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The Coherence of Democratic Peace-Building

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Abstract

Recent attention has focused on the difficulties of establishing ‘coherence’ between humanitarian relief aid in complex emergencies and the objective of ending violent conflict. This paper introduces a parallel problem: absence of total synergy between making peace and building democracy. A widely held assumption in the international community is that in post-conflict situations peace-building and democratization are virtually synonymous; creating the conditions for the one does so for both, the two processes will be reciprocal and mutually supportive. This suggests the policy issues will be simple. But the reality could be very different. Choices have to be addressed between requisites for peace and conditions for democracy; over the different implications for peace of competing designs for democracy; and over the kind of ‘democracy’ and its relation to other essential developments like state-building. …/

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Institutional crafting is important; but matters concerning civil society and political culture must be addressed too. Governance and welfare considerations will bear on both peace and democracy but not necessarily in identical ways. There are temporal choices to address as well; the order of passage from peace to stable democracy may be as significant as the rites of passage. The belief that the well-known theory of a democratic peace in international relations has its complement in a democratic domestic peace looks plausible, but ‘getting there’ after conflict will be challenging. Issues of strategy and policy are most problematic where peace, prosperity and democracy have all been deficient—a situation common to many societies.
1 Introduction: peace or democracy?

From the time of the fall of the Berlin wall the international community formally encourages states to democratize. Democracy is proposed as a universal ideology; it should be the ‘only game in town’. Democracy promotion is now reckoned to account for around 5 per cent of all official development assistance, up from 0.5 per cent in 1991. In a significant number of countries there is a recent history of substantial sub-state violence of one sort or another, including civil war. Following the end of the cold war international actors have become increasingly drawn to intervene in these situations and are expected to engage in building the peace. Building peace and constructing democracy have come to be viewed as one: ‘democratic peace building’ sums up this compound agenda. It invokes the familiar ‘democratic peace’ thesis in international relations, which claims that inter-state peace is guaranteed between democracies. It conveys the idea of a democratic domestic peace: a society with an established democratic polity only rarely goes to war with itself. In the general discourse no alternative policy option to ‘democratic peace building’ is envisaged, the most likely alternative being a reversion back to violent conflict.

The past in many of today’s democracies is of course littered with periods of violent civil conflict; the one does not prevent the other. In some notable instances violence made democracy’s advance possible: the conflict was expressly about securing precisely that objective. Equally there have been times when it was ruthless government action or external political or military intervention that ended internal violence and planting democracy was no part of the motive or intent. European history tells us that where conflict has taken the form of civil war, regression to autocracy and progress towards democracy have both been among the outcomes, with institutional forces, the unity and cohesiveness of the winners, and the opposition’s strategy being determining factors (Kissane and Sitter 2005).

Today, the driving forces—aims, rationales and intensity of interest—of different actors at the national, intra-national and international levels in establishing peace in a country and in its democratization are unlikely to be identical. Peace and democracy serve different interests. Various reasons explain why peace and democracy are sought; they do not all coincide. Peace is valued not just because it might facilitate democracy. And democracy can be prized as a collective good for reasons other than the contribution it might make to peace. Democracy’s potential to enshrine liberty or make government accountable and more representative, the participatory dimension, its inclination towards ‘good governance’ and socially responsible economic management all make their own appeal irrespective of how far these qualities serve peace. Democracy may be an end in itself. In situations where regional stability or international security and the interests of international capital are at stake, the returns offered by an end to internal conflict and by transition to democracy are not synonymous. In the short run there
might be conflicting calculations, especially where state (re)building—as distinct from fashioning a democratic state—and economic reconstruction offer more immediate results, or where the peace dividend (domestic and international) that democracy is expected to bring in the long run is heavily discounted in the short term.

Thus peacemaking and peace-building or their requisites on the one hand and democratization and its conditions on the other might not coincide. Tension can exist between the two agendas, as well as among different constituents within each agenda. Failed attempts at democratic peace-building in developing and post-communist countries alike suggest there can be opportunity costs and trade-offs where bad choices are possible. The several kinds of ‘democracy’ or ‘diminished forms of democracy’/‘democracy with adjectives’ (‘electoral democracy’, ‘partial democracy’, ‘managed democracy’ and so on), different institutional designs for democracy, and different time horizons for democratization may all affect peace-building differently, from one post-conflict-situation to another. Identical democratic choices could bear differently on the prospects for peace in societies with dissimilar backgrounds, such as those with and without a recent history of conflict.

All this is made clearer by exploring the ideas of peace and democracy. On the evidential basis for a democratic peace in international relations, the more closely we investigate dissimilar forms of violence such as total war, ‘low intensity warfare’, sponsored political assassinations and so on, the less impressive the thesis looks. And it certainly sheds no light on relations between democracies and non-democracies. Indeed the reasons that might explain peace among democracies are more illuminating than the fact of peace itself: they are contested: they indicate the thesis is no iron law (indeed, causality might run from peace to democracy); and they need not apply in the future where the world’s democracies are far more diverse. Equally, ‘post-conflict’ can refer to a range of scenarios, not just complete and final closure; violent incidents often persist in some particular social arena or scattered geographical localities, as in Iraq. Similarly on democratic peace-building, the consequences of different democratic architectures and of the important distinction between stable democracy’s properties and the processes of democracy-building can have crucial implications for pacific outcomes.

1.2 Democracy and the causes of conflict

More specifically, the magnitude, duration and type of violent conflict, both its ‘causes’ and its impact on society—how it is understood and interpreted there—and how it was brought to an end can all have a bearing on whether, how and to what extent democracy offers a solution. Put differently, not all post-conflict societies are the same.

The vast literature on causes of civil conflict leaves no single theory a clear ‘winner’. But absence of democracy hardly figures among the front runners. One reason is that violent conflicts are so diverse: state-organized pogroms and ‘democide’, inter-ethnic and religious strife; class wars and ideologically-motivated revolutions; wars of national
secession; violent struggles over economic turf (warfare as ‘business’). Some analysts even sub-divide civil wars, into ‘old’ (ideologically-rooted) and ‘new’ (less political). Each category may have to be explained differently—and require its own solution. If for instance the ‘cause’ is environmental scarcity, or socio-economic inequality (two theories that do not receive wide support in the literature), then it is not obvious how democracy can help. And if greed combined with opportunity to command economic rents, rather than grievance concerning political oppression or exclusion from power, carry heaviest responsibility for a civil war, then should political scientists be prescribing democracy at all, let alone pore over competing schemes for establishing political inclusiveness? There are democracies where government has persistently mismanaged the nation’s financial and economic affairs, where rapacious profit-seekers have wreaked havoc, and where sizeable inequalities of income and wealth only increased during periods of sustained economic growth. The rule of law—and secure property rights especially—not free and fair elections appear to be the most significant for wealth creation. So, although some writers might envisage a democratic development(al) state as the ideal instrument to produce the economic conditions for durable peace, in some places the economic conditions could be more likely to emerge and consolidate under a semi-authoritarian developmental state.

On the relationship between ethnopolitics and conflict a substantial literature tells us ethnic diversity need not lead to violent conflict; it may not explain the majority of violent conflicts (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In Africa the principal exceptions appear to be where there is a high degree of polarization, as in Rwanda and Burundi. Collier and Hoeffler calculate that polarized societies have around a 50 per cent higher probability of civil war than either homogenous or highly fractionalized societies; Byman and Evera claimed that of 37 countries experiencing conflict after 1989 a hegemonistic ethnic group accounted in part for 25 of the cases. (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 572; Byma and van Evera 1998: 5). The democracy findings look even more encouraging: Fish and Brooks show ethnic heterogeneity does not make stable democracy less likely; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich conclude from their data ‘no intrinsic antipathy exists between ethnopolitical diversity and democratic stability in Africa, or, for that matter, elsewhere’ (Fish and Brooks 2004: 154; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich 2003: 389).

2 The democratic domestic peace and democratization

Why is democracy good for domestic peace? Democracies condone pluralism, accept diversity. They encourage contestation and competition. The line that borders conflict is a fine one, but conflict is not necessarily violent. Protests and demonstrations can be peaceful. Conflict can be the vehicle that enables much needed change. Without some conflict, democracy’s claim to a comparative advantage in the peaceful resolution of

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1 This thesis on the cause of civil wars generally was advanced by Collier and Hoeffler (1998: 563-73). Subsequent elaborations suggest that greed is more central to the perpetuation of civil war.
conflict would not be so special. The idea behind a liberal democratic domestic peace is that its distinctive political modus operandi is singularly well-equipped to manage conflict, by placing a premium on negotiation and willingness to compromise. Liberal democracy respects human rights. That bestows a durable form of legitimacy on the system. It ensures government decisions are widely accepted even among the 'losers': where there is dissatisfaction, governments can be removed and yet political order is retained. These qualities are more solid than mere ‘performance legitimacy’ (the ability to deliver material needs of security and welfare), which a wide range of political regimes could exhibit but which might be sufficient to sustain a new democracy until society comes to appreciate its deeper, intrinsic political worth.

Peace is not a sufficient condition for democracy; equally there is a threshold of conflict-reduction that societies must cross if they are to have any chance of building democracy: identifying the peace threshold and making it secure in practice may both be problematic. Hence the familiar problem of premature elections: when to stage elections that are supposed to end war, initiate ‘reconciliation’ and make transition to democracy, if the ‘security environment’ is not (yet) wholly favourable.

And although democracy might make violence unnecessary it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for domestic peace. On balance the evidence suggests that established democracies do perform better (less violent conflict) than autocracies, but in part this may be because autocracies tend to be less stable. Of course it could be argued that oppressive regimes should not even be viewed as a relevant comparator, where they inhibit sub-state violence by dint of instilling fear of the state and through intimidation—forms of violence in themselves. However, not all democracies are stable democracies; and attempts to build a democracy cannot guarantee political stability, especially after conflict in very poor countries. Needless to say the question whether there are any essential socio-economic requisites for stable democracy, and if so, what those requisites are, is prone to much dispute. India, Botswana, Mauritius and Costa Rica show that high average incomes are not essential for stable democracy. But Przeworski et al.’s estimate that democracy’s (but not autocracies’) survival will be guaranteed (only) after average per capita incomes have reached $6000 per annum is widely followed in the literature (Przeworski et al. 1996: 39-55). Needless to say that benchmark is well out of reach of many ‘post-conflict’ societies for whom the international community today recommends democracy. And in low income democracies political institutions ‘tend to have relatively high levels of instability, and this has probably tended to increase their risk of civil war’ (Collier et al. 2003: 65).

If unstable democracy compares unfavourably with stable autocracy in preventing violent internal conflict, then comparative analysis identifies semi-democracy as the most challenging of all political environments for peace (Ellingsen 2000: 243; Mousseau 2001: 546-67; Regan and Henderson 2002: 119-36). Being more liberal than dictatorships, such intermediate regimes encourage dissent but are not responsive
enough to concede the substantive demands. So, subjects resort to unconstitutional channels and violent means, and governments respond with repression. Political change can compound the problem further. Movement by an intermediate regime towards democracy can look like a shift in the right direction—descending the right-hand side of the inverted U-curve that represents the statistical relationship between internal violence and level of democracy. It means progression in the direction of an outcome that might resemble the least conflict-prone type of regime—stable democracy. However, only rarely does the process of democratization occur smoothly and in linear fashion. And statistical analysis by Hegre et al. suggests flux makes such periods of change especially hazardous, liable to increase the risk of conflict; Mousseau too finds that autocratization is less risky than democratization, in ethnically heterogenous societies (Hegre et al. 2001; Mousseau 2001). Specifically in these societies fragile new democracies’ effectiveness in preventing extreme forms of political violence compares unfavourably with the stable democracies. The complications that democratization can pose for the democratic peace theory in international relations are also noted by analysts whose particular interest is confined to the international domain.

Statistical findings aside, several analysts have elaborated reasons why or how democratization might increase the risk of violent conflict. Huntington, in Political Order in Changing Societies (1968) first drew attention to the dangers inherent in pushing social mobilization ahead of economic development in the absence of well institutionalized political organizations (like a strong party system) to contain and channel popular demands. Such uneven processes of change invite ‘political decay’: political violence and military coups. He re-presented his concerns within the context of democracy’s ‘third wave’, arguing that amid the new freedoms there is a rational temptation for politicians in divided societies to exploit and accentuate cultural (race, ethnicity, language) cleavages for purposes of political mobilization. Identity will be (re)constructed and instrumentalized to the end of retaining/winning power, possibly even to the point of encouraging xenophobia—dangerous to peace at home and abroad. Examples include Kenya’s President Moi and Yugoslavia’s President Milosevic. Snyder too highlighted the risks posed by exclusionary ethno-nationalism fashioned and manipulated by competing by elites. Accordingly he recommends that democratic elections after conflict should await the development of a ‘thick safety net’ of ‘civic institutions’ such as an impartial media that will encourage cross-cutting political alignments (Huntington 1996: 3-13; Snyder 2000).

So far, then, the inference both for post-conflict societies and the international community should be clear. The risks of internal violence provoked by political transition and the chances of eventually arriving at stable democracy must both be calculated carefully, and a view formed on what discount rate to apply to the possible future benefits, before pressing ahead with trying to democratize. These are areas of imperfect information and, more importantly, normative judgment; given that the
different actors will not have identical interests it would be surprising if there were not disagreements over strategy and the best way to proceed.

3 (In)coherence in democratic peace-building: the policy implications

A not untypical response to questions about what the international community should do in post-conflict situations is to say that what those societies need most is a holistic approach. That means addressing the whole gamut of social, economic and political problems, many of which will be closely interrelated. Related advice is to be prepared for a long haul. But such a potentially open-ended commitment backed by unlimited resources seems unrealistic, and at the very least needs justifying. For illustration there is Ottaway’s estimate that involvement in the DR Congo comparable to the support already provided in the ‘maximalist model’ of democratic construction employed in Bosnia-Herzegovina would require 900,000 international peacekeepers and administrators—well in excess of the ‘bargain basement imperial solution’ presently on offer (Ottaway 2003: 318). What is more, not all good things may go together at the same time: sequencing issues could be just as significant as overall resource constraints. Agendas clash, priorities compete; trade-offs have to be considered, difficult choices made. Here the fashionable goal of ‘coherence’ in complex emergencies, where international humanitarian relief aid meshes harmoniously with a determination to end the violence, or at minimum ‘does no harm’, meets its post-conflict counterpart. The following discussion is structured around eight issue areas.

3.1 Development for democracy

Collier et al. identify marginalized low-income countries—even if they have long enjoyed peace and experienced elected government—and countries caught in the conflict trap (where there has already been civil war) as being at high risk of civil war. While disputes that fall along ethnic and religious lines might become more highly politicized and turn violent where incomes are low and declining, ‘the key root cause of conflict is failure of economic development’ (Collier et al. 2003: 53). The verdict is the international community must not only prioritize military peacekeeping, disarmament, troop demobilization and reintegration of former combatants but also provide adequate economic support. Failure to address the economic sources of conflict and its damaging economic consequences will make a recurrence more likely. Even if the violence does not return soon, continuing economic weakness would indirectly impair the democracy’s quality and threaten its sustainability. In contrast, by raising the price paid for political instability an improving economic outlook creates stakeholders in peace. That will shift the incentive structure towards political co-operation—even over democratic rules of the game. A prospering market economy makes political power less highly sought after simply as a passport to wealth.

Here, at least, there is the possibility of a win-win situation, if attention to economic reconstruction both secures peace and underpins the democracy. However, if attempts to
install democracy founder and thereby fail to consolidate the peace then the prospects for development will suffer too. If the developmental impact of successful democratization itself is negative or very mixed then that too could endanger durable peace. And the possibility cannot be ruled out entirely that progress on development itself will be disruptive and create conflict, which might turn violent especially if the political institutions are weak or too rigid. This becomes more likely where rapid growth and technological change weaken established social bonds, and influential stakeholders find the distributive economic consequences (as they perceive them) unacceptable. To add to all these risks there is the statistical finding that violent conflict is more likely to emerge where there is a previous record. Both the chances of securing sound economic reconstruction and the implications for democracy, then, rest in part on other variables, most notably the health of the state.

3.2 The state as a problem

We live in an age that has discovered state failure and state collapse. They go together with conflict like ‘chicken and egg’. States can succumb to faulty design, inadequate resources and external aggression, with internal conflict playing no greater role than catalyst. The economic and social effects of HIV/AIDS will severely tax some states. In sultanistic regimes the leader’s demise automatically threatens the state. Conversely weak states with ineffective governments may persist without significant violence, or political violence brings down a government or transforms the regime but without assaulting the idea of statehood or eroding state capacity. A state’s ‘despotic power’ may wither yet its ‘infrastructural power’—the capacity to raise resources for development and meet the people’s needs—survives intact and, even, gains ground.

Nevertheless there are post-conflict situations where creating a new state, or rebuilding a failed/failing state and increasing its effectiveness is imperative to securing/maintaining peace. In any case some measure of governance capability to implement the peoples’ wishes has to be present before their democratic entitlement to express policy preferences and choose between alternative programmes is to have real meaning. This does not mean the issue of regime type is irrelevant. Notwithstanding the rival appeal of hereditary monarchy, or theocracy, or ‘Asian values’, in many places regime legitimacy may be held contingent on whether the state is judged to be liberal democratic; and in the long run legitimacy itself contributes to state effectiveness.

The key questions for policymakers then are what circumstances dictate that state (re)building take precedence over democratic transition, in the immediate term at least? And when, or at what point, can or should the emphasis switch? Of course the answers must refer back to the specific causes of a state’s failure and its consequences. For example giving priority to strengthening the state’s coercive powers hardly seems appropriate where the main problem has been one of state oppression. But where inter-communal violence ran deep, the state’s reputational power to be able to hold all sides to agreements can be crucial to persuading everyone to lay down arms and negotiate.
Concentrating power over the means of physical coercion and centralizing power over other critical resources—the financial wherewithal to buy off troublemakers, for instance—could be high priorities. That means strengthening executive capacity and consolidating instruments of governance (although it may not mean statehood, as Kosovo illustrates). Wimmer and Schetter for instance argued these are what Afghanistan needs most (Wimmer and Schetter 2003: 525-39).

In these circumstances fussing over institutional reforms to make government vertically and horizontally accountable (for example strengthening legislatures and judiciary respectively), promoting democratic decentralization and a high regard for democratic norms and practices can look like distractions. By creating opportunities for confusion and imposing delays they may postpone indefinitely the time when the authorities are able to organize national elections that command public confidence. A requirement to hold free and fair elections and invite alternations in power can easily complicate economic and state reconstruction. In contrast, the persistence of informal traditions of neo-patrimonialism and clientelism may usefully serve political stability in the interim, though anathema to the modern democratic state idea. Ottaway’s observation that the international community is overburdening some societies with its insistence on a ‘democratic reconstruction model’—‘a set of prescriptions for state reconstruction that is so exhaustive that it cannot possibly be followed in practice’—makes the point (Ottaway 2002: 1008-9). Similarly for Fearon and Laitin the main way to prevent civil wars starting (again) is to have well-financed, administratively competent government (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

How much stability and what extent of state capability should be secured before the emphasis can turn to democratic transition? These go beyond simply technical matters like addressing fiscal crisis. Initial approaches that are weighted too heavily towards statist and governance considerations may in the longer run fall prey to path dependence, constraining future possibilities for democracy. Vested interests in perpetuating the initial power structure will gel, well placed to frustrate political redistribution later. Meaningful democratization is then delayed or watered down; a return to political violence (democratic revolution) might be required if democratic reform is to make headway later. Similar points can be made about choices over specific features of democracy’s institutional design when these are offered as ‘temporary’ concessions to bind reluctant parties into peace.

3.3 The nation as a problem

Nation-building poses challenges analytically distinct from state-building, though connections can be strong. Where a sense of national community is improbable it is unlikely that a strong state could be built and foolish to think that democratic transition would succeed. There may be circumstances where democracy, or democratization, can help build a nation. Various types of constitutional asymmetry (communal representation and territorial, regional or cultural autonomy) might help here, although
Ghai argues many such schemes emphasize conflict management at the expense of longer run democratic equality and governability, and Lane and Ersson too find federalism is not always positive for democratic stability (Ghai 2002; Lane and Ersson 2005). There are places where the democratic self-determination of nations indicates that communities in conflict should be permitted to secede, such as where arbitrary boundaries are pure artefacts of history and do not ‘map on to’ distinct societies. The emergence of sovereign states like Eritrea and East Timor only after violent conflict (and after movement towards democracy, in Ethiopia and Indonesia) testify to the haphazard way decolonization was executed in the first place.

However, if nation-based democracy points in one direction, the consequences for peace are not so clear-cut. One survey of 125 civil wars and 21 partitions since 1945 found partition is neither a necessary nor effective solution to ethnic civil war or lower levels of ethnic violence. It did not even confirm that partition is positive for democratization; on the contrary, in Africa democracy’s capacity to assuage grievance through recognizing political and civil rights was found to be more effective than partition (Sambanis 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). In practice the international community is generally averse to ‘balkanization’ (ironically the end of the cold war is often viewed as having increased the sub-state violence among former communist states and ‘third world’ quasi-states where governments lost their superpower support). The proliferation of states is seen as a recipe for international disorder. This aversion to conceding the democratic case for political self-determination in those places where it might seem overwhelming (Somaliland is a possible example) could invite a lose-lose-lose situation—obstructive to state-building, to democracy, and to sustained peace.

### 3.4 Electoral timing

Elections a democracy do not make; even so, the timing of the first ‘post-conflict’ elections can be especially problematic where they carry multiple responsibilities: set the seal on peace, begin a process of reconciliation, inaugurate transition to democracy, and produce a government. The difficulties facing policymakers are well known. Held too soon, and the security environment is hostile and the infrastructure of elections management not yet complete. The ‘moderate majority’ might need more time to organize, if dubious sectional groups led by military strongmen or warlords and with fewer collective action problems are not to prevail. The case of Liberia’s Charles Taylor in 1997 is paradigmatic. The election might set the seal on conflict but transition to democracy is improbable. The victor, claiming a democratic mandate proceeds to expel international peace monitors and democracy advisers. Where the electoral process is obviously flawed and the result contentious, elections may fuel violence, setting the scene for renewed general strife. Proposals to counter these fears include a broadly-based interim electoral commission to foster collaboration. International backing might be valuable but should not hijack the process. Thus rather than concentrate on manufacturing structures to produce ‘free and fair’ elections external support should focus on fostering mechanisms that will change attitudes and expectations in the
direction of building confidence in peace (Lyon 2004). Transition elections that are
given lavish assistance by international organizations can set a precedent that poor
countries will be unable to repeat; inevitably subsequent elections are less well
managed, and that may give the impression of democratic regression; the social capital
then dwindles accordingly.

Yet a protracted delay before the first elections means the persistence of some kind of
rule that lacks basic legitimacy. It gives rise to suspicion over the true intentions, such
as a partisan desire to determine the eventual outcome. As frustration grows the peace
unravels. Where the peace negotiations embodied some post-election power-sharing
deal the point of contestation can look obscure anyway; it makes voter indifference
more likely—a bad start to democracy. So although representative democracy cannot be
built without elections, elections held at the wrong time or under the wrong conditions
undermine the chances of democratic transition, even if the authorities can summon
enough military clout to limit political violence. Afghanistan and Iraq offer test cases. In
worst case scenarios the peace process is sabotaged as well (Angola 1992). In contrast
even a flawed election might secure the peace but at the same time electoral
irregularities will set a bad precedent—repeated on future occasions (Nigeria). While
strategies for democratization must pay attention to democracy’s enemies and not just
its friends, in most cases of electoral malpractice the really troublesome—because least
predictable —actors will be the semi-loyal. Identifying democracy’s ‘fair weather’
friends is a highly speculative business.

3.5 Institutional crafting

Beyond the question of a post-conflict election’s timing lie bigger issues about a new
democracy’s architecture, its institutional design. This includes the kind of executive
and the extent of executive powers; executive-legislative relations; horizontal
instruments of accountability (judiciary, ombudsperson, auditor-general); and of course
the choice of electoral system. These are politically contentious issues. There are
complex political science literatures about them even for societies free of conflict; post-
conflict situations sharpen the debates, without generating any greater consensus.
Policymakers will look in vain for clear-cut and universally applicable solutions.

Some of the disagreements go to the heart of different understandings of democracy and
the relative importance attached to individual components, like accountability,
participation, and inclusiveness. Some ideas of accountable government, checks and
balances, and alternation in power (the last being critical to Huntington’s well-known
‘double turnover’ test of democratic consolidation) incline towards an adversarial style
politics, which may prove inflammatory in deeply divided societies. Presidential rule
and the representational consequences of majoritarian electoral systems tend to produce
clear lines of accountability, which has its merits. They also predispose towards
‘winner-take-all’ situations, which were held responsible for the move to one-party rule
and military coups in many post-colonial states and may be particularly unsuited to
polarized societies, where some form of proportional representation could be more appropriate. An institutional architecture that gives the losers in war or peace a stake in the democratic system will be at a premium. That means arrangements that can structure incentives in ways that deter political actors from cultivating the more divisive ethnonationalist agendas. One such proposal for inclusiveness is ‘vote-pooling’. This integrative approach presses politicians campaigning for office to draw support from across different communities, such as by making it mandatory to achieve some minimum threshold of support in every province (Nigeria). In fact the successful operation of multi-ethnic or broad alliance parties is common in the many heterogeneous African countries that have avoided violent conflict.

Consociational proposals offer an alternative, which pushes party leaders to join coalitions—a form of group power-sharing—in order to form a government (a ‘government of national unity’ even) after elections. The competing merits and limitations of these and other schemes are keenly contested. Thus it is said consociationalism provides no incentive to leaders to desist from mobilizing support on ethnic or other group lines. And it is a moot point whether consociationalism can establish confidence and build tolerance and trust, or performs well only where those properties are present already—which seems unlikely soon after conflict. The Netherlands’ Institute for Multiparty Democracy’s efforts to facilitate inter-party dialogue is an attractive model of what the international community can try to do in these situations. But perhaps even more damaging to consociationalism is the claim that it invites political paralysis—with negative consequences for governmental effectiveness that in turn may impact badly on peace. A parallel debate suggests that a strongly presidential system with a (no more than) two-party system, or possibly a parliamentary system like Britain’s, are more likely to provide stable, effective governance than is multipartyism combined with a weak form of presidentialism. Intermediate arrangements like semi-parliamentary and semi-presidential systems also have their own claimed advantages and disadvantages.

Whichever institutional designs look most attractive in theory, achieving democratic ownership in practice can mean having to settle for a design that is sub-optimal for conflict-resolution (Horowitz 2002: 36). By the same token designs that successfully reconcile all main stakeholders to peace could well depart in some respects from the liberal democratic ideal. For instance a peace settlement that has to make explicit recognition of collective ethnonational rights such as by reserving a quota of seats in government could end up both impeding political integration and complicating the democracy’s operation, yet be extremely difficult to reverse or revise later.

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2 Horowitz (2002) argues for vote-pooling and Arend Lijphart presents the case for consociationalism.
3.6 Civil society issues

If democratic design is one important influence on democratic prospects then the condition of civil society is another. There is much discussion of the concept itself and of civil society’s proper role and relationship to state, market and political society (in particular political parties), before, during, and after democratic transition. Views range widely. Civil societies themselves are nothing if not diverse: ‘civil society organizations are not inherently counterhegemonic or liberal’ (Hawthorne 2004: 11). Countries where associational groups have felt obliged to resort to coercive methods to oppose a dictatorship or where state failure has allowed ‘uncivil’ associations to expand or proliferate pose special difficulties for policymakers.

Strong, effective democratic states and strong civil societies go together; but the civil society might have to reinvent itself first. An indiscriminate enthusiasm for associational life after violent conflict could jeopardize state building and guarantee future disorder. The concentration of support by the international democracy assistance industry on ‘civil society’ has tended to prefer ‘modern’ civil society—professionalized, non-governmental organizations, either policy advocacy/lobby groups or service-providers that resemble western exemplars. It shows far less enthusiasm towards more ‘traditional’ or informal groupings grounded in kinship or ethnic associations, clans, religious sects, and the wider fringe of social movements. Many of these will not be predisposed towards violence. But by ignoring them at this stage the international community risks allowing their more dangerous cousins to gain disproportionate political influence, especially where a negotiated end to violence has required—and promoted—their participation.

When faced with an assortment of both civil and ‘uncivil’ associations policymakers must choose how to respond. Providing special assistance to very vulnerable groups like formerly oppressed minorities and associations whose express purpose is to build bridges across communities are the easy options. The promotion of politically ‘neutral’ policy issues might indirectly instigate the formation of new cross-cutting affiliations in civil society, environmental coalitions for example. But dealing with a legacy of dubious organizations poses more difficult dilemmas. Try to co-opt them? Convert them? Exclude them? Suppress them? Related conundrums are whether it is better to invest in capacity-building among chosen organizations and provide them with core support, or alternatively fund an ad hoc selection of activities, or instead concentrate on bringing about the right ‘enabling environment’ (legal and regulatory framework; tax inducements; media environment, and so on). Very similar considerations apply to support for the development of party politics, which is likely to become a growing area of international democracy promotion. In fact the early development of democratic parties and a viable party system might be essential if uncivil associational groups are not to occupy the political space. In divided societies it is not clearcut whether a fractionalized party system or a polarized system serves best to optimize the competing requirements of representativeness and integration/nation-building. Only to a limited
degree may the alternatives be susceptible to engineering via the particular choice of electoral system.

The record of achievement to date of extensive efforts to assist civic organizations in societies where civil society was previously weak is modest. The major difficulties that externally-supported organizations experience in achieving autonomy and self-sustainability have been extensively documented. It would be surprising if comparable difficulties are not encountered in the event of increased international support to the development of durable parties and effective party systems. Major policy issues include the limits of acceptable competition to discourage the deployment of racist or extreme nationalist agendas; the balance of public versus private funding of party activities; and how to translate party support into a stable, competitive party system that meets democracy’s main functional requirements.

3.7 Justice and reconciliation

Post-conflict societies are often much troubled by anxieties over how to deal with (bad memories of) the past. Liberal democracies should show an absolute commitment to fundamental human rights at all times, which makes the matter of ‘transitional justice’ a particularly delicate matter. ‘Faustian bargains’ and a promise of amnesties for ‘war criminals’ and gross abusers of human rights will be stronger incentives to co-operate in making peace than are threats of criminal prosecution. Peace objectives can vie with those of justice and the need for a new democratic government to demonstrate its firm commitment to the rule of law. Large-scale purges or lustration can deny the state essential human skills. Yet facing up to the past may be essential to reconciliation and to the possibility of achieving normal democratic life in the long run. Similarly, finding a solution to the proper requirement of judicial autonomy without seeming to vest too much political power in a democratically unaccountable institution is another puzzle that will demand attention.

3.8 Political culture and political economy

Many analysts believe the popular political culture (values, attitudes, beliefs, and affections) is critical to the success of democratization, especially democratic consolidation and democratic deepening, although less important to the overthrowing of an authoritarian regime and the immediate aftermath. Yet the discourse on conflict and peace makes little reference to political culture. An unhelpful exception are theorists who claim violence is rooted in atavism, that ethnic conflict stems from primordial sentiments rather than from say colonial ‘divide and rule policies’ or the past attempts of cold war warriors to destabilize allies of their opponents in the developing world. Nowadays, ethnic groups themselves are widely understood to be historical products, formed by processes of administrative classification, political mobilization, and socialization. Although the likelihood of conflict might be influenced by their relative displacement and distribution, the malleability of political culture offers the potential to
influence the prospects for democratic peace: key issues here involve who must be influenced, how to influence, and how long will it take.

Where efforts to make peace rest heavily on elite-level bargains between the leaders of the groups, bands or communities formerly at war, the question of popular culture barely seems to arise. The willingness of people to follow their leaders counts, obviously. However, for democratic sustainability in the long run—namely, where the political culture of the demos can be counted on both to underpin responsible political participation and to protect democracy’s institutions from subversion by self-seeking political rogues— the challenge of popular political culture must be addressed. One way of phrasing what needs to be done is the development of a ‘moderate majority’—citizens who are prepared to stand up and be counted for democracy. To reach that point could well require far more wide-ranging measures of political investment than simply voter education campaigns geared to navigating citizens through the practicalities of first generation elections. Progress may be slow; irreversibility is not guaranteed.

Moreover an elite-level approach to peacemaking/peace maintenance hardly seems to cohere with the normative case for a mass–level approach to building democracy. Democracy crafting in any situation invites choices between more elitist and more popular approaches; it is reasonable to expect the final decisions will reflect the existing—usually unequal—distribution of power. The choice of electoral rules is one example; it is an arena of political contestation that may have greater significance than—because it sets the context for—subsequent competitions among parties for the people’s vote. Mass engagement with the decision process might seem unhelpful, or premature, at this stage, and even dangerous to peace. But the consequence of adopting a more elitist or technocratic approach could be a democracy that resembles Joseph Schumpeter’s (1943) well-known—and much criticized—model: an arrangement for arriving at decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote. The consequences are writ large in the example of the EU. The current indifference of the European public to elections to the European Parliament can be said to originate in the early stages of post-1945 European integration, when the citizenry was excluded from a process designed primarily to create an elite political consensus.

A minimalist, procedurally-oriented democracy hardly delivers the democratic peace dividend envisaged by proponents of participatory democracy and social democracy let alone fulfil aspirations to ‘empowerment’. Grass-roots activists who fought against the ancien régime might feel cheated; even peaceful converts to the idea of liberal democracy might feel disappointed. Indeed, although Bastian and Luckham concluded that democracy’s institutional design really does influence the extent to which democracy eliminates violent conflict, they also recommend more attention be given to the ways democratic institutions can acquire legitimacy. For them, the secret lies in enhancing participation, or a ‘democratic politics’ (Bastian and Luckham 2003).
Democratic politics requires that all citizens are aware of their opportunity to participate. That can mean resisting the pressures to weight post-conflict structures in the direction of the very actors whose agreement to end conflict was most essential to achieving peace. Such structures could all too easily freeze the map of power, to the disadvantage of political interests and political formations that (can) emerge or develop only in the settled conditions of peace. Moreover the conditions for such enhanced participation go beyond just political inclusion for all: social and economic inclusion could be essential too. Particular concern should be paid to gender equality, if necessary through affirmative action measures (women being among violent conflict’s victims, they are often marginalized in the political manoeuvrings after conflict).

All this has special resonance where the international community is providing substantial humanitarian assistance and economic reconstruction aid as part of a strategy to build peace. Policy should not allow local powerbrokers to control the disbursements in ways that serve to intensify the politicization of difference between communities or obstruct the (re)building of vital state capacity, or reinforce elite (male) domination of political life. Only the specifics of the country’s political as well as economic situation can determine whether the market or public sector bodies or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the most appropriate vehicles for disbursing aid. Considerations of efficiency and financial accountancy should not be considered as ‘trumps’; even less so a commitment to principles of economic liberalization and privatization if an insistence on marketization or NGO-ization would seriously weaken an already fragile state. In deeply divided societies group-based (mis)perceptions of unequal or unfair patterns in the distribution of economic opportunities can have negative consequences for both peace and democracy. So even if the politics of deal-making that establishes peace require the negotiations to be conducted behind closed doors, the case for transparency in the arrangements for distributing international material assistance in these situations is strong.

4 The limits and responsibilities of international intervention

4.1 Limits

Some conflicts are brought to an end decisively, for instance where the oppressors triumph over rebels or alternatively are completely vanquished, or where all the parties to civil war are exhausted (Mozambique). The way peace arrives may both affect its durability and influence the democratic prospects near by (for example the post-civil war creation of Bangladesh in 1971 established electoral democracy there and also returned Pakistan to democracy). But if there are difficult choices over what should happen next so there are questions over who should or can do what. The United Nations Charter gives the international community legal authority to use force to intervene when the Security Council judges that a state poses a threat to the peace of neighbours. But it mentions no right to forcibly impose democracy, in any circumstances. The act of
intervening to impose peace, or the means employed, can disable the intervenors from playing a constructive role in building democracy, where for example local stakeholders interpret forcible intervention as a hostile act against the country or as politically partisan. The primary question will then be not what contribution the foreign actors can make to confidence-building between communities formerly at war, but how much confidence those actors can command when offering their ‘good offices’ to deliberations over the new democratic architecture. The role of the USA in Middle East diplomacy is made more difficult by issues such as these.

In democracies the people are supposed to be sovereign. And a common notion is that democratization must come from within, not gifted from without. Possibly a truism it is also a practical observation, for unlike a truce, which can be imposed, democracy must be owned by the people. Their involvement in the political process is essential. Only then can the political arrangements secure a lasting legitimacy. This condition has yet to be fulfilled in Bosnia-Herzegovina for example, notwithstanding, or possibly because of, very extensive political management of the local situation by outside agencies. Critics claim democracy there is being redefined as adherence to externally set standards and imposed decisions—very different from autonomy and domestic accountability or locally-rooted processes involving accommodations reached freely between the different groups. ‘If the international community is deciding which parties represent the public interest and which policies they should be implementing then there is little room for political contestation or for democratic involvement’ (Chandler 2002: 115). Either democracies cannot be imposed or, as has often been the case, the outcome proves politically unstable. The few exceptions like West Germany and Japan after 1945 are very special cases, from which we should not generalize. Constitutional advisers face similar conundrums when they ‘must consider not only whether a particular institutional design is attractive for a given polity but also whether the transitional environment makes it likely that the given design will be adopted’ (Solnick 2002: 205).

Yet clearly there are also circumstances of international intervention that can be helpful to the prospects for democratic transition, as well as for peace. Thus it matters whether it is UN-sanctioned and in accordance with the UN Charter, and if the execution has a multinational flavour. Making war on a country in order to build democracy might sound counter-intuitive. But an international presence by creating windows of peace may enable a society to take steps towards democracy, such as by defending it against external aggression (as in East Timor) or from the contagion of a bad neighbourhood, as in parts of West Africa. Sometimes it is there by invitation (Sierra Leone); and in places like Afghanistan and Iraq where uninvited external agency destroyed a regime there is a moral obligation to contribute constructively to building a replacement.

The idea of democratic self-determination suggests that an external presence should leave the scene as soon as possible after conflict, unless its continued assistance is freely
accepted. In principle conflict can be brought to an end rapidly by the use of superior force, especially when wielded by external actors who do not have to account to the people, although there have been places where maintaining the peace involved a long-term commitment (Cyprus). In practice closure may not be so swift. And at minimum the international community might have to signal an intention to enforce the peace for ‘as long as it takes’, if all the former combatants in civil strife are to be persuaded that from now on peaceful political methods really are the ‘only game in town’, As a last resort for peace the imposition of international trusteeship might be one—seemingly undemocratic—option, but Articles 77 and 78 of the UN Charter seem to disallow that for UN member states. Imposed trusteeship would then be beyond the international rule of law; if, however, trusteeship was the democratically expressed wish of the people, then it seems unlikely they would need it.

Pressure on international peacekeepers to withdraw too soon, owing to financial constraints or political pressure at home (an impending election for example) can mean their democracy puts obstacles in the way of successful peace-building. Likewise it might frustrate transition to democracy either because that needs peace or it requires significant long-term support in its own right. If international actors outstay their welcome that in itself may provoke new manifestations of violence, as they become targets. But for many of the post-conflict societies democratization is so novel and daunting that international assistance of one kind or another, direct and indirect, could be essential for many years to come. Thus whereas international peace-makers are usually on the look-out for an exit strategy (aiming to quit after new elections have been held), in the circumstances of democratic peace-building a more relevant outlook for international actors might be a ‘completion strategy’, While peace-makers look back, seeking signs that the glass of peace is increasingly full, democracy builders dwell on the task ahead and with good reason might conclude that their glass is still uncomfortably close to empty. Yet there are no scientifically-based criteria to tell us when the foundational work of political reconstruction is complete. That makes it difficult to establish precisely when the international community’s share of responsibilities for building democracy can or should come to an end.

4.2 Responsibilities

Peace and democracy may both be described as public goods, but international actors are no different from domestic actors in that the values they place on them will be influenced by more purely self-regarding interests. The degree to which international actors privilege efforts to strengthen state capacity, or, say, assist economic improvement, over building democracy, will depend on their reasons for involvement—the foreign policy drivers and on policy analysis. In this way debates over the primary cause of threats to international security (international conflict) mirror debates over sub-state violence. For example does the problem lie with domestic political oppression/illiberal regimes, or with state weakness (both may reflect a poor fit between nation and state)? Or is the main cause poverty and a sense of (global) social injustice,
or alternatively some specific political grievance (like the Palestinian cause), or religious jihad? As with policymakers’ precise choices of time horizons when formulating their action plans, different answers and responses will be suggested by the way a problem is defined and by how the causes are understood. This is as true in post-conflict situations as when international actors reflect on what pre-emptive action (if any) to take ahead of a possible slide towards domestic conflict. At present, confusion over these issues reigns in the West and inside the USA administration specifically. In the coming years responses are likely to be impacted by other changes in the international context. Will the UN acquire greater powers? If the world acquiesces in the idea of unilateral and pre-emptive military intervention in the name of national security, or gives permanent political status to illegal occupation (in the West Bank), then what will be the implications for the (international) rule of law?

In all of this the democracy promoters should remember that liberal democracy is not a solution to every political problem, at home or abroad. The persistence of intense desires for self-determination by distinct communities within multinational societies like the UK, Canada and Spain is evidence. A world of democracies may not address more insistent demands from the world’s poor for global social equity. Potential new sources of violent conflict like environmental catastrophe (‘water wars’ in the Middle East for instance) may require solutions beyond democracy’s toolkit. And right now in ‘advanced democracies’ some erosion of liberties appears an accepted price for measures to counter terrorism. However, if democracy is a prize worth having, and not least because it can serve a range of primary values other than peace (or prosperity even), then the case for the international community to promote democratization applies almost anywhere, irrespective of whether there has been conflict. Demand (need) outstrips supply (international offers of support). In that case the democracy promotion actors must assess the respective chances of achieving success. Do post-conflict situations make the democratization challenge easier or is success less probable than in more orderly societies that have a functioning economy but authoritarian rulers oppose political change? How can we compare the prospective returns on the political investment in democracy promotion in such dissimilar situations as say Liberia and North Korea today? Even outside the conflict zones building democracy and its political conditions is likely to be a long haul, for any society that has yet to engage in democratic transition or so far has made only a few false starts.

So the substantive contribution the international community can make to democratization and the precise modalities will depend on the society’s political configuration and the political inheritance it brings from the past. The nature of the previous regime will shape opportunities, needs and constraints. This is yet another reason why not all post-conflict societies are the same. In countries where a version of democracy has already been tried before, it is important to establish whether that experience was responsible for the outbreak of violent conflict or whether the conflict occurred only because democracy had failed. New strategies for peace and democracy
should be adapted accordingly. It can mean much more than ‘doing democracy projects’—support for elections, parties, civil associations and the like—and much more than attaching democracy conditionalities to financial and economic aid. In Europe’s transition economies the goal of accession to the European Union has of course provided a major inducement to rapid political reform. But in other regions too trade and financial concessions can form part of the package of persuasion, as in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development.

Anyone seeking to build liberal democracy especially after civil war must attend to the ‘deep politics of society’ (Bastian and Luckham: 2003) as well as the ‘high politics’ of state. They must ‘address issues of both economic growth and social justice as probable necessary conditions’ (Barnes 2001: 87). Sustained economic development can make violent conflict less likely (without eliminating it completely. Israel and Ulster are no strangers to political violence while surpassing Przeworski’s income benchmark for impregnable democracy. The same applies on a purchasing power parity basis to several other countries including Russia). And there is much evidence from developing countries (but not necessarily supported in all advanced economies) for the rather different proposition that wide socio-economic inequality harms democracy. In low-income countries, then, pro-poor development improves the chances of sustaining a democracy even if passing the Przeworski benchmark does not guarantee that society will actually choose democracy, certainly not liberal democracy (which Singapore is not), let alone bring all political violence to an end.

However, given that democracy, or democratization, may not provide the most favourable political environment for economic progress except perhaps in the long run and when the democracy is liberal and stable (which could mean that favourable average income levels have already been attained), the message to the international community is unmistakable. Failure to underpin democratization with essential economic support in the early days could rob the political transition of performance legitimacy at a very vulnerable time, and place everything at risk. In the absence of political stabilization the return of violent conflict would become more likely. So for example imposing aid sanctions in response to a fragile new democracy’s failure to comply fully with economic and financial policy conditions—as happened to Haiti’s elected President Aristide (2004)—could be very short-sighted. In fact there is a very strong case for assessing the impact on democracy of all forms of aid intervention and not just of democracy aid.3 Externally imposed conditionalities may be an affront to democracy anyway, where they undercut the ability of elected government to respond to the voters’ preferences and override their political entitlement to hold it to account. On the face of it the case for ‘positive conditionalities’ (incentives) looks more compelling than for ‘negative conditionalities’ (penalties). However, for aid to become a more effective instrument for promoting democratic progress at all, substantial real budgetary

increases will be required. The irony is that aid budgets were reducing throughout the 1990s just as the international community’s interest in promoting democracy was increasing.

The all-round resourcing implications of a serious commitment to democracy promotion seen against the background of the special demands of peace-building makes a compelling case for considering global strategy in a more optimal way. That means more than simply establishing a permanent, dedicated UN agency for (democratic) state-building.4 A rational advance could be to empowering a distinct institutional site to assemble a collective memory of democratic peace-building, even if every new post-conflict situation differs somewhat from the last and produces some new problems.5 But just as important is improved coordination among the various state and non-state actors—national and international—operating either side of the line dividing the peace and democracy ‘industries’. Once again Bosnia stands out: many studies mention the parallel involvement of multiple international organizations as a textbook case of how not to proceed, notwithstanding the maintenance of peace.

The main findings about international democracy assistance to date raise even larger issues than that. Certainly, methodologies for ex post evaluation of democracy assistance even in peaceful situations are at best embryonic and contentious. Project or programme input is easier to measure than output, but neither compare with the difficulties of assessing the wider impact on democracy. By comparison evaluating democracy promotion efforts in post-conflict situations—characterized by multiple goals and exaggerated expectations—suggests a Herculean task. That said, some of the overarching lessons from democracy assistance to date have relevance. First, it works best where the tide is running in the right direction anyway, which is where the necessity for assistance is least obvious. It is likely that a movement away from the employment of political conditionalities for aid and towards greater selectivity in allocating democracy aid—akin to what some economists propose for the allocation of official development assistance—would serve to compound that tendency. Post-conflict societies where the (successful) struggle was primarily about introducing democracy would be among the ‘winners’; societies where other issues defined the violence and the conflict has failed to generate a widespread commitment to democracy would be ‘losers’. Is that an acceptable result?

The second lesson is that the international community should focus less on trying to reproduce specific (democratic) institutional models—that might be ethnocentric—and reflect further about the routes by which genuine democratic advance might be achieved. Put differently, pay more attention to process and less to grand designs. The

4 Something commentators have looked for in vain ever since UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali wrote his An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (1992).

5 Chesterman makes this claim in Ryan (2003: 219-25).
point applies not only to democratization—a process that could depend on (non-violent) conflict—but to state-building too (see Ottaway 2003).

5 Conclusion

Widely held assumptions about post-conflict situations make peace-building and democratization virtually synonymous or mutually supportive. But the reality can be different. Violent conflict often occurs on new democracy’s watch. This owes less to the limitations of the democratic ideal than to choices concerning the degree and kind of democracy and its institutional design; the process of democratization and how it is being promoted—including the nature of any international involvement—may also be very influential here. Choices may have to be addressed between requisites for peace and conditions for democracy. Policy must consider both the implications for democracy of different approaches to peace, and the different implications for peace of alternative ideas for democracy. It must take account of other essential political developments such as state-strengthening too. There are temporal choices and issues of sequencing. One possibility is that stable democracy lies far out of reach for an immediate post-conflict situation; but no less worrying, a resort to second best solutions in the interim could have constraining consequences for the democratic prospects in the longer term.

Violent conflict is an aberration. In theory sound institutional crafting is a helpful preventative; in practice it is no ‘silver bullet’. Advisers should identify closely what it is about democracy (a promise of accountability; good governance; inclusiveness; political equality; security for minority rights; and so on) that could contribute most to preventing the recurrence of violent conflict in the society in question. And then tailor recommendations to the society in question: sound institutional choices will be context-specific. Democratic sustainability, effective governance, and sound economic management as well as the potential to manage conflicts peaceably can all invoke different institutional solutions. Designing democratic states is but an art, not a science; political science provides no straightforward policy consensus; many uncertainties exist on the ground.

Indeed, in the light of their case study findings Bastian and Luckham (2003: 314) felt tempted to suggest an ‘iron law of the perverse consequences of institutional design’ (Bastian and Luckham 2003: 314). In fact specialists from different branches of institutional politics ranging from electoral systems to constitutional asymmetries offer the view that complex arrangements and a willingness to engage in continual tinkering can both disappoint. This does not mean institutions do not matter; on the contrary, two contrasting signals are being sent to democratic peace-builders. First, foreswear excessive confidence in institutional solutions, especially very sophisticated ones; and notwithstanding the above, aim to get it right for democracy first time—do not count on
it coming good later. *Inter alia* that means institutionalizing respect for the rule of law no less than installing democracy’s more mundane electoral procedures.

The consolidation of liberal democracy is not an inevitable outcome of political transition or of democratic transition. A new democracy’s ability to manage political conflict may not tackle the underlying conditions that determine whether violent conflict will reoccur and proceed to put the new democracy in peril. If democratization is a correct response to violence then that means addressing such matters as civil society and political culture too. But democratization ‘constitutes only one component of an effective preventive strategy’ towards conflict (Sandbrook 2002: 151). issues relating to effective governance and economic welfare could be at least as important. For the international community to figure out how to advance the cause of liberal democracy and then put the knowledge into practice has proven difficult enough, even in situations unburdened by a history of violent conflict. And even in those cases some significant trade-offs are only to be expected; notable choices have to be made. *Any* country’s political absorptive capacity for international democracy assistance will be limited at a particular time, no matter how settled the social and political order. But the choices and trade-offs are sharper in ‘post-conflict’ situations, where the effects of conflict and peacemaking/peace-building demand serious attention too. Democracy is neither a one-stop shop nor a guaranteed cure.

The UNDP’s 2002 *Human Development Report* reasons that democracies are superior to non-democracies at managing domestic conflict in ways that do not harm economic performance. It is indeed a happy conclusion that peace, prosperity and democracy could go together. The theoretical claim that the democratic peace thesis in international relations has its complement in a democratic domestic peace still looks plausible. But ‘getting there’ after conflict will be very challenging, especially for societies where all three qualities—peace, prosperity and democracy—have been noticeably deficient.

**References**


