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Verti-zontal Differentiation in Monopolistic Competition*

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The pattern of trade observed from firm-product-country data calls for a new generation of models. To address the unexplained variation in the data, we propose a new model of monopolistic competition where varieties enter preferences non-symmetrically, capturing both horizontal and vertical differentiation in an unprecedented way. Together with a variable elasticity of substitution, competition effects, varying markups and prices across countries, this results in a tractable model whose predictions differ from existing ones. Using the population of Belgian exporters, our model succeeds in explaining the hitherto unexplained variation. The implications call for a re-thinking of earlier results and measurement practices.

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1 Introduction

Using firm-product-country data for Belgian exporters, we establish two robust stylized facts that cannot be explained together by any of the existing trade models of monopolistic competition. First, when we compare export prices of Belgian firms selling the same product to a set of destinations, we see that prices are highly correlated across markets. In other words, highly-priced varieties in one market are also highly priced in other markets. Second, sales of firm-products in different markets are much less correlated. Put differently, a particular firm-product that sells well in one destination market need not sell much in another one. The high firm-product price correlation across markets associated with a much lower firm-product sales correlation holds for all the product definitions and geographical destinations considered.

Several recent papers analyzing the variability in firm-level prices and sales across a range of export destinations come to the conclusion that cost factors cannot account for all the variation in the data. While firm efficiency appears very important in explaining firms' entry into export markets,¹ which confirms Melitz (2003), this is far less the case for firm-level sales in different markets.² Early attempts to model additional heterogeneity allowing models to better fit the empirical evidence are those that augment firms differences in productivity with quality differences.³ Still, substantial unexplained variation remains. Based on French firm-level evidence Eaton et al. (2011) report that the variation in the sales performance of the same firms in different markets points at an additional source of variation on the demand side. Closer to us, Kee and Krishna (2008) find that the correlation between firm-level sales of Bangladesh firms in different destination markets is close to zero and conclude that only demand shocks can explain these facts. They rationalize this observation by assuming different weights for varieties in a CES setting. However, their modelling strategy does not allow firms to charge different free-on-board (fob) prices across markets for the same product, which runs against recent findings on market segmentation (Handbury and Weinstein,

¹See Aw et al. (2000); Bernard et al. (2003) and Arkolakis (2010).

²Notable examples are Eaton et al. (2011) and Manova and Zhang (2011).

³See Baldwin and Harrigan (2011); Eckel et al. (2011); Hallak and Sivadasan (2009).

2011; Manova and Zhang, 2011; Syverson, 2007).

Only a few theory papers in the trade literature have accounted for demand factors. Either these models build on CES models of monopolistic competition,⁴ or stem from discrete choice theory.⁵ Such models are important to understand the patterns of trade and complement supply-side-oriented models. However, a particular difficulty faced by these models is to disentangle the different sources of variability at work. To achieve this goal, we propose a model rooted in the Lancasterian setting, which arguably provides the best analytical setting to study product differentiation with asymmetric varieties.

Ever since Hotelling (1929), two varieties of the same good are defined as horizontally differentiated when there is no common ranking of these varieties across consumers. By contrast, two varieties are vertically differentiated when all consumers agree on their ranking (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979). Combining these two types of differentiation, our model generates a set of predictions which are in line with the micro trade patterns that we observe and that allow for a separate source of variation affecting sales but not prices. This leads us to refer to it as a model of “verti-zontal” differentiation whose main purpose is to propose a richer parameterization on the demand side, something which is difficult to accomplish within the same augmented-CES model but which is easy to do under quadratic preferences.

In the spirit of Lancaster (1979), the vertical attributes in our model affect prices similarly in all markets. By contrast, horizontal attributes do not affect prices but affect quantities differently across markets. The predictions that arise from this trade model are in line with what we observe: prices are strongly correlated across markets because they reflect cost and vertical differentiation attributes, which are variety-specific, whereas quantities are not because they depend on consumer taste, which varies across markets. The strong price correlation suggests that vertical differentiation and horizontal differentiation have to be explicitly distinguished.

The identification of consumer taste in our model has potentially important

⁴For example, see Bernard et al. (2010b), Kee and Krishna (2008), or Crozet et al. (2011).

⁵See Fajgelbaum et al. (2011); Katayama et al. (2009); Khandelwal (2010) or Verhoogen (2008).

implications for the measurement of vertical differentiation, which is conveniently interpreted as quality. Once we allow for markets to be characterized by different tastes, specific varieties can sell more than others at the same price and quality because they match local taste better. This suggests being careful when trying to infer quality by looking only at prices and quantities sold in one market. Without a clear separation between horizontal and vertical differentiation, researchers are likely to misinterpret high sales conditioning on prices and confound quality with consumer taste. Our model allows for a clear identification of the different parameters describing horizontal and vertical differentiation at the firm-product level. This is hard to achieve under a CES utility where quality and taste are intertwined within the substitution parameter. Lastly, the model we present here allows to identify empirically the toughness of competition in different markets through identifiable market indices.

Empirically, we compare fob export prices and sales of more than 24,000 firm-product combinations exported by Belgian firms to different destination countries in a particular year. This cross-section allows us to compare within firm-product prices and quantities across destination markets. According to our model, the absolute levels of export prices across countries can differ for reasons related to different local market conditions. However, the price ranking across markets should not. This is a prediction that our model has in common with cost or quality heterogeneity models under CES or quadratic preferences (see, e.g., Foster et al., 2008; Melitz, 2003). But whereas these models would also predict a similar strong correlation for quantity rankings across destination markets, the model presented here allows quantity ranking to differ across countries as a result of different consumer taste for each firm-product in each destination market.

The low quantity correlation across markets is a prediction that our model has in common with Bernard et al. (2010b) and Kee and Krishna (2008), which have introduced horizontal differentiation in a CES setting. However, these models predict that the fob price of the same firm-product does not vary across markets, which is refuted by the data in several other papers such as Manova and Zhang (2011) and Syverson (2007).

The quadratic preferences we use build on Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and allow for variable elasticity of substitution, varying

markups, competition effects and varying prices in different countries, something which is difficult to accomplish within the same CES-based model. In addition, our extension of the quadratic utility model allows for a more refined parameterization on the demand side through the introduction of *asymmetric preferences*. Note also that, under this rich parameterization, product prices are allowed to range from pure monopoly to marginal costs of production.

Our model encompasses important insights provided by models of industrial organization dealing with product differentiation. In this literature there has been a long tradition of distinguishing vertical from horizontal differentiation because they generate very different results. However, unlike industrial organization models which emphasize strategic interactions between firms, our approach focuses on "weak interactions", meaning that firms' behavior is influenced only by market aggregates which are themselves unaffected by the choices made by any single firm. These market aggregates of variables or parameters are weighted by variety-specific consumer tastes. For example, market prices are strongly (weakly) affected by the mass of varieties which have a good (bad) match with consumers' ideal varieties, very much as in Lancasterian models of product differentiation. For this reason, we find it fair to say that our model provides a reconciliation of the two main approaches to competition on differentiated markets pioneered by Hotelling (1929) and Chamberlin (1933).

To keep the model as general as possible, we do not assume any particular link between cost, quality and taste distributions. While other papers require quality and marginal cost to be correlated,⁶ the model presented here does not impose any restrictions on whether quality is associated with marginal costs or with fixed investments in research and development, or advertising. The same is true for the relationship between quality and taste. Yet one could think of cases where high quality products are mainly sold in rich countries reflecting a different taste for quality.

The model we develop remains largely agnostic about the supply side of the economy. For example, neither firms' entry and exit nor the multi- or single-product nature of firms are explicitly treated. However, the improvements proposed on the modelling of the demand side of the economy can be directly used as

⁶See, for example, Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) and Feenstra and Romalis (2012)

a “module” that can be incorporated into trade models where the supply side has additional features.

The next section presents some first evidence to motivate the model’s assumptions while Section 3 presents the model and its properties. Using a unique dataset on Belgian exporters with product and destination market information, Section 4 investigates the empirical relevance of the model. Section 5 concludes.

2 Motivation

Before introducing our model, we first look at how micro-level evidence on prices and quantities typically looks like. For this purpose we turn to a free and publicly available dataset on the European car market used by Goldberg and Verboven (2001). The patterns arising from the car data are very similar to the ones we observe in the Belgian export dataset which will be presented in section 4. The reason why we prefer to use the car evidence to motivate our choice of assumptions is that these data can be easily verified by any reader, which is useful given that access to firm-level data is not always granted.⁷

In order to motivate our modelling choices, we look at prices and quantities in the five countries reported in the dataset (France, Italy, Germany, UK and Belgium) in 1999, the year in which the highest number of identical car models, 72, were sold in all of them. Because prices and quantities are likely to be affected by local market conditions that are not directly comparable, we assign a price and a quantity rank to each car model in each market and, in Figure 1a, plot one against the other in all markets. Each dot in the figure represents a combination of a price and quantity rank in a particular geographical market for a particular car model.

INSERT FIGURE 1a HERE.

If one assumes, as most trade models implicitly do, that all car models face the same demand in every market, and that the only difference between car models is the cost at which they are produced, one would expect all observations to lie

⁷The dataset can be found on <http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/ndbad83/frank/cars.htm>.

around the diagonal from top-left to bottom-right. Put differently, one would expect high-cost cars to rank high in the price ranking (close to the origin on the price axis) with few people buying them (top-left area of the figure). Low-cost cars, on the other hand, would sell a lot at a low price (bottom-right area of the figure). If instead one assumes that quality is the only source of heterogeneity and acts as a demand shifter, one would expect observations of different car models to cluster around the diagonal running from bottom-left to top-right. Put differently, one would expect high-quality cars to be highly priced and to sell a lot, while low-quality cars would be associated with low prices and would sell poorly in all markets.

Interestingly, Figure 1a shows that there is no clear correlation pattern between price and quantity rankings.⁸ This suggests that a particular car model, displaying the same price ranking across markets, can sell relatively well in one market but badly in another. Such a pattern is inconsistent with a model where the only source of heterogeneity between models is productive efficiency or quality. Consequently, an important first observation arising from the car data is that more than one source of heterogeneity appears to be needed to fit micro-level data.⁹

A second important observation arises from plotting price rankings between countries, which we do in Figure 1b. Each dot in the figure now represents the ranking of a car model in a particular geographical market compared to the ranking of that car model in Belgium (horizontal axis), in such a way that a perfect correlation between price ranks across markets would result in dots following the 45° line. Looking at Figure 1b, we see that bilateral price rank correlations are in fact surprisingly high, ranging from 95.7% to 98.3%. A strong and positive price correlation between markets corresponds to the prediction arising both from a pure cost and a pure intrinsic quality model, but appears inconsistent with a model of differently perceived quality. A model that assumes quality to be perceived differently in every market would in fact result in a low price correlation between markets which is not what we observe in the data. Therefore when we

⁸On average, the correlation between price and quantity rankings of car models within markets is around -11%, with rank correlations ranging from 10% in Germany to -30% in Italy, through -0.2% in Belgium

⁹Similar conclusions are reached through more formal analyses by authors such as Brooks (2006); Crozet et al. (2011); Hummels and Klenow (2005) .

introduce vertical differentiation in the model, we assume it to be *intrinsic* to the variety and independent of the destination market. This choice is also shown to be consistent with a rigorous interpretation of what is horizontal and what is vertical in product differentiation.

INSERT FIGURE 1b HERE.

A third observation arising from the car data stems from Figure 1c. There we plot quantity ranking of car models between countries in a similar way as we plotted price ranking. The pattern arising from quantity ranking is very different from the price ranking. Bilateral rank correlations of car models averages 66% and can be as low as 49.5%, which is much less than the corresponding price rank correlations. Hence, while price ranking of car models is quite stable across markets, quantity ranking is not. In section 4 we discuss evidence based on a detailed micro-level dataset on Belgian exporters and show that these empirical regularities turn out to be extremely robust and hold in virtually all markets and products considered.¹⁰.

INSERT FIGURE 1c HERE.

Based on existing trade models incorporating either cost or quality heterogeneity or both, we would expect quantity rankings to be just as regular as price rankings. What this observation is telling us, though, is that there appears to be a source of heterogeneity affecting quantities that is not just variety-specific but also market-specific. The introduction of an additional source of heterogeneity affecting quantities but not prices seems necessary to account for prices and quantities behaving so differently. Or put differently, *heterogeneity on the supply side needs to be supplemented by heterogeneity on the demand side*, and notably by idiosyncratic consumer taste but in such a way that the taste only affects quantities.

We respond to these empirical challenges by extending a quasi-linear model of

¹⁰This finding is consistent with the observation of a puzzlingly weak relationship between firms' productivity and size found by Brooks (2006) and Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) and with the evidence of a bias towards the consumption of domestic varieties (Ferreira and Waldfogel, 2010).

monopolistic competition with a quadratic sub-utility for the differentiated good in a way such that each variety may be viewed as a different bundle of horizontal and vertical attributes. In the spirit of Lancaster, we assume that vertical attributes are intrinsic to varieties, affecting prices *similarly in all markets*. By contrast, horizontal attributes are allowed to be valued *differently across markets*. The vertical attributes are captured by a demand-shifting parameter; the horizontal attributes will be interpreted as measuring taste mismatch between varieties' characteristics and consumers' ideals as it has been developed in industrial organization (Anderson et al., 1992). In line with the overwhelming majority of trade models and empirical evidence, we also allow for cost heterogeneity.

By choosing the quadratic utility model, we further acknowledge that competition effects are important and that they can differ in geographical markets. Empirical evidence has shown indeed that absolute price levels can be very different between countries. This suggests the existence of important local market effects, which operate like a market-specific demand shifter (but which does not affect price rankings). In other words, markets appear to be segmented, with the intensity of local competition playing a role as important as individual product characteristics in affecting prices and quantities.

3 Re-thinking product differentiation in monopolistic competition: Chamberlin and Hotelling unified

In this section, we present a model that builds directly on the above-mentioned stylized facts, embedding them in a rigorous model of product differentiation inspired by the industrial organization literature.

There are several definitions of vertical and horizontal differentiation, which are (more or less) equivalent. Ever since Hotelling (1929) and Lancaster (1979), two varieties of the same good are said to be horizontally differentiated when there is no common ranking of these varieties across consumers. In other words, horizontal differentiation reflects consumers' idiosyncratic tastes. By contrast, two varieties are vertically differentiated when all consumers agree on their rankings.

Vertical differentiation thus refers to the idea of quality being intrinsic to these varieties (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1983). Such definitions of horizontal and vertical differentiation have hitherto been proposed for indivisible varieties with consumers making mutually exclusive choices. In what follows, we first formulate our model within the Lancasterian definitional setting and then generalize it to allow (i) consumers to buy more than one variety and (ii) the differentiated good to be divisible.¹¹ Defining horizontal differentiation when consumers have a love for variety is straightforward because such a preference relies on horizontally differentiated varieties. By contrast, defining vertical differentiation is more problematic because the ranking of varieties may change with consumption levels, an issue that we address below.

3.1 The one-variety case

Imagine an economy with one consumer whose income is y . There are two goods: the first one is differentiated while the second one is a Hicksian composite good which is used as the numéraire. Consider one variety s of the differentiated good. The utility from consuming the quantity $q_s > 0$ of this variety and the quantity $q_0 > 0$ of the numéraire is given by

$$u_s = \alpha_s q_s - \frac{\beta_s}{2} q_s^2 + q_0$$

where α_s and β_s are positive constants, which both reflect different aspects of the desirability of variety s with respect to the numéraire. The budget constraint is

$$p_s q_s + q_0 = y$$

where p_s is the price of variety s . Plugging the budget constraint in u_s and differentiating with respect to q_s yields the inverse demand for variety s :

$$p_s = \max \{ \alpha_s - \beta_s q_s, 0 \}. \quad (1)$$

¹¹Note that our approach, like most models of monopolistic competition, abstracts from the way product characteristics are chosen by firms. This issue has been tackled in a handful of theoretical papers (Hallak and Sivadasan, 2009) and analyzed empirically by Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) and Eckel et al. (2011).

In this expression, p_s is the highest price the consumer is willing to pay to acquire the quantity q_s of variety s , i.e. her willingness-to-pay (WTP). When the good is indivisible, the WTP depends only on α and β . Here, instead, it declines with consumption, following the decrease in its marginal utility. As long as the WTP for one additional unit of variety s is positive, a consumer chooses to acquire more of this variety. In contrast, she chooses to consume more of the numéraire when the WTP is negative. The equilibrium consumption is obtained when the WTP is equal to zero.

The utility u_s being quasi-linear, the above expressions do not involve any income effect. However, we will see below how our model can capture the impact of income differences across markets.

3.2 The two-variety case: a spatial interpretation

Consider now the case of two varieties, whose degree of substitutability is captured by a parameter $\gamma > 0$. That γ is positive and finite implies that varieties are imperfect substitutes entering symmetrically into preferences. The utility of variety $s = 1, 2$ is now given by

$$u_s = \alpha_s q_s - \frac{\beta_s}{2} q_s^2 - \frac{\gamma}{2} q_s q_r + q_0 \quad (2)$$

where q_r is the amount consumed of the other variety.

In this case, $\alpha_s - \gamma q_r/2$ is the marginal utility derived from consuming an arbitrarily small amount of variety s when q_r units of variety r are consumed. This marginal utility varies inversely with the total consumption of the other variety because the consumer values less variety s when her consumption of its substitute r is larger. Note that the intercept is positive provided that the desirability of variety s (α_s) dominates the negative impact of the consumption of the other variety, q_r , weighted by the degree of substitutability between the two varieties (γ). As q_s increases, the WTP of this variety decreases and variety s is consumed as long as its WTP is positive.

Repeating the procedure to obtain the inverse demand as in (1), the WTP of

variety s becomes

$$p_s = \alpha_s - \frac{\gamma}{2}q_r - \beta_s q_s. \quad (3)$$

Compared to (1), the WTP for variety s is shifted downward to account for the fact that the two varieties are substitutes; the value of the shifter increases with the total consumption of the other variety and the degree of substitutability.

Following the literature, we define two varieties as vertically differentiated when consumers view the vertical characteristics of variety 1 as dominating those of variety 2. Therefore, in line with the definition of vertical differentiation used by (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1983), we say that varieties 1 and 2 are vertically differentiated when all consumers' WTP for the first marginal unit of variety 1 exceeds that of variety 2, i.e. $\alpha_1 > \alpha_2$. Because a higher α_s implies that the WTP increases regardless of the quantity consumed, it follows that α_s can be interpreted as a measure of the *quality* of variety s . Since the WTP for a variety decreases with its level of consumption, an alternative definition would be to say that varieties 1 and 2 are vertically differentiated when $\alpha_1 - \beta_1 q > \alpha_2 - \beta_2 q$ for all $q > 0$. However, this definition overlaps with the very definition of the WTP that captures more features than vertical attributes. Note, finally, that α may reflect effects other than quality. We will return to this issue in section 3.3.

We now come to the interpretation of parameter β_s . It is well known that the best approach to the theory of differentiated markets is the one developed by Hotelling (1929) and Lancaster (1979) in which products are defined as bundles of characteristics in a multi-dimensional space. In this respect, one of the major drawbacks encountered in using aggregate preferences such as the CES and quadratic utility models is that a priori their main parameters cannot be interpreted within a characteristics space.¹² This is why we find it critical to provide an unambiguous interpretation of β_s within the Lancasterian framework, such that each parameter of the model we develop here is given a precise and specific definition. In addition, the differentiated good being divisible in monopolistic competition, the interpretation of these parameters must be independent of the unit in which the good is

¹²Anderson et al. (1992) have pinned down the Lancasterian foundations of the CES utility. To be precise, they show that there exists a one-to-one relationship between the elasticity of substitution across varieties and the distance between these varieties in the characteristics space: the larger the distance between varieties, the smaller the elasticity of substitution.

measured.

Our spatial metaphor involves a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. Whereas in Hotelling's model they are assumed to make mutually exclusive purchases, in the verti-zontal model we develop consumers are allowed to visit several shops. In the spirit of spatial models of product differentiation, we first assume here that consumers buy one unit of the good in each shop they visit, an assumption that will be later relaxed.

In Figure 2, we depict a spatial setting in which two varieties/shops, indexed $s = 1$ and $r = 2$ respectively are located at the endpoints of a unit segment, where $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \alpha$ and $\beta_2 = 1 - \beta_1 > 0$. Using (3), the WTP for, say, variety 1 has an intercept equal to $\alpha - \gamma/2$, while β_1 is the distance between shop 1 and consumers, the transport rate being normalized to 1. The consumer's WTP for variety 1 equals zero at

$$\beta_{\max} = \alpha - \gamma/2.$$

INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE.

Treading in Hotelling's footsteps, we say that a consumer located at $\beta_1 \in [0, \beta_{\max}]$ is willing to buy variety 1 when her WTP for one unit of the good from shop 1 is positive, that is, when the distance to this shop is smaller than β_{\max} . Therefore, a high (low) value of β_1 amounts to saying that the consumer is far from (close to) shop 1. As a result, we may view β_s in (2) as a parameter expressing the *idiosyncratic mismatch* between the horizontal characteristics of variety s and the consumer's ideal. This interpretation of β_s is nicely related to the concavity of u_s . As the mismatch between variety s and the consumer's ideal horizontal characteristics β_s increases, it is natural to expect the consumer to reach faster the level of satiation. In other words, if our consumer prefers vanilla to chocolate as an ice-cream flavor, the utility of an additional chocolate scoop will decrease faster than that of a vanilla scoop.

We now proceed by exploring the links between the above spatial setting and our model of monopolistic competition. When $\beta_1 < \beta_{\max}$, the consumer visits at least shop 1. However, as long as $\alpha - \gamma/2 - \beta$ is positive at $1/2$, then there is

another segment $[1 - \beta_{\max}, \beta_{\max}]$ in which both $\alpha - \gamma/2 - \beta_1$ and $\alpha - \gamma/2 - (1 - \beta_1)$ are positive. Indeed, since consumers have a love for variety, a consumer located in the vicinity of $1/2$ may want to visit both shops. For this to happen, we must account that the consumer has already acquired one unit of the good so that the two WTP-lines shift downward by $\gamma/2$. Therefore, the segment over which both shops are actually visited is narrower than $[1 - \beta_{\max}, \beta_{\max}]$ and given by $[1 - \beta_{\max} + \gamma/2, \beta_{\max} - \gamma/2]$. Consequently, when the consumer is located at $\beta_1 < 1 - \beta_{\max} + \gamma/2$ she visits shop 1 only, whereas she visits both shops when her location belongs to $[1 - \beta_{\max} + \gamma/2, \beta_{\max} - \gamma/2]$.

The foregoing argument shows how our spatial model can cope with consumers buying one or two varieties of the differentiated good. In particular, regardless of her location β_1 , any consumer acquires the two varieties when the interval $[1 - \beta_{\max} + \gamma/2, \beta_{\max} - \gamma/2]$ is wide enough. This will be so if and only if

$$\alpha - \gamma > 1.$$

This condition holds when the desirability of the differentiated good is high, the substitutability between the two varieties is low, or both.

Conversely, it is readily verified that, regardless of her location, our consumer acquires a single variety if and only if

$$1 > 2(\alpha - \gamma) \Leftrightarrow \gamma > \alpha - \frac{1}{2}.$$

In other words, when varieties are very good substitutes, consumers choose to behave like in the Hotelling model: despite their love for variety, they patronize a single shop because the utility derived from buying from the second shop is overcome by the cost of patronizing this shop. In particular, consumers located near the ends of the segment buy only one variety and consumers located in the central area buy both if and only if

$$\alpha - \gamma < 1 < 2(\alpha - \gamma).$$

Note that, when α is sufficiently small, a consumer located in the central area does not shop at all because both her desirability of the differentiated good is

low and her taste mismatch is high. In the standard Hotelling framework, this corresponds to the case in which the price of the good plus the transport cost borne by the consumer exceeds her reservation price.

Summing up, we find it fair to say that the preferences (2) encapsulate both vertical (α_s) and horizontal (β_s) differentiation features. Indeed, we drew a parallel between the taste parameter β_s and the distance a consumer has to travel to the shop. From this parallel it is clear that a large value of β_s corresponds to a "bad" match because of the longer distance one has to travel. In other words, when β_s is large, the consumer's ideal variety is far from the actual variety. This interpretation of beta allows us to refer to this parameter as an inverse indicator of taste.

3.3 A digression: how income matters

In the foregoing, income had no impact on the demand for the differentiated good. Yet, it is reasonable to expect consumers with different incomes to have different WTP. When the product under consideration accounts for a small share of their total consumption and the numéraire is interpreted as capturing a bundle of consumption of all the other products, we may capture this effect by slightly modifying the utility function $u_{s,i}$ of consumer $i = 1, \dots, n$. Specifically, consumer i 's utility of variety s is now given by

$$u_{s,i} = \alpha_s q_s - \frac{\beta_{s,i}}{2} q_s^2 + q_{0,i}$$

where $q_{0,i} = \delta_i q_0$ and $\beta_{s,i}$ is consumer's taste mismatch, which may be interpreted as in the foregoing. In this reformulation, $\delta_i > 0$ measures the consumer's marginal utility of income. Because this typically decreases with the consumer's income, we may rank consumers by decreasing order of income, and thus $\delta_1 < \delta_2 < \dots < \delta_n$ where $\delta_1 = 1$ and $q_{0,1} = q_0$ by normalization.

Consumer i 's WTP for variety s becomes

$$p_{s,i} = \max \left\{ \frac{\alpha_s - \beta_{s,i} q_s}{\delta_i}, 0 \right\}$$

where $p_{s,i}$ is expressed in terms of the numéraire of the richest consumer: the lower δ , the higher the WTP for the differentiated good. Thus, we indirectly capture

the impact of income on demand. Therefore, though we find it convenient to refer to α_s as the quality of variety s , we acknowledge that this parameter interacts with some other variables, such as income. It is readily verified that such variables generate market effects akin to what we call quality. Note also that a quasi-linear model like ours can deal with income differences across countries but is not suited to deal with income differences between consumers within a country. Yet, country characteristics such as income inequality within and between countries can be captured by country dummies, which is what we will do in our empirical section.

3.4 The multi-variety case

For notational simplicity, we return to the case of one market whose demand side is represented by a consumer and consider the standard setting of monopolistic competition in which the differentiated good is available as a continuum $S \equiv [0, N]$ of varieties, where N is the mass of varieties.

$$\begin{aligned} u_s &= \alpha_s q_s - \frac{\beta_s}{2} q_s^2 - \frac{\gamma}{2} q_s \left[\int_S q_r dr \right] + q_0 \\ &= \alpha_s q_s - \frac{\beta_s}{2} q_s^2 - \frac{\gamma}{2} q_s Q + q_0 \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

where $\gamma > 0$ and Q is the consumer's total consumption of the differentiated good. In this expression, γ measures the direct substitutability between variety s and any other variety $r \in S$. This parameter is assumed to be the same between any two varieties because β_s already captures asymmetries in preferences. Allowing γ to vary across varieties would make the algebra more cumbersome without adding much to the analysis.¹³

Consequently, the two-variety WTP now generalizes into

$$p_s = \alpha_s - \frac{\gamma}{2} Q - \beta_s q_s. \tag{5}$$

¹³Note that constant patterns of substitutability between varieties within a product category, or even the entire economy, is the standard assumption virtually all trade models, be they based on CES or linear quadratic utility functions.

Compared to (1), the WTP for variety s is shifted downward to account for the fact that all varieties are substitutes; the value of the shifter increases with the total consumption of the differentiated good and the substitutability across varieties.

Integrating (4) over the set S of varieties consumed, yields the utility function

$$U = \int_S \alpha_s q_s ds - \frac{1}{2} \int_S \beta_s q_s^2 ds - \frac{\gamma}{2} \left[\int_S q_s ds \right]^2 + q_0$$

where α_s and β_s are two positive and continuous functions defined on S , the former measuring the intrinsic quality of variety s and the latter capturing the distance between the consumer's ideal and variety s . The above expression is to be contrasted to the standard quadratic utility in which α and β are identical across varieties, which means that all varieties have the same quality and taste mismatch.

The budget constraint is

$$\int_S q_s p_s ds + q_0 = y.$$

Using (5), we readily see that the demand for variety s is given by

$$q_s = \frac{\alpha_s - p_s}{\beta_s} - \frac{\gamma(\mathbb{A} - \mathbb{P})}{\beta_s(1 + \gamma\mathbb{N})} \quad (6)$$

where

$$\mathbb{N} \equiv \int_S \frac{dr}{\beta_r} \quad \mathbb{A} \equiv \int_S \frac{\alpha_r}{\beta_r} dr \quad \mathbb{P} \equiv \int_S \frac{p_r}{\beta_r} dr.$$

Note that the density over S is equal to 1 because each variety is supplied by a single firm.

Like in most models of monopolistic competition, the demand for a variety depends on a few market aggregates, here three (Vives, 2001), which are market-specific. Using the interpretation of β_r given above, it is straightforward to see $1/\beta_r$ as a measure of the proximity of variety r to the representative consumer's ideal set of characteristics. Consequently, a variety having a small (large) β_r has

a strong (weak) impact on the demand for variety s because the representative consumer is (not) willing to buy much of it.¹⁴ In contrast, a variety with a small β_r has a strong impact on the consumption of variety s because the representative consumer highly values its horizontal characteristics. This explains why β_r appears in the denominator of the three aggregates, \mathbb{N} , \mathbb{A} and \mathbb{P} .

Having this in mind, it should be clear why each variety is *weighted by the inverse of its taste mismatch* to determine the effective mass of varieties, given by \mathbb{N} . It is \mathbb{N} and not the unweighted mass of varieties, N , that affects the consumer's demand for a given variety. Indeed, adding or deleting varieties with bad taste matches, for example, does not affect much the demand for the others, whereas the opposite holds when the match is good. Note that \mathbb{N} may be larger or smaller than N according to the distribution of taste mismatches. Similarly, the quality and price of a variety are weighted by the inverse of its taste mismatch to determine the effective quality index \mathbb{A} and the effective price index \mathbb{P} . In particular, varieties displaying the same quality (or price) may have very different impacts on the demand for other varieties according to their taste mismatches. These three aggregates show that taste heterogeneity affects demand and, therefore, the market outcome. In addition, two different markets are typically associated with two different β -distributions. Consequently, the nature and intensity of competition may vary significantly from one market to another, even when the same range of varieties is supplied in both.

The above discussion shows that it is possible to introduce heterogeneity across varieties on the consumer side in order to generate a large array of new features in consumer demand. In what follows, we call *verti-zontal differentiation* this new interaction of vertical and horizontal characteristics.

¹⁴ Formally, we should consider an open interval of varieties containing r because the impact of a single variety upon another is zero.

3.5 Monopolistic competition under verti-zontal differentiation

When each variety s is associated with a marginal production cost $c_s > 0$, operating profits earned from variety s are as follows:

$$\Pi_s = (p_s - c_s)q_s$$

where q_s is given by (6). Differentiating this expression with respect to p_s yields

$$p_s^*(\mathbb{P}) = \frac{\alpha_s + c_s}{2} - \frac{\gamma(\mathbb{A} - \mathbb{P})}{2(1 + \gamma\mathbb{N})}. \quad (7)$$

The natural interpretation of this expression is that it represents firm s ' best-reply to the market conditions. These conditions are defined by the aggregate behavior of all producers, which is summarized here by the price index \mathbb{P} . The best-reply function is upward sloping because varieties are substitutable: a rise in the effective price index \mathbb{P} relaxes price competition and enables each firm to sell its variety at a higher price. Even though the price index is endogenous, \mathbb{P} is accurately treated parametrically because each variety is negligible to the market. In contrast, \mathbb{A} and \mathbb{N} are exogenously determined by the distributions of quality and tastes over S . In particular, by shifting the best reply downward, a larger effective mass \mathbb{N} of firms makes competition tougher and reduces prices. Similarly, when the quality index \mathbb{A} rises, each firm faces varieties having in the aggregate a higher quality, thus making the market penetration of its variety harder. Thus, through market aggregates determined by the asymmetric distribution of varieties, our model of monopolistic competition manages to reconcile weak interactions, typical of Chamberlin-like models, with several of the main features of Hotelling-like models of product differentiation.

Integrating (7) over S shows that the equilibrium price index can be expressed in terms of three market indices:

$$\mathbb{P}^* = \mathbb{C} + \frac{\mathbb{A} - \mathbb{C}}{2 + \gamma\mathbb{N}} \quad (8)$$

where the cost index is defined as

$$\mathbb{C} \equiv \int_S \frac{c_r}{\beta_r} dr.$$

In this expression, varieties' costs are weighted as in the above indices for the same reasons as in the foregoing. Hence, efficiently produced varieties may have a low impact on the cost index when they have a bad match with the consumer's ideal. Note also that \mathbb{A} affects prices positively, even though it affects each individual variety's price negatively.

Plugging \mathbb{P}^* into (7), we obtain the (absolute) markup of variety s :

$$p_s^* - c_s = \frac{\alpha_s - c_s}{2} - \mathcal{T} \left(\frac{\tilde{a} - \tilde{c}}{2} \right) \quad (9)$$

where taste-weighted average quality and cost indices are obtained by dividing cost and quality indices by the effective number of varieties in the market:

$$\tilde{a} \equiv \mathbb{A}/\mathbb{N} \quad \tilde{c} \equiv \mathbb{C}/\mathbb{N}$$

Note that the first term of (9) is variety-specific, but the second term is not. Since it affects identically all the varieties in a market, we refer to it as a market effect (*ME*). In words, a variety markup is equal to half of its social value minus half of the average social value of all varieties, the second term being weighted by a coefficient that accounts for the *toughness of competition*, i.e.

$$\mathcal{T} \equiv \frac{\gamma\mathbb{N}}{2 + \gamma\mathbb{N}} \in [0; 1]$$

which depends on the effective mass of firms and the degree of substitutability across varieties. In particular, only the varieties with the highest social value will survive, very much as in oligopolistic models of product differentiation (Shaked and Sutton, 1983). When $\gamma\mathbb{N}$ is arbitrarily small, each variety is supplied at its monopoly price since $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow 0$. On the other hand, when $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow 1$, the market outcome converges toward perfect competition. The benefits of assuming that γ is the same across varieties are reaped by capturing the degree of competition on a

particular market through \mathcal{T} . In addition, the toughness of competition may vary from one market to another because \mathcal{T} depends on the effective mass of varieties.¹⁵

Last, suppose that the average effective quality \mathbb{A}/\mathbb{N} increases by $\Delta > 0$. Then, if the quality upgrade Δ_s of variety s is such that

$$\Delta_s > \mathcal{T}\Delta$$

then its markup and price will increase, even though the quality upgrade Δ_s may be lower than Δ . In contrast, if the quality upgrade of variety s is smaller than $\mathcal{T}\Delta$, then its markup and price will decrease, even though the quality upgrade Δ_s is positive. In other words, quality differences are exacerbated by the toughness of competition in the determination of markups.

Note that the equilibrium price of variety s is independent of β_s . This is because the price elasticity is given by

$$\epsilon_s = \frac{p_s}{\alpha_s - \gamma Q - p_s}$$

This expression ranges from 0, when $p_s = 0$, to ∞ , when prices equal the intercept of the inverse demand function, $\alpha_s - \gamma Q$. Note that β_s does not affect ϵ_s and, therefore, has no impact on p_s . However, the whole distribution β_r matters because it influences the equilibrium value of Q .

Using the properties of linear demand functions, we readily verify that the equilibrium output of each variety is given by

$$q_s^* = \frac{1}{\beta_s}(p_s^* - c_s) \tag{10}$$

while the corresponding equilibrium operating profits are

$$\pi_s = \frac{1}{\beta_s}(p_s^* - c_s)^2.$$

¹⁵This parameter can be nicely related to the existence of different price ranges across sectors observed by Khandelwal (2010). Noting that each variety is characterized by an idiosyncratic quality and cost parameter, we can show that, paraphrasing Khandelwal, it is “the length of the markup ladder” that varies across sectors in our model: the tougher the competition, the shorter the ladder.

It is also interesting to notice how cost, quality and taste interact in determining the market share of a certain variety, in terms of quantities sold:

$$\frac{q_s}{Q} = \frac{\gamma}{2\beta_s} \left(\frac{\alpha_s - c_s}{\tilde{a} - \tilde{c}} \frac{1}{\mathcal{T}} - 1 \right).$$

The relative sales of a particular variety in a market is here shown to depend not only on the quality and cost of a particular variety with respect to the rest of the market, but also on variety-specific taste mismatch, β_s , market specific toughness of competition, \mathcal{T} , and product substitutability, γ . Specifically, varieties with higher quality, α_s , or lower costs, c_s , or better match with local taste, β_s , will have higher market shares. The more so, the lower is the toughness of competition in the market or the higher is product substitutability.

To sum up, our model is flexible enough to replicate several results obtained in differentiated oligopoly theory while retaining the flexibility displayed by the standard quadratic utility model. This is achieved by using market aggregates of variables or parameters, weighted by variety-specific consumer tastes. For these reasons, we find it fair to say that the model presented here provides a reconciliation between localized competition à la Hotelling (1929) and non-localized competition à la Chamberlin (1933). Indeed, in our setting global competition is affected by the proximity/remoteness among varieties through simple and intuitive market aggregates.

3.6 The trade model

While the model has been solved for one consumer, from this point forward we interpret the model in a trade context where the world consists of different countries i populated by M_i consumers. Consumers living in the same country share the same preferences. The theory then tells us what to expect as price and per capita quantity determinants in each destination market. Variety-specific determinants of prices and per capita quantities (captured by subscript s), such as cost and quality, do not vary by destination market and influence prices and quantities in a similar way in all countries. The idiosyncratic taste parameter, β , varies by variety and country, so it is indexed by i and s . Since we follow the literature in

assuming that markets are segmented, market aggregates such as the price index \mathbb{P} , the mass of competing varieties \mathbb{N} and the quality index \mathbb{A} are also considered as country-specific variables having an effect on local prices and per capita quantities. The relevant product-market in which varieties are competing, S , is composed by all the varieties s of a certain good in a specific market i .

Equilibrium prices and quantities can then be written as follows:

$$p_{s,i}^* = \frac{\alpha_s + c_s}{2} - \mathcal{T}_i \left(\frac{\tilde{a}_i - \tilde{c}_i}{2} \right) \quad (11)$$

$$q_{s,i}^* = \frac{M_i}{\beta_{s,i}} \left[\frac{\alpha_s - c_s}{2} - \mathcal{T}_i \left(\frac{\tilde{a}_i - \tilde{c}_i}{2} \right) \right] \quad (12)$$

Note that the second terms on the RHS of (11) and (12) shows that absolute prices and quantities of varieties can differ across geographical markets due to a common market effect (composed of all the terms indexed by i) which can be thought of as local competitive conditions. This market effect acts like a shifter for all prices in a particular market. Thus, although the general level of prices can differ across markets, if a variety is sold at a relatively high price in a market, it will remain relatively expensive in another market because its cost and quality parameters have a same effect on prices anywhere. Furthermore, the same variety may be sold in different markets at different prices and in different quantities, even when the differences in costs are negligible. Prices and markups depend on the vertical attributes of each variety and on the market-specific degree of competitiveness, which can be fully captured by taste-weighted price, quality and cost indices as well as by the effective mass of competitors. Quantities also depend on market variety-specific mismatch.

In what follows, we assume transport costs to be product-specific and identical for all products going from the same origin country (Belgium in our case) to the same destination market, thus they will not affect price ranks of varieties across markets. Transport costs will consequently cancel out and will not need to be modelled explicitly.¹⁶

The above analysis suggests the following predictions. (i) In all markets, high-

¹⁶Note that our approach would be consistent with the assumption of both linear or iceberg transport costs, as long as they are product-specific and do not vary by variety.

quality (or high-cost) firm-products are sold at higher prices than low-quality firm-products. However, (ii) the price of a given firm-product need not be the same across markets, as it will experience a downward shift in each export destination due to local market competition. (iii) Because demand is affected by consumers' idiosyncratic taste regardless of the quality level, quantities sold are likely to display more variation than prices across markets. We verify in the next section if this is what we observe in the data.

4 Empirical evidence

The aim of this section is to confront the above model with micro-level data. To this end, we use a unique dataset on Belgian exporters similar to the one used by Bernard et al. (2010a). The data is composed of fob (free on board) export prices and quantities by destination market at the firm-product level.¹⁷ This allows us to compare prices and quantities of the same firm-products across destination markets as well as prices and quantities of different firm-products within the same destination market.

4.1 Data

The Belgian export data used in this paper are obtained from the National Bank of Belgium's Trade Database, which covers the entire population of recorded annualized trade flows by product and destination at the firm-level. Exactly which trade flows are recorded (i.e. whether firms are required to report their trade transactions) depends on their value and destination. For extra-EU trade, all transactions with a minimum value of 1,000 euros or weight of more than 1,000 kg have to be reported. For intra-EU trade, firms are only required to report their export flows if their total annual intra-EU export value is higher than 250,000 euros. The export data are recorded at the year-firm-product-country level, i.e. they provide information on firm-level export flows by 8-digit Combined Nomenclature (CN8)

¹⁷Prices are unit values obtained by dividing values by quantities with the latter expressed in weight or units, depending on the product considered.

product and by destination country.¹⁸ For firms with primary activity in manufacturing, the data includes over 5,000 exporters and over 7,000 different CN8 products, resulting in more than 60,000 firm-product varieties exported to 220 destination markets in a total of almost 250,000 observations in one year. We use cross-sectional export data for the year 2005 from manufacturing firms and for which both values and weights (or units shipped) are reported which allows us to compute prices. Given that the theory is about consumption goods, we only consider consumption goods as indicated by the BEC classification.¹⁹

Because CN8 is the most detailed product-level classification available, we define a *variety* s as a firm-CN8 combination. While our definition of a variety does not change throughout the analysis, the definition of a product and the size of the product-market S_i is allowed to change with the level of product aggregation. Thus, several varieties can be supplied by the same firm at levels of aggregation higher than CN8.

When defining a relevant product-market, the level of product aggregation must be traded off against the number of varieties, which falls dramatically as the product-market narrows. For this reason, we do not retain a single level of aggregation but repeat our analysis for four levels of aggregation, the CN8, CN6, CN4 and CN2. In a more aggregated product classification, a *product* will then be defined as a collection of varieties (firm-CN8) sharing the same CN code. More broadly defined product-markets will have a higher number of varieties, but the varieties included will be poorer substitutes and, therefore, the assumption of symmetry in substitutability becomes more stringent. In what follows, we explain how products and destination markets have been included in our analysis. Their intersection determines the product-market samples on which price and quantity comparisons are

¹⁸The Combined Nomenclature is the European Union's product classification, with 8 digits being the most detailed level. Due to its hierarchical nature, all products expressed as CN8 are also classified as products at more aggregated level such as CN6, CN4 and CN2. Incidentally, CN6 is identical to the HS 6 digit classification, which is the international product classification. The CN classification can be downloaded from the Eurostat Ramon server: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/>.

¹⁹The BEC classification is an indicator of consumption goods at the 6 digit level. Thus, goods in sector CN8 and sector CN6 are easy to classify. However turning to more aggregate sectors like sector CN2, both consumption and other (capital, industrial) goods may occur. Our decision rule has been to include sectors CN2 and sectors CN4 when there was at least one CN6 consumption product.

conducted in the following analysis.

Product selection. This far, a product has been defined at the CN8 level. From now on, we consider different levels of aggregation (CN8, CN6, CN4, CN2) and call a "product" a group of CN8-codes that fall within a more aggregate CN level. Within each such product, we analyze differences across markets and varieties (firm-CN8). Therefore, we must focus on products which are sold in a sufficiently large number of varieties and markets. To ensure that there are enough varieties in enough markets, we retain the five "products" which are associated with the highest number of varieties at each level of aggregation. These products are listed in Table A.1 with corresponding CN codes and descriptions.

INSERT TABLE A.1 HERE.

Market selection. Since our analysis focuses on price and quantity variations across destination markets, another trade-off involves the number of countries to consider. Since we are interested in price and quantity differences across markets, we need a sufficient number of markets to compare. However, we also need a sufficient number of varieties to be simultaneously sold in all the markets. The trade-off arises because the number of varieties simultaneously present in all markets drops significantly with each additional destination market. Since there is no clear-cut rule to settle this issue, we follow a data driven approach, the aim of which is to retain a set of countries and products that allow for *a maximum number of observations to base our analysis on*. We start by considering only those destination markets that are important outlets for Belgian exporters in terms of the number of firm-products. This leads us to include only those destination markets that import at least 5,000 varieties. This results in 12 destination markets, which are listed in Table A.2. Next, we explore all possible market combinations to find how many varieties are exported simultaneously to $N = 2, 3, \dots, 12$ countries and, for each value of N we identify a *best N-market combination*. In the first column of Table A.2, we report the number of varieties shipped to each of these 12 markets. The second column gives the total number of varieties sold simultaneously in each best N-market combination, which is obtained by adding the corresponding country to

all the countries listed in the previous rows.

INSERT TABLE A.2 HERE.

Product-market samples. The intersection of all the best N-market combinations with the 20 products (i.e., five products for each of the four levels of aggregation) leads to 220 potential data samples. Since some samples are very small, having just 2 or 3 varieties, we further restrict ourselves to samples with more than 10 varieties in order to permit a meaningful correlation analysis between markets. This results in 171 samples. Across these samples, Table 1 provides the actual number of varieties used in our analysis for each level of aggregation (rows) and each best N-country combination (columns).

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE.

4.2 Looking at prices and quantities: rank correlations

We start by considering rank correlations of prices and quantities within and between markets. The use of rank correlations allows us to capture general features of the data, even in the context of non-linear or non-additive demand functions. Put differently, by considering rank correlations we are imposing a less strict interpretation of the theory. This will be relaxed later where we show results also to hold for actual prices and quantities.

Price-quantity rank correlations within markets. Similarly to what we have shown on the car data example in section 2, we investigate whether, within each market, rankings of prices and quantities are significantly correlated. In a model where only quality or only cost efficiency matters, they should be. If at least both elements are at play, then the relationship should be generally weak or insignificant, with the exception of sectors in which there is not much scope for quality or productive differences. Both a Spearman's and a Kendall's rank correlation is applied on the samples resulting from our market and product selection.²⁰

²⁰The difference between these two approaches to rank correlation is that, whereas the Spear-

Results are given in Table 2a where we report them by product-market aggregation and number of countries included in the analysis. In particular we report how many times the within market price-quantity correlation is not significantly different from 0 at a 5% level of confidence.

Interestingly, results vary a lot depending on the level of aggregation and N-market combination considered. Overall, for the entire sample, the data reject a significant correlation of prices and quantities within markets in about 1/3 of the times. Evaluated in the narrowest product definition, the CN8 level, the rejection rate of a significant correlation is much higher and lies between 76% and 78% of the cases, depending on the statistic used. These results seem to confirm the notion that any theory should at least involve two sources of heterogeneity to explain the pattern of prices and quantities observed in the data. This is most evident in narrowly defined product-markets.

We now turn to statistics for quantity rank correlations and price rank correlations across markets. Results are reported in Table 2b in a similar format as in table 2a. It can be noted that quantity rank correlations between markets are often not significantly different from 0, at a 5% level. At the narrowest product-level which is the CN8, the quantity correlations are equal to zero in about 60% of the cases. In table 2c, we show the corresponding results for price rankings between markets. It is striking how much lower the rejection rates are for prices as compared to quantities. The Spearman rank statistic, considers prices to be significantly correlated in 98% of cases, while the corresponding value for the Kendall Tau statistic is about 97%. Put differently, both measures of rank correlations estimate price correlations not to be correlated in only 2 to 3% of the cases.

INSERT TABLES 2b AND 2c HERE.

Between-market price and quantity rank correlations. The between-market predictions are what truly delineate the verti-zontal model from a model with only cost and quality heterogeneity. These two sources of heterogeneity can-

man rank correlation transforms actual values into their relative rank and then compute a standard correlation, the Kendall tau rank correlation measures the frequency of concordant pairs, i.e. observations whose rank coincides.

not explain a systematically different rank correlation across markets for prices as compared to quantities, which is what we observe. The introduction of a third source involving idiosyncratic taste can achieve this.

An illustrative example: chocolate products. To make our analysis more concrete and to illustrate the discrepancy between price correlations and quantity correlations between markets, we focus on one particular product. A product frequently exported from Belgium and included in our data is Belgian chocolates. At the CN8 level, Belgian chocolates fall under “Chocolate products not containing alcohol”. For the sake of illustration, we show results limiting ourselves to the best 3-destination market combination, which involves Germany, France and the Netherlands, for which we identify 34 different varieties exported to each of the three destination markets. The values of the pairwise ranking correlations are provided in the top panel of Table 3. We note that price rank correlations ($corr(pp)$) are systematically higher than quantity rank correlations ($corr(qq)$) which suggests that the relative price ranking across the three destination markets is more regular than the quantity ranking. This is true not only for the average correlations across country pairs, but for any country pair correlation, even when CN6 and CN4 definitions of chocolate products are used, which are reported in the middle and bottom panel of Table 3 respectively.

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE.

The general case. While the chocolate example reported the correlation coefficients for 3 chocolate-related CN samples, the same analysis can be repeated for the remaining 168 samples in our data and, for robustness, for all varieties belonging to the manufacturing sector. In order to give the reader a sense of the pattern that emerges from all the pairwise correlations considered, we report averages.²¹ So for reporting purposes we average the pairwise coefficients arising from comparing rankings in any two destination markets at the sample level and

²¹When 3 markets are considered, for example, 3 pairwise market correlations for prices and 3 for quantities are obtained; when 4 markets are considered, the coefficients are 6, and so on up to 12 markets, at which point 66 bilateral correlations are obtained.

then average these sample coefficients by level of product-aggregation and market-combination.²²

Tables 4 report average Spearman correlation coefficients and show that *average price rank correlations between markets are systematically higher than average quantity rank correlations*. This holds irrespective of the number of varieties included (column dimension) and the number of markets considered (row dimension). The difference lies around 15 percentage points, which is relatively similar across the samples.²³

INSERT TABLES 4 HERE.

As a robustness check, we repeat the same rank correlation analysis considering the entire manufacturing sector, resulting in a unique correlation coefficient per country combinations. Results are even stronger, i.e. high price correlation but low quantity correlation between markets, and can be seen on the working paper version of the article.

As noted in section 2, these results are not consistent with a combination of cost and quality heterogeneity. Price correlations between markets are high, suggesting that quality and/or productive efficiency are intrinsic and not market-specific. Yet, quantity correlations are lower, indicating that an additional source of heterogeneity must be present at a market-variety level.

These results support the idea that a third source of heterogeneity needs to be taken into account when dealing with micro-level trade data.

4.3 Taking the verti-zontal model to the data

A general feature of quadratic utility functions is that they generate extremely tractable demand functions. Whereas this represents a clear advantage in terms of theoretical developments, it may pose some problems when confronted with real data, as it imposes a linear demand on the data. A legitimate concern may then

²²All the coefficients associated to each individual sample can be provided upon request.

²³Very similar results are obtained when Kendall instead of Spearman rank correlations are considered.

arise on how restrictive this linearity assumption is. We explore this issue in two ways.

First, we repeat the previous correlation analysis looking at the actual values instead of rankings. If we find correlations on absolute values of prices and quantities to be similar to rank correlations, this suggests that the assumption of linear demand is not very restrictive. To see this, consider the case where demand is non-linear. If the rankings of prices show a strong positive correlation, this may just imply that prices are monotonic (not necessary linear) in quality, marginal costs of production and local market characteristics. But when the absolute value of prices shows a similar positive correlation, it must be the case that a linear structure is a good approximation and that local market effects are shifting the demand for all the varieties in a parallel way.

Second, we run an OLS regression on market and variety dummies and consider the variability explained. This will tell us how well a linear regression line fits the cloud of observed prices. The goodness-of-fit of such a regression will tell us something about the validity of our linearity assumption.

Actual correlations of prices and quantities across markets. In Table 5 we show the correlations of actual prices and quantities across markets, which can usefully be compared to the results in Table 4 where Spearman rank correlations have been displayed.

INSERT TABLE 5 HERE.

The average difference between price and quantity correlations across destination markets when using actual values (column 1) is surprisingly similar to the rank correlations, ranging from 15% to more than 25% depending on the sample considered. Correlations lose however, some of their strength due to the possible presence of outliers, different transport costs across markets and any other possible measurement error whose importance was reduced through the use of rankings. Still, it can be noted that average price correlations are much higher than average quantity correlations even when using actual values, independently of the product aggregation and the number of destination markets that are included in the

sample.

These results suggest that prices across markets depend on some variety-specific characteristics which have a similar impact across markets, while quantities sold appear to be affected by “something else”. In our model, this “something else” is captured by market-variety specific differences in the liking by consumers of a set of product characteristics. It is also worth noting that if destination market-specific factors, such as institutions or market size, affected Belgian exports in a similar fashion, this would not affect correlation coefficients within a product category.²⁴ We build on this point in the next step of our exploratory analysis, where we show that variety- and market-dummies capture the variability of prices across markets much better than for quantities.

OLS regression and goodness of fit. Once we accept that at least three sources of heterogeneity seem to be present in micro-level trade data, we go one step further and see if the way in which they are combined in the vertical model is consistent with the prices and quantities observed. Turning to equation (11), we observe that profit-maximizing prices depend on a variety-specific component, indexed by s , and a market specific component, indexed by i . Thus, the first term differs across varieties but not across markets, whereas the last term varies across destination markets, capturing relevant dimensions of local competitive pressure. As shown by equation (12), profit-maximizing quantities also depend on a market-variety specific taste component(β).

These implications of the model can be empirically tested by regressing individual firm-product prices and per capita quantities ($y_{s,i}$) on variety-specific dummies capturing variety-specific components of prices and quantities such as cost and quality, and destination market-specific dummies capturing market effects as in (13):²⁵

²⁴Note that bigger markets could be expected to buy more products of a particular type. But this does not necessarily mean that each variety will sell more, as a bigger market is typically served by more varieties (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011). Hence the effect of market size on the actual sales of a particular variety is not clear a priori.

²⁵Since countries have different sizes M_i , the quantities used in our analysis are the total quantities divided by the population size of each destination country, $q_{s,i}/M_i$. Using instead total quantities yields results that are qualitatively the same as those obtained here.

$$y_{s,i} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 Variety_s + \delta_2 Market_i + \epsilon_{s,i} \quad (13)$$

We run the specification in (13) on the 171 data samples identified. Note that the unit of observation is always an individual variety, defined by the combination of a firm and a CN8 product code, in a particular destination market. Each variety will then be associated with a specific dummy in all the markets where it is sold. Similarly, all the varieties present in the same destination market will be assigned a dummy equal to one when observed in that specific market.

In terms of the verti-zontal model, the first dummy on the RHS in (13) is meant to capture all the variety-specific characteristics, i.e. marginal cost of production and idiosyncratic quality while the second dummy is expected to capture destination market-wide differences. A high R^2 for prices then suggests that each variety has some intrinsic characteristics determining pricing decisions. Based on the equilibrium quantity (12), we would expect a systematically lower R^2 for quantities, due to the presence of market-variety characteristics which vary both per variety - s - and destination market - i - thus reducing the amount of sample variability explained by the two sets of dummies. As a benchmark, the reader can bear in mind the implications of alternative models other than the verti-zontal model. In a pure cost or quality model we would expect the independent variables in (13) to explain an equal amount of variability of both prices and quantities, which is not what we find in the data. Also, the predictions of the verti-zontal model can be contrasted with a model of market-specific demand shifters (capturing, say, differently perceived quality), rather than a variety-specific demand shifter in the verti-zontal model. Based on such a model we would expect only a negligible amount of variability to be explained by our two sets of dummies for both quantities and prices, while results suggest the opposite. The average (R^2) for regression (13) are summarized in Table 6.

INSERT TABLE 6 HERE.

The price regressions have an R^2 of between 60 and 70% depending on the sample that is used, which is systematically higher than the one associated with

quantity regressions that ranges from 40 to 50%. Looking at the top row, column (1), we can see that the average of the averages across all samples displays a difference of 20% in the captured variability between price and quantity regressions. Browsing Table 6, we see that this difference is systematically present, no matter which product-market definition or market combination is used. This consistently higher goodness-of-fit for price as opposed to quantity regressions can be interpreted as the effect on quantities of different tastes in different markets.

The differences in goodness-of-fit are displayed in Figure 3, where the square dots should now be read as average R^2 resulting from the price regressions and the triangle dots are the R^2 from the quantity regressions. The horizontal line segments indicate the average R^2 by level of product aggregation, while the individual dots show the averages by number of markets considered for each level of product aggregation. The solid line shows average prices while the dashed line shows average quantities in different samples. It can be noted that the OLS fit is systematically better in the price regressions than in the quantity regressions

INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE.

Omitted variable tests. In order to complement our analysis of the variability explained by the regressions, we run a test especially designed to verify the functional forms used in the theory and to test for omitted variable bias, which is the Ramsey's RESET. We know that a low R^2 may be caused by omitted variables or non-linear functional forms involving variety- and market-specific effects. In what follows, we use the RESET to assess their respective role. Table 7 shows how many times the RESET test is passed. The results are strikingly different for price and quantity regressions. The top row shows that the price regression passes the Ramsey test in 71.9% of the samples, while the comparable number of the quantity regression is 9.4%. A natural way to interpret this is that the high R^2 for the price regression suggests that the linear functional form is reasonable and no important variables are omitted. The opposite holds true for quantity regressions, which supports the idea that a market-variety-specific taste parameter is missing in the regression and structural parameters affecting equilibrium quantities do so in a non-linear way.

The rest of the Table 7 disaggregates this by levels of product aggregation and best-N market combinations. The difference between price regressions and quantity regressions remains striking, at all levels of product aggregation and for any number of destination markets. For example, when 7 markets are considered, only 1 quantity regression out of 20 passes the RESET test, whereas 16 out of 20 do so for the price regressions on dummies. Note also that the country dummies ($Market_i$ in (13)) control for variations across countries such as income differences and market size.

INSERT TABLE 7 HERE.

Overall variability explained. Up to this point, our analysis has always been restricted to the 171 product-market combinations identified earlier. As a robustness check, the same regression analysis is repeated considering the entire manufacturing sector.²⁶ For robustness, we also verify results when market-product dummies are considered instead of market dummies alone with products defined at a 2-digit CN level. This allows for different local competitive pressure across products, which may affect prices and quantities differently.

An important caveat is that the unit of measurement in which per capita quantities are expressed in the data can differ when dealing with the whole manufacturing sector. While in the large majority of cases quantities are expressed in kilograms, for some products another unit of measurement is used (liters, pairs, square meters and so on). This did not constitute a problem as long as our analysis was restricted to specific product definitions, which are always measured in the same way, but it becomes more of an issue when the entire manufacturing sector is considered, as different units of measurement now co-exist in the sample. To account for this, we consider the results for varieties whose quantity is expressed in terms of weight (kilograms) separately from those varieties whose quantities are expressed in units.

The results are even stronger than those reported in Table 6, as can be ver-

²⁶Implicitly this amounts considering the entire economy as a product-market in 13, attributing the same pattern of substitutability to all the varieties produced, which is a convenient assumption also present in CES models used to study economy-wide issues.

ified on the working paper version of the article. This is true both for varieties expressed in units and for varieties whose quantities are expressed in weight.

Consistently with our previous results, the amount of variation captured by these two simple sets of dummies is impressive, and so is their difference. It is also interesting to note that the inclusion of product-market dummies instead of pure market dummies does not affect the goodness of fit in the price regressions. On the other hand, quantity regressions are sensitive to the kind of product-market dummy considered, which is consistent with the idiosyncratic nature of our taste mismatch parameter β in the model.

Does geography matter? Finally, we ask ourselves whether our results may be driven by the fact that most destination countries included in our analysis are European (see Table A.2). Indeed, European integration may have a dampening effect on price differences as a result of arbitrage, proximity or lack of border controls, which could explain the high price correlation observed in the data. Even if we find it hard to see how this could explain the low correlation in terms of quantities sold, we consider this a legitimate concern. For this reason, we check whether a different country selection could have affected our results. We do so by considering a range of heterogeneous and remote countries (Brazil, South Africa, Australia, Turkey, China, India, Japan, US, and Canada) together with the three main trading partners of Belgium (France, Netherlands and Germany). Out of the whole manufacturing sector, this choice of destination countries results in 87 varieties exported in 2005 to these 12 countries. The rank correlation pairs for these 87 varieties are plotted in Figure 4 for prices and quantities, sorting them by decreasing quantity rank correlation. The results are again surprising but in line with earlier results. Price rank correlations range between 84% and 97% for all the country pairs, while quantity rank correlations can be as low as 50%, averaging 71%. This result is reassuring since it confirms that prices are surprisingly similar across markets, even when including countries outside the European Union, whereas quantities sold are far less similar.

In fact, if anything it appears that the original samples containing mostly European countries may generate results against our modelling choices. This can

be seen again from Figure 4. Of all the countries included in this new sample, the ones displaying the highest pairwise quantity rank correlations are the 3 European countries, with an average price rank correlations also above average. In our setting, this would be associated with countries sharing similar tastes or, more precisely, countries with similar taste mismatch between their ideal variety characteristics and the actual characteristics of the 87 varieties considered. This means that our original samples containing mostly European countries may have overestimated the regularity of quantities sold across markets and underestimated the real distance between price and quantity coefficients in correlation and regression analyses.

5 Conclusions

Existing trade models are not fully able to explain the patterns observed in firm-product-country level trade data, thus calling for a new generation of models. This paper proposes an extension of the quadratic utility model to respond to this challenge. By enriching the demand side to account for non-symmetric varieties through a precise interpretation of horizontal and vertical differentiation, we developed a tractable framework in which taste heterogeneity interacts with cost heterogeneity and vertical differentiation, which may be interpreted as quality. We called it a “verti-zontal” model to stress its vertical and horizontal attributes based on Lancasterian definitions. This model offers a tractable and fully identifiable alternative to existing models of monopolistic competition.

The verti-zontal model can address the concerns raised by a growing number of empirical studies that fail to find evidence in support of existing models when confronted with micro-level data. To further illustrate this point, we have used a unique dataset on Belgian exporters, with information on products and destinations, and find that one of the weakest points of existing theories lies in assuming that prices and quantities associated with segmented markets are determined by the same set of parameters. This results in a set of predictions that do not correspond with what we and others observe in the data. We tackle this issue by accounting for product differentiation in monopolistic competition in a novel way which generates a set of predictions in line with what we observe.

Figure 1a: Scatterplot of price against quantity rankings for car models sold in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and UK within each market.




Figure 1b: Price ranks in France, Germany, Italy and UK against price ranks in Belgium.




Figure 1c: Quantity ranks in France, Germany, Italy and UK against quantity ranks in Belgium.




Figure 2: Graphical intuition of the spatial problem






Figure 3: Visual representation of the results reported in Table 6.



Notes: Square dots indicate average R^2 for regressions of prices on dummies by best N-market combination across product codes, triangle dots indicate the same for regressions of quantities on dummies. The horizontal line segments refer to average R^2 across best N-market combinations by level of product disaggregation: the solid one refers to prices, the dashed one to quantities.

Figure 4: Pairwise rank correlations for a sample of the 12 relevant export markets selected from across the globe



Notes: The countries considered are: France, Netherlands, Germany, US, Canada, Brasil, South Africa, Australia, Turkey, China, India, Japan. The square dots indicate price rank correlations for all the 66 country pair combinations, triangle dots indicate pairwise quantity rank correlations. The horizontal line segments refer to the averages: the solid one refers to prices, the dashed one to quantities. Note that for illustrative purposes country pairs have been sorted in decreasing quantity rank correlation order. The shaded area covers the three most correlated country pairs in terms of quantity ranks: France-Netherlands; Germany-France; Germany-Netherlands.

Table 1: Varieties considered in each intersection of best N-market combination and level of product disaggregation.

Number of varieties considered	Best N-country combinations										
	N=2	N=3	N=4	N=5	N=6	N=7	N=8	N=9	N=10	N=11	N=12
<i>top 5</i> CN8	275	221	174	139	117	93	66	24	15	12	11
<i>top 5</i> CN6	333	263	215	174	130	100	72	10	0	0	0
<i>top 5</i> CN4	818	604	464	339	250	174	134	83	41	24	22
<i>top 5</i> CN2	3674	2591	1835	1352	1123	811	698	535	358	259	135
Whole Manufacturing (weight)	12981	8908	6040	4166	3361	2362	1908	1407	893	599	355
Whole Manufacturing (units)	2831	1913	1306	879	701	502	412	311	212	146	81

Notes: Each intersection is composed of 5 samples at most, but there could be less, as samples are considered valid for our analysis when they are composed of at least 10 varieties. On the last two rows, all the varieties are reported for which we observe quantities shipped in Kilograms (weight) or other units of measure (units). The sum of the last two rows is higher than the second column of Table A.2 because some varieties report both weight and units and therefore are counted only once in Table A.2.

Table 2a: Rejection rates for within-market rank correlations.

<i>Spearman</i> and <i>Kendall Tau</i> rank correlation: Rejection of significance for <i>price-quantity correlations within markets</i>												
All the samples	Spearman	35.3%										
	Kendall	37.6%										
	Samples	(171)										
By level of product aggregation:	Spearman	CN8	CN6	CN4	CN2							
		76.3%	25.7%	48.9%	1.8%							
	Kendall	78.9%	34.3%	48.9%	1.8%							
	Samples	(38)	(35)	(45)	(53)							
By best N-market combinations:	Spearman	12 Mkts	11 Mkts	10 Mkts	9 Mkts	8 Mkts	7 Mkts	6 Mkts	5 Mkts	4 Mkts	3 Mkts	2 Mkts
		50.0%	37.5%	44.4%	54.5%	47.1%	55.0%	40.0%	35.0%	25.0%	15.0%	15.0%
	Kendall	50.0%	37.5%	44.4%	54.5%	52.9%	60.0%	40.0%	35.0%	30.0%	20.0%	15.0%
	Samples	(6)	(8)	(9)	(11)	(17)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)

Notes: Percentages of samples not significantly correlated at a 5% level are reported by product aggregation and market combination. The number of samples considered is reported in brackets. For example, looking at Spearman rank correlations at a CN8 level of product aggregation, 76.3% of the 38 samples considered are not significantly different from 0.

Table 2b: Rejection rates for between-market quantity rank correlations.

<i>Spearman</i> and <i>Kendall Tau</i> rank correlation: Rejection of significance for <i>quantity correlations between markets</i>												
All the samples	Spearman	19.1%										
	Kendall	19.7%										
	Samples	(171)										
By level of product aggregation:	Spearman Kendall	CN8	CN6	CN4	CN2							
		60.5%	8.6%	15.6%	0.0%							
		60.5%	11.4%	15.6%	0.0%							
	Samples	(38)	(35)	(45)	(53)							
By best N-market combinations:	Spearman Kendall	12 Mkts	11 Mkts	10 Mkts	9 Mkts	8 Mkts	7 Mkts	6 Mkts	5 Mkts	4 Mkts	3 Mkts	2 Mkts
		50.0%	37.5%	22.2%	18.2%	29.4%	25.0%	20.0%	15.0%	15.0%	10.0%	5.0%
	Samples	(6)	(8)	(9)	(11)	(17)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)

Notes: Percentages of samples not significantly correlated at a 5% level are reported by product aggregation and market combination. The number of samples considered is reported in brackets. For example, looking at both Spearman and Kendall rank correlations at a CN8 level of product aggregation, 60.5% of the 38 samples considered are not significantly different from 0.

Table 2c: Rejection rates for between-market price rank correlations.

<i>Spearman</i> and <i>Kendall Tau</i> rank correlation: Rejection of significance for <i>price correlations between markets</i>												
All the samples	Spearman	2.9%										
	Kendall	3.5%										
	Samples	(171)										
By level of product aggregation:	Spearman Kendall	CN8	CN6	CN4	CN2							
		5.3%	2.9%	4.4%	0.0%							
		10.5%	2.9%	2.2%	0.0%							
	Samples	(38)	(35)	(45)	(53)							
By best N-market combinations:	Spearman Kendall	12 Mkts	11 Mkts	10 Mkts	9 Mkts	8 Mkts	7 Mkts	6 Mkts	5 Mkts	4 Mkts	3 Mkts	2 Mkts
		0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	18.2%	11.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Samples	(6)	(8)	(9)	(11)	(17)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)

Notes: Percentages of samples not significantly correlated at a 5% level are reported by product aggregation and market combination. The number of samples considered is reported in brackets. For example, looking at Spearman rank correlations at a CN8 level of product aggregation, 5.3% of the 38 samples considered are not significantly different from 0.

Table 3: Spearman rank correlations for chocolate products.

CN8 - 18069019 (Best 3 markets)	Chocolate products not containing alcohol			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Market pairs	Average	FR-NL	FR-DE	NL-DE
Rank Corr(pp)	71.35%	69.38%	66.81%	77.85%
Rank Corr(qq)	56.01%	44.17%	56.17%	67.70%
Varieties	34	34	34	34

CN6 - 180690 (Best 3 markets)	Chocolate products			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Market pairs	Average	FR-NL	FR-DE	NL-DE
Rank Corr(pp)	80.99%	78.79%	80.85%	83.32%
Rank Corr(qq)	60.67%	56.25%	59.09%	66.67%
Varieties	94	94	94	94

CN4 - 1806 (Best 3 markets)	Chocolate and other food preparations containing cocoa			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Market pairs	Average	FR-NL	FR-DE	NL-DE
Rank Corr(pp)	83.84%	82.56%	84.77%	84.18%
Rank Corr(qq)	65.52%	64.47%	61.95%	70.15%
Varieties	150	150	150	150

Notes: Spearman rank correlations for prices and quantities between markets are reported for the product codes involving chocolate present in our “top 5” product list, considering the “best 3 destination markets” .

Table 4: Between-market Spearman price and quantity rank correlations.

Spearman Rank correlations		Average of averages	CN8	CN6	CN4	CN2
			(Average of Top 5)	(Average of Top 5)	(Average of Top 5)	(Average of Top 5)
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Average of Averages	p	75.29%	70.17%	73.36%	74.90%	81.25%
	q	61.38%	50.36%	56.99%	60.66%	75.79%
2-market combination	p	73.55%	64.16%	78.67%	76.14%	75.24%
	q	58.51%	49.38%	54.43%	60.83%	69.42%
3-market combination	p	76.05%	68.00%	80.48%	76.69%	79.00%
	q	61.13%	51.43%	60.37%	59.13%	73.59%
4-market combination	p	76.25%	68.52%	79.68%	76.10%	80.70%
	q	61.49%	48.71%	62.40%	59.09%	75.77%
5-market combination	p	75.71%	70.96%	76.41%	75.09%	80.40%
	q	60.09%	41.99%	63.64%	57.32%	77.41%
6-market combination	p	74.93%	69.45%	75.50%	73.71%	81.05%
	q	62.12%	41.45%	65.28%	62.72%	79.02%
7-market combination	p	74.85%	68.25%	74.22%	74.46%	82.46%
	q	61.19%	36.00%	63.62%	63.83%	81.33%
8-market combination	p	73.56%	65.02%	75.91%	70.46%	82.86%
	q	65.13%	50.61%	63.64%	65.43%	80.83%
9-market combination	p	66.92%	72.10%	45.99%	66.50%	83.09%
	q	55.69%	60.42%	22.53%	59.58%	80.22%
10-market combination	p	76.01%	72.36%		71.03%	84.64%
	q	65.76%	57.43%		63.56%	76.28%
11-market combination	p	81.71%	78.73%		82.76%	83.63%
	q	63.45%	56.81%		59.38%	74.17%
12-market combination	p	78.68%	74.37%		80.96%	80.69%
	q	60.59%	59.72%		56.43%	65.61%

Notes: Between-market Spearman price and quantity rank correlations are reported for the varieties present in Table 1. Coefficients are averaged across the number of samples present per intersection of best N-market combination and product disaggregation.

Table 5: Between-market price and quantity simple correlations.

Between-market correlations		Average of averages	CN8	CN6	CN4	CN2
			(Average of Top 5)	(Average of Top 5)	(Average of Top 5)	(Average of Top 5)
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Average of Averages	p q	71.55% 56.35%	74.31% 52.39%	74.36% 50.43%	70.98% 57.32%	66.20% 61.87%
2-market combination	p	57.56%	51.58%	68.90%	59.22%	50.55%
	q	46.94%	40.78%	51.49%	34.97%	60.51%
3-market combination	p	70.88%	70.31%	81.28%	70.48%	61.47%
	q	49.19%	37.76%	50.82%	41.36%	66.83%
4-market combination	p	73.34%	73.49%	80.13%	72.15%	67.59%
	q	50.22%	41.21%	49.78%	43.06%	66.81%
5-market combination	p	73.51%	78.03%	78.59%	68.53%	68.89%
	q	51.80%	40.85%	53.94%	50.52%	61.91%
6-market combination	p	72.26%	74.60%	74.88%	67.80%	71.75%
	q	54.61%	43.06%	54.19%	57.77%	63.40%
7-market combination	p	73.72%	75.32%	78.78%	70.81%	69.97%
	q	55.52%	42.97%	51.12%	62.62%	65.36%
8-market combination	p	73.63%	74.15%	82.19%	67.09%	71.09%
	q	61.52%	62.62%	51.13%	66.64%	65.68%
9-market combination	p	65.06%	78.74%	50.15%	62.47%	68.89%
	q	61.42%	78.32%	41.01%	64.56%	61.78%
10-market combination	p	75.52%	83.09%		74.30%	69.18%
	q	68.08%	72.10%		71.45%	60.70%
11-market combination	p	75.90%	78.52%		83.61%	65.57%
	q	62.34%	58.32%		68.40%	60.30%
12-market combination	p	75.71%	79.57%		84.38%	63.20%
	q	58.26%	58.34%		69.12%	47.33%

Notes: Between-market price and quantity correlations are reported for the varieties present in Table 1. Coefficients are averaged across the number of samples present per intersection of best N-market combination and product disaggregation.

Table 6: R^2 associated with prices and quantities regressed on dummies.

R-squared in regressions on dummies		Average of averages	CN8	CN6	CN4	CN2
			(Average of Top 5)	(Average of Top 5)	(Average of Top 5)	(Average of Top 5)
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Average of Averages	Price Quantity	72.13% 49.89%	74.35% 49.70%	79.16% 50.88%	69.22% 46.28%	65.78% 52.71%
2-market combination	Price Quantity	77.05% 67.48%	75.46% 64.35%	81.12% 68.48%	77.15% 60.58%	74.48% 76.51%
3-market combination	Price Quantity	78.15% 58.32%	77.26% 52.78%	86.03% 58.75%	77.95% 50.91%	71.37% 70.82%
4-market combination	Price Quantity	76.74% 51.93%	78.20% 46.41%	83.34% 51.20%	76.90% 45.98%	68.51% 64.13%
5-market combination	Price Quantity	75.11% 47.19%	80.84% 43.25%	81.58% 47.68%	69.17% 41.03%	68.85% 56.81%
6-market combination	Price Quantity	71.92% 45.70%	72.77% 40.06%	72.76% 45.50%	68.58% 41.49%	73.59% 55.75%
7-market combination	Price Quantity	73.81% 42.07%	76.40% 37.83%	79.14% 41.48%	68.87% 39.91%	70.85% 49.07%
8-market combination	Price Quantity	73.72% 41.60%	77.84% 37.98%	79.24% 41.44%	66.23% 38.68%	71.55% 48.32%
9-market combination	Price Quantity	67.08% 46.18%	77.59% 46.91%	70.03% 52.53%	62.46% 40.40%	58.25% 44.88%
10-market combination	Price Quantity	62.49% 46.61%	69.59% 51.56%		58.95% 43.88%	58.93% 44.38%
11-market combination	Price Quantity	60.98% 53.36%	62.53% 58.93%		62.97% 59.74%	57.43% 41.40%
12-market combination	Price Quantity	63.80% 46.97%	69.35% 66.62%		72.23% 46.50%	49.83% 27.78%

Notes: This table reports R^2 associated with OLS regressions of prices and per capita quantities on dummies for the varieties present in Table 1. Coefficients are averaged across the number of samples present per intersection of best N-market combination and product disaggregation.

Table 7: Success rates in tests for omitted variables in the regressions on dummies run for Table 6.

Share of samples passing the regression specification error test (<i>RESET</i>) for omitted variables.												
All the samples	Price	71.93%										
	Quantity	9.36%										
	Samples	(171)										
By level of product disaggregation:	Price	CN8		CN6		CN4		CN2				
		76.32%		88.57%		62.22%		66.04%				
		10.53%		5.71%		6.67%		13.21%				
	Samples	(38)		(35)		(45)		(53)				
By best N-market combinations:	Price	12 Mkts	11 Mkts	10 Mkts	9 Mkts	8 Mkts	7 Mkts	6 Mkts	5 Mkts	4 Mkts	3 Mkts	2 Mkts
		50.0%	50.0%	44.4%	54.6%	70.6%	80.0%	70.0%	70.0%	85.0%	80.0%	85.0%
	Quantity	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	10.0%	25.0%	30.0%
	Samples	(6)	(8)	(9)	(11)	(17)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)

Notes: Percentages of samples passing the RESET test for omitted variables are reported by product disaggregation and market combination. The number of samples considered is reported in brackets. For example, at a CN8 level product disaggregation, 63.7% of the 38 samples considered passed the test when prices were regressed on dummies, but only 21.1% passed the test when quantities regressions were considered.

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Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables

Table A.1: Product codes considered for each level of product disaggregation.

“Top 5” Combined Nomenclature product codes							
<i>CN2</i>	Short description	<i>CN4</i>	Short description	<i>CN6</i>	Short description	<i>CN8</i>	Short description
84	Machinery and mechanical appliances	1806	Chocolate and food preparations with cocoa	180690	Chocolate products	39269099	Other articles of plastics
39	Plastics and articles thereof	3926	Articles of plastics	170490	Sugar confectionery not containing cocoa	18069019	Chocolate products not containing alcohol
85	Electrical machinery and equipment	0710	Frozen vegetables	220300	Beer made from malt	21069098	Food preparations
73	Articles of iron or steel	9403	Furniture and parts thereof	210690	Food preparations	57033019	Polypropylene carpets and floor coverings
90	Optical, measuring, precision, medical, or surgical instruments	4911	Printed matter, including printed pictures and photographs	071080	Frozen vegetables	22030001	Bottled beer made from malt

Table A.2: Varieties by destination markets and destination-market combinations.

Markets	Varieties exported to this particular destination market	Varieties shipped to this market and all the previous
France	24,612	24,612
Netherlands	24,183	13,608
Germany	17,911	9,347
UK	11,956	6,367
Spain	8,799	4,419
Italy	8,869	3,572
Denmark	5,540	2,519
Sweden	5,530	2,047
Poland	6,227	1,498
Switzerland	5,732	966
U.S.	6,592	649
Luxembourg	10,317	393

Notes: In the first column is reported, for each destination market, the number of exported varieties for which units or Kilograms shipped are available. In the second column only varieties that are present simultaneously also in all the destination markets listed in the previous rows are counted.