Gall, Thomas; Amann, Roland

Working Paper
How (not) to Choose Peers in Studying Groups

Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, No. 79.2006

Provided in Cooperation with:
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Suggested Citation: Gall, Thomas; Amann, Roland (2006) : How (not) to Choose Peers in Studying Groups, Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, No. 79.2006, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano

This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73948

Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
How (not) to Choose Peers in Studying Groups
Roland Amann and Thomas Gall

NOTA DI LAVORO 79.2006

MAY 2006

CTN – Coalition Theory Network

Roland Amann, University of Konstanz
Thomas Gall, University of Bonn

This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index:
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=904315

The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano (I), web site: www.feem.it, e-mail: working.papers@feem.it
How (not) to Choose Peers in Studying Groups

Summary
This paper analyzes social group formation when agents are subject to peer effects within groups increasing human capital and instantaneous utility. When agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions, ability and social skills, and monetary payments are not feasible the model predicts segregation at the top and at the bottom of the attribute space and bunching for heterogeneous intermediate types. Groups may be heterogeneous in taste types and more heterogeneous types are more likely to participate. The equilibrium allocation does not induce cost-efficient human capital accumulation. Introducing ability tracking may produce beneficial results despite decreasing differences in human capital production.

Keywords: Education, Peer-effects, Matching, Group Formation

JEL Classification: I21, C78, D51

The authors are grateful for valuable discussion to seminar participants in Mannheim, Bonn, at the UniNet Meeting in Warwick and the CTN Meeting 2006. Gall gratefully acknowledges financial support from the European Commission. The usual disclaimer applies.

"This paper was presented at the 11th Coalition Theory Network Workshop organised by the University of Warwick, UK on behalf of the CTN, with the financial support of the Department of Economics of the University of Warwick, UNINET, the British Academy, and the Association for Public Economic Theory, Warwick, 19-21 January 2006."

Address for correspondence:

Thomas Gall
Economic Theory II
University of Bonn
Lennéstr. 37
53113 Bonn
Germany
E-mail: tgall@uni-bonn.de
How (not) to Choose Peers in Studying Groups∗

Roland Amann† and Thomas Gall‡

Preliminary
This Version: March 26, 2006

Abstract
This paper analyzes social group formation when agents are subject to peer effects within groups increasing human capital and instantaneous utility. When agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions, ability and social skills, and monetary payments are not feasible the model predicts segregation at the top and at the bottom of the attribute space and bunching for heterogeneous intermediate types. Groups may be heterogeneous in taste types and more heterogeneous types are more likely to participate. The equilibrium allocation does not induce cost-efficient human capital accumulation. Introducing ability tracking may produce beneficial results despite decreasing differences in human capital production.

Keywords: Education, peer-effects, matching, group formation.
JEL: I21, C78, D51.

1 Introduction

Important aspects of the economic allocation are often crucially determined by the allocation of social ties between economic agents. For instance, in many economies an individual’s success in encountering suitable employment depends largely on the social ties this individual has. Studies pioneered by Myers and Shultz (1951) find that individuals frequently encounter new jobs on the base of personal relationships. An individual with a greater number of loose acquaintances stands a better chance of encountering new employment (Granovetter, 1973). Other examples include trading networks where

∗The authors are grateful for valuable discussion to seminar participants in Mannheim, Bonn, at the UniNet Meeting in Warwick and the CTN Meeting 2006. Gall gratefully acknowledges financial support from the European Commission. The usual disclaimer applies.
†University of Konstanz; email: Roland.Amann@uni-konstanz.de
‡Corresponding author; University of Bonn, Economic Theory II, Lennéstr. 37, 53113 Bonn, Germany; email: tgall@uni-bonn.de
trade opportunities are open only to network members, or implicit risk-sharing agreements in social groups (for a recent survey on social networks see Jackson, 2005).

Therefore we argue that economic efficiency of an allocation cannot be evaluated independently of the formation of such social groups. When social groups are formed by decentralized decision-making of economic agents, observing market prices for group membership or individual ties is quite unusual. This is not to say that there does not exist a market and corresponding prices for group membership, however prices may take the form of in kind payments or the exchange of favors. This lack of observable transfers obstructs empirical research considerably. Therefore, one aim of this paper is to enable sharp predictions on the observable outcome.

A natural although by no means exclusive example of productive activity conducted jointly in social groups is that of human capital acquisition, especially in education. The particular allocation of students into social groups can be expected to affect acquisition of human capital due to the widely observed presence of peer effects. Peer effects are commonly found to provide a positive in-group externality, thereby introducing a local public good in human capital accumulation. A natural example are studying groups at university. The key idea of this paper is to separate peer effects within groups into those that affect primarily instantaneous utility and those that have a lasting effect on agents’ utility, for instance via an agent’s attribute such as human capital. We call the former consumption peer effects which may be thought of as favors provided by group members to their group mates that have a predominantly consumptive character. On the other hand, when peer effects affect the future utility stream, most notably by changing an agent’s characteristics such as productivity, we use the term productive peer effects. That is, we argue that group formation is determined not only by ability. Indeed, in a recent study Heckman et al. (2006) present evidence that both cognitive and non-cognitive abilities affect significantly agents’ socio-economic outcomes.

In the process of social group formation individuals will be able to exploit both types of peer effects to generate utility. Peer effects are assumed to be subject to decreasing differences (see e.g. Hanushek et al., 2001, Vigdor and Nechyba, 2004, for some empirical support of this hypothesis), this assumption is not tight, however, and can be replaced by assuming there exist gains from trade for some agents. Agents are heterogenous with respect to their ability to produce each kind of peer effects. This introduces a possibility for agents to ”trade“ across the two dimensions. In the baseline model agents’ attractiveness for a potential match is determined exclusively by their type. Intuitively, a
charming person can potentially make up for a certain deficit in skill – and vice versa. Agents located on a componentwise extremum of the type space will, however, fail to encounter any agents either acceptable or willing to accept and segregate. This favors a decentralized allocation characterized by bunching, that is heterogenous groups of intermediate types and homogeneous groups of extreme types. In an extension we show that this intuition carries over to attribute choice as long as agents cannot to commit to pre-specified investment levels or the transferability of utility generated by the possibility to try harder for a better match is sufficiently low.

Formally, the paper employs a one-sided static matching model with endogenous group size and strictly nontransferable utility. It is well-known that the matching pattern depends on agents’ ability to transfer utility (e.g. Legros and Newman, 2004, for results on assortative matching). Already Becker (1973) shows that positive assortative matching occurs in spite of decreasing differences of valuation functions under strictly nontransferable utility. In contrast to this we do not find assortative matching on the entire type space but segregation and bunching in different regions of the type space. The reason is that agents may compensate each other across dimensions. The decentralized allocation fails to maximize aggregate surplus or human capital production since although heterogenous coalitions are formed, heterogeneous matches tend to be constrained to types on the same level set only. This means the model yields a set of testable predictions. Negative assortative matching between agents of similar attractiveness to other agents implies that the correlation between group members’ attributes is not perfect and possibly nonlinear. Some heterogeneity in taste types can be expected since the equilibrium allows agents of different taste types to match together if they have a preference for their match’s strength. Moreover, agents whose types have extreme differences between dimensions gain most from group membership implying high participation rate for these agents.

Recently, the results of the PISA studies have rekindled interest in educational policies such as ability tracking. Yet our model suggests that some caution is appropriate concerning the introduction of ability tracking, that is the sorting of students with respect to ability. Although human capital production has decreasing differences we find that introducing ability tracking may indeed increase human capital production by altering the allocation of social groups. Moreover, since equilibrium allocations tend to be Pareto efficient switching from one regime to another is bound to create losers.

This paper is related to the contributions of Epple and Romano (1998) and Epple et al. (2002). They analyze school choice when agents differ in income
and ability and schools set admission fees and ability standards. Profit maximization by schools then introduces a substitutability between income and ability that leads to stratification by income and ability, while we find negative assortive matching between agents of similar attractiveness when monetary transfers are not feasible. This connects our paper also to earlier work on Tiebout economies, see among others Conley and Wooders (2001) for a very general setup. They find that core allocations do not necessarily exhibit homogeneity in taste, where taste refers to preference orderings over local public good provision. Our model is able to replicate this finding, in particular for agents who have preferences valuing their respective strengths lower than their weaknesses. Another contribution of this paper emerges when interpreting the model as a pure exchange economy with indivisible goods. Our segregation result implies then that comparative advantage does not suffice for trade, trade rather tends to be limited to exploit absolute advantages on type level sets.

Finally, it stands to reason to take advantage of the model’s predictions on the nature of equilibrium matching patterns with respect to human capital formation. In particular, the model’s prediction of heterogeneous groups with respect to ability and social competence contrasts with the observation that agents tend to favor interaction with people similar to them, a feature known as homophily. We are currently gathering survey data on studying group formation among students at various German universities.

The paper proceeds by reviewing some empirical findings. Section 3 introduces the baseline model without effort investments, where agents generate peer effects according to their two-dimensional type. In section 4 we analyze properties of the decentralized allocation of the baseline model. Section 5 considers an extension allowing for effort investments and section 6 concludes.

2 Empirical Findings

Let us first review the empirical evidence that has been collected on peer effects in education. A general caveat is that empirical findings for class and school level studies tend to be affected by a number of econometric problems. This seems less to be the case for more recent room mate studies that can make use of random assignments and smaller peer groups.

Peer effects exist and are positive.

There has emerged a quite large body of evidence stating that less able students consistently tend to benefit from more able peer groups. One strand of the literature observes positive peer effects on students’ grades at school

Less able students benefit more from more able peers than more able students.

Hanushek et al. (2001) find that math test scores of bad students are affected more by the presence of good peers at classroom level than the test scores of good students, a finding that is affirmed by Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer (2005) for Austrian students with an emphasis on reading skills. Also a number of studies of roommate peer effects (Winston and Zimmerman, 2003, Zimmerman, 2003, Hoel et al., 2004) find that low ability students are affected to a greater extent by sharing rooms with high ability students than high ability students. This points to decreasing returns to scale for peer effects.

Peer effects eventually decrease in group size.

In the study of Hoel et al. (2004) peer effects decrease as social group size decreases. Maasoumi et al. (2004) find that whereas weak students benefit more from good peers in small classes, strong students benefit more in large classes. This lends some support to the view that peer effects are subject to congestion, and, in particular, that congestion decreases in average ability of the social group.

3 A Simple Model

3.1 Agents

In the model economy there live a continuum of agents. An agent is characterized by his ability to generate consumption and production peer effects, that is a tuple $(\gamma_i, \theta_i) \in \Gamma \times \Theta$ where $\Gamma$ where $\Theta$ are compact subsets of $\mathbb{R}$. Denote such a tuple by $i$. Only finitely many elements of $\Gamma \times \Theta$ are endowed with positive Lebesgue measure of agents. The set of all tuples endowed with positive measure is called the agent set $I$. An agent $i$’s preference ordering over exposure to consumption and production peer effects can be expressed by an additively separable function, say $c_i + h_i$, where $c_i$ denotes consumption...
peer effects agent $i$ is exposed to and $h_i$ the human capital accumulated by an agent $i$.³

### 3.2 Groups

Agents may form social groups to benefit from peer effects. Membership in a group is exclusive. A group in this model can be interpreted as an organizational unit fully encompassing any direct utility benefits emerging from social interaction between agents. A group $N$ is the set of its members $N = \{(\gamma_1, \theta_1), ..., (\gamma_i, \theta_i), ..., (\gamma_n, \theta_n)\}$ or, equivalently, the set of its members’ types. The size of group $N$ is given by $n$. We assume that each member has the possibility to unilaterally withdraw from a group and all members of a group must consent to the entry of a new member.

A group member $i$’s benefit from consumption peer effects within the group is a function $c_i(.)$ of all group members’ types.

$$c_i = c_i(N).$$

That is, consumption peer effects are a social activity generating utility for all group members. A group member $i$’s benefit from human capital production is a function $h_i(.)$ depending on all group members’ types as well.

$$h_i = h_i(N).$$

This means an agent not only raises her own human capital by her presence, but also provides human capital to the remainder of the group. This gives automatically the outside option of an agent $i$ who chooses to remain unmatched: $c_i(\{i\})$ and $h_i(\{i\})$. Consistent with the empirical observations cited above, the assumptions on the peer effects production functions are stated as follows.

**Assumption 1 (Peer effect production)** The peer effect production functions $c_i(.)$ and $h_i(.)$ have the following properties.

(i) Regularity: For all $i \in I$, $c_i(.)$ and $h_i(.)$ are continuously differentiable, strictly increasing functions and symmetric in the arguments $\gamma_j$, respectively $\theta_j$, with $j \neq i$.

(ii) Decreasing differences for all $i \in I$:

$$\frac{\partial^2 h_i(N)}{\partial \theta_i \theta_j} < 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial^2 c_i(N)}{\partial \gamma_i \gamma_j} < 0 \text{ for all } i, j \in N,$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 h_i(N)}{\partial \theta_i \gamma_j} \leq 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial^2 c_i(N)}{\partial \gamma_i \theta_j} \leq 0 \text{ for all } i, j \in N,$$

³For instance, productive peer effects may determine an agent’s human capital which in turn determines the wage and thus lifetime consumption.
(iii) Decreasing returns to size: For all \((\theta, \gamma) = (\theta_i, \gamma_i)\) with \(i \in I\)

\[
\begin{align*}
&h_i(N \cup \{i_{n+1}\}) - h_i(N) < h_i(N) - h_i(N \setminus \{i_n\}), \\
&c_i(N \cup \{i_{n+1}\}) - c_i(N) < c_i(N) - c_i(N \setminus \{i_n\})
\end{align*}
\]

for all \(i \in N\) with \(N = \{i_1, i_2, ..., i_n\}\), \(n > 1\) and \(\theta_i = \theta\) and \(\gamma_i = \gamma\).

(iv) Boundedness: For all \(i \in I\) there exists \(\bar{n}(\theta, \gamma) < \infty\) such that

\[
\begin{align*}
&h_i(\bar{N}) + c_i(\bar{N}) - (h_i(\bar{N} \setminus \{i_{\bar{n}}\}) + c_i(\bar{N} \setminus \{i_{\bar{n}}\})) \leq 0
\end{align*}
\]

where \(\bar{N} = \{i_1, i_2, ..., i_{\bar{n}}\}\) with \(\theta_{i_j} = \theta_i\) and \(\gamma_{i_j} = \gamma_i\) with \(j = 1, ..., \bar{n}\).

Part (i) ensures tractability of the model by assuming sufficient regularity on the production functions. \(h_i()\) and \((c_i().)\) are defined on \(\mathbb{R}^{2n}\) rather than on the type space to ensure compatibility with section 5 where effort is introduced. (ii) reflects the empirical finding of decreasing returns to scale of peer effects in human capital production. Consumption peer effects have decreasing returns as well and there may be substitutability between consumption and production peer effects, for instance due to a concave utility function.\(^4\) Part (iii) reflects a congestion effect on peer effects as the group size increases and the group gets more crowded and (iv) ensures that group sizes are finite as congestion precludes additional benefits from peer effects at some finite group size. Congestion is assumed to affect both consumption and production peer effect production similarly as both effects work primarily through the same channel, communication between agents. This is, for instance due to an agents’ limited span of attention, severely impeded by congestion. Whether more or less able groups have greater sizes depends on whether differences in peer effects are decreasing or increasing in input levels, a property that appears hard to ascertain in empirical studies.

### 3.3 Agents’ valuations

An agent \(i\)'s valuation from being matched into a particular social group \(N\) depends on the types of the other group members and on his own type and is denoted by \(v_i\).

\[
v_i(N) = c_i(N) + h_i(N).
\]

This means an agent’s valuation for a coalition \(N\) is the utility from being exposed to the peer effects in the coalition. If an agent remains solitary his

\(^4\)Note that this set of assumptions is not tight. The crucial assumption is that there exist agent types that have gains from trade, in the sense that they mutually benefit from forming a group with respect to segregation. This may stem from decreasing differences in peer effect exposure, from agents’ preferences or from concavity of the utility function.
valuation is given by \( v_i = v_i(\{i\}) \geq 0 \). Note that \( v_i(.) \) is submodular on \((\Theta \times \Gamma)^{|N|}\) due to decreasing returns to scale in Assumption 1.

### 3.4 Group formation

Group formation occurs on a matching market under complete information. Agents decide on whom to match into a group with and can commit to their decision. Group membership is strictly voluntarily. As equilibrium concept we choose a static one-sided matching equilibrium. Let \( \mathcal{F}(I) \) denote the set of all finite subsets of the agent space \( I \). Formally, a matching equilibrium in this model is defined as follows.

**Definition 1** A matching equilibrium denoted by \( P^* \) is a partition of the agent space \( I \) into finite coalitions such that

- \( P^* \) is measure consistent, and
- \( \not\exists P'_i \in \mathcal{F}(I) \) such that \( v_i(P'_i) > v_i(P^*_i) \forall i \in P'_i \) (stability).

Measure consistency requires loosely speaking that the measure of first members of a certain group equals the measure of second members etc. Stability means that there exist no deviating coalition such that all members of the deviating coalition are better off than in the equilibrium allocation. Note that this equilibrium is in fact equivalent to the f-core.  

### 3.5 Benchmark

Pareto optimality has not much bite in this framework, as introducing an arbitrarily small degree of transferability into the model renders any matching equilibrium allocation Pareto optimal. Therefore we introduce two concepts of optimality that may be of interest from a policy perspective. For comparison with a world in which utility is perfectly transferable consider first the objective to maximize the aggregate sum of utility in the economy, i.e. to finding a partition \( P \) of the type space into finite groups such that \( \sum_{i \in I} v_i(P_i) \) with \( P_i \in P \) is maximized. By decreasing differences of \( h_i(.) \) and \( c_i(.) \) for all \( i \in I \) under Assumption 1 it is straightforward that matching must be component-wise negative assortative, that is \( \theta_i > \theta_j \) implies \( \theta_l \leq \theta_k \) for some \( l \in P_i \) and some \( k \in P_j \). Matching across dimensions must be negative assortative as well for negative spillovers between dimension and there is no indication for separability of both dimensions.  

---

5See Kaneko and Wooders (1986, 1996) on measure consistency and the f-core.  
6If \( c_i(.) \) has increasing differences for all \( i \in I \), the utility maximizing matching must be negative assortative on \( \Theta \) and positive assortative on \( \Gamma \). If there are positive spillovers
4 Properties of equilibrium

As a first step we verify that an equilibrium indeed exists. This is fairly straightforward using a result by Kaneko and Wooders (1986). Thus it suffices to show that a characteristic function can be constructed from \( v_i \) meeting some regularity conditions and that per capita payoffs are bounded in all coalitions.

**Proposition 1** A matching equilibrium \( P^* \) exists.

*Proof:* In Appendix.

4.1 Matching Pattern

Of primary interest is, of course, the matching pattern that emerges in equilibrium. Start by noting that an agent \( i \) can never persuade a social group where every member’s type on each dimension is at least as high as \( i \)'s type to let him join. This is a direct implication of strictly nontransferable utility but does not imply it, see section 5. The agent \( i \) may, however, be able to persuade a group to let him join if \( i \) replaces a member whose type is strictly lower on one dimension at least.

Agent \( i \) in turn must prefer to join the group as well. Since all agents can secure themselves at least the payoff from being member of a homogenous group, this gives a lower bound on \( i \)'s payoff in the group. Denote an optimally sized homogenous coalition of agent type \( i \) by \( N_i \). Hence, homogeneous groups are not stable if there exists an agent \( i \) whose type is (i) lower on one dimension and higher on the other than the group members’ type, and (ii) there exist gains from trade, that is \( i \) has an absolute advantage sufficiently great that is valued by the group and vice versa. To formalize this intuition we say agent \( i \) has *absolute gains from trade* with \( j \) if there exists \( x \) on the lattice \( \{(\theta_i, \gamma); (\theta_j, \gamma_j)\}^{\max\{|N_i|;|N_j|\}} \) such that

\[
 v_i(x) > v_i(N_i) \text{ and } v_j(x) > v_j(N_j). 
\]

We use this to derive a sufficient condition for the emergence of homogenous groups in equilibrium.

**Proposition 2** A homogeneous group of type \((\theta, \gamma)\) agents cannot be blocked if there does not exist a type \((\theta', \gamma')\) with \( \text{sgn}(\gamma_N - \gamma_M) \neq \text{sgn}(\theta_N - \theta_M) \), \(|\gamma - \gamma'| \) and \(|\theta - \theta'| \) sufficiently great, so that there exist mutual absolute gains from trade between \((\theta, \gamma)\) and \((\theta', \gamma')\).

---

between dimensions, the benchmark allocation must have positive assortative matching between dimensions.
Proof: Let \( N \) denote a homogenous group of agents of type \((\theta, \gamma)\) of size \( n^* (\theta, \gamma) \). Let \( n^* = \arg \max_n v_i (N) \). \( N \) cannot be blocked in an equilibrium allocation \( P \) if there is no \( N' \) with \((\theta, \gamma) \in N' \) such that for all \( i \in N' \) it holds that \( v_i (N') > v_i (N) \) if \( i \in N \) and \( v_j (N') > v_j (P) \) if \( j \notin N \). For an agent \( j \) it must hold that \( v_j (P) \geq v_j (M) \) where \( M \) is a homogenous group of type \((\theta_j, \gamma_j)\) agents of optimal size \( m^* \) as this gives the minimal payoff any agent \( j \) can obtain in equilibrium. That is, \( N \) cannot be blocked if there does not exist \( N' \) with \( v_i (N') > v_i (N) \) if \( i \in N \) and \( v_j (N') > v_j (M) \) if \( j \notin N \).

Note that if \( N' \) exists, it must contain at least one agent of type \((\theta, \gamma)\) with \( \theta > \theta_M \) and \( \gamma < \gamma_M \) or vice versa by monotonicity of \( h_i (\cdot) \) and \( c_i (\cdot) \). Suppose without loss of generality that \( \theta > \theta_M \) and \( \gamma < \gamma_M \). Then the existence of \( N' \) implies that there exists \( x \) on the lattice \( X = \{(\theta, \gamma); (\theta_M, \gamma_M)\}^{\max \{n^*; m^*\}} \) such that \( h_i (N) - h_i (x) < c_i (x) - c_i (N) \) and \( h_j (x) - h_j (M) > c_j (M) - c_j (x) \). This implies \( c_i (M) - c_i (N) > h_i (N) - h_i (x) \) and \( c_j (M) - c_j (x) < h_j (N) - h_j (M) \), that is \( h_i (x) > h_i (N) \) and \( c_i (N) \) and \( c_j (x) > c_j (M) - (h_i (N) - h_i (M)) \) for all \( i \in N' \) and \( N' \) = \( X \). Since \( c_j (x) > c_j (x') \) implies \( h_i (x) < h_i (x') \), \( x, x' \in X \), and the lattice \( X \) is a discrete space, there exist \( \delta > 0 \) and \( \delta > 0 \) such that \( c_i (M) - c_i (N) \) and \( h_i (N) - h_i (M) > \delta \) for all \( i \in N, j \in M \). Because of monotonicity of \( h_i (\cdot) \) and \( c_i (\cdot) \) there exist \( \theta > 0 \) and \( \gamma > 0 \) such that \( \hat{\theta} > \theta_M \) and \( \hat{\gamma} > \gamma_M \). Moreover, the condition \( v_i (x) > v_i (N) \) and \( v_j (x) > v_j (M) \) for some \( x \in X \) as defined above is the definition of absolute gains from mutual trade for both \( i \) and \( j \).

That is, existence of \( N' \) implies existence of a type \((\theta, \gamma)\) with \( \gamma - \gamma_M > \gamma_M - \gamma_M > \hat{\gamma} \) and \( \theta - \theta_M > \hat{\theta} \), and \((\theta, \gamma)\) such that \( i \) has gains from trade with \( j \) and the reverse is true as well. The proposition follows by contraposition.

This means agents close to the border of the agent space on both dimensions segregate, as well as agents that do not have counterparts who are similarly attractive, measured by the sum of attributes. Moreover, reversing Proposition 2 implies that homogenous coalitions of both type \((\theta, \gamma)\) and type \((\theta', \gamma')\) agents cannot be part of an equilibrium. This allows us to state the following corollary.

**Corollary 1** An allocation of only homogeneous groups of agents cannot be stable if there exist types \( \theta \) and \( \theta' \) with \( \text{sgn}(\gamma - \gamma') \neq \text{sgn}(\theta - \theta') \), both \( |\gamma - \gamma'| \) and \( |\theta - \theta'| \) sufficiently great, and \( |\theta + \gamma - (\theta' + \gamma')| \) sufficiently small.

That is, whenever the attribute space is sufficiently large and sufficiently rich, there will emerge heterogeneous coalitions formed by agents in the interior.
of the type space. In this case returns to specialization within a group are sufficiently large to be exploited despite nontransferable utility. To capture this idea let us introduce the concept of *symmetric* types of agents.

**Definition 2 (Symmetric Types)** Types $J = \{(\theta_1, \gamma_1), (\theta_2, \gamma_2), \ldots\}$ are

- symmetric at $n$ if there exists $N^*(n)$ such that $N^*(n) = \arg \max_{N \in J^n} v_j(N)$ for all $j \in J$, $J \subseteq N^*$ with $\frac{\partial v_j(N^*)}{\partial \gamma_l} = - \frac{\partial v_j(N^*)}{\partial \theta_l}$ for all $j \in J$,

- symmetric if they are symmetric at $n^*$ and there exists $N^* = \arg \max_{N \in \{N^*(n) : n \in \mathbb{N}\}} v_j(N)$ for all $j \in J$.

For instance, in the most simple version of the model where $v_i = h(\theta) + c(\gamma)$ and $h(.) = c(.)$, $i$ and $j$ are symmetric types at even group sizes if $\theta_i = \gamma_j$ and $\gamma_1 = \theta_1$ and $i$, $j$, and $k$ are symmetric types at odd group sizes if $i$ and $j$ as above and $\theta_k = \frac{1}{2}(\theta_i + \theta_j) = \gamma_k$. Choosing a functional form $h(\theta) = (\sum_{l=1}^n \theta_l)^{1/n}$ and likewise for $c(.)$, types $i$ and $j$ are symmetric if $\theta_i = \gamma_i$ and $\theta_i + \theta_j \geq \frac{9}{4}$.

Note that heterogenous groups of agents with symmetric types fully exploit the returns to specialization under strictly nontransferable utility. Hence, coalitions of symmetric agents cannot be blocked. Indeed, whenever the outside option of all agents are sufficiently low, that is when congestion is not severe, we have the following.

**Proposition 3** Let $v_i(\{i\}) \leq v_i(\{i, i\})$ for all $i \in 1 \times \Theta$. An allocation with only heterogenous groups of symmetric agents is stable.

**Proof:** Let $J$ be symmetric agents. We first show that in a coalition of symmetric agents at $n$, $N^*(n) \in J^n$ defined as in Definition 2, an agent $l \notin N^*$ is preferred by $i \in J$ to $j \neq i \in J$ if $\theta_i + \gamma_l > \theta_j + \gamma_j$. Then we extend this result to coalitions of symmetric agents with respect to deviations by any finite set of agents $L \notin N^*$. Finally, we argue that under an allocation of only groups of symmetric agents there exists no blocking coalition.

Let us look at agent $i$ without loss of generality. For $i$ to prefer $l$ to $j$ it must hold that $v_i(\{N', l\}) > v_i(\{N', j\})$ where $N' = N^* \setminus \{j\}$. This implies

$$h_i(\{N', l\}) - h_i(\{N', j\}) > c_i(\{N', j\}) - c_i(\{N', l\}).$$

(1)

For $\frac{2}{n} \leq \theta_i + \theta_j \leq \frac{9}{4}$ the preferred group size increases to 3 and $i$ and $j$ are symmetric if and only if $\theta_j = \frac{2}{3} \theta_i + \frac{1}{3} \gamma_i$ in which case $N^* = \{i, j, \ldots\}$ or $\theta_j = -\frac{1}{3} \theta_i + \frac{2}{3} \gamma_i$ with $N^* = \{i, i, j, \ldots\}$. Additionally there are symmetric types $J$ with $|J| = 3$ and $\sum_{j \in J} \theta_j = \sum_{j \in J} \gamma_j$ and $\theta_j + \gamma_j = c$ for all $j \in J$. 

---

\[\text{Note:} \]

\[\text{For} \ \frac{2}{n} \leq \theta_i + \theta_j \leq \frac{9}{4} \text{ the preferred group size increases to 3 and } i \text{ and } j \text{ are symmetric if and only if } \theta_j = \frac{2}{3} \theta_i + \frac{1}{3} \gamma_i \text{ in which case } N^* = \{i, j, \ldots\} \text{ or } \theta_j = -\frac{1}{3} \theta_i + \frac{2}{3} \gamma_i \text{ with } N^* = \{i, i, j, \ldots\}. \]
Symmetry of $i$ and $j$, monotonicity and decreasing differences of $h_i$ and $c_i$ in all arguments imply that $v_i(N)$ attains a maximum at $N = N^*(n)$ in the space $\mathcal{A} = N' \cup \{(\theta, \gamma) \in \Theta \times \Gamma : \theta + \gamma \leq \theta_i + \gamma_i\}$. Hence, it is not possible to find $l \neq j \in A$ such that (1) holds with $\gamma_l + \theta_l \leq \gamma_i + \theta_i$. The extension of this argument to potential blocking coalitions with sets of agents $L \not\subseteq N^*(n)$ is straightforward as by Definition 2 $v_i(N)$ attains a maximum at $N = N^*(n)$ in the space $\mathcal{A} = N' \cup \{(\theta, \gamma) \in \Theta \times \Gamma : \theta + \gamma \leq \theta_i + \gamma_i, \forall l \in N\}$ as well. Hence, for (1) to hold, there must be $l \in L$ with $\theta_l + \gamma_l > \theta_i + \gamma_i$. That is, a group $N^*(n)$ of agents symmetric at $n$ is stable with respect to deviating coalitions of the same size. Hence, a group $N^*$ such that $N^* = \arg \max_{N \in \{N^*(n), n \in N\}} v_j(N)$ for all $j \in J$, that is $J$ are symmetric, is stable with respect to potential blocking coalitions $L$ containing only types $l$ with $\theta_l + \gamma_l \leq \theta_i + \gamma_i$.

This implies that a collection $P$ of finite sets of agents containing only groups of symmetric types is stable. Under $P$ an agent $i \in P_i \subseteq P$ has no deviating coalition. For any $L$ such that $v_i(\{i, L\}) > v_i(P_i)$ there must be $l \in L$ with $\theta_l + \gamma_l > \theta_i + \gamma_i$. By the above argument then $v_i(\{l, L\}) < v_i(P_i)$, $P_l \in P$. Since $v_i(P_i) \geq v_i(N_i)$, $N_i = \{i, i, \ldots, i\}$, for all $|N_i| > 0$ by the previous argument the assumption implies that $i$ prefers $P_i$ to $\{i\}$. Hence, an allocation $P$ with only symmetric groups of agents is stable.

Whether an allocation of symmetric agents will indeed emerge in equilibrium will depend heavily on the distribution of types in the economy. Hence, Proposition 3 primarily aims to highlight the mechanism at work in the matching market. Heterogenous coalitions form if there exist types such that gains from specialization outweigh potentially differing levels of inputs, yet heterogeneity is limited by non-transferable utility in that peers in groups are of similar attractiveness to the market.

### 4.2 Participation

Of particular interest is which agents will form into social groups and which agents will choose to remain solitary. Start by noting that for any agent who chooses to remain unmatched by decreasing returns to group size the following must hold.

$$h_i(\{i\}) + c_i(\{i\}) > h_i(\{i, i\}) + c_i(\{i, i\}).$$

This means a necessary condition for unmatched agents is given by sufficiently severe congestion. To translate this into a condition on the primitives requires putting more structure on the congestion function. However, only agents
matching into homogenous coalition are pushed to their lower utility boundary. All other agent types must receive more than their segregation payoff. Note that singletons are homogenous groups with optimal size 1 in the terminology of Proposition 2. Therefore a sufficient condition for agent $i$ to remain unmatched in equilibrium is given by (2) and the condition in Proposition (2), that is there does not exist a type $j \neq i$ with positive measure so that $\text{sgn}(\gamma_i - \gamma_j) \neq \text{sgn}(\theta_i - \theta_j)$, both $|\gamma_i - \gamma_j|$ and $|\theta_i - \theta_j|$ sufficiently great, and there exist mutual gains from trade.

That is, agents whose potential gains from trade are comparatively small are likeliest to remain unmatched. Gains from trade for agent $i$ by matching into group $N$ provided the remaining group members accept $i$ are given by

$$h_i(N) + c_i(N) - (h_i(N_i) + c_i(N_i)),$$

where $N_i$ denotes a homogenous group of $i$ agents of size $|N|$. Expanding the term shows that gains from trade depend positively on the distance of attributes in each dimension. Hence, agents with balanced attributes, that is agents where the difference $\frac{\partial h_i(\cdot)}{\partial i} - \frac{\partial c_i(\cdot)}{\partial i}$ is comparatively low, have little to gain from forming groups with other agents. This means whenever congestion is severe for an agent type $i$, there are no gains from trade or location at an componentwise extremum of the type dimension make it likely that $i$ remains unmatched in equilibrium.

### 4.3 Ability Tracking

Given that the issue of ability tracking has induced some interest in the recent past we are interested in how it may affect the decentralized allocation in our model. Ability tracking refers to the policy of segregating students of similar ability. Although the assumption of decreasing differences in generating peer effects seems to suggest that ability tracking cannot be beneficial from the perspective of a social planner, we have to provide two caveats.

Ability tracking can be incorporated in the model as partitioning the agent space along the ability dimension. Note first that a change in the partitioning of the agent space can never induce a Pareto superior allocation if preferences over social groups are strict or there is some degree of transferability. Secondly, when ability tracking is introduced, indirect effects may dominate the direct effect from decreasing differences and both human capital production and aggregate utility may increase. Consider the simple example depicted in Figure 1 (for the numerical example see the Appendix). Preferences are such that groups size is bounded above by 2 and there are equal measures of agents types $A$, $B$, $C$, and $D$. $A$ prefers $B$ to $A$ and $A$ to everyone else. $B$ prefers $C$
to both $A$ and $D$, and $A$ to $B$. $C$ prefers $B$ to $D$ and $D$ to $C$, while $D$ prefers $C$ to $D$. Under ability tracking, symbolized by the dotted line separating the agent space, $A$ will match with $B$ and $C$ with $D$. Without ability tracking $B$ and $C$ match into a social group while $A$ and $D$ segregate. Note that it is possible to slightly adjust preferences in this example so that introducing ability tracking is a Pareto improvement.

Figure 1: Introducing Ability Tracking

That is, separating the type space may break up relatively homogenous groups thereby enabling more heterogenous groups. This is favored, for instance, by high in-group correlation of types without ability tracking. This example primarily aims to highlight that assessing the consequences of a regime change is not obvious even when assuming decreasing differences in human capital production.

5 Effort Investment

This section looks at a simple extension of the baseline model by letting agents choose effort levels on each dimension. This may introduce limited transferability of utility when effort levels proposed explicitly or implicitly at the matching stage are credible. Therefore both cases, with and without commitment, are considered. The results prove to be reasonably robust, as in the case of no commitment power, there is a unique Nash equilibrium within a group and this essentially permits the above analysis to hold true. In case of commitment power Proposition 2 continues to hold if the inputs are sufficiently complementary in the classical sense as to induce sufficient productivity loss when moving away from the optimal factor input ratio.
5.1 Framework

In this section agents have the opportunity to exert effort in order to provide consumption and production peer effects. Denote agent $i$’s effort levels in consumption peer effects by $g_i \in \mathbb{R}$ and by $f_i \in \mathbb{R}$ in production peer effects. Exerting effort comes at a utility cost of $k_c(g_i, \gamma_i)$ and $k_h(f_i, \theta_i)$, respectively. An agent’s cost of effort is affected by his type. The utility is additively separable, so that an agent’s utility function becomes $u_i = c_i + h_i - k_c - k_h$.

Cost functions are strictly convex in investments $g_i$, $f_i$ and differ across agents only by the parameters $\gamma_i$ and $\theta_i$. In particular, we assume that higher types always face higher marginal costs all else equal.

**Assumption 2 (Single crossing)** For all $i, j \in I$:

\[
\gamma_i > \gamma_j \iff \frac{\partial k_c(g_i, \gamma_i)}{\partial g} < \frac{\partial k_c(g_j, \gamma_j)}{\partial g} \forall g \geq 0 \text{ and }
\theta_i > \theta_j \iff \frac{\partial k_h(f_i, \theta_i)}{\partial f} < \frac{\partial k_h(f_j, \theta_j)}{\partial f} \forall f \geq 0.
\]

This means the higher an agent’s type the lower the marginal cost for producing peer effects at any given level of peer effects. Production of peer effects is adapted to the introduction of effort. Consumption peer effects in a group $N$ are generated according to the function $c_i((f_j, g_j)_{j \in N})$. Production peer effects are generated according to the function $h_i((f_j, g_j)_{j \in N})$.

Unfortunately, it is necessary to put some more regularity on the functions $c_i$ and $h_i$ to ensure tractability of the model when allowing for effort investments.

**Assumption 3 (Peer effect production)** In addition to Assumption 1 the functions $c_i$ and $h_i$ have the following properties.

(i) $c_i(N, f, g) = c_i((g_j)_{j \in N})$ and $h_i(N, f, g) = h_i((f_j)_{j \in N})$.

(ii) for all $i, j \in I$, $c_i$ and $h_i$ are linear transformations of $c_j$ and $h_j$, respectively.

Part (i) of this assumption assumes separability of consumption and production peer effects and (ii) is needed for comparative static analysis.

5.2 Agents’ valuations

An agent $i$’s valuation from being matched into group $N$ depends on the investments in peer effects of the other group members and on his own investment net of effort cost and is denoted by $v_i$.

\[
v_i(N, f, g) = c_i((f_j, g_j)_{j \in N}) + h_i((f_j, g_j)_{j \in N}) - k_c(g_i, \gamma_i) - k_h(f_i, \theta_i).
\]
If an agent \( i \) remains solitary his valuation is given by \( v_i(i, f^*_i, g^*_i) \geq 0 \) where \((f^*_i, g^*_i)\) maximizes \( c_i + h_i - k_c(g_i, \gamma_i) - k_h(f_i, \theta_i) \). Given the assumptions on regularity this program has always a unique solution. Note that \( v_i(.) \) is submodular in \((f, g)\) due to decreasing returns to scale in Assumption 1.

### 5.3 Equilibrium Concept

The equilibrium concept employed needs some modification as well in order to account for effort decisions. Let a matching equilibrium with effort investments under commitment be defined as follows.

**Definition 3** A matching equilibrium denoted by \((P^*, f^*, g^*)\) is a partition \(P^*\) of the agent space \( I \) into finite coalitions and individual investment plans in human capital \( f^* \) and social activities \( g^* \) such that

- \( P^* \) is measure consistent, and
- \( \nexists P'_i \in \mathcal{F}(I) \) such that \( v_i(P'_i, f_{P'_i}, g_{P'_i}) > v_i(P^*_i, f_{P^*_i}, g_{P^*_i}) \forall i \in P'_i \) (stability).

The key difference to section 3 is that with effort investment and commitment there arises a limited opportunity for transferring utility between group members. Existence is straightforward by a version of the proof of Proposition 1.

### 5.4 Constrained efficient investments

Let an agent \( i \) be member of social group \( N \) of size \( n \). Let \( V(N, f, g) = \sum_{i\in N} v_i(N, f, g) \) denote the value of a group \( N \) given vectors of investments \((f, g)\). Surplus maximizing investments within this social group solve the following optimization problem of the coalition \(N\).

\[
\max_{(f_i, g_i), i \in N} \sum_{i \in N} v_i(N, g, f) .
\] (3)

First order necessary conditions are then for all \( i \in N \)

\[
\sum_{i \in N} \frac{\partial c(g_1, \ldots, g_n)}{\partial g_i} = \frac{\partial k_c(g_i, \gamma_i)}{\partial g_i} \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{i \in N} \frac{\partial h(f_1, \ldots, f_n)}{\partial f_i} = \frac{\partial k_h(f_i, \theta_i)}{\partial f_i} .
\] (4)

Denote the investment vectors defined by these equations by \( f^* \) and \( g^* \).

Then define the potential value of a coalition \(N\) by

\[
V^*(N) = \arg \max_{(f_i, g_i), i \in N} \sum_{i \in N} v_i(N, g, f) .
\]
$V^*(N)$ is the highest attainable sum of utilities in social group $N$. Note, however, that $(f^*_i, g^*_i)_{i \in N}$ pins down uniquely the allocation of the surplus among group members. The allocation of surplus within the group can be changed by varying investment levels of agents. This induces a fundamental nontransferability of utility. Define now the utility possibility frontier of agent $i \in N$ in group $N$ by the maximum amount of utility $i$ can secure for himself provided all agents $j \neq i \in N$ obtain at least $u_j$ each. $u_i$ is shorthand for the vector of the remaining agents’ minimum utility.

$$
\phi_i(N, u_{-i}) = \max_{(f_j, g_j)_{j \in N}} v_i(N, g, f) \text{ s.t. } \forall j \neq i \in N, v_j(N, g, f) = u_j \geq 0. \tag{5}
$$

Note that for sufficiently high $u_j$ this maximization problem has no solution. Set in this case $\phi_i(u_{-i}) = 0$. Then the utility possibility frontier of coalition $N$, $\Phi(N)$ can be written as

$$
\Phi(N) = \{u \in \mathbb{R}^n : u_i = \phi_i(u_{-i}) \forall i \in N\}.
$$

$\Phi(N)$ gives all distributions of surplus within group $N$ on the efficient frontier. The optimization problem (5) requires agents to choose investments as to minimize utility cost when providing a given utility level to the other group members. That means for all points of $\Phi(N)$ all members of $N$ have to equate their marginal costs of investment in human capital and social activities.

For all points $u \in \Phi(N)$ it must hold that the associated investment levels are constrained optimal, that is

$$
\frac{\partial h(\cdot)}{\partial f_i} = \frac{\partial k_h(f_i, \theta_i)}{\partial f_i} \text{ and } \frac{\partial h(\cdot)}{\partial f_j} = \lambda_j \frac{\partial k_h(f_j, \theta_j)}{\partial f_j} \forall j \neq i \in N,
$$

$$
h(g, f) + c(g, f) - k_h(f_j) - k_c(g_j) = u_j \forall j \neq i \in N.
$$

where $\lambda_j$ denote the Lagrange multipliers. Necessary conditions for investment in $g_i$ are derived analogously. Let us state now a number of technical preliminaries that will become useful later on.

**Lemma 1** (Monotonicity) For any $N \in \mathcal{F}(I)$, it holds for all $i \in N$ that $\gamma_i > \gamma_j \Rightarrow g^*_i > g^*_j$ and $\theta_i > \theta_j \Rightarrow f^*_i > f^*_j$ for $g^*$ and $f^*$ that solve (3).

**Proof:** $f^*$ and $g^*$ solve problem (3). Hence, the necessary conditions (4) hold. Let us focus on investments in productive peer effects first. Symmetry and strict concavity of $h(\cdot)$ imply that

$$
\sum_{j \in N} \frac{\partial h(\cdot)}{\partial f_i} < \sum_{j \in N} \frac{\partial h(\cdot)}{\partial f_j} \Leftrightarrow f^*_i > f^*_j. \tag{6}
$$
By convexity of the cost function and single crossing in Assumption 2 it holds that

\[ \theta_i > \theta_j \implies \left( \frac{\partial k_h(f^*_i, \theta_i)}{\partial f_i} \geq \frac{\partial k_h(f^*_j, \theta_j)}{\partial f_j} \land f^*_i \geq f^*_j \right) \]

\[ \lor \left( \frac{\partial k_h(f^*_i, \theta_i)}{\partial f_i} < \frac{\partial k_h(f^*_j, \theta_j)}{\partial f_j} \land f^*_i < f^*_j \right), \tag{7} \]

for some well-defined \( f(\theta_i, \theta_j, f^*_j) > f^*_i \). Using the identities (4) and equivalence (6) the first case yields a contradiction. Hence, using (4) and (6),

\[ \theta_i > \theta_j \implies f(\theta_i, \theta_j, f^*_j) > f^*_i > f^*_j. \]

An analogous argument hold for \( g^* \).

Define now the surplus maximizing group size of a homogenous group of type \((\gamma, \theta)\) agents, \( n^*(\gamma, \theta) \).

\[ n^*(\gamma, \theta) = \arg \max_n V^*(N) \text{ with } n = |N| \text{ and } (\gamma_i, \theta_i) = (\gamma, \theta) \forall i \in N. \tag{8} \]

Denote such a group by \( N^*(\gamma, \theta) \). Then \( V^*(N^*(\gamma, \theta)) \) gives the maximal value of a homogenous coalition. The following lemma shows that this determines an agent \( i \)'s minimal payoff in a matching equilibrium, \( v(\gamma, \theta) \).

**Lemma 2** (Segregation Payoffs) In any matching equilibrium, an agent \( i \) of type \((\gamma, \theta)\) obtains at least payoff

\[ v(\gamma, \theta) = h(g^*_i, ..., g^*_{n^*(\gamma, \theta)}) - k_c(g^*) + h(f^*_1, ..., f^*_{n^*(\gamma, \theta)}) - k_h(f^*), \]

where \( g^*_i = g^* \) and \( f^*_i = f^* \), with \( i = 1, ..., n^*(\gamma, \theta) \) solve (4) for \( N^*(\gamma, \theta) \) and \( n^*(\gamma, \theta) \) is defined as in (8).

**Proof**: All types are endowed with positive measure. Hence, an agent \( i \) of type \((\gamma, \theta)\) cannot receive less payoff in an equilibrium group than by matching into a homogeneous group. The homogeneous group generating maximum surplus is given by \( N^*(\gamma, \theta) \). Constrained efficient investments \( f^*_i \) and \( g^*_i \) are given by (4). By Lemma 1, for a homogeneous group it must hold that \( g^*_i = g^*_j \) and \( f^*_i = f^*_j \) with \( i \neq j \in N^*(\gamma, \theta) \). Therefore any agent \( i \) of type \((\gamma, \theta)\) can secure himself at least payoff \( v(\gamma, \theta) = h(g^*) - k_c(g^*) + h(f^*) - k_h(f^*) \) in an efficient homogeneous coalition \( N^*(\gamma, \theta) \).

For any equilibrium with positive measure of a homogeneous coalition \( N \), each \( i \in N \) must receive the same payoff and \((n, f, g)\) must maximize group surplus under equal sharing. Hence, the only stable homogeneous coalition is \( N^*(\gamma, \theta) \) with investments \( f^*(N^*(\gamma, \theta)) \) and \( g^*(N^*(\gamma, \theta)) \). Otherwise, there is
a positive measure of agents with lower payoff who are able to form this group and thus obtain strictly higher payoffs.

Lemma 2 gives agents’ segregation payoffs which coincide with payoffs of agents matched into homogenous coalitions with positive measure in equilibrium. Moreover, the regularity assumptions on the production function and cost allow us to state the following important preliminary that will become useful for determing the efficiency benchmark.

Lemma 3 $V^*(N)$ is strictly increasing and strictly submodular in members’ types $(\gamma, \theta)$.

Proof: The system of equations (4) defines $f^*(N, \theta)$ and $g^*(N, \gamma)$ because of separability of utility. Differentiating $V^*(N) = V(N, g^*(N, \gamma), f^*(N, \theta))$ with respect to $\gamma_i$ and $\theta_i$ yields by the envelope theorem

$$\frac{\partial V^*(N, \gamma, \theta)}{\partial \gamma_i} = -\frac{\partial k_c(g^*_i(\gamma), \gamma_i)}{\partial \gamma_i} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial V^*(N, \gamma, \theta)}{\partial \theta_i} = -\frac{\partial k_h(f^*_i(\theta), \theta_i)}{\partial \theta_i} > 0.$$

The cross partial derivatives are then

$$\frac{\partial^2 V^*(N, \gamma, \theta)}{\partial \gamma_i \partial \gamma_j} = -\frac{\partial k_c(g^*_i(\gamma), \gamma_i)}{\partial \gamma_i} \frac{\partial g^*_i(\gamma)}{\partial \gamma_j} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial^2 V^*(N, \gamma, \theta)}{\partial \theta_i \partial \theta_j} = -\frac{\partial k_h(f^*_i(\theta), \theta_i)}{\partial \theta_i} \frac{\partial f^*_i(\theta)}{\partial \theta_j}.$$

Because of monotonicity of investments in types from Lemma 1 and decreasing returns to scale from Assumption 1, indeed it must hold that $\frac{\partial g^*_i(\gamma)}{\partial \gamma_j} < 0$, and likewise for $\theta$. Hence, the cross partial derivatives are strictly negative and $V^*(N)$ is strictly submodular in the vectors of types, $\gamma$ and $\theta$.

5.5 Benchmark

We are interested in a benchmark allocation to compare with matching outcomes. To reflect potentially diverging interests in human capital formation and utility we provide two benchmarks. The first maximizes the sum of utilities in the economy and can be derived by the allocation $(P_U, f^U, g^U)$. The second benchmark is the allocation maximizing human capital formation, $(P_H, f^H)$. Submodularity of $V^*(N)$ in types and separability of the utility function then imply almost immediately the following proposition.

---

8There is another way of proof by preservation of supermodularity under maximization, see Theorems 2.6.2 and 2.7.6 in Topkis (1998); however, it involves some more notation.
Proposition 4 Both benchmark allocations, \((P^U, f^U, g^U)\) and \((P^H, f^H)\), are characterized by negative assortative matching on each type dimension, that is groups must be heterogeneous along each dimension.

**Proof:** Let \(P \in P^U\) with \(P = \{(\gamma_1, \theta_1), \ldots, (\gamma_n, \theta_n)\}\). The value of group \(P\) is then accordingly \(V^*(P, \gamma, \theta)\). If \(P \in P^U\) with positive measure, it must hold that

\[ |P| V^*(P, \gamma, \theta) \geq \sum_{P' \in P'} V^*(P'_i, \gamma, \theta) \]

for all partitions \(P'\) of \(\bigcup_{i=1}^{\vert P \vert} P\). That is, partitioning a subset \(\bigcup_{i=1}^{\vert P \vert} P\) of the agent space into \(\vert P \vert\) groups \(P\) must induce at least the same social surplus as any partition of that subset of the agent space. Strict submodularity of \(V^*(N)\) in \(\gamma\) and \(\theta\) from Lemma 3 implies strictly decreasing differences (Theorem 2.6.1 in Topkis, 1998). That is,

\[ \sum_{i \in P} V^*(N'(i)) \leq |P| V^*(P) \]

with strict inequality for \(\gamma_i \neq \gamma_j\) or \(\theta_i \neq \theta_j\) for at least one pair \(i \neq j \in P\). Thus allocations that maximize aggregate surplus on each dimension of peer effects must have heterogeneous groups along both type dimensions. This extends to the allocation \((P^H, f^H)\) as well because of separable utility. A surplus maximizing allocation indeed exists, because both optimization problems are equivalent to matching problems with fully transferable utility. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 the matching problems can be rewritten to yield convex games for which a solution exists (see Kaneko and Wooders, 1996). □

Socially optimal outcomes always have heterogeneous groups with respect to human capital acquisition. This result obviously depends on the assumption of decreasing differences in peer effects. For increasing differences of \(c(.)\) the proof can be reversed yielding a positive assortative matching pattern of the benchmark allocation with respect to cost of consumption peer effects. It is noteworthy though that negative assortative matching with respect to \(\theta\) in both benchmark allocations does not depend on the separability of utility. The critical assumption is monotonicity, that is differences of \(h(.)\) are increasing globally and independently from \(c(.)\).

### 5.6 Commitment

Suppose first that agents who form a social group have the possibility to choose levels of individual investments in peer effects when forming the group. We
assume that agents can indeed commit to these investment levels when group production of human capital takes place. Several natural motivations come to mind. Agents’ behavior in social groups may be described best by an infinitely repeated game. Hence, there exists the possibility of supporting equilibrium allocations Pareto-dominating an equilibrium where every group member free rides by adequate use of punishments in players’ strategies. Secondly, social groups can be interpreted to be formed on a daily basis, so that the assumption of commitment power reduces really to assuming commitment power over a very limited amount of time. Moreover, our results remain unchanged for limited commitment as long as all groups have access to the same commitment technology. However, individual heterogeneity of the agents with respect to commitment ability could be accommodated by this model if it is possible to interpret the ability to commit as part of an individual’s social skills.

Given that agents are now able to transfer utility within groups by allocating effort levels among members it can no longer be expected that the baseline results, notably Proposition 2, continue to hold. It has been shown previously (e.g. in Legros and Newman, 2004) that as transferability improves sufficiently sorting will inevitably match the pattern maximizing total surplus, that is negative assortative in our case. Intuitively, under full transferability of utility bad types can compensate better types fully for their presence. When the benefit of a good type to a bad type exceeds the benefit of a good type to a good type, bad types will be able to outbid good types in competition for good types.

Due to monotonicity of constrained efficient effort investments in type we know that Proposition 2 holds point-wise for constrained efficient effort levels. That is, under constrained efficient effort levels an agent of worse type and strictly worse on at least one dimension cannot compensate an agent of higher type. However, under effort investments transferability is limited. In order to transfer utility among peers a group of agents will have to choose inefficient effort levels. For Proposition 2 to carry over the efficiency loss incurred by a departure from constrained efficient effort investments must outweigh the gain by exploiting submodularity of \(c(\cdot)\) and \(h(\cdot)\). Putting the condition in terms of the utility possibility frontier yields that for all \(i, j \in I\) with \(\theta_j \geq \theta_i\) and \(\gamma_j \geq \gamma_i\) with one strict inequality it must hold that

\[
\phi_j(N, (v(i))_{i \in N \setminus \{j\}}) < v(j).
\]

However, the properties of the utility possibility frontier are notoriously hard
to ascertain. Therefore a simple example may be in order.

5.6.1 An example

Let $\Gamma \times \Theta = \{1; 2\} \times \{1; 2\}$, that is agents’ types are binary in each dimension. Assume that each type $(\gamma, \theta)$ occurs with equal probability in the population of agents. Cost of effort is assumed to be $k_c(g_i, \gamma_i) = \frac{\gamma_i}{2} g_i^2$ and $k_h(f_i, \theta_i) = \frac{\theta_i}{2} f_i^2$. Specify the peer effect production technology by assuming $c_i(g_1, ..., g_n) = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n} g_i}$ if $n \leq 2$ and 0 otherwise; and $h_i(f_1, ..., f_n) = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n} f_i}$ if $n \leq 2$ and 0 otherwise. That is, groups have at most size $n = 2$. This parametric specification is in line with Assumptions 2 and 1, except for strictly decreasing returns to size which are only weakly decreasing in this example. As this already suffices to prevent groups of size $n > 2$, this deviation is of no further consequence. This means an agent $i$’s valuation for coalition $N$ is given by

$$v_i(N, f, g) = \left( \sum_{i=1}^{2} g_i \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} + \left( \sum_{i=1}^{2} f_i \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} - \gamma_i g_i^2 - \theta_i f_i^2.$$  

As we have shown above, the efficient allocation is then given by negative assortative matching on each dimension, that is for all groups $N$ it must hold that $\theta_i \neq \theta_j$ and $\gamma_i \neq \gamma_j$ for $i \neq j \in N$. Combined with constrained efficient investments given by equations (4) this pins down the efficient allocation $P^*$: for all $P^*_i \in P^*$, $|P^*_i| = 2$, $\theta_i \neq \theta_2$ and $\gamma_1 \neq \gamma_2$ and $f^* = \left( \left( \frac{2}{3} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}}, \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{2}{3} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \right) = g^*$ with higher investment by the lower cost agent.

Now we turn to the utility possibility frontier of a social group $N$, $\Phi(N)$ which is of interest only for $n = 2$. Although the problem is quite simple, deriving the utility possibility frontier is not trivial. Hence, we provide a numerical solution in Figure 2 depicting the relevant utility possibility frontiers in different coalitions. The first tuple in the coalition denotes agent $i$’s type and the second one agent $j$’s type.

To solve for the market allocation start by checking homogeneous groups of low cost $(1, 1)$ agents. For stability group members have to split the surplus which coincides with constrained efficient investments, $f = \left( 2^{-\frac{1}{2}}, 2^{-\frac{1}{2}} \right) = g$. That is, $v(1, 1) = \frac{3}{4} 2^{\frac{1}{4}}$. Moreover, $v(1, 2) = \left( \frac{3}{2} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}}$. Numerical analysis shows that the maximum payoff of an agent $i$ with type $(1, 1)$ when matching with a $(1, 2)$ agent is given by $\phi((1, 1),(1, 2), v(1, 2)) = 1.8820 < v(1, 1)$. This corresponds to the dashed box in Figure 2: in a $((1, 1),(1, 2))$ coalition the second agent must obtain at least the same utility as from equal sharing in a $((2, 1),(1, 2))$ coalition. This leaves the first agent with less than splitting the surplus in a $((1,1),(1,1))$ coalition. Hence, groups consisting of both
(1, 2) and (1, 1) agents are not stable. One can show by solving problem (5) numerically, that the same argument goes through for (2, 1) and (1, 1) agents. Hence, since $v_i((1,1), (1,1)) > v_i(1,1)$, homogeneous coalitions of two (1, 1) agents are stable.

Now we turn to homogeneous groups of (2, 1) and (1, 2) agents, respectively. It is immediate from decreasing returns to scale that there exist payoffs for agents in ((2, 1), (1, 2)) or ((1, 2), (2, 1)) groups that dominate homogeneous coalitions, that is $\phi((2,1), (1,2)) > v(2,1)$ and vice versa. Note that $v(2,1) = v(1,2)$ due to the symmetry of the valuation function. Numerical analysis can be used to show that also $\gamma(2,1) > \phi((2,1), (2,2), v(2,2)) = 1.6840$ and by symmetry also $\gamma(1,2) > \phi((1,2), (2,2), v(2,2))$. Hence, ((2,1), (1,2)) or ((1,2), (2,1)) are stable. Since $v_i((2,2), (2,2)) > v_i((2,2))$ when splitting the surplus this also implies that homogeneous (2,2) groups are stable as well.

The decentralized allocation in this little example is summarized in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\gamma_i = 1$</th>
<th>$\gamma_i = 2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_i = 1$</td>
<td>segregates</td>
<td>matches with (1, 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_i = 2$</td>
<td>matches with (2, 1)</td>
<td>segregates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That is, the matching has segregation at the (component-wise) top and the
(component-wise) bottom of the agent space. Agents in between form heterogeneous groups. Note that heterogeneous coalitions of intermediate types (e.g. (1, 2), (2, 1)) dominate homogenous coalitions (e.g. (1, 2), (2, 1)). This shifts the relevant utility possibility frontier in Figure 2 to the right which induces homogenous coalitions of (1, 1) and (2, 2) agents to be stable. This intuition lies at the heart of Proposition 2.

The matching pattern does not depend on the distribution of types among agents although the distribution of payoffs does. Investment in peer effects are constrained efficient in homogeneous groups which depends on equal weighting of peer effects but these groups are subject to mismatch. Sorting for intermediate agents is efficient, but investments may not be efficient depending on payoffs and thus on the type distribution.

5.7 No Commitment

Let us assume now that agents do not possess the power to commit to effort levels announced at the matching stage but play a noncooperative investment game within groups. Start by analyzing the within group game in some coalition \( N \in F(I) \). An agent \( i \in N \)’s strategy space is given by \( (f_i, g_i) \in F \times G \), his payoff by \( v_i(N, f, g) \) where \( g \) and \( f \) are \((1 \times n)\) vectors of investment levels.

**Proposition 5 (Noncooperative investments)**

(i) The game \((G \times F, v_i, i \in N)\) has a nonempty, Pareto-rankable set of Nash equilibria \((f^*, g^*)\).

(ii) For any equilibrium agent \( i \)’s investment \( f_i^* (g_i^*) \) strictly increases in own type \( \theta_i \) \((\gamma_i)\) and the remaining players’ investment \( f_j^* (g_j^*) \) strictly decreases in \( i \)’s type \( \theta_i \) \((\gamma_i)\), \( j \in N \setminus \{i\} \).

(iii) \( v_i(N, f^*, g^*) \) strictly decreases in own type \( \theta_i \) \((\gamma_i)\) and strictly increases in another player’s type \( \theta_j \) \((\gamma_j)\), \( j \in N \setminus \{i\} \).

(iv) \( v_i(N, f^*, g^*) \) has decreasing differences in \((\theta_j)_{j \in N}, v_i(N, f^*, g^*) \) has decreasing differences in \((\gamma_j)_{j \in N}.\)

*Proof:* In Appendix.

Part (i) of the proposition implies that applying the Pareto criterion for equilibrium selection the equilibrium effort levels are unique. Hence, there exist functions \( f_i^* : F(I) \mapsto F \) and \( g_i^* : F(I) \mapsto G \) determining effort levels of
all \( i \in N \) for any \( N \in \mathcal{F}(I) \). That is, an agent \( i \)'s valuation \( v_i(N) \) depends only on \( N \) and can be written as part

\[
v_i(N) = h_i((f_j^i(N), g_j^i(N))_{j \in N}) + c_i((f_j^i(N), g_j^i(N))_{j \in N})
- k_h(f_i^i(N), \theta_i) - k_c(g_i^i(N), \gamma_i).
\]

Combined with part (iv) this implies that \( v^*_i(N) = v_i(N, f^*, g^*) \) is submodular on \( \Theta \times \Gamma \). This is quite useful as Propositions 2 and 3 can be applied.

Part (ii) and (iii) give some intuition on the mechanics under noncooperative investments. Effort investments are determined by an agent’s relative cost of effort. Hence, a high cost type on both dimensions will free ride on effort investments and therefore will not be accepted by any type with lower cost type on both dimensions. Moreover, equilibrium investment levels are monotone in type and do not fully internalize submodularity of the effort provision technology. Hence, there are gains from specialization at the matching stage and heterogenous groups of agents from the interior of the type space may emerge.

6 Conclusion

This paper has developed a framework for the economic analysis of social group formation. It implies a number of testable predictions, such as a nonlinear correlation between group members’ attributes in the attribute, heterogeneity in taste types among group members for some groups, and higher participation rates among agents with higher attribute difference between dimensions. Equilibrium allocations fail to maximize human capital production or aggregate utility but tend to be Pareto optimal, in particular when allowing for effort choice under commitment. Yet even under the assumption of decreasing differences in human capital production it turns out that introducing ability tracking may be beneficial to human capital accumulation.

A Appendix: Proofs

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1

For the proof of existence a modified version of \( v_i, v_i^M \), is needed to construct a super-additive characteristic function of the game along the lines of Shubik and Wooders (1983). That means it must be ensured that any union of disjoint coalitions must be able to reach the same allocation as the disjoint coalitions. Hence we define \( v^M_i(P_i, N) = v_i(P_i) \), where \( N \in \mathcal{F}(I) \) and \( P_i \subset N \). \( v^M_i \)
specifies agent \(i\)'s valuation for being member of group \(P_i\) which may or may not coincide with coalition \(N\). Now let \(V(N)\) denote the characteristic function of the assignment game \((I, v^M_i)\) where \(N \in \mathcal{F}(I)\) and \(P_N\) is a partition of \(N\).

\[
V(N) = \{(v^M_i(P, P_i))_{i \in N} : \forall i \in N, P_i \in P_N\}.
\]

Then construct the comprehensive extension of \(V(N)\) by defining

\[
\hat{V}(N) = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^{|N|} : x \leq V(N)\}.
\]

\(\hat{V}(N)\) defines a set in \(\mathbb{R}^{|N|}\) that is bounded above by \(V(N)\) for any finite set of agents \(N\). Then \(\hat{V}(N)\) has the following properties:

\[
\hat{V}(P) \times \hat{V}(O) \subseteq \hat{V}(P \cup O) \forall O, P \in \mathcal{F}(I) \text{ with } O \cap F = \emptyset,
\]

\[
\inf \sup \hat{V}([i]) > -\infty,
\]

for any \(N \in \mathcal{F}(I), x \in \hat{V}(N)\) and \(y \in \mathbb{R}^p\) with \(y \leq x, y \in \hat{V}(N)\),

\[
\forall N \in \mathcal{F}(I), \hat{V}(N) \bigcup_{i \in N} \left[\text{int}V([i]) \times \mathbb{R}^{|N|-1}\right] \text{ is non-empty and bounded. (13)}
\]

Properties 9, 10 and 12 follow directly by definition of \(v_i, v^M_i\) and \(\hat{V}\), respectively. Property 11 follows from the existence of an outside option, \(V([i]) \geq 0\). This and \(v_i(P_i) > 0\) for all set of agents \(1 < |P_i| < \bar{n}\) from Assumption 1 also imply property 13. Therefore \(\hat{V}\) is a characteristic function in the sense of Kaneko and Wooders (1986).

Denote by \(N_{(\theta, \gamma)}\{i \in N : (\theta_i, \gamma_i) = (\theta, \gamma)\}\) a subset of \(N\) of positive measure containing all agents of types \((\theta, \gamma)\). Then there exists a partition of \(N\) into subsets of equal types, \((N_{(\theta_k, \gamma_k)})_{k=1}^T\). Hence, the game \((I, \hat{V})\) has the \(r\)-property with respect to \((N_{(\theta_k, \gamma_k)})_{k=1}^T\) in the terminology of Kaneko and Wooders (1986).

The game \((I, \hat{V})\) is per-capita bounded with respect to \((N_{(\theta_k, \gamma_k)})_{k=1}^T\) iff there is a positive real number \(0 < \delta < 1\) and a \(K \in \mathbb{R}\) such that for any \(S \in \mathcal{F}(I)\), where payoffs \(x_i \in \hat{V}(S)\) are such that \(x_i = x_j\) for all \(i, j \in N_k \cap S\) for \(k = 1, \ldots, T\), \((1 + \delta)\mu(N_k) \geq \frac{|S \cap N_k|}{|S|} \geq (1 - \delta)\mu(N_k)\) implies \(x_i < K\) for all \(i \in S\).

Any agent \(i \in S\) obtains some payoff \(x_i \in \hat{V}(S)\). By construction of \(\hat{V}\) and strict non-transferability, \(x_i \leq v_i(S_i)\) with \(S_i \subset S\) such that \(i \in S_i\). By Assumption 1 there exists \(\bar{n}(\theta_i, \gamma_i) < \infty\) such that \(v_i(N) \geq v_i(\bar{N} \cup N')\) where \(\bar{N} \subset N_i\) and \(N' \subset N_i\). Hence, \(v_i(S_i) < \infty\) for all \(i \in N\) and \(S_i\). An upper bound \(K\) can be obtained by setting \(K = \max_{i \in I} \bar{E}_i\). Thus \((I, \hat{V})\) is per-capita bounded.
Now we are in a position to apply Theorem 1 from Kaneko and Wooders (1986) and existence of the f-core of the characteristic function game associated with $\hat{V}$ follows. What remains to be shown is that an allocation in the f-core of $\hat{V}$ is also an equilibrium as defined above. A vector of payoffs in the f-core of $\hat{V}$, $\hat{x} \in \hat{V}(N)$ cannot be improved upon, that is there exists no $S \in \mathcal{F}(I)$ with $x' \in \hat{V}(S)$ such that $x' > x$ for each $i \in S$. By construction of $\hat{V}$ there must exist $x \in V(N)$ with $x \geq \hat{x}$. Hence, neither can $x$ be improved upon.

Then the partition $(P_N)$ of $N$ such that $x_i = v(P_i)$ with $P_i \in P_N$ and $i \in P_i$ for all $i \in N$ defines the equilibrium coalitions in the sense of our equilibrium definition.

\section*{A.2 Example for Ability Tracking}

Suppose there are four types of agents, $A$, $B$, $C$, and $D$ with equal measures. Preferences over groups $N$ are given by agents’ valuations $v_i(N)$.

$$v_i(N) = \sqrt{\sum_{j \in N} \theta_j + \beta_i \sqrt{\sum_{j \in N} \gamma_j}},$$

for all $N$ with $|N| \leq 2$ and by $V_i(N) = 0$ if $|N| > 2$. This implies the preference ordering given in Section 4.3 for instance if parameter values are $\theta_A = 4$, $\gamma_A = 1$, $\beta_A = 0.718$, $\theta_B = 2.5$, $\gamma_B = 2.25$, $\beta_B = 0.983$, $\theta_C = 2.25$, $\gamma_C = 2.5$, $\beta_C = 1.016$, $\theta_D = 1$, $\gamma_D = 4$, $\beta_D = 1.392$. It is easy to verify that without partitioning of the type space $B$ and $C$ match together, $A$ prefers segregation to $D$, and therefore $D$ segregates as well. Splitting the agent space at $\theta = 2.3$ for instance, yields the matches $A$ and $B$, and $C$ and $D$ since all types prefer their match to segregation. It can be calculated easily that indeed $\sqrt{2\theta_A} + \sqrt{2\theta_B} + 2\sqrt{\theta_C + \theta_D} < 2\sqrt{\theta_A + \theta_B} + 2\sqrt{\theta_C + \theta_D}$ and likewise for the sum of valuations. Setting $\beta_B = 0.9824$ and $\beta_C = 1.0163$ yields $A \sim_B C$ and $B \sim_C D$ and therefore ability tracking Pareto dominates the regime without it.

\section*{A.3 Proof of Proposition 5}

(i) Existence is immediate as $G \times F$ is compact, $f_i$ and $g_i$ are continuous and $v_i$ is continuously differentiable in $(f, g)$. Note that $f(.)$ is submodular in $(f, g)$ and $k_i(.)$ is supermodular in $(f_i, g_i)$. Hence, $(G \times F, v_i, i \in N)$ is a submodular game (see Topkis, 1998, for details). That means that the set of equilibria of this game has a partial order and the lowest element of the set is Pareto best.

(ii) Agent $i$’s reaction correspondence $(g_i, f_i)(g_{-i}, f_{-i})$ to other players’ strategies $(f_{-i}, g_{-i})$ can be written as $f_i(f_{-i})$ and $g_i(g_{-i})$ due to separability
of consumption and production peer effects. The proof focusses on production peer effects, extending it to consumption peer effects is straightforward.

\( f_i(f_{-i}) \) is implicitly given by the first order necessary conditions of his optimization problem.

\[
\frac{\partial h_i(f_i, f_{-i})}{\partial f_i} = \frac{\partial k_h(f_i, \theta_i)}{\partial f_i}.
\tag{14}
\]

It follows immediately from submodularity of \( h_i(.) \) and convexity of \( k_h(.) \) that \( f_i \) decreases in \( f_{-i} \). The next step is to establish that \( f_i \) increases and \( f_{-i} \) decreases in \( \theta_i \). Suppose the first order conditions (14) hold for all \( i \in N \). The proof proceeds by contradiction. Let \( \theta_i \) decrease to \( \theta'_i < \theta_i \). Suppose \( f_i \) increases to \( f'_i \geq f_i \) in response and therefore by (14)

\[
\frac{\partial h_i(f'_i, f'_{-i})}{\partial f'_i} > \frac{\partial h_i(f_i, f_{-i})}{\partial f_i}.
\tag{15}
\]

Then by submodularity of \( h_i(.) \) for some \( j \in N \setminus \{i\} \) it holds that \( f'_j < f_j \). But this means \( \frac{\partial h_i(f'_j, \theta_i)}{\partial f'_j} < \frac{\partial h_i(f_j, \theta_i)}{\partial f_j} \) and consequently \( \frac{\partial h_i(f'_j, f'_{-i})}{\partial f'_j} < \frac{\partial h_i(f_j, f_{-i})}{\partial f_j} \) by \( j \)'s first order condition. This is a contradiction to (15) due to part (ii) of Assumption 3. Hence, \( f'_i < f_i \).

Suppose now there is some \( j \in N \setminus \{i\} \) such that \( f'_j < f_j \). This means

\[
\frac{\partial h_j(f'_j, f'_{-j})}{\partial f'_j} < \frac{\partial h_j(f_j, f_{-j})}{\partial f_j},
\tag{16}
\]

as argued above. From above we know that \( f'_i < f_i \) and thus by submodularity of \( h_i(.) \) there must be an \( l \in N \setminus \{i\} \) with \( f'_l > f_l \). For \( n = 2, j = l \) which already contradicts (16). For \( n > 2, l \neq j \) and \( \frac{\partial h_i(f'_i, f'_{-i})}{\partial f'_i} > \frac{\partial h_i(f_j, f_{-i})}{\partial f_j} \) by \( l \)'s first order condition. By part (ii) of Assumption 3 this contradicts (16) and \( f'_j > f_j \) for all \( j \in N \setminus \{i\} \).

(iii) Differentiating \( v_i(N, f^*, g^*) \) with respect to \( \theta_i \) ceteris paribus and applying the envelope theorem yields

\[
\frac{\partial v_i(N, f^*, g^*)}{\partial \theta_i} = \sum_{j \neq i \in N} \frac{\partial h_i(f^*)}{\partial f^*_j} \frac{\partial f^*_j}{\partial \theta_i}.
\tag{17}
\]

By part (ii) of this proof this expression must be negative. Now let \( \theta_j \) decrease to \( \theta'_j < \theta_j \). As shown above, \( f'_j > f_j \) and therefore \( \frac{\partial h_i(f'_j, f'_{-i})}{\partial f'_j} > \frac{\partial h_i(f_j, f_{-i})}{\partial f_j} \). By strict monotonicity of both \( h_i(.) \) and \( k_h(.) \), \( h_i(f') < h_i(f) \) and \( k_h(f'_j) > k_h(f_j) \) and thus \( v_i(N, f', g) < v_i(N, f, g) \).

(iv) It suffices to establish that expression (17) is decreasing in \( \theta_i \). Let \( \theta_j \) increase to \( \theta'_j > \theta_j \). By symmetry of \( h_i \) in all \( f_j \), (17) can be rewritten as
\[
\frac{\partial h_i(f^*)}{\partial f_i} \sum_{j \neq i \in N} \frac{\partial f^*_j}{\partial \theta_i} \quad \text{Let } \theta_j \text{ increase to } \theta'_j > \theta_j. \text{ By part (ii) we know that } \frac{\partial h_i(f'^*)}{\partial f_i} < \frac{\partial h_i(f^*)}{\partial f_i} \text{ and therefore } \frac{\partial h_i(f'^*)}{\partial f_i} < \frac{\partial h_i(f^*)}{\partial f_l} \text{ for all } l \neq i \in N.
\]

Hence, we only need to show that \( \sum_{j \neq i \in N} \frac{\partial f^*_j}{\partial \theta_i} \geq \sum_{j \neq i \in N} \frac{\partial f'^*_j}{\partial \theta_i} \). That is, \( \text{in terms of differences, } \sum_{j \neq i \in N} (f^*_j(\theta'_i, \theta_j) - f^*_j(\theta_i, \theta_j)) \geq \sum_{j \neq i \in N} (f'^*_j(\theta'_i, \theta_j) - f'^*_j(\theta_i, \theta_j)) \) must strictly increase in the difference \( \frac{\partial h_i(f^*(\theta_i, \theta_j)) - \partial h_i(f'^*(\theta_i, \theta_j), \theta'_i)}{\partial f_i} - \frac{\partial h_i(f^*(\theta_i, \theta_j)) - \partial h_i(f'^*(\theta_i, \theta_j), \theta'_i)}{\partial f_i} \). The latter is weakly increasing in \( f_i^* \) due to decreasing differences and strict convexity of \( k_i(.) \) from Assumption 2. Since \( f_i^*(\theta_i, \theta_j) > f_i^*(\theta_i, \theta'_j) \), we have that indeed for the differential operator \( D_{\theta_j} \), \( D_{\theta_j} \sum_{j \neq i \in N} (f^*_j(\theta'_i, \theta_j) - f^*_j(\theta_i, \theta_j)) \leq 0 \). This means, by separability of \( h_i(.) \) and \( c_i(.) \), \( v_i(f^*) \) has decreasing differences in \( \theta \). ■

**References**


*CEPR Discussion Paper Series 5018.*


Choosing to Have Less Choice

Does Envy Destroy Social Fundamentals? The Impact of Relative Income Position on Social Capital

Relative Income Position and Performance: An Empirical Panel Analysis

Taxing Tourism In Spain: Results and Recommendations

An Accidental Oil Spill Along the Belgian Coast: Results from a CV Study

Endogenous Technology and Tradable Emission Quotas

The Role of Agglomeration and Technology in Shaping Firm Strategy and Organization

An Assessment of Economic Implications

Measurement and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in The Netherlands and Belgium

Construction and Import of Ethnic Categorisations: “Allochthones” in Situation Migrants: The Case of Undocumented Poles and Bulgarians in Brussels

Ways and Methodologies for Mapping these Contexts?

Perceived Diversity of Complex Systems to Coalition Formation Under Adverse Selection

Choice Modelling Analysis

Marketing and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in The Netherlands and Belgium

Construction and Import of Ethnic Categorisations: “Allochthones” in Situation Migrants: The Case of Undocumented Poles and Bulgarians in Brussels

Ways and Methodologies for Mapping these Contexts?

Perceived Diversity of Complex Systems

Marketing and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in The Netherlands and Belgium

Construction and Import of Ethnic Categorisations: “Allochthones” in Situation Migrants: The Case of Undocumented Poles and Bulgarians in Brussels

Ways and Methodologies for Mapping these Contexts?

Perceived Diversity of Complex Systems

Marketing and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in The Netherlands and Belgium

Construction and Import of Ethnic Categorisations: “Allochthones” in Situation Migrants: The Case of Undocumented Poles and Bulgarians in Brussels

Ways and Methodologies for Mapping these Contexts?

Perceived Diversity of Complex Systems

Marketing and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in The Netherlands and Belgium

Construction and Import of Ethnic Categorisations: “Allochthones” in Situation Migrants: The Case of Undocumented Poles and Bulgarians in Brussels

Ways and Methodologies for Mapping these Contexts?

Perceived Diversity of Complex Systems

Marketing and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in The Netherlands and Belgium

Construction and Import of Ethnic Categorisations: “Allochthones” in Situation Migrants: The Case of Undocumented Poles and Bulgarians in Brussels

Ways and Methodologies for Mapping these Contexts?

Perceived Diversity of Complex Systems

Marketing and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in The Netherlands and Belgium

Construction and Import of Ethnic Categorisations: “Allochthones” in Situation Migrants: The Case of Undocumented Poles and Bulgarians in Brussels

Ways and Methodologies for Mapping these Contexts?

Perceived Diversity of Complex Systems

Marketing and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in The Netherlands and Belgium

Construction and Import of Ethnic Categorisations: “Allochthones” in Situation Migrants: The Case of Undocumented Poles and Bulgarians in Brussels

Ways and Methodologies for Mapping these Contexts?

Perceived Diversity of Complex Systems

Marketing and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in The Netherlands and Belgium

Construction and Import of Ethnic Categorisations: “Allochthones” in Situation Migrants: The Case of Undocumented Poles and Bulgarians in Brussels

Ways and Methodologies for Mapping these Contexts?

Perceived Diversity of Complex Systems

Marketing and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in The Netherlands and Belgium

Construction and Import of Ethnic Categorisations: “Allochthones” in Situation Migrants: The Case of Undocumented Poles and Bulgarians in Brussels

Ways and Methodologies for Mapping these Contexts?

Perceived Diversity of Complex Systems
(lxxviii) This paper was presented at the Second International Conference on “Tourism and Sustainable Economic Development - Macro and Micro Economic Issues” jointly organised by CRENoS (Università di Cagliari and Sassari, Italy) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy, and supported by the World Bank, Chia, Italy, 16-17 September 2005.

(lxxix) This paper was presented at the International Workshop on "Economic Theory and Experimental Economics" jointly organised by SET (Center for advanced Studies in Economic Theory, University of Milano-Bicocca) and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy, Milan, 20-23 November 2005. The Workshop was co-sponsored by CISEPS (Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, University of Milan-Bicocca).

(lxxx) This paper was presented at the First EURODIV Conference “Understanding diversity: Mapping and measuring”, held in Milan on 26-27 January 2006 and supported by the Marie Curie Series of Conferences “Cultural Diversity in Europe: a Series of Conferences.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2006 SERIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CCMP</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SIEV</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NRM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KTHC</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IEM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CSRM</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRCG</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ETA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CTN</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>