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Child Quality and Child Quantity: Evidence from Bolivian Household Surveys

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Abstract

Models built on the classical quality-quantity trade-off predict an increase in child quality and a decrease in child quantity in poor developing countries when parental wealth and educational levels increase. This paper tests this prediction empirically in a cross-sectional framework with data from Bolivian household surveys. Instead of focusing on actual fertility levels, the reported desired number of children is considered. The potential problem of ex-post rationalizing births – i.e. the adaptation of desired to actual fertility levels – is taken into account. The empirical findings are in line with the predictions of these models. Furthermore a weak but significant negative impact of fertility exceeding the desired level on educational outcomes is found.

JEL-classification: C21, D10, J24

Keywords: education, quality-quantity trade-off, excess fertility, Bolivia

1 Introduction

The issue of a trade-off between child quality and child quantity has received much attention in economic literature since the seminal works of Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker and Tomes (1976). Its basic idea is that – given a certain level of income – the more children parents have the less they will invest in the quality of their offspring as the shadow price for quality rises with an increase in the number of children. Or, put it the other way round, parents will have the less children the more they wish to invest in their quality as the shadow price for quantity rises as the quality augments. Literature suggests that this effect might have far reaching effects. For instance in Galor and Weil (2000) the trade-off is a cornerstone to explain not less than the demographic transition that took place in Europe by the end of the 19th century.

Fundamental in the models of Becker and Lewis and Becker and Tomes is the consideration that quantity and quality of children generate utility. The costs parents incur by having children might be direct or indirect as foregone parental income and

reduce current consumption that contributes to parental utility as well. However, especially in poor agrarian countries, it might be the case that wealth flows do not go from parents to children but go instead in the opposite direction as children work and contribute to parental income. Thus, a large number of children can be utility increasing for parents in a way other than the “intrinsic utility” of children. This idea was put forward by Caldwell (1976) and subsequently formalized in several theoretical works as in Hazan and Berdugo (2002). Similar formalizations can be found in Baland and Robinson (2000), Maldonado and Gonzáles-Vega (2008), Sugawara (2009) and Basu et al. (2010). In what follows, these models will be referred to as “extended quality-quantity trade-off models” as the traditional model is extended by the incorporation of child work. Hazan and Berdugo (2002) model parent’s utility as function of their consumption level and of the educational level or future income of their children which is in turn negatively affected by child work. Under quite general assumptions Hazan and Berdugo show that schooling is then a *non-decreasing* function of parental maximal income – i.e. the income parents could earn if they dedicated all their available time to work – whereas fertility is a *non-increasing* function of parental maximal income. The intuitive explanation is quite simple. With rising maximal parental income, the opportunity costs of child rearing increase what causes a decline in fertility. At the same time, the contribution children can make to the household’s income decreases relative to parental income. Marginal utility of additional income raised by child work in order to fund household consumption decreases as well. Consequently, with an increase in parental income, children’s time is shifted away from the labor market into schooling. If parental maximal income is sufficiently high, child labor vanishes entirely. It has to be noted that Hazan and Berdugo (2002), like most of the authors mentioned above, embed their model in an intergenerational analysis that assumes members of one generation to be identical. In this paper in turn the basic predictions of the model with regard to child quality and quantity are tested based on a cross-sectional dataset. Heterogeneity in wealth levels and educational levels of the parental generation is exploited in order to figure out whether some empirical evidence in favor of the extended quality-quantity trade-off model can be found.

There is a considerable strand of literature investigating the connection between fertility and child quality in developing countries whereby child quality is usually captured by schooling outcomes. Most of the studies model schooling variables as endogenous and take fertility as exogenously given (e.g. Behrman and Wolfe, 1984; Chernichovsky, 1985; Pong, 1997; Anh et al., 1998; Buchmann, 2000; Huisman and Smits, 2009). Not all of these studies find a relation between fertility and schooling as the quality-quantity trade-off suggests. Instead, some of the results indicate that there might be even positive effects as the work load per child is reduced as the number of children increases (Chernichovsky, 1985) and that birth order and siblings sex composition might play an important role as well (Huisman and Smits, 2009). However, it is obvious that according to the classical and extended quality-quantity model child quality as well as fertility should be considered as the result of one optimization process. In fact parental maximal income is the true exogenous factor that simultaneously determines both variables.

Thus, rather than asking if the *actual* fertility level influences schooling outcomes two other questions seem to be of interest: The first question is, whether the basic assumptions derived from the theoretical model can be confirmed by empirical data, namely that educational outcomes are positively influenced by parental maximal income and whether the influence on *desired* fertility is negative. The distinction between actual and desired fertility in this context is important. Households are not necessarily able to achieve their desired number of children due to unintended births or unfulfilled desires for children. Assuming that unobserved family characteristics influence child quality and desired fertility simultaneously it seems straightforward to tackle this first question empirically by means of simultaneous equation models (Rosenzweig and Evenson, 1977).

The second question is based on the distinction between *actual* and *desired* fertility. If both parameters do not match one has to ask which impact this mismatch has on child quality. Two approaches have been considered in literature to tackle this question. Montgomery and Lloyd (1999) employ data of the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) from several developing countries which contains information on the desired fertility levels of women as well as on the actual number of children. This allows for the determination of excess fertility by simply deducting the desired from the actual number of children. The authors then model schooling outcomes as a function of excess rather than actual fertility. The second approach consists in identifying the effect of child quantity on child quality by using exogenous shocks to fertility. Two types of shocks have been primarily employed in this context: twin births (e.g. Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980; Black et al., 2005; Angrist et al., 2010; Li et al., 2008; de Haan, 2010) and sibling sex composition (e.g. Angrist et al., 2010; Conley and Glauber, 2006; Silles, 2010).

To the best of my knowledge the first question as raised above has not been addressed in the literature so far.¹ This might be due to the controversies of measures related to desired fertility. Although women are asked to reveal this parameter in the context of the DHS, there are several reasons why the women's answer does not necessarily reflect the variable of interest. One important reason for that is the possibility of so called "ex-post rationalization" (Bongaarts, 1990; Pritchett, 1994) that occurs if women exceeding their original level of desired fertility subsequently adjust this level to the actual level of fertility. Ex-post rationalization is highly problematic for the assessment of the above raised questions as it introduces a systematic upward bias in the reported level of desired fertility for women experiencing excess fertility and a systematic downward bias in the reported level of excess fertility (measured as actual number of children minus reported desired number of children) in general.

Based on the DHS data collected in Bolivia this paper presents an approach to assess the prevalence of ex-post rationalization. Subsequently, the DHS data is used to tackle the two questions raised above in a count model framework. Bolivia seems to be an interesting case in this context. Firstly, the country is one of the poorest in Latin America what implies that the theoretical considerations outlined above might apply. Childwork is a common phenomenon in the country especially in rural areas where children predominantly work in the agricultural sector (International Labor

¹Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) model child quality and fertility as simultaneous decisions but focus on actual rather than on desired fertility.

Organization, 2008). Secondly, Latin American countries are in general among those countries for which the highest levels of excess fertility are observed (Bongaarts, 1997; Hakkert, 2001) thus assessing the impact of excess fertility on educational outcomes in the region is of high interest.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the datasets used in this study and discusses the sample selection criteria. Section 3 investigates the prevalence of ex-post rationalization. Section 4 discusses the issue of returns to schooling in Bolivia. It is important to assess whether sending and keeping children in school can indeed be considered to be an investment in “quality” of children. The empirical approach and the results of the empirical analysis are outlined in Section 5.

2 Data and Sample Selection Criteria

Two datasets are used for the present study: the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) datasets for Bolivia of the years 2003 and 2008. The DHS is a standardized survey conducted in more than 80 developing countries and funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development. In Bolivia, the DHS are implemented by the ministry of health and sports and are coordinated by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). Both waves of the Bolivian DHS employed for this study contain information on socioeconomic characteristics of around 20 000 households and their members. Furthermore, a women dataset provides detailed information on fertility preferences and birth histories of around 17 000 women aged between 15 and 49. Women were asked to reveal their desired number of children and whether their fertility preferences coincide with those of their partners. In case of disagreement, women reported whether the partner desires more or fewer children, but not how many he desires. In 2003 and 2008 the same survey sampling procedure was used in order to obtain nationally representative data.²

The main analyses in this paper are based on the DHS 2008 dataset and are conducted on the level of couples and children of these couples. A couple was kept in the sample for the analysis if information on the woman are available in the women dataset. In order to ensure some degree of homogeneity with regard to age, couples in which the woman is younger than 30 years were dropped. There are in total 5 652 couples identified this way for which data are completely available. The number of couples which had to be dropped due to missing data is around 30. Thus the number of women who do not provide numerical answers to the desired fertility question is negligible.

Two more sample selection criteria were applied. First, women were only kept in the sample if they reported to have had only one lifetime partner. Second, women were only kept if they reported that their partners desire the same number of children as they do. These criteria are meant to ensure that only couples are included which can be supposed to form a couple since the time when family planning decisions became relevant. Furthermore, putting the focus on couples in which both partners have the same fertility preferences seems advisable, since it is unclear whether the man’s or woman’s desire prevails in the case of disagreement. These constraints seem necessary,

²Detailed information on the DHS surveys can be found on the DHS homepage under: <http://www.measuredhs.com>.

Table 1: Comparison of couple characteristics for couples dropped in sample selection process and couples in the sample.

Variable	Dropped		Selected Sample		Difference
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	
Asset Index Value ¹	0.0467	1.0119	0.1526	1.0137	-0.1060***
<i>Schooling woman (higher than or equal to..., Share)</i>					
Primary Uncompleted	0.9002	0.2997	0.9273	0.2597	-0.0270***
Primary Completed	0.4173	0.4932	0.4536	0.4979	-0.0362***
Secondary Uncompleted	0.3682	0.4824	0.4092	0.4918	-0.0410***
Secondary Completed	0.2775	0.4478	0.3258	0.4688	-0.0483***
<i>Schooling partner (higher than or equal to..., Share)</i>					
Primary Uncompleted	0.9727	0.1631	0.9823	0.1318	-0.0097***
Primary Completed	0.5364	0.4988	0.5855	0.4927	-0.0491***
Secondary Uncompleted	0.4795	0.4997	0.5238	0.4995	-0.0443***
Secondary Completed	0.3449	0.4754	0.3891	0.4876	-0.0441***
<i>Language learned as child (both partners, Share)</i>					
Quechua	0.2185	0.4133	0.2186	0.4134	-0.0001
Aymara	0.1078	0.3102	0.1508	0.3579	-0.0429***
Spanish	0.5463	0.4979	0.5201	0.4997	0.0262*
Mixed/Other	0.1274	0.3335	0.1105	0.3136	0.0169*
Children alive	4.1675	2.2150	3.5119	2.0340	0.6556***
Children desired	2.8623	1.8080	2.8180	1.4874	0.0443
Share rural	0.4195	0.4936	0.3874	0.4873	0.0321***
Number of observations	3 218		2 434		

* significant on the 10%-level

** significant on the 5%-level

*** significant on the 1%-level

¹The asset index value was calculated on the household level and might thus be the same for several couples if they live in the same household.

however they eliminate 3 218 couples and are thus likely to introduce some sample selection bias. Table 1 reveals the magnitude and the direction of the bias for some key variables.

Table 1 indicates that there are pronounced differences between selected couples and those that were dropped from the sample. Selected couples are better educated and wealthier compared to couples that have been dropped. Wealth is captured by an asset index. Such an index is likely to be better suited to capture wealth in developing countries than information on monetary income as the latter is often very volatile (cf. e.g. Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Sahn and Stiefel, 2003; McKenzie, 2005; Booyesen et al., 2008). It aggregates information on different long term household assets, on access to infrastructure (electricity, sanitation) and living conditions (building materials of the house) into one single index using principal component, factor, or multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). The asset index in this paper has been calculated by means of MCA as all variables that are included in the index are dichotomous (referring to if the household possesses a good or not, if it has access to a certain type

of infrastructure or not and if a certain type of material was used for the shelter or not). In this case, Booyesen et al. (2008) propose the application of MCA. By construction, the mean value of the index is 0 and its standard deviation is 1. The index was constructed based on data from all households in the DHS 2008.

Furthermore, it is striking that selected and dropped couples do not differ significantly in the number of desired children but they do with regard to the actual number of living children. This finding might be a sign that excess fertility is higher among dropped couples compared to couples in the sample. However, there is an alternative explanation. Dropped couples comprise those couples in which there is disagreement with regard to the desired number of children. It is not clear which partner's desires prevail in this case. If male desires prevail, the number of desired children reported in Table 1 might not be relevant as it has been reported exclusively by women. Among couples with disagreement the case in which the man wants more children than the woman is twice as frequent as the opposite case which supports this alternative explanation.

To sum up, Table 1 suggests that the application of the mentioned sample selection criteria leads to an overrepresentation of wealthy and well-educated couples. Assuming that the DHS is representative on the national level it should thus be kept in mind that the results of this paper have been derived based on a special subsample of the Bolivian population. It would be desirable to have a variable at hand that determines whether a couple meets the sample selection criteria but does not influence desired fertility levels or schooling outcomes. In this case one could apply a sample selection procedure to correct for the potential bias. However, it is hard to imagine a good candidate for such a variable.

Finally, it is important to mention that the analysis here and throughout the entire paper focuses on living children. This is an important decision because child mortality in Bolivia is still quite high. Examination of the birth history of the 2434 women in the selected sample reveals that the number of living children amounts to 8548 and the number of deceased children to 1083 which implies that more than 10% of the considered women's children are not alive any more. If already deceased children should be taken into account in the analysis is a tough question. Undoubtedly the death of a child puts a high psychological burden on the parents and might have an influence on further fertility decisions. However, assessing the impact of these effects is beyond the scope of this paper. The general death age of the deceased children is quite low – the mean is around 15 months and the median around 3 months – which finally led to the decision to focus on living children only.

3 Determining Desired Fertility

The DHS 2008 contains information on the desired fertility level of women. The wording of the question asked in this context is: “If you could go back to the time when you did not have any children, and you would be able to choose exactly the number of children in your entire life, how many would that be?” In general the answer to this question contains the information needed in order to investigate the relationship between parental income and the desired number of children and the

impact of excess fertility on child quality. However, it is likely that the desired number of children is not time constant as the actual number of children might have an impact on the desired number (Bongaarts, 1990; Pritchett, 1994, cf.). If ex-post rationalization – the adaptation of the desired to the actual fertility level – occurs, the observed desired fertility level for women with many children can be expected to be systematically upward biased, whereas the observed levels of excess fertility would be generally downward biased.

The most straightforward way to determine the importance of ex-post rationalization would be to survey women several times over their lifetime about the actual and the desired number of children. However, this type of data is (to the best of my knowledge) not available for Bolivia and most other developing countries. What the DHS offers are cross-sectional data sets collected in several years. In the present paper data from 2003 and 2008 are used. As only cross-sectional data is available tracking the desired fertility level of a given woman in the 2008 dataset back to 2003 is not possible. But the detailed fertility history for every woman contained in the 2008 dataset allows for calculating her number of children in 2003. Based on this information, women in the 2008 dataset are matched with those women in the 2003 dataset whose number of children equals their number of children in 2003. The matching procedure then assigns an estimated desired fertility in 2003 to each woman in the 2008 dataset.

The matching procedure focuses on women that might ex-post rationalize: those who do not want any more children in the future. Only women from the 2003 dataset are considered who report not to want children anymore. From the 2008 dataset women are only included in the matching procedure if they reported not to want children anymore and if all births since 2003 (if there were any) were unwanted. Thus, no woman from the 2008 dataset did want to have more children back in 2003. Comparing the difference in desired fertility levels between 2008 and 2003 (whereby the value for 2003 is not observed and can only be inferred by the matching procedure) for women who had no births in this time interval to the difference of those who had undesired births should reveal the magnitude of ex-post rationalization. If ex-post rationalization indeed occurs, the difference for women with undesired births should be systematically higher. Of course it is not unlikely to assume that ex-post rationalization not only results in altering the desired fertility level but also in labeling initially undesired births as desired later on. Thus it is likely that the described procedure underestimates the magnitude of ex-post rationalization since women who ex-post rationalize births by adapting the desired fertility level and by relabeling initially undesired births are not included in the matching sample.

In order to assess to what extent this problem influences the results of the matching procedure a second procedure was implemented. In this procedure, women from the 2008 dataset are all women who report not to want children any more, whether they had wanted births since 2003 or not. The fact that they do not want children anymore makes it more likely that the birth that occurred before were unwanted but might have been ex-post rationalized. However, the fact that some of the births between 2003 and 2008 might have been desired for some women implies that not all women from the 2008 dataset had reached their desired fertility level in 2003 and thus did not belong to the group of women who did not want children anymore back then but wanted additional children instead. Thus, this procedure can be expected to

overestimate the prevalence of ex-post rationalization. The matching procedure in which only women from the 2008 dataset are included who reported not to want children anymore and who declared all births since 2003 to be unwanted is referred to as procedure (1). The alternative procedure in which all women from the 2008 dataset are included who reported not to want children anymore is referred to as procedure (2).

Several socioeconomic characteristics listed in Table A1 in the appendix were employed as matching variables. All characteristics are coded in binary form. Each woman in the 2008 dataset was compared to all potential matching partners in the 2003 dataset by considering the Tanimoto coefficient. The Tanimoto coefficient comparing woman i from the 2008 dataset and woman j from the 2003 dataset with K denoting the number of binary matching variables and x_k denoting the k -th matching variable can be written as:

$$\text{Tanimoto}_{ij} = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^K a_{ijk}}{\sum_{k=1}^K a_{ijk} + \sum_{k=1}^K b_{ijk}} \quad (1)$$

with

$$a_{ijk} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x_{ik} = x_{jk} = 1 \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad b_{ijk} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x_{ik} \neq x_{jk} \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

The Tanimoto coefficient divides the number of matching variables that take the value one for both women by the number of matching variables that differ between both women plus the number of matching variables that take the value one for both women. It thus can be interpreted as a similarity measure standardized to the interval $[0; 1]$. The desired fertility level for a woman in the 2008 dataset in 2003 is then calculated as the average desired fertility of all potential matching partners (women from the 2003 dataset with the same number of children in 2003) having the largest value of the Tanimoto coefficient. Thus the estimated desired fertility level in 2003 can be expressed as:

$$\widehat{\text{DesiredFertility03}}_i = \frac{1}{|J_i|} \sum_{j \in J_i} \text{DesiredFertility03}_j \quad (2)$$

The set J_i comprises all matching partners for woman i , i.e. all women in the 2003 dataset whose number of children equals the number of children of woman i in 2003³ and for whom the Tanimoto coefficient from the comparison with woman i takes the highest value. The term $|J_i|$ denotes the number of matching partners for woman i . If an individual woman from the 2003 dataset exhibits a higher Tanimoto coefficient than any other woman (i.e. $|J_i| = 1$), the estimated desired fertility level for woman i in 2003 is set equal to the actual desired fertility level of this woman in the 2003 dataset.

Table 2 reveals the results of the matching procedure. The results are displayed for all women and for the subsample of women for whom one or several “perfect matching” partners could be found (i.e. matching partners for whom the Tanimoto coefficient equals 1). Focusing on perfect matching partners ensures that results are not driven by systematic differences between women in the 2008 dataset and their matching partners from the 2003 dataset that prevail for several variables according to Table

³If a woman has more than 11 children she is matched with all women who have more than 11 children.

A1. As can be seen in the upper panel, the estimated average change in desired fertility between 2003 and 2008 is close to zero for women who had no birth of a child who is still alive in this period. When matching procedure (1) is applied the effect of having had 1 birth since 2003 is slightly negative, whereas the effect of 2 births is positive, albeit not statistically significant as can be seen in the lower panel. The effect of having had 3 births seems positive as well, however given the very small number of observations for this group the results are not very meaningful. As mentioned above, matching procedure (1) is likely to underestimate the magnitude of ex-post rationalization whereas procedure (2) can be supposed to overestimate it. Indeed the results for procedure (2) suggest a higher magnitude of ex-post rationalization than procedure (1) does. The change in desired fertility is significantly higher for the group of women with two births since 2003 for both the entire sample and the subsample of perfect matches compared to the group of women with no births. For the entire sample also the differences between the groups with no and 1 birth and the groups with 1 and 2 births are statistically significant. The results suggest that 2 births increase the desired fertility level by around 0.6 children on average and 1 birth leads to an increase of around 0.2 desired children on average. As a consequence, it seems recommendable to assess the sensitivity of the empirical findings to the occurrence of ex-post rationalization. This issue will be tackled in Section 5.

Table 2: Estimated average change in the desired number of children between 2003 and 2008 broken down by number of born children between 2003 and 2008 (upper panel) and average differences between groups (lower panel).

Living children born since 2003	Procedure 1		Procedure 2	
	All ¹	Perfect Matches ¹	All ¹	Perfect Matches ¹
0	0.0389 (1074)	-0.0164 (437)	0.0389 (1074)	-0.0164 (437)
1	-0.0369 (284)	-0.1856 (92)	0.2352 (583)	0.2011 (190)
2	0.1943 (72)	0.3258 (31)	0.6843 (161)	0.5472 (53)
3	0.1694 (10)	0.5000 (4)	0.3559 (16)	0.7000 (5)
Compared groups				
$\Delta(1,0)$	-0.0758	-0.1692	0.1963**	0.2176
$\Delta(2,0)$	0.1554	0.3422	0.6453***	0.5636**
$\Delta(2,1)$	0.2312	0.5114	0.4490***	0.3460

* significant on the 10%-level

** significant on the 5%-level

*** significant on the 1%-level

¹Number of observations in parenthesis

Finally, it should be mentioned that ex-post rationalization might also occur in the other direction.⁴ Unmet desires for children (e.g. due to infecundity) might lead to a downward adjustment of the desired number of children if the initially desired level cannot be reached. In order to check the prevalence of this form of ex-post rationalization, the matching procedure was repeated, using the subsample of women from the 2003 data who declared to want more children or to be sterile. The same

⁴I am grateful to Iris Gönsch for pointing this out to me.

subsample from the 2008 dataset was used. Furthermore, women from the 2008 dataset were dropped if they had one or several births since 2003. The intention is to focus on women who had unmet desires for children in 2003 and were unable to meet them until 2008. If downward adjustments of desired fertility levels took place amongst these women, the desired fertility level in 2008 should be inferior to the level in 2003. However, no significant differences could be detected as the average desired fertility level is almost identical.

4 Assessing Child Quality in Bolivia

As outlined in the introductory section, most theoretical models describing the quality-quantity trade-off proxy quality by children’s educational outcomes and – especially models designed for the context of developing countries – the amount of child work. Due to data constraints in the DHS, this paper will focus on educational outcomes only. As in Maldonado and González-Vega (2008), educational outcomes are captured via the so called “schooling gap”. This indicator is calculated as the maximal number of schooling a child could already have obtained given his age minus the actual years of schooling the child has completed. A schooling gap superior to zero indicates that the child experienced some kind of distortion like grade repetition, delayed school entrance or school dropout at some point of his or her schooling career. As children in Bolivia enter school by the age of six, they should complete the first year of schooling by the age of seven, thus the schooling gap is simply calculated as $\max(\text{age-completed years of schooling}-7,0)$. Maldonado and González-Vega (2008) use the formula $\max(\text{age-completed years of schooling}-6,0)$. However, if a child enters school by the age of six and has not finished the first grade by the age of seven this does not necessarily indicate some kind of distortion because the child turns seven while attending the first grade. Thus, one “is on the safe side” using the formula $\max(\text{age-completed years of schooling}-7,0)$ because one might wrongly assign a schooling gap of zero to a child who experienced some kind of distortion but one avoids wrongly assigning a positive schooling gap to a child who never experienced distortion.

The Bolivian educational system is basically threefold: primary education lasts for eight years and is compulsory. The official age of entry is six years, what implies that children should finish primary education by the age of 14. In the old educational system that was replaced by the education reform of 1994, primary education was split into a basic and intermediate level, with the former lasting five and the latter lasting three years. Secondary education comprises four years and is non-compulsory. Tertiary education is provided by the highly autonomous Bolivian universities. There exists also an initial education system for children aged less than six years. Although the importance of initial education is emphasized (see for example World Bank, 2006, 31) enrollment rates in Bolivia are very low (Contreras and Talavera Simoni, 2003).

While primary education net enrollment rates are close to 100%, only approximately half of the students of the respective age group attend secondary schools (World Bank, 2006). Given this low secondary enrollment rate, it is surprising that the attendance rate of universities reaches up to 25% in some urban areas, which is quite high compared to international standards (Lizárraga Zamora, 2005). This means that a large

share of those who opt for secondary education do so with the intention of achieving a university degree afterwards. Studies on returns to education covering Bolivia suggest that such a behavior is quite rational from an economic perspective. Returns to education in general – and to secondary enrollment in particular – have been found to be quite low, while higher education is much more rewarding in terms of labor market wages (Psacharopoulos and Ng, 1994; World Bank, 2005). However, those findings should not lead to the conclusion that the quality of Bolivian universities is exceptionally high. Rather the opposite seems to be the case, as indicated by low graduation rates (World Bank, 2006). Given that roughly 25% of Bolivian overall education expenditures are spent for higher education (ibidem), this poor performance indicates considerable inefficiencies within the Bolivian university system. Nevertheless, it seems that secondary education is not attractive without the perspective of attending a university subsequently.

Besides the low returns to secondary education the supply of schooling facilities is another reason for the drop in enrollment rates in higher grades. Enrollment rates already start dropping after five to six years of schooling especially among indigenous children and children from rural areas. This drop might be due to a declining supply of schooling facilities for higher grades. While 13 000 schools in Bolivia offer grades 1 to 3, only 5 000 schools offer grades 7 and 8 and less than 2 500 schools offer secondary education (World Bank, 2006). These figures are due to the Bolivian system of so-called nuclear schools that prevails in rural areas of the country. A central school provides initial, primary and secondary education whereas various local schools in areas around the central school only provide grades 1 to 3 (Comboni Salinas and Juárez Núñez, 2000).

Besides looking at returns to education assessed based on countrywide datasets it seems worth considering what labor market characteristics and narrative evidence and smaller scale empirical studies can tell about the attractiveness of education in Bolivia. The reason is that returns to education are difficult to measure in general – due to the well-known problem of unobserved heterogeneity that might influence wages and decisions on education at the same time – and can be very sensitive to the applied method.⁵ Furthermore, one has to keep in mind that one key element of determining those returns is income expressed in monetary units which is particularly hard to measure in developing countries due to seasonal fluctuations and the high importance of self-sufficiency (see e.g. Sahn and Stiefel, 2003).

The Bolivian labor market is characterized by a high degree of informal employment. Many enterprises hesitate to go formal as the costs for doing so are prohibitively high especially for small enterprises and informality is used as a mean to bypass the extremely tight labor market regulations in Bolivia (World Bank, 2005). But informality is also associated with lacking access to bank loans, what causes many small firms to be “trapped in a bad equilibrium” (World Bank, 2005, 49), as they have no possibility to invest in order to expand their business or to increase productivity. The low productivity in turn leads to an inability of the firms to pay high wages to better educated people. Additionally, small and informal firms usually do not demand

⁵Depending on the method, Psacharopoulos and Ng (1994) either find that primary and secondary schooling almost bring the same return per year of schooling or that the return to primary schooling is almost three times as high as the return to secondary schooling.

high-skilled labor. Thus it is not surprising that the share of workers without any formal education in the Bolivian labor force is very high (Lizárraga Zamora, 2005). Furthermore, as the Bolivian educational system does not seem to be much oriented towards the needs of the labor market many employers tend to contract less formally educated people and train them on the job (ibidem). The importance of training on the job compared to formal education is also stressed by Lay and Wiebelt (2001). However, the authors point out that formal education might yield an indirect return in the sense that it opens the door to better quality jobs whose execution leads to the accumulation of skills that are rewarded by the labor market. For rural areas, Zalles Cueto (2000) find the importance of formal education to be rather limited when it comes to assessing the determinants of social advancement. The most common ways to improve the own standard of living are acquiring a vehicle in order to provide transportation services or to become a merchant that organizes the collection process of the harvested goods. Both activities do not require a high level of formal education. On the other hand, some basic skills like the mastery of basic calculus are useful in order to help one's parents with their daily business (Ministerio de Educación de Bolivia, 2009). Godoy et al. (2005) find that even in autarkic foraging societies in the Bolivian lowlands each additional year of schooling yields a return of around 5% using several different income measures that try to capture different potential income sources for members of these societies. Based on a dataset collected among Aymaran women in rural areas of the Bolivian highlands, Bindon and Vitzhum (2002) find indications that women with higher education are healthier and better nourished.

Summing up, one can state that formal investigations based on data on income and educational achievements as well as narrative evidence suggest a rather limited return to education in Bolivia. Secondary schooling only seems rewarding when it is undertaken as a step towards higher education. It might be highly insecure if a university degree can be obtained in later years (due to limited access and supply to, respectively, of universities or due to limited skills of the child) at the moment when the decision about enrollment in a secondary school has to be taken. This insecurity might prevent many households from sending their children to school after primary education is finished and might thus explain the considerable difference in enrollment rates between primary and secondary school. However, a basic level of schooling seems to be rewarding even in remote areas and for members of foraging societies.

Taking those considerations into account this paper focuses on primary school age children between 8 and 15 years. This seems reasonable as the returns to secondary schooling – especially in rural areas – seem to be quite limited, thus it is questionable whether sending children to secondary schools really can be considered to be an investment in quality. Furthermore, the DHS data do not contain information on school supply. The risk of an omitted variable problem caused by this fact can be dampened by focusing on scholastic achievements in primary school as supply restrictions in lower grades are less binding.

5 Empirical Approaches and Findings

The data analysis in this section occurs at two different levels. Desired fertility is modeled on the couple level whereas child quality is analyzed on the child level. The data used in this section refers to all couples having children aged between 8 and 15 years and belonging to the group that was selected according to the sample selection procedure described in Section 2. As not all couples do have children in the relevant age group not all of them are included in the subsequent analysis.⁶ Table 3 displays descriptive statistics of relevant variables separately for rural and urban areas. Thereby, two different weighting schemes are applied. One attaches the same weight to each child, which implies that couples with more children in the sample obtain a higher weight (referred to as weighting (1)). The second scheme attaches the same weight to each couple which lowers the weight for children if some of their brothers or sisters are included in the sample, too (referred to as weighting (2)).

The table reveals some striking differences between rural and urban areas. The educational levels of both partners are much higher in urban areas (e.g. only 7% of women in rural areas have some secondary schooling whereas the same is true for more than 50% of women in urban areas). The asset index value clearly indicates that urban households are wealthier and better equipped than rural households. Furthermore, it is also evident that the share of couples who learned indigenous languages (Quechua and Aymara) as children is much higher in rural areas which is also true for both fertility and excess fertility in rural areas. Due to these discrepancies subsequent analyses are conducted for rural and urban areas separately.

In the following, several econometric approaches will be presented. Thereby, desired fertility is assumed to be a function of couple characteristics, child quality is a function of couple characteristics and child characteristics. Excess fertility is assumed to affect child quality, but not desired fertility. The potential impact of excess on desired fertility has been studied in Section 3 with ambiguous findings. Later on, the potential effect of excess fertility on desired fertility will be taken into account. However, for now the results of matching procedure (1) – according to which there is no impact of excess on desired fertility – will be taken for granted.

Emphasis is put on the estimated coefficients linked to the asset index, partners' education and excess fertility as these are the variables of interest with regard to the two questions tackled by this paper. Asset index and parental education can be considered proxies of the parental maximal income. A negative relationship between educational level and asset index value on the one hand and schooling gap and desired fertility on the other hand would be in line with the extended quality-quantity trade-off model. It has to be mentioned that the asset index might be affected by reverse causality: if children work and contribute to household income instead of going to school and the money they earn is used to purchase assets captured by the index one might erroneously associate a high index value with low educational outcomes. Furthermore, a positive coefficient of the excess fertility variable in the schooling gap equation does not necessarily represent a causal effect. It might well be the case that unobserved family characteristics influence both, excess fertility and schooling gap.

⁶1 760 of the 2 434 couples have at least one child in the relevant age group.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics for relevant variables by rural and urban residence and by weighting scheme.

	Weighting 1				Weighting 2			
	Rural		Urban		Rural		Urban	
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
Asset Index	-0.89	0.6637	0.6544	0.6144	-0.86	0.8408	0.7393	0.8022
<i>Schooling woman (higher than or equal to..., Share)</i>								
Primary Uncompleted	0.8630	0.3440	0.9543	0.2088	0.8663	0.5736	0.9644	0.5025
Primary Completed	0.0988	0.2985	0.5613	0.4964	0.1150	0.3858	0.6156	0.6474
Secondary Uncompleted	0.0695	0.2543	0.5066	0.5001	0.0856	0.3459	0.5642	0.6490
Secondary Completed	0.0408	0.1979	0.3858	0.4869	0.0548	0.2910	0.4427	0.6276
<i>Schooling partner (higher than or equal to..., Share)</i>								
Primary Uncompleted	0.9490	0.2200	0.9940	0.0773	0.9572	0.5279	0.9951	0.4721
Primary Completed	0.2766	0.4475	0.6821	0.4658	0.2995	0.5560	0.7283	0.6285
Secondary Uncompleted	0.2065	0.4049	0.6124	0.4874	0.2313	0.5143	0.6630	0.6391
Secondary Completed	0.0988	0.2985	0.4694	0.4992	0.1096	0.3716	0.5227	0.6398
<i>Language learned as child (both partners, Share)</i>								
Quechua	0.4003	0.4901	0.1442	0.3514	0.3850	0.5547	0.1275	0.3554
Aymara	0.2078	0.4058	0.1436	0.3508	0.2032	0.4532	0.1275	0.3552
Spanish	0.2951	0.4562	0.5841	0.4930	0.3155	0.5679	0.6225	0.6357
Mixed/Other	0.0969	0.2959	0.1280	0.3342	0.0963	0.3256	0.1225	0.3563
Children alive	5.4098	2.1113	3.6581	1.6758	4.9840	2.4715	3.2559	1.5651
Excess Fertility	2.2192	2.5287	0.8930	1.9726	1.8636	2.5549	0.5158	1.8302
Children								
	Weighting 1				Weighting 2			
	Rural		Urban		Rural		Urban	
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
Age	11.0516	2.1256	11.3486	2.2311	10.9736	5.6570	11.3073	5.7188
Female	0.5080	0.5001	0.4886	0.5000	0.5046	0.6060	0.4921	0.6008
Younger Siblings	0.8770	0.3286	0.7302	0.4440	0.8362	0.5265	0.6746	0.5593
Older Siblings	0.8190	0.3851	0.6737	0.4690	0.7769	0.5479	0.6078	0.5535
Schooling Gap	0.3091	0.7966	0.1130	0.5399	0.2721	0.7524	0.0948	0.5023

Number of couples: 748 (rural) and 1012 (urban)

Number of children: 1569 (rural) and 1664 (urban)

Montgomery and Lloyd (1999) find indications for endogeneity of the excess fertility variable in two of the four countries they examine.

Keeping those caveats in mind, the estimation results are presented next. In a first step, schooling gap and desired fertility are modeled in a standard Poisson model framework. The dependent variables are denoted by y_1 and y_2 . Let $y_{1_{mn}}$ be the schooling gap of child n of couple m , accordingly y_{2_m} is the desired number of children of couple m . Explanatory variables are captured in the vectors $\mathbf{x}_{1_{mn}}$ and \mathbf{x}_{2_m} . Both vectors contain the Asset Index value, dummy variables referring to both partners' educational attainment and the language dummies as listed in Table 3. Both vectors also include a constant, the age of woman and partner as well as dummy variables capturing one of the nine Bolivian departments. Furthermore, vector $\mathbf{x}_{1_{mn}}$ includes the excess fertility variable and some child specific variables, namely dummy variables indicating whether the child has younger and/or older siblings and the sex of the child and the child's age. The age is also captured by dummy variables, whereby each dummy refers to a certain age in years between 9 and 15 (age 8 was omitted to avoid perfect collinearity) and takes the value of one if the child has the respective age. Denoting the total number of couples by M , the number of children of couple m in the sample by N_m and the faculty operator by the !-sign, the log likelihood functions are (cf. Cameron and Trivedi, 2001):

$$\begin{aligned} \ln L_1 &= \sum_{m=1}^M \sum_{n=1}^{N_m} (y_{1_{mn}} \mathbf{x}'_{1_{mn}} \boldsymbol{\beta}_1 - \exp(\mathbf{x}'_{1_{mn}} \boldsymbol{\beta}_1) - \ln(y_{1_{mn}}!)) \\ \ln L_2 &= \sum_{m=1}^M (y_{2_m} \mathbf{x}'_{2_m} \boldsymbol{\beta}_2 - \exp(\mathbf{x}'_{2_m} \boldsymbol{\beta}_2) - \ln(y_{2_m}!)) \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

The expectation of $y_{1_{mn}}$ is $\mu_{1_{mn}} = \exp(\mathbf{x}'_{1_{mn}} \boldsymbol{\beta}_1)$, accordingly the expectation of y_{2_m} is $\mu_{2_m} = \exp(\mathbf{x}'_{2_m} \boldsymbol{\beta}_2)$. As both models are not connected, the first can be estimated on the child level whereas the second is estimated on the couple level. The results of this simple Poisson regression are shown in Table A2 in the appendix. Based on the results shown in the table, a test on over- or underdispersion as suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2001) was conducted for all four estimated models. The test clearly indicates that overdispersion is present in the schooling gap equation whereas the desired fertility equation is underdispersed. In general, underdispersion is rather rare when dealing with count data. However, it often occurs in count data referring to the number of children (Wang and Famoye, 1997). Underdispersion is quite unfortunate in this case as it impedes the modeling of correlated error terms in a count data model framework. Such an approach has been proposed by Munkin and Trivedi (1999), but it is only feasible for two overdispersed equations. Thus potential correlation of omitted variables is not taken into account in the estimations.⁷

The simple Poisson regression cannot account for the lack of data on schooling supply. As already outlined, one way of dealing with this issue is focusing on primary schooling, but it is unlikely that this entirely resolves the problem. Unobserved schooling supply can be supposed to simultaneously affect all children from one area. The areas in which the DHS data was collected were partitioned in 1000 so called "Unidades Primarias de Muestreo" (UPM). In each UPM are between 80 and 350 dwellings and

⁷Results of a seemingly-unrelated-regressions estimation indicate, that this type of correlation is only moderate. The estimated correlation is around 0.05 and not significant in all estimations.

UPM identifiers are contained in the DHS data. As a first alternative, a Poisson regression model with random effects on the UPM level is specified. The random effects are assumed to be normally distributed with expectation zero and variance σ^2 . In this case, the integral of the unconditional likelihood has no closed form solution and needs thus to be approximated. In this paper simulated maximum likelihood (SML) is used (cf. e.g. Cameron and Trivedi, 2006). In SML, the integral capturing the distribution of the random effects is approximated by the average of a certain number of random draws from a predefined distribution. I use draws from a standard normal distribution, which take the same value for all children within the same UPM (Practically, random numbers are only generated for the first child in a UPM and subsequently assigned to all other children in the same UPM). Having the random draws at hand, σ^2 can be estimated by means of an ordinary likelihood estimation. As the random effect is assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in $\mathbf{x}'_{1_{mn}}$, the inclusion is not likely to lead to significant changes in the estimated coefficients but should result in more appropriate estimates of the standard deviations. The first two columns of Table 4 show the results for rural and urban areas. As can be seen, the impact of wealth captured by the asset index is highly significant for both rural and urban areas. Furthermore, maternal as well as paternal primary schooling is associated with better education. Somewhat puzzling is the negative impact of some paternal secondary schooling in rural areas. The effect of excess fertility is significantly negative in rural areas, but very small.⁸

Assuming that the random effects on the UPM level are not correlated with any of the explanatory variables is questionable. Given that no information on the schooling supply is available it is easy to imagine how this omitted variable has an impact on all households in one geographical cluster and might also be correlated for instance with parental education if parents grew up in the same area and schooling supply does not change too much over time. Obviously, this would lead to confounding in the estimation results. In order to circumvent this problem a fixed effects Poisson estimator can be used (see Wooldridge, 2010, for fixed effects Poisson regressions).

The drawback of this approach is that UPMs, for which only zeros are observed as dependent variable values, do not contribute to the likelihood-function. This is problematic in the context of the schooling gap, as the prevalence of zeros is quite high. As a consequence, the number of observations is cut in half if the schooling gap is defined as $\max(\text{age-completed years of schooling}-7,0)$. Obviously this introduces a strong sample selection bias as only those observations with a zero schooling gap drop out. As a consequence, the schooling gap was defined in a less conservative way as $\max(\text{age-completed years of schooling}-6,0)$. This bears the risk of erroneously assigning a positive schooling gap value to children who did not experience some kind of distortion in their schooling career so far, but it decreases the number of UPM containing only children with a zero schooling gap.⁹ However, the loss of observations

⁸Calculation of the marginal effect based on average marginal effects reveals that an increase of excess fertility by one is associated with an increase of the schooling gap by roughly 0.02 years. In Poisson models with a constant, average marginal effects can be calculated by multiplying the estimator (0.06) with the mean of the dependent variable (around 0.3, cf. Table 3).

⁹In order to assess the impact of modifying the schooling gap, the random effects estimations whose results are displayed in Table 4 have been reestimated using the modified schooling gap as dependent variable. The results can be seen in Table A3 in the appendix. Obviously, the significance

Table 4: Results of the random effects and fixed effects Poisson model estimates for urban and rural areas with schooling gap as dependent variable.

Dependent Variable	Random Effects		Fixed Effects	
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
	School	School	School	School
	Gap	Gap	Gap	Gap
Asset Index	-1.11*** (0.12)	-0.82*** (0.23)	-0.64*** (0.13)	-0.40** (0.17)
<i>Schooling woman (higher than or equal to...)</i>				
Primary Uncompleted	-0.41*** (0.15)	-0.94** (0.47)	0.07 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.32)
Primary Completed	-1.91* (1.03)	0.32 (0.59)	-0.27 (0.39)	-0.90** (0.40)
Secondary Uncompleted	0.85 (1.19)	0.16 (0.63)	-0.70 (0.59)	0.45 (0.43)
Secondary Completed	0.77 (0.85)	-0.41 (0.43)	0.84 (0.56)	-0.10 (0.28)
<i>Schooling partner (higher than or equal to...)</i>				
Primary Uncompleted	-0.38* (0.22)	-0.30 (0.96)	-0.09 (0.20)	-14.94 (496.73)
Primary Completed	-1.72*** (0.42)	-1.37* (0.75)	-0.08 (0.22)	0.01 (0.33)
Secondary Uncompleted	1.42*** (0.47)	0.48 (0.78)	-0.33 (0.27)	0.15 (0.37)
Secondary Completed	-0.54 (0.40)	0.40 (0.44)	-0.06 (0.28)	-0.55** (0.27)
Excess fertility	0.06** (0.02)	0.06 (0.07)	0.05** (0.02)	0.09** (0.04)

Number of observations random effects: 1 569 (rural) and 1 664 (urban)

Number of observations fixed effects: 1 311 (rural) and 891 (urban)

Standard Deviations in parentheses

* significant on the 10%-level

** significant on the 5%-level

*** significant on the 1%-level

Note: Estimates include controls for partners' age, the language partners learned as children, the child's sex, the child's age and whether the child has younger and/or older siblings. Random effects estimates also include controls for the department. The schooling gap was calculated as $\max(\text{age-completed years of schooling}-6,0)$ for fixed effects estimates.

especially in urban areas remains considerable. Results of this estimation are displayed in columns three and four of Table 4. In the fixed effects framework, parental education is insignificant, except paternal secondary education in urban areas. The impact of the asset index remains significant, the same is true for excess fertility.

To sum up, the random effects model suggests that the impact of parental wealth captured by the asset index and of parental education is more important in rural areas. In fixed effects models however, variables related to parental education loose

pattern does not change much, however, the point estimates shift towards zero. This is to be expected as the average of the modified schooling gap is necessarily higher what would lead to a strong increase in the marginal effects if the point estimates did not change.

their importance in rural areas, but some of them have a significant impact in urban areas. In general, the results in both rural and urban areas are compatible to the extended quality-quantity trade-off model. Furthermore the results indicate a small but statistically significant association between excess fertility and educational outcomes in rural areas and in urban areas when the fixed effects model is used. Of course, it is questionable whether this relationship is really causal. Some robustness checks (results not displayed here but available upon request) were conducted in which variables indicating usage of contraceptives and variables indicating the time interval between births were included. These variables might be correlated with both excess fertility and educational outcomes and might thus lead to an omitted variable problem when not taken into account. The inclusion of these variables does not change the results, the coefficient associated with the excess fertility variable remains significant for rural areas and for urban areas when fixed effects were used. However, proper instruments for the excess fertility variable would be needed to rule out a potential omitted variable problem. Unfortunately, no convincing instrument could be found. In addition, it was tested to what extent negative values of the excess fertility variable influence the results. One might argue, that women with negative excess fertility still could have more children. Thus, all negative values were replaced by zeros. This procedure even slightly increased the impact of excess fertility.

Next, the results linked to desired fertility will be presented. Underdispersion is modeled via a generalized Poisson regression as proposed by Famoye (1993) and Wang and Famoye (1997). In order to take geographical heterogeneity into account, observations were clustered when calculating the estimator variances.¹⁰ Results of the generalized Poisson regression estimates for the desired number of children are displayed in the first two columns of Table 5. The impact of all variables but the transition from completed primary to uncompleted secondary is insignificant in urban areas. In rural areas desired fertility seems to be declining with wealth. The impact of maternal secondary education is rather ambiguous but having at least some years of primary schooling has a negative impact. No impact of paternal education on the desired number of children can be detected in rural areas. The parameter α captures potential underdispersion. The fact that its estimator is significantly negative in both estimations, confirms the presence of underdispersion (cf. Wang and Famoye, 1997).

Besides the generalized Poisson results, Table 5 also contains the results of a fixed effects Poisson estimation, that accounts for geographical heterogeneity and allows for correlation of the fixed effects with explanatory variables. As can be seen in the third and fourth column, wealth and primary maternal schooling are the only two variables for which a significant effect can be found in rural areas. For urban areas, all estimated coefficients are insignificant.

So far, a potential feedback effect of actual fertility on desired fertility has been neglected. This is in line with one of the two matching approaches presented in Section 3 which is supposed to underestimate the prevalence of ex-post rationalization. The second approach however, which is likely to overestimate the prevalence of ex-post

¹⁰Clustering in a maximum likelihood framework occurs by summing the values of the gradient vectors for all observations within one cluster before applying the robust variance estimator (cf. Wooldridge, 2010).

Table 5: Results of the generalized and fixed effects Poisson model estimates for urban and rural areas with the desired number of children as dependent variable.

Dependent Variable	Generalized		Fixed Effects	
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
	Desired Children	Desired Children	Desired Children	Desired Children
Asset Index	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.17** (0.07)	-0.01 (0.06)
<i>Schooling woman (higher than or equal to...)</i>				
Primary Uncompleted	-0.22*** (0.06)	0.12 (0.08)	-0.16* (0.09)	0.12 (0.15)
Primary Completed	-0.17 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.13)
Secondary Uncompleted	0.25* (0.14)	0.14* (0.07)	0.19 (0.24)	0.11 (0.14)
Secondary Completed	-0.22** (0.11)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.14 (0.20)	-0.03 (0.09)
<i>Schooling partner (higher than or equal to...)</i>				
Primary Uncompleted	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.26)	-0.23 (0.15)	0.30 (0.57)
Primary Completed	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.06)	0.05 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.12)
Secondary Uncompleted	0.05 (0.10)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.14)	0.00 (0.13)
Secondary Completed	-0.08 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.13 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.09)
α	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	- -	- -

Number of observations generalized Poisson: 748 (rural) and 1012 (urban)

Number of observations fixed effects: 622 (rural) and 829 (urban)

Standard Deviations in parentheses

* significant on the 10%-level

** significant on the 5%-level

*** significant on the 1%-level

Note: Estimates of desired number of children include controls for partners' age and the language partners learned as children. Generalized Poisson estimates also include controls for the department.

rationalization, indicated a probability somewhere between 0.2 and 0.3 to adjust the number of desired children after the occurrence of an unwanted birth.

Therefore, the estimations presented above are repeated, but this time the variable capturing the desired number of children is corrected by the effect of ex-post rationalization. Thereby it is assumed that the actual prevalence of ex-post rationalization equals its upper bound estimates. Due to the lack of more adequate data, four assumptions are necessary: (1) The occurrence of ex-post rationalization is independent from the occurrence of ex-post rationalization for other births. (2) The probability of ex-post rationalizing is equal for all women and does not depend on any socio-demographic characteristics. (3) The desired number of children is at least two. This

implies, that ex-post rationalization cannot occur if a woman has two or less children or if her desired number of children is two or less.¹¹ (4) Women with a negative excess fertility (i.e. women who desire more children than they actually have) do *not* ex-post rationalize as the concept of ex-post rationalization suggests that it can occur only if the actual number of children surpasses the desired number.

Assumptions (3) and (4) reduce the number of women who might have ex-post rationalized from 1760 to 633. For each of these 633 women the maximum number of “occasions” for ex-post rationalizing is the actual number of children minus two. At the same time, it is known that the number of ex-post rationalized births cannot be superior to the desired number of children minus two. The number of ex-post rationalized births then follows a binomial distribution where the number of draws n is the number of occasions and the probability of a “success” is $P = 0.3$ as 0.3 is the upper bound estimate for the probability of ex-post rationalizing. The distribution is conditional on the fact that the number of “successes” cannot be superior to the number of desired children minus two. The estimated number of ex-post rationalized births is then equal to the integer which seems most likely given the parameters of the binomial distribution, i.e. the mode of the distribution. In order to clarify the idea, consider the following example: a woman has five children and reports a number of desired children of four. The number of “occasions” for ex-post rationalization then is $5 - 2 = 3$, namely each of the three last births. However, as the number of desired children is four, the maximum number of ex-post rationalized births is $4 - 2 = 2$. Let $\text{Bi}_{3,0.3}()$ be the distribution function of the binomial distribution with $n = 3$ and $P = 0.3$. Then the probability that the woman never ex-post rationalized is $\text{Bi}_{3,0.3}(0)/(1 - (\text{Bi}_{3,0.3}(3) - \text{Bi}_{3,0.3}(2))) = 0.352$. The probability for having ex-post rationalized once is: $(\text{Bi}_{3,0.3}(1) - \text{Bi}_{3,0.3}(0))/(1 - (\text{Bi}_{3,0.3}(3) - \text{Bi}_{3,0.3}(2))) = 0.453$. The probability for two ex-post rationalized births is: $(\text{Bi}_{3,0.3}(2) - \text{Bi}_{3,0.3}(1))/(1 - (\text{Bi}_{3,0.3}(3) - \text{Bi}_{3,0.3}(2))) = 0.194$. Thus it is most likely that the woman ex-post rationalized one birth as $0.453 > 0.352 > 0.194$ and 1 is the mode of the described distribution.

Corrected desired fertility then simply is the reported desired number of children minus estimated ex-post rationalized births, excess fertility is calculated as actual fertility minus corrected desired fertility. The correction leads to an increase in average excess fertility by 0.084 in urban and by 0.374 in rural areas, which is at the same time the decline in average desired fertility. In what follows the corrected desired fertility variable will be labeled as *Desired Children C1*. Furthermore, instead of considering the mode of the described distribution, I also ran Monte-Carlo Simulations in which the number of ex-post rationalized births was generated by randomly drawing from the distribution described in the last paragraph. As computational time required for the SML-estimations is considerable the number of replications was restricted to 10.

In order to check the robustness of the results in the schooling gap equation to the alternative specifications of the excess fertility variable, the estimations in Table 4 were repeated. Only two changes are worth mentioning: the coefficient associated with excess fertility in urban areas in the random effects specification rises from 0.04 to 0.12 but it remains statistically insignificant. All other coefficients remain practically

¹¹Only 10% of the women in the dataset report to want less than two children, and only 3 out of 77 women who actually have less than two living children report to want less than two children.

unchanged (results are not displayed but available upon request). Furthermore, when the Monte-Carlo approach is used, the coefficient associated with excess fertility in rural areas in the random effects specification is significant only on the 10%-level in 8 out of 10 cases and insignificant in the remaining 2 cases.

Table 6: Results of the generalized and fixed effects Poisson model estimates for urban and rural areas with the desired number of children – corrected according to the method described in the text – as dependent variable.

Dependent Variable	Generalized		Fixed Effects	
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
	Desired Children C1	Desired Children C1	Desired Children C1	Desired Children C1
Asset Index	-0.06* (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.15* (0.08)	0.02 (0.07)
<i>Schooling woman (higher than or equal to...)</i>				
Primary Uncompleted	-0.26*** (0.06)	0.13* (0.07)	-0.22** (0.09)	0.14 (0.16)
Primary Completed	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.19)	-0.06 (0.14)
Secondary Uncompleted	0.16 (0.14)	0.16** (0.07)	0.15 (0.25)	0.11 (0.14)
Secondary Completed	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.21)	-0.02 (0.09)
<i>Schooling partner (higher than or equal to...)</i>				
Primary Uncompleted	-0.10 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.22)	-0.25 (0.16)	0.09 (0.58)
Primary Completed	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.05 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.13)
Secondary Uncompleted	0.11 (0.11)	0.04 (0.06)	0.03 (0.15)	0.00 (0.13)
Secondary Completed	-0.08 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.13 (0.14)	0.01 (0.09)
α	-0.03*** 0.01	-0.07*** 0.01	– –	– –

Number of observations generalized Poisson: 748 (rural) and 1012 (urban)

Number of observations fixed effects: 622 (rural) and 829 (urban)

Standard Deviations in parentheses

* significant on the 10%-level

** significant on the 5%-level

*** significant on the 1%-level

Note: Estimates of desired number of children include controls for partners' age and the language partners learned as children. Generalized Poisson estimates also include controls for the department.

The impact of correcting the desired fertility variable on estimates of the desired fertility can be supposed to be more pronounced. Table 6 is the equivalent to Table 5 but with the corrected desired fertility variable *Children desired C1* as dependent variable. Comparing the generalized Poisson estimates in both tables, it turns out that the impact of higher education seems slightly weaker and that of lower education slightly higher in rural areas, whereas in urban areas the positive impact of education

on desired fertility increases. For the fixed effects estimates no significant changes can be detected. Applying the Monte-Carlo approach led by and large to the same results as in Table 6. To sum up, it seems that the impact of ex-post rationalization on the results is rather limited, even when a very high prevalence is assumed.

6 Conclusion

Several theoretical models developed in recent years extend the classical quality-quantity trade-off model for the case of developing countries and take child work into account. One prediction of those models is a decrease of fertility and an increase of child quality with parental maximal income. The focus of the present paper is to test this prediction empirically. In line with quality-quantity trade-off models, fertility decisions and decisions regarding the quality of children are modeled to occur simultaneously. A second question this paper tackles is the impact of excess fertility on child quality. It is important to stress that estimates were based on a subsample of the Bolivian DHS dataset, which is wealthier and better educated than the rest.

In the empirical model parental maximal income was captured by an asset index and by parental education. For rural areas some evidence in favor of the extended quality-quantity trade-off model could be found. The asset index value is associated with better education (a lower schooling gap) and less desired children in both Poisson random effects and fixed effects models that control for geographical heterogeneity. In this context it has also to be kept in mind, that the true effect of wealth on education might even be stronger as reverse causality potentially dampens this effect. This is because income from child work might be used to purchase assets which raise the asset index value. Maternal primary education seems to be influential too, but is not significant in the schooling gap equation when fixed effects are included. The coefficient for excess fertility is statistically significant and points at a negative association of excess fertility with child quality (a positive association with the schooling gap). However, the size of the coefficient is almost negligible. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent this coefficient measures the causal impact of more children than originally intended on educational outcomes. Although several robustness checks were conducted it is impossible to rule out an omitted variable problem. If parents who care less about achieving a certain fertility target at the same time tend to care less about their offspring's education, the coefficient of the excess fertility variable might in fact capture the effect of an omitted parental taste variable. In urban areas, evidence in favor of the extended quality-quantity trade-off model is weaker. Parental wealth and education play a role for educational outcomes but not for desired fertility levels. Interestingly, excess fertility is also significant in estimates for urban areas, however – as just mentioned – the results should be interpreted with caution.

The result that the extended quality-quantity trade-off model seems to be more appropriate to describe family decisions in rural areas is not surprising. Many Bolivian households in rural areas rely on child work as support in agricultural production. As a consequence, many children in rural areas attend school and work at the same time (cf. Zapata et al., 2011). In such an environment, it is not unlikely that parents take economic considerations into account when making fertility decisions.

However, at this point, it is important to stress that the fact that the empirical findings seem to be in line with the extended quality-quantity trade-off model are no definite evidence in favor of the model. For example, it might be possible, that couples with a higher preference for children have more children and spend more time on child rearing and less time on raising income that might be used to purchase assets. The empirical results are in favor of the model only to the extent that they do not contradict it. In order to find stronger evidence in favor of the model it would be necessary to have a dataset that combines information on education, child work (including domestic work) and desired fertility. In the present paper, child work can only be captured in an indirect way as it is supposed to come along with a greater schooling gap since the DHS data does not contain information on child work. It would also be advantageous to have repeated observations on desired fertility levels in a panel data framework. This would allow to assess the reliability of this measure. However, as shown in this paper, such an assessment is – of course to a more limited extent – also possible if several cross-sections of data are available.

To conclude, it should be stated that even if the quality-quantity trade-off is investigated based on cross-sectional data, the results are also of interest from an inter-generational point of view. If the trade-off indeed applies, children who receive a good education today and are wealthier tomorrow and will invest more in the quality of their children. Furthermore, education is also likely to decrease fertility rates not only by lowering undesired fertility but also by decreasing desired fertility levels. This brings out that policies pushing children from poor families to attend school are highly recommendable. Policies of this kind have recently been implemented in Bolivia in the form of conditional cash transfers and school meals, which seems a step in the right direction, although these programs seem to suffer from free-riding behaviour (Grigoli and Sbrana, 2011). Not only today's children will benefit from these measures, but also the subsequent generations as the merits of education will be passed on.

Appendix

Table A1: Differences between matching variable values of women from the 2008 dataset and average matching variable values of their matching partners from the 2003 dataset.

Variable	Difference (Procedure 1)		Difference (Procedure 2)	
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
<i>Schooling woman (higher than or equal to..., Share)</i>				
Primary Uncompleted	-0.0356***	0.2125	-0.0301***	0.2134
Primary Completed	0.0078	0.1904	0.0020	0.1974
Secondary Uncompleted	-0.0093*	0.1815	-0.0150***	0.1877
Secondary Completed	-0.0198***	0.1683	-0.0296***	0.1973
<i>Schooling partner (higher than or equal to..., Share)</i>				
Primary Uncompleted	-0.0127***	0.1222	-0.0141***	0.1257
Primary Completed	0.0053	0.1889	0.0024	0.1939
Secondary Uncompleted	-0.0209***	0.1838	-0.0238***	0.1924
Secondary Completed	-0.0210***	0.2183	-0.0325***	0.2388
<i>Language learned as child (both partners, Share)</i>				
Quechua	0.0056*	0.1184	0.0051*	0.1264
Aymara	0.0027	0.1007	0.0069**	0.1148
Spanish	-0.0190***	0.1531	-0.0325***	0.1902
Mixed/Other	0.0108***	0.1225	0.0205***	0.1544
<i>Age group 2003 (higher than or equal to..., Share)</i>				
31-35	-0.1339***	0.3417	-0.1706***	0.3742
36-40	-0.0548***	0.2833	-0.0791***	0.3084
41-44	-0.0332***	0.2360	-0.0364***	0.2311
<i>Department (Share)</i>				
Pando	0.0106***	0.1190	0.0108***	0.1227
Beni	0.0010	0.0880	0.0037*	0.0946
Santa Cruz	-0.0023	0.1111	0.0001	0.1157
Tarija	0.0038	0.1243	0.0026	0.1204
La Paz	-0.0199***	0.1513	-0.0238***	0.1606
Cochabamba	-0.0043	0.1060	-0.0042	0.1096
Oruro	0.0021	0.1205	0.0015	0.1330
Chuquisaca	0.0024	0.1010	0.0012	0.1020
Potosi	0.0066**	0.1059	0.0081***	0.1235
Share rural	-0.0082	0.2562	-0.0051	0.2646
Number of observations		1 440		1 834

* significant on the 10%-level

** significant on the 5%-level

*** significant on the 1%-level

Table A2: Results of the Poisson model estimates for urban and rural areas.

Dependent Variable	Rural		Urban	
	School Gap	Children Desired	School Gap	Children Desired
Asset Index	-1.12*** (0.10)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.61*** (0.14)	-0.03 (0.04)
<i>Schooling woman (higher than or equal to...)</i>				
Primary Uncompleted	-0.33*** (0.12)	-0.22*** (0.06)	-0.70*** (0.25)	0.12 (0.12)
Primary Completed	-1.94* (1.01)	-0.17 (0.13)	0.13 (0.39)	-0.08 (0.10)
Secondary Uncompleted	0.89 (1.16)	0.25 (0.17)	0.02 (0.44)	0.14 (0.10)
Secondary Completed	0.76 (0.80)	-0.23 (0.16)	0.19 (0.31)	-0.08 (0.07)
<i>Schooling partner (higher than or equal to...)</i>				
Primary Uncompleted	-0.36*** (0.16)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.45 (0.55)	-0.06 (0.27)
Primary Completed	-1.74*** (0.39)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.65 (0.41)	-0.08 (0.09)
Secondary Uncompleted	1.41*** (0.43)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.20 (0.45)	0.04 (0.09)
Secondary Completed	-0.54 (0.36)	-0.08 (0.10)	0.38 (0.32)	0.02 (0.06)
Excess fertility	0.03 (0.02)	- -	0.04 (0.04)	- -

Number of couples: 748 (rural) and 1 012 (urban)

Number of children: 1 569 (rural) and 1 664 (urban)

Standard Deviations in parentheses

* significant on the 10%-level

** significant on the 5%-level

*** significant on the 1%-level

Note: Estimates of schooling gap include controls for partners' age, the language partners learned as children, department, the child's sex, the child's age and whether the child has younger and/or older siblings. Estimates of desired number of children include controls for partners' age and department. Estimates of schooling gap are on the child level, estimates of desired number of children on the couple level.

Table A3: Results of the random effects Poisson model estimates with alternative schooling gap specification for urban and rural areas.

Dependent Variable	Rural School Gap	Urban School Gap
Asset Index	−0.65*** (0.06)	−0.50*** (0.11)
<i>Schooling woman (higher than or equal to...)</i>		
Primary Uncompleted	−0.23*** (0.09)	−0.31 (0.24)
Primary Completed	−0.75*** (0.32)	−0.15 (0.27)
Secondary Uncompleted	−0.05 (0.44)	−0.09 (0.30)
Secondary Completed	0.50 (0.43)	−0.02 (0.22)
<i>Schooling partner (higher than or equal to...)</i>		
Primary Uncompleted	−0.15 (0.13)	−0.16 (0.54)
Primary Completed	−0.49*** (0.15)	−0.23 (0.24)
Secondary Uncompleted	0.05 (0.19)	−0.00 (0.26)
Secondary Completed	−0.21 (0.21)	−0.32 (0.20)
Excess fertility	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05 (0.03)

Number of children: 1 569 (rural) and 1 664 (urban)

Standard Deviations in parentheses

* significant on the 10%-level

** significant on the 5%-level

*** significant on the 1%-level

Note: Estimates include controls for partners' age, the language partners learned as children, department, the child's sex, the child's age and whether the child has younger and/or older siblings.

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