

Bozzoli, Carlos; Brück, Tilman; Muhumuza, Tony

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DIW Berlin  
German Institute for Economic Research  
Mohrenstr. 58  
10117 Berlin

Tel. +49 (30) 897 89-0  
Fax +49 (30) 897 89-200  
<http://www.diw.de>

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# Movers or Stayers? Understanding the Drivers of IDP Camp Decongestion during Post-Conflict Recovery in Uganda<sup>1</sup>

Carlos Bozzoli\*, Tilman Brück\*\* and Tony Muhumuza\*\*<sup>2</sup>

\*German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), and Households in Conflict Network (HiCN)

\*\*German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), Households in Conflict Network (HiCN) and Humboldt University of Berlin

## Abstract

The paper explores factors that influence the household decision to leave internal displacement camps in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict. Our analysis is based on two sources of information: household survey data collected in northern Uganda for households that were displaced by the civil conflict, and geo-referenced data on armed conflict events, with which we construct our developed index of recent conflict exposure. We compare households that moved out of camps with those that remained in the camps after the region was declared safe from rebel incursions. The study covers the first few months of the end of conflict, when return was regarded as largely voluntary. We find that a history of conflict both at the place of residence, and at the expected place of return reduces the likelihood of return. Access to camp services overall encourages households to stay in camps, although the effect varies with the proportion of young household members. Results also show that a history of economic skills poses varying effects on return decisions. While experience in cultivation is associated with a high likelihood of moving out of the camp, households with members with recent experience in trading are less inclined to return. From a policy perspective, the results point to the need for recovery initiatives to ensure access to adequate infrastructures in return locations in order to fast-track reintegration.

**Key words:** Conflict, IDP, northern Uganda, returnees

**JEL Classifications:** D74, J60, R23

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<sup>2</sup> Corresponding author: email: tmuhumuza@diw.de

## **1. Introduction**

Little is known about why people return home despite decades of research on migration. Within the field of forced migration, there is a big gap between conflict-induced displacement and voluntary return after violent conflict. This subject is important because forced migration is one of the most daunting humanitarian challenges in the world today. By 2011, more than 42 million people worldwide were forced to leave their homes due to violent conflict. Of these, about 27.5 million were displaced within their own countries (IDMC, 2011). The African continent hosts almost half of the internally displaced persons (hereafter, IDPs), most of whom are victims of civil conflict (Crisp, 2010; Czaika and Kis-Katos, 2009; Ojeda, 2010).

Violent conflict affects IDPs in a number of ways. At their places of origin, conflict is often associated with severe destruction of property (Shemyakina, 2006), depletion of household assets (Bundervoet and Verwimp, 2005), disruption of labour markets and economic activities (Gonzalez and Lopez, 2007; Shemyakina, 2006) and severe loss of lives (Bundervoet and Verwimp, 2005; Verwimp, 2005). Households displaced into camps face deplorable living conditions. Camps are associated with poor health conditions which result in high rates of mortality and morbidity (Verwimp and van Bavel, 2005). There is also evidence that displaced households significantly reduce consumption and asset levels compared to households that do not move (Fiala, 2011). IDPs are often exposed to violence and lose their cultural and social identities, their livelihoods, and are subjected to a host of human rights violations (Ferris et al., 2011; USIP, 2011). These experiences could impact negatively on household behaviour long after the war has ended (Collier et al., 2003; Hoeffler, 2008).

After violent conflict subsides, one of the central issues discussed by governments and humanitarian agencies is how to facilitate the return of IDPs to their homes. During early periods of recovery, however, the prospects of households re-integrating into their original communities is limited. IDPs must decide whether to return to their communities or stay longer, or even permanently, in areas of displacement (IDMC, 2009), assuming that they are not forced to return. A number of factors may facilitate or inhibit such a voluntary return process, and manifest at the individual, household and community levels (Deininger et al., 2004; Pantuliano et al., 2007; Shewfelt, 2007). Understanding drivers of IDP return matters for post-conflict recovery interventions for a number of reasons. On one hand, factors that impede return have negative implications for recovery. On the other, factors that facilitate return provide an opportunity for a quick recovery. Understanding postwar movements is also important for planning service delivery.

Most studies on IDPs focus on the drivers of conflict-induced displacement (see, for instance, Czaika and Kis-Katos, 2010; Ibáñez and Velez, 2007; Mesnard, 2009). While research on returning after conflict is relatively thin, most investigate intentions to return rather than whether the move out actually occurred or not. Notable among these literatures is a study in Columbia by Deininger et al. (2004), that analyses the determinants of the desire by IDPs to return. Vinck and Pham (2009) address this question using data for IDPs in four districts of Northern Uganda. A common finding between these studies is that past war experiences, services and economic opportunities in return locations, as well as individual characteristics accounted for the differences in the desire to return.

Shewfelt (2007) provides a more appealing analysis of return after violent conflict by investigating actual decisions to return, using data from the Aceh province of Indonesia. Shewfelt's findings reveal a strong effect of security-related factors in shaping individual return decisions. Closely related to Shewfelt's work, this paper analyses the determinants of actual return, for a Ugandan sample. The difference here lies in four aspects. Our study covers a sample of 3900 households, more than twice as much as the Aceh sample, which is advantageous for detecting smaller effects. Unlike the data for Aceh, the Uganda survey allows for assessment of the pre-return IDP camp situation for households that moved, particularly with regard to facilities. In addition, we use a more disaggregated measure of exposure to violent conflict, that we perceive to shape return decisions. Finally, we model the household rather than individual return decision.

This chapter contributes to two different threads in the literature, namely those on forced migration and on the economics of conflict. To these literatures, we make three contributions. First, building largely on migration literature, we study actual movement in a post-conflict setting. We account for conflict in this context, studying households forcefully dislocated during war. Second, we make the first attempt to capture household movements immediately after the end of mass violent conflict. Third, we apply a novel approach that we recently developed to measure exposure to violent conflict (see Bozzoli et al., 2011). Rather than counting the number of events in respective districts, this approach involves weighting individual conflict episodes based on how far they are from respective households. Such a measure accounts for the fact that households located at different points in the same district experience different degrees of exposure to violent conflict. Accounting for recent exposure to war is important, given that war shapes individual expectations and preferences (Bozzoli et al., 2011; Voors et al., 2010), human capital (Justino and Verwimp 2006), household welfare

(Fiala, 2011; Justino, 2011), and the local economy ( Brück, 2004), all of which are vital for reintegration after conflict.

We find that a history of conflict, both at the place of residence and at the expected place of return, reduces the likelihood of leaving a camp. Access to camp services generally encourages households to stay in camps, although the effect varies with the proportion of different age groups in the household. Economic skills accumulated in the past (before the move out) have varied effects. While previously participating in cultivation and herding is associated with a high likelihood of leaving the camp, the reverse is true for involvement in trading.

From a policy perspective, these results underscore the importance of fast-tracking service delivery in return areas to facilitate reintegration. Providing an environment conducive to the proper functioning of markets could improve opportunities for the reinstatement of livelihood, and reduce costs of return. This could go hand-in-hand with measures aimed to ensure that households preserve relevant skills for recovery upon return. These could be achieved, in part, if security concerns and their resultant effects on individual and household behaviour are addressed.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section presents a review of related literature. Section 3 provides a background to conflict and displacement in northern Uganda. The data set is described in Section 4. The theoretical framework and empirical model are presented in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Descriptive statistics and empirical results are provided in Sections 7 and 8, respectively. Section 9 discusses the results and concludes the study.

## **2. Literature on migration and return**

Migration literature has a rich tradition of describing patterns of movement and their drivers. Economic theory postulates that migration is an investment decision that involves future costs and benefits. A utility maximizing agent makes rational decisions depending on the utility derived from alternative actions (stay, migrate) and will decide to migrate when the expected benefits of migrating exceed the costs in present value terms (Navratil and Doyle, 1977; Todaro, 1976). In this framework, individuals would, for instance migrate to an economy where wages are high, if the expected value of their lifetime income, net of costs, is higher than in their low-wage economy (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). In the event that the value of life time income becomes higher in their place of origin,

than in their receiving communities, return would be an optimal decision. This could occur if the conditions in either of the locations changes, such that the wage differential favours return, or individual expectations about the receiving community were too high.

While neoclassical micro economic theory views migration as an individual decision driven by utility maximization, household migration theory posits that household welfare matters more than individual expected utility (Mincer, 1978; Stark and Bloom, 1985; Stark, 1993; Massey et al., 1993). In this context, the decision to migrate or return is a joint decision of a larger unit of related people because the cost and benefits of either action are often shared.

Return migration can also be explained in the framework of the segmented labor-market theory. This theory argues that labour opportunities in the receiving community may be reserved to individuals on certain grounds, for instance, residence status, gender and education (Bailey and Cooke, 1998). In such a case, migrants who may fail to find jobs, may choose to return home.

Networks in receiving communities have also been regarded as vital for the integration and adjustment of migrants. The network theory contends that networks make it easier for migrants to secure housing, support in finding employment and other contacts. Absence of an active network system may result in return migration for those who cannot cope without them (Orrenius, 1999). Return migration can also be explained from the perspective of the life cycle theory. The theory views return as a process of individual advancement from one age to another, such that one returns after reaching a certain age (Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996). Life cycle migrants determine the length of stay in the host community. They often compare the benefits of higher savings and higher lifetime consumption, with the marginal utility cost of work in receiving communities. Their primary objective is to accumulate savings and return home to consume (Yang, 2007).

In another framework, individuals are regarded as deriving utility from comparing themselves to others in the same community (Stark, 1984; Stark and Yitzhaki, 1988). Individuals who regard themselves as poor would opt to migrate to other locations to better their lives. With time, they begin to compare their wellbeing with members of the receiving community, and choose to return if they expect to be relatively better-off in their home communities.



In order to understand the mechanisms that underlie return migration, it is imperative to recognize that the circumstances under which individuals might migrate from their homes may be varied, and these could play a key role in informing their return decisions. For instance, while migration during violent conflict is forced, usually as a result of a deliberate strategy pursued by combatants, individuals that live under peaceful conditions largely move by choice. Thus, post-conflict returnees may face different mechanisms that influence return decisions, from those who migrated under normal security situations. However, for circumstances where return after conflict is voluntary, there is evidence that formally displaced individuals may exhibit rational behaviour that is comparable to those who left their homes by choice, although drivers of return could differ (Deininger et al., 2004).

Literature on refugee repatriation shows that displaced persons tend to possess control over the timing and context of their return, if return is voluntary (Koser, 1993). They often assess the conditions at home before deciding to return (Rogge and Akol (1989). These decisions may in part be influenced by their duration of stay in host communities. Long displacement spells may be associated with a high level of acculturation in host communities, thus discouraging return (Djuraskovic and Arthur, 2009; Badurdeen, 2010). In Tanzania, for instance, 80% of Burundian refugees who were displaced in 1972 opted for citizenship, while others resisted repatriation efforts (Hovil and Bueno, 2011). Return may also be influenced by the perception of the prevailing security situation in return communities. In Chad, a report by Oxfam (2010) indicated that IDPs were not willing to return as long as their security was not guaranteed. Similar findings were obtained among IDPs in Uganda (Brown, 2006) and Timor (ICG, 2008).

Closely related to security concerns, the experience of trauma during conflict may shape the return process. When displacement is caused by traumatic events, such as death of a household member, families are reluctant to leave receiving communities (Deininger et al., 2004). Research among IDPs in Indonesia reveals that those who lost relatives as a result of conflict were less likely to go back to their homes (Turnip 2003). Kalyvas (2006) notes that the nature of violence may vary widely at the local level such that communities may have different conflict experiences even when they share a common boundary. Such differences may influence the nature of the post-conflict setting. If displacement was a deliberate strategy to alter the ethnic, political, or demographic composition of a community, reintegration may be further delayed and complicated (Reilly and Risser, 2000). With evidence thus far, it is clear that the role of conflict experiences on individuals or households should not be

underestimated during post-conflict recovery. Experiences of violence may be deeply rooted in affected parties to the extent that their decisions long after the conflict may in part be hinged on how much they were affected.

Displaced persons may also compare the economic survival possibilities between their current locations and their homes, which may affect the timing of return (Deininger et al. 2004; Koser, 1997). In Kosovo, for example, lack of employment prospects hindered the reintegration process, forcing young families to either stay longer or to out-migrate (Rabenhorst, 2003). In Uganda, existence of trading opportunities in IDP camps discouraged early reintegration (Bjorkhaug et al., 2007). Individuals may also prefer to prolong their stay when they expect the institutional conditions necessary for sustainable reintegration in return locations to be absent for a longer time (USIP, 2011; Vinck and Pham, 2009). For instance, households without children in school may find it is easier to return (Pantuliano et al., 2007), while other households may delay their return if it is expected to disrupt child schooling, especially if education facilities are non-existent in return areas (LEMU, 2006). Continued provision of relief services may also delay reintegration. This is most likely for vulnerable individuals and those who lose livelihoods to the extent that their survival may not be guaranteed on return (Knoeche, 2010). More households headed by males register higher return patterns than households managed by women (Bjorkhaug et al., 2007), but this is less likely if males were the main victims of conflict (Shewfelt, 2007).

From the above literature, is evident that most of the existing studies on return migration after violent conflict are qualitative. Due to data limitations, there is lack of quantitative work on actual return decision in during the immediate aftermath of violent conflict. Work by Shewfelt (2007) in Indonesia analysed this question using data that were collected between February and April 2007, about 18 months after the conflict that ended. This chapter uses data collected around the same time, but about 8 months after the region was declared peaceful. We therefore able to capture household movement soon after war. In addition using a larger sample, and being able to identify pre-return camp facilities for those who moved, we use a measure of conflict exposure which is more disaggregated at the village level, compared to the sub-district level for Indonesia. This measure may reflect household past exposure to conflict more precisely.

### **3. Conflict, displacement and the return process in Northern Uganda**

Violent conflict in northern Uganda began in 1986 when rebel forces opposed to the newly formed government took over power. Until 2002, the war was concentrated in the Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts of the Acholi sub region. Attacks later spread to the Lango and Teso sub regions. Throughout the 1980s, the conflict remained largely military in nature. However, in the early 1990s, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels began to focus on the local population and instill terror among villages by ambushing, looting and killing civilians. The rebel movement was also known for abducting young people on a large-scale to boost their forces (Blattman, 2010). The UNICEF (2006) report indicates that more than one in three young men and one in six young women had at least once been abducted.

In 1996, the government began a policy of moving civilians forcefully from their homes to "protected villages". These villages were, in essence, camps for the internally displaced population. Systematic displacement increased in 2002, during military operations against the LRA in southern Sudan ("*Operation Iron Fist*"). The war resulted in the displacement of 1.8 million people, almost 90% of the population in the region (IDMC, 2008). The government argued that relocating households into IDP camps was necessary in order to protect communities from LRA attacks. By 2006, there were a total of 220 registered camps in the region. The majority of the displaced persons endured deplorable conditions in camps. They were denied freedom of movement by the military, lacked access to sufficient social infrastructure and had no access to adequate food and income-generating activities. Living in overcrowded settlements resulted in poor health conditions, with high incidence of diseases and fatalities (Bozzoli and Brück, 2010; Jacobsen et al., 2006).

The difference between the conflict in northern Uganda and other research conflicts is that the displacement was not idiosyncratic. Displacement, wherever it was effected applied to all households irrespective of social and economic status. There was therefore no sample selection bias in displacement.

Between 2006 and 2007, following a cease-fire agreement (August 2006), and a series of peace negotiations between government and rebel forces, the security situation improved. From the ceasefire onwards, IDPs were allowed to return home. Camp phase-out guidelines were drawn to aid the return process. These guidelines stipulated that the right to freedom of movement should be respected (GoU, 2008). At least by 2007, households in IDP camps were

still free to make decisions whether to return or stay longer (Oxfam, 2008; USAID, 2007)<sup>3</sup>. With joint effort from government and relief agencies, IDPs were provided with information via radio broadcasts, regarding the conditions in the areas of their origin in order to allow them to make informed decisions about voluntary return (USAID, 2008). As a result of the improved security situation, a number of IDPs were encouraged to move closer or return to areas of origin. Although the large-scale movement of IDPs from camps did not gain momentum until 2008 (IDMC, 2010a), by May 2007, more than 850,000 displaced persons had voluntarily left the camps (USAID, 2007).

The return process was fast in the Lango sub region, such that by the end of 2007, almost all households had moved out of camps (Oxfam, 2008). This was attributed to the late displacement of households in this region, and faster return to normalcy (Bjorkhaug et al., 2007). By November 2010, there were a total of 13 camps left in Acholi sub region. More than 90% of the displaced people had returned home, while only 182,000 people were still in camps or transit sites (IDMC, 2010a).

*(Figure 1 about here)*

For households that were still in camps, the living conditions improved and previous restrictions of movement were lifted. IDMC (2010b) highlighted four categories of IDP residents who could remain in camps. These included the “extremely vulnerable individuals” and people with special needs, people who were unable to return due to land disputes, individuals who wanted to take advantage of the IDP policy of “freedom of movement” to return when they wished, young people who were left behind by their families to benefit from services provided in camps such as education and health care, and those who did not intend to return due to the existence of better product markets in camps.

## **4. Data sources**

### ***4.1. Northern Uganda Livelihood Survey-NULS (2007)***

We use data from the Northern Uganda Livelihood Survey-NULS (2007). The survey was collected by the Norwegian Institute for Labour and Social Research and the Uganda Bureau of Statistics between April and May 2007. It was the first comprehensive survey collected after the war ended and as households were moving out of camps. The survey

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<sup>3</sup> Although this was a period when people were moving of their own volition, in later years, IDP return was partly influenced by forced closure of camp by authorities and pressure from owners of land in which IDPs were settled.

covers Gulu, Kitgum, Amuru and Pader districts in the Acholi sub region, and Lira and Oyam districts in Lango (Figure 2) and is representative of all households that resided in IDP camps at some point during the conflict. The data were collected using a two-stage cluster design. The first stage involved obtaining full lists of IDP and return populations in the districts. The number of primary sampling units was then determined in respective locations. For households in camps, the units were camps where the settlements were small, or randomly selected geographic spots in each large camp. For return locations, the primary sampling units constitute one randomly selected village in each parish. In the second stage, four households at return sites and five households in camps from each of the selected units were randomly selected for interviews. In total, the survey covered about 3,984 households.

*(Figure 2 about here)*

Two main questionnaires were used. The household questionnaire was administered to the head of the household, their spouse or a responsible individual who was available at the time of the interview. It covered characteristics of the household and its individual members, information on demographic characteristics, housing conditions, education, household economy, health and displacement. The randomly selected individual questionnaire was answered by a randomly selected member of the household aged 16 years and older. It addressed issues pertaining to displacement, security, social and political situation.

#### ***4.2. Armed Conflict and Locations Data-ACLED (2010)***

We merge household survey data with the Armed Conflict Events Data (ACLED). The latter provides detailed geo-referenced information and dates of village-level conflict episodes based on press reports and various publications (Karlsen, et al., 2010). This enables us to capture exposure of households to conflict episodes. The dataset defines an event in various ways; 1) a battle between government forces and rebel groups; 2) an attack either by the rebel group(s) or government forces on civilians; 3) a battle between rebel movements. For the case of northern Uganda, there was only one rebel movement since the 1990s, and therefore no events corresponding to the third definition. The data include a total of 3,233 events between 1997 and 2007 in the country, of which 1,661 took place in the surveyed districts (Lango and Acholi sub regions). In 2006, the data provide a total of 89 events in the districts while there were only four events between January and March 2007. During the time of the livelihood survey, there were no events reported. We believe this estimate to be an actual representation

of events. This is because the period was largely peaceful, and the media is often interested in recording conflict events during peace talks.

*(Figure 3 about here)*

We use the data to construct two conflict intensity indices (see Bozzoli et al, 2011): One index reflects the intensity of conflict at the location expected place of return. Reports indicate that most households were returning to their home villages (Bjorkhaug, et al., 2007; Mabikke, 2011; Rugadya et al., 2008). This is likely to be the ancestral village of the head, given that access to land is mainly tied to family or clan ties (Mabikke, 2011). We only include events that took place in the surveyed districts. We base this decision on the notion that external events should not matter for household return. To construct the index, we use information about the geographic location of each event ( $y_i$ ) in that year derived from the ALCED database (Karlsen et al., 2010) as well as the location of the household ( $h_i$ ). We consider the year 2006 for two reasons. First, we can tell where the household was located during that year. Second, between January and March 2007 (shortly before the survey was collected), the data set recorded only 4 events in two districts, and no events in four districts. We then estimate the absolute square of the distance ( $d^2$ ) in degrees between the household and each of the events. This is defined as;  $d^2(y_i, h_i) = \|y_i - h_i\|^2$ . The resulting index ( $C(h_i)$ ) is obtained by aggregating events in a given year and discounting them by their respective distances from the household.

$$C(h_i) = \sum_{i=1}^I e^{-\alpha(d^2(y_i, h_i))} \quad (1)$$

The parameter  $\alpha$  is a distance-discount factor. Different values of  $\alpha$  evaluate the potential influence of respective events on the household. The larger the value, the less relevant the distant conflict events may be to the household's point of view, while a lower value attaches more importance to these events. We constructed indices for different values of  $\alpha$  and selected the index that maximizes the log likelihood function. In our case, ( $\alpha = 10$ ) offered the best fit.

The GPS coordinates for the location of the household in 2006 are used to construct the index for place of residence in 2006, while the other index is computed using coordinates for the expected place of return. We focus exclusively on events that involved gun shots, rebel

activity and activities by the national army, and disregard encounters that took place outside the study area. Czeika and Kis-Katos (2009) indicate that insecurity creates additional costs that modify the expected outcome and that it reduces the relevance of other factors that may influence migration. Following this argument, we expect conflict intensity to discourage household return.

## 5. Modeling return

Following the household migration theory, we posit that returning as a large unit would pay off more than as an individual, given the uncertainties associated with re-integration. Most households in Northern Uganda tend to settle in their communities of origin. As noted in section 4.2, settlement patterns are related to the fact that households access land under the clan or customary system. Access to land may be easier for families rather than individuals. A recent report on land policy and administration in the region (Rugadya et al., 2008) reveals a high prevalence of land disputes among returnees. Given this challenge, returning to the community as a household rather than an individual may facilitate access, security and legitimacy over land.

In the remainder of this section, we closely follow the theoretical model of Deininger et al. (2004), although we make some modifications for the case of Uganda. We account for the possibility of recent exposure to violence around the camp and return areas. We recognize that there might be spatial heterogeneity in the intensity of violence, which we proxy for with an indicator of armed conflict events described in section 4.2. For the case of leaving the camp, we label this indicator  $r$ , and we consider that it may negatively affect utility.

A household  $i$  finances consumption ( $g_i$ ) with two resources: income ( $q_i$ ) and wealth ( $W_i$ ). Income is generated through various sources of activity (cultivation, herding, trading). We assume that income  $q_i$  is a function of accumulated (previous) skills in different activities. Let  $S_i$  denote a vector of skills (proxied by having been involved in different activities). Then, abstracting from other factors (household demographics, community characteristics,  $H$ ), we have  $q_i = q(S_i)$ . Households can also use wealth to meet the budget constraint:

$$q_i + W_i \leq g_i \quad (2)$$

Thus, the indirect utility from leaving the camp is:

$$V_{leaving}(r, W_i; H_i, S_i) \quad (3)$$

Recall that the household has the option to stay in the camp or leave, at least by the time of the survey (Ofxfam, 2008; USAID, 2007; USAID,2008). However, camps may not be entirely safe. In Uganda, there was evidence of insecurity in IDP camps, although the likelihood was minimal. Stites (2006) notes that the protection of civilians in the camps was not effective, as many rebel attacks and waves of abduction occurred during the time when communities were in camps. We argue that the likelihood of violence while staying in a camp may also affect utility, and we label it  $x$ .

In spite of challenges faced in confinement, households can generate income ( $y_i$ ) while in camps through, for instance, (limited) agricultural opportunities, trading activities, and sale of donations (e.g. food, unused seeds). We assume that  $y_i$  also depends on skills, so that  $y_i = y(S_i)$ . Income is complemented with assistance ( $z_i$ ) they receive from government and relief agencies. Then, if the household chooses to stay, its budget constrain will consist of income and transfers, so that:

$$z_i + y_i(S_i) \leq g_i \quad (4)$$

The indirect utility from staying is then:

$$V_{staying}(x, z_i; H_i, S_i) \quad (5)$$

The location decisions will be made basing on the utility a household expects to derive. A household will return if:

$$V_{leaving}(r, W_i; H_i, S_i) > V_{staying}(x, z_i; H_i, S_i) \quad (6)$$

One can (log) linearize both indirect utility functions to set up an additive random utility model to model the probability of return, as we do in the next sections.



## 6. Empirical specification

Let  $y^*$  be the difference in the lifetime utility (V) between leaving and staying. In our empirical setting,  $y^*$  is parametrized as a linear function of explanatory variables, which proxy for arguments in section 5, the unknown vector of parameters ( $\beta$ ) and a disturbance term ( $\varepsilon$ ), which is assumed to be normally distributed.

$$y^* = \beta_1 Hh + \beta_2 Econ + \beta_3 Serv + \beta_4 Conf + \varepsilon \quad (7)$$

The outcome of the decision to leave or not can be summarized in a “response” variable  $y = \{(1), (0)\}$ . The household will leave if  $y^* > 0$  and stay otherwise. That is,

$$y = \begin{cases} 1 \rightarrow y^* > 0 \\ 0 \rightarrow y^* \leq 0 \end{cases} \quad (8)$$

The survey questionnaire lists three categories of households. The first category includes 2,135 (53.59%) households that were full-time residents in the camp. The second includes 1,573 (39.48%) households that had permanently moved out of camps or settled in transit sites (closer to home), while the third includes 276 (6.93%) households that commuted between camps and return (or transit) sites. We categorise a household as a commuting household if at least 50% of the members in the household commuted. This accounted for 56 households in Lango sub region and 220 households in Acholi. Since households in this category spent most of their time in camps, we posit that they were not excluded from services provided in the camps. For most of our analysis, we consider them among camp residents. Later, in section 8, we redefine the classification to check for robustness of our results.

The vector  $Hh$  controls for household characteristics. These include household size, gender of the household head, age of the head, and proportion of young members (below 15 years) in the household. The second set of variables ( $Econ$ ) controls for economic skills that may be relevant for recovery. We particularly consider whether the head of the household cultivated, reared animals; engaged in trading or made handicrafts in the past one or two years<sup>4</sup>. We also separately include variables that capture a history of involvement of any

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<sup>4</sup> We exclude the current year to avoid potential endogeneity.

members in economic activities. These include: whether at least one member of the household was involved in cultivation, trading, herding or making handicrafts in the past one year, or involved in the respective activities in the previous two years. These past experiences could influence camp decongestion, as households may seek to relocate to areas where markets may facilitate these activities.

The vector *Serv* captures the presence of facilities in camps. While it represents the current camp situation for IDPs, it also represents previous camp situations for households already in return sites<sup>5</sup>. During displacement, development agencies tend to provide a host of services to displaced households. Continued provision of these services during transition to recovery may discourage camp decongestion especially if the relevant services do not exist or are inadequate in return areas. We include dummy variables to investigate whether existence of facilities such as markets, primary schools, secondary schools and health services have an effect on the probability of moving out of camps.

*Conf* is a vector of variables that capture the effect of violent conflict. In addition to the conflict intensity indices described in section 4.2, the vector includes a control for duration in the IDP camp (in years). We also control for the effect of recent conflict-related deaths in the household, proxied by an indicator of whether a household lost an economically active member (aged 15-64) due to conflict or conflict-related illness in the past two years.

## 7. Descriptive evidence

Tables 1 and 2 provide a description of variables and a summary of the full sample. Evidence in the survey indicates a high degree of camp decongestion in the Lango sub region (65%) compared to the Acholi sub region, where 23% had moved out of camps (Table 3). On average, households were displaced for 7 years. The striking observation is that communities that were displaced much later by the insurgency had higher adjustment rates. On average, households in the Lango sub region had been displaced for about four years compared to nine years for households in Acholi.

Districts in the Acholi sub region registered the highest proportion of camp residents (Figure 4). Kitgum district had about 95% of the households still residing in camps followed by Amuru district (about 81%) and Gulu (about 73%) at the time of the survey.

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<sup>5</sup> In the survey instrument, the question is posed as: “*In the IDP camp where you live/ used to live, are there any of the following services?*”

*(Figure 4 about here)*

We also observe a higher proportion of households headed by females residing in IDP camps (29%) compared to households that moved (20%). Over 70% of the households had access to camp services, particularly water, health facilities, markets, and primary schools. This proportion was higher for camp residents (table 2).

Returnee households have more educated heads compared to those that stayed. 40% of household heads in IDP camps have no education while they account for about 30% among returnee households. About 44% of the heads in camps have primary education and 15% have at least secondary education. This is lower when compared with about 53% and about 18% respectively for returnee households.

*(Table 1 about here)*

With regard to activity histories, overall about 10% of the household heads had a history of cultivation in the previous year, and the proportion was higher for residents in the camp (table 2). 16 percent of the total sample had heads with history of herding in the past year, and this was more profound among returnee households. More heads with a history of trading were found in camps.

The conflict indices for place of birth and place of origin reveal greater exposure for households residing in camps (Table 2). Conflict intensity at the location of camp residents in 2006 is 2.4 units higher than for households that left the camps (2.65 compared to 5.09 units respectively). Intensity of conflict at the expected place of return is higher for those still staying in camps.

A comparison between the two sub regions also shows marked differences. The conflict index for location in 2006 is higher for households in the Acholi sub region than in Lango, while the difference is higher in Acholi for conflict intensity at the expected place of return.

*(Table 2 about here)*

## 8. Regression results

In this section, we estimate different specifications to analyse the effect on the dependent variable for varying sets of controls. The first specification includes conflict indicators. In the second, we introduce household characteristics. In specification three, we control for accumulated economic skills. The fourth introduces indicators for access to facilities in camps. Lastly, we interact indicators of access to facilities with household composition. All specifications control for district fixed effects.

### *Effect of recent conflict on residence status*

As seen in Table 3, conflict proxies strongly influence the decision to move out of the camp. The indicators remain negative and highly significant, even when controls are included in the model. A longer period of displacement reduces the likelihood of households to leave the camp. This observation concurs with findings by Deininger et al (2004) that a long duration of displacement may discourage return. A long period of displacement could have a number of effects. The associated loss of livelihoods may perpetuate dependence on relief aid, which households may not expect on return. Living longer in the camp may also erode expectations on recovery, thereby discouraging return.

*(Table 3 about here)*

The two conflict intensity indices are associated with a reduction in the probability of leaving the camp. This relationship remains negative after adding controls in the next specifications. Recent insecurity in camps and return locations could encourage households to stay longer in camps, where protection is more guaranteed. While the index for location in 2006 is highly statistically significant overall, it has no effect on individual models for the Acholi and Lango regions (table 7). The possibility of leaving the camp is also low for households that lost at least one economically active member due to violent conflict. This is plausible given that a reduction in human resources may increase the cost of adjustment during return.

### *Past economic experiences and residence status*

Results indicate that past experience of the head in animal rearing is positive and strongly significant across specifications (table 3). In table 4, we find that involvement (of any member including the head) in cultivation or herding in the past one year increases the

probability of a household leaving the camp, compared to a household without any experience in them. Cultivation in the two years preceding the survey also increases this likelihood. It could be reasonable to argue that the experience in these activities may encourage households to leave camps, where competition for land is high. This move could be driven by expectations of better opportunities to improve livelihoods in return locations, where resources such as land are in abundance. In our recent work (Bozzoli et al., 2011), we found that individual expectations are high for individuals who were recently active in economic activities. On the other hand, households whose skills have been eroded would find it hard to adjust if they were to return.

*(Table 4 about here)*

In contrast, past skills of the head in trading activities discourage camp decongestion. A similar effect emerges for households whose members (including the head) were involved either during the past one or two years. A possible explanation could be that inadequacy of product markets in return areas may reduce employment options of households that have recently been active in trading. We also find similar findings in the Acholi and Lango sub samples (table 5).

*(Table 5 about here)*

### ***Does presence of facilities in IDP camps deter return?***

Facilities in camps turn out to be important in influencing return decisions (table 3). The indicator for existence of water is negative although weakly significant at the 10% level in specifications *iii* and *iv*. Presence of primary and secondary school also reduces the probability that a household will leave the camp. In the last specification, we interact camp facilities with the proportion of young members in the household. We base this on the premise that, much as facilities are important to the household as a whole, they could matter more for certain age categories. The interaction terms for access to markets is significant and negative. This implies that in the presence of markets, the likelihood of leaving the camp is low for a household with a high proportion of members below 15 years of age. Interacting the indicator for primary and secondary schools with the proportion of young members also yields a negative and significant effect: this is expected since households with a large proportion of individuals of school-going ages may value this type of infrastructure more than other

households. Generally, we observe a similar pattern for the Lango and Acholi sub regions (table 6).

*(Table 6 about here)*

### **8.1. Robustness checks**

In table 3, the indicator for camp residence includes households that commuted between camps and return sites. This category was included in the IDP category because they benefited from services provided in camps. However, it could be the case that households that commute may possess inherent characteristics that could facilitate them to partially relocate, compared to permanent residents in camps or return sites. As a robustness check (Table 7), we exclude them from the sample and estimate a probit regression where the residence status variable now equals 1 if a household permanently left the camp and zero if still in the camp. Apart from the minimal differences in the size of the coefficients, the results remain largely comparable.

*(Table 7 about here)*

In table 8, we estimate a multinomial logit regression for three decisions, namely: stayed in the camp, moved to the place of origin (Home), or moved into a transit site close to the place of origin (Transit), and the results are consistent with our main probit results. For instance, we find that conflict variables are negatively associated with choosing to relocate to origin or transit site compared to staying in the camp.

*(Table 8 about here)*

Note that our conflict indices exclude events that were external to the study area. In order to argue with confidence that the decision to move was only influenced by internal conflict events, rather than external ones, events that are external to the survey districts should not matter for return. Thus, it is important to investigate whether these events had a bearing on return decisions. Table 9, presents two sets of indices capturing events that are external to the six districts. In the first set, we capture 91 events that took place in other parts of the country, for location in 2006 and expected place of return, respectively. However, in the results we find no significant effect on return decisions. Next, we construct indices for 49 events in neighboring DRC, Southern Sudan and CAR, and the effect turned out insignificant. Lastly, when all events are considered, the results remain consistent with our main results.

This confirms our position that the decision to leave the camp was independent of external events.

*(Table 9 about here)*

## **9. Conclusions**

The study examines the factors that influence household decisions to leave internal displacement camps in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict. We merge data from the northern Uganda Livelihood Survey (2007) for households that were at any one time displaced by violent conflict with geo-referenced conflict event data to identify possible drivers of return decisions.

From the results, it is apparent that the exposure to recent violent conflict episodes plays an important role in influencing household decisions to reintegrate. High intensity of conflict around camps may signal uncertainty in the return process. Households may therefore opt to remain in camps where protection may be more guaranteed. A rational household will factor in the security situation at the return site before choosing to move. As expected, our results indicate that the household will most likely choose to move out of the camp in the event of less exposure to violent conflict at the return site. Recent exposure to conflict creates uncertainties among households. It may also result in negative expectations about return to normalcy, thus delaying the early post-conflict reconstruction effort.

We confirm recent findings that longer displacement periods could offer disincentives for reintegration after conflict. This could in part result from high levels of acculturation and creation of stronger networks in host communities. Inactiveness that results from staying longer in camps could also increase vulnerabilities, such that staying in camps could offer safety nets for household survival.

We also find that the presence of services in displacement sites may play an important role in informing location decisions of households. The availability of educational and health facilities in IDP camps may discourage camp decongestion. The assessment of different age categories reveals that the significance of camp services varies with household composition. For instance, households with a higher proportion of children below 18 years are more likely to stay in camps, if there is access to primary schooling in camps. This result may reflect the likely difficulties associated with access to resources for households with a small active labour force in the event of return. We observe that access to education services may be important for households with more school-age children. Households with a higher

proportion of young members are more likely to stay in camps in the presence of primary schools. The key policy lesson here is that social service provision in return sites is key to IDP return. Recovery initiatives need to ensure access to adequate infrastructure in return sites if reintegration and camp decongestion efforts are to yield faster results. Delayed provision of the services may increase cost of return and slow down the recovery process.

Previous skills may also be crucial during the camp decongestion process. Our findings show that households whose heads had past experience in herding were more likely to leave camps. This is not surprising, given that conditions around camps may not facilitate active participation in certain welfare enhancing activities, the period of peace may provide an opportunity for households to re-establish their status quo outside camps. Experience in trading on the other hand discourages return, probably owing to advantages of trading opportunities around camps. For activities that require active markets, return areas may not provide incentives during the early period of return. In such cases, transaction costs are very low around camps, where population is high and relevant structures exist. Reintegration initiatives need to ensure access to vital infrastructure in return areas to enhance livelihood reconstruction.

It is imperative to note that war may create new realities, such that returning to a pre-war economy may be challenging. The associated wave of displacement results in new settlement patterns that households may not easily be given up.



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
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Figure 1. The trend of internal displacement in Northern Uganda



**Notes:** The figure represents the estimates of the population in IDP camps in Lango and Acholi sub regions (This represents a stock, not a flow). The estimates were obtained from various agency reports (IDMC 2009; 2010b; OCHA, 2007; United Nations, 2009; USAID, 2006; WFP Uganda, 2003). Information on the number of people displaced in the period preceding 2000 may not be reliable to report due to existence of few relief agencies and frequent movement of people between displacement sites and homes in response to intensity of conflict. The estimates only consider individuals in designated camp locations. Nonetheless, available evidence provides a close picture of internal displacement and return, which may coincide with intensity and spread of the conflict. Phase A represents the period when the conflict was concentrated in Acholi sub region. This excludes displacements that occurred before 2000. Phase B constitutes the acceleration of the conflict and the spread to Lango and other sub regions, following “*Operation Iron fist*” in Southern Sudan. Phase C was a period of peace talks and the end of violent conflict.

Figure 2. Districts covered by Northern Uganda Survey (2007)






Figure 3. Average number of conflict events in Acholi and Lango sub regions (1997-2007)



**Notes:** Source: authors' computations using Armed Conflict and Events data -ACLED (2010). Phase A represents the period when the conflict was concentrated in Acholi sub region. The figure excludes events that occurred before 1997, which could also constitute to this phase. Phase B constitutes the acceleration of the conflict, and spread to Lango and other sub regions, following "Operation Iron fist" in Southern Sudan. Phase C was a period of peace talks and the end of violent conflict.



Figure.4. Shares of camp decongestion in surveyed districts.



Notes: Estimates based on the weighted sample.

Table 1. Description of variables and summary statistics (full sample)

<i>Definition</i>	<i>Variable type</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std Dev</i>
Mean duration in IDP camp in years	Continuous	6.768	4.118
Member (15-64 years) died in the past 2 years	Discrete	0.013	0.110
Conflict intensity at location in 2006	Count	4.123	4.357
Conflict intensity at origin in 2006	Count	4.015	4.104
Age of household head	Continuous	42.37	15.242
Head is female	Discret	0.252	0.417
Size of the household	Continuous	5.773	2.572
Ratio of males to females	Continuous	1.238	1.150
Head is single	Discrete	0.027	0.159
Head is married	Discrete	0.744	0.421
Head is widowed/divorced	Discrete	0.229	0.403
Head has no formal education	Discrete	0.361	0.481
Head has primary education	Discrete	0.476	0.500
Head has secondar eduction	Discrete	0.163	0.354
Proportion of the young (below 18)	Continuous	0.551	0.222
Head ever cultivated	Discrete	0.103	0.215
Head ever herded	Discrete	0.160	0.492
Head ever traded	Discrete	0.092	0.442
Head ever made handicrafts	Discrete	0.021	0.151
A member cultivated last year	Discrete	0.240	0.025
A member cultivated in the last 2 years	Discrete	0.185	0.025
A member has never cultivated	Discrete	0.034	0.025
A member traded last year	Discrete	0.111	0.018
A member traded in the last 2 years	Discrete	0.179	0.017
A member has never traded	Discrete	0.629	0.011
A member herded last year	Discrete	0.153	0.009
A member herded in the last 2 years	Discrete	0.255	0.010
A member has never herded	Discrete	0.380	0.012
A member made handicrafts last year	Discrete	0.049	0.005
A member made handicrafts in the last 2 years	Discrete	0.038	0.005
A member has never made handicrafts	Discrete	0.801	0.009
IDP camp has markets	Discrete	0.892	0.451
IDP camp has secondary school	Discrete	0.429	0.477
IDP camp has primary school	Discrete	0.897	0.451
IDP camp has health services	Discrete	0.875	0.455

**Table 2. Summary statistics, IDP residents and returnee households**

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Left the camp (n=1,573 )</i>		<i>Still in camp (n=2,411 )</i>	
	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std Dev</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std Dev</i>
Mean duration in IDP camp in years	4.739	3.123	8.109	6.047
Member (15-64 years) died in the past 2 years	0.004	0.087	0.019	0.123
Conflict intensity at location in 2006	2.658	2.646	5.090	4.670
Conflict intensity at origin in 2006	2.600	2.532	4.949	4.357
Age of household head	41.89	14.537	42.69	15.677
Head is female	0.199	0.387	0.287	0.433
Size of the household	6.032	2.578	5.602	2.563
Ratio of males to females	1.290	1.196	1.204	1.117
Head is single	0.010	0.156	0.031	0.161
Head is married	0.797	0.393	0.710	0.437
Head is widowed/divorced	0.184	0.370	0.259	0.420
Head has no formal education	0.296	0.367	0.403	0.489
Head has primary education	0.527	0.500	0.443	0.499
Head has secundar education	0.177	0.360	0.153	0.351
Proportion of the young (below 18)	0.499	0.316	0.488	0.301
Head ever cultivated	0.062	0.242	0.119	0.324
Head ever herded	0.19	0.294	0.154	0.294
Head ever traded	0.078	0.383	0.161	0.368
Head ever made handicrafts	0.051	0.220	0.046	0.210
A member cultivated last year	0.022	0.145	0.045	0.208
A member cultivated in the last 2 years	0.017	0.130	0.040	0.196
A member has never cultivated	0.027	0.161	0.039	0.193
A member traded last year	0.129	0.335	0.109	0.312
A member traded in the last 2 years	0.080	0.272	0.077	0.267
A member has never traded	0.654	0.476	0.620	0.485
A member herded last year	0.177	0.382	0.161	0.368
A member herded in the last 2 years	0.245	0.430	0.276	0.447
A member has never herded	0.355	0.479	0.404	0.491
A member made handicrafts last year	0.049	0.216	0.048	0.213
A member made handicrafts in the last 2 years	0.043	0.203	0.042	0.200
A member has never made handicrafts	0.797	0.402	0.812	0.391
IDP camp has markets	0.851	0.476	0.899	0.478
IDP camp has secondary school	0.355	0.455	0.478	0.449
IDP camp has primary school	0.821	0.451	0.865	0.457
IDP camp has health services	0.794	0.485	0.812	0.484

**Table 3. Probit results for determinants of camp decongestion**

<i>Dep Variable:</i> <i>Left camp=1</i>	<i>Specifications</i>				
	<i>(i)</i>	<i>(ii)</i>	<i>(iii)</i>	<i>(iv)</i>	<i>(v)</i>
<b>CONFLICT VARIABLES</b>					
Camp Duration	-0.01*** (0.003)	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.04*** (0.006)	-0.04*** (0.006)
Member died	-0.75** (0.249)	-0.67* (0.262)	-0.72** (0.264)	-0.72** (0.247)	-0.72** (0.246)
Conflict index in 2006	-0.04** (0.014)	-0.04** (0.014)	-0.04** (0.014)	-0.05*** (0.013)	-0.05*** (0.013)
Conflict index at place of birth in 2006	-0.05*** (0.015)	-0.05*** (0.015)	-0.05*** (0.015)	-0.05** (0.014)	-0.05** (0.014)
<b>HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS</b>					
Age of the head		0.02 (0.097)	-0.01 (0.099)	0.01 (0.097)	0.01 (0.097)
Head is female		-0.28* (0.125)	-0.23 (0.122)	-0.17 (0.118)	-0.16 (0.119)
Household size		0.20* (0.090)	0.17 (0.092)	0.10 (0.092)	0.09 (0.092)
Male:Female ratio		0.01 (0.029)	0.01 (0.029)	0.02 (0.028)	0.02 (0.029)
Head married ( <i>Ref: Single</i> )		-0.05 (0.219)	-0.06 (0.210)	-0.08 (0.201)	-0.06 (0.201)
Head widowed		-0.58* (0.291)	-0.56 (0.285)	-0.53 (0.277)	-0.53 (0.279)
Head female * Head widowed		0.62* (0.240)	0.60* (0.238)	0.55* (0.237)	0.56* (0.238)
Head primary ( <i>Ref: head no schooling</i> )		0.12 (0.073)	0.11 (0.072)	0.11 (0.071)	0.11 (0.071)
Head secondary		0.01 (0.098)	0.00 (0.098)	-0.01 (0.097)	-0.02 (0.097)
Proportion of young		-0.26 (0.160)	-0.22 (0.159)	-0.15 (0.156)	-0.06 (0.296)
<b>HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY AND EXPECTATIONS</b>					
Head cultivated			0.12 (0.100)	0.06 (0.098)	0.06 (0.098)
Head herded			0.26** (0.082)	0.25** (0.080)	0.25** (0.080)
Head traded			-0.25* (0.111)	-0.23* (0.107)	-0.22* (0.107)
Head made handicrafts			0.02 (0.127)	0.01 (0.130)	0.00 (0.125)
<b>ACCESS TO CAMP SERVICES</b>					
Water in camp				-0.30* (0.131)	-0.62* (0.307)
Market in camp				-0.06 (0.098)	0.51 (0.260)
Primary school in camp				-0.28* (0.118)	-0.46 (0.299)
Sec. school in camp				-0.18* (0.073)	-0.14 (0.192)
Health fac. In camp				-0.19 (0.098)	-0.16 (0.278)
Water * proportion of young					0.62 (0.530)
Market * proportion of young					-1.06* (0.443)
Primary sch. * proportion of young					-0.68* (0.341)
Sec. school * proportion of young					-0.09 (0.335)
Health fac. * proportion of young					-0.03 (0.465)
Observations	3984	3984	3984	3922	3922
Wald chi2	828.4	839.3	821.3	867.1	878.4
Rsq	0.202	0.215	0.222	0.246	0.248

**Notes:** Robust standard errors in brackets. \*Significant at 10%, \*\* 5%, \*\*\* 1%, District fixed effects included.

**Table 4. History of economic activities of the household**

<i>Dep Var:</i> <i>Returnee</i>	<i>Activity</i>				
	<i>Cultivation</i>	<i>Trade</i>	<i>Herding</i>	<i>Handicrafts</i>	<i>All</i>
CULT_1YR ( <i>Ref: CULT_NEVER</i> )	0.65* (0.266)				0.70** (0.270)
CULT_2YR	0.20* (0.098)				0.22* (0.096)
TRADE_1YR ( <i>Ref: TRADE_NEVER</i> )		-0.25** (0.086)			-0.31*** (0.089)
TRADE_2YR		-0.05*** (0.015)			-0.02 (0.096)
HERD_1YR ( <i>Ref: HERD_NEVER</i> )			0.21* (0.088)		0.25** (0.090)
HERD_2YR			-0.04 (0.075)		-0.02 (0.080)
CRAFT_1YR( <i>Ref: CRAFT_NEVER</i> )				-0.01 (0.135)	-0.01 (0.141)
CRAFT_2YR				-0.04 (0.148)	-0.04 (0.152)
DISTRICT FIXED EFFECTS	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Obs	3922	3922	3922	3922	3922
Wald chi2	880.8	841.9	834.0	838.6	878.3
Rsq	0.217	0.219	0.218	0.216	0.226

**Notes:** Robust standard errors in brackets. \*Significant at 10%, \*\*Significant at 5%, \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Other variables in specification 4 included, except for participation of the head in economic activities. CULT\_1YR, TRADE\_1YR, HERD\_1YR, CRAFT\_1YR are dummies representing any member of the household who cultivated, traded, herded and made handicrafts in the past one year respectively; CULT\_2YR, TRADE\_2YR, HERD\_2YR, CRAFT\_2YR; for members who cultivated, traded, herded and made handicrafts in the past two years respectively; CULT\_NEVER, TRADE\_NEVER, HERD\_NEVER, CRAFT\_NEVER, for a member who never engaged in the respective activities.

**Table 5. History of economic activities of the household (Acholi sub region)**

Dep Var: Returnee	Acholi Sub region					Lango Sub region				
	Cultivation	Trade	Herding	Crafts	All	Cultivation	Trade	Herding	Crafts	All
CULT_1YR (Ref: CULT_NEVER)	0.57*				0.69**	0.11*				0.12*
	(0.253)				(0.260)	(0.050)				(0.051)
CULT_2YR	0.31				0.37	0.55				0.67
	(0.277)				(0.276)	(0.536)				(0.564)
TRADE_1YR(Ref: TRADE_NEVER)		-0.27**			-0.29**		-0.38*			-0.38*
		(0.102)			(0.107)		(0.152)			(0.160)
TRADE_2YR		-0.10			-0.08		-0.15*			-0.16*
		(0.102)			(0.107)		(0.074)			(0.074)
HERD_1YR (Ref: HERD_NEVER)			0.21*		0.20			0.31*		0.36*
			(0.099)		(0.109)			(0.142)		(0.144)
HERD_2YR			0.11		0.15			0.21		0.33
			(0.095)		(0.101)			(0.169)		(0.169)
CRAFT_1YR(Ref: CRAFT_NEVER)				0.16	0.13				0.25	0.31
				(0.112)	(0.117)				(0.172)	(0.181)
CRAFT_2YR				-0.11	-0.14				-0.18	-0.18
				(0.143)	(0.148)				(0.229)	(0.239)
Observations	2523	2523	2523	2523	2523	1399	1399	1399	1399	1399
Wald chi2	120.0	121.4	117.0	118.3	137.2	40.86	49.00	44.34	40.02	59.78
Rsqr	0.0630	0.0651	0.0611	0.0609	0.0725	0.0423	0.0484	0.0492	0.0440	0.0683

**Notes:** Robust standard errors in brackets. \*Significant at 10%, \*\*Significant at 5%, \*\*\*Significant at 1%. Other variables in specification 4 included, except for participation of the head in economic activities. CULT\_1YR, TRADE\_1YR, HERD\_1YR, CRAFT\_1YR are dummies representing any member of the household who cultivated, traded, herded and made handicrafts in the past one year respectively; CULT\_2YR, TRADE\_2YR, HERD\_2YR, CRAFT\_2YR, for members who cultivated, traded, herded and made handicrafts in the past two years respectively; CULT\_NEVER, TRADE\_NEVER, HERD\_NEVER, CRAFT\_NEVER, for a member who never engaged in the respective activities.

**Table 6. Probit results for Acholi and Lango sub regions**

Dep Variable:	Acholi Sub region					Lango sub region				
	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)
<b>CONFLICT VARIABLES</b>										
Left camp										
Camp Duration	-0.01*** (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.05*** (0.007)	-0.05*** (0.007)	-0.02** (0.005)	-0.02*** (0.006)	-0.02*** (0.006)	-0.05*** (0.012)	-0.05*** (0.012)
Member died	-0.86*** (0.219)	-0.76** (0.231)	-0.79*** (0.232)	-0.74** (0.234)	-0.75** (0.233)	-0.44 (0.552)	-0.40 (0.552)	-0.49 (0.516)	-0.65 (0.469)	-0.64 (0.470)
Index in 2006	-0.02 (0.015)	-0.02 (0.015)	-0.02 (0.015)	-0.02 (0.014)	-0.02 (0.014)	-0.05 (0.046)	-0.06 (0.046)	-0.06 (0.045)	-0.07 (0.048)	-0.08 (0.048)
Ind at place of birth in 06	-0.04** (0.016)	-0.04** (0.016)	-0.04** (0.016)	-0.04** (0.015)	-0.04** (0.015)	-0.11* (0.051)	-0.11* (0.051)	-0.12* (0.049)	-0.12* (0.051)	-0.12* (0.051)
<b>HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS</b>										
Age of the head		0.13 (0.108)	0.14 (0.111)	0.14 (0.112)	0.15 (0.112)		0.03 (0.158)	-0.01 (0.162)	-0.00 (0.153)	0.01 (0.154)
Head is female		-0.56*** (0.140)	-0.55*** (0.141)	-0.47*** (0.138)	-0.47*** (0.138)		0.14 (0.304)	0.26 (0.270)	0.28 (0.235)	0.29 (0.242)
Household size		0.18 (0.096)	0.16 (0.098)	0.09 (0.098)	0.09 (0.097)		0.25 (0.141)	0.17 (0.144)	0.03 (0.143)	0.01 (0.145)
Male:Female ratio		0.03 (0.031)	0.03 (0.031)	0.04 (0.033)	0.04 (0.032)		-0.04 (0.046)	-0.03 (0.047)	-0.01 (0.044)	-0.01 (0.045)
Head married (Ref: Single)		0.00 (0.202)	-0.03 (0.204)	-0.00 (0.201)	-0.01 (0.204)		-0.22 (0.557)	-0.25 (0.499)	-0.39 (0.452)	-0.36 (0.424)
Head widowed		-0.24 (0.294)	-0.24 (0.299)	-0.12 (0.290)	-0.13 (0.295)		-1.02 (0.630)	-1.02 (0.577)	-1.25* (0.529)	-1.26* (0.514)
Head female * Head widowed		-0.58*** (0.159)	-0.57*** (0.160)	-0.50** (0.156)	-0.49** (0.156)		0.56 (0.422)	0.50 (0.403)	0.57 (0.377)	0.62 (0.384)
Head primary (Ref: head no schooling)		-0.03 (0.078)	-0.04 (0.078)	-0.03 (0.078)	-0.03 (0.079)		0.21 (0.136)	0.19 (0.135)	0.17 (0.127)	0.19 (0.128)
Head secondary		-0.20 (0.116)	-0.20 (0.117)	-0.23* (0.115)	-0.22 (0.115)		0.22 (0.170)	0.19 (0.169)	0.17 (0.165)	0.17 (0.166)
Proportion of young		-0.04 (0.175)	-0.01 (0.177)	0.10 (0.177)	0.09 (0.357)		-0.32 (0.246)	-0.21 (0.245)	-0.13 (0.235)	0.19 (0.488)
<b>HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY</b>										
Head cultivated			0.19 (0.101)	0.16 (0.100)	0.15 (0.100)			0.21 (0.177)	0.07 (0.174)	0.06 (0.172)
Head herded			0.02 (0.102)	0.03 (0.100)	0.02 (0.101)			0.42** (0.132)	0.39** (0.126)	0.40** (0.126)
Head traded			-0.23* (0.101)	-0.21* (0.101)	-0.13 (0.104)			-0.26* (0.128)	-0.26* (0.128)	-0.30* (0.127)
Head made handicrafts			0.22 (0.179)	0.18 (0.178)	0.18 (0.179)			0.21 (0.222)	0.09 (0.200)	0.10 (0.201)
<b>ACCESS TO FACILITIES</b>										
Water in camp				-0.16 (0.186)	-0.73 (0.492)				-0.35 (0.205)	-0.46 (0.443)
Market in camp				-0.27 (0.143)	0.66 (0.407)				0.07 (0.147)	0.49 (0.382)
Primary school in camp				-0.41* (0.161)	-0.65 (0.430)				-0.52* (0.211)	-0.78 (0.488)
Sec. school in camp				-0.08 (0.080)	-0.22 (0.223)				-0.45*** (0.120)	-0.31 (0.290)
Health fac. In camp				-0.17 (0.136)	-0.18 (0.374)				-0.05 (0.144)	0.14 (0.351)
Water * proportion of young					1.07 (0.853)					0.22 (0.727)
Market * proportion of young					-1.77* (0.697)					-0.79 (0.626)
Primary sch. * proportion of young					0.42 (0.756)					0.48 (0.778)
Sec. school * proportion of young					0.25 (0.377)					-0.26 (0.500)
Health fac. * proportion of young					0.12					-0.36 (0.581)
Observations	2573	2523	2523	2523	2523	1411	1399	1399	1399	1399
Wald chi2	72.57	114.1	118.1	176.6	184.9	13.51	38.71	50.96	114.2	117.0
Rsq	0.0393	0.0596	0.0629	0.0940	0.0965	0.0144	0.0404	0.0597	0.111	0.115

**Notes:** Robust standard errors in brackets. \*Significant at 10%, \*\* 5%, \*\*\* 1%, District fixed effects included.

**Table 7. Excluding commuting households**

<i>Dep Variable:</i>	<i>Specifications</i>				
	<i>(i)</i>	<i>(ii)</i>	<i>(iii)</i>	<i>(iv)</i>	<i>(v)</i>
<i>Left camp=1</i>					
<b>CONFLICT VARIABLES</b>					
Camp Duration	-0.01*** (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.02*** (0.004)	-0.04*** (0.007)	-0.04*** (0.007)
Member died	-0.66** (0.258)	-0.60* (0.269)	-0.65* (0.269)	-0.66** (0.253)	-0.65** (0.251)
Index in 2006	-0.05*** (0.013)	-0.05*** (0.014)	-0.05*** (0.014)	-0.05*** (0.013)	-0.05*** (0.013)
Index at place of birth in 2006	-0.04** (0.014)	-0.04** (0.015)	-0.04** (0.015)	-0.04** (0.015)	-0.04** (0.015)
<b>HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS</b>					
Age of the head		-0.01 (0.103)	-0.04 (0.105)	-0.01 (0.103)	-0.01 (0.103)
Head is female		-0.30* (0.135)	-0.25 (0.132)	-0.20 (0.128)	-0.19 (0.128)
Household size		0.23* (0.096)	0.19* (0.097)	0.11 (0.097)	0.10 (0.098)
Male:Female ratio		0.00 (0.031)	0.00 (0.031)	0.02 (0.030)	0.02 (0.030)
Head married ( <i>Ref: Single</i> )		0.03 (0.245)	0.03 (0.234)	0.01 (0.225)	0.03 (0.226)
Head widowed		-0.43 (0.317)	-0.40 (0.309)	-0.39 (0.301)	-0.38 (0.305)
Head female * Head widowed		0.65* (0.253)	0.62* (0.251)	0.58* (0.250)	0.59* (0.252)
Head primary ( <i>Ref: head no schooling</i> )		0.11 (0.078)	0.10 (0.078)	0.10 (0.076)	0.10 (0.076)
Head secondary		0.00 (0.104)	-0.01 (0.105)	-0.03 (0.103)	-0.03 (0.103)
Proportion of young		-0.32 (0.170)	-0.28 (0.168)	-0.21 (0.166)	-0.01 (0.319)
<b>HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY</b>					
Head cultivated			0.10 (0.107)	0.03 (0.105)	0.02 (0.105)
Head herded			0.27** (0.086)	0.26** (0.084)	0.25** (0.083)
Head traded			0.03 (0.139)	-0.00 (0.131)	-0.00 (0.131)
<b>ACCESS TO CAMP SERVICES</b>					
Water in camp				-0.29* (0.138)	-0.55 (0.312)
Market in camp				-0.05 (0.103)	0.51 (0.265)
Primary school in camp				-0.30* (0.125)	-0.46 (0.303)
Sec. school in camp				-0.18* (0.077)	-0.14 (0.203)
Health fac. In camp				-0.20* (0.102)	-0.18 (0.278)
Water * proportion of young					0.50 (0.541)
Market * proportion of young					-1.06* (0.455)
Primary sch. * proportion of young					0.28 (0.529)
Sec. school * proportion of young					-0.08 (0.353)
Health fac. * proportion of young					-0.02 (0.467)
<b>DISTRICT FIXED EFFECTS</b>					
	<i>YES</i>	<i>YES</i>	<i>YES</i>	<i>YES</i>	<i>YES</i>
Observations	3708	3708	3708	3649	3649
Wald chi2	783.8	771.3	747.6	804.3	833.0
Rsq	0.224	0.226	0.246	0.254	0.268

**Notes:** Robust standard errors in brackets. \*Significant at 10%, \*\*Significant at 5%, \*\*\*Significant at 1%

**Table 8. Multinomial logit results (base category: camp resident)**

	(i)		(ii)		(iii)		(iv)		(V)	
	<i>Transit</i>	<i>Home</i>	<i>Transit</i>	<i>Home</i>	<i>Transit</i>	<i>Home</i>	<i>Transit</i>	<i>Home</i>	<i>Transit</i>	<i>Home</i>
<b>CONFLICT VARIABLES</b>										
Camp Duration	-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.024*** (0.008)	-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.032*** (0.009)	-0.071*** (0.013)	-0.090*** (0.020)	-0.070*** (0.013)	-0.089*** (0.021)
Member died	-1.418*** (0.464)	-1.248 (1.018)	-1.277** (0.512)	-1.249 (1.016)	-1.336** (0.523)	-1.375 (0.898)	-1.296*** (0.497)	-1.608* (0.853)	-1.304*** (0.497)	-1.596* (0.860)
Index in 2006	-0.067** (0.027)	-0.061 (0.052)	-0.068** (0.027)	-0.070 (0.054)	-0.067** (0.027)	-0.075 (0.055)	-0.073*** (0.025)	-0.076 (0.055)	-0.077*** (0.026)	-0.083 (0.056)
Ind at birth place	-0.098*** (0.029)	-0.077 (0.057)	-0.100*** (0.029)	-0.068 (0.059)	-0.095*** (0.029)	-0.062 (0.059)	-0.095*** (0.028)	-0.062 (0.059)	-0.093*** (0.028)	-0.062 (0.060)
<b>HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS</b>										
Age of the head			0.069 (0.179)	0.061 (0.243)	0.056 (0.183)	-0.018 (0.249)	0.114 (0.184)	-0.018 (0.242)	0.102 (0.185)	0.022 (0.242)
Head is female			-0.725*** (0.266)	-0.195 (0.393)	-0.705*** (0.267)	-0.059 (0.368)	-0.577** (0.267)	0.015 (0.335)	-0.615** (0.270)	0.059 (0.349)
Household size			0.163 (0.174)	0.448** (0.227)	0.143 (0.176)	0.372 (0.229)	0.042 (0.179)	0.175 (0.232)	0.066 (0.179)	0.157 (0.238)
Male:Female ratio			0.053 (0.047)	-0.042 (0.076)	0.048 (0.048)	-0.040 (0.076)	0.056 (0.047)	-0.016 (0.072)	0.052 (0.048)	-0.002 (0.074)
Head married ( <i>Ref: Single</i> )			-0.079 (0.380)	-0.100 (0.727)	-0.114 (0.383)	-0.089 (0.658)	-0.105 (0.381)	-0.207 (0.609)	-0.146 (0.379)	-0.131 (0.608)
Head widowed			-0.527 (0.537)	-1.426* (0.844)	-0.499 (0.540)	-1.361* (0.779)	-0.382 (0.531)	-1.544** (0.735)	-0.425 (0.533)	-1.518** (0.746)
Head female * Head widowed			0.667 (0.480)	1.416** (0.591)	0.645 (0.480)	1.361** (0.573)	0.503 (0.470)	1.423** (0.557)	0.540 (0.475)	1.482*** (0.575)
Head primary ( <i>Ref: head no schooling</i> )			-0.020 (0.134)	0.506** (0.206)	-0.015 (0.135)	0.458** (0.201)	-0.016 (0.136)	0.454** (0.195)	-0.009 (0.136)	0.482** (0.197)
Head secondary			-0.293 (0.204)	0.366 (0.253)	-0.285 (0.206)	0.305 (0.253)	-0.325 (0.203)	0.304 (0.252)	-0.309 (0.203)	0.311 (0.253)
Proportion of young			-0.181 (0.314)	-0.616 (0.394)	-0.155 (0.316)	-0.518 (0.391)	-0.043 (0.315)	-0.368 (0.383)	-0.609 (0.631)	0.457 (0.740)
<b>HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY</b>										
Head cultivated					0.253 (0.172)	0.208 (0.272)	0.180 (0.170)	0.060 (0.266)	0.183 (0.173)	0.055 (0.266)
Head herded					0.074 (0.180)	0.678*** (0.202)	0.086 (0.180)	0.652*** (0.196)	0.054 (0.183)	0.663*** (0.196)
Head traded					-0.439* (0.236)	-0.477 (0.293)	-0.392* (0.233)	-0.410 (0.276)	-0.369 (0.232)	-0.394 (0.275)
<b>ACCESS TO CAMP SERVICES</b>										
Water in camp							-0.260 (0.318)	-0.798** (0.319)	-1.728** (0.738)	-0.660 (0.667)
Market in camp							-0.505** (0.227)	0.171 (0.229)	0.983 (0.681)	0.869 (0.557)
Primary school in camp							-0.239 (0.266)	-0.762** (0.324)	-0.316 (0.755)	-1.357* (0.813)
Sec. school in camp							-0.138 (0.146)	-0.473** (0.185)	-0.551 (0.399)	-0.094 (0.470)
Health fac. In camp							-0.452** (0.219)	-0.314 (0.225)	-0.520 (0.582)	-0.023 (0.577)
Water * proportion of young									2.819** (1.334)	-0.178 (1.109)
Market * proportion of young									-2.823** (1.182)	-1.332 (0.932)
Primary sch. *proportion of young									0.077 (1.343)	1.048 (1.233)
Sec. school * proportion of young									0.745 (0.663)	-0.718 (0.815)
Health fac. * proportion of young									0.247 (1.038)	-0.512 (0.955)
DISTRICT . E	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Observations	3984	3984	3922	3922	3922	3922	3922	3922	3922	3922

**Notes:** Robust standard errors in brackets. \*Significant at 10%, \*\*Significant at 5%, \*\*\*Significant at 1%



**Table 9. Effect of external events**

	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)
<i>Only locations in the survey</i>				
Index in 2006	-0.04**			
	(0.014)			
Index at place of birth in 2006	-0.05***			
	(0.015)			
<i>Other locations in Uganda</i>				
Index in 2006		6.63		
		(5.919)		
Index at place of birth in 2006		-0.02		
		(0.015)		
<i>Only other countries (DRC, CAR, Sudan)</i>				
Index in 2006			1.72	
			(4.598)	
Index at place of birth in 2006			-0.16	
			(0.329)	
<i>All locations</i>				
Index in 2006				-0.02***
				(0.005)
Index at place of birth in 2006				-0.02**
Observations	3984	3838	3838	3913
Wald chi2	828.4	738.4	745.1	731.1
Rsq	0.202	0.178	0.176	0.195

**Notes:** Robust standard errors in brackets. \*Significant at 10%, \*\*Significant at 5%, \*\*\*Significant at 1%