Altshuler, Rosanne; Goodspeed, Timothy J.

Working Paper

Follow the leader? Evidence on European and US tax competition

Working Paper, No. 2002-26

Provided in Cooperation with:
Department of Economics, Rutgers University


This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79146

Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
Follow the Leader?
Evidence on European and U.S. Tax Competition

by

Rosanne Altshuler
Rutgers University
altshule@rci.rutgers.edu

and

Timothy J. Goodspeed
Hunter College and CUNY Graduate Center
timothy.goodspeed@hunter.cuny.edu

Abstract: This paper contributes to the small empirical literature that attempts to estimate tax reaction functions of national governments competing with other national governments. After presenting a simple theoretical model, we estimate reaction functions for European countries for a pure Nash model and for a model in which the U.S. can act as a Stackelberg leader while the European countries compete with each other in a Nash way. We initially find a positive Nash reaction function for European countries with respect to capital taxes, but no reaction with respect to labor taxes. Further investigation of the capital tax response results in our main finding, that the European countries behave as if the U.S. is a Stackelberg leader in setting corporate taxes after the U.S. 1986 Tax Reform Act but not before. We also test whether Germany or the United Kingdom played a leadership role and find that they did not. These regression results are reinforced by our Granger causality tests, and are somewhat stronger when we exclude certain tax havens. Over time, European countries seem to have become more intensely competitive with the U.S. in corporate taxes, but less intensely competitive among themselves.

We thank Julian Alworth, Austan Goolsbee, Roger Klein, Edward Outslay, John Landon-Lane, Michael Smart and participants at the 2003 University of Illinois Tax Research Symposium, 2002 NBER Summer Institute, the 2002 IIPF Meetings, Tulane University, and the University of Rennes 1 for helpful comments and suggestions.
1. Introduction

It is often alleged that countries will compete in setting tax rates on mobile factors such as capital. If true, tax competition could have a profound impact on fiscal systems worldwide, possibly altering revenue, progressivity, the mix of taxes and the overall efficiency of the tax system. Many argue that tax competition will lead to less reliance on taxes on capital and more reliance on taxes on labor, possibly reflecting more closely the benefits that different groups receive in terms of public services.

A large theoretical literature on tax competition has developed beginning with papers such as Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986), Wildasin (1988), Bond and Samuelson (1989), Kanbur and Keen (1993) and recently surveyed in Wilson (1999). The basic argument is that countries recognize that taxes can be avoided by relocation in the case of capital taxes or cross-border purchases in the case of consumption taxes. Consequently, the tax rates set by other countries can influence the tax rate set by a given country. Most of the theoretical models of tax competition that have been developed consider a Nash game. Gordon (1992) provides an interesting exception to this by considering a Stackelberg game. He suggests that the United States may have been large and influential enough to have played the role of a Stackelberg leader. Moreover, it has sometimes been suggested that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the United States (hereafter TRA’86) stimulated European tax reforms in the ensuing years. In this paper we investigate empirically the role of the United States vis-à-vis Europe in the setting of tax rates.

Empirical examination of tax competition has lagged behind the development of theoretical models and is quite recent. Moreover, most of the empirical work, surveyed by Brueckner (2003), concentrates on tax competition between governmental units within a country.\(^1\) Several recent papers in

\(^1\) Goodspeed (1998) discusses the similarities between the fiscal federalism and international tax literatures on tax competition.
this literature such as Besley and Rosen (1998), Goodspeed (2000, 2002), Hayashi and Boadway (2001), and Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) investigate Stackelberg behavior of the central government vis-à-vis lower level governments within a country. A recent paper in the environmental economics literature, Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), studies whether California has played a leadership role in setting automobile emissions standards at the state level. A small empirical literature has recently begun that attempts to estimate tax reaction functions of national governments competing against other national governments. For instance, Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) and Besley, Griffith, and Klemm (2001) estimate Nash reaction functions for OECD countries. Both studies find a positively sloped Nash reaction function, but do not consider the possibility of Stackelberg behavior.

Our primary goal in this paper is to estimate the reaction function of European countries. We do so both for a pure Nash model and for a model in which the U.S. can act as a Stackelberg leader while the European countries also compete with each other in a Nash way. We find that European countries did not compete with each other over labor taxes, but did compete with each other in a Nash way over corporate taxes. Our main finding is that the European countries behave as if the U.S. is a Stackelberg leader in setting corporate taxes after TRA’86 but not before. We also test whether Germany or the United Kingdom played a leadership role and find that they did not. These regression results are reinforced by our Granger causality tests, and are somewhat stronger when we exclude certain tax havens. Over time, European countries seem to have become more intensely competitive with the U.S. in corporate taxes, but less intensely competitive among themselves. This last result is consistent with the results of Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon (2001) who find that the overseas assets of U.S. multinationals became more sensitive to differences in corporate tax rates between 1984 and 1992.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a simple theoretical model. Section 3 discusses our empirical methodology and data. Section 4 presents our
results. Section 5 concludes.

2. Theoretical Background

A number of game-theoretic models of tax competition have been developed. Most of these consider governments competing against each other in a Nash game. For instance, Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) model governments operating in small open economies which take the return to capital as given. Wilson (1991) also considers a Nash game among large governments who realize that they impact the return to capital. An interesting departure from the Nash game is explored in Gordon (1992). Gordon considers a game in which one country is a Stackelberg leader and finds that in certain cases capital income taxes can be sustained when countries use a tax-credit system to alleviate double-taxation.

We develop below a simple and standard model of tax competition. The point of departure for our simple model is that one country is assumed to be large and act as a Stackelberg leader in setting its capital taxes. Our focus will be the effect that a change in the leader’s choice of tax rate has on the follower’s optimal tax rate. Suppose that there are \( n \) countries and consider country \( i \). The representative consumer of country \( i \) is endowed with perfectly mobile capital and a fixed factor labor. Capital and labor are combined to produce output according to a constant returns to scale production function. Income from the endowment of capital, \( K_i^* \), and from the fixed factor can be used to consume a private good, \( X_i \), or a public good, \( G_i \). The public good is financed by levying a per-unit tax on capital; we also introduce a tax-credit system for taxation of foreign income as discussed further below. Profit-maximization by perfectly competitive firms implies that a firm’s demand for capital satisfies:
\[ \frac{\partial f_i}{\partial K_i} = r + t_i \]  
(1)

where \( r \) is the after-tax return to capital and \( t_i \) is the per unit tax on capital. The capital market equilibrium condition is:

\[ \sum_i K_i (r + t_i) = \sum_j \sum_i K_{ji} = \sum_i K_i^* \]  
(2)

where \( K_i \) is the demand for capital in country \( i \) and \( K_{ji} \) is the demand for country \( i \)'s capital in country \( j \).

As mentioned above, we will assume that one of the \( n \) countries is large and acts as a Stackelberg leader when choosing its tax rate. Other countries are assumed to be small and act as Nash competitors with each other and as Nash followers with respect to the Stackelberg leader. Since the leader is a large country, its actions will impact the before-tax rate of return necessary to attract capital according to the capital market equilibrium condition. In particular, total differentiation of the capital market equilibrium condition indicates 
\[ \frac{\partial r}{\partial t_L} < 0 \]  
where \( t_L \) denotes the leader’s tax rate. Although a follower is small and does not directly affect the after-tax return when it changes its tax rate, it recognizes that the return to capital depends on the tax rate chosen by the leader.

Suppose that a country taxes all capital located within its borders and also taxes domestic capital located overseas in conjunction with a tax-credit system to alleviate double taxation. The tax-credit will be assumed to be limited to the domestic tax rate. Tax revenues are:

\[ T_i = t_i K_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \max(t_i - t_j, 0)(K_{ji}) \]  
(3)

The first term is the revenue collected within country \( i \)'s borders. If country \( i \)'s tax rate is less than country \( j \)'s tax rate, no additional revenue is collected. If country \( i \)'s tax rate is greater than country \( j \)'s, country \( i \) will collect additional revenue equal to the difference between the tax rates times the amount of overseas capital. As noted above, the demand for capital located in country \( i \) depends on the tax rate of country \( i \). For simplicity, the demand for country \( i \)'s capital located in country \( j \) is assumed to depend on country \( j \)'s tax rate even when the tax rate for country \( j \) is less than that for country \( i \) and country \( i \) uses a
tax credit system. This follows from Hartman’s (1985) argument that repatriation taxes are irrelevant for investment funded from retained earnings. Note that a territorial tax system corresponds to the case in which country $i$’s tax rate is less than country $j$’s tax rate, so we do not consider this as a separate problem.

As mentioned, our main focus in the empirical section is in estimating the followers’ reaction function. We therefore consider here the maximization problem faced by a follower, country $i$. Country $i$’s problem will be to select a tax rate to maximize the utility of the representative consumer:

$$\max_{t_i} u(X) + v(G_i)$$

$$s.t. \quad X_i = f(K_i) - (r + t_i)K_i + rK^*_i$$

$$G_i = t_i K_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \max(t_i - t_j, 0)(K_{ji})$$

(4)

where utility is assumed to be additively separable. The first order condition for this problem, which defines the reaction function, is

$$-\frac{\partial u}{\partial X_i} K_i + \frac{\partial v}{\partial G_i} \left( K_i + t_i \frac{\partial K_i}{\partial t_i} + \sum_{j < t_i} K_{ji} \right) = 0$$

(5)

where we have substituted for $\frac{\partial f}{\partial K_i}$ using the fact that profit-maximization by perfectly competitive firms implies that a firm’s demand for capital satisfies (1) above. Rewriting the first order condition yields

$$\frac{\partial v}{\partial G_i} = \frac{l}{I + \varepsilon \sum_{j < t_i} \left( \frac{K_{ji}}{K_i} \right)}$$

(6)

The tax rate will be chosen to equate the marginal rate of substitution between public and private goods to
the tax-price. The tax price depends on the degree to which capital flees a jurisdiction as it increases its
tax rate, the elasticity of capital with respect to the tax rate denoted \( \varepsilon_{K,t} \). The greater is the response of
capital to an increase in the tax rate, the higher is the tax-price and the lower is the optimal tax rate. If
there are no countries whose tax rate is less than the tax rate of country \( i \) (or equivalently under a
territorial system), the summation in the denominator is zero and the tax-price reduces to the standard first
order condition of the tax competition literature.

If country \( i \) operates under a tax credit system and there are other countries with lower tax rates,
the bracketed term becomes relevant. As country \( i \) increases its tax rate, it not only loses some revenue as
domestically located capital leaves, but also gains some revenue from a higher net tax on domestically
owned capital that is located in countries with lower tax rates. This diminishes the capital flight impact
on revenues, lowers the tax price, and tends to increase the optimal tax rate.

The empirical work will attempt to estimate the slope of the followers’ reaction function. With
respect to the leader’s tax rate, \( t_L \), the slope of the follower’s reaction function can be derived by
differentiating (5). This yields:

\[
\begin{align*}
&-u_x K_i \frac{\partial X_i}{\partial t_L} - u_x \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\partial K_j}{\partial t_L} \frac{\partial r}{\partial t} + v_a \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\partial G_j}{\partial t_L} \\
&+ v_a \frac{\partial K_i}{\partial r} \frac{\partial r}{\partial t_L} + v_a t_i \frac{\partial K_i^2}{\partial t_j \partial t_L} + v_a \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\partial K_j}{\partial t_L} \frac{\partial r}{\partial t_L} \\
&= \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\partial K_j}{\partial t_L} \frac{\partial r}{\partial t_L} \\
&= \frac{\partial K}{\partial r} \frac{\partial r}{\partial t_L}
\end{align*}
\]

Examination of this derivative indicates that it is ambiguous in sign. To give some intuition, we group
the terms into four categories: a desire to maintain public spending (term 3), a desire to maintain private
consumption (term 1), a change in the elasticity of domestic capital (terms 2, 4, and 5), and a change in
the demand for taxed capital overseas (term 6).
The desire to maintain public spending. Differentiation of the constraint for public spending yields:

$$\frac{\partial G_i}{\partial t_L} = t_i \frac{\partial K_i}{\partial r} \frac{\partial r}{\partial t_L} + \sum_{j \in \{t_j < t_i\}} (t_i - t_j) \frac{\partial K_{ji}}{\partial r} \frac{\partial r}{\partial t_L} - \alpha t_L K_{Li} > 0 \text{ for } \alpha = 0 \quad (8)$$

where $\alpha = 1$ if $t_L < t_i$ and 0 otherwise. A decrease in the leader’s tax rate leads to an outflow of capital from country $i$ and countries other than $L$ in which country $i$’s capital is located. The after-tax return to capital is raised in equilibrium. This implies that the first two additive terms are positive and public spending in country $i$ must fall if country $i$ leaves its tax rate unchanged, so $\partial G_i/\partial t_L < 0$ if $\alpha = 0$. The fall in $G$ increases the value of public spending on the margin and country $i$ consequently has an incentive to increase its tax rate to maintain public spending. In this case the third term of the comparative static is negative and tends to make the reaction function downward sloping. If the leader has a tax rate less than country $i$ ($\alpha = 1$), country $i$ gains some revenue on its capital located in the leader country making the sign of (8) and the third term of the comparative static ambiguous.

The desire to maintain private spending. Differentiation of the constraint for private spending yields:

$$\frac{\partial X}{\partial t_L} = \frac{\partial r}{\partial t_L} (K_i^* - K_i) > 0 \text{ if net capital importer, } < 0 \text{ if net capital exporter} \quad (9)$$

A decrease in the leader’s tax rate raises the after-tax return to capital. This raises the capital income of country $i$ ($r K_i^*$) but decreases country $i$’s labor income ($f(K_i) - (r + t_i)K_i$). If the follower is a net capital importer, private consumption falls because its labor income falls by more than its capital income rises.\(^2\)

Private consumption becomes more valuable on the margin, but additional consumption of the private good entails a lower tax rate for the follower and term 1 is positive. If the follower is a capital exporter, a

\(^2\) Capital importer and capital exporter are used somewhat loosely to mean the cases for which $K_i^* < K_i$ and $K_i^* > K_i$, respectively.
fall in the leader’s tax rate increases private consumption which becomes less valuable on the margin. The follower would like to consume less of the private good which entails a higher tax rate for the follower and term 1 is negative. Hence, the first term tends to make the reaction function negatively sloped for a capital exporter and positively sloped for a capital importer.

A change in the elasticity of domestic capital. Terms 2, 4, and 5 relate to a change in the elasticity of domestic capital on the right hand side of (6). The elasticity is of course defined as \( (t/K_i) \) \( (\partial K_i/\partial t_i) \). Terms 2 and 4 derive from the fact that a lower tax rate for the leader increases the after-tax return to capital which will result in less capital located in country \( i \). This implies that the elasticity of capital is higher. In other words, a decrease in the tax rate of the leader increases the tax-price of public spending for country \( i \), and there will be an incentive for country \( i \) to lower its tax rate in response.\(^3\) Thus terms 2 and 4 tend to make the reaction function positively sloped.

Term 5 arises from the possibility that a change in the leader’s tax rate changes the response of country \( i \)’s capital to a change in its tax rate, i.e. that it changes \( \partial K_i/\partial t_i \). The sign of this term depends on the sign of the cross-tax derivative. To the extent that a lower leader tax rate increases the response of \( K_i \) to change in \( t_i \), the elasticity and tax-price perceived by country \( i \) is higher and the follower would decrease its tax rate, making this term positive. More generally, the term is ambiguous in sign.

A change in the demand for taxed capital overseas. Term 6 is positive and arises from the fact that a lower tax rate for the leader increases the after-tax return to capital and results in less formerly taxed overseas capital located in countries with tax rates less than country \( i \). This loss in revenue

\(^3\) Formally, adding term 2 and term 4 together yields:

\[
ux \frac{\partial K_i}{\partial r} \frac{\partial r}{\partial tL} \left( \frac{vG}{ux} - 1 \right) > 0
\]

where the positive sign follows from the first order condition: fearful of capital flight, the tax-price perceived by the follower is greater than 1.
increases the tax-price of public spending for country $i$, and there will be an incentive for country $i$ to lower its tax rate in response.

To summarize, the reaction function of a small country with respect to a change in the tax rate of a large leader can be positively or negatively sloped in theory. We have derived four factors that influence the slope: a desire to maintain public spending and private spending, a change in the elasticity of domestic capital, and a change in the demand for taxed capital overseas. Intuitively, the main reason one might observe a negatively sloped reaction function is a desire to maintain public spending (and to reduce private consumption for a capital exporter) while a positively sloped reaction function is due primarily to a higher elasticity of capital resulting from the leader’s tax change. We turn next to the estimation.

3. **Empirical Methodology**

3.1 **Econometric Specification**

The theory that underlies the empirical work is a strategic model of tax competition that allows for one large country to act as a Stackelberg leader. Empirically, our goal is to estimate a reaction function for the followers. The few empirical papers that have attempted to estimate national reaction functions (e.g. Besley, Griffith, and Klemm, 2001, and Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2002) have considered a Nash competition model. We follow this literature in that we allow the followers to be Nash competitors with each other, but we also allow them to react to the actions of a large country. We think that the United States may have played a Stackelberg leader role as it passed TRA’86. Our focus is thus on European countries acting as Nash competitors with each other, and viewing the United States as a Stackelberg leader, although we also test whether the United Kingdom or Germany could have played this
Accordingly, our basic estimating equation is:

\[
\tau_{i,t} = \beta \sum_{j \neq i} \omega_{ij} \tau_{j,t} + X_{i,t} \theta + \tau_{L,t-1} \eta + d_i \phi + T_i \psi + \varepsilon_i
\] (10)

where \(i\) indexes the follower countries and \(t\) indexes time, \(\tau_i\) is our tax rate measure, \(\tau_{L,t-1}\) is the lagged tax rate of the leader, \(X_i\) is a vector of exogenous control variables, \(\omega\) is a weighting matrix discussed further below, \(\beta, \theta, \phi, \eta, \psi\) are estimated parameters (\(\theta\) being a vector of estimates), \(d_i\) is a set of country fixed effects, \(T\) is a time trend, and \(\varepsilon_i\) is an error term.\(^4\) We discuss our exogenous control variables in some detail in the next section. The slope of the reaction function with respect to the Stackelberg leader is the estimated coefficient \(\eta\). As our theoretical derivation makes clear, this coefficient could be negative (due primarily to a desire to maintain public spending) or positive (due primarily to a higher elasticity of capital resulting from the leader’s tax change).

The slope of the reaction function with respect to other Nash competitors is the coefficient \(\beta\). The weights of the weighting matrix \(\omega\) are constructed to reflect the influence of each neighbor’s tax rate on the “own” country tax rate. A weighting scheme that seems particularly appealing to us is one in which weights are assigned based (inversely) on the distance between the own country and all countries for which interactions are assumed. This equation has been found to explain well trade relations. One such scheme assigns a weight of one to contiguous countries (states, counties, etc.) and zero to all others (see, for example, Besley and Case 1995). These weights are normalized to add to one. We follow this simple weighting scheme in our analysis. However, in assigning weights to neighbors we have ignored relatively small bodies of water separating countries. For example, the neighbors of Norway are Denmark, Finland

\(^4\) We use the lagged value for the leader since our assumption is that the Stackelberg leader moves first.
and Sweden. These three countries each receive a weight of one-third in our weighting matrix.\(^5\) We further test the validity of this weighting matrix by testing whether the weighted average tax rate of the neighbors of the neighbors of country \(i\) is significant in our regression specification. We define the neighbors of the neighbors using the same logic that we used to identify the neighbors of country \(i\) and we find that this weighted average tax rate is not significant in our regressions.\(^6\) Appendix table 1 shows our classification of the geographic neighbors of the countries in our dataset.

We investigate several variations of the basic regression equation. We start by dropping the leader’s rate to estimate a simple Nash specification. We estimate this first specification for both capital and personal tax competition. One would expect tax competition to be particularly pronounced for mobile capital and relatively sedate for immobile labor. Second, one might suspect that globalization and increased mobility of capital would lead to steeper reaction functions over time. Indeed, Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (2001) find that the location of the assets of U.S. multinationals became more sensitive to differences in corporate tax rates between 1984 and 1992. If governments perceive this change, their perceived tax price would increase, lowering the tax rate on capital.

We also explore whether the reaction function of the follower European countries became steeper with respect to the U.S. lead. Here we take the TRA’86, which significantly lowered the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate while broadening the base, as the potential turning point. It is possible that the TRA’86 combined with the relaxation of capital controls in Europe and technological advances that eased capital mobility resulted in European nations treating the U.S. as a Stackelberg leader after 1986. Previous work

---

\(^5\) Another example of a country whose neighbors’ are assigned ignoring small bodies of water is the United Kingdom. Instead of assuming that the United Kingdom has no interaction with European countries, we consider the possibility that the federal government strategically interacts with Belgium, France, Ireland and the Netherlands. In our view, this is consistent with assigning countries based on borders.

\(^6\) We thank Austan Goolsbee for this suggestion. We constructed the variable as follows. Assume that country 1 has two neighbors, countries 2 and 3. Assume further that countries 2 and 3 together have three neighbors that are not neighbors of country 1. The “neighbor’s neighbor” rate would be a weighted average of the three neighbors corporate tax rates (where each receives a weight of 1/3).
has presented suggestive evidence of this dynamic in tax competition. For instance, tax return data shows that the average foreign effective tax rates faced by U.S.-based multinationals abroad have declined substantially between 1983 and 1992 (see, for example, Grubert, Randolph and Rousslang 1996 and Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon 2001). Grubert, Randolph and Rousslang (1996) find this trend is primarily due to reductions in country average tax rates that closely paralleled the decrease in the U.S. statutory rate in 1986. During this same period, U.S.-based multinationals have increased outbound investment and become more sensitive to differences in local tax rates abroad. Desai (1999) argues that taken together these trends suggest that changes in the tax rates of large countries such as the United States “…can trigger a transitional period of tax competition (p. 176).” Our work directly tests whether TRA’86 initiated a period of more intense European tax competition at two levels: first, whether European countries became more responsive to their neighbor’s tax changes and second, whether these same countries “followed” the U.S. reforms.

3.2 Data and Variables

We use data for 1968 to 1996 from the OECD Revenue Statistics. This data source provides us with a relatively long time-series of country tax revenue detail that is comparable across countries. We calculate a measure of average corporate and individual tax rates by dividing revenues from each tax by gross domestic product. This is one common average tax rate measure and has been used by, among

---

7 Desai (1999) finds similar patterns using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. He finds that the ratio of foreign income taxes to profit-type return fell significantly between 1982 and 1995. The data show that there was a substantial period of adjustment to the 1986 U.S. tax reform.
9 Corporate tax revenues are class 1200 “taxes on income, profits and capital gains of corporations.” Personal tax revenues are class 1100 “taxes on income, profits and capital gains of individuals.” The OECD data breaks tax
others, Besley, Griffith and Klemm (2001) to estimate Nash fiscal reaction functions for OECD countries. Although this is not a perfect measure, it has the virtue of being available from the late 1960s for our sample. Moreover, alternative measures of corporate tax burdens, such as those calculated by considering the tax burden of marginal investments in different asset classes, are also problematic since, as pointed out by Slemrod (2001) they rely on some arbitrary assumptions and do not consider certain aspects such as enforcement. Moreover, these hypothetical tax rates often do not account for differences in international double taxation relief across countries. A true effective marginal tax rate would be at least firm-specific and more likely project-specific within a firm, so it is unclear a-priori whether a particular country effective tax rate calculated in the usual way offers any advantage over our average tax rate measure. In any case, these measures are available for a relatively short time frame, having only been calculated from the 1980s onward, which makes them of dubious use for the focus of our analysis.

We include GDP per capita, total government spending (as a percentage of GDP) and the value of our personal tax measure as control variables. High corporate tax rates in a country could be a by-product of a relatively high demand for public services. As a result, corporate taxes may vary due to differences in the demand for services. If the demand for government services is correlated with income, then it is important to control for any differences in income across countries. We use per-capita GDP as a measure of country income.

---

An interesting paper that estimates Nash reaction functions using three measures of corporate taxes (statutory rates, effective marginal tax rates, and effective average tax rates) is Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002). Their effective tax rate measures are based on those proposed in Devereux and Griffith (2003).
The government budget constraint suggests the inclusion of government spending and the personal tax rate. If government spending is held fixed, an increase in one revenue source such as the personal income tax will need to be matched by a corresponding decrease in another revenue source, such as the corporate tax. Hence, personal and corporate revenues may be negatively correlated. Further, the theoretical model in Gordon (1986) suggests that tax competition will lead to a movement away from taxes on mobile factors toward taxes on immobile factors, also suggesting a negative correlation. If government spending increases, the budget constraint maintains balance through an increase in some revenue source. Part of the increase might result from an increase in the corporate tax, suggesting a positive correlation between government spending and corporate tax. Thus, variation across countries in corporate rates may be correlated with variation in spending levels as well as changes in personal tax rates.

These arguments suggest that we control for differences in the personal tax rate and government spending. However, they also suggest that the personal tax rate and government spending may be endogenous. As explained further below, before proceeding with our estimation of the reaction function we test whether the personal tax rate and government spending are endogenous.

3.3 Econometric Issues

Several econometric issues arise in the estimation of equation (10). First, the tax rates appearing on the right hand side are clearly endogenous in theory if all countries are playing Nash: country $j$ responds to a change in country $i$'s tax rate just as country $i$ responds to a change in country $j$’s tax rate.\footnote{In theory the Stackelberg leader’s tax rate is exogenous for the follower.} Consistent estimates can be obtained through the spatial econometric approach employed by Case, Hines and Rosen (1993) in their study of expenditure competition, or by using an instrumental variable.
technique. We employ the latter solution, which Kelejian and Prucha (1998) show is also consistent in
the presence of a second possible problem, spatial error dependence. In addition, both the personal tax
rate and government spending are also potentially endogenous. We explain our endogeneity tests and
instrumental variables approach more fully below. The use of fixed country effects eliminates a third
possible problem, omission of unobserved country characteristics that do not vary over time. Baldwin
and Krugman (2001) suggest that agglomeration economies, which tend to be fixed over time if
historically determined, may be important for understanding tax competition across countries. We use the
method of first-differencing to implement fixed effects. Given our exploitation of the time series nature
of our data, we need to be concerned with a fourth possible problem, serial correlation. We tested for
serial correlation by augmenting our regression to include the residual (as well as checking the Durbin-
Watson statistic) and found serial correlation to be an issue. We correct this by computing and presenting
Newey-West (1987) standard errors which also are robust to heteroskedasticity.

As noted, we have good theoretical reasons to suspect that neighbors’ tax rates are endogenous.
We also suspect that two of our other explanatory variables may be endogenous: spending per capita and
our measure of the personal tax rate. We therefore need to carefully test for endogeneity and correct our
estimates if we reject the hypothesis that OLS estimates are consistent. To test for endogeneity we
employ a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. The results of this test indicate that the neighbor’s tax rate is
endogenous and that OLS is inconsistent if not corrected. However, neither spending nor the personal tax
rate were found to be endogenous in the sense of leading to inconsistent OLS estimates. Since an attempt
to use IV estimates for these variables could lead to greater error and imprecision of the estimates, we
proceed by treating the personal tax rate and spending per capita as exogenous.

---

12 We use two-year intervals in first-differencing since political processes can be slow in practice. At the same time,
our two-year window minimizes the loss in data that would result from a longer interval.
To explain our instrumental variable approach for neighbors’ tax rates more fully, let $\omega_{i,t}$ represent the neighbor tax rate for country $i$. If country 1, for example, has two neighbors, countries 2 and 3, then $\omega_{1,1} = \frac{1}{2}\tau_{2} + \frac{1}{2}\tau_{3}$. The neighbor co-variates, $\omega_{i}X_{i}$ are defined similarly. The first stage regression used to generate a predicted value for neighbors’ tax rates is:

$$
\omega_{i}(\tau_{i,t} - \tau_{i,t-2}) = C + \gamma \omega_{i}(X_{i,t} - X_{i,t-2}) + \theta (X_{i,t} - X_{i,t-2}) + \Psi T_{t} + \varepsilon_{i}
$$

where $C$ is a constant term and, dropping the time subscript for simplicity, $\omega_{i}\tau_{i}$ is country $i$’s “neighbor” tax rate, $\omega_{i}X_{i}$ is a vector of neighbor explanatory variables, $X_{i}$ is a vector of own country explanatory variables, and $T$ is a time trend.

The variables in the “neighbor” matrix $(\omega_{i}X_{i})$ are neighbor’s GDP per capita, neighbor’s spending per capita, neighbor’s personal tax rates (tax revenues/GDP), neighbor’s percentage of population under 14, neighbor’s percentage of population over 65, neighbor’s population density, and neighbor’s unemployment rate.\(^{13}\) The variables in the own country matrix $(X_{i})$ are similarly defined.\(^{14}\)

The fitted values for the neighbor tax rates are used as instruments in the second stage regression:

$$
\tau_{i,t} - \tau_{i,t-2} = C + \beta_{1}(\tau^{*}_{i,t} - \tau^{*}_{i,t-2}) + \beta_{2}(GDP_{i,t} - GDP_{i,t-2}) + \beta_{3}(S_{i,t} - S_{i,t-2})
$$

$$
+ \beta_{4}(P_{i,t} - P_{i,t-2}) + \beta_{5}T_{t} + \varepsilon_{i}
$$

where $\tau^{*}_{i,t}$ is the fitted value of the neighbors’ tax rate, $GDP_{i,t}$ is GDP per capita, $S_{i,t}$ is government spending per capita, and $P_{i,t}$ is our measure of the personal tax rate, all for country $i$ and year $t$. We use an overidentifying restrictions test to judge whether the instruments used in our first-stage regressions are uncorrelated with the error term. The results of this test indicate that we can accept the joint null hypothesis that the instruments we use are uncorrelated with the error term for each regression that we

\(^{13}\) Data on country area used to compute population density comes from Eurostat’s Basic Statistics of the Community, demographic data comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and unemployment data comes from the OECD’s Labour Force Statistics.

\(^{14}\) Note that we include a constant term in equation (11) to allow for the possibility that the constant term in each yearly regression may vary across time. Our results are not sensitive to including the constant term.
present. Appendix table 3 shows the results of our first-stage regressions.

4. Results

Table 1 presents our basic estimates of reaction functions for European countries. The specification of the first column assumes only a Nash tax-setting game between European neighbors; that is, we omit any possible Stackelberg game with the U.S. The coefficient on the neighbors’ corporate tax change is positive and significant at a more than five percent confidence level. Using sample means, this suggests that a ten percent decrease in the neighbors’ corporate tax rate induces about a 3.6 percent decrease in a country’s corporate rate. The magnitude of the effect of an individual neighbor’s tax change on a country’s tax rate depends on the neighbor’s weight. The average number of neighbors for a country in our data set is about four which suggests that, at the sample means, a ten percent decrease in a neighbor’s tax rate leads to about a 1 percent decrease in the own country tax rate.

We find that greater levels of spending are positively associated with corporate tax rates. Consistent with the idea that tax rates on different bases are substitutes, the coefficient on the personal tax rate in column 1 is negative and highly significant. Somewhat surprisingly, differences in income, as measured by GDP per capita, do not explain differences in corporate tax rates.

Interestingly, we do not find the same results when we investigate the impact of neighbors’ personal tax changes on own country personal tax rates in column 2. The coefficient on the neighbor’s personal tax rate is negative and not significantly different from zero. This suggests that countries do not set personal tax rates strategically most likely because labor is less mobile than capital.\(^{15}\)

In column 3 we continue to assume that European countries behave as Nash competitors with

---

\(^{15}\) The results of Besley, Griffith, and Klemm (2001) also support the idea that taxes on more mobile factors react more strongly than those on more immobile factors.
each other, but we further investigate whether they behave as if the U.S. were a Stackelberg leader when setting corporate taxes. Column 3 shows estimates of the impact of a change in neighbors’ and U.S. tax rates on own country corporate tax rates. When we add the lagged value of the U.S. corporate tax rate, the coefficient on the neighbors’ tax rate falls from about .45 to .41 but remains significant at a greater than 5 percent confidence level. The U.S. rate (lagged) is also statistically different from zero at a greater than 5 percent confidence level. The results suggest that European countries respond both to their neighbor’s and U.S. tax changes.

In the fourth column of table 1, we explore whether the U.S. became a leader after TRA’86. To do this we include a dummy variable that equals one for observations prior to and including 1986 and an interaction term between this variable and the U.S. tax rate. The estimated coefficient shows the difference (if any) between the responsiveness of corporate tax rates to U.S. tax changes before and after TRA’86.

The estimates in the fourth column suggest that the Europeans did act as if the U.S. were a Stackelberg leader following the U.S. tax reform. Once we allow for a different effect of the U.S. rate before and after the U.S. tax reform, the coefficient on the neighbors’ tax rate falls and becomes insignificant. The coefficient on the U.S. rate remains highly significant. At the sample means, a 10 percent decrease in the U.S. tax rate leads to a 6.1 percent decrease in the own tax rate. The coefficient on the lagged U.S. tax rate prior to TRA’86 is not statistically different from zero.\textsuperscript{16} The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the difference between the coefficient on the U.S. rate before and after 1986 is statistically different from zero.

In the final column we explore whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of “tax havens”. It is possible that the tax havens in our sample (Ireland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland) are playing a

\textsuperscript{16} We estimate the coefficient and obtain the t-statistic on the neighbor tax rate prior to 1986 by running the same regression but replacing the pre-1986 dummy with a variable that equals one if the observation is for the later period (1987-1996).
different game, possibly responding to each other’s tax changes but not to the rates chosen by their neighbors that are not tax havens.\(^\text{17}\) In addition, they may react in a different way to changes in the U.S. rate. The fifth column presents results of a regression that drops these countries from the sample. Although the coefficient on the U.S. rate is similar, the coefficient on the neighbor’s rate is now larger in magnitude and is statistically significant at a greater than 1 percent confidence level. These results suggest that non-havens compete with each other and react to U.S. tax reforms.

Table 2 presents regressions that consider the possibility that other large countries have played the role of Stackelberg leader after 1986. We start by examining the case of Germany. The first two columns of table 2 present estimates of reaction functions using a sample that excludes Germany.\(^\text{18}\) The first column demonstrates that our results on Nash tax competition continue to hold when Germany is dropped from the analysis. However, the results in column two show that Germany is not perceived as a Stackelberg leader by European countries. The coefficient on the lagged German rate is negative and not statistically different from zero. The same result holds if we allow the effect of the German tax rate to be constant over time by dropping the dummy variable for 1986 and the interaction between the lagged German corporate tax rate and the dummy variable.\(^\text{19}\) The remaining columns consider the case of the United Kingdom. As with Germany, we first present results for the sample that simply drops the U.K. from the analysis. Again, the Nash tax competition results are similar to those in column (1) of table 1. The coefficient on the neighbor’s tax rate increases in magnitude when we drop the U.K. (and Germany in column 1) from the analysis. Column 4 contains results of tests of whether the U.K. was a leader after 1986. As was the case with Germany, the coefficient on the U.K. rate is not statistically significant. It may be important, however, to take into account that the U.K. had a major corporate tax reform in 1984.

---

\(^\text{17}\) Our classification of European tax havens follows Hines and Rice (1994).
\(^\text{18}\) Germany is excluded as a country (observation) in the sample and as a neighbor.
\(^\text{19}\) The results of this regression are not shown in the table to conserve on space.
The final column tests whether this reform resulted in the U.K. being a “tax leader”. Again, the coefficient on the U.K. rate is not statistically different from zero.

Our results suggest that in the post-TRA86 period, U.S. tax changes precede European tax changes of the same direction. However, it may also be the case that changes in European tax rates influence U.S. tax changes. To explore this, we present results of Granger causality tests in table 3. We test whether, controlling for past changes of country tax rates, past changes in U.S. tax rates help forecast current changes in country tax rates. The null hypothesis is that U.S. corporate tax changes do not Granger cause European changes. In addition, controlling for past changes in U.S. rates, we test whether past changes in European rates contain any information that is useful for predicting changes in U.S. rates. Similarly, the null hypothesis is that European tax changes do not Granger cause U.S. ones. We use three lags of the tax variables in each test. The results are consistent with the story that emerges in table 1. The first and last two rows of table 3 show that for the whole sample period and the pre-TRA86 period we cannot reject either null hypothesis. However, for the post-TRA86 period we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative that the U.S. tax changes Granger cause the European tax changes.

Finally, we test whether strategic interaction between European countries has intensified in recent years. To do this, we simply break the sample into two periods encompassing the first and last ten years of data and estimate reaction functions. Thus, the “early” period contains the years 1971-1980 and the “late” period runs from 1987-1996. Table 4 contains our results. Column one reports results for the early period for the Nash model. The estimated coefficient on the neighbor’s tax rate is much larger in magnitude than our results for the full sample and is statistically different from zero at conventional levels. Although we expected to find that tax competition has become fiercer in recent times, our estimates for the “late” sample suggest that this is not the case for the European Nash model. The estimated coefficient on the neighbor tax rate reported in column two falls almost in half and is
statistically different from the column one coefficient.\textsuperscript{20} The last two columns of the table show results of our “Stackelberg” econometric model. As we found in our table 1 regressions, changes in the lagged U.S. tax rate are not significant determinants of changes in European corporate tax rates in the “early” period. However, as in table 1, during the post-TRA86 period (our “late” sample) countries respond to changes in the lagged U.S. tax rate. Further, once the lagged U.S. tax rate is included as an explanatory variable, the coefficient on the neighbor tax rate decreases in magnitude and loses significance. European countries thus seem to have become more competitive in taxes vis-à-vis lagged U.S. changes, but not more competitive amongst themselves.

5. Conclusions

Tax competition is a potentially important force shaping national tax systems around the globe and influencing countries’ tax revenue, progressivity, tax mix and overall efficiency. In spite of a large theoretical literature, very little empirical evidence concerning national tax systems has been offered. The purpose of our paper has been to provide some evidence on the period between 1968 and 1996. Our focus is on tax competition among European countries and between those countries and the United States. A common observation among policy makers is that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the United States led to reforms in other nations, particularly those in Europe.

The background for our empirical work is a simple model of tax competition in which one large country acts as a Stackelberg leader while the other countries follow the leader and compete among themselves in a Nash way. The slope of the reaction function of a follower with respect to the leader is ambiguous in sign. It tends to be positive because the leader’s tax change increases the elasticity of

\textsuperscript{20} Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003) report a similar finding. One focus of their work is identifying the factors that contribute to the tax sensitivity of U.S. multinational investment abroad. They find that U.S. affiliate investment in Europe is more sensitive to differences in local tax rates than U.S. affiliate investment generally. However, their results do not indicate that this sensitivity has increased over their sample period (1983-1997). The interpretation is that tax competition within Europe has not intensified over time.
capital but negative because of a desire to maintain public spending. Our empirical work provides estimates of European reaction functions for the standard tax competition model in which each country plays a Nash game as well as the European reaction function in a game in which the U.S. is a Stackelberg leader.

Our empirical tests add to the evidence of a positively sloped Nash reaction function in corporate tax as found in recent papers on OECD countries by Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) and Besley, Griffith, and Klemm (2001). We also find no competition in labor tax between European countries. In contrast to previous research, we also estimate reaction functions that include the tax rate of a Stackelberg leader. Our main finding is that the European countries behave as if the U.S. is a Stackelberg leader in setting corporate taxes after TRA’86 but not before. We test whether Germany or the United Kingdom played a leadership role and find that they did not. Our Stackelberg findings for the U.S., Germany, and the U.K. are reinforced by our Granger causality tests, and our results on the responsiveness of European countries to changes in neighbors’ tax rates and the U.S. rate are somewhat stronger when we exclude certain tax havens. Over time we find that European countries have become more intensely competitive with the U.S. in corporate taxes, but less intensely competitive among themselves. It would seem that European countries have moved from being Nash competitors among themselves to being Stackelberg followers to the U.S. after TRA’86.
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Country corporate tax (t-[t-2])</th>
<th>Country personal tax (t-[t-2])</th>
<th>Country corporate tax (t-[t-2])</th>
<th>Country corporate tax (t-[t-2])</th>
<th>Country corporate tax (t-[t-2])</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors’ corporate tax (t-[t-2])</td>
<td>0.451** (0.195)</td>
<td>0.410** (0.193)</td>
<td>0.284 (0.221)</td>
<td>0.537** (0.220)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors’ personal tax (t-[t-2])</td>
<td>-0.158 (0.109)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country GDP per capita/100 (t-[t-2])</td>
<td>0.014 (0.019)</td>
<td>-0.014 (0.018)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.021)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.020)</td>
<td>0.014 (0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country spending (t-[t-2])</td>
<td>0.166*** (0.041)</td>
<td>0.401*** (0.035)</td>
<td>0.172*** (0.042)</td>
<td>0.171*** (0.040)</td>
<td>0.157*** (0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country personal tax rate (t-[t-2])</td>
<td>-0.193** (0.078)</td>
<td>-0.203*** (0.078)</td>
<td>-0.199*** (0.074)</td>
<td>-0.188** (0.081)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country corporate tax rate (t-[t-2])</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.331*** (0.068)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged U.S. corporate tax ([t-1]-[t-3])</td>
<td>0.148** (0.073)</td>
<td>0.451** (0.183)</td>
<td>0.428** (0.188)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged U.S. rate * dummy for pre-86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.335* (0.180)</td>
<td>-0.413** (0.184)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy for pre-1986</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.002 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time trend (year/1000)</td>
<td>0.145 (0.468)</td>
<td>-2.40** (0.693)</td>
<td>-0.088 (0.485)</td>
<td>0.695 (0.667)</td>
<td>0.477 (0.736)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.000 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.476*** (0.137)</td>
<td>0.017 (0.096)</td>
<td>-0.139 (0.133)</td>
<td>-0.096 (0.147)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Include tax havens? Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Number of observations 442 442 442 442 364
Adjusted R-squared .11 .52 .12 .14 .11

Notes: Corporate tax equals corporate tax revenues divided by GDP. Personal tax equals personal tax revenues divided by GDP. Spending equals total tax revenue divided by GDP. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West standard errors. The dummy for pre-1986 equals one for observations prior to 1986. Instrumental variables estimation (see text for details). Tax havens include Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland. * denotes statistical significance at a 10 percent confidence level, ** at a 5 percent level and *** at a 1 percent level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Exclude Germany from sample</th>
<th>(2) Germany leader</th>
<th>(3) Exclude U.K. from sample</th>
<th>(4) U.K. leader</th>
<th>(5) U.K. leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors’ corporate tax (t-[t-2])</td>
<td>0.288 (0.183)</td>
<td>0.345* (0.199)</td>
<td>0.397* (0.209)</td>
<td>0.416 (0.264)</td>
<td>0.344 (0.248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country GDP per capita/100 (t-[t-2])</td>
<td>0.012 (0.020)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.020)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.019)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.022)</td>
<td>0.009 (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country spending (t-[t-2])</td>
<td>0.168*** (0.041)</td>
<td>0.169*** (0.041)</td>
<td>0.156*** (0.044)</td>
<td>0.155*** (0.044)</td>
<td>0.156*** (0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country personal tax rate (t-[t-2])</td>
<td>-0.201*** (0.078)</td>
<td>-0.199*** (0.076)</td>
<td>-0.180** (0.083)</td>
<td>-0.174** (0.080)</td>
<td>-0.175** (0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged German corporate tax ([t-1]-[t-3])</td>
<td>-0.095 (0.268)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged U.K. corporate tax ([t-1]-[t-3])</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.093 (0.090)</td>
<td>0.105 (0.080)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged German rate * dummy for pre-1986</td>
<td>0.276 (0.301)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged U.K. rate * dummy for pre-1986</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.081 (0.119)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged U.K. rate * dummy for pre-1984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.096 (0.116)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy for pre-1986</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy for pre-1984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time trend (year/1000)</td>
<td>0.180 (0.481)</td>
<td>0.130 (0.839)</td>
<td>0.202 (0.481)</td>
<td>0.598 (0.843)</td>
<td>0.715 (0.804)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.036 (0.095)</td>
<td>-0.027 (0.167)</td>
<td>-0.041 (0.095)</td>
<td>-0.119 (0.168)</td>
<td>-0.143 (0.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>.12  .11  .09  .09  .10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Corporate tax equals corporate tax revenues divided by GDP. Personal tax equals personal tax revenues divided by GDP. Spending equals total tax revenue divided by GDP. The dummy for pre-1986 equals one for observations prior to 1986. Similarly, the dummy for pre-1984 equals one for observations prior to 1984. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West standard errors. Instrumental variables estimation (see text for details). Number of observations = 416. * denotes statistical significance at a 10 percent confidence level, ** at a 5 percent level and *** at a 1 percent level.
Table 3  
Results of Granger Causality Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>F-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full sample</strong></td>
<td>U.S. corporate change Granger causes Europe’s change</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe’s corporate change Granger causes U.S. change</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-TRA86</strong></td>
<td>U.S. corporate change Granger causes Europe’s change</td>
<td>2.71**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe’s corporate change Granger causes U.S. change</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-TRA86</strong></td>
<td>U.S. corporate change Granger causes Europe’s change</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe’s corporate change Granger causes U.S. change</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

denotes statistical significance at a 5 percent confidence level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors’ corporate tax (t-[t-2])</td>
<td>1.08** (0.532)</td>
<td>0.560** (0.259)</td>
<td>1.00* (0.562)</td>
<td>0.307 (0.266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country GDP per capita/100 (t-[t-2])</td>
<td>0.074 (0.064)</td>
<td>0.010 (0.023)</td>
<td>0.067 (0.068)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country spending (t-[t-2])</td>
<td>0.104** (0.051)</td>
<td>0.205*** (0.069)</td>
<td>0.107** (.050)</td>
<td>0.223*** (0.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country personal tax rate (t-[t-2])</td>
<td>-0.074 (0.064)</td>
<td>-0.223 (0.149)</td>
<td>-0.082 (0.062)</td>
<td>-0.240 (0.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged U.S. corporate tax ([t-1]-[t-3])</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.105 (0.121)</td>
<td>0.467** (0.204)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time trend (year/1000)</td>
<td>-1.98 (1.91)</td>
<td>-1.89 (2.43)</td>
<td>-2.60 (2.10)</td>
<td>2.27 (2.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.389 (0.377)</td>
<td>-0.377 (0.483)</td>
<td>0.511 (0.414)</td>
<td>-0.454 (0.462)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Corporate tax equals corporate tax revenues divided by GDP. Personal tax equals personal tax revenues divided by GDP. Spending equals total tax revenue divided by GDP. Numbers in parentheses are Newey-West standard errors. Instrumental variables estimation (see text for details). * denotes statistical significance at a 10 percent confidence level, ** at a 5 percent level and *** at a 1 percent level.
### Appendix Table 1
Geographic Neighbors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Neighbors</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Neighbors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Germany, Italy,</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>United Kingdom,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>France, Germany,</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Austria,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luxembourg,</td>
<td></td>
<td>France,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Greece,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Germany, Norway,</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Belgium,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Norway, Sweden</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Belgium,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Belgium, Italy,</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Denmark,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luxembourg, Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td>Finland,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany, United</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kingdom, Ireland,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium,</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Germany,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark, France,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Austria,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austria, France,</td>
<td></td>
<td>France,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luxembourg,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden, Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Italy, Turkey</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Belgium,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ireland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27
## Appendix Table 2
Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country tax variables (t-[t-2])</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate tax</td>
<td>0.000739</td>
<td>0.00658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal tax</td>
<td>0.00218</td>
<td>0.0108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbor’s tax</td>
<td>0.00584</td>
<td>0.00362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. corporate tax</td>
<td>-0.00103</td>
<td>0.00476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. corporate tax rate*dummy for pre-1986</td>
<td>-0.00149</td>
<td>0.00421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country variables (t-[t-2])</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita/100</td>
<td>0.0174</td>
<td>0.0239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending /GDP</td>
<td>0.00811</td>
<td>0.0190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Corporate tax and personal tax equal corporate and personal tax receipts, respectively, divided by GDP. Spending equals total tax receipts divided by GDP.
### Appendix Table 3
First-stage Results for Corporate Tax Regressions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Change in neighbors’ corporate tax</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors’ change in GDP</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors’ change in spending</td>
<td>0.091***</td>
<td>0.103***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors’ change in personal tax rate</td>
<td>-0.253***</td>
<td>-0.273***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors’ change in population density/1000</td>
<td>-0.172**</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors’ change in proportion young</td>
<td>-0.151**</td>
<td>-0.153**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors’ change in proportion old</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors’ change in unemployment</td>
<td>-0.0004***</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.098*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Includes own state covariates? Yes Yes
Includes lagged U.S. corporate rate? No Yes
Number of observations 442 442
Adjusted R-squared .16 .20

**Notes:** The neighbor variables are defined in the text (see the discussion of equation 12). Corporate tax equals corporate tax revenues divided by GDP. Personal tax equals personal tax revenues divided by GDP. Spending equals total tax revenue divided by GDP. All regressions include own state covariates (those that appear in the second-stage regression and those that appear in the table above). Robust-to-heteroskedasticity standard errors are reported in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at a 10 percent confidence level, ** at a 5 percent level and *** at a 1 percent level.
References


