	.309	.402	.324	.263	-.424
2	.303	-.421	-.308	-.306	-.262	.347
3	.222	-.341	-.254	-.187	-.333	.152
4	-.218	.502	.179	.283	.447	-.188
5	.002	-.017	-.001	.001	-.007	.003
6	-.285	.518	.253	.213	.508	-.064
7	-.242	.414	.298	.359	.334	-.301
	T Values					
1	-.8	3.7	4.0	3.0	2.0	-4.2
2	2.9	-6.3	-4.5	-3.9	-3.1	4.9
3	2.6	-5.8	-4.3	-2.7	-4.9	2.2
4	-2.1	8.5	2.7	3.8	6.3	-2.6
5	.2	-3.0	-.2	.1	-1.1	.4
6	-2.1	6.2	2.9	2.5	5.4	-.8
7	-2.2	5.9	4.2	5.2	3.8	-4.3
	Number of Cases					
1	102	137	141	120	106	137
2	109	144	150	125	114	146
3	113	148	153	129	117	146

4	114	154	159	133	119	152
5	62	77	78	64	68	76
6	68	90	94	80	72	92
7	108	144	149	125	112	143

Notes: For definitions of the variables see Table 1.

Appendix Table A-7

Simple Regressions of Economic Parameters on Value Variables

A - Labor Economists

Dependent Variables:

1-1 3-1 6-1 7-1 10-1 11-1

Independent
Variable:

	Adjusted R2					
v-1	.121	.021	.045	.104	.000	.098
v-2	.208	.000	.000	.141	.000	.065
v-3	.011	.051	.015	.033	.000	.036
v-4	.171	.068	.000	.008	.000	.103

T Values

v-1	2.0	1.5	-1.7	-2.7	.6	3.3
v-2	2.2	.6	-1.0	-2.3	.4	2.9
v-3	-1.6	-2.0	1.3	-2.5	-.4	-2.1
v-4	2.5	2.4	-.4	-1.2	.0	2.9

Number of Cases

v-1	54	57	55	55	61	64
v-2	46	51	48	48	54	56
v-3	54	57	55	55	61	64
v-4	50	54	51	51	57	59

B - Public Economists

1-p 2-p 3-p 4-p 5-p 6-p

	Adjusted R2					
v-1	.000	.000	.041	.037	.000	.000
v-2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001
v-3	.000	.000	.074	.009	.000	.000
v-4	.206	.000	.137	.000	.047	.000

T Values

v-1	-.6	0.2	-2.4	-1.8	-.4	1.2
-----	-----	-----	------	------	-----	-----

v-2	-.6	1.3	-1.1	-.5	.1	1.6
v-3	.7	.4	2.3	1.4	.4	-.4
v-4	-3.5	-1.1	-3.2	-1.0	-1.8	.7

	Number of Cases					
v-1	57	56	53	58	60	54
v-2	56	56	53	57	59	54
v-3	53	52	49	54	56	50
v-4	49	47	45	49	53	46

Note: For definitions of the variables see Table 2

Appendix Table A-8

Multiple Regressions of Economic Parameters on Values and Political-Economy Variables - A.E.A. Sample

Dependent Variable:		Independent Variables:							
		Adjusted R2	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
		Regression Coefficients							
8	.064	-.206	.285	.249	.159	-.036	.105	-.022	
9	.316	.019	-.190	.123	.249	-.013	.434	-.137	
10	.126	.393	-.098	-.192	-.505	.013	.217	.105	
11	.161	.088	.320	-.050	.338	-.011	-.157	.110	
12	.455	-.060	.191	-.044	.564	-.008	.610	-.398	
13	.091	-.256	-.065	.015	-.082	-.011	.191	-.352	

	Number of cases	T Values						
8	32	-.8	.9	1.0	.5	-2.5	.4	-.1
9	40	.1	-1.2	.8	1.2	-1.5	2.7	-.7
10	40	2.0	-.6	-1.2	-2.5	1.5	1.2	.5
11	32	.5	2.0	-.4	1.8	-1.3	-1.1	.6
12	37	-.3	1.2	-.3	3.0	-.9	3.6	-1.9
13	40	-1.5	-.4	.1	-.5	-1.4	1.2	-1.9

Notes: For definitions of the variables see Table 1.

Table A-9

Multiple Regressions of Economic Parameter Estimates on Values

Dependent Variable	Adjusted R2	Independent Variables				Number of Cases
		1-v	2-v	3-v	4-v	

A - Labor Economists

T Values						
1-l	.282	1.1	.9	1.0	1.4	42
3-l	.052	.2	-.9	-1.3	1.8	48
6-l	.061	-1.8	.7	.0	2.1	44
7-l	.086	-.7	-1.1	-.6	.9	44
10-l	.000	1.1	-.4	-.5	-1.1	50
11-l	.068	.5	-.1	.4	1.9	51

B - Public Economists

1-p	.232	1.3	-1.2	-.6	-3.4	46
2-p	.009	.5	1.4	.6	-1.2	45
3-p	.117	-.1	1.3	1.0	-1.7	43
4-p	.099	-2.7	2.2	-.1	.7	46
5-p	.020	.9	.3	-.7	-2.0	50
6-p	.000	.9	.4	.1	-.9	45

Note: For definitions of the variables see Table 2.

Appendix Table A-10

Simple Regressions of Normative and Political-Economy Variables
A.E.A. Sample

Independent Variable:	Dependent Variable:						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Adjusted R2							
1	--	.194	.051	.057	.006	.076	.096
2	.194	--	.228	.257	.092	.188	.350
3	.051	.228	--	.357	.048	.191	.270
4	.057	.257	.357	--	.163	.285	.306
5	.006	.092	.048	.163	--	.190	.051
6	.076	.188	.191	.285	.190	--	.407
7	.096	.350	.270	.306	.051	.407	--
Regression Coefficients							
1	--	-.588	-.365	.350	-3.733	.363	.437
2	-.341	--	.557	-.526	5.996	-.412	-.603
3	-.159	.419	--	-.530	3.799	-.366	-.457
4	.183	-.497	-.681	--	-7.355	.510	.552
5	-.005	.017	.016	-.024	--	-.028	-.014
6	.241	-.481	-.548	.575	-7.30	--	.682
7	.235	-.589	-.603	.563	-4.53	.607	--

T Values

1	--	-6.7	-2.8	3.5	-1.2	2.8	4.0
2	-4.8	--	6.6	-7.2	2.9	-4.5	-8.8
3	-2.7	6.4	--	-9.1	2.0	-4.6	-7.3
4	2.8	-7.2	-9.2	--	-4.0	6.1	8.1
5	-1.3	3.2	2.1	-3.9	--	-3.4	-2.2
6	3.0	-4.5	-4.6	6.1	-3.4	--	7.8
7	3.6	-8.8	-7.3	8.1	-2.2	7.8	--

Number of Cases							
1	--	133	136	138	76	81	132
2	133	--	145	147	75	85	142
3	136	145	--	151	75	86	144
4	138	147	151	--	75	92	148
5	76	75	75	75	--	46	74
6	81	85	86	92	46	--	88
7	132	142	144	148	74	88	--

Note: For definitions of the variables see Table 1. The regression coefficients for variable 5 must be interpreted with caution since the units differ; for all other variables the range is 1 to 5, while for variable 5 the potential range is 0 to 100.

a. All regression coefficient are significant at the 5 percent

Appendix Table A-11

Simple Regressions of Value Judgments

I. Simple Regressions

		Dependent Variables							
		1-v	2-v	3-v	4-v	1-v	2-v	3-v	4-v
Labor Economists				Public Economists					
Independent Variables:									
Adjusted R2									
1-v	--	.685	.491	.514	--	.691	.562	.536	
2-v	.685	--	.258	.451	.691	--	.305	.357	
3-v	.491	.258	--	.265	.562	.305	--	.583	
4-v	.514	.451	.265	--	.536	.357	.583	--	
T Values									
1-v	--	11.1	-7.4	7.1	--	12.8	-9.0	9.0	
2-v	11.8	--	-4.5	7.2	11.9	--	-5.3	5.7	
3-v	-6.5	-4.5	--	-3.8	-9.0	-5.3	--	-8.8	
4-v	7.0	6.5	-4.7	--	8.2	5.7	-8.8	--	

Number of Cases								
1-v	--	57	65	60	--	68	63	58
2-v	57	--	57	52	68	--	62	57
3-v	65	57	--	60	63	62	--	56
4-v	60	52	60	--	58	57	56	--

II. Multiple Regressions

Labor Economists

Dependent Variable:	Adjusted R2	Independent Variables			
		1-v	2-v	3-v	4-v
T Values					
1-v	.803	--	5.8	-3.1	3.0
2-v	.671	5.8	--	1.1	.8
3-v	.503	-4.2	1.2	--	-1.8
4-v	.624	2.7	.7	-1.6	--

Public Economists

1-v	.790	--	7.3	-3.3	1.2
2-v	.681	8.0	--	1.0	.7
3-v	.636	-3.3	1.4	--	-4.1
4-v	.607	1.2	.8	-4.1	--

Notes: For questions see T-2. For labor economists there are 52 cases and for public economists 55.

Appendix Table A-12

Multiple Regressions of Value and Political Economy Variables

A.E.A. Sample

Dependent Variable	Adjusted R2	Independent Variable						
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Regression Coefficients:								
1	.000	---	-.040	-.063	.155	-.004	.159	-.192
2	.363	-.050	---	.299	-.063	.002	-.046	-.278
3	.487	-.096	.358	---	-.505	.005	.078	-.182
4	.544	.144	-.046	-.309	---	.002	.049	.410
5	.000	-1.819	.694	1.535	.855	---	-3.149	-1.403
6	.380	.186	-.042	.060	.061	-.008	---	.551
7	.604	-.157	-.179	-.098	.360	-.003	.387	---

T Values

1	---	-.3	-.7	.8	-.6	1.0	-.7
2	-.3	---	2.0	-.3	.2	-.3	-1.3
3	-.4	2.0	---	-2.5	.5	.4	-.8
4	.9	-.3	-2.5	---	.2	.3	2.4
5	-.5	.2	.5	.2	-.3	-.9	-.3
6	1.0	-.3	.4	.3	-.9	---	3.0
7	-1.0	-1.3	-.8	2.4	-.3	3.0	---

Notes: For definitions of the variables see Table 1. There are 40 cases in all regressions.

level, except the coefficient of variable 1 on variable 5.

Appendix Table A-13
Simple Regressions of Policy Variables
A.E.A. Sample

Independent Variable:	Dependent Variable:						
	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
	Adjusted R2						
14	--	.035	.072	.000	.099	.085	.143
15	.035	---	.263	.141	.240	.205	.248
16	.072	.263	---	.113	.237	.174	.334
17	.000	.141	.113	---	.103	.099	.117
18	.099	.240	.237	.103	---	.231	.587
19	.085	.205	.174	.099	.231	---	.274
20	.143	.248	.334	.117	.587	.274	--
	Regression Coefficients						
14	--	.296	.341	-.090	-.470	-.397	.543
15	.140	--	.428	-.417	-.490	-.419	.496
16	.230	.624	--	-.452	-.593	-.461	.680
17	-.038	-.353	-.264	--	.306	.275	-.311
18	-.225	-.499	-.408	.358	--	.445	-.761
19	-.230	-.501	-.389	.385	.530	--	-.570
20	.274	.510	.498	-.396	-.775	-.489	--
	T Values						
14	--	2.6	4.6	-.6	-4.9	-3.9	6.6
15	2.3	--	7.5	-5.4	-7.0	-6.4	7.2
16	3.8	7.5	--	-4.7	-7.0	-6.6	8.8
17	-.7	-5.1	-4.2	--	4.0	3.9	-4.3
18	-3.9	-7.0	-7.0	4.0	--	6.8	-15.4
19	-4.0	-6.4	-5.6	4.0	6.8	--	-7.7
20	4.5	7.2	8.8	-4.6	-16.3	-7.7	--

Number of Cases

14	--	153	151	143	146	151	150
15	153	--	157	147	152	156	155
16	151	157	--	145	154	155	154
17	143	147	145	--	141	143	144
18	146	152	154	141	--	152	151
19	151	156	155	143	152	--	154
20	150	155	154	144	151	154	--

Notes: For definitions of the variables see Table 1.

Appendix Table A-14
Simple Regressions of Policy Variables

A - Labor Economists

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables					
	12-1	13-1	14-1	15-1	16-1	17-1
Adjusted R2						
12-1	--	.002	.065	.173	.297	.136
13-1	.002	--	.042	.079	.113	.000
14-1	.065	.042	--	.226	.134	.200
15-1	.173	.079	.226	--	.477	.256
16-1	.297	.113	.134	.477	--	.122
17-1	.136	.000	.200	.256	.122	--
T Values						
12-1	--	1.1	-2.3	3.7	-5.2	3.2
13-1	1.1	--	-1.8	2.5	-2.9	.1
14-1	-2.3	-1.9	--	-3.8	3.3	-3.9
15-1	3.7	2.5	-4.4	--	-7.6	4.5
16-1	-5.2	-2.9	3.0	-7.6	--	-3.0
17-1	3.2	.1	-3.9	4.5	-3.0	--
Number of Cases						
12-1	--	59	62	62	62	58
13-1	59	--	60	60	60	56
14-1	62	60	--	63	63	57
15-1	62	60	63	--	63	57
16-1	62	60	63	63	--	57
17-1	58	56	57	57	57	--

B - Public Economists

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables				
	7-p	8-p	9-p	10-p	11-p
Adjusted R2					
7-p	--	.049	.099	.165	.064
8-p	.049	--	.000	.000	.000

9-p	.099	.000	--	.138	.045
10-p	.165	.000	.138	--	.026
11-p	.064	.000	.045	.026	--

T Values					
7-p	--	-2.1	2.9	-3.7	-2.6
8-p	-2.1	--	.0	.7	.7
9-p	2.8	.0	--	-3.4	2.0
10-p	-3.7	.7	-3.4	--	1.6
11-p	-2.5	.7	-2.0	1.6	--

Number of Cases					
7-p	--	66	64	66	63
8-p	66	--	65	67	64
9-p	64	65	--	66	63
10-p	66	67	66	--	64
11-p	63	64	63	64	--

Note: For definitions of the variables see Table 2
Appendix Table A-15
Multiple Regressions of Policy Variables
A.E.A. Sample

Dependent Variable	Independent Variables:							
Adjusted R2	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	

Regression Coefficients								
14	.152	--	-.004	.119	.069	-.004	-.097	.223
15	.417	-.005	--	.299	-.103	-.238	-.268	.048
16	.373	.117	.224	--	-.082	.018	-.066	.285
17	.129	.156	-.177	-.188	--	.179	.140	.051
18	.623	-.004	-.152	.016	.066	--	.111	-.659
19	.340	-.116	-.245	-.080	.074	.159	--	-.107
20	.641	.164	.027	.213	.017	-.579	-.066	--

T Values								
14	126	---	0.0	1.3	1.1	0.0	-1.3	2.5
15	126	0.0	---	2.9	-1.5	-2.1	-2.9	.4
16	126	1.3	2.9	---	-1.4	.2	-.8	2.8
17	126	1.1	-1.6	-1.3	---	1.3	1.0	.3
18	126	0.0	-2.2	.2	1.3	---	1.4	-7.5
19	126	-1.2	-2.9	-.8	1.1	1.5	---	-.9
20	126	2.5	.4	3.1	.3	-6.6	-.8	---

Notes: For definitions of the variables see Table 1.

Appendix Table A-16
Multiple Regressions of Policy Variables

A - Labor Economists

Dependent Variable:	Adjusted R2	Independent Variables						
	12-1	13-1	14-1	15-1	16-1	17-1		

T Values

12-1	.266	--	-.1	-.1	-.1	-2.7	1.3
13-1	.291	-.1	--	-2.6	.8	-2.2	-3.0
14-1	.344	-.1	-2.6	--	-1.1	-.6	-3.1
15-1	.540	-.1	.8	-1.1	--	-3.9	2.1
16-1	.561	-2.7	-2.2	-.6	-3.9	--	-.7
17-1	.441	1.3	-3.0	-3.1	2.1	-.7	--

B - Public Economists

Dependent Variable:	Adjusted R2	Independent Variables				
	7-p	8-p	9-p	10-p	11-p	

T Values

7-p	.219	--	-1.8	1.3	-2.2	-1.5
8-p	.000	-1.6	--	.6	.2	-.1
9-p	.157	1.3	.5	--	-1.9	-1.1
10-p	.222	-2.3	.2	-2.3	--	1.0
11-p	.079	-1.4	-.1	-1.1	1.0	--

Notes: For definitions of the variables see Table 2. There are 53 cases for labor economists and 60 for public economists.

Table 1
Responses to the AEA Survey

	Mean	S.D.	N
1. Suppose technical change would raise the level of output permanently by 2%, but would cause a totally arbitrary 5% redistribution within each income decile, while leaving the distribution between quintiles unchanged. Would you favor this development? [Strongly favor ... Strongly disfavor] ^a	1.9	1.0	142
2. Whether GDP grows at 1.5% or 2% is not nearly as important as enhancing social justice. (C)	3.3	1.4	152
3. The government has a moral right to redistribute income if a majority supports this. (C)	2.9	1.6	156
4. Maintaining or preferably enhancing freedom from government control should be the main goal of economic policy (L)	3.1	1.4	161
5. While it is hard to generalize about the many government programs involved, by and large, if the government adopts a program to help the lowest income quintile I would expect that roughly speaking -- % of the benefits would go to the upper half of the income distribution instead of the lowest quintile. (C)	46.4	24.4	78
6. In general, the law of unanticipated consequences ensures that most programs that are intended to help the poor harm them more than they help them. (L)	03.2	1.3	95
7. Government intervention that would substantially reduce the inequality of the income distribution would have major social and political effects. On the whole, these effects would be [Strongly detrimental .. Strongly favorable] (L)	3.0	1.4	150
8. A \$50 billion rise in government expenditures with no accompanying change in the money supply is more expansionary over a 5 year period than is a \$50 billion increase in the money supply with no change in fiscal policy. (C)	3.2	1.4	119
9. A 10 percent cut across the board in income tax rates would substantially increase work effort. (L)	3.6	1.2	158

10. Product markets in the U.S. are better described as competitive than oligopolistic, (L)	2.5	1.2	164
11. Speculation in foreign exchange markets is beneficial because it is usually stabilizing rather than destabilizing. (L)	2.7	1.2	137
12. Halving the capital gains tax rate would raise the economic growth rate by 0.25 or more. (L)	3.5	1.3	124
13. Financial markets generate serious misallocations of resources because stock prices are dominated by short-term returns, and long-term consequences tend to be neglected. (C)	3.8	1.2	157
14. It is better to aim for a balanced budget over the business cycle rather than yearly. (C)	1.6	.9	157
15. Industrial policy(that is government support for innovative industries) should not be dismissed out of hand, but deserves serious consideration. (C)	3.3	1.4	162
16. An increase in unionization is desirable. (C)	3.6	1.2	161
17. Trade in human organs for transplants should be permitted. (L)	3.0	1.5	150
18. Government spending as a percent of GDP should be reduced. (L)	2.8	1.4	156
19. The prime concern of macropolicy should be to hold down inflation. (L)	2.9	1.3	160
20. Compared to the current situation, the federal government's role in the income distribution should be [Larger .. Smaller] (C)	3.0	1.4	160

Note: Unless otherwise indicated the respondents were presented with five boxes ranging from : "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". The letter in parenthesis indicates whether it is conservatives or liberals who are assumed to assign a high value to this parameter when measured on a scale ranging from "strongly oppose" to "strongly favor".

a. Responses cannot be classified as conservative or liberal.

Table 2

Condensed Versions of the Questions in Surveys of Specialists

A. Values - Labor Economists and Public Economists

Does the government play too large or too small a role in income redistribution? (L) [1-v]

Same as the previous question on the assumption that redistribution would have no distortionary effects. (L) [2-v]

Should policy place more weight on equity or on efficiency than it does now? (C) [3-v]

Should policy give more weight to individual or to social responsibility than it does now? (L) [4-v]

B. Economic Parameters - Labor Economists

Total wage elasticity of labor demand? (C) [1-l]

Output constant wage elasticity of labor demand? (C) [2-l]

Percent impact on earnings of youths of JTPA job training? (L) [3-l]

Percent impact on earnings of adult males of JTPA job training? (L) [4-l]

Percent impact on earnings of adult females of JTPA job training? (L) [5-l]

Uncompensated elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [6-l]

Uncompensated elasticity of labor supply for women aged 25-54? (C) [7-l]

Compensated elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [8-l]

Compensated elasticity of labor supply for women aged 25-54? (C) [9-l]

Percent impact of unions on the earnings of their members? (L) [10-l]

Percent of male-female wage gap due to employer discrimination? (L) [11]

C. Economic Parameters - Public Economists

Change in the GDP growth rate if all capital income taxes were replaced by a revenue-neutral wage tax? (C) [1-p]

Uncompensated elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [2-p]

Compensated elasticity of labor supply for men aged 25-54? (C) [3-p]

Percent of inflows to IRA's that are net additions to saving? (C) [4-p]

Personal saving ratio in the absence of Social Security? (C) [5-p]

Ratio of administrative costs of mandatory private retirement accounts to the administrative costs of Social Security? (L) [6-p]

D. Policy Recommendations- Labor Economists

Increase AFDC benefits financed by a proportional increase in marginal

income tax rates. (L) [12-l]
 Eliminate the OASI cap on taxable wages, offset by a revenue-neutral reduction in payroll tax rates (L) [13-l]
 Eliminate the OFCCP Affirmative Action Program (C) [14-l]
 Increase the minimum wage from \$4.25 to \$5.15 over two years (L) [15-l]
 Eliminate the federal role in job training programs and apply the savings to debt reduction. (C) [16-1]
 Change the law to permit workers to form union if a majority of workers in the bargaining unit sign cards. (L) [17-7]

E. Policy Recommendations - Public Economists

Increase AFDC benefits financed by a proportional increase in marginal income tax rates. (L) [7-p]
 Replace individual and corporate income tax and estate tax with a revenue neutral value-added tax. (C) [8-p]
 Eliminate the cap on taxable wages under OASI with an offsetting reduction in the payroll tax rate. (C) [9-p]
 Raise the maximum IRA contribution to \$5000 and restore "up front" tax deductions of IRA contributions for everyone. (C) [10-p]
 Replace part of the current payroll tax with a mandatory self-directed savings program, annuitized at retirement. (C) [11-p]

NOTE: These are summaries of the questions. For the complete questions see Fuchs et al (1998) The letter in parenthesis indicates whether it is conservatives or liberals who are assumed to assign a high value to this parameter when measured on a scale ranging from "strongly oppose" to "strongly favor" on the policy questions, and from "much less" to "much greater" on the value questions (except for question 4-v where the range is from "individual responsibility" to "public responsibility.") The symbol in brackets is the designation used for this question in the subsequent tables.

a. Choices ranged from "strongly oppose" to "strongly favor".`

Source: Fuchs et al (1998) pp. 1416-23.

Table 3
Summary of Results for Simple Regressions

		Percent of Coefficients significant and with sign: ^a		Mean absolute value of significant coefficients with right sign ^a	Mean Adjusted R ² ^b
		right	wrong		
A.	Economic parameters regressed on each other:				
	AEA sample	73%	0%	.248	.081
	Labor economists	2	16	--	.011
	Public economists	14	0	--	.028
B.	Economic Parameters regressed on ideological variables:				
	AEA sample ^c	83	0	.259	.107
	Labor economists	29	12	--	.040
	Public economists	17	0	--	.026
C.	Ideological variables: regressed on each other:				
	AEA sample ^c	97	0	.434	.228
	Labor economists	100	0	--	.650
	Public economists	100	0	--	.444
D.	Policy variables: regressed on each other:				
	AEA sample	95	0	.413	.181
	Labor economists	77	3	--	.144
	Public economists	33	22	--	.050

-- denotes not computed because of incommensurability of the variables.

a. Significant at the 5 percent level. For labor and public economists denominator of the ratio excludes coefficients with a t of zero.

b. Excludes simple regressions in which the coefficient has the wrong sign.

c. Excludes question 1, and for the mean of coefficients question 5.

Table 4

Summary of Results of Multiple Regressions

	Percent of regressions in which 67% or more of the coefficients have right signs. ^a	Adjusted R ² ^a
A. Economic parameters regressed on each other:		
AEA sample	67%	.263
Labor economists	9	.093
Public economists	83	.045
B. Economic Parameters regressed on ideological variables:		
AEA sample ^c	67	.202
Labor economists	20	.052
Public economists	17	.090
C. Ideological variables regressed on each other:		
AEA sample	100	.396
Labor economists	100	.650
Public economists	100	.678
D. Policy variables regressed on each other:		
AEA sample	100	.382
Labor economists	50	.407
Public economists	60	.130

- a. Excludes regressions in which more than half the coefficients have the wrong sign.
- b. Excludes coefficients with a t value of less than 0.1.
- c. Excludes question 1.

Table 5
Regressions of Parameter and Policy Variables on Compound
Values and Political Efficacy Variables - A.E.A. Sample

I. Simple Regressions								
Dependent Variable	Adjusted R2		Regression Coefficients		T Value		Number of Cases	
	C1	C2	C1	C2	C1	C2	C1	C2
A. Economic Parameters								
8	.058	.051	.314	.317	2.5	2.1	102	64
9	.374	.368	-.625	-.612	-9.0	-7.0	135	83
10	.103	.058	-.330	-.259	-4.1	-2.4	139	88
11	.128	.141	-.356	-.333	-3.8	-3.6	116	74
12	.283	.305	-.566	-.543	-6.6	-5.5	108	67
13	.094	.042	.319	.204	3.7	2.2	135	86
B. Economic Policy								
14	.114	.108	.274	.255	3.9	2.9	134	85
15	.156	.243	.472	.577	5.1	5.3	138	87
16	.190	.315	.442	.535	5.6	6.3	136	86
17	.047	.130	-.294	-.456	-2.7	-3.6	129	80
18	.478	.515	-.798	-.810	-11.0	-9.4	133	83
19	.237	.266	-.524	-.516	-6.5	-5.6	135	84
20	.643	.630	.920	.901	15.7	13.0	137	85
II. Multiple Regressions								
C. Economic Parameters								
8	.016	.022	.254	.1	1.0		58	
9	.367	-.330	-.326	-2.5	-2.4		72	
10	.010	-.089	-.114	-.6	-.7		76	
11	.175	-.226	-.169	-1.6	-1.2		64	
12	.363	-.180	-.472	-1.2	-3.0		60	
13	.059	.216	.054	1.4	.4		75	
D. Policy								
14	.163	.039	.302	.4	2.5		74	
15	.201	.047	.518	.3	3.0		75	
16	.285	.053	.486	.4	3.5		74	
17	.128	.437 ^c	-.665	2.4 ^c	-3.5		70	
18	.519	-.299	-.570	-2.2	-4.1		72	
19	.207	-.220	-.271	-1.6	-1.9		72	
20	.690	.490	.535	3.9	4.1	73		

Note: For definitions of the dependent variables see Table 1.

- a. C1 is the mean of variables 2, 3 and variable 4 with its sign reversed.
- b. C2 is the mean of variables 6 and 7 with the signs reversed.
- c. coefficient has the wrong sign.