

Yaǎsar, Burak Serkan

Working Paper

An Overview of Anti-Dumping Practices in the World and in the Framework of EU-Turkey Relations

LICOS Discussion Paper, No. 174

Provided in Cooperation with:

LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven

Suggested Citation: Yaǎsar, Burak Serkan (2006) : An Overview of Anti-Dumping Practices in the World and in the Framework of EU-Turkey Relations, LICOS Discussion Paper, No. 174, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, LICOS Centre for Transition Economics, Leuven

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/74864>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

LICOS

Centre for Transition Economics

LICOS Discussion Papers

Discussion Paper 174/2006

**"An Overview of Anti-Dumping Practices in the World and
in the Framework of EU-Turkey Relations"**

Burak Serkan Yaşar



Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

LICOS Centre for Transition Economics
Huis De Dorlodot
Deberiotstraat 34
B-3000 Leuven
BELGIUM

TEL: +32-(0)16 32 65 98

FAX: +32-(0)16 32 65 99

<http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/licos>

An Overview of Anti-Dumping Practices in the World and in the Framework of EU-Turkey Relations

Burak Serkan Yaşar

LICOS Centre for Transition Economics, K. U. Leuven, Belgium

May 31, 2006

Abstract

This paper has two main objectives. First, we aim to discuss current developments in the field of AD and document the AD practices in the world. Second, we aim to assess the implications of possible future enlargement of the EU to include Turkey on the AD practices of both. We show that there is a proliferation of AD cases by the WTO Members until 2001 but the number of cases decreased since then. AD has been more used by developing countries than developed countries between 1995 and 2005. China has been the main target of AD practices and metal sector has been the main concern of AD practices by the WTO Members. We then show that, despite the larger number of cases by the EU, Turkey has been using AD instrument more intensively than the EU. Both the EU and Turkey mainly target Asian Countries regarding dumped imports, however, their priorities in terms of targeted sectors are not the same. Thus, EU's possible future enlargement to include Turkey will be a real challenge for both of the parties regarding their AD practices. Despite the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey, both parties retain the right to impose AD duties on imports from the other. Once Turkey accedes to the Union, the AD measures between the parties will drop automatically, however, the abolition of such measures before Turkey's accession is not very likely to occur.

This paper was written during my stay as an International Scholar at LICOS between September 15, 2005 and May 31, 2006. My stay at LICOS was financed by the European Commission Delegation to Turkey according to the financial agreement signed between the Government of Turkey and the European Commission – Project Number DG ELARGE/MEDTQ/04-02 (Jean Monnet Scholarship Programme).

I wish to express my deep gratitude to Prof. Dr. Joep Konings for his supervision, support and guidance during my stay at LICOS.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction	1
II. AD Practices in the World	6
II. 1. Current Developments	6
II. 2. AD Investigations and Measures by the WTO Members	9
II. 3. Targets of AD Investigations and Measures by the WTO Members	14
II. 4. Sectoral Breakdown of AD Investigation and Measures	16
III. AD Practices in the Framework of EU-Turkey Relations	16
III. 1. History of EU-Turkey Relations	17
III. 2. Trade between the EU and Turkey	19
III. 3. AD Practices of the EU and Turkey against Third Countries	22
III. 4. The Decision-Making Process in the EC	26
III. 5. Enlargement Effects on the AD Practices of the EU and New Members	28
III. 6. Sectors Targeted by the AD Practices of the EU and Turkey	30
III. 7. Countries Targeted by the AD Practices of the EU and Turkey	31
III. 8. AD Practices of the EU and Turkey against Each Other	32
III. 8. 1. AD Investigations and Measures by the EC on Imports from Turkey	35
III. 8. 2. AD Investigations and Measures by Turkey on Imports from the EC	37
IV. Conclusion	38
Figures	40
Tables	44
References	62

I. Introduction

The World Trade Organization (WTO) defines dumping as the introduction of products of one country into the commerce of another at less than the normal value of the products and condemns it if it causes or threatens material injury to an established domestic industry or materially retards the establishment of such industry¹. To combat dumping, which is commonly believed to be a form of unfair trade practice, countries take anti-dumping (AD) measures on the imports of dumped products. However, there is a growing debate on whether AD policy itself is fair. While some believe that AD measures are necessary to counteract unfair trade, others argue that AD measures are often used to protect domestic industries from competition from imports and thus are themselves unfair (Matsushita et al., 2003). Yet, there is a growing consensus on the latter view, and below is a short review of some authors' opinions in favour of this belief.

AD is a tool of protectionism against foreign competition² or a selective safeguard applicable almost at will whenever given imports cause injury to a particular domestic industry³; it has a significant trade-depressing effect⁴ and is an obstacle to free and fair trade⁵; it does not bring about the welfare benefits that an optimal international resource allocation ought⁶ and, even, it causes economic injury⁷ and welfare loss⁸ and wastes resources⁹.

These features of AD bring about even a larger consensus on the necessity of reforms in the field of AD: WTO's AD disciplines need strengthening¹⁰, fundamental reform is required to give AD a sound economic basis which it lacks¹¹ and the situation in the field of AD could be improved by a number of changes¹².

¹ Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994

² Prusa (2005), Barfield (2005), Kerr and Loppacher (2004), Harpaz (2005)

³ Didier, 2001

⁴ Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2006

⁵ Prusa, 2005

⁶ Conrad, 2002

⁷ Prusa, 2005

⁸ Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2006

⁹ Kerr and Loppacher, 2004

¹⁰ Didier, 2001

¹¹ Kerr and Loppacher, 2004

¹² Silberston, 2003

This common belief that AD disciplines need reforms has also been shared by a number of WTO Members and at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha in 2001, despite the reluctance of some developed countries, particularly the US and the EU, the WTO's AD rules were opened for negotiations within the new round of trade talks, known as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). After the failure in the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún, significant progress was achieved at the Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005 where Members of the WTO decided to conclude the negotiations within the context of the DDA by the end of 2006. It is difficult to predict the outcomes of the negotiations concerning AD issues, however, it is sure that this trade defense instrument will continue to exist in the course of international trade and remain a hot topic in the multilateral trade talks.

There are two main objectives of this paper. First, we aim to discuss current developments in the field of AD and document the anti-dumping AD practices in the world. Second, we aim to assess the implications of possible future enlargement of the EU to include Turkey on the AD practices of both. Thus, the paper comprises mainly of two parts. In the first part, we have a closer look at the debates under the WTO on AD rules. We then analyze the AD practices in the period 1995 – 2005. In the second part, we focus on the AD practices of the European Union (EU) and Turkey in the framework of EU – Turkey relations, with specific emphasis on the EU - Turkey Customs Union.

We show in the first part of the study that in the period 1995 – 2005, there is an increase in the number of cases from 1995 until 2001, but then a decrease is observed after a peak of the AD cases in 2001. Scholars investigating the AD practices until 2001 find out that there is a proliferation of AD cases (Prusa (2005), Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2006)), however this is not the case after 2001. Our other two findings regarding the use of AD are in parallel to the findings of these authors and those of Messerlin (2004). First, there is a proliferation of users of AD in the last decade. While between 1980 and 1984 the number of users was only 8, between 1995 and 2005 a total of 41 countries have used this instrument. Second, AD has been more used by developing countries¹³ (or new users) than developed

¹³ Developing countries definition according to UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2005).

countries (or traditional users) between 1995 and 2005. 28 of the 41 countries to initiate AD investigations were developing countries, which have filed 61 percent of the AD cases in this period. Among the top 20 users of AD, only 6 are developed countries.

China has by far been the main target of AD practices in the period 1995 - 2005, which is also pointed out by Messerlin (2004). China has also been an active user of AD since 2001, however, between 1995 and 2005 it has been targeted by approximately 4 AD cases for each AD case it has launched.

Being the target of 29 percent of the AD investigations and 32 percent of the AD measures, Section XV (base metals and articles of base metal) of the Harmonized System (HS) has been the main concern of AD practices by the WTO Members. Chemicals, plastics, textiles and machinery and electrical equipment are the other major sectors targeted by AD investigations.

The EU is the largest exporter and the second largest importer in world merchandise trade. Accounting for more than 18 percent of world merchandise imports, EU is obviously an attractive market for exporting countries and the AD practices of the EU are of utmost importance for its trading partners. Each enlargement of the EU increases the importance of the EU's AD system in international trade since with each enlargement, more and more countries start to impose the AD measures of the EU. Enlargement also brings about new challenges, the most significant being the increased complexity of the decision-making process within the EU.

The EU is by far the main trading partner of Turkey, and Turkey is also a major trading partner for the EU. The association between Turkey and the EU (at that time the European Economic Community, EEC) dates back to 1960s. On 31 December 1995, a Customs Union was established between the parties and since December 1999, Turkey is an official candidate to join the EU. Accession negotiations with Turkey began towards the end of 2005.

Within 10 years of Customs Union, i.e. from 1996 to 2005, there has been 164 percent increase in the volume of trade between EU(25) and Turkey. The increase in

the volume of trade between EU and Turkey and Turkey's progress towards accession make the AD practices of both parties against each other and against third parties an important issue to be studied.

The European Communities (EC) has launched 327 AD cases in the period 1995 – 2005 and ranks the third among users of AD in the last decade. Turkey stands within the top ten users of AD with a total of 101 cases in the same period. We see, however, that in 2004 Turkey has initiated 10 times more AD cases per billion dollar of imports than the EU has. We show that while 62 percent of the cases launched by the EU have resulted in the imposition of a definitive measure, Turkey has imposed definitive measures in 90 percent of the cases it has launched. Since the AD rules of both the EU and Turkey closely follow WTO's AD rules, we attribute the difference in "success" in concluding AD cases with the imposition of a definitive measure to the complexity of the decision-making process in the EU.

20 percent of the AD cases launched and concluded by the EC between 1995 and 2005 were terminated at later stages after the determination of dumping and an injury by the European Commission. Vermulst (2005) also points out to this situation and states that despite the presence of dumping, resulting injury and Community interest, regularly, and particularly in high-profile-controversial cases, no measures were imposed because for a variety of reasons Member States either voted against or abstained from voting the Commission proposal in the European Council. Additionally, Evenett and Vermulst (2005) identify two blocks in EU15, one in favour of the Commission proposal and one that opposes it. The accession of the 10 New Members in May 2004 and the future enlargements of the EU are likely to add to this complexity of the decision-making process in the EU.

When enlargement of the EU takes place, AD measures in force in the EU automatically apply to imports into the enlarged EU including New Members, the New Members no longer apply trade defense measures on a national basis and the measures of the EU and the New Members against each other drop automatically. The 10 New Members that acceded in May 2004 and the candidate states, except for Turkey, are not real fans of AD practices. On the other hand, since 1997, Turkey has launched a remarkably high number of AD cases and ranks tenth among WTO

Members to initiate AD cases. In this respect, EU's enlargement to include Turkey will be more challenging for the EU than its last enlargement.

Although the EC and Turkey have some common concerns regarding dumping practices in certain sectors, the priorities are not the same. Once Turkey accedes to the EU, it will abandon its AD measures and assume those of the EC, thus Turkey will begin to impose AD duties on the imports from the sectors which have not been the primary concern of its national industry.

Like the WTO Members in general, the EC and Turkey have also targeted imports from China the most. 7 Asian countries, including China, India, Korea, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia have been the target of 52 percent of the EC's AD cases and 76 percent of Turkey's AD cases.

Although a customs union exists between the EU and Turkey, both parties retain the right to impose AD measures against each other. Suspension of the application of these measures require that Turkey provide a guarantee against unfair competition comparable to that existing the internal market¹⁴. As was seen with the previous enlargements, EU's enlargement to include Turkey will bring about the automatic termination of AD measures between parties, however, the abolition of such measures before Turkey's accession is not very likely to occur.

After the establishment of the Customs Union between EU and Turkey, EU has filed 9 cases against imports from Turkey, and currently, the EU imposes definitive duties on two products imported from Turkey. Turkey currently imposes AD duties on the imports of one commodity from 7 Members of the EU, but no definitive duties have been put into force on imports from the EC as a whole. Overall, the AD measures have affected the exports of the other party, but the effects have not been so drastic.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II is about the AD practices in the world and current developments. In Section III, we discuss the AD practices of the EU and Turkey and enlargement effects. Finally, there is a concluding section.

¹⁴ Article 44 of the Decision No. 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council

II. AD Practices in the World

In this part of the study, first, current developments in the field of AD will be discussed, with special emphasis on the debates under WTO's Doha Development Agenda and the recent Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, trying to analyze the opposing approaches by the WTO Members on the WTO's AD system. Then, making use of the WTO statistics, AD practices by the WTO Members will be analyzed in terms of the initiators of AD cases, the targets of these cases and their sectoral breakdown.

II.1. Current Developments

On 18 December 2005, which was the final day of the WTO's Sixth Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong, the Ministers from the 149 member governments of the WTO approved a declaration which was, by many, considered significant progress in the course of Doha Development Agenda, and as Pascal Lamy, the Director-General of the WTO, told in the press conference, "the Round was put back on track after a period of hibernation". After the Ministers of the WTO members agreed to launch a new round of trade talks in the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001, the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún in September 2003 was a failure since it ended without consensus on how to move the negotiations forward. Trying to resolve the resulting "deadlock" in the Doha Development Agenda, the General Council adopted a Decision on 1 August 2004 (the so-called "July Package") which contained frameworks and other agreements designed to raise the negotiations to a new level and which then served as a basis for the work thereafter, including the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, where members renewed the resolve to conclude the negotiations launched at Doha successfully in 2006.

WTO's AD rules have become a hot issue in the trade talks within the context of the Doha Development Agenda. Recent WTO meetings have shown that traditional users of AD and countervailing duty (CD) laws, particularly the United States (US), have been extremely reluctant to allow such laws even to put on the agenda of future WTO negotiations (Blonigen, 2005). Before the launch of the Doha Round in November 2001 the US Congress advised the President not to agree to major

revisions in the current AD regime and defenders of US trade laws wanted the administration to veto any discussion of AD issues in the upcoming negotiations (Barfield, 2005). According to Barfield, although the US was against any talks on reform of AD laws, in order to break a deadlock that could prevent the launch of the new round, it agreed to open for negotiations the trade defense instruments, but only under tightly restricted conditions and terms.

Despite their reluctance on the issue, developed countries, particularly the US and the European Union (EU), agreed to open for renegotiation the Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which deals with AD, at the Doha Ministerial Conference, however, strict limits were put on what was open for negotiation (Kerr and Loppacher, 2004). While on the one hand the developed countries, or the traditional users of AD and CD laws, were reluctant to any possible reforms in the AD rules of the WTO, on the other hand, a group of developing countries supported by a number of developed countries strongly supported the idea of redressing the AD rules. About the debates on AD in the Doha Round, Barfield (2005) reports that leading developing countries such as Brazil, Chile, Korea, Colombia, Hong Kong, Turkey, Mexico, Costa Rica, Singapore, and others, also joined by several developed countries including Norway, Switzerland, Israel and Japan, have threatened to hold all other negotiating issues hostage to changes in this protectionist system.

Believing that the existing AD Agreement should be improved so as to counter the abuse of AD measures, 15 Members of the WTO (namely Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, China, Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, Thailand and Turkey) have come together to form an informal group called “Friends of AD Negotiations” (FANs) which submitted many proposals to tighten the WTO AD investigation procedures.¹⁵

What the US and the Friends of AD Negotiations expect from reform negotiations of the AD Agreement are fundamentally different. The FANs want changes that will prevent AD actions from being used as disguised barriers to trade. What the US

¹⁵ http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/brief11_e.htm

expects is to increase the strength and effectiveness of the AD Agreement. Yet, the interests of the US and the FANs converge on transparency and fairness issues. As more and more developing countries turn their attention to AD practices, they start to use domestic AD mechanisms some of which lack transparency, which increases the risks for firms in international business (Kerr and Loppacher, 2004). Transparency issues were found to rank high on the list of problems regarding procedural issues in AD system in a project called “TEN” where trade experts from 10 countries (Australia, Brazil, China, the EC, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand and the US) analyzed the 10 major problems with the AD instrument in their country (Horlick and Vermulst, 2005).

Doha Ministerial Declaration deals with AD under the heading “Rules” together with subsidies and countervailing measures and regional trade agreements. The increasing use of trade defense instruments by Members being emphasized in the Declaration, Members agreed to negotiate for clarification and improvement of the disciplines under the Agreements on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (The Anti-Dumping Agreement) and on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, while the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of these Agreements and their instruments and objectives were to be preserved and the needs of developing and least-developed participants to be taken into account. Keeping the fundamentals of the AD Agreement unchanged was what the US, the EU and some developed countries wanted while they agreed to negotiations on the Agreement. According to Kerr and Loppacher (2004), “preserving the basic concepts and principles” means that the concepts such as “price discrimination” or “selling below cost” must be maintained (the WTO allows AD duties when one of these two definitions of the practice of dumping is met) and “preserving the effectiveness” means that improvements to the functioning of the AD mechanisms that would reduce their effectiveness cannot be entertained.

After the Doha Ministerial Conference, where Members of the WTO agreed to negotiate on trade defense instruments, in the initial phase of the negotiations, Members indicated the provisions that they would like to be clarified and improved in the subsequent phase. Most of the submissions addressing the AD Agreement, the issues and proposals were compiled. During the second phase after Cancún, the

Group began meeting in informal sessions where the idea was to clarify what exactly the proponents were seeking and to provide feedback on what proposals may or may not attract broad support. In the spring of 2005, the third phase of negotiations was launched by adding bilateral and plurilateral consultations for rigorous consideration of legal texts of proposed amendments to the relevant Agreements. Also, a technical group was established to work on a standard AD questionnaire.¹⁶

Thanks to the success in Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in “putting the Round back on track”, trade talks are continuing and Members aim to conclude the negotiations by the end of 2006. Within the context of the Doha Development Agenda, together with many other issues, Members are seeking ways to clarify and improve the disciplines under the AD Agreement, while also trying to preserve the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of the Agreement and its instruments and objectives, as Members agreed at the Doha Ministerial Conference and as stated in its Declaration. Due to the presence of opposing approaches to the negotiations on AD rules, it is difficult to predict the outcomes of the Doha Round regarding AD issues. Whatever the outcome is, it is sure that this trade defense instrument will continue to exist in the course of international trade, either under provisions similar to those existing today or under modified and clarified rules. It is also very likely that AD issues will remain a hot topic in the multilateral trade talks.

Since it is mainly the developing countries who want to review and amend the existing AD rules of the WTO and the big actors of international trade are reluctant on this issue, many could easily believe that the top users of the AD instruments are the developed (or rich) countries where the main target is developing or least developed (poor) countries. However, the statistics tell a different story.

II. 2. AD Investigations and Measures by the WTO Members

Canada was the first country to have a legislation to counteract dumping (which dates back to 1904) and by 1921, the US, the United Kingdom and many members of the British Commonwealth had AD laws (Harpaz, 2005). However, AD measures

¹⁶ http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/brief_e/brief08_e.htm

were an exception until the 1980s. After lowering of the import duties in consecutive GATT rounds, AD became to appear as one of the most important import restrictions. In the US, the EU, Canada and Australia, more than 1000 AD proceedings took place in the 1980s (Conrad, 2002).

However, it was in the last two decades that there has been a drastic increase in the number of countries having an AD law in their legislation and also in the number of countries using AD as a trade defense mechanism. Prusa (2005) points out that the numbers of GATT members and AD users have almost tripled over the past 25 years and that there is a high degree of correlation between number of GATT/WTO members and the number of countries with an AD law. As of 1 November 2005, 96 WTO Members had notified the WTO regarding their domestic AD legislation since the entry into force of the AD Agreement on 1 January 1995¹⁷ whereas in 1989 only 49 countries had an AD law (Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2006). Given the high number of WTO Members that have adopted an AD law in the past two decades or more, the opening for negotiations of the WTO AD rules becoming a hot topic in Doha Round should come as no surprise.

In his paper, Prusa (2005) shows that AD is used more frequently, by more countries, and against more products than ever in its history. He states that AD is no longer being used solely by high-income developed countries; it is increasingly being used by middle- and even lower-income countries. Barfield (2005) notes that, whereas new AD measures by developed countries have fluctuated from 33 to 105 for the past decade or more, new AD measures by developing countries have risen almost steadily each year from three in 1990 to 146 in 2002. This trend is parallel to the increase in number of countries which have an AD law in their legislation. Today, more than 90 percent of total world imports enter countries where AD laws are in place (Harpaz, 2005). Messerlin (2004) mentions that despite the general perception during WTO Doha Ministerial Meeting in 2001 that antidumping was an issue pitting developing economies, the picture is much more complex if the AD measures in force at the end of each year during 1995-2002 are closely examined.

¹⁷ WTO, Report (2005) of the Committee On Anti-Dumping Practices, No. G/L/758

Table 1 and **Figure 1** show on a yearly basis the number of initiations of AD investigations by the WTO Members in the period 1995 – 2005¹⁸. Starting from 1995, the year of establishment of the WTO, until 2005, a total of 2840 AD investigations have been launched by the Members. There is an increase in number of cases from 1995 until 1999 and a decrease is observed in 2000 followed by a peak of AD cases in 2001. The number of AD cases then starts to fall and this trend continues until 2005, where the number of cases drops even below that in 1996. When we look at the cases filed by the developed countries and developing countries individually, we see that the trends are rather arbitrary, i.e. it is not possible to say that the decrease in the number of AD cases is because of the decrease in activity of the either group of countries.

Yet, one interesting remark could be made about the year the decrease in the number of AD cases started: the Members of the WTO agreed to negotiate on the WTO's AD rules at the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001, and the following year, the number of AD cases dropped to 312, down from 364 in 2001 and the decreasing trend continued thereafter. It is also worth noting that compared to 2001, in 2002 the developing countries increased their AD activities while developed countries lowered theirs. In this respect, it seems more than just a coincidence; probably with the launch of the Doha Development Agenda in November 2001, the developed countries lowered their AD activities so as to prove that the existing AD rules and the AD practices were not that threatening for the international trade and especially for the developing countries.

The breakdown of the AD investigations by year and importing member (**Table 1**) shows that a total of 41 Members, 28 of which are developing countries, initiated AD investigations in the period 1995 - 2005. Each year in this period, the developing countries have launched more AD investigations than the developed countries. Developing countries have initiated 1722 (61%) of the AD investigations by the WTO Members. India is the leader of the league of Members initiating AD investigations by 425 cases, followed by the United States and European Communities (EC). The top

¹⁸ In the WTO statistics on AD, which are produced by the WTO based on the reports of the WTO Members to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, each AD initiation and measure covers one product imported from one country. This also applies throughout this paper.

20 members in the table account for 95% of the AD investigations, whereas the remaining 21 countries have launched only 5% of the cases. Needless to say, 14 of the Top 20 countries are developing countries. In other words, the major initiators of AD investigations are these 20 Members, only 6 of which are not developing economies.

There has been a sharp increase in the number of countries which use AD as a trade defense instrument in the last 20 years. Whereas between 1980 and 1984, the number of users was only 8 and more than 97 percent of the cases were launched by 4 countries (the US, Australia, the EU and Canada) (Prusa, 2005), the number of users in the period 1995-2005 rose up to 41 and the above mentioned four countries' share of the AD cases dropped to only 36 percent.

Scholars investigate the worldwide AD practices sometimes by looking at the AD activities of “developed countries” and “developing countries” – as in Barfield (2005) – and sometimes by defining “traditional users” and “new users” of AD and comparing their activities – as in Prusa (2005). Vandebussche and Zanardi, in their recent study (2006), go one step forward and classify the users of AD in four: “traditional users” refer to countries that have adopted an AD law before 1980 and “new users” refer to those countries that have adopted an AD law after 1980, and, within each group, a further distinction is made between “tough” and “weak” users, depending on the number of AD initiations and measures by the country. According to their findings, between 1980 and 2000, while total initiations by traditional tough users (Australia, Canada, EU, New Zealand and US) show a negative trend, total initiations by new users have clearly an increasing trend over time.

Since the 41 users of AD in the period 1995 –2005 have extensively varying import volumes, it is more meaningful to make a comparison of each Member's AD cases with regard to the volume of imports. For this purpose, Prusa (2005) defines a “filing intensity” by calculating the number of cases per real dollar of imports and setting the intensity level of the US to 100 in 1980. While the filing intensities of the US, Australia, EU and Canada are well above 100 between 1980 and 1995, after 1995, the intensities decrease significantly and the filing intensities of the US and EU drop down below 100. Starting from 1990s, the filing intensities of a number of new users

of AD are above 1000. In the period 2000-2002, India and Argentina's intensities are still above 1000, which means that these countries are filing 10-20 times the frequency of the US and the EU. (Prusa, 2005)

Not all the AD investigations by the WTO Members are concluded with the imposition of a final measure. Sometimes, no dumping or injury is found as a result of AD investigation, sometimes the AD cases are withdrawn by the complainant and sometimes the AD investigations can be terminated without the imposition of an undertaking or a definitive AD duty, mostly because of the expiry of the deadline to impose a definitive measure. Now, we will try to analyze the AD practices of the Members of the WTO in terms of the AD measures they have taken.

Table 2 shows the AD measures taken by WTO Members with respect to years. 38 WTO Members have taken a total of 1804 AD measures in the period 1995 – 2005. The top 20 initiators of AD investigations are also at the top of the rank in taking AD measures: 96% of the AD measures by the WTO Members are taken by these 20 Members. India, US and EC are again the top 3 Members to take AD measures. Among the 38 Members of the WTO that have put into force AD measures in the given period, 27 are developing economies, while the remaining 11 are developed countries. The developing countries have taken 1147 AD measures, or 64 percent of all the AD measures by the WTO Members in the period 1995 – 2005.

While Prusa (2005) makes an analysis of AD filings by the countries between 1980-2002, Messerlin (2004) makes a similar analysis to that of Prusa by examining the AD measures in force at the end of each year during the period 1995-2002. He calculates the average number of measures in force per \$1,000 of 1997 imports of the user country. For the top 10 AD users in the period 1995-2001, the average number of measures by value of imports are tabulated in **Table 3**. In the period 1995-2001, six of the top 10 users of AD are developing economies (as is the case for the period 1995 - 2005, see **Table 2**) and these six Members have taken more AD measures per imports, compared to three of the four (excluding Australia) industrial countries.

A comparison of **Table 1** and **Table 2** gives us a rough figure of what percent of the AD investigations by the WTO Members have resulted in an AD measure. During the period 1995 – 2005, 2840 AD investigations have been launched by the Members and 1804 AD measures have been put into force, meaning that 64% of the investigations (in other words, 6 out of 10 investigations) have resulted in a measure. Keeping in mind that there may be some investigations initiated before 1995 resulting in an AD measure after 1995 and that there may also be some investigations launched until the end of 2005 but not yet concluded, the estimate is only a rough one.

Our findings regarding the usage of AD are parallel to the findings of the authors referred to in this section. There is a proliferation of users of AD in the last two decades and an increase in the number of AD cases between 1995 - 2001. However, an analysis of the AD practices after 2001, which, in general, have not been covered in the abovementioned authors' works, shows that the number of AD cases started to decrease in 2002 and the same trend was also observed in 2005. Contrary to the common belief that AD is mostly used by the developed countries against developing countries, it is seen that developing countries have made use of this defensive tool much more intensively than the developed countries in the period 1995 – 2005.

II. 3. Targets of AD Investigations and Measures by the WTO Members

Table 1 showed the year-by-year distribution of the AD investigations by the WTO Members, but what about the target of these investigations? Is there a narrow group of Members which are the target of many AD investigations, or, compared to the small number of AD initiators, are the targets much more wide-spread?

Table 4 shows the distribution of 2840 AD investigations in the period 1995 – 2005 by exporting (or target) Member. In comparison to the number of initiators of AD investigations, we see that a wider spectrum of Members have been the target of the AD investigations. In the period 1995 – 2005, the exports of a total of 98 Members have been subject to AD investigations. However, it should be noted that, unlike initiations of AD investigations, the members of the EC can be the target of AD investigations besides the EC itself, i.e. an AD investigation may target an individual

member of the EC as well as the EC as a whole. Even when the Members of the EC are not taken into consideration in counting the number of targeted Members and only EC is counted as a targeted Member, the number of WTO Members as target of AD investigations is nearly twice the number of Members as launchers of AD investigations.

China has by far been the main target of the AD investigations each year. In the given period, nearly 17 percent of the AD investigations by the Members have targeted imports from China. The top 20 Members have been the target of 77 percent of the AD investigations launched by the WTO Members.

Table 5 shows the distribution of 1804 AD measures in the period 1995 – 2005 by exporting (targeted) Member. In this period, 90 Members have been the target of AD measures. As in the case for AD investigations, China has by far been the leading target of AD measures, being the target of nearly 19 percent of the AD measures taken by the WTO Members. The top 20 Members have been the target of 78 percent of the AD measures.

In order to investigate the relationship between being an initiator of AD investigations and being a target of AD cases, the top 20 users of AD practices in the period 1995 – 2005 are listed in **Table 6** together with the number of AD investigations they have initiated and AD investigations they have been the target of. Then, for each of these 20 Members, the number of cases in which the member has been targeted per AD case initiated by that Member is calculated. It should here be noted that, since the AD investigations can target Members of the EC individually besides the EC itself, the calculated figure for the EC is not directly comparable with that of the other countries.

On an average, these 20 WTO Members have been targeted by 0.61 AD cases for each AD investigation they have initiated. However, there is a huge variation among the Members: number of targeted cases per number of launched cases vary between 0.03 and 3.81. Australia, for example, has been the target of one AD case for every 10 AD cases it has launched. China, on the other hand, has been targeted by almost 4 AD cases for each AD case it has launched.

Although it is possible to say that the main users of AD measures as a trade defense instrument are also targets of many AD cases launched by the other countries, due to the high degree of variation among the Members in number of cases as targeted country per number of cases as initiator country, it is difficult to make a general comment on the correlation between “being the target” and “being the initiator” of AD cases.

II. 4. Sectoral Breakdown of AD Investigation and Measures

When the AD investigations and measures of the WTO Members in the period 1995 - 2005 are grouped with respect to Harmonized System (HS) sections (**Table 7**), it is seen that “base metals and articles of base metal” (Section XV) has been the main concern of AD practices, being target of 29 percent of all AD investigations and 32 percent of all AD measures by the WTO Members. Chemicals, plastics, textiles and machinery and electrical equipment are the other major sectors targeted by AD investigations.

These five sectors account for 77 percent of the AD investigations and 80 percent of the AD measures. According to Messerlin (2004), these sectors are key sources of exports for dynamic developing economies in the first stages of industrial development, and they tend to have a high proportion of relatively standard products and oligopolistic market structures.

III. AD Practices in the Framework of EU-Turkey Relations

In the first part of the study, we focused on the recent developments in the field of AD and the AD practices by the WTO Members. In the second part of the study, we have a closer look at the AD practices of the EU and Turkey, especially from the EU - Turkey Customs Union point of view. This part begins with a brief history of EU - Turkey relations, followed by an overview of the trade between EU and Turkey. Then, AD practices of the two parties against third countries will be analyzed. After a discussion on the decision-making process in the EU and enlargement effects on the AD system of the EU and new Members, the main sectors and countries targeted by

the AD cases of the EU and Turkey, and finally, the AD practices of the EU and Turkey against each other will be under investigation.

III. 1. History of EU-Turkey Relations

Turkey's first application to join what was then the European Economic Community (EEC) dates back to July 1959, only one and a half years after the entering into force of the Rome Treaty establishing the EEC. The EEC's response to this first application was to suggest the establishment of an association until Turkey's circumstances permitted its accession. The proposed association between the EEC and Turkey came into being with the signing of the "Agreement Creating an Association Between The Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community" (Ankara Agreement) on 12 September 1963, which entered into force on 1 December 1964. The Ankara Agreement envisaged the progressive establishment of a customs union which would serve as an instrument to bring the two parties closer in economic and trade matters.¹⁹

As was stated in the Ankara Agreement, the association comprises: a) a preparatory stage (during which Turkey shall, with aid from the Community, strengthen its economy so as to enable it to fulfill the obligations which will devolve upon it during the transitional and final stages), b) a transition stage (during which the Contracting Parties shall, on the basis of mutual and balanced obligations, establish progressively a customs union between Turkey and the Community and align the economic policies of Turkey and the Community more closely in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Association and the progress of the joint measures which this requires) and c) a final stage (which shall be based on the customs union and shall entail closer coordination of the economic policies of the two Parties).

According to Article 10 of the Agreement, the customs union covers all trade in goods and involves: a) the prohibition between Member States of the Community and Turkey, of customs duties on imports and exports and of all charges having equivalent effect, quantitative restrictions and all other measures having equivalent

¹⁹ http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/eu_relations.htm , <http://www.euturkey.org.tr>

effect which are designed to protect national production in a manner contrary to the objectives of this Agreement and b) the adoption by Turkey of the Common Customs Tariff of the Community in its trade with third countries, and an approximation to the other Community rules on external trade. As the article implies, an approximation to the Community rules on external trade is envisaged as a constituent of the customs union.

The Ankara Agreement was supplemented by an Additional Protocol, which was signed between the parties on 23 November 1970, which set the provisions relating to the conditions, arrangements and timetables for the implementation of the transitional stage. The timetable for the abolition of tariffs and quotas on goods circulating between Turkey and the EEC was covered by this Protocol.

The Customs Union between EU and Turkey, which was envisaged in the Ankara Agreement, was established by the Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council which entered into force on 31 December 1995. According to the Decision, very briefly,

- i) Regarding the trade of non-agricultural products between the Parties, customs duties and charges having equivalent effect and quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect should be eliminated,
- ii) Turkey should incorporate into its internal legal order the Community instruments relating to the removal of technical barriers to trade,
- iii) Turkey should, in relation to countries which are not members of the Community, apply provisions and implementing measures which are substantially similar to those of the Community's commercial policy,
- iv) Turkey should, in relation to countries which are not members of the Community, align itself on the Common Customs Tariff;
- v) Turkey should align itself progressively with the preferential customs regime of the Community,
- vi) Turkey should adopt customs provisions based on Community Customs Code.

Aiming at bringing the two parties to a closer alignment in economic and trade issues, the Establishment of the Customs Union was an important step forward in EU-Turkey relations. Since then, there has been a remarkable increase in the trade volume between EU and Turkey, which will be dealt with in more detail in the following section.

Next and maybe the most important step of Turkey's relations with the EU was its official recognition as a candidate state on an equal footing with other candidate states, at the Helsinki European Council of December 1999. This marked the beginning of a pre-accession strategy for Turkey designed to stimulate and support its reform process through financial assistance and other forms of cooperation. Turkey also drew up a National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis, which outlined the government's own strategy for the harmonisation of its legislation with that of the EU.²⁰

On 17 December 2004, the European Council defined the perspective for the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey and finally, in October 2005, The Council approved a framework for negotiations with Turkey on its accession to the EU, and accordingly, the negotiations began thereafter. There are 35 chapters to be negotiated and Chapter 29 is on Customs Union.

The Negotiation Framework for Turkey, which covers principles governing the negotiations, states that the pace of the negotiations will depend on Turkey's progress in meeting the requirements for membership and that the process is open-ended and the outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand. Although there does not exist any calendar specifying the possible year of accession, the general perception is that the accession of Turkey to the EU will take more than a decade.

III. 2. Trade between the EU and Turkey

The EU is by far the main trading partner of Turkey. Turkey's import and export volumes in the period 1995 – 2005 together with the EU's share are given in **Table 8**.

²⁰ http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/eu_relations.htm

The percent share of the EU in Turkey's imports and exports between 1995 – 2005 are plotted in **Figure 2**. In 2005, the EU accounted for 42 percent of Turkey's imports and 52 percent of its exports, while in the first year of Customs Union (in 1996) the EU's share in Turkey's imports and exports were 53 percent and 50 percent, respectively. In 2005, we see 4 percent decrease in the EU's share in Turkey's imports and 2 percent decrease in its share in Turkey's exports compared to the previous year.

A comparison of the shares of the EU in Turkey's external trade in 1996 and 1995 shows that the establishment of the Customs Union between EU and Turkey in 1996 brought about a 6 percent increase in EU's share in Turkey's imports and 1.5 percent decrease in its share in Turkey's exports. The EU's share in Turkey's exports again decreased in 1997, but immediately rose up to 50 percent in 1998, and then to 54 percent in 1999 and stayed almost constant until 2005 when a 2 percent decrease was seen compared to 2004. Contrarily, the EU's share in Turkey's imports immediately fell to 51 percent in 1997 from 53 percent in 1996, and then to 50 percent in 2000 and to 46 percent in 2001. Finally, the share of the EU in Turkey's imports decreased to 42 percent in 2005 from 47 percent in 2004.

EU's share in Turkey's external trade in 2005 is 46 percent and this is the lowest percent share in the period 1995 – 2005, where the highest share of the EU was observed in 1999 with 53 percent. Thus, despite some fluctuations between 1995 and 2005, it is easily possible to say that nearly half of Turkey's external trade is with the EU.

The fall of EU's shares in Turkey's external trade, as it occurred in some years during the period 1995 – 2005, does not mean a decrease in the volume of trade. Generally speaking, each year in the given period, there was an increase in the volume of trade between EU and Turkey compared to the previous year. The decrease in EU's shares only mean that in some years, the increase in volume of trade between EU and Turkey was less than the increase in Turkey's external trade volume.

Actually, there has been a remarkable increase in the volume of trade between EU and Turkey between 1995 and 2005. **Table 9** and **Figure 3** give the volume of trade

between the EU and Turkey in the period 1995-2005 in terms of billion Euros.²¹ In 1996, which was the first year of Customs Union between EU and Turkey, the trade volume expanded by 26 percent compared to 1995. From 1995 to 1996, the exports of EU(25) to Turkey increased by 37 percent where Turkish exports to the EU(25) increased by only 10 percent. Within 10 years of Customs Union, i.e. from 1996 to 2005, there has been 164 percent increase in the trade volume between EU(25) and Turkey, while Turkey's external trade expanded by 184 percent in the same period. In ten years from 1996 to 2005, Turkey's exports and imports increased by 216 percent and 167 percent, respectively, while the volume of exports from Turkey to the EU(25) increased by 228 percent and the volume of imports of Turkey from the EU(25) increased by 128 percent in the same period. However, in 2005, Turkey still had a trade deficit of 10.7 billion dollars in its trade with the EU, which constituted 25 percent of Turkey's external trade deficit in 2005.

From **Figure 3**, it is visible that the volume of EU(25)'s exports to Turkey decreased significantly in 2001 compared to the previous year, while there is an increasing trend between 1995 and 2005. This sharp decline in the volume of Turkey's imports from EU(25) is mainly due to the financial crisis in Turkey in February 2001 which resulted in the devaluation of Turkish Lira by about 30 percent and thus a decrease in the import volume.

Turkey's overall external trade deficit and the trade deficit in its trade with the EU between 1995 and 2005 are given in **Figure 4**. While in 1995, trade deficit of Turkey in its trade with the EU was only 5.8 billion dollars, in 1996 the deficit doubled and in 1996 and 1997, more than half of the trade deficit of Turkey was due to its trade with the EU. There was a sharp decrease in the trade deficit of Turkey in 2001, which can be attributed to the abovementioned financial crisis in Turkey in 2001. Between 2002 and 2005, with the boost of Turkey's external trade, the deficit rose up to 43 billion dollars, but now, only 25 percent of the deficit is due to the trade with the EU.

²¹ Although the enlargement of EU15 to include 10 new Member States occurred on 1 May 2004, on Eurostat, the statistics are available for EU25 from 1999 (The statistics for EU15 and EU25 for the period 1995-1998 yield the same figures). Imports and Exports between Turkey and the 10 new Member States in the period 1999 – 2005 are given as separate rows in Table 9.

Turkey has also been an important trading partner for the EU. In 2004, Turkey ranked seventh among EU(25)'s import partners and sixth among its export partners.²² Turkey's share in the imports and exports of the EU25 between 1995 and 2005 is shown in **Figure 5**. From 1995 to 1996, there is a sharp increase in Turkey's share in EU25's exports, however, the increase in Turkey's share in EU's imports is very little. In 2005, Turkey accounted for 2.84 percent of EU25's imports and 3.91 percent of EU25's exports, while Turkey's share in EU25's imports and exports in 1995 were 1.83 and 2.57 percent, respectively. Overall, Turkey had a share of 3.35 percent in the extra-EU25 trade of the EU in 2005.

Between 1995 and 2005, the volume of EU25's trade with Turkey increased more than the increase in EU's extra-EU25 trade. There has been 133 percent increase in EU25's extra-EU25 imports between 1995 and 2005, however the increase in EU25's imports from Turkey in the same period was 262 percent. Likewise, EU25's exports to Turkey increased by 212 percent compared to a 105 percent increase in EU25's extra-EU25 exports.

The year-by-year increase in the volume of trade between EU and Turkey since the establishment of the Customs Union and Turkey's progress towards accession to the EU make the AD practices of both parties against third countries and against each other an important issue to be analyzed. For this purpose, in the following parts of the paper we analyze the AD practices of the EU and Turkey with specific emphasis on the Customs Union between them.

III. 3. AD Practices of the EU and Turkey against Third Countries

Being the largest exporter and the second largest importer (after the USA) in world merchandise trade, the EU is undoubtedly one of the leading actors in world trade. In 2004, extra-EU (25) exports and extra-EU(25) imports accounted for 18.1 and 18.3 percent, respectively, of the world merchandise trade (excluding intra EU-(25) trade)²³ Accounting for more than 18 percent of the world merchandise imports, the

²² <http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/html/122530.htm>

²³ International Trade Statistics 2005, WTO (http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2005_e/its2005_e.pdf)

EU is a very attractive market for countries that want to be involved in the world trade through exportation.

Upon lowering of the tariffs as a consequence of multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT and later under the WTO, many countries began to turn increasing attention to using AD practices as a trade defense instrument against imports, and EU was no different. Realizing almost one-fifth of world's imports and exports, the trade policy of EU is of utmost importance for world trade, and the figures for the AD cases initiated by EU and those launched against EU imply that AD policy and practices of the EU are certainly capable of affecting the international flow of goods in trade.

AD legislation in the EU dates back to 1968 and has closely followed the wording of the GATT/WTO rules. As a customs union, the EC operates a Common Commercial Policy and commercial defense instruments are a cornerstone of this policy. According to this, the Member States of the EU can not impose AD measures unilaterally or against each other. It is the EC institutions that will impose the measures on an EC-wide basis and only against those countries which are not members of the EC. (Vermulst, 2005)

EC has launched 443 AD investigations in the period 1980 – 1994 (Prusa, 2005) and 327 AD investigations in the period 1995 - 2005, by which it ranks the third among users of the AD in the last decade. Vandebussche and Zanardi (2006) classify EU within “traditional tough users” together with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and US, where “traditional tough users” refer to those countries that often used their AD laws before 1980.

The breakdown of the AD initiations and measures by the EC starting from the year 1995 is given in **Table 10**. The EC, between 1995 and 2005, has initiated 327 AD investigations, and 219 measures have been put into effect, either in the form of a definitive duty or an undertaking. **Table 11** gives a list of the definitive AD measures by the EC in force on 31 December 2005.

Turkey adopted its first AD law in 1989²⁴. Recalling **Table 1** from previous section, Turkey stands within the top ten of the AD users with a total of 101 AD cases launched in the period 1995 – 2005. **Table 1** also shows that Turkey did not report any AD cases to the WTO in 1995 and 1996, but after launching a total of 5 cases in 1997 and 1998, it has been reporting an average of 14 AD cases annually since 1999. The number of AD investigations initiated by Turkey in 2005 is 12, down from 25 cases reported to the WTO in 2004.

Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2006) classify Turkey within “new tough users” together with Brazil, India, Mexico and Taiwan, where “new tough users” refer to those countries where the sum of total initiations and total measures over the period 1980-2000 is at least 50 percent higher than for other new users.

The breakdown of the AD initiations and measures by Turkey, starting from the year 1995, is given in **Table 12**. Turkey, between 1995 and 2005, has initiated 101 AD investigations and 86 measures have been put into effect, either in the form of a definitive duty or an undertaking. The definitive AD measures of Turkey in force on 31 December 2005 are listed in **Table 13**.

In a similar approach to that of Messerlin (2004), to be able to make a more meaningful comparison of the EU and Turkey regarding their AD practices, the number of AD cases launched per billion dollars of imports are calculated for EU and Turkey for 2004 and are given in **Table 14**.

As **Table 14** shows, EU has initiated 0.0234 AD cases per billion dollar of imports, whereas the figure for Turkey is 0.256, which means that in 2004, Turkey has initiated 10 times more AD cases per billion dollar of imports than EU has. Despite the import volume of EU being 13 times that of Turkey, the number of AD cases launched by EU is only 20 percent more than that launched by Turkey. As the table implies, it can be said that AD was used as a trade defense instrument more intensively by Turkey than the EU.

²⁴ Law No:3577 on “Prevention of Unfair Competition in Importation” entered into force on 1 October 1989 (<http://www.dtm.gov.tr/ithalat/english/trade/anti.htm>)

Besides the intensity of AD cases, which was calculated above as the number of AD cases per billion dollar of imports, efficiency of the AD investigations, which could very simply be measured by the number of AD measures per number of AD investigations, can also be considered an important tool to compare the AD activity of EU and Turkey. In the period 1995 – 2005, EU has initiated 327 cases and concluded 301 of these investigations, the remaining still pending (not concluded yet). Of these 301 investigations which were initiated and concluded between 1995 - 2005, 115 investigations were concluded with no final measure, meaning that only 186 (or 62 percent) of the cases resulted in a definitive measure, either in the form of an undertaking or a definitive AD duty (see **Table 15**).

Contrary to the EU, a high percent of the AD cases initiated by Turkey have resulted in an AD measure. In the period 1995 – 2005, the number of cases initiated by Turkey is 101, 18 of which are still pending. Of the 83 investigations which were initiated and concluded between 1995 - 2005, 75 were concluded with the imposition of a final measure, meaning that only 8 (or 10 percent) were either terminated or withdrawn without the imposition of a final measure.

It should come as no surprise that the fraction of AD cases by the EU resulting in a AD measure is far too low compared to that of Turkey. The huge size of industry and the large volume of trade lead to more complicated AD cases to be handled by the European Commission. In addition to that, as mentioned before, it is the European Community that launches the AD cases on behalf of its 25 member countries, which could well mean that the concerns and interests of the Members within the Community can sometimes be extensively variant.

Both Turkey's and EU's AD rules are in parallel to the WTO AD Rules and thus the procedures for an AD investigation and imposition of AD measures are similar, but the difference in the decision-making process is that the EU is a "union" of now 25 countries, where these 25 Members are involved in the process.

III. 4. The Decision-Making Process in the EC

When the EC receives a complaint about dumping of foreign imports, the European Commission carries out three important steps: dumping investigation, injury investigation and determination of whether the imposition of AD duties would be in the Community's interest. Although the Commission is obliged to ask the views of the member states at these stages, the views are not legally binding. Despite the important role the Commission plays in the determination of dumping and injury and evaluation of Community's interest, it is the member states that act collectively and finally determine whether AD duties are going to be imposed on EU's imports. For the imposition of definitive AD duties, a simple majority in the European Council must vote in favour of the Commission proposal, and since 20 March 2004²⁵, the abstentions are counted as votes in favour of the proposal. (Evenett and Vermulst, 2005)

As it was previously mentioned, from the 301 AD cases launched and concluded in the period 1995 – 2005 , 115 cases resulted in no final measure. From **Table 15**, we see that 55 of these 108 cases were terminated either because no dumping or no injury was found or because the case was withdrawn. In only 20 of the cases no dumping or injury was found, meaning only a very small fraction of the complaints against foreign imports were found irrelevant, and in 35 of the cases, the case was withdrawn.

60 of the cases in the given period were terminated without a final measure, due to other reasons, including the expiration of the 15-month deadline to impose measures. Thus, 20 percent of the cases launched and concluded in this period were terminated at later stages after the determination of dumping and an injury by the European

²⁵ Council Regulation (EC) No 461/2004 of 8 March 2004 (amending Regulation (EC) No 384/96 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community and Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community) was published in Official Journal of the European Communities L 77 of 13 March 2004 and entered into force on 20 March 2004. After the amendment, Article 9(4) of the Regulation (EC) No 384/96 reads: "Where the facts as finally established show that there is dumping and injury caused thereby, and the Community interest calls for intervention in accordance with Article 21, a definitive anti-dumping duty shall be imposed by the Council, acting on a proposal submitted by the Commission after consultation of the Advisory Committee. The proposal shall be adopted by the Council unless it decides by a simple majority to reject the proposal, within a period of one month after its submission by the Commission."

Commission. Parallely, in his study to define the 10 major problems with the AD instrument in the EC, Vermulst (2005) points out to the quality of the decision-making process in the Council. According to Vermulst, regularly, and particularly in high-profile-controversial-cases, no measures were imposed even though dumping, resulting injury and Community interest in AD measures were found to exist, because, for a variety of reasons, Member States either voted against or abstained from voting the Commission proposal.

Evenett and Vermulst (2005), based on their study on the media articles about the member states' votes and views on EC AD matters, identify two blocks of member states in EU15, one that supports the imposition of AD measures and one that opposes the Commission proposal to impose definitive measures. According to their study, Portugal, France, Italy, Greece and Spain have supported steps towards AD duties on 85 percent or more occasions. On the other hand, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom stood against the AD measures approximately 85 percent of the time. Thus, five member states appear to consistently vote in favour of definitive duties and seven against the measures, where Belgium tends to vote with the pro-duties block. Since a simple majority in the European Council in favour of the Commission proposal is required for the imposition of definitive duties, the votes of the remaining two member states, namely Austria and Ireland, determine whether the duties are to be imposed.

Evenett and Vermulst also state that, while prior to 1995 the member states are said to have a tendency to vote in favour of Commission proposals on imposing definitive AD duties, since 1995, member states are said to have more frequent disagreements among themselves and with the EC. Wenig (2005) points out that a proposal by the European Commission for the imposition of measures has to pass a strict test in the EC AD Committee and monthly meetings of the Committee, in which Commission officials and representatives of the Member States participate, are a forum in which the Commission proposals are discussed and scrutinized from a Member States' perspective.

The work of Evenett and Vermulst shows the difficulty in the decision-making process within the EU15 regarding AD issues. Furthermore, in his study, Wenig (2005)

mentions that the different interests of the 25 Member States clash and are, ideally, reconciled with each other in the AD Committee, which meets monthly to discuss the Commission proposals, and only after detailed discussions ranging from technical to procedural issues, a measure can be adopted by the Council. Therefore, it would not be wrong to conclude that the accession of the ten new Member States in May 2004, and also the future enlargements of the EU will increase the complexity of the decision-making process within the EU and bring about new challenges for the EU in the field of AD.

III. 5. Enlargement Effects on the AD Practices of the EU and New Members

The EU has a common trade policy (called Common Commercial Policy) and the EU acts as one single actor in trade issues, including WTO matters. On behalf of the Union's Member States, the European Commission represents the European interests and negotiates trade agreements.²⁶

The EU's Common Commercial Policy includes the uniform EU-wide application of Trade Policy Instruments and with each enlargement of the Union, like with all the other aspects of the EU Common Commercial Policy, the EU trade defense law and measures are automatically applied in the New Member States. Upon enlargement of the Union to include new Member States, the new Members no longer apply trade defense action on a national basis and abandon the measures they have taken and the pending investigations. The existing trade defense measures of the EU against imports from any of the new Members, the measures imposed by any of the Members on imports from the EU and the measures among the new Members drop automatically.²⁷

On 15 April 2004, before the enlargement of the EU on 1 May 2004, in order to inform the related parties the Commission published in the Official Journal of the European Union a Notice²⁸ regarding the application of AD and anti-subsidy measures in force in the Community following enlargement to include 10 new Member States. The first paragraph of the Notice reads :

²⁶ http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/newround/index_en.htm

²⁷ http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/respectrules/tdi_enlarg/index_en.htm

²⁸ EU Official Journal No. C91/2 dated 15 April 2004, Notice No. 2004/C 91/02

When enlargement takes place on 1 May 2004, all antidumping and anti-subsidy measures in force will automatically apply to imports into the enlarged twenty-five Member State Community. Accordingly, these measures will also apply to imports into the ten new Member States. On enlargement, there will be a number of pending investigations initiated before 1 May 2004. Should such investigations lead to measures, these will equally apply to imports into the twenty-five Member State Community.

In order to be able to comment on the effects of the May 2004 enlargement and possible future enlargements on the EU AD practices, it is necessary to examine the AD practices of the ten acceded Members and the current candidate states. Using the data from **Table 1**, the AD practices of 10 new Member States and 4 candidate countries in the period 1995 – 2005 are tabulated in **Table 16**.

As **Table 16** shows, except Turkey, the accession countries and candidate states are not really fans of AD practices. 7 of the 10 accession countries have not initiated any AD investigations since 2000 until their accession in May 2004 and although Poland, Latvia and Lithuania filed a number of AD cases in the last decade, it is not possible to say that AD practices were intensively used by these countries as a trade defense instrument.

Among the candidates, Croatia and Romania never launched AD cases in the past decade and Bulgaria launched only one case which was in 2002. On the other hand, Turkey has, since 1997, launched a remarkably high number of AD cases and been an active user of AD practices. Turkey ranks 10th among WTO Members to initiate AD investigations and 7th to take AD measures and therefore Vandebussche and Zanardi (2006) classify Turkey within “new tough users”, i.e. those countries where the sum of total initiations and total measures over the period 1980-2000 is at least 50 percent higher than for other new users.

Given the fact that the new Members of the EU have not been very active users of AD practices in the last decade, these Member States are not expected to be strongly demanding for AD investigations and duties by the EU. However, this should also not mean that they will resist the Commission proposals on imposition of AD duties. Rather, as suggested by Evenett and Vermulst (2004), these new Members, most of which are small countries, are likely to prefer to abstain on votes on AD issues, as there is a tendency for small countries to do so. In this case, since the abstentions are counted as votes in favour of the Commission’s proposal after the

amendment on 8 March 2004, it will be easier to have a simple majority in favour of the Commission's proposal on imposing definitive duties. However, this is only a prediction and the tendency of the new members on AD issues can only be seen with time.

Due to the high AD activity of Turkey in the last decade, EU's possible future enlargement to include Turkey will be more challenging than the fifth and biggest enlargement of the EU in May 2004. Actually, Turkey's accession will bring about new challenges mainly in two respects. First, thanks to the large number of cases it has launched and the measures it has taken, Turkey is highly experienced in AD practices, which will make it more selective in deciding on and voting for Commission proposals to impose AD duties. Second, despite being an intensive user of AD, Turkey is also one of the "Friends of AD Negotiations" (FANs), which want fundamental reforms in AD rules so as to prevent abuse of AD actions, however, EU is clearly not on the demanding side for fundamental reforms in this field. Thus, it becomes apparent that the EU and Turkey do not share a common notion on current AD rules, which may be a sign of possible future difficulties once Turkey accedes the Union.

III. 6. Sectors Targeted by the AD Practices of the EU and Turkey

In the first part of the paper, we showed that the main target of the AD cases by the WTO Members has been Section XV of the HS (base metals and articles of base metal) which has been targeted by 29 percent of all AD investigations in the world in the period 1995 – 2005. Chemicals, plastics, textiles and machinery and electrical equipment have been the four other major sectors targeted by AD investigations.

We now aim to analyze the main concerns of EU and Turkey regarding dumping practices, by looking at the sectors they have targeted in AD investigations. **Table 17** gives the sectoral breakdown of AD initiations and measures by the EC and Turkey against the exporting countries, and it shows that, just like more than one-fourth of the AD cases by the WTO members have targeted, base metals and articles of base metal (Section XV) has been the EC's primary concern regarding dumping practices, followed by Section VI (chemical products) and Section XVI (machinery and electrical

products). On the other hand, Turkey's primary concern regarding dumping practices has been plastics and rubbers (Section VII), followed by Section XI (textiles) and Section XV (base metals and articles of base metal).

Although the EC and Turkey have some common concerns regarding certain sectors, the priorities do not overlap. Metals sector has been the EC's primary concern, however, this sector has been the third among the AD investigations initiated by Turkey. Also, plastics and rubbers sector has been the primary sector Turkey is focused on, whereas it ranks fifth as far as the EC is concerned.

As mentioned before, once Turkey accedes to the EU, it will abandon its AD investigations and measures and assume those of the EU. Thus, it is possible to say that after accession Turkey will begin to impose AD duties on the sectors which have not been the primary concern of its national industry regarding dumping practices. Also, it will be difficult for Turkey to convince the EC to take AD measures regarding the sectors of its primary concern, because those sectors have not been the priorities of the EU in the last decade.

III. 7. Countries Targeted by the AD Practices of the EU and Turkey

It was mentioned in the first part of the paper that 16 percent of the AD investigations by the WTO Members have targeted China as the exporting country in the period 1995 –2005 and that a group of 20 WTO Members have been targeted by 77 percent of the AD investigations.

We now try to see if the similar case holds for the AD investigations of the EC and Turkey. The number of AD cases launched by the EC and Turkey in the period 1995 – 2005 based on exporting country are given in **Table 18** and **Table 19**.

The EC has targeted a wide range of countries in its AD cases (48 countries) and Turkey has targeted 26 countries in its 101 AD cases. It was previously shown that Turkey has been filing AD cases more intensively than the EU when compared with regard to the import volumes, however, Turkey's AD activity is concentrated on a narrower group of countries.

China has been targeted by 18 and 38 percent of the AD cases launched by the EC and Turkey, respectively, and thus has been the main target of AD investigations by these two Members of the WTO. 7 Asian countries, namely China, India, Korea, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, account for 52 percent of the EC's AD cases and 76 percent of Turkey's AD cases.

It can be seen from **Table 18** that, from 1995 on, the EC has launched 35 AD cases against 8 of its 10 new Member States and 21 cases against its current candidate states, namely Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey. However, as was stated earlier, the pending AD cases and existing AD measures against the 10 new Member States dropped automatically upon their accession to the EU on 1 May 2004. It is also worth noting that Poland among the new Member States and Turkey among the candidate states rank 9th and 10th, respectively, among the target countries of the EC's AD cases. With the accession of Poland to the EU, the EU can no longer initiate AD cases against Poland and the existing measures and pending cases are dropped, however, despite the customs union between EU and Turkey, both parties can still initiate AD cases and impose definitive measures against the other.

III. 8. AD Practices of the EU and Turkey against Each Other

Despite the substantial depth of integration envisaged under the EU-Turkish Customs Union, both EU and Turkey retain the right to initiate, investigate and impose trade defense measures, including AD and countervailing duties, in cases of unfair practices in their bilateral trade (Ülgen and Zahariadis, 2004). While it was aimed by the Additional Protocol dated 23 November 1970 to align the economic policies of the EC and Turkey, some clauses also enabled the parties to introduce protective measures against the other during the transitional stage. According to Article 47 of the Protocol, which explicitly deals with dumping practices, the injured party may take suitable protective measures. However, it is the Council of Association that will receive the application from one party, find out if there is a dumping practice and address recommendations in such a way to end the dumping practice if exists. The injured party may introduce some measures in case the Council of Association does not take a decision within three months after the application, or if dumping practices

continue despite the recommendations of the Council. The injured party may also take some immediate interim actions, such as introduction of AD duties, but only after informing the Council. The Council of Association may decide that the protective measures shall be suspended, or recommend the abolition or amendment of the measures under certain conditions.

The aim of Article 47 of the Additional Protocol was to settle the disputes concerning dumping allegation within the Council of Association through consultations. However, during the transitional period, instead of using the Article 47 procedure in cases of dumping allegations, the European Commission started investigations and imposed AD duties without the involvement of Council of Association disregarding Article 47 of the Additional Protocol. (Kabaalioglu, 1996)

With the Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council which entered into force on 31 December 1995, a Customs Union was established between the parties and this marked the end of the transitional stage and passing to the final stage of the Association between EU and Turkey, which was envisaged in the Ankara Agreement. Since Additional Protocol deals with the implementation of the transitional stage, upon passing to the final stage with the Decision 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council, the provisions of Additional Protocol were no longer in force, or was this really the case?

Section III of Chapter IV of the Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council deals with trade defense instruments and first paragraph of Article 44 in this Section states that the principle of application of trade defense instruments other than safeguard by one party in its relations with the other shall be reviewed by the Association Council upon the request of either party. According to the same paragraph, during any such review, the Association Council may decide to suspend the application of these instruments provided that Turkey has implemented competition, state aid control and other relevant parts of the *acquis communautaire* which are related to the internal market and ensured their effective enforcement, so providing a guarantee against unfair competition comparable to that existing inside the internal market.

Thus, for the Association Council to decide to suspend the application of trade defense instruments, the first paragraph of Article 44 determines it as a prerequisite that Turkey implement the relevant parts of the *acquis communautaire* related to the internal market and ensure their effective enforcement. However, a more important statement exists in the second paragraph of Article 44 of the Decision, which directly addresses the implementation of AD measures: it states that “the modalities of implementation of AD measures set out in Article 47 of the Additional Protocol remain in force”.

Now, here’s the answer to the question above. Although the provisions of Additional Protocol had a limited period of application (during the period of twenty-two years between 1973-1995, i.e. the transitional stage) and should no longer be in force after passing to the final stage, Article 47 of the Additional Protocol revived with the second paragraph of Article 44 of the Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council, which means that the parties can take suitable protective measures, such as the introduction of AD duties, in trade with the other party. This has been the basis of the AD practices of EC and Turkey against the imports from the other party.

These protective measures can only be allowed to lapse if Turkey can convincingly demonstrate to the Community that all competition and antitrust disciplines as well as other areas of the *acquis communautaire* have been adopted and enforced in the Turkish economy (Ülgen and Zahariadis, 2004). As the implementation and enforcement of the *acquis communautaire* have been determined together with many other criteria as the prerequisites of Turkey’s accession to the EU, once accession takes place, the conditions for the suspension or annulment of trade defense measures between the parties will also have been provided. Thus, EU’s enlargement to include Turkey will bring about the termination of the definitive AD duties and pending cases, as was seen with the previous enlargements of the EU.

Despite being less likely, there is also a possibility of termination of the AD duties and investigations in process before Turkey’s accession to the EU. This could be the case where, as stated in Article 44 of the Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council, Turkey implements competition, state aid control and other relevant parts of the *acquis communautaire* which are related to the internal market and ensures their

effective enforcement thus providing a guarantee against unfair competition comparable to that existing inside the internal market, but still does not fulfill the other criteria - especially those regarding political issues - for full accession to the EU. In this case, if the Association Council finds out that the economic criteria mentioned in Article 44 have been met, it may decide on the suspension or annulment of the AD practices between the parties.

However, as was said before, this is not very likely to occur, and as Ülgen and Zahariadis (2004) also discuss in their study, while competition disciplines can address certain areas and eliminate AD practices, there are also certain areas that competition policy becomes irrelevant, which involve the more protectionist aspects of AD, specifically protection of domestic monopolists or cartels from fringe competition. According to Ülgen and Zahariadis, there are no such allegations in the context of EU – Turkey relations, however there have been cases where Turkish firms had a negligible share of the EU market (below 5 percent) which suggests that the European complainants were not targeting predation but they were rather trying to protect their dominant position in the EU market. The authors thus claim that while harmonizing the competition policy with that of the EU can deal with some aspects of contingent protection, this could never lead to their full abolition. (Ülgen and Zahariadis, 2004)

III. 8. 1. AD Investigations and Measures by the EC on Imports from Turkey

Starting from 31.12.1995 - which was the date Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union entered into force - until 31.12.2005, the European Communities have initiated 9 AD investigations against imports from Turkey: 1 in 1996, 1 in 1997, 1 in 1999, 3 in 2000, 2 in 2001 and 1 in 2002. The details of the AD cases by the EC against Turkey are given in **Table 20**.

Currently, “welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel” and “steel ropes and cables” are the only two products on which the EC imposes definitive measures regarding imports from Turkey.

“Welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel” are classified within Combined Nomenclature (CN) codes 7306.30.51, 7306.30.59, 7306.30.71 and 7306.30.78 and “steel ropes and cables” are classified within CN codes 7312.10.82, 7312.10.84, 7312.10.86, 7312.10.88 and 7312.10.99. EC’s imports from Turkey of these commodities between 1995 and 2005 are given in **Figure 6** and **Figure 7**, respectively, and these figures show how Turkish exports of these commodities were affected by the AD measures of the EC.

For “welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel”, the investigation was initiated in 2001 and provisional and definitive duties were imposed in 2002. From **Figure 6**, it is seen that there is a gradual decrease of EU’s imports from Turkey of these commodities starting from 2000 until 2003. The volume of imports for 2004 is same as that in 2003, however another decrease in import volume is observed for 2005. Compared to 2002, there has been 13 percent decrease in the volume of imports in 2003, and there has been a further 21 percent decrease in import volume in 2005 compared to 2004.

For “steel ropes and cables”, the investigation was initiated in 2000 and provisional duties, undertakings and definitive duties were introduced in 2001. From **Figure 7**, it is obvious that the EU’s imports from Turkey of these commodities in 2003 and 2004 are drastically lower than the import volumes in 2000, 2001 and 2002. From 2002 to 2003, the decrease in the volume of imports is 50 percent. However, there was a sharp increase in the volume of imports in 2005 and the import volume almost reached its value in 2002.

From **Figure 6** and **Figure 7**, it can be concluded that the AD measures by the EC on imports from Turkey of the two commodities had adverse effects on Turkish exports, however, despite some fluctuations in the volume of imports from Turkey, it is possible to say that the effects have not been so drastic, at least, the AD measures have not resulted in the complete elimination of Turkish exports from the EU market.

III. 8. 2. AD Investigations and Measures by Turkey on Imports from the EC

In the same period, i.e. during the 10 years of Customs Union, Turkey also has initiated and concluded some AD investigations against imports from the Members of the EC, and also against the EC as a whole.

In June 1997, Turkey initiated an AD investigation against the EC regarding the imports of “ball bearings” but the investigation was terminated without taking any final measures since no injury was found.

On 2 November 2001, Turkey initiated an AD investigation regarding the imports of “polyvinyl chloride” against then 6 Members of the Community, namely Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy and Netherlands, along with 5 other countries: Hungary (which became a Member of the EU on 1 May 2004), Israel, Romania, Russian Federation and United States. The investigation was concluded with the imposition of AD duties at varying rates on the imports of “polyvinyl chloride” from all of the above mentioned countries, except for Russian Federation, on 6 February 2003.

The definitive AD duty on the imports of “polyvinyl chloride” from the 7 current Members of the EC, together with 3 non-EU countries, is still in force and currently this is the only product on which Turkey imposes AD duties on imports from the EC Members. As of 31 December 2005, there are no definitive duties on the imports from the EC as a whole and there are also no pending cases.

“Polyvinyl chloride” is classified within HS6 code 3904.10 and the total exports of 7 Members of the EU to Turkey of this commodity between 1995 and 2005 are given in **Figure 8**. It is seen from the figure that, in 2001, there has been a 33 percent decrease in the volume of exports of these countries of “polyvinyl chloride” to Turkey, compared to 2002. However, this sharp decrease can be said to occur before the initiation of the AD investigation, because the investigation was initiated in November 2001 and thus, the decrease in the volume of imports of this product can be attributed to the financial crisis in Turkey in 2001, which led to an overall decrease in Turkey’s imports.

Starting from 2002, after the initiation of the AD investigation by Turkey in November 2001, the volume of exports began to increase and the introduction of the definitive AD measure by Turkey in 2003 only helped prevent a further increase in the volume of imports in 2004, keeping the volume of imports above that in 2001 but below 2000. However, in 2005, a drastic increase (nearly 26 percent) was observed in the import volume compared to 2004.

Thus, it is difficult to say that the existing AD measure on imports of “polyvinyl chloride” from the 7 Members of the EU has been very useful to protect Turkey’s domestic industry from dumped imports. Probably, it has only served to retard the expansion in the volume of imports, because in 2005, despite the AD measure being in effect, the volume of Turkey’s imports of this product from these countries was higher than ever.

IV. Conclusion

There is a growing debate on the fairness of the AD rules. Members of the WTO agreed to negotiate AD rules within the context of the Doha Development Agenda, however, some Members try to keep the fundamentals unchanged while others, particularly developing countries, want fundamental changes that will prevent AD actions from being used as disguised barriers to trade. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations will be, it seems that AD will still exist in the course of international trade for a long time.

We showed in the first part of the study that there is an increase in the number of AD cases from 1995 until 1999, but then a decreasing trend is observed starting from 2001. There is a proliferation of users of AD in the last decade and AD has been more used by developing countries than developed countries between 1995 and 2005. China has been the main target of AD practices and base metals and articles of base metal have been the main concern of AD practices.

In the second part, we focused on the AD practices of the EU and Turkey, which will be an important issue as far as Turkey’s progress towards accession to the EU is concerned. The EU ranks third among users of AD in the last decade and Turkey is

within the top ten. However, we showed that Turkey has been using AD instrument more intensively than the EU, when the volume of imports has been taken as the basis. In this respect, EU's enlargement to include Turkey will be a real challenge regarding the AD system and the relevant decision-making process of the EU. Accession to the EU will also be a challenge for Turkey, since Turkey will have to abandon its existing measures and assume those of the EU and the priorities in terms of targeted sectors are not the same.

The EC currently imposes definitive measures on the imports of two products from Turkey, but has not filed any AD cases against Turkey since October 2002. Turkey imposes AD duties on the imports of one product from 7 Members of the EC and since November 2001, no AD cases were launched by Turkey against the EC or its Members. This loss of AD activity against each other in the recent years may have resulted from the reluctance of both the EU and Turkey to use this tool against the other, as well as from Turkey's stepwise implementation of the relevant parts of the *acquis communautaire* in the course of progress towards accession. EU's possible future enlargement to include Turkey will automatically terminate the AD measures between the parties, however, the abolition of such measures before Turkey's accession is not very likely to occur.

Figure 1. Number of initiations of AD investigations by WTO Members on a yearly basis.
(Data from **Table 1**)




Figure 2. Percent share of the EU in Turkey's imports and exports between 1995 – 2005.
(Data from **Table 8**)




Figure 3. The volume of trade between the EU and Turkey in the period 1995-2005.
(Data from **Table 9**)




Figure 4. Turkey's overall external trade deficit and the trade deficit in its trade with the EU between 1995 and 2005.
(Data from **Table 8**)




Figure 5. Turkey's share in the imports and the exports of the EU25 between 1995 and 2005.




Figure 6. EC's imports from Turkey of "welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel" (CN codes 7306.30.51, 7306.30.59, 7306.30.71 and 7306.30.78) between 1995 and 2005.

(Source: Eurostat)




Figure 7. EC's imports from Turkey of "steel ropes and cables" (CN codes 7312.10.82, 7312.10.84, 7312.10.86, 7312.10.88 and 7312.10.99) between 1995 and 2005.

(Source: Eurostat)




Figure 8. Turkey's imports from Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Netherlands of "polyvinyl chloride" (HS6 code 3904.10) between 1995 and 2005.

(Source: Eurostat)




Table 1. The breakdown of the anti-dumping investigations by year and initiating WTO Member.
(Source: WTO statistics on anti-dumping, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm)
(Shaded area: Top 20 users of AD)

Member Initiating AD Investigation	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total
India	6	21	13	28	64	41	79	81	46	21	25	425
United States	14	22	15	36	47	47	75	35	37	26	12	366
European Community	33	25	41	22	65	32	28	20	7	30	24	327
Argentina	27	22	14	8	23	45	26	14	1	12	12	204
South Africa	16	33	23	41	16	21	6	4	8	6	23	197
Australia	5	17	42	13	24	15	23	16	8	9	7	179
Canada	11	5	14	8	18	21	25	5	15	11	1	134
China, P.R.	0	0	0	0	0	6	14	30	22	27	24	123
Brazil	5	18	11	18	16	11	17	8	4	8	6	122
Turkey	0	0	4	1	8	7	15	18	11	25	12	101
Mexico	4	4	6	12	11	6	5	10	14	6	7	85
Korea, Rep. of	4	13	15	3	6	2	4	9	18	3	4	81
Indonesia	0	11	5	8	8	3	4	4	12	5	0	60
Peru	2	8	2	3	8	1	8	13	4	7	4	60
Egypt	0	0	7	14	5	1	7	3	1	0	12	50
New Zealand	10	4	5	1	4	9	1	2	5	5	0	46
Malaysia	3	2	8	1	2	0	1	5	6	3	4	35
Thailand	0	1	3	0	0	0	3	21	3	3	0	34
Israel	5	6	3	7	0	1	4	0	0	1	6	33
Venezuela	3	2	6	10	7	1	1	1	0	0	0	31
Colombia	4	1	1	6	2	3	6	0	0	2	2	27
Philippines	1	1	2	3	6	2	0	1	1	0	0	17
Chile	4	3	0	2	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	14
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	3	5	12
Poland	0	0	1	0	7	0	0	3	1	0	0	12
Trinidad and Tobago	0	1	0	4	3	1	1	0	2	0	0	12
Chinese Taipei	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	2	0	0	8
Costa Rica	0	4	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	7
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	0	0	0	7
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	1	6	0	0	0	0	0	7
Uruguay	0	0	1	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	6
Jamaica	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	4
Czech Republic	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Japan	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Nicaragua	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Panama	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Ecuador	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Guatemala	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Paraguay	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	157	225	243	257	354	292	364	312	232	213	191	2840

Table 2. The breakdown of the anti-dumping measures imposed by WTO Members by year.(Source: WTO statistics on anti-dumping, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm)

(Shaded area: Top 20 users of AD)

Member Taking AD Measure	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total
India	7	2	8	22	23	53	38	64	53	29	17	316
United States	33	12	20	12	24	31	33	25	12	14	18	234
European Community	15	23	23	28	18	41	13	25	2	10	21	219
Argentina	13	20	11	12	9	15	15	24	19	1	8	147
South Africa	0	8	18	14	35	13	5	15	1	4	0	113
Turkey	11	0	0	0	1	8	2	11	28	16	9	86
Canada	7	0	7	10	10	14	19	0	5	8	4	84
Mexico	16	4	7	7	7	6	3	4	7	7	8	76
China, P.R.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	33	14	16	68
Australia	1	1	1	17	6	5	10	9	10	4	3	67
Brazil	2	6	2	14	5	9	13	5	2	5	3	66
Korea, Rep. of	0	5	10	8	0	5	0	1	4	10	3	46
Peru	2	2	3	0	3	4	1	7	7	8	3	40
Egypt	0	0	0	5	13	0	0	7	4	1	0	30
Indonesia	0	0	4	2	7	0	1	0	1	8	4	27
Thailand	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	20	1	2	27
Malaysia	0	2	2	4	1	1	0	1	7	0	7	25
Venezuela	2	0	4	0	8	9	0	1	0	1	0	25
New Zealand	3	4	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	2	4	17
Israel	1	0	0	6	4	0	1	2	0	1	0	15
Colombia	1	1	1	0	6	2	0	0	0	1	0	12
Philippines	0	2	0	0	3	4	0	0	0	0	0	9
Poland	0	0	0	1	0	6	0	0	2	0	0	9
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	4	1	8
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	7
Trinidad and Tobago	0	0	0	2	0	1	2	0	1	1	0	7
Chile	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Jamaica	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	0	4
Japan	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	3
Chinese Taipei	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Singapore	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Costa Rica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Guatemala	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Nicaragua	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Paraguay	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Uruguay	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	119	92	125	170	185	228	166	216	221	151	131	1804

Table 3. Top 10 AD users and the average number of measures in force per \$1,000 of 1997 imports of the user country. (Table adapted from Messerlin, 2004)

Country or group	Average number by value of imports
Industrial countries	
Australia	0.77
Canada	0.38
European Union	0.19
Unites States	0.29
Developing Economies	
Argentina	1.17
Brazil	0.51
India	1.28
Mexico	0.72
South Africa	1.81
Turkey	0.61

Table 4. The breakdown of the anti-dumping investigations by year and exporting WTO Member. (Source: WTO statistics on anti-dumping, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm) (Shaded area: Top 20 targets of AD investigations)

Member Subject to AD Investigation	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total
China, P.R.	20	43	33	28	40	43	53	51	52	49	57	469
Korea, Rep. of	14	11	15	24	34	22	23	23	17	24	11	218
United States	12	21	15	15	14	12	15	12	21	14	11	162
Chinese Taipei	4	9	16	11	22	16	19	16	13	21	13	160
Japan	5	6	12	13	22	9	13	13	16	9	7	125
Indonesia	7	7	9	5	20	13	18	12	8	8	14	121
India	3	11	8	12	13	10	12	16	14	8	13	120
Thailand	8	9	5	2	19	12	16	12	7	9	12	111
Russia	2	7	7	12	17	12	9	18	2	8	3	97
Brazil	8	10	5	6	13	9	13	4	3	9	4	84
Germany	7	9	13	8	11	5	9	7	3	2	0	74
Malaysia	2	3	5	4	7	9	6	4	8	6	13	67
European Community	0	1	2	4	7	9	9	10	10	3	5	60
Ukraine	2	3	4	9	9	7	6	8	3	1	3	55
South Africa	2	6	4	5	4	6	9	10	4	0	2	52
Italy	6	5	5	5	2	5	8	3	4	0	0	43
Spain	2	4	7	7	5	6	4	2	4	1	0	42
United Kingdom	6	4	6	4	2	9	6	2	0	1	0	40
Mexico	3	5	2	9	4	1	3	2	4	3	1	37
France	0	4	4	10	7	2	3	2	3	1	0	36
Turkey	2	3	1	2	6	7	5	4	4	1	1	36
Singapore	2	0	4	0	5	0	12	9	1	1	1	35
Romania	1	2	1	5	4	4	5	8	2	0	1	33
Canada	2	1	3	3	0	1	7	5	4	2	1	29
Netherlands	6	1	5	3	2	3	4	1	0	2	0	27

Poland	2	3	3	4	3	5	1	4	0	1	0	26
Argentina	1	0	0	1	4	2	5	3	1	3	4	24
Chile	2	2	2	2	1	6	4	4	0	0	1	24
Kazakhstan	3	1	2	4	0	3	3	6	0	0	0	22
Belgium	1	2	3	3	1	0	5	1	3	1	0	20
Hong Kong	1	3	2	3	2	1	3	3	0	0	2	20
Czech Republic	1	1	0	2	7	3	2	1	1	0	0	18
Venezuela	0	1	1	4	2	2	4	3	1	0	0	18
Australia	1	0	1	2	3	4	1	3	2	0	0	17
Viet Nam	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	3	0	7	3	16
Iran	0	1	2	0	2	3	2	2	1	2	0	15
Hungary	2	0	2	2	4	0	3	1	0	0	0	14
Saudi Arabia	0	1	0	3	2	3	1	1	2	0	1	14
Sweden	1	2	5	0	1	0	2	1	0	1	1	14
Austria	0	2	3	0	3	3	0	1	0	1	0	13
Bulgaria	0	3	2	1	1	1	2	0	1	0	1	12
Belarus	0	0	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	0	11
Egypt	1	2	1	2	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	10
Finland	0	0	1	1	2	0	1	2	2	1	0	10
Lithuania	0	0	1	0	4	1	1	3	0	0	0	10
Pakistan	0	2	1	0	1	0	1	2	2	0	1	10
Slovak Republic	0	1	1	1	3	1	2	1	0	0	0	10
United Arab Emirates	0	0	1	0	0	2	2	0	3	2	0	10
New Zealand	1	1	0	0	2	0	3	1	0	0	0	8
Philippines	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	0	8
Israel	0	1	2	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	7
Latvia	0	0	2	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	7
Macedonia	1	0	1	1	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	7
Croatia	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	6
Denmark	1	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Greece	0	0	3	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	6
Ireland	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	6
Portugal	0	2	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	6
Colombia	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5
Norway	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	5
Switzerland	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	5
Estonia	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	4
Guatemala	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	3
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	3
Moldova	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	3
Serbia and Montenegro	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	3
Trinidad and Tobago	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	3
Uruguay	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	3
Uzbekistan	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3
Yugoslavia	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Algeria	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Costa Rica	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Cuba	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Ecuador	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2
Faroe Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Libya	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Macau	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Nepal	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
Peru	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
Slovenia	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2

Zimbabwe	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Bahrain	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Bangladesh	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Bosnia Herzegovina	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Dominican Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Georgia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Honduras	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Jordan	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Korea, PDR	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Liechtenstein	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Malawi	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Mozambique	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Nicaragua	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Oman	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Paraguay	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Qatar	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Sri Lanka	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Total	157	225	243	257	354	292	364	312	232	213	191	2840

Table 5. The breakdown of the anti-dumping measures by year and exporting WTO Member.

(Source: WTO statistics on anti-dumping, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm)

(Shaded area: Top 20 targets of AD measures)

Member Target of AD Measure	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total
China, P.R.	26	16	33	24	20	29	30	37	40	43	40	338
Korea, Rep. of	4	6	3	12	13	21	12	13	22	13	8	127
Chinese Taipei	2	2	6	12	8	17	9	14	11	10	8	99
United States	8	4	9	11	8	12	4	10	6	10	13	95
Japan	5	6	5	7	10	19	8	5	11	6	7	89
Russia	8	3	9	4	15	9	8	3	12	5	6	82
Thailand	5	8	2	5	1	12	7	8	8	6	6	68
Brazil	9	10	7	6	5	8	2	6	4	2	5	64
India	4	1	5	6	9	7	6	6	7	10	2	63
Indonesia	0	2	4	7	4	11	5	9	12	2	7	63
Ukraine	5	1	3	5	7	7	7	5	6	0	1	47
European Community	0	0	1	1	4	4	8	6	7	6	3	40
Malaysia	3	3	3	4	3	4	1	4	3	6	3	37
Germany	4	2	2	5	5	6	1	6	4	0	0	35
South Africa	2	3	2	2	3	4	3	7	8	0	0	34
France	1	1	2	5	7	3	4	1	1	0	2	27
Italy	2	2	1	7	5	1	2	4	2	0	0	26
Mexico	0	3	4	1	3	4	1	3	0	3	2	24
Romania	2	1	1	2	2	3	1	4	5	2	1	24
Spain	3	0	0	4	4	3	3	3	0	1	1	22
Turkey	1	1	1	2	4	3	3	3	2	2	0	22
Singapore	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	7	7	1	0	21
United Kingdom	3	1	2	3	3	1	2	5	1	0	0	21
Kazakhstan	0	0	2	2	4	0	1	2	7	0	0	18
Poland	1	1	3	1	4	2	4	1	1	0	0	18
Chile	0	1	1	3	0	0	4	4	1	1	0	15
Netherlands	2	0	1	2	1	3	1	2	2	0	1	15

Belgium	0	1	0	4	5	0	0	2	2	0	0	14
Czech Republic	1	1	1	0	1	4	1	3	1	1	0	14
Argentina	3	0	0	0	1	1	3	1	1	0	2	12
Canada	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	4	4	1	0	12
Hong Kong	0	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	0	0	12
Venezuela	4	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	2	1	0	12
Belarus	0	1	0	0	0	3	3	2	0	1	0	10
Bulgaria	2	0	1	0	2	1	1	2	0	1	0	10
Viet Nam	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	2	4	10
Australia	0	0	0	1	2	2	0	0	1	2	0	8
Sweden	0	0	0	4	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	8
Finland	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	2	1	7
Hungary	0	1	0	0	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	7
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	2	1	7
Latvia	0	0	0	1	1	0	4	0	1	0	0	7
Slovak Republic	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	2	1	0	0	7
Austria	1	0	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	6
Croatia	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	6
Pakistan	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	6
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	6
Israel	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	5
United Arab Emirates	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	5
Denmark	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	4
Egypt	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Greece	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	4
Macedonia	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	4
Moldova	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	4
Philippines	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	4
Portugal	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	4
Ecuador	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	3
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	3
New Zealand	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	3
Algeria	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
Colombia	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Estonia	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Ireland	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Nepal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Norway	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Paraguay	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Serbia and Montenegro	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Switzerland	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Trinidad and Tobago	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Uruguay	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	2
Bangladesh	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Bosnia Herzegovina	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Cuba	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Dominican Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Faroe Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Georgia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Guatemala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Honduras	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Jordan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Libya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Liechtenstein	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Malawi	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1

Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Oman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Qatar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Slovenia	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Sri Lanka	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Uzbekistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Yugoslavia	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Zimbabwe	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	119	92	125	170	185	228	166	216	221	151	131	1804

Table 6. Top 20 users (WTO Members) of AD practices and the number of AD cases they have launched and they have been targeted by.

Member	AD investigations initiated	Target of AD investigations	Number of targeted cases/ Number of launched cases
India	425	120	0.28
United States	366	162	0.44
European Community	327	60	0.18
Argentina	204	24	0.12
South Africa	197	52	0.26
Australia	179	17	0.09
Canada	134	29	0.22
China, P.R.	123	469	3.81
Brazil	122	84	0.69
Turkey	101	36	0.36
Mexico	85	37	0.44
Korea, Rep. of	81	218	2.69
Indonesia	60	121	2.02
Peru	60	2	0.03
Egypt	50	10	0.20
New Zealand	46	8	0.17
Malaysia	35	67	1.91
Thailand	34	111	3.26
Israel	33	7	0.21
Venezuela	31	18	0.58

Table 7. AD investigations and measures of the WTO Members in the period 1995 - 2005 with respect to Harmonized System (HS) sections.

(Source: WTO statistics on anti-dumping, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm)

Section	Description	Number of AD investigations	Number of AD measures
I	Live Animals; Animal Products	47	25
II	Vegetable Products	41	23
III	Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils and Their Cleavage Products; Prepared Edible Fats; Animal or Vegetable Waxes	11	2
IV	Prepared Foodstuffs; Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar; Tobacco and Manufactured Tobacco Substitutes	41	22
V	Mineral Products	64	42
VI	Products of the Chemical or Allied Industries	563	359
VII	Plastics and Articles Thereof; Rubber and Articles Thereof	376	226
VIII	Raw Hides and Skins, Leather, Furskins and Articles Thereof; Saddlery and Harness; Travel Goods, Handbags and Similar Containers; Articles of Animal Gut (Other than Silk-Worm Gut)	5	1
IX	Wood and Articles of Wood; Wood Charcoal; Cork and Articles of Cork; Manufactures of Straw, of Esparto or of Other Plaiting Materials; Basketware and Wickerwork	48	24
X	Pulp Of Wood or of Other Fibrous Cellulosic Material; Recovered (Waste and Scrap) Paper or Paperboard; Paper and Paperboard and Articles Thereof	125	73
XI	Textiles and Textile Articles	202	134
XII	Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas, Sun Umbrellas, Walking-Sticks, Seat-Sticks, Whips, Riding-Crops and Parts Thereof; Prepared Feathers and Articles Made Therewith; Artificial Flowers; Articles of Human Hair	25	17
XIII	Articles of Stone, Plaster, Cement, Asbestos, Mica or Similar Materials; Ceramic Products; Glass and Glassware	97	46
XIV	Natural or Cultured Pearls, Precious or Semi-Precious Stones, Precious Metals, Metals Clad with Precious Metal and Articles Thereof; Imitation Jewellery; Coin	1	0
XV	Base Metals and Articles of Base Metal	821	586
XVI	Machinery and Mechanical Appliances; Electrical Equipment; Parts Thereof; Sound Recorders and Reproducers, Television Image and Sound Recorders and Reproducers, and Parts and Accessories of Such Articles	238	136
XVII	Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels and Associated Transport Equipment	22	14
XVIII	Optical, Photographic, Cinematographic, Measuring, Checking, Precision, Medical or Surgical Instruments and Apparatus; Clocks and Watches; Musical Instruments; Parts and Accessories Thereof	29	18
XIX	Arms and Ammunition; Parts and Accessories Thereof	0	0
XX	Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles	69	46
XXI	Works of Art, Collectors' Pieces and Antiques	0	0
...	Unknown	15	10
	Total	2840	1804

Table 8. Turkey's import and export volumes and the EU's share in the period 1995 – 2005.

(Sources: Turkish Statistics Institute - Turkey's Statistical Yearbook, 2004 (<http://www.die.gov.tr>) and State Planning Organization of Turkey - Main Economic Indicators, January 2001 and February 2006 (<http://www.dpt.gov.tr>))

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
<i>Turkey's exports (m\$)</i>											
Exports to the EU	11,071	11,549	12,248	13,498	14,333	15,086	16,854	19,468	25,899	34,451	38,350
Exports to other countries	10,566	11,676	14,013	13,476	12,255	12,689	14,480	16,591	21,354	28,716	34,925
Total Exports	21,637	23,225	26,261	26,974	26,588	27,775	31,334	36,059	47,253	63,167	73,275
EU's share in exports (%)	51.2	49.7	46.6	50.0	53.9	54.3	53.8	54.0	54.8	54.5	52.3
<i>Turkey's imports (m\$)</i>											
Imports from the EU	16,861	23,138	24,870	24,075	21,419	27,388	18,949	24,519	33,495	45,444	49,048
Imports from other countries	18,848	20,489	23,689	21,846	19,273	27,115	22,450	27,035	35,845	52,096	67,304
Total imports	35,709	43,627	48,559	45,921	40,692	54,503	41,399	51,554	69,340	97,540	116,352
EU's share in imports (%)	47.2	53.0	51.2	52.4	52.6	50.3	45.8	47.6	48.3	46.6	42.2

Table 9. Trade volume between the EU and Turkey in the period 1995-2005.

(Source: Eurostat)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
<i>EU's imports from Turkey (m Euros)</i>											
EU25's imports	9,245	10,184	11,872	13,624	15,595	18,213	21,359	23,584	25,854	30,945	33,441
EU15's imports	9,245	10,184	11,872	13,624	15,071	17,547	20,231	22,061	24,044	29,095	31,309
Ten New Members' imports					524	666	1,128	1,523	1,810	1,849	2,132
<i>EU's exports to Turkey (m Euros)</i>											
EU25's exports	13,391	18,320	22,377	22,187	20,920	30,687	20,906	25,448	29,444	38,009	41,817
EU15's exports	13,391	18,320	22,377	22,187	20,580	29,953	20,265	24,344	28,248	35,970	39,103
Ten New Members' exports					340	733	641	1,104	1,196	2,039	2,714

Table 10. The breakdown of the anti-dumping initiations and measures by the European Community between 1995 – 2005.

(Source: WTO statistics on anti-dumping, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total
AD Investigations	33	25	41	22	65	32	28	20	7	30	24	327
AD Measures	15	23	23	28	18	41	13	25	2	10	21	219

Table 11. Definitive AD measures by the EC in force on 31 December 2005.

(Source: WTO, Semi Annual Report No. G/ADP/N/139/EEC dated 6 April 2006)

Origin	Product	Measure
Algeria	Urea and ammonium nitrate solutions	Duties Undertakings
Australia	Polyester staple fibres	Duties
	Polyethylene terephthalate	Duties Undertakings
Belarus	Polyester filament tow (extension of polyester staple fibre)	Duties
	Polyester staple fibres	Duties
	Potassium chloride	Duties Undertakings (valid until 13.04.2006)
	Urea and ammonium nitrate solutions	Duties
	Urea	Duties
Brazil	PET (polyethylene terephthalate) film	Duties
Bulgaria	Urea	Duties
P.R. China	Aluminium foil	Duties
	Barium carbonate	Duties
	Bicycles	Duties
	Bicycle parts	Duties
	Castings	Duties
	Colour television receivers	Duties Undertakings
	Coumarin	Duties
	Ferro molybdenum	Duties
	Furfuraldehyde	Duties
	Furfuryl alcohol	Duties
	Glyphosate	Duties
	Granular polytetrafluoro-ethylene (PTFE)	Duties
	Hand pallet trucks and their essential parts	Duties
	Lamps (integrated electronic compact fluorescent)	Duties
	Lighters (non-refillable and refillable)	Duties
	Magnesia (deadburned)	Duties
	Magnesia bricks	Duties Undertaking
	Magnesium oxide (caustic magnesite)	Duties
	Magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks)	Duties
	Okoumé plywood	Duties
	Para-cresol	Duties
	Polyester filament fabrics (finished)	Duties
	Polyester staple fibres	Duties
	Polyethylene terephthalate	Duties
	Potassium permanganate	Duties
	Powdered activated carbon	Duties
	Ring binder mechanisms	Duties
	Silicon carbide	Duties
	Silicon	Duties
	Sodium cyclamate	Duties

Origin	Product	Measure
	Stainless steel fasteners and parts thereof	Duties
	Steel ropes and cables	Duties
	Sulphanilic acid	Duties
	Trichloroisocyanuric acid	Duties
	Tube and pipe fitting, of iron or steel	Duties
	Tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide	Duties
	Zinc oxides	Duties
	Zinc oxides mixed with silica (extension to zinc oxides)	Duties
Croatia	Seamless pipes and tubes of non-alloy steel	Duties (partially suspended until 18.11.2006)
	Urea	Duties
Faeroe Islands	Trout (large rainbow)	Duties Undertakings
Hong Kong	Magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks)	Duties
India	Coumarin	Duties Undertaking
	Graphite electrode systems	Duties
	PET (polyethylene terephthalate)	Duties Undertakings
	PET (polyethylene terephthalate) film	Duties Undertakings
	Polyester staple fibres	Duties Undertakings
	Polyester textured filament yarn (PTY)	Duties
	Steel ropes and cables	Duties Undertakings
	Sulphanilic acid	Duties
	Synthetic fibre ropes	Duties
Indonesia	PET (polyethylene terephthalate)	Duties Undertakings
	Ring binder mechanisms	Duties
	Polyester staple fibres	Duties
	Sodium cyclamate	Duties
	Stainless steel fasteners and parts thereof	Duties
	Tube and pipe fitting, of iron or steel	Duties
Israel	PET (polyethylene terephthalate) film	Duties
Japan	Internal gear hubs for bicycles	Duties
	Magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks)	Duties
	Television camera systems	Duties
Korea (Rep. of)	Colour television receivers	Duties
	Magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks)	Duties
	PET (polyethylene terephthalate)	Duties
	PET (polyethylene terephthalate) film	Duties
	Polyester staple fibres	Duties
	Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel	Duties
Libya	Urea	Duties
Malaysia	Colour television receivers	Duties
	Glyphosate	Duties
	PET (polyethylene terephthalate)	Duties
	Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel	Duties
Moldova	Steel ropes and cables	Duties
Morocco	Steel ropes and cables	Duties
Norway	Trout (large rainbow)	Duties
Pakistan	Bed linen (cotton-type)	Duties
	Lamps (integrated electronic compact fluorescent)	Duties
Philippines	Lamps (integrated electronic compact fluorescent)	Duties
Romania	Seamless steel pipes and tubes	Duties (suspended) Undertakings (suspended)
	Urea	Duties
Russia	Aluminium foil	Duties Undertakings
	Ammonium nitrate	Duties

Origin	Product	Measure
		Undertakings
	Grain oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel (small + big)	Duties Undertakings
	Granular polytetrafluoro-ethylene (PTFE)	Duties
	Potassium chloride	Duties Undertakings (valid until 13.04.2006) Undertakings
	Seamless steel pipes and tubes	Duties (suspended) Undertakings (suspended)
	Silicon carbide	Duties Undertakings
	Silicon	Duties Undertakings
	Steel ropes and cables	Duties Undertakings
	Urea and ammonium nitrate solutions	Duties
	Tube and pipe fittings, of iron or steel	Duties
	Urea	Duties
Saudi Arabia	Polyester staple fibres	Duties Undertakings
South Africa	Steel ropes and cables	Duties Undertakings
Sri Lanka	Tube and pipe fitting, of iron or steel	Duties
Taiwan	Compact disk recordables (CD-Rs)	Duties
	Glyphosate	Duties
	Lighters (non-refillable and refillable)	Duties
	PET (polyethylene terephthalate)	Duties
	Stainless steel fasteners and parts thereof	Duties
	Tube and pipe fitting, of iron or steel	Duties
Thailand	Colour television receivers	Duties
	Coumarin (ext.)	Duties
	PET (polyethylene terephthalate)	Duties
	Stainless steel fasteners and parts thereof	Duties
	Steel ropes and cables	Duties Undertakings
	Polyester staple fibres	Duties
	Tube and pipe fitting, of iron or steel	Duties
	Welded tubes and pipes, of iron or non-alloy steel	Duties
Turkey	Steel ropes and cables	Duties
	Welded tubes and pipes, of iron or non-alloy steel	Duties
Ukraine	Ammonium nitrate	Duties Undertakings
	Seamless pipes and tubes of non-alloy steel	Duties (partially suspended until 18.11.2006)
	Silicon carbide	Duties Undertakings
	Steel ropes and cables	Duties
	Urea and ammonium nitrate solutions	Duties
	Urea	Duties
	Welded tubes and pipes, of iron or non-alloy steel	Duties
USA	Ethanolamines	Duties
	Grain oriented flat-rolled products of silicon-electrical steel (small + big)	Duties Undertakings
	Trichloroisocyanuric acid	Duties
Vietnam	Bicycles	Duties
	Lamps (integrated electronic compact fluorescent)	Duties
	Stainless steel fasteners and parts thereof	Duties
	Zinc oxides (extension from zinc oxides China)	Duties
	Ring binder mechanisms (extension from same imports from China)	Duties

Table 12. The breakdown of the anti-dumping initiations and measures by Turkey between 1995 – 2005.
(Source: WTO statistics on anti-dumping, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total
AD Investigations	0	0	4	1	8	7	15	18	11	25	12	101
AD Measures	11	0	0	0	1	8	2	11	28	16	9	86

Table 13. Definitive AD measures by Turkey in force on 31 December 2005.
(Source: WTO, Semi Annual Report No. G/ADP/N/139/TUR dated 17 March 2006)

Country/Customs Territory	Product	Measure
Belarus	Polyester synthetic staple fibres (not processed)	AD Duty
Belgium	Polyvinyl Chloride	AD Duty
Brazil	Fittings	AD Duty
China, P.R.	Certain refillable pocket flint lighters	AD Duty
	Fittings	AD Duty
	Woven fabrics of synthetic and artificial stable fibres	AD Duty
	Wall clocks (battery accumulator or main powered)	AD Duty
	Woven fabrics of synthetic filament yarn	AD Duty
	Non-refillable pocket lighters (gas fuelled) refillable pocket lighters (gas fuelled with electrical ignition system) and parts of lighters	AD Duty
	Acrylic mink blanket	AD Duty
	Hook & loop	AD Duty
	Pencils with leads of graphite and pencils with lead of crayons encased in a rigid sheath	AD Duty
	Bicycle tyres and bicycle tubes	AD Duty
	Motorcycle tyres and motorcycle tubes	AD Duty
	Chain (stud-link and other welded link)	AD Duty
	Certain door locks and padlocks, locks and cylinder for door locks.	AD Duty
	Tempered glass lid/cover	AD Duty
	Furniture hinge and mounting plate and drawer slide	AD Duty
	Ball point pens propelling or sliding pencils	AD Duty
	Baby carriages parts	AD Duty
	Metallized yarn	AD Duty
	Ropes and cables (including locked coil ropes)	AD Duty
	Certain textiles or fabrics, impregnated, coated, covered or laminated with polyurethane	AD Duty
	Tools for drilling and milling	AD Duty
	Slide fasteners	AD Duty
	Colour TV receivers with integral picture tube	AD Duty
	New pneumatic tyres of rubber	AD Duty
	Skid chain or motor vehicles of iron or steel	AD Duty
	Pentaerythritol	AD Duty
Finland	Polyvinyl Chloride	AD Duty
Germany	Polyvinyl Chloride	AD Duty
Greece	Polyvinyl Chloride	AD Duty
Hungary	Polyvinyl Chloride	AD Duty
India	Metallized yarn	AD Duty
	Polyester synthetic staple fibres (not processed)	AD Duty
	Polyester textured yarn	AD Duty
	Bicycle tyres and bicycle tubes	AD Duty
Indonesia	Polyester synthetic staple fibres (not processed)	AD Duty
Israel	Polyvinyl Chloride	AD Duty

Country/Customs Territory	Product	Measure
Italy	Polyvinyl Chloride	AD Duty
Korea, Rep. of	Metallized yarn	AD Duty
	Polyester flat yarns	AD Duty
	Polyester synthetic staple fibres (not processed)	AD Duty
	Polyester textured yarn	AD Duty
	Woven fabrics of synthetic filament yarn	AD Duty
Malaysia	Vulcanised rubber thread and cord	AD Duty
	Woven fabrics of synthetic filament yarn	AD Duty
Moldova	Steel billets, rolled or obtained by continuous casting	AD Duty
Netherlands	Polyvinyl Chloride	AD Duty
Romania	Polyvinyl Chloride	AD Duty
Russian Federation	Copper wire rod	AD Duty
	Ropes and cables (including locked coil ropes)	AD Duty
	Steel billets, rolled or obtained by continuous casting	AD Duty
Sri Lanka	Bicycle tyres and tubes	AD Duty
Chinese Taipei	Polyester textured yarn	AD Duty
	Woven fabrics of synthetic filament yarn	AD Duty
	Hook & loop	AD Duty
	Polyester synthetic staple fibres (not processed)	AD Duty
	Motorcycle tyres and tubes	AD Duty
	Bicycle tyres and tubes	AD Duty
	Metallized yarn	AD Duty
Thailand	Woven fabrics of synthetic filament yarn	AD Duty
	Bicycle tyres and bicycle tubes	AD Duty
	Polyester synthetic staple fibres (not processed)	AD Duty
	Motorcycle tyres and motorcycle tubes	AD Duty
Ukraine	Pentaerythritol	AD Duty
	Steel billets, rolled or obtained by continuous casting	AD Duty
United States	Polyvinyl Chloride	AD Duty
Vietnam	Bicycle tyres and tubes	AD Duty
	Motorcycle tyres and tubes	AD Duty

Table 14. The number of AD cases launched by the EU and Turkey per billion dollars of imports in 2004.

(Source for import volumes: International Trade Statistics 2005, WTO (available online:

http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2005_e/its2005_e.pdf))

(Please note that the import volume for EU(25) is the volume of extra-EU25 imports.)

	Billion dollar of Imports	Number of AD cases launched	Number of AD cases / billion dollar of imports
EU (25)	1280.6	30	0.0234
Turkey	97.5	25	0.256

Table 15. The breakdown of the AD cases by the EU in the period 1995 – 2005.

Total Number of AD Cases in the Period 1995 –2005	327
Number of cases concluded in the given period	301
Number of Cases resulting in the imposition of a measure	186
Number of Cases concluded with no final measure, due to:	115
• No injury	9
• No dumping	11
• Case withdrawn	35
• Other (including expiration of 15-month deadline to impose measures)	60

Table 16. The AD practices of 10 new Member States of the EU and 4 candidate countries in the period 1995 – 2005. (Adapted from **Table 1**)

Member Initiating AD Investigation	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total
10 New Members												
Poland	0	0	1	0	7	0	0	3	1	0	0	12
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	0	0	0	7
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	1	6	0	0	0	0	0	7
Czech Republic	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Candidates												
Turkey	0	0	4	1	8	7	15	18	11	25	12	101
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 17. The sectoral breakdown of anti-dumping initiations and measures by the EC and Turkey against the exporting countries in the period 1995 – 2005.

(Source: WTO statistics on anti-dumping, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm)

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII	XIII	XIV	XV	XVI	XVII	XVIII	XIX	XX	Other	Total
EC's AD initiations	6	0	0	0	1	51	28	4	9	0	38	9	4	0	111	47	7	0	0	12	0	327
EC's AD measures	3	0	0	0	1	41	17	1	9	0	22	5	2	0	80	28	6	1	0	3	0	219
<i>EC's priorities (first 5)</i>						2	5				4				1	3						
Turkey's AD initiations	0	0	0	0	0	7	37	0	2	0	21	0	1	0	18	5	0	1	0	9	0	101
Turkey's AD measures	0	0	0	0	0	8	33	0	0	0	18	0	1	0	15	1	0	1	0	9	0	86
<i>Turkey's priorities (first 5)</i>						5	1				2				3					4		

Table 18. Target countries of the AD cases by the EC and the number of investigations against each country in the period 1995 – 2005

(Source: WTO statistics on anti-dumping)

China, P.R.	60
India	27
Korea, Rep. of	25
Chinese Taipei	19
Russia	16
Thailand	15
Malaysia	13
Indonesia	12
Poland	10
Turkey	9
Ukraine	9
United States	9
Japan	8
Czech Republic	7
Egypt	6
Lithuania	6
Pakistan	6
Viet Nam	6
Croatia	5
Hungary	4
Romania	4
Slovak Republic	4
Belarus	3
Brazil	3
Bulgaria	3
Hong Kong	3
Norway	3
South Africa	3
Australia	2
Estonia	2
Faroe Islands	2
Iran	2
Libya	2
Mexico	2
Philippines	2
Saudi Arabia	2
Singapore	2
Algeria	1
Canada	1
Chile	1
Guatemala	1
Kazakhstan	1
Latvia	1
Macau	1
Serbia and Montenegro	1
Slovenia	1
Uzbekistan	1
Yugoslavia	1
Total	327

Table 19. Target countries of the AD cases by Turkey and the number of investigations against each country in the period 1995 – 2005.

(Source: WTO statistics on anti-dumping)

China, P.R.	38
Chinese Taipei	9
Thailand	9
India	7
Korea, Rep. of	7
Indonesia	4
Russia	3
Malaysia	3
Ukraine	2
Japan	2
Viet Nam	2
United States	1
Hungary	1
Romania	1
Brazil	1
Bulgaria	1
Serbia and Montenegro	1
Belgium	1
European Community	1
Finland	1
Germany	1
Greece	1
Israel	1
Italy	1
Netherlands	1
Sri Lanka	1
Total	101

Table 20. AD cases by the EC against Turkey in the period 1995 - 2005

Product	Initiation of Investigation	Provisional Duty	Final Measure
Unbleached cotton fabrics	21.02.1996	20.11.1996	Terminated due to expiry of 15 months deadline to impose definitive measures (1998, 2nd half)
Unbleached cotton fabrics	11.07.1997	09.04.1998	
Steel wire rod	22.05.1999	12.08.2000	Terminated due to withdrawal of the case (12.08.2000)
Steel ropes and cables	05.05.2000	03.02.2001	Undertakings (03.02.2001), Definitive duty (04.08.2001) Amendments due to withdrawal or breach of undertakings (21.12.2002, 18.07.2003) Amendment definitive duty (15.04.2005)
Paracetamol	13.05.2000		Terminated due to withdrawal of the case (10.02.2001)
Colour television receivers	15.07.2000		Terminated (13.10.2001)
Welded tubes and pipes of iron or non-alloy steel	29.06.2001	27.03.2002	Definitive duty (27.09.2002)
Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel (hot rolled coils)	20.12.2001		Terminated due to expiry of 15 months deadline to impose definitive measures (March 2003)
Hollow Sections	16.10.2002	15.07.2003	Terminated due to withdrawal of the case (16.12.2003)

References

- Barfield, C. (2005), "Anti-dumping Reform: Time to Go Back to Basics", *The World Economy*, 28(5), pp. 719-737
- Blonigen, B. A. (2005), "The Effects of NAFTA on Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Activity", *The World Bank Economic Review*, 19(3), pp. 407-424
- Conrad, C. A. (2002), "Dumping and Anti-dumping Measures from a Competition and Allocation Perspective", *Journal of World Trade*, 36(3), pp. 563-575
- Didier, P. (2001), "The WTO Anti-Dumping Code and EC Practice – *Issues for Review in Trade Negotiations*", *Journal of World Trade*, 35(1), pp. 33-54
- Evenett, S. J. and Vermulst, E. (2005), "The Politicisation of EC Anti-dumping Policy: Member States, their Votes and the European Commission", *The World Economy*, 28(5), pp. 701-717
- Harpaz, G. (2005), "'Dumping' the Anti-dumping Instruments in the Trade Relations Between the European Union and the State of Israel? – The European Union's Perspective", *Journal of World Trade*, 39(3), pp. 445-482
- Horlick, G. and Vermulst, E. (2005), "The 10 Major Problems With the Anti-Dumping Instrument: An Attempt at Synthesis", *Journal of World Trade*, 39(1), pp. 67-73
- Kabaalioglu, H. (1996), "Completion of the Customs Union and the Accession of Turkey to the European Union", *Third ECSA-World Conference – The European Union in a Changing World*, 19-20 September 1996
(<http://www.ecsanet.org/conferences/ecsaworld3/kabaalioglu.htm>)
- Kerr, W. A. and Loppacher, L. J. (2004), "Anti-dumping in the Doha Negotiations: Fairy Tales at the World Trade Organization", *Journal of World Trade*, 38(2), pp. 211-244

Matsushita, M., Schoenbaum, T. J., Mavroidis, P. C. (2003), "The World Trade Organization - Law, Practice, and Policy", Oxford University Press Inc., New York, pp. 301-339

Messerlin, P. A. (2004), "China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguards", *The World Bank Economic Review*, 18(1), pp. 105-130

Prusa, T. J. (2005), "Anti-dumping: A Growing Problem in International Trade", *The World Economy*, 28(5), pp. 683-700

Silberston, A. (2003), "Anti-dumping Rules – Time for Change?", *Journal of World Trade*, 37(6), pp. 1063-1081

Ülgen, S. and Zahariadis, Y. (2004), "The Future of Turkish-EU Trade Relations – Deepening vs Widening", *Centre for European Policy Studies - EU-Turkey Working Papers*, No.5

Vandenbussche, H. and Liu, X. (2002), "European Union anti-dumping cases against China – An overview and future prospects with respect to China's World Trade Organization membership", *Journal of World Trade*, 36(6), pp. 1125-1144

Vandenbussche, H. and Zanardi, M. (2006), "The Global Chilling Effects of Antidumping Proliferation", *Katholieke Universiteit Leuven - LICOS Discussion Paper Series*, No.167

Vermulst, E. (2005), "The 10 Major Problems With the Anti-Dumping Instrument in the European Community", *Journal of World Trade*, 39(1), pp. 105-113

Wenig, H. (2005), "The European Community's Anti-dumping System: Salient Features", *Journal of World Trade*, 39(4), pp. 787-794