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**Book Part**

## Demography and migration in transition: Reflections on EU-Turkey relations

**Provided in Cooperation with:**

Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI)

*Suggested Citation:* İçduygu, Ahmet; Biriz Karaçay, Ayşem (2012) : Demography and migration in transition: Reflections on EU-Turkey relations, In: Paçacı Elitok, Seçil Straubhaar, Thomas (Ed.): Turkey, migration and the EU, ISBN 978-3-937816-94-4, Hamburg University Press, Hamburg, pp. 19-38,  
<https://doi.org/10.15460/hup.227.1656>

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/61472>

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Hamburg Institute  
of International  
Economics

Series Edition HWWI Volume 5

## Demography and Migration in Transition: Reflections on EU-Turkey Relations

*Ahmet İçduygu and Ayşem Biriz Karaçay*

in:

## Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities

edited by

Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar

pp. 19–38

Hamburg University Press

Verlag der Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg

Carl von Ossietzky

## Imprint

Bibliographic information published by the *Deutsche Nationalbibliothek* (German National Library).

The *Deutsche Nationalbibliothek* lists this publication in the *Deutsche Nationalbibliografie*; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

The online version is available for free on the website of Hamburg University Press (open access). The *Deutsche Nationalbibliothek* stores this online publication on its Archive Server. The Archive Server is part of the deposit system for long-term availability of digital publications.

Available open access in the Internet at:

Hamburg University Press – <http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de>

PURL: [http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/HamburgUP/HWWI5\\_Elitok\\_Migration](http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/HamburgUP/HWWI5_Elitok_Migration)

Archive Server of the *Deutsche Nationalbibliothek* – <http://deposit.d-nb.de>

ISBN 978-3-937816-94-4 (printed version)

ISSN 1865-7974 (printed version)

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Printing house: Elbe-Werkstätten GmbH, Hamburg, Germany  
<http://www.ew-gmbh.de>

Cover design: Benjamin Guzinski, Hamburg

Cover illustration: “Migrant”, courtesy of Alessandro Gatto

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# Demography and Migration in Transition: Reflections on EU-Turkey Relations

*Ahmet İcduygu and Ayşem Biriz Karaçay*

## Introduction

Public and scholarly discourses on the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Turkey in the 1990s were dominated by discussions of “democracy”. This was mostly due to the conditionality of the Copenhagen Criteria in the context of Turkey’s prospective EU membership, which was concerned with bringing the structures and procedures of Turkish democracy closer to European standards.<sup>1</sup> Interestingly, what seems to partly accompany this discourse in the 2000s is a discourse centered around another concept which also carries the prefix “demo”, that is “demography”, and together with it, one of its by-products, “migration”.<sup>2</sup> These discourses stress the question of the compatibility of demographic and migratory regimes between the EU and Turkey and largely focus on the related outcomes of observed or assumed incompatibility.<sup>3</sup>

Likewise, it is also not surprising to see that migration issues are debated in a period of membership negotiation between the EU and Turkey. Debates about migration involve a variety of issues. For instance many politicians in Europe frequently speak of the “invasion” of migrants from Turkey when they publicly debate Turkish EU membership.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the commonly accepted view that Turkish immigrants who are already in Europe face integration difficulties, together with intensifying Islamophobia on the continent, have made

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<sup>1</sup> Çarkoğlu/Rubin (2003), Kramer (2000), Uğur (1999).

<sup>2</sup> Behar (2006, pp. 17–31), Erzan/Kuzubaş/Yıldız (2006, pp. 3–44), Coleman (2004), TFHPF (Turkish Family, Health and Planning Foundation) (2004), ICT (Independent Commission on Turkey) (2004).

<sup>3</sup> İcduygu (2010, pp. 59–71).

<sup>4</sup> Lagro (2008, pp. 58–78).

Turkey-related migration issues a topic of critical debate in European circles.<sup>5</sup> However, proponents of Turkey's EU membership argue that Turkey's EU membership is in the Union's interest, because it would reduce demographic pressures on the labor market by bringing workers into the Union.<sup>6</sup> As these examples demonstrate, migration-related issues in the context of Turkey's prospective EU membership have attained growing salience in public, policy, and academic debates in the EU because they have unique and multi-faceted implications for the economic, social, political and demographic structures and processes of the EU.

Against this background, the main purpose of this paper is to map out the demography related debate in the context of the EU-Turkey relationship.

### Rethinking International Migration for the EU and Turkey

The early 1960s and the 1970s have witnessed the emigration of large numbers of Turkish nationals to Western European countries, particularly West Germany. These emigration flows continued until recent times through family reunification schemes and the asylum track. However, today Europe is not the only point of destination for the migration movement from Turkey to abroad. In addition to the neighboring Arab countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the geographical area to which migration of Turkish origin reaches includes countries such as the United States of America (USA), Australia and Canada.<sup>7</sup> More recently, Turkey has also become a country of transit for irregular migrants from Asian countries, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, who are trying to reach the Western world and for refuge for asylum seekers coming from neighboring Middle East countries and beyond. Furthermore, Turkey is also becoming a destination country for EU professionals and retirees as well as regular and irregular migrants from former Soviet Bloc countries.<sup>8</sup> Because Turkey possesses multiple identities within the context of international migration, the topic is inevitably of great importance in terms of the handling of migration issues within the relationship between the EU and Turkey.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Erzan/Kirişçi (2009), Kaya/Kentel (2005).

<sup>6</sup> Constantinos (2004, pp. 203–217), Behar (2006, pp. 17–31), Muenz (2006).

<sup>7</sup> İçduygu (2004, pp. 88–99).

<sup>8</sup> İçduygu/Kirişçi (2009), İçduygu/Toktaş (2003, pp. 25–54).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

The Republic of Turkey, which will celebrate the centennial of its proclamation in 2023, is currently undergoing a very significant period of transformation at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Since Turkey has been experiencing an intense period of economic, social and political transformation based on democratic and liberal values – along with becoming increasingly integrated into the world economy due to globalization – it is inevitable that Turkey has been faced with new migratory movements. In this process, the neighboring polities, including Europe, are also expected to face new dynamics of migration. Because of this, it is certain that the demographic processes to be experienced in the upcoming years will have an impact on the migratory movements that Turkey, Europe and other neighboring regions might encounter. However, it is a fact that the “window of demographic opportunity”, which is expected to open when an “environment where labor supply, employment and the quality of the labor force constantly increases, leading to an increase in economic performance”, emerges due to the “significant increase in the rate of the working age population”, will reduce possible migration tendencies in Turkey in the prospective new era that the Turkish demography will enter.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, the future status of international migration should be considered together with its economic, social, political and demographic dimensions.

The emergence and continuity of international migration can be explained, in general, by the balance between the receiving country’s or territory’s need for a migrant labor force and the concomitant need of the source country or territory to reduce the pressure of the unemployed labor force on the economy. From this point of view, it is clear that there is a strong potential for international migration within the geographical area that includes the European Union and Turkey within coming decades. The process initiated by rapidly decreasing fertility rates and an aging population creates a demographic gap that essentially calls for migration in order for the member states of the European Union to be able to reproduce themselves economically and socially. It is clear that in the EU’s immediate neighbors to the South and East, there is a large, geographically mobile labor force that cannot be absorbed by the economies of these countries and, hence, there exists the potential for migratory flows that could fill the aforementioned demographic gap within the European Union’s member states. However, one must recognize that international migration does not simply emerge on the basis of a “principle of compu-

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<sup>10</sup> Behar (2008), Muenz (2006).



tational fluid”.<sup>11</sup> In addition to the comparisons of economic “supply and demand” or “necessities and opportunities”, political and social “selectivity and choice” determines the emergence and continuity of migration, as well. It is precisely these social and political reflections that make the governance of migration difficult.

Inevitably, issues of international migration relating to Turkey shall be centered around the European Union, whether Turkey’s EU membership is realized or not.<sup>12</sup> In other words, whatever course Turkey’s accession to the EU takes, and whatever results it brings forth, it remains certain that any international migration debate regarding the EU will frequently include discussions focusing on Turkey. This is not merely due to the likelihood of intensive migration from Turkey into the European Union, but also because of the hundreds of thousands of immigrants of Turkish origin presently living in European Union member states. Furthermore, such issues are likely to remain on the agenda both because Turkey is a buffer zone between the EU and the source countries and territories that are the origin of migration towards the EU and because the economic, social, political and cultural bonds between Turkey and the EU are deep and profound. In this context, it is quite evident that a European Union including Turkey as a member state can oversee the issue of international migration in relation to Turkey more easily. Similarly, Turkey as a member state of the EU can handle the issue of international migration in relation to itself more easily. However, the key point to all remains constant: both the European Union and Turkey should realize that, through the policies they have drafted and will draft in the future, international migration is not a problem, but “a phenomenon that requires governance” through social transformation. Both polities must further realize that this governance is only possible through “sharing problems and liabilities” related to migration and that the current approaches adopted by both parties, such as “passing the buck to the other”, will not provide any solutions.

It is not surprising that the international migratory waves have been questioned both quantitatively and qualitatively in the countries of destination since the phenomenon began. In other words, the question of “who has arrived” in addition to “how many migrants have arrived” has been debated frequently and from various perspectives in the countries receiving migration. In

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<sup>11</sup> İçduygu (2006, pp. 47–58).

<sup>12</sup> Erzan/Kirişçi (2008).

the context of Turkey-EU relations – particularly in the case of the free movement of labor – it is not surprising that the potential of Turkey for EU migration has created many quantitative and qualitative debates. However, what is surprising at this juncture is the extent that such debate has reached: for instance, Turkey’s accession to the EU has almost been entirely evaluated on the basis of the magnitude of possible migration from Turkey to the EU. While the assumptions on the magnitude of these migration waves are not actually based on particularly scholarly studies, another course of debate based on the assumption that a migration wave from Turkey will be a solution to the significant process of aging and demographic shrinkage process that the EU population has entered into. In short, issues of international migration have begun to constitute an increasingly politicized area within EU-Turkey relations.

Due to reasons such as the association of international migration issues with the European Union’s economic, social and political areas of integration in general, along with Turkey’s significant position as a “sending country”, “receiving country”, and “migration transit zone” (especially within Eurocentric international migration and asylum discourses), international migration debates have become central to Turkey-EU relations. Within this framework, one observes that there are three main issues in EU discussions on the issue of international migration in relation to Turkey, including: (a) whether an intense migratory wave towards the EU in case of free movement will create serious economic, social and political adjustment problems (especially in the case of Turkish migrants); (b) whether Turkey’s demography and, as a consequence of this demography, the migration waves of Turkish origin, will have a complementary role in the demographic shrinkage process (low fertility and intense aging population) in the EU and (c) whether Turkey, in its position as a “receiving country” and “migration transit zone”, will be successful, and, if so, to what extent, in producing and implementing policies in compliance with the EU-centric international migration and asylum regimes.

In regard to international migration, it is a fact that the aforementioned areas of debate will continue to persist regardless of the possible results of the course of Turkey’s EU membership accession process. In other words, whether Turkey becomes a member of the EU or not, discussions around the harmonization problems of Turkish-origin migrants currently living in the EU member states, along with the course of possible migratory waves from Turkey to these states (family reunification, marriage migration, irregular migration and asylum-seeker movements), will continue. Even if accession does not occur, the

question of whether Turkey's young population will have a complementary impact on the aging population of the EU, or whether this young population will create an intense migratory wave towards the EU, will remain a topic of intense debate. Even if the accession issue is removed from the agenda, the question of how Turkey will protect the South-eastern border of the EU from migration waves will remain of crucial import. From this perspective, the importance of thinking in terms of the issue of international migration within this relationship carries with it two distinct scenarios pertaining to Turkey's accession to the EU – that is, the scenario of the realization of such accession, and the scenario of the failure of such accession.

In the context of the emergence and continuity of international migration, differences in terms of development between countries or territories are frequently underlined as the most significant factors. Today, it is evident that Turkey's socio-economic and demographic indicators show significant differences in comparison to the indicators of the EU member states; these differences, in turn, are frequently quoted as a cause of potential migratory waves. For instance, in terms of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, Turkey would be the poorest country in comparison to the EU member states.<sup>13</sup> The average value in terms of the GDP-based Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) for the EU-27 member states is 100; this value is 105.5 for Italy, 48.7 for Poland and 30.5 for Bulgaria – yet, for Turkey, it is only 28.5.<sup>14</sup> Demographic indicators also highlight striking differences between Turkey and the EU-27, and other candidate states. For example, the natural growth rate of the population in Turkey is approximately 13 times higher than the population growth rate of the EU-27 member states. In this regard, the direction and rate of change of these differences between countries are evidently among the key indicators that will highlight the intensity of the prospective migration waves. However, particularly in considering the rates of change in the socio-economic indicators of the past 20 years, Turkey seems to be rapidly making up the difference with the other countries of comparison in terms of modernization steps. The increase in Gross National Product (GNP) per capita from 1,200 USD in the 1980s to 6,000 USD in the 2000s along with an increase in life expectancy to 70 years during the 2000s (an increase of ten years since the 1980s) provide examples of such progress. In addition to these indicators, the Turkish economy has grown at a rate

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<sup>13</sup> İçduygu (2006).

<sup>14</sup> These figures were taken from the website of EUROSTAT (2011).

of 6–9 % in recent years. It is evident that the direction of transformation and development that Turkey has been experiencing in recent years points to reducing the pressure of migration in Turkey in the long run. On the other hand, it is also clear that a Turkey as a member of the EU will make up the difference in terms of development with the EU in a much shorter time compared to a Turkey that is not a member of the EU.

### Demographic Transition and Potential Migratory Flows from Turkey to the EU: Some Indicators and Scenarios

More important than the economic developmental difference, however, is the demographic difference that has been the key reason for intensive discussions of international migration within the context of Turkey's accession to the EU. This demographic difference is seen as the most important source of debate on the magnitude of potential migration from Turkey into the EU, especially in the event that Turkey becomes a full member of the EU. In this regard, some have emphasized low fertility and an aging population (in terms of the EU), and the relatively high rates of population growth and the high percentage of youth within the country's total population (in terms of Turkey) as the key reasons for potential migration from Turkey to the EU. In analyzing this point, it is important to examine the details of the projected demographic processes in the EU and Turkey for the coming years.

### Demography, the Labor Market and Possible Trends in the EU

Low fertility rates and increasing average life spans are, in an important sense, changing the structure of the age pyramid in European countries, reducing the share of the young population within the overall population, increasing the percentage of the elderly population and resulting in an aging labor force. Considering the medium-scale natural changes in population and migration assumptions, the total population of the EU-27 member states will increase to 478 million in 2025 from 472 million in 2005 before entering a phase of decline. In the year 2050, the population of the EU-27 member states will decrease to 462 million. In the same period, in the event that they do not receive migration, the total population of the Western and Central European countries will begin

to decline after reaching a peak in 2010, decreasing to 460 million in 2025 and 415 million by 2050.<sup>15</sup>

The working population (ages 15–64) in the Western and Central European countries is expected to decline to 302 million in 2015, and to 261 million in 2025 from 317 million in the year 2005.<sup>16</sup> The number of youth recruited in the labor market is gradually decreasing in many EU member states, a situation that will apply to the entire EU-27 member states in the coming 45 years. In contrast to this age group, the numbers of those in the 65 + bracket will reach 107 million in 2025 and 133 million in 2050 (from a total of 79 million as of 2005) due to an increasing average life span. Looking at the changes that have occurred in the median age as a measure reflecting the age structure of the population, the present figure for this data in these European countries is 38.5, a full 6.5 years older than it was during the 1960s – a time when fertility rates were significantly higher. This figure, meanwhile, is expected to reach as high as 48 by the year 2050, meaning that virtually half of the entire European population will be comprised of people aged 50 and above by that date.<sup>17</sup>

Demographic processes, together with trends in the labor market and labor force participation rates, determine the future size of the labor force. Currently, there are 227 million people in the labor market of the EU-27 member states. Of this number, 21 million (9 %) are of foreign origin. Based on the current labor force participation rates, it is clear that the aging population will cause a rapid decline in the size of the labor force, meaning that its estimated size will decline to 211 million (a 7 % decrease) by the year 2025, and to 183 million (a 19 % decrease) by 2050 in Western and Central European countries.<sup>18</sup> In the event that these countries do not receive any migration, this rate of decline will be higher: the size of the labor force will be as low as 201 million in 2025, and 160 million in 2050. This means that unless a medium-scale migration occurs, the labor force in Europe will decline by 67 million by the year 2050. Together with the aging of the population, this process will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the social, economic and political order of Europe.

It seems that in terms of the EU, there are *three key options* for handling the issue of demographic aging and the consequent decrease in the share of

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<sup>15</sup> Muenz (2006).

<sup>16</sup> İçduygu (2006).

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* (p. 84).

<sup>18</sup> Muenz (2006).

the local population participating in the labor force: increasing labor force participation rates, raising the retirement age and pursuing an active economic migration policy.<sup>19</sup> In the event of a medium-scale migration, provided that the labor force participation rate in the EU-27 member states is equivalent to that of the three countries (Denmark, Iceland and Sweden) with the highest labor force participation rates, the size of the labor force in Western and Central European countries will reach 233 million in 2025 (an increase of six million over the figures for 2005) before beginning to decline to 222 million by the year 2050. In the event of no such migration taking place, the size of the labor force will decline to 195 million (year 2050) from 222 million (year 2025) even if labor force participation rates are increased. However, if the labor force participation rates for women (age groups 15 to 64) in all the EU member states are equivalent to the labor force participation rates for men, then the size of the labor force in Europe will remain at 224 million in the year 2025 before declining to 205 million by 2050. In the event that the retirement age in the EU member states is raised by five years by the year 2025, and then ten years by 2050, then the size of the labor force will increase, as well. However, unless the EU member states receive migration, a decline in the size of the labor force by 2050 is inevitable: the year 2025's projected number of workers of 218 million will decrease to 190 million by 2050. If the EU member states do not receive any migration, but, instead, choose to follow only the first and second options stated above, then it appears that the aging population will have no negative impact on the labor force. If these two options are implemented together to the extent that the labor force participation rates equal those of the Scandinavian countries, then, by the year 2050, the size of the labor force in the Western and Central European countries will be 228 million (this figure was 227 million in 2005, and is estimated to be 241 million in 2025). In short, any combination of these two options that does not meet the above levels will result in negative repercussions for the numbers active within the labor force.<sup>20</sup>

Undoubtedly, the question of the magnitude of migration required to fill the demographic gap in Europe is of the utmost importance. Considering labor force participation rates, and assuming that there is no migration, the size of the labor force in Western and Central Europe will decline by 26 million in the period between 2005 and 2025 and then, approximately, by 66 million

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<sup>19</sup> İçduygu (2006, pp. 91–94).

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* (p. 92).

between 2005 and 2050. It is evident that labor force migration serves to fill this gap. In this respect, the EU-27 member states need to add 1.3 million migrants into their labor force pool each year between 2005 and 2025. Between 2025 and 2050, this figure will need to reach 1.6 million annually. If we consider that 70 % of the migrants heading towards Europe will be participating in the labor force, the annual net contribution to be obtained from migration will be around 1.9–2.0 million by 2025, and 2.3 million in the period until 2050. According to these estimations, 95 million migrants of ages 15–64 will be required between the years 2005 and 2050.<sup>21</sup> These figures foresee much higher numbers of migrants moving to the Continent in comparison to the annual number of migrants that have been received by Europe in recent years, suggesting that there is nothing realistic about such estimation.

### Demography, the Labor Market and Possible Trends in Turkey

Turkey completed its *demographic transformation* in the early 2000s in terms of the transition from a traditional social structure to a modern social structure. This transformation is also called a *demographic transition*. In one way, this is a transition from very high birth and mortality rates to lower birth and mortality rates, and, in another way, it means the closing of the gap between birth rates and mortality rates. From another angle, it also reflects a significant decline in the population growth rate: Turkey's annual population growth rate has been lower than 1.5 % in recent years.<sup>22</sup> Life expectancy at birth has reached around 70 years of age. The total fertility rate is around 2.2 children and the child mortality rate is under 30/1000. Turkey's population is expected to increase at a constant rate corresponding to this level of growth rate in the coming years. It is estimated to reach 90 million by 2025 from 73 million in the year 2005 before hitting 100 million by 2050. However, it is also estimated that Turkey's population growth rate might stagnate at this level in the 2050s (or, indeed, even before reaching 100 million) before entering a period of decline.<sup>23</sup>

The main assumption underlying these estimations is that the average expected number of children per woman will fall to 2.1 – the figure required for a basic reproduction rate – in 2010 and then remain constant at this level for

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<sup>21</sup> Muenz (2006).

<sup>22</sup> İçduygu (2006, p. 95).

<sup>23</sup> Behar (2008, p. 16).

the following years. Estimations based on this assumption suggest that the ratio of the age group 0–15 will decrease to 28 % of the 2005 ratio and then to 22 % in 2025, before receding to 19 % by the year 2050. For the percentage share of the 15–64 age cleavage engaged in the labor force, 2005's figure of 67 % will rise to 68 % by 2025 before declining to 62 % in 2050. In the light of these developments, it is apparent that the population will enter a process of rapid aging. The share of the population of the 65 + age group, which was 6 % in 2005, will reach 10 % by 2025 before rapidly increasing by 18 % in the subsequent 25 years.<sup>24</sup>

If we look at the status of the age group 15–64 within Turkey's overall population in terms of absolute figures, it is probable that this age group will continue growing until the year 2035. Considering that people constituting this age group belong to the generations that were born in periods when fertility rates were quite high, the reason for the high figures (which will continue in the coming years) in this age group becomes clear. While Turkey's population will grow by 30 % by the 2030s, the age group 15–64 will grow at a faster rate than the one predicted for the rest of the population. In this time period, the size of the age group 15–64 will increase from 42 million to 60 million, a growth rate of 40 %. Certainly, this growth will be translated into increases in the labor force and labor force supply and, if the labor force simultaneously gains productivity, mobility and flexibility parallel to this demographic development, there will be no reason not to term the outcome as a "window of demographic opportunity".<sup>25</sup> However, it should be noted that this window of demographic opportunity will gradually close after the year 2025 in proportion to the overall population in Turkey, due mainly to the increase in the 65 + age group and the corresponding decrease in the 15–64 age group. In this process of demographic transformation, the population entering a significant aging period is also inevitable. By 2050, it is estimated that while Turkey's population will increase by approximately 40 %, the ratio of the 65 + age group will also double. This transformation will take place especially in the period following the year 2025 following a decline in fertility rates and the aging of the current generations, being replaced by a relatively smaller population. In this context, forecasts estimate that the size of the 65 + age group, which was 3.6 million in the year 2000, will reach 17 million in 2050. It seems that after the year 2025,

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* (p. 17).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* (pp. 17–19).



Turkey will no longer have a young population. In this, the most significant indicator is the increasing median age: estimates suggest that the median age will increase to 33 years by the year 2025 and to 39 years by 2050 from approximately 25 years in the year 2000.

If no migration occurs between 2005 and 2025, the population under 40 years of age (the active young population) will gradually become smaller, the 40–65 age group (the active middle-aged population) will remain constant, while the ratio of the 65 + age group (the retired population) to the entire population will increase in the EU-27 member states.<sup>26</sup> Because of this, the active young section (ages 20–40) will decline by 17 %, the active middle-aged section will remain the same, and the elderly section (ages 65 +) will reach over one third of the entire population (34 %). If Turkey were to join the EU today, the changes that would occur in the EU by 2025 would be as follows: the size of the active young section (ages 20–40) would decline by 12 %, the active middle-aged section (ages 40–60) would increase by 6 % and the elderly section (ages 65 +) would increase by 37 %. In light of the above comparison, it can be said that Turkey's accession to the European Union might slow down the decline in the numbers of the active young population within the entire EU population given the former's young population and growth rates that far outstrip those of the rest of the organization, yet it is evident that this will not completely resolve the issue of the EU's aging population.

When emphasizing the necessary and complementary impact of migration for Europe in demographic and economic terms, the question of “what kind of migration” is an issue that inevitably appears. In addition to the desire for “migration that will provide a qualified labor force that is more required”, the construction of “migration that will provide a labor force more in harmony with European societies in social and cultural terms” is also emphasized. However, an overly selective migratory approach with the aforementioned economic, social, political and ideological positioning is not very realistic considering the magnitude of the migration that is demographically required by the EU, especially if one considers the narrow migratory market that will provide the potential migrants. For instance, a study conducted by the United Nations and cited in this work states that the number of migrants required to eliminate the negative demographic tendency experienced in the EU-15 member states will vary according to the countries' objectives. The study discusses that,

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<sup>26</sup> İçduygu (2006, pp. 86–89).

if the objective is to preserve the current magnitude of the working-age population, then the European Union will need 79 million people (1.5 million migrants each year) in the period between 2000–2050; however, if the objective is to preserve the “potential support ratio” (in other words, the ratio of the age group 15–64 to the age group 65 +), then 674 million people (14 million migrants each year) will be required.

It is evident that the number of migrants possibly required by the labor force market in the EU cannot be met even in the event of Turkey’s entire population migrating to Europe. As we have emphasized before, the demographic change experts anticipate in the population of Turkey for the period between 2005 and 2050 is as follows: the age group 15–64 will reach 63 million (31 %) in the year 2025 before slowing its growth rate to reach 67 million (40 %) by 2050 from 48 million in the year 2005; in the same time period, the size of the labor force in Turkey, which is 25 million today, will reach 47 million (32 %) in the year 2025 and 51 million (45 %) by 2050.

### Magnitude of Possible Movements and Characteristics of the Potential Migrants

In the context of the EU-Turkey relationship, the discussions on international migration issues are grounded in two essential questions: (a) What will be the magnitude of the possible migratory movements towards the EU? and (b) What qualifications will potential Turkish migrant groups to the EU have? In a study<sup>27</sup> conducted in 2006 for the purpose of providing answers to these questions, people’s desire to migrate to the EU member states was examined at two different levels. Firstly, the study examined the general intention of the people in question and queried whether a general desire to migrate to the EU member states was extant. Secondly, the study investigated the level of specific intention in an effort to acquire more definite and detailed information in relation to the desire to migrate.

When these two indicators are evaluated, Turkey demonstrates an interesting picture. While Turkey has the largest number of people with a general intention to migrate among the 13 countries (the ten countries that became EU member states after the recent enlargement, plus the last new members Bulgaria and Romania, as well as candidate country Turkey) examined, it is also

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<sup>27</sup> Krieger/Maitre (2006, pp. 45–66).

the country with the least number of people with a specific intention to migrate. In this respect, only 0.3 % of the population of Turkey has a specific intention to migrate in the following five years. When searching for an answer to the question, “How does this contradictory situation translate into possible migration from Turkey following the advent of free movement?”, it is possible to say the following: in 2003, the number of potential Turkish migrants was 48.9 million, and one can estimate that the potential size of the population with a general intention to migrate is 3.03 million. Yet, of these, only 150,000 have a specific intention to migrate. When the more fundamental intentions to migrate is examined, it is estimated that in the following five years, the possible size of migrants from Turkey to the EU–15 member states will be 400,000 people.<sup>28</sup>

On the basis of the difference between the general intention and the specific intention to migrate explained above, the search for answers to the question regarding the characteristics of people with a general intention to migrate has also revealed interesting results. The possible migratory movement from Turkey is expected to include people from rural areas and a lower level of income. Meanwhile, mobility among the unemployed is expected to be relatively high. In relation to these three situations, it can be argued that the possible migration from Turkey of groups such as these will result in serious adjustment problems for the labor force markets of the countries receiving migrants. However, another important aspect regarding the prospective migrants within possible migratory movements from Turkey is the possibility of the majority of these migrants being university graduates or current students continuing their education. Considering this aspect, possible migratory movements from Turkey may not cause serious adjustment problems in economic terms.

The results from another study<sup>29</sup> that develop certain scenarios on possible migration from Turkey to the EU help us make the following two main inferences: first, the expected migration will not actually be in extreme volumes at all and, second, if Turkey’s accession to the EU, and consequently free movement, is not realized, then higher levels of migration will occur. Some crucial results of this study are as follows: if the scenario of freedom of movement is realized, then migration from Turkey to the EU member states will increase relatively less and reach a total of one million in the period between 2004 and 2030. The second scenario, which is based on the notion of guest-workers mov-

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<sup>28</sup> İçduygu (2006, p. 113).

<sup>29</sup> Erzan/Kuzubaş/Yıldız (2008, pp. 29–40).

ing between countries (in contrast to the scenario of freedom of movement outlined in the first instance), estimates that there will be a significant increase in the magnitude of migration after 2015 and that the rate of migration will almost double. However, even this migration scenario limits the number of migrants from Turkey to the EU by the year 2030 with a total of 1.8 million in 45 years.

On the other hand, the first scenario yields the following results regarding migration under conditions of high rates of economic growth, achievement of full accession to the EU and thereby free movement by 2015: an approximate increase of 2.1 million in the immigrants of Turkish origin in Europe in the period between 2004 and 2030 and an annual approximate increase of 25,000 during 2004–2015, followed by an increase of 125,000 during 2015–2030. Another scenario option involves much higher volumes of migratory movements under the conditions of a low rate of economic growth in Turkey, failure to achieve EU membership and, thus, free movement. According to this scenario, by the year 2030, the total net migration from Turkey will exceed 2.7 million. In the period between 2004 and 2015, it is approximately estimated that over 70,000 people will arrive in Europe as new immigrants annually, and that in the period of 2015–2030, the annual average will be over 130,000.<sup>30</sup> In other words, if Turkey's membership is no longer on the agenda, then the EU will face a much more intense migratory wave.

In addition to the basic findings we have tried to summarize here, it will be helpful to remember some other key points while discussing the migration issue within EU-Turkey relations. First of all, it should be kept in mind that Europe is not the sole destination of the migratory waves originating from Turkey; traditional migration countries like Canada, the USA and Australia on the one hand, and newer migration countries like the Middle Eastern countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) provide employment opportunities for the hundreds of thousands of people emigrating from Turkey. Future migration estimates and assumptions should take into consideration that there will be other destination points for migratory movements from Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey has also acquired, especially in the last 20 years, the status of a “migrant receiving” and “migratory transit country” in addition to its identity as a “source country” within the international migration market. Considering that a similar process has been experienced by current EU mem-

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<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* (p. 38).

ber states such as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, it can be said that these new migratory processes can bring Turkey to a status that is parallel to those of such states in the European migration- and asylum-seeking regimes.<sup>31</sup> It is clear that such a transformation will be reflected in a gradual change and decline in the pressure of migration from Turkey into the EU. Of course, the occurrence of such a process will only be possible if Turkey achieves a period of rapid economic growth and social development as the result of the prospect of eventual EU membership.

As already discussed in this study, even though the importance of the economic, social and demographic differences between countries are emphasized in regard to the formation of migratory movements, migration is certainly not a phenomenon to be assessed merely in a quantitative framework through simple arithmetic calculations such as “replacing negatives with positives” and “substituting one population with another population”. It is important to consider the formation and continuity of migration multi-dimensionally; that is, both from quantitative and qualitative perspectives. Even though migration is the movement of a labor force on the basis of “supply and demand” and “needs and opportunities” in economic terms, it also involves “selectivity” in political and social terms. Migratory movements expected to form due to economic and demographic reasons may be shaped differently due to political and social choices. One form of migration might be preferred to another or one migrant to another migrant. In short, international migration is “a political phenomenon that requires governance”. Moreover, the process of international migration is an area of politics – a politicized area – where internal actors (the migrant-receiving country, source country and the migrants themselves) constantly negotiate. Within this framework, issues regarding international migration within the context of EU-Turkey relations necessitate that the parties or actors consider this matter as “a political phenomenon that requires governance”.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> İçduygu (2006, pp. 123–140).

<sup>32</sup> İçduygu (2004, pp. 88–99).

## Concluding Remarks

This study aims to underline that both the view of discrepancy based on demographic difference and the view of complementariness based on demographic difference are inadequate in explaining how potential international migratory movements will shape EU-Turkey relations in the future. These differences may imply a potential for migratory movements, yet a series of quite different processes are required for this potential to be realized. What is important here is to explain how this process of transformation might occur in the future. On the other hand, it is neither particularly realistic to emphasize the prospective positive impacts of the migratory movement from Turkey on the EU population solely based on the demographic complementariness thesis, nor to expect that these positive impacts will immediately occur as soon as Turkey becomes a member state. Population and migration are dynamic elements, and these dynamic elements become even more complex through economic, social and political processes. Within this framework and within a future in which Turkey's accession to the EU may be realized, the demographic process that populations in both the EU and in Turkey might undergo should also be examined. Of course, the transformation of the demographic difference between the EU and Turkey into one of complementariness will be related to the possible appearance of the "demographic demise" (the decline of fertility and an aging population) in the EU and the "window of demographic opportunity" (an environment of constant increase in the labor supply, employment and the quality of the labor force and, thus, in economic performance) in Turkey.

For positive results for each of the EU, Turkey and the migrants themselves to occur, each polity must accomplish a series of tasks in addition to handling the issue of migration as a "political phenomenon that requires governance". For Turkey, this requires rapidly completing membership negotiations, integrating with the EU and succeeding in complementing the "window of demographic opportunity" with "increasing the labor supply, the level of quality education, the rate of employment and maintaining a steady economic growth" in the next 20 years. For the EU, meanwhile, this requires rapidly completing membership negotiations, integrating with Turkey and succeeding in complementing its "demographic demise" with a "far-sighted migration policy based on economic rationality and diversity and free of xenophobia". Should both the EU and Turkey succeed in doing this, the impact of

migratory movements from Turkey to the EU should be beneficial to all concerned.

At the core of these demographic accounts lies a new aspect of migration debates between the EU and Turkey, which has emerged only recently, in the last 5–6 years: its politicization in the context of Turkey’s accession negotiations. For the EU, such debates, developed during the course of its relations with Turkey and during discussion of international migration, do not only mirror a pessimistic perspective over the capacity of the EU to manage migration flows for economic and social benefits, but also reflect the necessity of good governance of migration for the EU’s benefit. For Turkey, together with being part of both the conditionality and socialization principles of the EU accession process, these debates are largely indicators of her migration transition from a country of emigration to immigration, which requires new and complicated tools of management as part of integration into the global world system in general and into the EU in specific. More importantly, these debates also plainly show the strategic use of “migration diplomacy” as a bargaining tool over and during the membership negotiation process between the EU and Turkey.

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