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in an Enlarged European Union**

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March 2013

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ABSTRACT

Migration Strategies of the Crisis-Stricken Youth in an Enlarged European Union

This paper studies the migration response of the youth from new EU member states to disparate conditions in an enlarged European Union at the onset of the Great Recession. We use the Eurobarometer data and probabilistic econometric models to identify the key drivers of the intention to work in another member state of European Economic Area (EEA) and their expected duration. We find that migration intentions are high among those not married and among males with children, but both categories are also overrepresented among people with only temporary as opposed to long-term or permanent migration plans. Whereas age affects migration intentions negatively, education has no effect on whether working abroad is envisaged. However, conditional on envisaging to work abroad, completion of education (if after 16th birthday) is associated with long-term (at least five years), but not permanent, migration plans. Finally, we find that socio-demographic variables explain about as much variation of migration intentions as self-reported push and pull factors and migration constraints.

JEL Classification: F22, J61

Keywords: EU labor markets, migration, youth, EU enlargement, labor mobility, free movement of workers, transitional arrangements, new member states, European Union

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1. Introduction

The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU extended the freedom of movement to workers from twelve new member states mainly from Central and Eastern Europe.¹ The ensuing migration generally proved to be a positive experience for European Union and the pre-enlargement fears from free labor mobility of new EU citizens turned out unjustified. No economically significant detrimental effects on the receiving countries' labor markets have been documented, nor has there been any evidence for statistically significant welfare shopping.² Rather, there appear to have been positive effects on EU's productivity.³ The sending countries face some risks of losing their young and skilled labor force, but free labor mobility has relieved them of some redundant labor and the associated fiscal burden during the recession of the late 2000s and early 2010s. They have also profited from remittances, and the experience gained abroad proves useful upon return.⁴

The severe economic slowdown of the late 2000s and early 2010s, also dubbed the Great Recession, abruptly changed the migration landscape in Europe. The youth has disproportionately borne the economic adversities caused by the economic shocks that

¹ Including Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004 (EU10) and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 (EU2). We denote the union of the two groups EU12, and EU8+2 whenever Cyprus and Malta are omitted.

² Kahanec and Zimmermann (2010).

³ Kahanec and Pytlikova (2013).

⁴ For a general account see Kahanec (2013b), Kahanec and Zimmermann (2010) and Kureková (2011) and the literature cited in these works. Concerning the possible negative effects see e.g. Kahancová and Kaminska (2010) on the effect of out-migration on wages, Anderson et al. (2006) and Blanchflower and Lawton (2010) on migrants' life satisfaction, and Meardi (2011) and Galgóczi et al. (2012) on how enlargement interacted with the social fabric of Europe. For a general review of European migration see Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) and Zimmermann (2005).

asymmetrically affected countries and sectors in the European Union, struggling with exceptionally high unemployment rates in many EU member states. Whereas before the Great Recession many young workers from the new member states could have afforded ignoring the option of seeking employment abroad, or perceived it just as a luring option, during the crisis for many of them this option turned to be the only possibility of finding a job.

The migration response of the youth from the new member states to the changing economic conditions has not yet been well documented. And yet their response critically conditions the capacity of the European Union, and the European Monetary Union in particular, to absorb asymmetric economic shocks and thus the European integration project itself. Indeed, the long-run capacity of the European Union to deal with global economic challenges crucially depends on the degree of mobility of its labor force. In this regard, permanent moves help to absorb current economic disparities, but do not provide for increased capacity to absorb ensuing economic shocks. Temporary migration trajectories, on the other hand, provide for a labor force that is more responsive to economic fluctuations. On the background of aging populations, the temporal nature of youth mobility is of key importance from the perspective of the economic potential and welfare sustainability in the sending countries.

In the spirit of Hirschman (1970), from the perspective of the sending countries, permanent out-migration of young people can be interpreted as an exit strategy driven by their frustration with the adverse labor market situation in the home country. On the other

hand, temporary out-migration rather implicitly represents voice as an artifact of changing economic opportunities across the European Union. Loyalty and other interfering variables, including push and pull factors, determine whether exit or voice prevails.⁵

This paper explores the preferences of the youth in the new member states over migration strategies in wake of the Great Recession of the late 2000s and early 2010s. We specifically distinguish mobility plans of short and long duration, and study the factors that determine the decision to move and—conditional on that decision— to stay in the destination country temporarily or permanently. For this purpose we utilize the Eurobarometer dataset 337, wave 72.5, from 2009—the year when the Great Recession started to fully affect EU labor markets. This dataset provides individual-level socio-economic data including variables on migration intentions and their time frame. Binomial and ordered logistic regression models enable us to disentangle the main factors affecting migration intentions, including standard socio-economic variables as well as individual perceptions about key pull and push factors affecting their migration intentions.

We proceed as follows: Section 2 introduces the context of post-enlargement migration in the EU and briefly reviews the literature. Section 3 outlines the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 reports and interprets the result, and section 5 concludes.

2. The scale and composition of migration in the EU following its eastern enlargement

The gradual extension of the right of free movement to new EU citizens brought about by the 2004 and 2007 enlargements enabled them to seek employment in the fifteen “old” EU member states (EU15).⁶ The higher standard of living in the old member states lured many EU12 citizens to pursue their careers in the EU15. According to Holland et al. (2011), there were about one million citizens from the EU8 and almost another million from the EU2 in EU15 in 2004.⁷ Only five years after the first enlargement, in 2009, the combined number of citizens from the new member states in the EU15 reached almost five million, about equally split between the 2004 and 2007 entrants. This corresponds to 1.22 percent of the total EU15 population and 4.75 percent of the combined populations of new member states.⁸

Figure 1 depicts some of the main migration trends in an enlarged EU from sending countries’ perspective. We observe a much increased dynamics of migration after the 2004 enlargement, and relatively abrupt slow-down, but not cessation, during the Great Recession. Relative to their population, the lowest senders were the Czech Republic,

⁶ The so called transitional arrangements allowed old member states to impose restrictions on the access of new EU citizens to their labor markets based on a 2+3+2 formula, with restrictions reviewed after two and three years, but lifted after seven years. Whereas some countries opened up their labor markets immediately upon enlargement (e.g. the UK, Ireland and Sweden for the 2004 entrants) others kept the restrictions until the last moment (e.g. Austria and Germany for 2004 entrants). Kahanec (2013b) provides an up-to-date summary of the gradual liberalization. EU15 denotes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

⁷ See Kahanec (2013b) on the limitations of the data.

⁸ Kahanec, (2013b).

Hungary and Slovenia; whereas the highest senders were Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania. Most migrants came from Romania and Poland. As for the receiving countries, in 2009 Germany and the UK hosted about two thirds of all citizens of the new member states in the EU15, but the primary destinations for EU2 migrants were Spain and Italy.⁹ A major trend was that the traditional destinations for migrants from the new member states such as Germany or Austria lost their relative significance whereas an increasing share of these migrants targeted new destination countries, such as Ireland, the United Kingdom, or Spain.

Many of these movers were young workers and students, who generally only had limited labor market experience, were singles and had no children.¹⁰ As Figure 2 indicates, among migrants from the EU12 in the EU15 young people, aged 15 to 34, were overrepresented in most countries. As can be expected, the share of young people among migrants is significantly higher after 2004 when EU10 countries joined the EU in all the EU15 countries represented in Figure 2. The largest increase in youth mobility was observed in the Netherlands, Austria, but also Greece, Denmark, and France.

[Figure 1 around here]

[Figure 2 around here]

Generally speaking these young cohorts of migrants were gender-balanced although female-bias emerged in some countries. Among young migrants after 2004 the highest

⁹ Kahanec, (2013b).

¹⁰ Kahanec and Zimmermann, (2010).

proportion of females were observed in Austria, France, Greece, and the Netherlands (See Figure 2). On average post-enlargement migrants were well educated compared to the populations in the source but also destination countries (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010; Kahanec, 2013b).

[Figure 3 around here]

3. The data and analytical framework

The analysis in this paper is based on data from Special Eurobarometer 337, wave 72.5, conducted between 13th November and 9th December 2009. 26,761 inhabitants of the European Union member states were surveyed resulting in sample size of around 1000 observations per country.¹¹ Probabilistic random sampling was employed to select surveyed households to ensure representativeness for the population of the EU member states aged 15 years or above.

A subset of the data has been selected for the purpose of this paper consisting of the residents of EU8+2 countries aged 15 to 35, broadly representing the youth in the new member states. From this subset we kept only those respondents that expressed desire to work in a European country, either their own or in another member state of the European Economic Area (EEA), but not elsewhere. Through these procedures, a sample of 2,240 young residents of EU8+2 was gained and used as a basis for statistical inference.

¹¹ In the countries with smaller populations (e.g. Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus) only about 500 observations were gathered.

The key dependent variables were constructed using three questions from the Eurobarometer dataset about respondents' expectations regarding their migration. The first question asked whether the respondent envisages to work in a country outside his or her own country at some time in the future (question QC10). Based on this question we constructed variable *Move* that is 1 if the answer is positive and zero otherwise. We then used question QC15: "If you do have an intention to work outside (own country), how long do you think you will be working there?" to measure the intended duration of stay abroad. The range of responses included the following options: a few weeks or less, a few months to less than 1 year, 1 year to less than 2 years, 2 years to less than 5 years, 5 years to less than 10 years, 10 years or more, as long as possible, until you retire, for the rest of your life. Based on this variable we constructed variable *Duration5* with 1 for those intending to work abroad at least five years, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we constructed variable *Permanent* based once again on the variable QC15, valued 1 if the respondent indicated desire to move "until you retired" or "for the rest of your life", and 0 otherwise.

[Figure 4 around here]

A number of socio-demographic characteristics were scrutinized in relation to the intentions of the surveyed individuals to work in another European country vis-à-vis staying in their own country, and the intended duration of working abroad. As evident from Figure 4, men are more likely to look for work beyond the borders of their own country. While approximately 70 per cent of young females in the EU8+2 signaled no desire for move, only a little more than a half of their male counterparts expressed similar

intentions. Among Eastern Europeans who expressed intentions to work abroad in the future a majority also expressed preference for seeking a longer-term arrangement abroad, lasting for at least one year.

Table 1 shows that the family situation strongly correlates with migration intentions. Only about 22 per cent of married respondents with children reported intentions to move, while more than a half of singles¹² with no children foresaw themselves working in another EU member state. Married couples, regardless of whether with children or not, are less migration-prone than cohabiting couples, which were in turn less interested in migration than singles. Across these three categories, respondents with children were more likely to stay at home than childless members of their respective group. As far as the expected duration of migration experience is concerned, respondents with children are clustered in both “up to 1 year” and more than “5 years”, while childless respondents seemed to be more open to medium-term migration.

[Table 1 around here]

As concerns age, the younger the people are (within the 15-35 cohort) the more likely they are to expect moving abroad to work (See Figure 5). Only slightly more than 40 per cent of people under 18 signal no intentions to seek work abroad, while the corresponding figure for those aged between 30-35 is about 75 per cent. A similar pattern

¹² This category includes all respondents without a partner.

emerges for the prevalence of expectations about stays abroad of long duration (more than 5 years), which also declines with age.

[Figure 5 around here]

Table 2 reveals that no straightforward patterns of relationship between education and migration expectations emerge, although students and those completing their education before their 16th birthday appear to be more mobile.

[Table 2 around here]

Finally, it is possible to identify three levels of migration propensity in relation with professional affiliation. At the top, the unemployed, just like students, are very prone to looking for work abroad, as about half of them intend to work abroad. In contrast, the self-employed individuals, non-managerial white collar workers and especially housepersons do not seem to be very mobile. Managers and manual workers are somewhere in between with about a third of them expecting working in another European country. These patterns are also visible for the expected duration of stay abroad, with students, the unemployed, and managers expecting longer-term commitments; whereas housepersons and the self-employed appear to have more temporary plans.

[Table 3 around here]

These descriptive statistics reveal a number of interesting patterns. Young male singles without children, still studying or with little education, or unemployed, appear to be most likely to expect future mobility. However, there may be more complex interactions among these variables, which may confound some of this descriptive inference. For example, age and student status are correlated, and simple statistics do not disentangle their independent effects on migration expectations. Other variables, such as having children, may have different effects for males and females.

To pinpoint and measure robust determinants of youth's migration intentions, we use binomial and ordered Logit models predicting the probability of expectations to move, and to move for longer durations. Among the key explanatory variables we include gender, age, professional and marital status, having children or not and educational attainment. These models disentangle conditional correlations among the studied variables and also enable us to look also at the interaction effects of gender and having children. The inclusion of country fixed effects controls for cross-sectional variation that invariably characterizes each country, including country-specific push factors.

Additionally, the dataset permits looking at the effects of a set of variables measuring subjective stance of respondents on various factors enhancing or limiting their propensity to migrate. These variables are listed in Table 4. Including these variables in the analysis enables us to disentangle the effects of socio-demographic variables from perceived push and pull factors and constraints relevant for migration intentions of the youth in new member states.

[Table 4 around here]

4. The results

The results from binomial Logit regressions are reported in Table 5. Among the positive factors for the intentions to move to another EEA country we identify not being married (whether single or cohabiting with a partner) and being a male with children. This finding and the insignificance of the coefficient with gender indicates that the correlation of gender and migration intentions arises through gendered response of households to the presence of children, and not as a direct effect of gender. The negative factors include age and working in a white-collar job. While upon inclusion of self-reported push and pull factors and constraints the latter effect disappears, the inclusion of push and pull factors and constraints does not qualitatively alter the results for the socio-demographic variables. Interestingly, education has essentially no effects on the intentions to work abroad.

A somewhat different picture emerges when it comes to expected duration of stay abroad for people intending to work abroad in the future.¹³ Being a houseperson reduces the chance of expecting to stay abroad for at least five years; this effect is not present if we look at the intentions to stay permanently. Living with a partner as opposed to being married appears to reduce the probability of expecting duration of staying abroad of at least five years as well as, although to a smaller degree, to stay abroad permanently.

There is an indication of a similar negative effect on the intention to move permanently of being single. Remarkably, conditional on expecting to move, men with children expect shorter duration of stay, below five years. This may signify circular or seasonal migratory trajectories of male bread winners and, as mentioned above, a gendered response to the presence of children in the household. Interestingly, education gains importance, with more educated migrants (completing their education after their sixteenth birthday, i.e. not students or low educated) exhibiting a higher probability of expecting stays lasting for at least five years. This effect is not present, and perhaps even reverses, when it comes to intentions to move permanently. Generally, the inclusion of self-reported push and pull factors and constraints increases the precision and explanatory power of our regression models.¹⁴

[Table 5 around here]

It is interesting to observe that the effects of socio-demographic characteristics on migration expectations are rather independent of the considered self-reported pull and push factors and migration constraints. We report in Table 6 the coefficients for these factors corresponding to columns 4-6 in Table 5. We observe that most of these factors are significant predictors (of expected sign) of the intentions to move. Better labor market opportunities, political or economic climate, but also social networks abroad are important push and pull factors. Interestingly, consistent with the findings of Giulietti et al. (2013) social and health care factors are not strongly related to the decision to move,

¹⁴ Importantly, all respondents were asked the questions about push and pull factors and constraints regarding their *actual* or *hypothetical* migration plans.

although there appears to a small statistically significant positive effect, along with life quality, on the interest to move permanently. Conditional on intending to move, those who want to discover something new or improve their qualification, or have concerns about the migration-related costs to their family, children or friends, or own house or other property in their home country, tend to prefer migratory moves of shorter duration. Those who perceive the efforts needed to migrate as high, already have a good job, find it difficult to learn a new language, do not feel sufficiently qualified, perceive the cost of living abroad as high, or have strong emotional relationship to their home country tend to have a lower propensity to migrate.

[Table 6 around here]

As the threshold of 5 years in the definition of *Duration5* indicating long-term migratory intentions is arbitrary, we also considered an alternative measure with the duration threshold of 1 year. The results were essentially the same as reported in columns 2 and 5 of Table 5.¹⁵ We also test the robustness of our predictions using the ordered Logit model. The results reported in Table 7 are fully in line with those obtained from binomial Logit models above.

[Table 7 around here]

Not reported, available upon request.

5. Conclusions and implications

In this paper we address the question of how did the youth in new EU member states respond to their newly acquired right to freely move for work within the European Union on the background of economic developments at the onset of the Great Recession. We review the literature and descriptively analyze the EU LFS data from 2010 to find that the youth in the new member states has vigorously reacted to the (perspective of) accession of their countries to the European Union. Can these significant migration flows be considered as permanent, signifying exit from sending countries, or did the youth have just temporary migration plans, thus with their mobility decisions rather implicitly voicing their discontent with the socio-economic situation in their home countries?

To answer this question we studied migration intentions of the youth in new member states using the Eurobarometer 337, wave 72.5, database. We distinguished temporary and permanent migration intentions by looking at the expected duration of working abroad. Disentangling a number of interacting factors using a binomial Logit model, we find that the only variables that matter significantly in the statistical sense and thus have an independent effect on the probability of intentions to work abroad are age (negative), not being married, and having children if male (positive).

We further looked at the determinants of the expected duration of the intended working abroad. The analysis has shown that among the most loyal young people – i.e. not intending to stay abroad for more than 5 years – are housepersons, men with children,

and those living with a partner (but not married). Those with completed education (if after their 16th birthday) are more likely to report intentions to stay abroad more than five years, but less likely to report permanent migration intentions. Beyond the completion threshold the level of education however does not seem to matter much, indicating that, at least measured by intentions, there is little selection on formal education of migrants into temporary and longer or permanent migration plans.

The analysis of push and pull factors and migration constraints indicates that social, economic and political conditions abroad, as well as existing social networks abroad, all increase the propensity to indicate migratory intentions. Interestingly, the effect of the perception of better social and health care system abroad ends up only marginally significant, although there appears to be a small positive and statistically significant effect on permanent migratory intentions. On the other hand various constraints related to perceived costs of migration are very relevant factors that limit migration intentions.

Interestingly, when it comes to the desired duration of intended working abroad, among the youth most loyal to their home country, i.e. intending to return within five years after departure, are those who only want to discover something new or improve their qualifications, and who do not want to impose big changes on their family or children, or do not want to leave property behind. Those discontented with the political situation at home are considerably less loyal, however.

These findings indicate that post-enlargement migration of young workers from new member states to more advanced European economies can be seen as a signal of socio-economic disparities in an enlarged European Union. A non-negligible fraction of the youth report intentions of long-term work abroad, indicating some preference for long-term or permanent exit from their home countries. A much larger share, however, appear to be attached to their home countries, reporting preference for stays abroad of shorter duration, and thus with their migration plans signaling their discontent with their present situation. Having completed education and the family status appear to be the key socio-demographic drivers of the choice between the two strategies.

In relation to the debate about circular migration and brain circulation, our findings indicate that there is little evidence of a significant educational gradient, or brain drain, in selection to permanent migration intentions. On the other hand, improvement in the political situation, quality of social and health care system, and quality of life are desirable on the assumption that temporary migration trajectories are preferred to long-term or permanent exits.

Socio-demographic variables and perceived pull and push factors and constraints on peoples' migration decisions independently explain similar fraction of the variation in migration intentions. The significance of education and family status implies that at certain stage of people's life cycle migration is more likely to be perceived as a viable alternative. In addition, a number of push and pull factors indicate that discovering something new, improving one's qualifications, or simply career opportunities are

important determinants of the migration decision among the young workers from new EU member states. Fresh and recent graduates planning their future career and making family choices is thus the social group that appears to be more responsive to policy intervention regarding their mobility choices and temporal nature of their migration plans.

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
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
Figures

Figure 1. Migration in an enlarged European Union (1997-2009)

a. High senders




b. Low senders



Source: Own calculations based on the data provided in Holland et al. (2011) and Eurostat Populations Statistics. In per cent, left axis: bars. Total stock, right axis: triangles. Adapted from Kahanec (2013a).


Figure 2. The share of youth (15-34) among all EU12 migrants in the EU15, by arrival



Notes: In per cent.

Source: Own calculations based on the EU Labor Force Survey, 2010. Migration status defined by place of birth, except for Germany for which due to data constraints nationality is used.


Figure 3. Percent females among EU10+2 migrants in the EU15



Notes: In per cent.

Source: Own calculations based on the EU Labor Force Survey, 2010. Migration status defined by place of birth, except for Germany for which due to data constraints nationality is used. 15-35 2004+ denotes migrants aged 15-35 and arriving after 2004.


Figure 4. Intentions to work abroad and expected duration of stay abroad, by gender.



Notes: In per cent.

Source: Own calculation based on Eurobarometer data 337, 72.5.

Figure 5. Intentions to work abroad, by age



Notes: In per cent.

Source: Own calculation based on Eurobarometer data 337, 72.5.

Tables

Table 1. Intentions to work abroad, household type

Family status	No move	Up to 1 year	1 year to 5 years	More than 5 years
Married, no children	71.26	5.39	7.78	15.57
Living with partner, no children	57.19	7.49	18.86	16.47
Single, no children	49.66	7.91	20.05	22.37
Married, with children	78.12	5.26	5.4	11.22
Living with partner, with children	67.39	6.52	12.5	13.59
Single, with children	62.00	9.00	9.00	20.00

Notes: In per cent.

Source: Own calculation based on Eurobarometer data 337, 72.5.

Table 2. Intentions to work abroad, by education

Age at completion of full time education	No move	Up to 1 year	1 year to 5 years	More than 5 years
<16	62.86	10.29	13.71	13.14
16-18	72.09	4.6	10.12	13.19
19-21	69.34	6.61	9.42	14.63
22+	69.29	4.82	10.15	15.74
Still studying	63.57	6.74	13.13	16.56

Notes: In per cent.

Source: Own calculation based on Eurobarometer data 337, 72.5.

Table 3: Intentions to work abroad, by professional status

Professional status	No move	Up to 1 year	1 year to 5 years	More than 5 years
Self-employed	77.36	6.29	6.92	9.43
Managers	64.32	6.1	10.33	19.25
Other white collar	78.38	3.3	8.11	10.21
Manual workers	69.07	5.45	11.09	14.4
House person	80.09	4.42	7.96	7.52
Unemployed	51.64	10.18	15.27	22.91
Students	43.27	9.81	22.5	24.42

Notes: In per cent.

Source: Own calculation based on Eurobarometer data 337, 72.5.

Table 4. Push and pull factors and constraints of migration propensity

Push and Pull Factors	Constraints
Better quality of life abroad Better working conditions abroad	Your home is here You would not want to impose big changes on your family and/or children
Better career or business opportunities abroad	You do not want to leave your friends behind
Better chances of finding employment abroad	It is difficult to learn a new language
To discover something new and meet new people	You do not want to give up your house or other property
To improve your qualifications (e.g. learn a new language)	You already have a good job here
Better economic climate abroad	It is too much of an effort to go and work abroad
To be closer to relatives or friends who live abroad	The cost of living is too high abroad
Better social and health care system abroad	The quality of life abroad is worse
Better political situation abroad	The attitude towards foreigners abroad is hostile The political situation abroad is worse You don't feel qualified enough to work abroad The economic climate abroad is worse Yourself or your friends/relatives have made bad experiences abroad

Table 5. The Determinants of Migration Intentions

	<i>Move</i>	<i>Duration5</i>	<i>Permanent</i>	<i>Move</i>	<i>Duration5</i>	<i>Permanent</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gender: Female	-0.0527* (0.0283)	-0.000629 (0.0451)	0.00770 (0.0152)	-0.0421 (0.0294)	0.0321 (0.0477)	0.0103 (0.0128)
Age (years)	-0.00985*** (0.00281)	0.000919 (0.00489)	0.00330** (0.00135)	-0.00827*** (0.00296)	-0.00296 (0.00523)	0.00224* (0.00118)
Profession: Self-Employed	-0.125* (0.0704)	-0.190 (0.125)	0.0245 (0.0304)	-0.0429 (0.0729)	-0.250* (0.133)	0.0289 (0.0258)
Profession: Manager	-0.00390 (0.0675)	-0.0978 (0.115)	0.0276 (0.0285)	0.0657 (0.0704)	-0.13 (0.122)	0.0232 (0.0249)
Profession: White collar	-0.147** (0.0622)	-0.102 (0.106)	0.0320 (0.0264)	-0.0677 (0.0643)	-0.151 (0.113)	0.0326 (0.0230)
Profession: Houseperson	-0.112* (0.0667)	-0.313*** (0.121)	-0.0172 (0.0310)	-0.0809 (0.0702)	-0.335*** (0.128)	-0.0144 (0.0258)
Profession: Unemployed	0.0718 (0.0550)	-0.0851 (0.0881)	0.00540 (0.0233)	0.0777 (0.0577)	-0.145 (0.0934)	0.00823 (0.0201)
Profession: Manual Worker	-0.0976* (0.0560)	-0.132 (0.0963)	0.0305 (0.0244)	-0.0365 (0.0587)	-0.176* (0.101)	0.0290 (0.0211)
Lives With a Partner	0.0770** (0.0322)	-0.108* (0.0585)	-0.0347** (0.0166)	0.0717** (0.0333)	-0.143** (0.0621)	-0.0334** (0.0142)
Lives Alone	0.103*** (0.0338)	-0.0437 (0.0594)	-0.0323** (0.0150)	0.0907*** (0.0351)	-0.0724 (0.0627)	-0.0289** (0.0129)
Has Children	0.207** (0.0804)	-0.256* (0.138)	-0.0790* (0.0409)	0.275*** (0.0824)	-0.255* (0.145)	-0.0623* (0.0344)
Gender x Children	-0.159*** (0.0477)	0.202** (0.0834)	0.0443* (0.0238)	-0.177*** (0.0487)	0.212** (0.0880)	0.0347* (0.0200)
Age at completion of full time education: 16-18	-0.0260 (0.0452)	0.134* (0.0790)	-0.0429** (0.0192)	-0.0472 (0.0470)	0.183** (0.0837)	-0.0395** (0.0168)
Age at completion of full time education: 19-21	-0.000641 (0.0472)	0.135* (0.0819)	-0.0367* (0.0190)	-0.0375 (0.0490)	0.202** (0.0865)	-0.0287* (0.0161)
Age at completion of full time education: >22	-0.0136 (0.0507)	0.134 (0.0887)	-0.0378* (0.0204)	-0.0725 (0.0529)	0.214** (0.0948)	0.0103 (0.0128)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Push&Pull Factors and	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.215** (0.0876)	-0.0939 (0.150)	-0.198*** (0.0517)	0.0796 (0.0962)	0.0894 (0.173)	-0.171*** (0.0481)
Observations	2240	816	773	2240	816	773
chi2	352.16	33.60	41.02	540.44	87.97	35.39
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0921	0.118	0.0000	0.0005	0.1588
Pseudo R2	0.1447	0.0326	0.1524	0.2632	0.0935	0.1980

Notes: Marginal effects from binomial Logit regressions of reported variables on the probability of expectations to move sometime in the future (Columns 1 and 4), stay there for at least 5 years (2 and 5), and stay there permanently (3 and 6). The excluded category is married male without children who still studies or completed his studies before his 16th birthday.

Table 6: Impact of Push and Pull Factors and Constraints

Push and Pull Factors				Constraints			
	(4)	(5)	(6)		(4 cont'd)	(5 cont'd)	(6)
Better chances of finding employment abroad	0.204*** (0.0258)	-0.0762* (0.0456)	-0.00924 (0.0101)	Your home is here	-0.288*** (0.0249)	-0.0558 (0.0429)	N/A
Better working conditions abroad	0.186*** (0.0251)	0.027 (0.0427)	0.00286 (0.00946)	You would not impose big changes on family/children	-0.107*** (0.0280)	-0.111** (0.0499)	N/A
Better career opportunities abroad	0.128*** (0.0277)	0.0924* (0.0483)	N/A	You do not want to leave your friends behind	-0.100*** (0.0273)	-0.0619 (0.0456)	N/A
To be closer to relatives or friends who live	0.0961** (0.0457)	-0.084 (0.0835)	N/A	You do not want to give up	-0.148*** (0.0337)	-0.160** (0.0625)	N/A
To discover something new and meet new	0.232*** (0.0323)	-0.118** (0.0531)	N/A	You already have a good job here	-0.238*** (0.0339)	-0.0864 (0.0611)	N/A
To improve qualifications (e.g. learn	0.159*** (0.0289)	-0.107** (0.0499)	N/A	It is too much effort to go and work abroad	-0.172*** (0.0374)	-0.126* (0.0695)	N/A
Better quality of life	0.165*** (0.0243)	0.066 (0.0434)	0.0228** (0.00929)	It is difficult to learn a new language	-0.191*** (0.0336)	0.00953 (0.0587)	N/A
Better political situation abroad	0.121** (0.0517)	0.187** (0.0849)	N/A	The cost of living is too high abroad	-0.0964*** (0.0341)	0.0548 (0.0594)	N/A
Better economic climate abroad	0.219*** (0.0316)	-0.0677 (0.0521)	0.00523 (0.0105)	Yourself or your friends/relatives have made	-0.0382 (0.0526)	-0.150* (0.0869)	N/A
Better social and health care system abroad	0.0567* (0.0323)	0.102* (0.0574)	0.0267** (0.0108)	You do not feel qualified enough to work abroad	-0.171*** (0.0465)	-0.105 (0.0873)	N/A
Other reasons	0.183* (0.0952)	0.111 (0.175)	N/A	The quality of life abroad is worse	-0.0998* (0.0561)	-0.0864 (0.0943)	N/A
				The political situation abroad is worse	0.0172 (0.0725)	0.144 (0.109)	N/A
				The economic climate abroad is worse	-0.107 (0.0702)	-0.0429 (0.105)	N/A
				The attitude towards foreigners abroad is hostile	-0.0321 (0.0344)	-0.0224 (0.0567)	N/A

Notes: Marginal effects from binomial Logit regression models

Table 7. Ordered Logit models

	Stayers and movers		Movers only	
	(3)	(4)	(3)	(4)
Gender: Female	-0.202*	-0.134	0.0208	0.112
	(0.122)	(0.129)	(0.165)	(0.172)
Age (years)	-0.0376***	-0.0296**	-0.00417	-0.0194
	(0.0124)	(0.0133)	(0.0184)	(0.0191)
Profession: Self-Employed	-0.322	-0.0577	-0.798*	-0.977**
	(0.308)	(0.327)	(0.463)	(0.480)
Profession: Manager	0.0859	0.322	-0.327	-0.459
	(0.296)	(0.315)	(0.427)	(0.442)
Profession: White collar	-0.590**	-0.351	-0.311	-0.51
	(0.276)	(0.292)	(0.391)	(0.404)
Profession: Houseperson	-0.563*	-0.564*	-1.111**	-1.229***
	(0.300)	(0.320)	(0.436)	(0.450)
Profession: Unemployed	0.366	0.34	-0.335	-0.587*
	(0.233)	(0.249)	(0.316)	(0.330)
Profession: Manual Worker	-0.341	-0.182	-0.451	-0.635*
	(0.243)	(0.260)	(0.349)	(0.360)
Lives With Partner	0.318**	0.251	-0.297	-0.402*
	(0.145)	(0.154)	(0.219)	(0.228)
Lives Alone	0.515***	0.432***	-0.0762	-0.138
	(0.152)	(0.161)	(0.227)	(0.235)
Has Children	0.770**	1.066***	-1.315**	-1.262**
	(0.357)	(0.376)	(0.524)	(0.539)
Gender x Child	-0.595***	-0.652***	0.916***	0.964***
	(0.212)	(0.223)	(0.318)	(0.326)
16-18 years of education	-0.113	-0.202	0.565**	0.797***
	(0.197)	(0.208)	(0.285)	(0.297)
18-21 years of education	-0.00672	-0.0918	0.514*	0.713**
	(0.207)	(0.219)	(0.300)	(0.309)
22+ years of education	-0.0641	-0.278	0.596*	0.920***
	(0.225)	(0.239)	(0.328)	(0.342)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Push&Pull Factors and Constraints	No	Yes	No	Yes
Cut 1 Constant	-0.774**	0.266	-1.489***	-2.105***
	(0.366)	(0.434)	(0.563)	(0.644)
Cut 2 Constant	0.603*	1.830***	0.237	-0.26
	(0.366)	(0.436)	(0.560)	(0.639)
Observations	2157	2157	816	816
chi2	379.53	691.15	40.92	111.56
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0169	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.1013	0.1844	0.0242	0.0658

Notes: Coefficients from ordered Logit regressions of reported variables on the probability of expectations to move and stay for less than a year, at least a year but less than five years, and more than five years (Columns 1 and 3). Columns 2 and 4 report the coefficient from a regression model excluding the category of stayers. The excluded category is married male without children who still studies or completed his studies before his 16th birthday.