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## Agency Costs, Net Worth, and the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy

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# BONN ECON DISCUSSION PAPERS

Discussion Paper 2/2000

## Agency costs, Net Worth, and the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy

by

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March 2000



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# Agency Costs, Net Worth, and the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy

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March, 2000

## Abstract

A variety of empirical and theoretical evidence published in recent years suggests that frictions in credit markets are crucial to understand the monetary transmission mechanism. The objective of this paper is to provide a quantitative evaluation of the “credit view”-interpretation of this evidence. Special attention is paid to the role of borrowers’ net worth. A model with endogenous agency costs is developed where a debt contracting problem with asymmetric information between lender and borrower is embedded in a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with money. The model incorporates a cash-in-advance constraint and a limited participation assumption in order to induce a liquidity effect of monetary shocks and to propagate monetary disturbances. The paper has two principal conclusions: First, the model economy shows that a positive money supply shock generates an increase in output and in employment. Second, ex ante heterogeneity of borrowers has a significant influence on the reactions of the model economy to a monetary shock.

JEL classification: E13, E32, E44, E51

Key words: financial intermediation, costly state verification, monetary transmission mechanism, credit channel, limited participation, liquidity effect

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# 1 Introduction

Conventional wisdom holds that an expansionary monetary policy shock generates a decrease in nominal interest rates and an increase in the level of employment and output - the so-called liquidity effect of monetary policy.<sup>1</sup> In recent years many economists argued that frictions in credit markets are crucial to understand how this monetary shock works, that is to understand the monetary transmission mechanism.<sup>2</sup>

The most important example of this view is the credit channel of monetary policy, which consists of the Bank Lending Channel and the Balance Sheet Channel.<sup>3</sup> Both emphasize the importance of asymmetric information in financial markets. According to the bank lending channel, borrowers do not have direct access to the credit markets but depend on loans from banks as financial intermediaries can solve asymmetric information problems in credit markets more easily. Expansionary monetary policy, which increases bank reserves and bank deposits, increases the quantity of bank loans available and therefore increases loans to finance investment spending which will in turn increase aggregate output and employment. The balance-sheet channel emphasizes the role of the net worth of borrowers. Following the balance-sheet channel, the amount borrowed does not only depend on the price of credit, that is the interest rate, but, due to problems of asymmetric information, also on borrowers net worth. A lower net worth means a higher risk of adverse selection and moral hazard. Therefore whenever the central bank actions influence the net worth of firms, e.g. through the general price level, the price of equity shares or the nominal interest rates, these actions will also influence the firms' ability to invest.

On the theoretical side, the simple monetized Real Business Cycle with no other frictions than a cash-in-advance constraint cannot account for a rise of the output after a monetary shock. In these models, a monetary expansion will always lead to a reduction of real output and of employment. Recent papers by Fuerst (1992), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992b), and Christiano (1991), based on the earlier work of Grossman and Weiss (1983), Rotemberg (1984), Lucas (1990), show however, that a positive output response is possible in a monetary model with a cash-in-advance constraint. This is done by incorporating the so called

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<sup>1</sup>For recent empirical evidence in support of the existence of the liquidity effect of monetary policy, see e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992a).

<sup>2</sup>So Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Bernanke et al. (1996), Mishkin (1996), and many others.

<sup>3</sup>For the credit channel, see, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Morris and Sellon (1995), Hubbard (1995), or Ramey (1993).

”limited participation” or ”sluggish cash flow” assumption into a magnetized RBC model. This assumption means that firms and financial intermediaries adjust their financial positions more frequently or more easily than do households, who cannot adjust their portfolio immediately after a monetary shock is realized. After a monetary expansion and as the households cannot adjust their real balances within the period, the borrowers have to absorb the new amount of money, which they will be willing to do only at a lower interest rate. This decrease of the interest rate spurs investment and output growth.

As some of these limited participation models can replicate the liquidity effect of monetary policy it has been argued in the literature, that they are “stylized representations” of the credit channel.<sup>4</sup>

Concerning this argument and therefore concerning the relevant models, there are, however, two important points to criticize. First, the special role of banks in these models is purely ad hoc. The assumption that borrowers can only borrow from banks is not further justified. Such an assumption should, however, be based on first principles as well as on explicitly modeled informational problems. Second and even more important, the special role of borrowers’ net worth is not examined. Either there is no net worth of borrowers at all, or it is set constant. This stands in clear contrast to the balance-sheet channel which exactly emphasizes the effect of a changing net worth on the monetary mechanism. Furthermore, at least since the ”debt-deflation” explanation of the Great Depression by Fisher (1933), many economist have viewed financial factors, such as borrowers net worth, as important elements of business-cycle fluctuations in general. A seminal contribution to this line of research was made by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), who developed a general equilibrium model in which agency costs arise endogenously. Building on this work, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) have shown that to model borrowers with endogenous net worth can improve the dynamics of a real business cycle model considerably.

In this paper, I present a model which is not subject to either of these two points of criticism. Concerning the first problem, I follow the recent work of Fuerst (1995), Fisher (1999), and Cooley and Nam (1998) and embed the costly state verification framework introduced by Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) into a monetary business cycle model with cash-in-advance constraint and limited participation assumption. As in Diamond (1984), there is a clear role for a financial intermediary to intermediate between borrowers and households in order to minimize the aggregate monitoring costs. Therefore the special role of

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<sup>4</sup>So e.g. Bernanke et al. (1999) or Christiano and Eichenbaum (1999).

banks is well founded. Concerning the second point, I allow for asset holding of borrowers and that they can change their net worth endogenously. The size of the required loans does not only change with the size of the project, but also with the size of borrower's net worth.

The model of this paper can be thought of as a full stylized representation of the credit channel of the monetary transmission mechanism, as all the informational problems in the financial markets are fully included and net worth can change endogenously. Allowing endogenous net worth of long-lived borrowers introduces the problem of heterogeneity. At any point in time, there will be a non-trivial distribution of net worth heterogeneity across borrowers. However, by following the aggregation technique of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) and assuming a linear investment and linear monitoring technology, only the first moment of the distribution of borrowers' net worth has an effect on the aggregate economy. Keeping track of the mean is simple and amounts to adding an additional state variable to the dynamic program.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section develops the optimal financial contract between lender and borrower in a partial equilibrium setting. Then, Section 3 describes the economic environment and defines the general equilibrium. In Section 4, I calibrate the model using long-run US data, compute the equilibrium by the method of undetermined coefficients and discuss its quantitative effects by analyzing impulse response functions. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

## 2 The financial contracts

In this section we consider a financial contracting problem in a partial equilibrium setting. We are able to separate the consideration of this contract from the rest of the general equilibrium model because, by assumption, the contract is one period of length only: For tractability we assume that there is enough anonymity in financial markets that only one-period contracts between borrowers and lenders are feasible.<sup>5</sup> The contract is negotiated at the beginning of a period and resolved by the end of the same period.

The credit market comprises two types of agents, potential borrowers and potential lenders. Both types are assumed to be risk neutral. The potential borrowers

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<sup>5</sup>A similar assumption is made by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) and Bernanke et al. (1999).

are entrepreneurs who wish to undertake risky projects but lack the necessary resources so they turn to the investors for external finance. Investors can obtain their resources by paying the rate on interest on riskless securities. In a competitive market each investor treats the rate of interest on riskless securities as a parameter and assumes he can obtain whatever funds he needs at that rate. The gross interest rate, henceforth denoted by  $R > 1$ , is therefore the fixed opportunity cost of funds for the investor. Here, it is taken parametrically and will be later endogenized in Section 3. Because investors have unlimited access to funds at the riskless rate of interest, we can assume without loss of generality that each entrepreneur obtains funds from at most one lender. In what follows, therefore, we consider only a single, representative lender-borrower pairing.

The entrepreneur has access to a stochastic production technology in which an input of  $I$  units of the consumption good is transformed into  $\omega I$  units of the capital good. The random variable  $\omega$  is independent and identically distributed across time and entrepreneurs, with cumulative probability distribution function  $\Phi$ , continuous probability density function  $\phi$ , a nonnegative support, and a mean of unity. On competitive markets, the consumption good can be bought for the price  $P$  and the produced output of the capital good can be sold for the price  $Q$ . For the purposes of this section, we will take both prices parametrically. These variables will be endogenized later in the general equilibrium framework.

At the beginning of the period, the investment level  $I$  is chosen. The entrepreneur possesses a real wealth of value  $N$ , measured in same terms as  $I$ , to finance his project. The difference  $P(I - N)$  must be financed by the lender. The entrepreneur maximizes his expected income on the project.

The entrepreneur's production decision is complicated by three factors: First, borrower's net worth  $N$  is sufficiently small so the entrepreneur would like to receive some external financing.<sup>6</sup> Second, the entrepreneur must choose his production level  $I$  before observing the idiosyncratic technology shock  $\omega$ . Finally, other agents must expend monitoring costs of  $\mu Q I$  to privately observe the outcome of a project with input level  $I$ .<sup>7</sup>

This informational framework is the static model of costly state verification due to Townsend (1979). The asymmetric information between borrower and lender creates a moral hazard problem in external financing because, absent mon-

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<sup>6</sup>In this section we just assume that net worth is sufficiently small so that the asymmetric information problem is really relevant. In Section 3, where the contractual problem is embedded into an infinite horizon framework, we guarantee that this condition is really true for each period.

<sup>7</sup>Note that the capital production as well as the monitoring technology exhibit constant returns to scale. This assumed linearity is the source of the aggregation result below.



itoring, the borrower may wish to under-report the true value of the shock  $\omega$  in order to reduce his debt repayment. As Townsend showed, this framework allows us to motivate why uncollateralized external finance may be more expensive than internal finance without imposing arbitrary restrictions on the contract structure.

Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1987) showed that the optimal contract for this type of environments is a standard debt contract.<sup>8</sup> In the underlying framework, this contract form implies the following behavior: An entrepreneur who borrows the amount of  $P(I - N)$  agrees to repay the fixed repayment  $Z = R^l P(I - N)$  if he is solvent, and defaults otherwise. Here  $R^l$  is the interest rate on loans. The entrepreneur will be insolvent if and only if his revenue from selling his produced capital is less than the repayment,  $Q\omega I < R^l P(I - N)$ , or equivalently, if the realization of the idiosyncratic shock  $\omega$  is too low,  $\omega < \bar{\omega} \equiv R^l P(I - N)/(QI)$ . The lender will monitor the project outcome if and only if the entrepreneur defaults and will then confiscate all the returns from the project. Note that the contract is completely defined by the pair  $(\bar{\omega}, I)$ , and that it is convenient to consider the optimization problem over these two arguments. The loan volume,  $P(I - N)$ , and the implied interest rate of loans,  $R^l$ , can then be calculated given the optimal values for  $\bar{\omega}$  and  $I$ .

For such a debt contract, the expected income of an entrepreneur with project size  $I$  is given by

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{E}^e(\bar{\omega}, I) &= \int_{\bar{\omega}}^{\infty} (Q\omega I - R^l P(I - N))\Phi(d\omega) + P(I - N) - P(I - N) \\ &= IQ \left[ \int_{\bar{\omega}}^{\infty} \omega \Phi(d\omega) - (1 - \Phi(\bar{\omega}))\bar{\omega} \right] \\ &= IQE^e(\bar{\omega}),\end{aligned}$$

where the second line follows from using the definition of  $\bar{\omega}$  and  $E^e(\bar{\omega})$  is defined by the term in brackets. Similarly, the expected income of the lender on such a loan is given by

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{E}^l(\bar{\omega}, I) &= \int_0^{\bar{\omega}} (Q\omega I - \mu QI)\Phi(d\omega) + \int_{\bar{\omega}}^{\infty} (R^l P(I - N))\Phi(d\omega) - RP(I - N) \\ &= IQ \left[ \int_0^{\bar{\omega}} \omega \Phi(d\omega) - \mu \Phi(\bar{\omega}) + (1 - \Phi(\bar{\omega}))\bar{\omega} \right] - RP(I - N) \\ &= IQE^l(\bar{\omega}) - RP(I - N),\end{aligned}$$

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<sup>8</sup>In addition, it must be assumed that monitoring is a deterministic function of the state and that a commitment device exists.

where the second line follows again from using the definition of  $\bar{\omega}$  and  $E^l(\bar{\omega})$  is defined by the term in brackets.

As in Gale and Hellwig and in Williamson, the optimal contract will maximize the expected pay-off to the informed entrepreneur, subject to the return of the uninformed lender being at least its exogenous opportunity cost  $R$ . The optimal contract is thus given by the  $(\bar{\omega}, I)$  pair that solve<sup>9</sup>

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\{\bar{\omega}, I\}} IQE^e(\bar{\omega}), \\ & \text{subject to } \frac{IQE^l(\bar{\omega})}{P(I-N)} \geq R. \end{aligned}$$

Solving this maximization problem leads us to the two following first-order conditions

$$1 - \Phi(\bar{\omega})\mu + \phi(\bar{\omega})\mu \frac{E^e(\bar{\omega})}{E^{e'}(\bar{\omega})} = R \frac{P}{Q} \quad \text{and} \quad (1)$$

$$I = \frac{PR}{PR - QE^l(\bar{\omega})} N. \quad (2)$$

Equation (1) defines an implicit function

$$\bar{\omega}\left(\frac{Q}{P}, R\right), \quad \text{with } \bar{\omega}_{Q/P} > 0, \bar{\omega}_R < 0. \quad (3)$$

Substituting this function (3) into (2), we get the implicit function

$$I\left(\frac{Q}{P}, N, R\right), \quad \text{with } I_{Q/P} > 0, I_N > 0, I_R < 0, \quad (4)$$

which represents the units of the consumption good placed into the capital technology. Given the infinite number of entrepreneurs, equation (4) can also be interpreted as the new-capital supply function. Since  $\bar{\omega}$  is independent of the level of individual net worth  $N$ , the linearity of (2) implies that this supply function aggregates. Aggregate investment will therefore depend only on the economywide relative price of capital  $Q/P$ , the economywide identical opportunity costs  $R$  and on the aggregate net worth. This is an implications following from our linearity assumptions.

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<sup>9</sup>In addition, the constraint  $IQE^l(\bar{\omega}) \geq N$  guarantees the participation of the entrepreneur. It is also straightforward to show that the entrepreneur will always want to invest all of his net worth in his own project, as the expected return to internal funds is higher than the expected return to external funds.

### 3 The computable general equilibrium model

In this section we will embed the static costly state verification framework of the previous section into a monetary business cycle model with limited participation assumption. Among other things, this will permit us to endogenize the safe interest rate and the prices of capital and consumption, all of which were taken as given in the partial equilibrium setting.

The model economy is divided into four types of agents: consumers, firms, entrepreneurs, and a financial intermediary. In addition, there is a monetary authority which injects new money into the system. At the beginning of time  $t$ , the households allocate their cash between two uses: loans to the financial intermediary and purchases of the consumption good. By assumption nominal consumption must be fully financed with cash. After this saving decisions, the monetary shock and the aggregate technology shock are realized. Then the entrepreneurs and the financial intermediary will write credit contracts, which happens before both parties realize the idiosyncratic productivity shock to the entrepreneurs. After the contractual negotiations are finished, these shocks are realized and the true realization is learnt costlessly by the respective entrepreneur. In the following, all production takes place and all trade is made: the household sells his labor and rents his capital stock to the firms and the entrepreneurs also sell their labor to the firms. The firms produce the consumption good, the entrepreneurs buy consumption goods from the firms in order to produce the capital goods. The households also buy the consumption goods from the firms and the capital goods from the entrepreneurs. Then the entrepreneurs will either pay back their credit or claim to be bankrupt. In the latter case, the borrower will be monitored by the financial intermediary. The entrepreneurs still having resources will then decide how much to consume and how much cash to hold and to carry over in  $t + 1$ . The intermediary then pays back the deposits to the households in form of interest and principal payments. Furthermore, the households get the profits from the intermediary and the firms and carry the balance of their income and expenditures over to the next period as cash holding.

I now present a formal description of the model by discussing the objectives and constraints facing the households, the firms, the entrepreneurs, and the financial intermediary.

### 3.1 Households

The consumers are modeled by a representative household who ranks alternative streams of consumption and leisure according to the criterion function:

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(C_t, L_t), \quad (5)$$

where  $\mathbb{E}_0$  denotes the expectation operator conditional on the time 0 information set,  $\beta$  is a subjective discount rate between 0 and 1,  $C_t$  denotes consumption at time  $t$ , and  $L_t$  denotes hours of work at time  $t$ . The household is endowed with one unit of time, which is divided between work and leisure, so that  $L_t \in [0, 1]$ . The household allocates his money between three uses: purchases  $P_t C_t$  of the consumption good, purchases  $Q_t I_t$  of the capital good, and deposits  $S_t$  with the financial intermediary. These deposits yield the gross nominal rate of interest  $R_t^D$ . By assumption, nominal consumption must be fully financed with cash. As all income is collected at the end of the period, this cash-in-advance constraint has to be satisfied with  $M_t^h - S_t$  only, so that

$$P_t C_t \leq M_t^h - S_t, \quad (6)$$

where  $M_t^h$  is the household's cash holding at the beginning of the period.<sup>10</sup> The decision about the volume of deposits has to be made before observing the aggregate shocks, this is the so-called "limited participation" or "sluggish cash flow" assumption.

The household receives labor income  $W_t L_t$ , capital income  $r_t^k P_t K_t$ , and profits of the firms,  $\Pi_t^F$ , and the bank,  $\Pi_t^B$ . Deposits  $S_t$  are paid back to the household in the form of interest and principal payments, represented by  $R_t^D S_t$ . The difference between all income and payments is then carried into the next period as  $M_{t+1}^h$ , with

$$M_{t+1}^h = W_t L_t + r_t^k P_t K_t + R_t^D S_t + \Pi_t^F + \Pi_t^B + (M_t^h - S_t - P_t C_t) - Q_t I_t, \quad (7)$$

where  $W_t, r_t^k, P_t, K_t, Q_t$ , and  $I_t$  are the time  $t$  nominal wage rate, real rental rate of capital, nominal price level of the consumption good, aggregate capital stock, nominal price level of the capital goods, and investment.

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<sup>10</sup>Other authors allow households to spend their current wage earnings for consumption to minimize the impact of inflation on average employment in the model. For a further discussion of this, see Christiano (1991).

Formally, the representative household maximizes (5) subject to (6), (7), and his capital accumulation condition

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t, \quad 0 < \delta < 1 \quad (8)$$

by choosing the amount to save, the amount of consumption, the fraction of period  $t$  time devoted to working, and the amount of investment.

### 3.2 Firms

The economy consists of many competitive firms producing a homogeneous consumption good according to a constant-returns-to-scale production function. In the aggregate, the firms are represented by a representative profit-maximizing and price-taking one which is producing the consumption good using the constant-returns-to-scale production function  $f(\cdot)$  with

$$Y_t = \theta_t f(K_t, H_t, H_t^e),$$

where  $Y_t$  is the aggregate output of consumption goods,  $\theta_t$  is an aggregate productivity shock,  $K_t$  is the aggregate capital stock, owned by the households,  $H_t$  is the labor input of the households, and  $H_t^e$  is the labor input of the entrepreneurs. As a standard in the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium business cycle model literature, we assume that the technology shock  $\theta_t$  evolves over time according to

$$\log \theta_t = (1 - \rho_\theta) \log \bar{\theta} + \rho_\theta \log \theta_{t-1} + \epsilon_{\theta,t},$$

where  $\epsilon_{\theta,t}$  is a serially uncorrelated shock,  $\rho_\theta \in (0, 1)$  is the autocorrelation coefficient, and the nonstochastic steady state of  $\theta$  is  $\bar{\theta}$ .

### 3.3 Entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs are modeled as introduced in Section 2. In this section, each entrepreneur is indexed by  $i$  with  $i \in [0, 1]$ . The key innovation of the paper is to allow for endogenous net worth accumulation of entrepreneurs and, hence, of borrowers in financial markets.

Entrepreneurs are endowed with one unit of leisure, which they inelastically supply to the firm for the wage rate  $W^e$ . This labor income, together with the individual cash holding at the beginning of the period,  $M_{it}^e$ , determines the individual net worth of an entrepreneur, used in the financial contractual negotiations, so that

$$N_{it} = (M_{it}^e + W_t^e)/P_t. \quad (9)$$

Labor income is introduced so that entrepreneurs going bankrupt in one period have at least some amount of net worth to finance projects in the next period. Otherwise, an entrepreneur once having been insolvent, could never again finance his project because, as shown by equation (2), the investment level  $I_i$  is linear in the net worth  $N_i$ . Therefore, the fraction of active entrepreneurs of the population would decrease over time, which would complicate the calculations considerably.

At the end of the period, the realized income can then be spent for consumption  $C_{it}^e$  and for net worth accumulation, which is done by cash holding carried over into the next period  $M_{it+1}^e$ .

Formally, each entrepreneur  $i$  maximizes his expected lifetime utility

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (\beta\gamma)^t C_{it}^e \quad (10)$$

subject to his budget constraint

$$\begin{aligned} M_{it+1}^e &= Q_t \omega_{it} I_t - R_t^l P_t (I_t - N_{it}) - P_t C_{it}^e, & \text{if } \omega_{it} \geq \bar{\omega}_t, \\ M_{it+1}^e &= 0, \quad C_{it}^e = 0, & \text{if } \omega_{it} < \bar{\omega}_t, \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

and subject to the definition of his net worth, equation (9).

As already mentioned in Section 2, agency issues imply that the return to internal funds exceeds the return to external funds. Given that and the infinite planning horizon of entrepreneurs in the general equilibrium setting, riskneutral entrepreneurs would like to postpone consumption into the future and accumulate enough net worth to be soon self-financed so that agency costs would disappear. In the contractual problem in Section 2 we assumed however that entrepreneur's net worth is never high enough for complete self-financing. Therefore, we need an assumption which makes cash holding less favorable for entrepreneurs. This is done by assuming that entrepreneurs discount future consumption more heavily than do households, meaning here that  $\gamma \in (0, 1)$ .<sup>11</sup> The exact relation between the discount factor of the households and the entrepreneurs is determined by the requirement that the shares of cash holding of the entrepreneurial sector and the households is constant in the steady state.

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<sup>11</sup>The same assumption was made by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) in similar settings. An alternative way to avoid a self-financing outcome would be to assume that each entrepreneur has a probability of surviving to the next period of less than unity, as it is done in Bernanke et al. (1999).

Assuming an interior solution, this utility maximization problem implies the following Euler-equation

$$\mathbb{E} \left\{ 1 - \beta \gamma \frac{Q_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} E^e(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}) \frac{R_{t+1}^D P_t}{R_{t+1}^D P_{t+1} - Q_{t+1} E^l(\bar{\omega}_{t+1})} \middle| \Omega_{1t} \right\} = 0. \quad (12)$$

Equation (12) is independent of the individual level of net worth  $N_i$  and identical for all solvent entrepreneurs, whatever their level individual net worth might be. Therefore, in the analysis of the general equilibrium we have only to consider this single Euler-equation for the whole entrepreneurial sector and do not have to take care of many entrepreneurial Euler-equations, being functions in  $N_i$ , and the distribution of  $N$  across the entrepreneurs.

As already shown in Section 2, the aggregate investment level is also independent of the distribution of individual net worth across the entrepreneurs and does only depend on the aggregate amount of net worth  $N_t$ . Therefore, for the analysis of the aggregate economy, we do not need either any level of individual net worth or even the distribution of net worth across entrepreneurs. In addition to the Euler-equation (12), we just have to keep track of the aggregate level of entrepreneurial net worth and of the entrepreneurial cash holding, being a component of  $N_t$ . The law-of-motion for aggregate entrepreneurial cash holding,  $M_t^e$ , is given by integrating the budget constraint (11) over all entrepreneurs

$$M_{t+1}^e = I_t Q_t E^e(\bar{\omega}_t) - P_t C_t^e,$$

where  $C_t^e$  denotes aggregate entrepreneurial consumption.

### 3.4 Financial Intermediary

The single financial intermediary called “bank” is owned by the households. Its role is to co-ordinate lending from consumers to entrepreneurs. All such lending must be handled by the bank. It receives deposits from consumers and lump sum payments from the government which represent the injection of money into the system. These assets are then lent to the entrepreneurs, using the standard debt contract outlined in Section 2. The bank behaves competitively in the deposit market.

In contrast to the standard monetary business cycle models without agency problems, such as Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) or Cooley and Hansen (1995), here the existence of the financial intermediary is clearly justified. In similar but richer credit contractual settings where direct lending from households

to entrepreneurs as well as indirect lending via a financial intermediary is possible, Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986) show that intermediation dominates borrowing and lending between individuals.<sup>12</sup> The intermediary performs a “delegated monitoring” to avoid duplication of monitoring and to minimize aggregate monitoring costs. In equilibrium, intermediation drives direct lending out of the system and justifies the clear and important role of the bank. Therefore, in our model with a credit market with asymmetric information, the assumption that only indirect lending is possible is well justified.

### 3.5 General equilibrium

Although the core problem is nonstationary, it is possible to obtain a stationary representation by normalizing relative to the aggregate money stock.<sup>13</sup> The nominal prices and quantities are redefined by dividing them by the money supply at the beginning of the period,  $M_t^S$ :

$$\begin{aligned} p_t &= P_t/M_t^S, & q_t &= Q_t/M_t^S, & s_t &= S_t/M_t^S, & w_t &= W_t/M_t^S, & w_t^e &= W_t^e/M_t^S, \\ \pi_t^B &= \Pi_t^B/M_t^S, & \pi_t^F &= \Pi_t^F/M_t^S, & m_t^h &= M_t^h/M_t^S, & m_t^e &= M_t^e/M_t^S. \end{aligned}$$

To complete the specification of the model, we specify the following law of motion for the growth rate of money  $\chi_t = M_{t+1}^S/M_t^S$ :

$$\log \chi_t = (1 - \rho_\chi) \log \bar{\chi} + \rho_\chi \log \chi_{t-1} + \epsilon_{\chi,t}$$

where  $\epsilon_{\chi,t}$  is a serially uncorrelated shock,  $\rho_\chi \in (0, 1)$  is the autocorrelation coefficient, and the nonstochastic steady state of  $\chi$  is  $\bar{\chi}$ . The money growth innovation  $\epsilon_{\chi,t}$  is assumed to be mutually uncorrelated with the technology shock innovation,  $\epsilon_{\omega,t}$ , at all leads and lags.

A rational expectations equilibrium can be defined in the usual way. It consists of time invariant aggregate allocation and price functions of the relevant state such that given these rules agents’ optimization satisfies market clearing. More formally, the general equilibrium can be defined in the following way:

#### *Definition*

A stationary competitive equilibrium consists of a set of policy functions,  $C = C(\kappa)$ ,  $L = L(\kappa)$ ,  $K = K(\kappa)$ ,  $I = I(\kappa)$ ,  $S = S(\kappa')$ ,

<sup>12</sup>A succinct discussion about the underlying frictions in markets that lead to intermediation can be found in Hellwig (1994).

<sup>13</sup>See Cooley and Hansen (1995) for details.



$m^h = m^h(\kappa)$ ,  $C^e = C^e(\kappa)$ ,  $m^e = m^e(\kappa)$ ,  $\bar{w} = \bar{w}(\kappa)$ , and pricing functions  $p = p(\kappa)$ ,  $q = q(\kappa)$ ,  $w = w(\kappa)$ ,  $w^e = w^e(\kappa)$ ,  $R^D = R^D(\kappa)$ ,  $r^k = r^k(\kappa)$ , where  $\kappa = (K_t, m_t^e, \chi_t, \theta_t)$  and  $\kappa' = (K_t, m_t^e, \chi_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1})$  are the relevant states of the economy, such that:

(i) households solve their utility maximization problem of Section 3.1, taking as given the states  $\kappa'$  and  $\kappa$ , and the pricing functions, with the solution being  $C = C(\kappa)$ ,  $L = L(\kappa)$ ,  $K = K(\kappa)$ ,  $S = S(\kappa')$ ,  $m^h = m^h(\kappa)$ ;

(ii) firms solve their profit maximization problem of Section 3.2, given  $\kappa$  and the pricing functions, with the form of solutions  $K = K(\kappa)$  and  $L = L(\kappa)$ ;

(iii) entrepreneurs solve their utility maximization problem of Section 3.3, taking as given the state of the economy  $\kappa$ , and the pricing functions, with the solution being  $C^e = C^e(\kappa)$  and  $m^h = m^h(\kappa)$ ;

(iv) entrepreneurs solve the credit contractual problem of Section 2, given  $p = p(\kappa)$ ,  $q = q(\kappa)$ ,  $R^D = R^D(\kappa)$ ,  $w^e = w^e(\kappa)$ , and  $m^e = m^e(\kappa)$ , with the solution being  $I = I(\kappa)$  and  $\bar{w} = \bar{w}(\kappa)$ ;

(v) goods, money, labor and loan markets clear.

The general equilibrium is then characterized by seven Euler equations<sup>14</sup> (appropriately redefined):

$$\mathbb{E} \left\{ U_{L,t} + \beta U_{C,t+1} \frac{w_t}{p_{t+1} \chi_t} \middle| \Omega_{1t} \right\} = 0, \quad (13)$$

$$\mathbb{E} \left\{ U_{C,t+1} \frac{q_t}{p_{t+1} \chi_t} - \beta U_{C,t+2} \frac{[p_{t+1} r_{t+1}^k + q_{t+1} (1 - \delta)]}{p_{t+2} \chi_{t+1}} \middle| \Omega_{1t} \right\} = 0, \quad (14)$$

$$\mathbb{E} \left\{ U_{C,t} - \beta R_t^D U_{C,t+1} \frac{p_t}{p_{t+1} \chi_t} \middle| \Omega_{0t} \right\} = 0, \quad (15)$$

$$\mathbb{E} \left\{ 1 - \beta \gamma \frac{q_{t+1}}{p_{t+1}} E^e(\bar{w}_{t+1}) \frac{R_{t+1}^D p_t}{\chi_t (R_{t+1}^D p_{t+1} - q_{t+1} E^l(\bar{w}_{t+1}))} \middle| \Omega_{1t} \right\} = 0 \quad (16)$$

$$w_t = p_t \theta_t f_H(K_t, H_t, H_t^e), \quad (17)$$

$$w_t^e = p_t \theta_t f_{H^e}(K_t, H_t, H_t^e), \quad (18)$$

$$r_t^k = \theta_t f_K(K_t, H_t, H_t^e), \quad (19)$$

<sup>14</sup>The information sets  $\Omega_{0t}$  and  $\Omega_{1t}$  refer to the states  $\kappa'$  and  $\kappa$ , respectively:  $\Omega_{0t}$  includes the aggregate capital stock  $K_t$ , the amounts of cash holding  $M_t^h$  and  $M_t^e$ , and the values of all economy-wide variables dated t-1 and earlier.  $\Omega_{1t}$  includes  $\Omega_{0t}$  and the period t realizations of the aggregate technology shock  $\theta_t$  and of the aggregate monetary shock  $\chi_t$ .

combined with the market clearing conditions

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t, \quad (20)$$

$$C_t + C_t^e + I_t = Y_t, \quad (21)$$

$$H_t = L_t, \quad (22)$$

$$H_t^e = 1, \quad (23)$$

$$m_t^h + m_t^e = m_t, \quad (24)$$

$$m_t = 1, \quad (25)$$

$$p_t(I_t - N_t) = s_t + m_{t+1}\chi_t - m_t, \quad (26)$$

and the other conditions

$$1 - \Phi(\bar{\omega}_t)\mu + \phi(\bar{\omega}_t)\mu \frac{E^e(\bar{\omega}_t)}{E^{e'}(\bar{\omega}_t)} = R_t^D \frac{p_t}{q_t}, \quad (27)$$

$$I_t = \frac{p_t R_t}{p_t R_t - q_t E^l(\bar{\omega}_t)} N_t, \quad (28)$$

$$N_t = (w_t^e + m_t^e)/p_t, \quad (29)$$

$$m_{t+1}^e \chi_t = q_t I_t E^e(\bar{\omega}_t) - p_t C_t^e, \quad (30)$$

$$Y_t = \theta_t (K_t)^{\alpha_1} (H_t)^{\alpha_2} (H_t^e)^{1-\alpha_1-\alpha_2}, \quad (31)$$

$$p_t C_t = m_t - s_t. \quad (32)$$

## 4 Quantitative properties

In this section I will describe the quantitative properties of the model economy. As the model is too complicated to be solved analytically, it will be solved and analyzed numerically. In order to come up with a numerical solution to the model the values of the parameters have to be specified. Then the solution technique can be applied. Thereafter, the quantitative properties will be discussed using impulse response functions.

### 4.1 Calibration

The model is parameterized at the non-stochastic steady state to roughly match empirical counterparts. The period in the model is assumed to be one quarter.

We use the utility function  $U(C_t, L_t) = \log C_t + v(1 - L_t)$  which is based on the work of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988). The constant  $v$  is set equal to

3.985, to match the empirical ratio of  $L/(1 - L) = 0.28$  reported in Christiano (1991). The interest rate of deposits  $R^D$  is set to 8.05%, so that, together with the mean monetary growth rate  $\bar{\chi} = 1.0119$  taken from Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), the discount rate  $\beta$  is pinned down to 0.9943 from the non-stochastic version of equation (15). The consumption production technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas with a capital share of 0.36, a household labor share of 0.6399, and an entrepreneurial labor share of 0.0001. We set the depreciation rate  $\delta$  to 0.0212, an estimate calculated by Christiano (1991). Concerning the autocorrelation coefficients of the law-of-motions of the aggregate shocks, we follow Christiano (1991) and others by using  $\rho_\chi = 0.32$  and the typical business cycle literature by setting  $\rho_\theta = 0.95$ . The value of  $\bar{\theta}$  is simply a matter of normalization, and is set to 1.

As for the monitoring technology, monitoring costs are incurred by financial intermediaries only when firms default on their loans. Therefore,  $\mu$  is identified using empirical evidence on bankruptcy costs. There is, however, a great deal of controversy within the empirical literature about the amount of these costs. It ranges from 1% to 36% of the firm's assets.<sup>15</sup> We set  $\mu = 0.15$ , a choice roughly in the middle which was also used by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998). As for the distribution  $\Phi$ , we assume that it is lognormal with a mean of unity and a standard deviation of  $\sigma_\omega$ .

We are thus left with two parameters:  $\sigma_\omega$  and  $\gamma$ . We treat these two variables as unobservable, and choose them indirectly to match two measures of risk: the annual risk premium and the quarterly bankruptcy rate. As quarterly bankruptcy rate we use the value of 0.998%, estimated using the Dun and Bradstreet data set for 1984–1992. As annual risk premium we take the average spread between the prime rate and the three-month commercial paper rate. As reported in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), this average spread is 187 basis points for the period of April 1971 to June 1996. Matching these two empirical risk measures implies  $\sigma_\omega = 0.197$  and  $\gamma = 0.96683$ .

## 4.2 Simulation

To solve the model numerically, first the equilibrium conditions (13) – (32) are log-linearized about the non-stochastic steady state of the economy. Then, decision rules are computed by using the method of undetermined coefficients.

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<sup>15</sup>Some of the relevant estimates are: Warner (1977): 1% to 5.3 %, Altman (1984): 11 to 17%, Guffey and Moore (1991): 9.12%, Alderson and Betker (1995): 36%.

We now turn to an analysis of the dynamic properties of the model. We investigate whether the endogenous wealth accumulation of entrepreneurs alters the dynamic properties of a standard monetary business cycle model. This is done by comparing the impulse responses of a monetary and a technology shock of the model of Section 3 with the responses of two reference models. The first one holds the cash holding of the entrepreneurs in the agency-costs model constant at its steady state value. Therefore, the entrepreneurs cannot change their net worth endogenously.<sup>16</sup> The other one is a model without agency problems: all  $\omega_i$  are set to their mean value of 1 and there are no monitoring costs, so  $\mu = 0$ .

#### 4.2.1 Monetary shock

Figure 1 to 10 report the result of a one-time shock to the money growth rate. The shock in question is assumed to appear in period 0 and to be 1% of size, so that  $\epsilon_{\chi,0} = 0.01$ . In the following periods  $\epsilon_{\chi}$  is assumed to be zero again. Although this is a single one-time shock, because money growth is autocorrelated, the growth rate will stay above trend for several quarters.

The dynamics of the endogenous net worth model can be described as follows. The new money enters the economy through the accounts of the bank. As the household is unable to change and particularly reduce his deposits at this point of time, the liquidity of the banking system raises by the full amount of the newly created money. The increased liquidity is then lent to the entrepreneurs and therefore the credit volume increases. In order to make the entrepreneurs willing to borrow the new money the interest rate on loans potentially decreases. As Figure 7 shows, this interest rate in fact decreases in the simulation. The increased credit volume is used by the entrepreneurs to produce capital goods, so that the end-of-period supply of capital goods increases which in turn increases aggregate investment, as shown by Figure 2. This expanded supply of capital decreases the relative price of capital,  $q/p$ , presented in Figure 10. This induces a *substitution effect* for the households: Because of capital goods being now relatively cheaper than consumption goods, the household will shift from the latter to the former and potentially increases its labor supply in order to finance an increased purchase of capital goods. In the period of the shock, however, consumption spending is fixed by the cash-in-advance constraint and therefore consumption must decrease as the

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<sup>16</sup>This model is similar to the one of Cooley and Nam (1998). They assume however that agency costs arise in the production of the aggregate output and not in the production of the investment goods. They do not model an entrepreneurial sector as they assume that consumption goods are transferred into capital goods on a constant 1:1 basis.

consumption price level increases.

Besides this substitution effect, there is the *anticipated inflation effect*, which is standard in monetary business cycle models, such as, e.g. the model of Cooley and Hansen (1995). Since  $\rho_\chi > 0$ , the monetary growth continues to be high relative to its steady state level after the one-time shock. This increases the household's expectation of future inflation. The household therefore shifts from consumption (the cash good) to investment (the credit good) and potentially reduces his labor supply.

The third effect of the increased money growth rate is a *labor demand effect*. Because of investment being larger than in steady state, the aggregate capital stock increases. This induces an increase in labor demand on the part of the firm.

The total effect is determined by the relative strength of these three effects. The impulse responses of Figure 3 and 4 show that labor input increases and consumption of households decreases for two subsequent periods. Therefore, the substitution effect and the labor demand effect, both stating that employment increases, dominate the inflation effect, which states that employment decrease. Because labor input and capital stock increases, output increases as well, as is seen on Figure 1

We are now ready to analyze if the agency model can reproduce the stylized facts of monetary policy. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992a), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), and Christiano et al. (1996) identify for the US economy the following four important facts. An expansive money supply shock leads to a decrease of nominal interest rates and to an increase of employment, output and real wages. As already mentioned in the above explanations and as shown by Figures 3, 1, and 7, respectively, employment and output level increase whereas nominal interest rate of loans decreases in the model, so that these facts are well replicated. Concerning the interest rate it is important to recognize that the nominal interest rate of deposits increases, shown in Figure 6. Therefore it depends on the used definition of nominal interest rate, of deposits or of loans, if the first stylized fact is really reproduced. Unfortunately, this model is unable to show the first fact, the increase in real wages. Here, the wages decrease following a positive money supply shock, as shown in Figure 8.

To understand the special contribution of the endogenous wealth accumulation of the entrepreneurs, it is important to analyze the dynamics of the two reference models. The three basic effects in the two reference models are quite similar to the effects in the model just examined. In the monetary business cycle model and in the model with constant cash holding, as in the model with endogenous net worth accumulation, an increase in the money growth rate leads to a substitution effect,

an anticipated inflation effect, and a labor demand effect. However, the relative strength of the effects differ between the models.

In the monetary business cycle model, because of the relative price of capital returning quicker to its steady state value, the household's reactions to the substitution effect are weaker. As the future effects of the consumption price level are larger the anticipated inflation effect will also be larger in this model. In addition, the smaller increase in investment induces a smaller increase in labor demand. In total, Figure 1 and 3 show for the simple monetary business cycle model that both, output and employment decrease in period 1. We can conclude, that in this model, the anticipated inflation effect is now strong enough to dominate the substitution effect and the labor demand effect, as this is the only effect inducing a negative employment response. Hence, in this simple model the important stylized facts concerning output and employment cannot be reproduced. This is a standard result in monetary business cycle theory. Pure models with only a cash-in-advance constraint and a limited participation assumption are in general incapable of generating a liquidity effect of monetary policy, see e.g. Christiano (1991). Some kind of further inflexibility or imperfection is needed in order to produce positive output and employment responses.

In the model where the cash holding of the entrepreneurs is held constant at the steady state level, the responses are almost identical to the simple monetary business cycle model. In total, Figure 1 and 3 show that this model can reproduce neither the important stylized fact of an increasing output level nor the fact of an increasing employment after a positive monetary shock.

In summary, we can state that the dynamics of the standard monetary business cycle model and the agency model with constant entrepreneurial cash holding are very similar, as is also seen in the plotted impulse responses. Therefore, embedding agency issues in business cycle model does not have large effects on the model dynamics. This is also emphasized in the literature.<sup>17</sup> In contrast, the possibility of entrepreneurial wealth accumulation and therefore endogenous net worth of borrowers changes the dynamics of the model considerably. The liquidity effect of monetary policy is found in this model only.

Having analyzed the dynamics of all three models, we are now able to isolate the special role of the possibility of entrepreneurial net worth accumulation for the dynamics. As net worth consists mainly of previously accumulated cash holding, it is essentially fixed in the period of the shock. It just slightly decreases as, with

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<sup>17</sup>See e.g. Fuerst (1995) or Cooley and Nam (1998). A similar conclusion for real models is drawn by Fuerst (1995) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).

an increased price level, the real value of the cash holding reduces. At the end of the period, the entrepreneurs have the following incentive to save and therefore to increase their net worth by holding more cash: As the relative price of capital,  $q/p$ , has decreased, consumption is relatively more expansive now. Therefore, a risk neutral entrepreneur wants to postpone consumption into the future and decreases present consumption. The reduction in present consumption comes along with an increase in cash holding.<sup>18</sup> At the beginning of period 1, net worth has increased for several reasons. First, as just described, the nominal cash holding of the entrepreneurs increased. Second, the wage of the entrepreneurs increases with the increase of output. Lastly, the real value of the cash holding further increases, as the aggregate price level decreases. This long-lasting increase in entrepreneurial net worth leads to a long-lasting increase in the production of capital goods. Hence, the supply of capital will remain on a high level for a longer time. This induces, that the relative price of capital will stay away its steady state value for a longer period of time.

This longer lasting effects are the reasons why we see positive output and employment responses in the model with endogenous net worth only: They induce that the household reacts in a stronger way to the substitution effect, and that the increase in labor demand is stronger. This implies that in this model the substitution effect, together with the labor demand effect, can be strong enough to dominate the anticipated inflation effect and hence lead to an increase in labor input, which itself leads to an increase in aggregate output. In contrast, as both effects are weaker in the two reference models, they are not strong enough to dominate the anticipated inflation effect and hence cannot lead to an increase in employment and output.

The next question we look at is if the model produces amplification or stronger propagation. In terms of output the answer to both questions is affirmative, as Figure 1 shows. The output swing of the model with endogenous entrepreneurial cash holding is more than three times larger than in the two reference models (17 vs. 5.6%). Concerning the second point, we measure persistence by the half-

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<sup>18</sup>As seen in Figure 5, the consumption of the entrepreneurial sector decreases more in the model with endogenous entrepreneurial cash holding than without. This shows the just described endogenous reaction of the entrepreneurs: Only in the model with entrepreneurial cash holding, the entrepreneurs increase their net worth by reducing their individual consumption level. Therefore, aggregate entrepreneurial consumption now decreases not only because more entrepreneurs go bankrupt, but also because the solvent entrepreneurs reduce their consumption spending endogenously.

life of a response, where we use the peak impact as starting point.<sup>19</sup> Given that definition, the model enhances persistence. For the two reference models, the peak response of output is 5.6%, with a half-life of less than one quarter. In the model with endogenous net worth the peak output response is 17%, with a half-life of 3 quarters.

#### 4.2.2 Technology shock

The second experiment we consider is a one-time shock to the aggregate productivity. Figures 11 to 16 report the results of such a shock where the shock in question is assumed to appear in period 0 and to be 1% of size, so that  $\epsilon_{\theta,t} = 0.01$ . As technology is autocorrelated, productivity will stay above trend for several quarters.

Because the effects of real shocks in models with endogenous entrepreneurial net worth have already been analyzed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), we will concentrate here on the main results. The most important stylized fact is the so-called mean-reversion, shown by Blanchard and Quah (1989), Cochrane (1994) and others for US data. According to this, the reaction of output to a transitory shock is hump-shaped: Output increases for several quarters and reaches its peak after two to four quarters.

In the numerical simulations, a shock to aggregate technology leads to a strongly hump-shaped impulse response of output and of investment, as seen in Figures 11 and 12, respectively. Both variables increase for several quarters after the shock has appeared and the peak is reached in period 3 and 4, respectively. In the two reference models output and investment also increase for two subsequent periods, the second increase is very weak. Therefore, only the model with endogenous entrepreneurial net worth replicates this important stylized fact of a hump-shaped output response. This is of particular interest given the recent work of Cogley and Nason (1995). They criticize in their study that standard RBC models are unable to deliver this hump-shaped behavior because of their weak internal propagation mechanisms. In these models, the output reaction corresponds mainly to the dynamic of the technology shock. Therefore, the underlying agency cost model is not subject to this criticism.

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<sup>19</sup>Alternatively, we could use the initial impact of a response as starting point. The choice between these two alternative is a problem especially in a model which generates a delayed response, as this is the case in the underlying model. Here we choose the latter definition as the initial impacts are very weak.



The dynamics can be interpreted in the following way: The positive technology shock shifts out the investment demand curve of the household. Subsequently, investment demand starts moving slowly back to normal as time progresses. This movement is largely driven by the autocorrelation coefficient  $\rho_\theta$ . In period 0, as entrepreneurial net worth is determined by the accumulated cash holding, investment supply raises little so that the relative price of capital increases, seen in Figure 14. In order to take advantage of the increased price and to increase his income as well, an entrepreneur wishes to increase his capital good production. This is done by decreasing present consumption and increasing cash holding, seen in Figure 15 and 16, respectively. The investment supply function is then shifted upwards. Therefore, the excess demand of capital goods is decreased in the following periods, which in turn decreases the relative price of capital as well. This increases entrepreneurial consumption and reduces the accumulation of additional cash. The increase in investment leads to an increase in the capital stock. This, together with the increased employment, leads to a hump-shaped increase in output seen in Figure 11. After the peaks in period 4 and 5, output, investment, entrepreneurial cash holding, and the relative price of capital move back to steady state values. The hump-shaped impulse response is therefore an outcome of the dynamic behavior of net worth in response to a technology shock.

In the two reference models, the entrepreneurs cannot react to the increased relative price of capital, so that the excess demand of investment is reduced slower. Hence, investment does not increase for a longer period of time and therefore the capital stock raises less. As there is now a monotone decrease of investment back to its steady state value, output does not show a hump response either.

## 5 Conclusion

This paper developed a monetary business cycle model with asymmetric information in the credit market. This informational asymmetry creates a moral hazard problem in lending and distorts the production of the capital good. The main contribution of this paper is to allow endogenous wealth accumulation of entrepreneurs and therefore ex-ante heterogeneity of borrowers in such an informational framework.

The model economy was calibrated to roughly match empirical counterparts and afterwards solved by the method of undermined coefficients. Numerical simulations then showed that a positive money supply shock generates a decrease in nominal interest rates and an increase in output and employment. In two refer-

ence models this behavior was not found. Additionally, the model produces amplification and stronger propagation, compared to models without endogenous net worth accumulation. Concerning a real technology shock, we saw that the model produces a strong hump-shaped output response in contrast to the two reference models. We can therefore conclude, that the agency-model with ex ante heterogeneous entrepreneurs represents a clear improvement to the standard monetary model as well as to the agency model with ex post heterogeneity only.

A possible extension is to abandon the assumption, that credit contracts can depend only on an entrepreneur's current level of net worth and not on his past history of debt repayments. This would allow for multi-period contracts which are, unfortunately, very difficult to handle in an infinite general equilibrium setting.<sup>20</sup>

Another possible extension of the model would be to change the sector being subject to agency problems. In this paper, agency costs arise in the production of the new capital, and thus affect the investment supply curve. One alternative is to construct a model in which agency costs arise in the consumption sector, and thus affect the investment demand curve. Another extension could be to assume that the agency costs arise in the aggregate production of a single consumption/investment good and therefore build on work of Cooley and Nam (1998) or Fisher (1999), both assuming constant net worth of borrowers.

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<sup>20</sup>For multi-period contract problems in other environments, see e.g. Gertler (1992) or Townsend (1982).

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


Figure 1: Output level




Figure 2: Investment




Figure 3: Household labor




Figure 4: Household consumption




Figure 5: Entrepreneurial consumption




Figure 6: Interest rate of deposits






Figure 7: Interest rate of loans




Figure 8: Real wage of households




Figure 9: Cut of value  $\bar{\omega}$




Figure 10: Relative price of capital




Figure 11: Output




Figure 12: Investment




Figure 13: Capital




Figure 14: Relative price of capital




Figure 15: Entrepreneurial consumption




Figure 16: Entrepreneurial money holding