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Exchange Market Pressures during the Financial Crisis: A Bayesian Model Averaging Evidence

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Abstract

In this paper, we examine whether pre-crisis leading indicators help explain pressures on the exchange rate (and its volatility) during the global financial crisis. We use a unique data set that covers 149 countries and 58 indicators, and estimation techniques that are robust to model uncertainty. Our results are threefold: First and foremost, we find that price stability plays a pivotal role as a determinant of exchange rate pressures. More specifically, the currencies of countries that experienced higher inflation prior to the crisis tend to be more affected in times of stress. Second, we investigate potential effects that vary with the level of pre-crisis inflation. In this vein, our results reveal that domestic savings reduce the severity of pressures in countries that experienced a low-inflation environment prior to the crisis. Finally, we find evidence of the mitigating effects of international reserves on the volatility of exchange rate pressures.

JEL-Classification: F31, F37 *Keywords:* Exchange market pressures, financial crisis

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1 Introduction

Beginning with the onset of the global financial crisis, exchange rate markets experienced dramatic developments in the years from 2009 to 2011. In this paper, we examine the determinants of the market movements in exchange rates by focusing on the exchange market pressure (EMP) index. The EMP measures the extent of exchange rate developments in terms of actual depreciations while controlling for policy actions brought about by changes in international reserves. Such an index is important from the perspective of a policymaker for at least two reasons: First, for countries that pursue a fixed exchange rate regime, exchange rate stability is a direct target. Second, exchange rate developments tend to have a sizable effect on the inflation outlook and therefore on price stability. The importance of monitoring the EMP is also reflected in the fact that it is one of five components that the IMF uses to measure financial stress (Balakrishnan *et al.*, 2011). Exchange market pressure indexes are also used to estimate *de facto* exchange rate regimes (Frankel & Wei, 2008; Frankel & Xie, 2010) or assess a country's readiness to adopt a common currency (Van Poeck *et al.*, 2007; Bayoumi & Eichengreen, 1998).

The analysis of shocks to foreign exchange markets was pioneered by Girton & Roper (1977). Bayoumi & Eichengreen (1998) focus on the determinants of these exchange market pressures and find that asymmetric shocks play a crucial role. Market pressures are also related to the economy's underlying financial structure such as the level of capital controls and the depth of financial markets. Tanner (2001) also stresses the role of domestic credit in reducing pressure on the currency. Pentecost *et al.* (2001) find that EMP fluctuations are related to money growth, long-term interest rates, real depreciation and budget and current account deficits. Van Poeck *et al.* (2007) find that current account and domestic credit growth determine exchange market pressures in eight Central and Eastern European countries.

Recently, there have been several attempts to study the determinants of exchange market pressures during the crisis. Using a sample of 28 emerging countries, Aizenman *et al.* (2012) find that per capita income prior to the financial crisis (as of 2007), inflation and the trade balance can explain differences across countries in the exchange market pressures experienced during the recent crisis reasonably well. Frankel & Saravelos (2012), using a large sample of roughly 150 countries, find that the pre-crisis level of reserves and preceding real exchange rate appreciation are robust leading indicators of exchange market pressures.

The empirical findings in the literature reviewed above point to mixed evidence, which can be partially attributed to neglecting (regression) model uncertainty and the attendant omitted variable bias.¹ Model uncertainty in this context refers to the problem of choosing regressors from a vast set of potential explanatory variables proposed in the literature. To fill this gap, we revisit the findings presented in the literature on the determinants of ex-

¹ See Fratzscher (2009), who emphasizes that there is a great degree of model uncertainty regarding exchange rate determinants.

change market pressure and its volatility during the crisis by employing Bayesian model averaging techniques that rigorously account for model uncertainty. More generally, we contribute to the literature on early warning mechanisms by focusing on a particular measure of crisis incidence – exchange rate pressures – in greater detail. While the literature on early warning is extensive, the role of model uncertainty, although crucial, has rarely been examined (notable exceptions are Babecky *et al.*, 2013; Christofides *et al.*, 2013).

Bayesian model averaging (BMA) was pioneered in the social sciences by Raftery (1995) and Raftery *et al.* (1997). It was employed heavily in the literature on the determinants of economic growth (Fernandez *et al.*, 2001b; Sala-I-Martin *et al.*, 2004; Durlauf *et al.*, 2008). More recently, BMA has received substantial attention in other fields of economics (see Moral-Benito, 2011, for a survey).

In this study, we examine 58 different potential pre-crisis indicators and link them to the extent of exchange market pressures during the recent crisis period using a sample of 149 countries. We employ a unique data set that covers indicators previously examined in the literature and other macroeconomic variables that have thus far received less attention. More precisely, we include macroeconomic fundamentals, measures of trade, debt, reserves and capital flows, money, inflation, and financial variables, measures of institutional quality, globalization indicators and monetary policy regimes (the full list of explanatory variables is available in Table A2 in the Appendix).

We find that pre-crisis average inflation is the most robust determinant of exchange rate pressures during the crisis. Furthermore, we examine potential non-linear effects that vary with the level of pre-crisis inflation. Our results show that domestic savings in a low-inflation environment are associated with a lower incidence of exchange rate pressures. Finally, the share of international reserves in GDP as of 2006 seems to be most robustly related to the volatility of exchange market pressures during crisis. Other variables that have been previously flagged as important determinants of exchange market pressure, such as imbalances in the current account or money growth – although having their expected signs – do not appear robust in our data. Clearly, this does not imply that, for other economies, country specifics do not play an important role in addition to these global results.

The finding that only a handful of indicators matter for our global sample accords with Rose & Spiegel (2011), who find that macroeconomic and financial variables have limited ability to predict the crisis. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the different measures of EMP we employ. Section 3 presents the empirical framework. Section 4 discusses our findings, while Section 5 concludes.

2 The Data

We collected data on the macroeconomy such as GDP and investment rates, trade and its composition, current account and savings, money and inflation, credit and interest rate, institutional quality, debt and external debt, capital flows and trade exposure, population and unemployment, globalization, indicators of monetary independence and financial openness. Overall, we include 58 potential determinants of exchange market pressure for 149 countries (see Table A1 in the Appendix for the full list of countries). All indicators are measured in the period prior to the crisis. The definitions of the variables and the sources and summary statistics can be found in the Appendix (Table A2).

We follow Aizenman & Pasricha (2012) and define exchange market pressure as

$$EMP_t = \left(\frac{e_t - e_{t-1}}{e_t} - \frac{ir_t - ir_{t-1}}{ir_t}\right) \times 100 \tag{1}$$

with e_t denoting the local nominal exchange rate per 1 unit of the IMF's SDR (an increase denotes depreciation) and ir_t denoting international reserves (minus gold) in time t.² The data that we use to construct the EMP are on a quarterly basis, and higher values of the index represent greater pressure. The explanatory variables refer to yearly, pre-crisis data, ending in 2006.

Figure 1 presents the evolution of exchange market pressures in different regions, including the period of the recent financial crisis. Regional aggregates are calculated as simple cross-country averages. The figure shows that most regions experienced rather strong exchange rate pressures in 2008 and 2010. There is, however, considerable cross-country heterogeneity in the EMP. Some countries primarily relied on exchange rate depreciation to absorb shocks, especially to counter the impact of the crisis on the real economy, and exhibited what Aizenman & Hutchison (2012) call the fear of reserve loss. Other countries, especially those with large balance sheet exposures, limited the scope of exchange rate depreciation. In particular, the currencies of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and those of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) faced substantial pressure. In the next section, we empirically investigate which pre-crisis indicators are able to explain these cross-country differences in the magnitudes of exchange rate pressures during the crisis period.

² See See Klaassen & Jager (2011) for a discussion of the definition, limitations and extensions of EMP. Dominguez *et al.* (2012) discuss the measurement issues regarding international reserves and their development during the financial crisis. Our choice of EMP proxies is also motivated by the ability to employ a global sample of countries. As in Aizenman & Pasricha (2012), we do not include interest rates in the calculation of EMP. See Tanner (2001) on the theoretical arguments for why interest rates should not be included in calculating the EMP. Tanner (2001) argues that interest rates can be considered a response variable rather than an indicator. Frankel & Saravelos (2012) mention the measurement issues related to international reserves and argue for the use of nominal exchange rate changes as the measure of exchange rate pressures. This is appealing, but our sample includes, for example, the Baltic countries, which were the most severely affected by the financial crisis yet maintained fixed exchange rate regimes.



Figure 1: Regional evolution of EMP (2002–2010)

More specifically, we propose three versions of the EMP that have been frequently used in the literature (e.g., Aizenman & Pasricha, 2012)

$$-EMPu_{max} = max(EMP_t), t \in \{2007Q3, \dots, 2011Q4\}$$

$$-EMPu_{max.0006} = EMPu_{max} - (1/28) * \sum_{t=200001}^{T=2006Q4} EMP_t$$

$$-EMPu_{ptt} = max(EMP_t) - min(EMP_t), t \in \{2007Q3, \dots, 2011Q4\}$$

The first measure $(EMPu_{max})$ captures the extent to which a country's currency came under pressure during the crisis, where we have defined the crisis period from 2007Q3 to 2011Q4, which is the last data point in our sample. The second measure $(EMPu_{max.0006})$ captures the distance between the maximum EMP during the crisis relative to the country's average EMP during the period from 2000 to 2006. This indicator should shed light on the extent to which the country's exchange rate came under pressure relative to the "normal times" experienced prior to the crisis. Finally, the third measure $(EMPu_{ptp})$ captures the volatility of the EMP during the crisis period (peak to trough measure).

3 Bayesian Model Averaging

For each of the exchange market pressure measures, we run the following linear regression model:

$$y = \mathbf{1}\alpha_s + X_s\beta_s + \varepsilon \tag{2}$$

where y denotes one of our three different market pressure measures, α_s is a model specific intercept, X_s is an $N \times k_s$ matrix of potential explanatory variables and ε is an N-dimensional vector of random shocks, assumed to be normally distributed, independent and homoskedastic. In our empirical analysis, we have N = 149 countries and a set of K = 58 potential explanatory variables. All of the candidate variables are measured prior to crisis (see Appendix).

The large number of candidate variables creates problems related to model uncertainty that could lead to severely flawed inference. To overcome these problems, we apply model averaging techniques that avoid the necessity of selecting individual specifications. Instead, we base inference on a weighted average of individual regressions. In the Bayesian framework, these weights arise naturally as *posterior model probabilities* (PMP) of the corresponding individual specifications.

The set of complementary models can be denoted $\mathcal{M} = \{M_1, M_2, \dots, M_{2^K}\}$, where K stands for the total number of explanatory variables. Inference on any parameter δ in Bayesian model averaging takes the form:

$$p(\delta|y) = \sum_{j=1}^{2^{K}} p(\delta|M_j, y) p(M_j|y)$$
(3)

with $p(\cdot|y)$ denoting posterior distributions and $p(\cdot|M_j, y)$ denoting posterior distributions under the assumption that M_j is the true model. Inference on some parameter or combination of parameters δ is based on individual inferences under models M_j , $j = 1, \ldots, 2^K$, where the individual estimates are weighted by their respective posterior model probabilities $(p(M_j|y))$. These (normalized) probabilities are obtained in a Bayesian setting using the integrated likelihood $p(y|M_j) = \int p(y|M_j, \theta_j)p(\theta_j|M_j)d\theta_j$ and the respective model prior $\overline{p}(M_l)$,

$$p(M_j|y) = \frac{p(y|M_j)\overline{p}(M_j)}{\sum_{l=1}^{2^K} p(y|M_l)\overline{p}(M_l)}.$$
(4)

A key quantity in BMA is the posterior inclusion probability (PIP) of a covariate, defined as:

$$PIP_z \equiv \sum_{\mathcal{M}:m_z=1}^{2^K} p(M_i|y)$$

with $m_z = 1$ indicating that variable z is included in the model. Thus, the PIP attached to a particular variable is the sum of the posterior model probabilities of all models that include this variable. Broadly speaking, it indicates the probability that a covariate to be included in a model can explain the dependent variable – in our case cross-country differences in exchange market pressures – in a reasonable way. To ease the interpretation of the PIP, we draw on the scale proposed in Eicher *et al.* (2011). The PIP of a variable is characterized as weak (50–75% PIP), substantial (75–95%), strong (95–99%), or decisive (99%+) evidence. While the sum in equation equation 3 is not directly computable for large values of K, Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms (Madigan & York, 1995; Fernandez *et al.*, 2001a) provide a reasonable approximation of the required statistic.

The Bayesian framework requires the specification of prior distributions on the model parameters α , β_s , and σ^2 , as well as on the model space \mathcal{M} . We follow the standard convention in BMA, assuming a zero-centered normal distribution on the slope coefficients β_s , scaled by Zellner's g (Zellner, 1986) hyperparameter:

$$\beta_s | \sigma^2, M_s, g \sim N(0, \sigma^2 g(X'_s X_s)^{-1}).$$
 (5)

The penalty for including new variables in the model can be regulated through the hyperparameter g in the marginal likelihood. Following Feldkircher & Zeugner (2009) and Ley & Steel (2012), we abstain from fixing g at a particular value. Instead, we make it data dependent and use a hyper-g prior.³ This approach has been shown to lead to inferences that are less prone to noise in the data (Feldkircher & Zeugner, 2012). Improper priors on the intercept $p(\alpha) \propto 1$ and variance $p(\sigma) \propto \sigma^{-1}$ indicate a lack of prior information.

Finally, we have to make assumptions about the model space, that is, which type of models are a priori more likely. As in Ley & Steel (2009), we opt for an uninformative binomial-beta prior for the inclusion of a given variable, with a prior expected model size of K/2 regressors. This reduces to initially ascribing the same prior probability to all models. Below, we relax this assumption and elicit an informative prior on the models when linear interaction terms are part of the model space.

All of the computations are performed using the R package BMS.⁴

³ We anchor the hyper-g prior such that the prior expected shrinkage factor g/(1+g) matches that induced by the unit information prior g/(1+g) = N/(1+N).

⁴ http://bms.zeugner.eu.

4 Drivers of exchange market pressure during the crisis

In this section, we present the results of the Bayesian model averaging. For the sake of illustration, we only present the 10 most robust variables for each of the three EMP indicators, while the full results can be found in the Appendix. All results are based on 3 million posterior draws after a burn-in phase of 1 million.

Table 1 presents the BMA results for the $EMPu_{max}$ measure. This measure captures the extent to which a country's currency came under pressure during the crisis. The results of our baseline model (*Model 1*) indicate a very small model with only two out of the 58 variables receiving large posterior support in terms of inclusion probability. This is in line with Rose & Spiegel (2011), who show that it is difficult to obtain robust leading indicators of the recent financial crisis.

Dependent Variable: <i>EMPumax</i>		Model 1			Mode	el 2
	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
euroAdopt	1.000	50.131	7.645	1.000	49.968	13.803
infl_0006	0.977	0.856	0.245	0.996	0.488	1.936
gross.savings_06	0.029	-0.003	0.028	0.579	-0.232	0.243
infl_0006#gross.savings_06	-	-	-	0.559	0.040	0.040
infl_0006#euroAdopt	-	-	-	0.257	-0.848	2.691
int.res.gdp_06	0.102	-0.017	0.060	0.196	-0.036	0.089
outputGap_06Exo	0.056	0.013	0.069	0.194	0.057	0.154
rgdpcap_06	0.027	0.024	0.305	0.189	0.597	1.847
creditInfIndex_06	0.081	-0.093	0.367	0.178	-0.190	0.508
invRate.gdp_0006	0.032	0.006	0.049	0.164	0.051	0.169

Table 1: What Determines Exchange Market Pressure during the Crisis? BMA Evidence

Notes: The table represents a snapshot of the full results and presents the 10 most robust variables. PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability, Post Mean for posterior mean and Post SD for the posterior standard deviation. Model 1 refers to the baseline model without interaction terms, while model 2 includes, in addition to the regressors in Model 1, selected interaction terms, with pre-crisis inflation taking the strong-heredity prior on the model space. The results are based on 3 million iterations of the MCMC sampler after discarding 1 million burn-in iterations for convergence.

The first of the two variables that appear robust in the data is a dummy variable for those countries that adopted the euro during the crisis period (Malta, Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia). The euro adoption dummy variable is positively related to exchange market pressure. Naturally, a large component of the international reserves held by these countries was denominated in euros, which after the adoption of the common currency no longer appears as a part of foreign currency denominated reserves. This mechanically increased the EMP for these countries, which is captured by the positive coefficient attached to the dummy.

Second, the countries that experienced higher rates of inflation prior to the crisis experienced, on average, stronger pressures on their currencies. The coefficient attached to the average pre-crisis inflation rate ($infl_0006$) implies that a 1-percentage point increase in average inflation translates to 0.9 percentage point increase in the EMP. As a consequence, our results highlight the importance of price stability in curbing financial pressures. Although the recent financial crisis documents that price stability is not sufficient for financial stability (see also White, 2006), our results nevertheless demonstrate the positive role the price stability plays. Other variables reported in the literature as important drivers of exchange market pressure, such as the level of GDP per capita or the trade balance (Aizenman *et al.*, 2012) – although having coefficients with the expected signs – do not appear robust in the data.

The role of pre-crisis movements in national prices in shaping the EMP revealed by *Model 1* is further discussed by examining a simple scatterplot. Figure 2, the top panel plots the dependent variable, $EMPu_{max}$, against pre-crisis inflation.



Figure 2: Scatterplot

The figure shows that most countries are clustered in the range of 0–10% pre-crisis inflation. Due to the global nature of our sample, the variation in pre-crisis inflation is, however, pronounced. In a second step, we aim to determine whether non-linear effects play a role in explaining cross-country differences in the EMP. For this purpose, we linearly interact (i.e., multiply) pre-crisis average inflation with selected candidate regressors, such as a measure for trade exposure to the EU-15 (**tradeExposureEU15.gdp_0006**), the euro adoption dummy (**euroAdopt**), two measures of the pre-crisis output gap (**dGap_0006**-**Exo, outputGap_06Exo**), the average investment rate as a share of GDP (**invRate.gdp_ 0006**), gross savings (**gross.savings_06**) and the level of international reserves expressed as a share of external debt in 2006 (**int.res.ext.debt_06**). Adding these interaction terms to our set of candidate regressors allows us to investigate whether there are robust drivers of EMP, the effects of which vary with the level of the average pre-crisis inflation rate. To ensure the interpretability of the estimated non-linear effects, we employ the strong heredity prior akin to Chipman (1996). More specifically, under strong heredity, we only assign positive prior inclusion probabilities to models that (1) do not include interaction terms or (2) include all variables related to the interactions. This prior implies that we are removing the prior probability mass from all the models where interactions are present but the corresponding linear terms are not part of the model. For a recent application of the strong heredity prior, see Feldkircher (2012).

The results of *Model 2* presented in Table 1 corroborate the findings of the baseline model: The dummy variable for euro-adopters and pre-crisis inflation both receive strong empirical support. Moreover, the model reveals some evidence for the interaction of pre-crisis inflation with domestic gross savings (**infl_0006#gross.savings_06**). We illustrate the marginal effect of gross savings on the EMP in Figure 3.



The figure is based on the posterior means of the 1000 models with the highest posterior model probability that included all three variables that compose the marginal effect (194, 189). The solid (red) line corresponds to the median and the dotted (blue) lines to the 5th and 95th percentiles. The top figure shows the marginal effect of gross savings on $EMPu_{max}$, and the bottom figure shows that on $EMPu_{max.0006}$. All effects are conditional on the average pre-crisis inflation rate.

Figure 3: Posterior distribution of the marginal effects of gross savings

The figure shows that gross savings (i.e., countries need to borrow relatively less from the rest of the world) reduce pressure on the exchange market in a low-inflation environment. By contrast, for countries that experienced pronounced inflation prior to the crisis, gross savings constitute a waste of resources for the economy, subsequently amplifying the pressure on the exchange market. The results demonstrate that gross savings only reduce pressure if the inflation rate is below approximately 5 percent.

Table 2 presents the results of the Bayesian model averaging with $EMPu_{max.0006}$ as the dependent variable. This measure captures the extent to which a country's exchange rate

came under pressure relative to pressure on the currency experienced during "normal" times. The results of *Model 1* corroborate the robustness of average inflation in explaining exchange market pressures and the dummy variable for euro adopting countries. In addition, we find evidence that countries that had already faced strong pressure prior to the crisis were less affected in relative terms during this crisis (**EMP_0006**).

The results of the conditional model (*Model 2*) indicate that, in addition to the variables reported as robust in *Model 1*, the interaction of pre-crisis inflation and gross savings is an important determinant of the exchange market pressures during the crisis. The non-linear effect is illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 3 and is in line with our previous findings: domestic savings act as a buffer for pressure on the exchange market, provided pre-crisis average inflation was low. For larger values, the marginal effect of domestic gross savings becomes positive, implying an increase in the EMP. In contrast to the results for $EMPu_{max}$, however, the posterior distribution of the marginal effect widens for larger values of pre-crisis inflation. That is, the effect is not as well estimated as for the results reported in Table 1.

Dependent Variable: $EMPu_{max.0006}$		Model 1			Mod	el 2
	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
euroAdopt	1.000	50.984	7.652	1.000	51.472	13.142
EMP_0006	1.000	-1.231	0.192	0.999	-1.265	0.204
infl_0006	0.987	0.881	0.231	0.998	0.729	2.483
gross.savings_06	0.036	-0.004	0.032	0.668	-0.291	0.254
infl_0006#gross.savings_06	-	-	-	0.654	0.051	0.043
rgdpcap_06	0.038	0.040	0.382	0.234	0.928	2.202
infl_0006#euroAdopt	-	-	-	0.230	-0.717	2.523
infl_0006#rgdpcap_06	-	-	-	0.184	-0.122	0.285
int.res.gdp_06	0.133	-0.024	0.070	0.177	-0.033	0.084
kof_persCont_06	0.072	0.008	0.035	0.154	0.022	0.066

 Table 2: What Determines the Severity of Exchange Market Pressure during the Crisis?

 BMA Evidence

Notes: The table represents a snapshot of the full results by presenting the 10 most robust variables. PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability, Post Mean for posterior mean and Post SD for the posterior standard deviation. Model 1 refers to the baseline model without interaction terms, while Model 2, in addition to the regressors in Model 1, includes selected interaction terms with pre-crisis inflation, employing the strong-heredity prior on the model space. The results are based on 3 million iterations of the MCMC sampler after discarding 1 million burn-in iterations for convergence.

Finally, Table 3 presents the results for $EMPu_{ptt}$. This measure aims to capture the volatility of exchange rate market pressure during the crisis period. In line with our previous findings, the results of *Model 1* reveal large posterior support for the euro adoption dummy variable, while inflation does not seem to explain cross-country differences in the volatility of the EMP. However, the level of international reserves prior to the crisis appears robust in the data. The positive coefficient attached to international reserves im-

plies that a 1% increase in the level of international reserves as a share of GDP mitigates the EMP by approximately 1 percentage point. We graphically illustrate the effect of international reserves on the volatility of the exchange rate market pressure in the bottom panel of Figure 2. The figure corroborates the negative relationship between the level of international reserves and the volatility of the EMP. Note that Slovakia exhibits the most pronounced $EMPu_{ptt}$ during our observation period, which can again be attributed to the adoption of the euro. The conditional model (Model 2) shows evidence for four variables: the euro adoption dummy (euroAdopt), international reserves in 2006 (int.res.gdp_06), the average rate of pre-crisis inflation (infl_0006) and the interaction of pre-crisis inflation with the euro dummy (infl_0006#euroAdopt). Having accumulated international reserves prior to the crisis again mitigates pressure on the currency. Note that the negative coefficient attached to the euro adoption dummy variable reflects the (stylized) situation in which pre-crisis inflation was zero. Evaluated at the mean of precrisis inflation (5.8%), the euro area adoption dummy is again positively associated with pressure on the exchange market. As mentioned previously, the positive coefficient arises by construction, as the foreign exchange sub-component of international reserves was primarily denominated in euros and thus dramatically declined following the adoption of the euro.

Dependent Variable: <i>EMPuptt</i>		Model 1			Mode	el 2
	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
euroAdopt	0.998	121.130	28.469	1.000	-171.444	66.892
int.res.gdp_06	0.906	-0.993	0.451	0.748	-0.620	0.443
infl_0006	0.220	0.274	0.610	1.000	1.399	3.379
infl_0006#euroAdopt	-	-	-	1.000	67.473	14.446
ext.debt.gdp_06	0.064	0.002	0.017	0.308	0.035	0.061
Floater	0.169	-2.650	7.074	0.284	-4.730	8.800
genGovDebt.gdp_06	0.126	0.020	0.066	0.251	0.048	0.099
adv.claims.gdp_06	0.060	0.002	0.035	0.251	0.060	0.123
outputGap_06Exo	0.100	0.059	0.243	0.185	0.145	0.401
genGovBal.gdp_0006	0.162	-0.265	0.734	0.175	-0.258	0.698

Table 3: What Determines the Volatility of Exchange Market Pressure? BMA Evidence

Notes: The table represents a snapshot of the full results by presenting the 10 most robust variables. PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability, Post Mean for posterior mean and Post SD for the posterior standard deviation. Model 1 refers to the baseline model without interaction terms, while Model 2, in addition to the regressors in Model 1, includes selected interaction terms, with pre-crisis inflation employing the strong-heredity prior on the model space. Results are based on 3 million iterations of the MCMC sampler after discarding 1 million burn-in iterations for convergence.

5 Concluding remarks

This paper studies the determinants of the exchange rate pressures experienced during the recent global financial crisis. Employing a unique data set with extensive global coverage and a rich set of potential explanatory variables, we analyze three versions of the exchange market pressure (EMP) index advanced by, e.g., Aizenman et al. (2012). Our measures of pressure on the currencies capture the maximum EMP during the crisis, the maximum EMP normalized to the average pre-crisis EMP and the volatility of the EMP during the crisis. Furthermore, we employ Bayesian model averaging because the set of potential variables proposed by the existing literature on exchange market pressure is vast. In contrast to the empirical literature on EMP determinants, our results are robust to model uncertainty.

Our main results are threefold: First and foremost, we find strong empirical evidence for the pivotal role of pre-crisis inflation in determining exchange market pressure for our global sample. In particular, a 1 percentage point increase in the average inflation rate prior to the crisis implies a deterioration (i.e., an increase) in both EMP measures of approximately 0.9 percentage points. The impact of inflation on the volatility of the EMP is also positive but significantly smaller in magnitude. This result is well in line with Aizenman et al. (2012), who find a significant role of inflation in explaining differences in exchange market pressures across countries during the recent financial crisis. Therefore, our findings highlight the importance of price stability. Although it has been forcefully argued that low and stable inflation is not necessarily sufficient for maintaining financial stability (see, e.g., White, 2006), our results nonetheless demonstrate that price stability reduces vulnerability to adverse financial shocks. However, other variables that appear important in Aizenman et al. (2012), such as the level of GDP per capita or the trade balance, do not seem to be robust determinants of EMP once one controls for a large set of potential explanatory variables. This complies with Rose & Spiegel (2011), who show that the set of robust leading indicators for the financial crisis is in general rather small. Second, we find evidence for the accumulation of international reserves prior to the crisis acting as a buffer for the pressure on the exchange market. More specifically, a 1 percentage point increase in international reserves expressed as a percentage of external debt decreases the volatility of the EMP by approximately the same magnitude. This finding is in line with Frankel & Saravelos (2012). In contrast to their findings, misalignments in the exchange rate do not seem to play a role in the global sample we employed in this study.

Finally, we investigate the existence of non-linear effects that vary with the rate of precrisis inflation. We find empirical evidence that the level of gross domestic savings prior to the crisis explains cross-country differences in both EMP measures but not in the EMP's volatility. More specifically, in a low-inflation environment, domestic savings absorb depreciation pressure on the currency by about 0.6 to 0.7 percentage points of the EMP. This effect, however, is reversed for countries with a pre-crisis rate of inflation above 5 percent, where hoarding domestic savings might constitute a waste of economic resources.

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Appendix

Europe

Table A1: List of countries used in the empirical analysis

Austria (AUT) Belgium (BEL) Cyprus (CYP) Denmark (DNK) Finland (FIN) France (FRA) Germany (DEU) Greece (GRC) Iceland (ISL) Ireland (IRL) Italy (ITA) Luxembourg (LUX) Malta (MLT) Netherlands (NLD) Norway (NOR) Portugal (PRT) Spain (ESP) Sweden (SWE) Switzerland and Liechtenstein (CHE) United Kingdom (GBR)

North America

United States (USA) Canada (CAN)

CEEC

Albania (ALB) Bosnia & Herzegovina (BIH) Bulgaria (BGR) Croatia (HRV) Czech Republic (CZE) Estonia (EST) Hungary (HUN) Latvia (LVA) Lithuania (LTU) Macedonia, FYR (MKD) Moldova (MDA) Poland (POL) Romania (ROM) Serbia, Republic of (SRB) Slovak Republic (SVK) Slovenia (SVN)

CIS Armenia (ARM) Azerbaijan, Rep. of (AZE) Belarus (BLR) Georgia (GEO) Kazakhstan (KAZ) Kyrgyz Republic (KGZ) Russian Federation (RUS) Ukraine (UKR)

Africa

Algeria (DZA) Benin (BEN) Botswana (BWA) Burkina Faso (BFA) Burundi (BDI) Cameroon (CMR) Cape Verde (CPV) Central African Rep. (CAF) Comoros (COM) Cŏte d'Ivoire (CIV) Eritrea (ERI) Ethiopia (ETH) Gabon (GAB) Gambia, The (GMB) Ghana (GHA) Guinea-Bissau (GNB) Kenya (KEN) Lesotho (LSO) Madagascar (MDG) Malawi (MWI) Mali (MLI) Mauritania (MRT) Mauritius (MUS) Morocco (MAR) Mozambique (MOZ) Namibia (NAM) Niger (NER) Nigeria (NGA) Rwanda (RWA) São Tomé & Príncipe (STP) Senegal (SEN) Seychelles (SYC)

Sierra Leone (SLE) South Africa (ZAF) Sudan (SDN) Swaziland (SWZ) Tanzania (TZA) Togo (TGO) Tunisia (TUN) Uganda (UGA) Zambia (ZMB)

Asia & Pacific

Bangladesh (BGD) Bhutan (BTN) Brunei Darussalam (BRN) Cambodia (KHM) China, P.R.: Hong Kong (HKG) China, P.R.: Mainland (CHN) Egypt (EGY) India (IND) Indonesia (IDN) Israel (ISR) Japan (JPN) Jordan (JOR) Korea, Republic of (KOR) Kuwait (KWT) Lebanon (LBN) Malaysia (MYS) Mongolia (MNG) Oman (OMN) Pakistan (PAK) Philippines (PHL) Saudi Arabia (SAU) Singapore (SGP) Sri Lanka (LKA) Syrian Arab Republic (SYR) Thailand (THA) Turkey (TUR) United Arab Emirates (ARE) Vietnam (VNM) Yemen, Republic of (YEM)

Australia (AUS) Fiji (FJI) New Zealand (NZL) Papua New Guinea (PNG) Samoa (WSM) Solomon Islands (SLB) Tonga (TON) Vanuatu (VUT)

Latin America & Caribbean Antigua and Barbuda (ATG) Argentina (ARG) Bahamas, The (BHS) Barbados (BRB) Belize (BLZ) Bolivia (BOL) Brazil (BRA) Chile (CHL) Colombia (COL) Costa Rica (CRI) Dominica (DMA) Dominican Republic (DOM) Ecuador (ECU) El Salvador (SLV) Grenada (GRD) Guatemala (GTM) Guyana (GUY) Honduras (HND) Jamaica (JAM) Mexico (MEX) Nicaragua (NIC) Panama (PAN) Paraguay (PRY) Peru (PER) St. Kitts and Nevis (KNA) St. Lucia (LCA) Suriname (SUR) Trinidad and Tobago (TTO) Uruguay (URY) Venezuela, Rep. Bol. (VEN)

Table A2: Data Description an	d Summary Statistics					
Variable	Description	Source	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Exchange market pressure indicators						
EMPu_max	Exchange market pressure: maximum over 2007Q3–2010Q2 period	Authors' calculations	21.62	17.85	-3.03	131.76
EMPu_max.07	Exchange market pressure: distance between maximum during crisis and EMP in 2007Q2	Authors' calculations	13.92	14.86	0.02	71.31
EMPu_PtT	Exchange market pressure: peak to through measure	Authors' calculations	61.00	58.39	7.55	545.43
GDP and investment rate						
rgdpcap_06	2006 GDP per capita in PPP	Penn World Tables 7.0	8.83	1.25	5.92	10.85
chg_rgdpcap0006	Percentage change in GDP per capita in PPP 2000–2006	Penn World Tables 7.0	122.86	22.19	81.75	219.39
real.gdp.gr_0006	Average annual growth rate of real GDP 2000–2006	IMF WEO April 2011	4.30	2.47	-0.05	14.47
invRate.gdp_0006	Investment rate in % of GDP, 2000–2006 average	IMF WEO April 2011	22.49	7.00	7.31	54.38
Trade and trade composition						
exp_0206	Exports of goods in % of GDP, 2000–2006 average	UN Comtrade	29.09	23.33	1.65	162.91
imp_0206	Imports of goods in % of GDP, 2000–2006 average	UN Comtrade	37.03	20.88	6.72	156.00
openness_0206	Exports and imports of goods in % of GDP	UN Comtrade	66.12	40.38	13.35	305.60
trade.balance_0206	Trade balance in % of GDP, 2000–2006 average	UN Comtrade	-8.01	18.22	-60.28	52.09
merchTrade.gdp_0006	Merchandise trade in % of GDP, 2000–2006 average	World Bank WDI	68.71	40.89	19.39	313.79
manuf.to.totExp_0006	Exports of manufactured goods in % of total exports, 2000–2006 average	UN Comtrade	13.60	13.65	0.00	78.97
petrol.to.Exp_0006	Exports of petroleum, petroleum products and related materials in % of total exports, 2000–2006 average	UN Comtrade	12.90	22.29	0.00	96.57
food.to.Exp_0006	Exports of food and live animals in $\%$ of total exports, 2000–2006 average	UN Comtrade	17.70	19.70	0.05	97.60
Current account and savings						
gross.savings_06	Gross savings in % of GDP, 2006	World Bank & IMF IFS	21.84	12.15	-9.39	64.72
ca.gdp_0006	Current account in % of GDP, 2000–2006 average	IMF WEO April 2011	-2.06	9.09	-26.53	50.85
Money and inflation	Inflation, 2000–2006 average	IMF WEO April 2011	5.84	6.43	-1.20	48.02
money.gdp_06	Money and quasi money (M2) in % of GDP, 2006	World Bank WDI	64.39 26 04	49.01 44 26	13.78 _100.00	260.47
	of GDP 2000–2006					

Exchange Market Pressures during the Financial Crisis

Variable	Description	Source	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Credit and interest rate dom.credit_06	Domestic credit provided by banking sector in % of GDP, 2006	World Bank WDI	65.92	59.72	-13.42	304.96
chg.dom.credit_0006	Domestic credit provided by banking sector in % of GDP, percentage change from 2000 to 2006	World Bank WDI	15.60	65.83	-202.82	353.74
creditInfIndex_06	Credit depth of information index from 0 (low) to 6 (high)	World Bank WDI	2.89	2.20	0.00	6.00
depRate_06	Deposit rate in % per annum, 2006	IMF IFS	5.35	3.52	0.57	22.30
Institutional quality						
legRightsIndex_06	Strength of legal rights index from 0 (weak) to 10 (strong)	World Bank WDI	5.43	2.35	1.00	10.00
cpi corruption_06	CPI (Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index)	Transparency Int.	4.24	2.11	2.00	9.60
Debt and external debt						
genGovDebt.gdp_06	General government debt in % of GDP, 2006	IMF WEO April 2011	54.63	40.42	1.89	213.79
genGovBal.gdp_0006	General government budget balance in % of GDP, 2006	IMF WEO April 2011	-1.52	4.99	-22.15	28.50
ext.debt.gdp_06	External debt in % of GDP, 2006	IMF, IFS and IIP	73.00	85.15	0.00	665.40
ext.debt.exp_06	External debt in % of total exports, 2006	IMF, IFS and IIP	458.88	778.54	0.00	5727.27
adv.claims.gdp_06	Claims of foreign banks (advanced countries) in % of GDP, 2006	BIS	31.27	41.07	0.41	230.30
Reserves						
int.res.gdp_06	International reserves (excl. gold) in % of GDP, 2006	IMF IFS	17.83	14.78	0.20	90.49
int.res.ext.debt_06	International reserves (excl. gold) in $\%$ of external debt, 2006	IMFIFS	61.57	135.21	0.00	1423.65
forEx.gdp_06	Foreign exchange in % of GDP, 2006	IMF IFS	17.63	14.75	0.15	90.20
forEx.extDebt_06	Foreign exchange in % of external debt, 2006	IMF IFS	53.97	79.37	0.00	610.34
Capital flows net.fdi.infl_0006	Net FDI inflows in % of GDP, 2000–2006 average	IMF IFS	5.67	5.73	-5.24	35.85
Trade exposure tradeExposureUS_0206	Goods imports from and exports to the U.S.A. in $\%$ of total exports, 2002–2006 average	UN Contrade	13.52	16.78	0.00	96.94
tradeExp.US.gdp_0006	Goods imports from and exports to the U.S.A. in $\%$ of GDP, 2000–2006 average	UN Comtrade	8.58	10.28	0.00	45.61
tradeExposureEU15.gdp_0006	Goods imports from and exports to the EU-15 in $\%$ of GDP, 2000–2006 average	UN Comtrade	19.47	18.06	0.53	113.81
tradeExposureEU15_0006	Goods imports from and exports to the EU-15 in % of total exports, $2000-2006$ average	UN Comtrade	106.98	183.10	4.30	1546.82

Table A2 (continued)

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Table A2 (continued)						
Variable	Description	Source	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Population and unemployment						
unempl_06	Unemployment rate, 2006	IMF IFS & WEO	11.02	10.43	0.60	77.00
pop_06	Population in millions	IMF WEO April 2011	1.93	1.94	-2.98	7.18
	ropmanon ฐางพาก, регосптаge спанge 2000–2000	IMF WEO APHI 2011	0./3	0.01	-9.33	43.37
<i>Monetary regime</i> Floater	Dummy variable for countries with no exchange rate anchor	IMF classification (2008)	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
Exchange rate misalignment and output gap						
emp_chg_0006	Exchange market pressure index covering changes in the nominal exchange rate and changes in international reserves, in %, 2006; negative values indicate pressure in the exchange market.	Authors' calculations based on Aizenmann et al. (2010)	-0.06	0.11	-1.03	0.08
reerm_06	Measure for overvaluation of the real exchange rate based on a panel regression on macro fundamentals, in $\%$, 2006	Authors' calculations based on the IMF's CGER assessment, fully described in Lee et al. (2008)	12.15	54.77	-110.55	376.17
dGap_0006		Authors' calculations	34.76	18.39	0.00	85.71
outputGap_0006Exo	Deviation from trend output in % in 2000–2006; calculation based on yearly GDP data up to 2006 using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter with the smoothness parameter $\lambda = 1600$	Authors' calculations	-1.98	2.29	-11.62	3.86
outputGap_06Exo	Deviation from trend output in % in 2006; calculation based on yearly GDP data up to 2006 using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter with the smoothness parameter $\lambda = 1600$	Authors' calculations	10.94	9.06	-7.87	41.07
dGap_0006Exo EMP_0006	Ratio of how often a country was above trend growth in the period from 2000 to 2006 Exchange market pressure average over the period from 2000 to 2006	Authors' calculations Authors' calculations	46.36 -4.77	13.25 7.28	0.00 49.70	85.71 7.58
Oil production	Dummy variable for oil exporting countries	Authors' calculations	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
oilProd	Total oil produced per day in % of total worldwide oil production in 2008	Authors' calculations	0.57	1.78	0.00	12.62
Globalization indicators	VOE Clabalization Indox moments on the 2006 (mboomponent of the Social	VOE Clabelization Indon	51 75	nn 62	11 77	00 200
koi_persCont_00	Globalization Index)	NOF GIODAIIZATION INDEX	C/.1C	20.22	11.27	93.38
kot_intFlows_06	KOF Globalization Index, information flows, 2006 (subcomponent of the Social Globalization Index)	KOF Globalization Index	68.67	18.27	34.70	97.95

Variable	Description	Source	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Globalization indicators						
kof_cultProx_06	KOF Globalization Index, cultural proximity, 2006 (subcomponent of the Social Globalization Index)	KOF Globalization Index	35.60	28.57	1.00	95.43
kof_poltGlob_06	KOF Political Globalization Index, 2006	KOF Globalization Index	68.16	20.51	1.54	98.01
kof_overallGlob_06	KOF Overall Globalization Index (economic, political and social), 2006	KOF Globalization Index	59.83	15.76	28.64	92.42
Trilemma indicators						
monInd_06	Monetary independence index (1=most independent)	Aizenman et al. (2008)	0.68	0.32	0.00	1.00
er.stab_06	Exchange rate stability index (1=most stable)	Aizenman <i>et al.</i> (2008)	0.38	0.23	0.00	0.94
FinOpenn_06	Financial Openness Index, measuring a country's degree of capital account openness (Chinn-Ito index, 1 = most open)	Aizenman <i>et al.</i> (2008)	0.56	0.38	0.00	1.00
Country dummies						
adv	Dummy variable for advanced countries.	IMF definition	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
euroAdopt	Dummy variable for countries that adopted the euro over the period from 2000 to 2011.	Authors' calculations	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00

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Table A2 (continued)

Table A3: Full	results - de	pendent varia	ble: El	MPumax
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	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
ouroAdapt	1.000	50 101	7.045	1.000	40.000	10.000
	0.077	50.131	7.045	0.000	49.968	1.026
gross savings 06	0.977	0.000	0.245	0.990	-0.222	0.242
in 0006#gross savings 06	0.029	-0.003	0.028	0.579	0.040	0.243
in 0006#euroAdopt	_	_	_	0.257	-0.848	2 691
int res ado. 06	0 102	-0.017	0.060	0.196	-0.036	0.089
outputGap_06Exo	0.056	0.013	0.069	0.194	0.057	0.154
radpcap_06	0.027	0.024	0.305	0.189	0.597	1 847
creditInfIndex 06	0.081	-0.093	0.367	0.178	-0.190	0.508
invRate.gdp 0006	0.032	0.006	0.049	0.164	0.051	0.169
dGap 0006Exo	0.020	0.000	0.015	0.159	-0.028	0.098
EMP 0006	0.037	-0.008	0.056	0.156	-0.050	0.148
real.gdp.gr 0006	0.051	-0.063	0.365	0.150	-0.203	0.629
kof_persCont_06	0.043	0.004	0.024	0.149	0.023	0.073
tradeExp.US.gdp_0006	0.044	-0.008	0.050	0.147	-0.037	0.124
adv.claims.gdp_06	0.069	0.004	0.019	0.147	0.009	0.027
petrol.to.Exp_0006	0.047	0.004	0.025	0.142	0.014	0.044
openness_0206	0.023	0.010	1.091	0.141	-0.270	13.644
inl_0006#rgdpcap_06	-	-	-	0.130	-0.070	0.213
reerm_06	0.024	0.000	0.004	0.127	-0.003	0.017
chg_rgdpcap0006	0.045	0.006	0.037	0.126	0.015	0.058
FinOpenn_06	0.027	-0.088	0.846	0.121	-0.575	2.167
tradeExposureEU15.gdp_0006	0.037	0.004	0.025	0.117	0.009	0.045
int.res.ext.debt_06	0.033	0.000	0.003	0.112	0.000	0.005
inl_0006#dGap_0006Exo	-	-	-	0.109	0.004	0.015
kof_poltGlob_06	0.026	0.001	0.017	0.104	0.013	0.061
tradeExposureUS_0206	0.027	-0.001	0.019	0.100	-0.001	0.053
emp_chg_0006	0.025	-0.213	2.579	0.097	-0.808	5.853
food.to.Exp_0006	0.031	0.002	0.018	0.096	0.007	0.033
kof_infFlows_06	0.030	0.002	0.022	0.093	-0.006	0.058
kof_overallGlob_06	0.026	0.002	0.028	0.092	-0.007	0.111
money.gdp_06	0.026	-0.001	0.007	0.091	-0.002	0.015
imp_0206	0.023	-0.008	1.090	0.091	0.279	13.620
legRightsIndex_06	0.024	0.010	0.113	0.090	0.031	0.222
merchTrade.gdp_0006	0.023	0.000	0.010	0.090	-0.008	0.048
trade.balance_0206	0.029	-0.002	0.053	0.089	-0.021	0.371
pop_06	0.030	-0.021	0.190	0.088	-0.021	0.392
dom.credit_06	0.024	0.000	0.005	0.088	-0.002	0.012
genGovBal.gdp_0006	0.029	-0.007	0.069	0.088	-0.018	0.127
oilExp	0.025	0.062	0.733	0.087	0.234	1.468
chg.dom.credit_0006	0.030	0.001	0.005	0.087	0.001	0.008
exp_0206	0.026	-0.011	1.093	0.087	0.294	13.688
ca.gdp_0006	0.037	-0.006	0.046	0.086	-0.003	0.078
manuf.to.totExp_0006	0.025	0.002	0.019	0.086	0.006	0.038
monInd_06	0.027	0.084	0.870	0.085	0.235	1.599
	0.023	0.002	0.043	0.084	-0.008	0.105
pop gr 0006	0.022	-0.001	0.021	0.082	-0.007	0.044
pupgi_0000	0.024	-0.001	0.031	0.082	0.005	0.067
kof aultBray 06	0.019	0.003	0.088	0.001	0.013	0.230
cpi corruption 06	0.024	-0.000	0.010	0.001	_0.002	0.020
Elector	0.022	-0.005	0.135	0.079	-0.010	1.018
adv	0.023	-0.020	0.478	0.079	-0.064	1.566
ext.debt.adp. 06	0.022	0.000	0.003	0.079	0.000	0.006
tradeExposureEU15_0006	0.021	0.000	0.000	0.078	0.000	0.003
er.stab 06	0.021	-0.027	0.929	0,078	0.040	1.954
ini 0006#outputGap 06Exo	_	-	-	0,078	-0.002	0.011
ext.debt.exp 06	0.020	0.000	0.000	0,078	0.000	0.001
chg.money.gdp 0006	0.020	0.000	0.004	0.078	0.001	0.009
dGap_0006	0.023	0.001	0.012	0.077	-0.001	0.025
depRate_06	0.021	0.001	0.065	0.077	0.003	0.119
oilProd	0.021	-0.003	0.117	0.077	-0.012	0.240
genGovDebt.gdp_06	0.021	0.000	0.005	0.076	0.000	0.011
ini_0006#openness_0206	_	_	_	0.074	-0.001	0.003
ini_0006#invRate.gdp_0006		-	-	0.060	-0.002	0.021
inl_0006#reerm_06	-	-	-	0.043	0.000	0.001
ini_0006#int.res.ext.debt_06	-	-	-	0.034	0.000	0.001

Notes: The PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability, Post Mean for posterior mean and Post SD for the posterior standard deviation. Model 1 refers to the baseline model without interaction terms included, model 2 includes on top of the regressors in Model 1 selected interaction terms with pre-crisis infation employing the strong-heredity prior on the model space. Results are based on 3 million iterations of MCMC sampler after discarding 1 million burn-in iterations for convergence.

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
euroAdopt	1.000	50.131	7.645	1.000	49.968	13.803
infl_0006	0.977	0.856	0.245	0.996	0.488	1.936
gross.savings_06	0.029	-0.003	0.028	0.579	-0.232	0.243
infl_0006#gross.savings_06	_	-	-	0.559	0.040	0.040
infl_0006#euroAdopt	_	-	-	0.257	-0.848	2.691
int.res.gdp_06	0.102	-0.017	0.060	0.196	-0.036	0.089
outputGap_06Exo	0.056	0.013	0.069	0.194	0.057	0.154
rgdpcap_06	0.027	0.024	0.305	0.189	0.597	1.847
creditInfIndex_06	0.081	-0.093	0.367	0.178	-0.190	0.508
invRate.gdp_0006	0.032	0.006	0.049	0.164	0.051	0.169
dGap_0006Exo	0.020	0.000	0.015	0.159	-0.028	0.098
EMP_0006	0.037	-0.008	0.056	0.156	-0.050	0.148
real.gdp.gr_0006	0.051	-0.063	0.365	0.150	-0.203	0.629
kof_persCont_06	0.043	0.004	0.024	0.149	0.023	0.073
tradeExp.US.gdp_0006	0.044	-0.008	0.050	0.147	-0.037	0.124
adv.claims.gdp_06	0.069	0.004	0.019	0.147	0.009	0.027
petrol.to.Exp_0006	0.047	0.004	0.025	0.142	0.014	0.044
openness_0206	0.023	0.010	1.091	0.141	-0.270	13.644
infl_0006#rgdpcap_06	-	-	_	0.130	-0.070	0.213
reerm_06	0.024	0.000	0.004	0.127	-0.003	0.017
chg_rgdpcap0006	0.045	0.006	0.037	0.126	0.015	0.058
FinOpenn_06	0.027	-0.088	0.846	0.121	-0.575	2.167
tradeExposureEU15.gdp_0006	0.037	0.004	0.025	0.117	0.009	0.045
int.res.ext.debt_06	0.033	0.000	0.003	0.112	0.000	0.005
infl_0006#dGap_0006Exo	-	-	-	0.109	0.004	0.015
kof_poltGlob_06	0.026	0.001	0.017	0.104	0.013	0.061
tradeExposureUS_0206	0.027	-0.001	0.019	0.100	-0.001	0.053
emp_chg_0006	0.025	-0.213	2.579	0.097	-0.808	5.853
food.to.Exp_0006	0.031	0.002	0.018	0.096	0.007	0.033
kof_infFlows_06	0.030	0.002	0.022	0.093	-0.006	0.058
kof_overallGlob_06	0.026	0.002	0.028	0.092	-0.007	0.111
money.gdp_06	0.026	-0.001	0.007	0.091	-0.002	0.015
imp_0206	0.023	-0.008	1.090	0.091	0.279	13.620
legRightsIndex_06	0.024	0.010	0.113	0.090	0.031	0.222
merchTrade.gdp_0006	0.023	0.000	0.010	0.090	-0.008	0.048
trade.balance_0206	0.029	-0.002	0.053	0.089	-0.021	0.371
pop_06	0.030	-0.021	0.190	0.088	-0.021	0.392
dom.credit_06	0.024	0.000	0.005	0.088	-0.002	0.012
genGovBal.gdp_0006	0.029	-0.007	0.069	0.088	-0.018	0.127
oilExp	0.025	0.062	0.733	0.087	0.234	1.468
chg.dom.credit_0006	0.030	0.001	0.005	0.087	0.001	0.008
exp_0206	0.026	-0.011	1.093	0.087	0.294	13.688
ca.gdp_0006	0.037	-0.006	0.046	0.086	-0.003	0.078
manuf.to.totExp_0006	0.025	0.002	0.019	0.086	0.006	0.038
monInd_06	0.027	0.084	0.870	0.085	0.235	1.599
net.fdi.infl_0006	0.023	0.002	0.043	0.084	-0.008	0.105
unempl_06	0.022	-0.001	0.021	0.082	-0.007	0.044
pop.gr_0006	0.024	-0.001	0.031	0.082	0.005	0.067
outputGap_0006Exo	0.019	0.003	0.088	0.081	0.013	0.230
kof_cultProx_06	0.024	0.000	0.010	0.081	0.002	0.028
cpi_corruption_06	0.022	-0.003	0.135	0.079	-0.010	0.325

Table A4: Full results – dependent variable: EMPumax.0006

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Floater	0.023	-0.026	0.478	0.079	0.086	1.018
adv	0.022	-0.011	0.668	0.079	-0.064	1.566
ext.debt.gdp_06	0.022	0.000	0.003	0.079	0.000	0.006
tradeExposureEU15_0006	0.021	0.000	0.001	0.078	0.000	0.003
er.stab_06	0.021	-0.027	0.929	0.078	0.040	1.954
infl_0006#outputGap_06Exo	-	-	-	0.078	-0.002	0.011
ext.debt.exp_06	0.020	0.000	0.000	0.078	0.000	0.001
chg.money.gdp_0006	0.020	0.000	0.004	0.078	0.001	0.009
dGap_0006	0.023	0.001	0.012	0.077	-0.001	0.025
depRate_06	0.021	0.001	0.065	0.077	0.003	0.119
oilProd	0.021	-0.003	0.117	0.077	-0.012	0.240
genGovDebt.gdp_06	0.021	0.000	0.005	0.076	0.000	0.011
infl_0006#openness_0206	-	-	-	0.074	-0.001	0.003
infl_0006#invRate.gdp_0006	-	-	-	0.060	-0.002	0.021
infl_0006#reerm_06		-	-	0.043	0.000	0.001
infl_0006#int.res.ext.debt_06	-	-	-	0.034	0.000	0.001

Table A4 (continued)

Notes: The PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability, Post Mean for posterior mean and Post SD for the posterior standard deviation. Model 1 refers to the baseline model without interaction terms included, model 2 includes on top of the regressors in Model 1 selected interaction terms with pre-crisis inflation employing the strong-heredity prior on the models space. Results are based on 3 million iterations of MCMC sampler after discarding 1 million burn-in iterations for convergence.

euroAdopt1.00050.1317.6451.00049.968infl_00060.9770.8560.2450.9960.488	13.803 1.936 0.243 0.040
infl_0006 0.977 0.856 0.245 0.996 0.488	1.936 0.243 0.040
	0.243 0.040
gross.savings_06 0.029 -0.003 0.028 0.579 -0.232	0 040
infl_0006#gross.savings_06 0.559 0.040	0.010
infl_0006#euroAdopt – – – 0.257 –0.848	2.691
int.res.gdp_06 0.102 -0.017 0.060 0.196 -0.036	0.089
outputGap_06Exo 0.056 0.013 0.069 0.194 0.057	0.154
rgdpcap_06 0.027 0.024 0.305 0.189 0.597	1.847
creditInfIndex_06 0.081 -0.093 0.367 0.178 -0.190	0.508
invRate.gdp_0006 0.032 0.006 0.049 0.164 0.051	0.169
dGap_0006Exo 0.020 0.000 0.015 0.159 -0.028	0.098
EMP_0006 0.037 -0.008 0.056 0.156 -0.050	0.148
real.gdp.gr_0006 0.051 -0.063 0.365 0.150 -0.203	0.629
kof_persCont_06 0.043 0.004 0.024 0.149 0.023	0.073
tradeExp.US.gdp_0006 0.044 -0.008 0.050 0.147 -0.037	0.124
adv.claims.gdp_06 0.069 0.004 0.019 0.147 0.009	0.027
petrol.to.Exp_0006 0.047 0.004 0.025 0.142 0.014	0.044
openness 0206 0.023 0.010 1.091 0.141 -0.270	13.644
infl 0006#rgdpcap 06 – – – 0.130 –0.070	0.213
reerm 06 0.024 0.000 0.004 0.127 -0.003	0.017
chg rgdpcap0006 0.045 0.006 0.037 0.126 0.015	0.058
FinOpenn 06 0.027 -0.088 0.846 0.121 -0.575	2.167
tradeExposureEU15.gdp 0006 0.037 0.004 0.025 0.117 0.009	0.045
int.res.ext.debt 06 0.033 0.000 0.003 0.112 0.000	0.005
infl_0006#dGap_0006Exo – – – 0.109 0.004	0.015
kof_poltGlob_06 0.026 0.001 0.017 0.104 0.013	0.061
tradeExposureUS_0206 0.027 -0.001 0.019 0.100 -0.001	0.053
emp_chg_0006 0.025 -0.213 2.579 0.097 -0.808	5.853
food.to.Exp_0006 0.031 0.002 0.018 0.096 0.007	0.033
kof_infFlows_06 0.030 0.002 0.022 0.093 -0.006	0.058
kof_overallGlob_06 0.026 0.002 0.028 0.092 -0.007	0.111
money.gdp_06 0.026 -0.001 0.007 0.091 -0.002	0.015
imp_0206 0.023 -0.008 1.090 0.091 0.279	13.620
legRightsIndex_06 0.024 0.010 0.113 0.090 0.031	0.222
merchTrade.gdp_0006 0.023 0.000 0.010 0.090 -0.008	0.048
trade.balance_0206 0.029 -0.002 0.053 0.089 -0.021	0.371
pop_06 0.030 -0.021 0.190 0.088 -0.021	0.392
dom.credit_06 0.024 0.000 0.005 0.088 -0.002	0.012
genGovBal.gdp_0006 0.029 -0.007 0.069 0.088 -0.018	0.127
oilExp 0.025 0.062 0.733 0.087 0.234	1.468
chg.dom.credit_0006 0.030 0.001 0.005 0.087 0.001	0.008
exp_0206 0.026 -0.011 1.093 0.087 0.294	13.688
ca.gdp_0006 0.037 -0.006 0.046 0.086 -0.003	0.078
manuf.to.totExp_0006 0.025 0.002 0.019 0.086 0.006	0.038
monInd_06 0.027 0.084 0.870 0.085 0.235	1.599
net.fdi.infl_0006 0.023 0.002 0.043 0.084 -0.008	0.105
unempl_06 0.022 -0.001 0.021 0.082 -0.007	0.044
pop.gr_0006 0.024 -0.001 0.031 0.082 0.005	0.067
outputGap_0006Exo 0.019 0.003 0.088 0.081 0.013	0.230
kof_cultProx_06 0.024 0.000 0.010 0.081 0.002	0.028
cpi_corruption_06 0.022 -0.003 0.135 0.079 -0.010	0.325

Table A5: Full results – dependent variable: $EMPu_{ptt}$

	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD	PIP	Post Mean	Post SD
Floater	0.023	-0.026	0.478	0.079	0.086	1.018
adv	0.022	-0.011	0.668	0.079	-0.064	1.566
ext.debt.gdp_06	0.022	0.000	0.003	0.079	0.000	0.006
tradeExposureEU15_0006	0.021	0.000	0.001	0.078	0.000	0.003
er.stab_06	0.021	-0.027	0.929	0.078	0.040	1.954
infl_0006#outputGap_06Exo	-	-	-	0.078	-0.002	0.011
ext.debt.exp_06	0.020	0.000	0.000	0.078	0.000	0.001
chg.money.gdp_0006	0.020	0.000	0.004	0.078	0.001	0.009
dGap_0006	0.023	0.001	0.012	0.077	-0.001	0.025
depRate_06	0.021	0.001	0.065	0.077	0.003	0.119
oilProd	0.021	-0.003	0.117	0.077	-0.012	0.240
genGovDebt.gdp_06	0.021	0.000	0.005	0.076	0.000	0.011
infl_0006#openness_0206	-	-	-	0.074	-0.001	0.003
infl_0006#invRate.gdp_0006	-	-	-	0.060	-0.002	0.021
infl_0006#reerm_06	-	-	-	0.043	0.000	0.001
infl_0006#int.res.ext.debt_06	-	-	-	0.034	0.000	0.001

Notes: The PIP stands for posterior inclusion probability, Post Mean for posterior mean and Post SD for the posterior standard deviation. Model 1 refers to the baseline model without interaction terms included, model 2 includes on top of the regressors in Model 1 selected interaction terms with pre-crisis inflation employing the strong-heredity prior on the models pace. Results are based on 3 million iterations of MCMC sampler after discarding 1 million burn-in iterations for convergence.