NATO’s NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT: A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT

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DIIS REPORT 2011:02
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Preface

Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning

The Atlantic Alliance has a New Strategic Concept that will guide it into the 21st century. It was adopted at the Lisbon Summit (19–20 November 2010) and it promises a renewed Alliance – a ’NATO 3.0’ ready for new challenges, new partnership, and renewed relevance and impact. This naturally calls for thorough assessment, which is why we convened a conference shortly after the Lisbon Summit to take stock of the New Strategic Concept and NATO more broadly. The conference, Why NATO? Taking Stock of the Atlantic Alliance and its New Strategic Concept, was held at the University of Southern Denmark on 29 November 2010. To bring the assessments presented at the conference to a wider public we asked conference contributors and other NATO experts to provide chapters for this book which is, to our best knowledge, the first comprehensive assessment on this scale of the New Strategic Concept and its potential for Alliance reform. Our goal in editing and publishing this volume has been to assess what is new and what is old in the Strategic Concept and, quite simply, to stimulate greater debate on NATO.

We owe debts of gratitude to many people. We would first of all like to thank the many contributors who agreed to expedite this work through the busy month of December to produce their written assessments. We realise how disruptive such pleas for fast-track action can be, and we greatly appreciate the exemplary efforts you have made. Next we would like to thank NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) who provided indispensable funding for the November 2010 conference. In cooperation with PDD we utilised a variety of electronic platforms to convey the program and contributions of the conference. The international relations student organisation at the University of Southern Denmark – IntRpol – was an ideal partner in this respect because they know these platforms much better than we do and we are grateful for all their assistance. We would also like to thank the Danish Social Science Research Council (FSE) for funding our 2008–2010 research project on NATO’s future (Whither the West?) which has stimulated our thinking on these matters and has indirectly made this publication possible. We are similarly indebted to DIIS – the Danish Institute of International Studies – for cooperating with us in the context of the conference and for making this publication possible in another instance of fast-track cooperation for which we are very grateful. We would finally like to thank our respective families for their
support and willingness to, as it turned out, let yet another high priority professional project wreck our private schedules.
Introduction. Taking Stock of NATO’s New Strategic Concept
Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning

On 19 November 2010 NATO formally agreed to adopt a New Strategic Concept. After a long, tightly scheduled and generally speaking fairly transparent process the NATO family endorsed an updated understanding of what the core purpose of the Atlantic Alliance is at the Lisbon Summit. NATO’s basic text – the Washington Treaty of 1949 – was, as it were, once again re-interpreted within a specific geopolitical context to fit an ever-changing strategic landscape. Or, put differently, with the adoption of the New Strategic Concept NATO sought to bring its basic interests and strategic thinking into line with the security environment as it has evolved since 1999 when the Alliance adopted its last Strategic Concept. Launched to great fanfare and amidst many high expectations this key text entitled ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’ is projected to confer a new strategic direction on NATO and to inform the world about why the Atlantic Alliance is still vital and vigorous.

As could be expected, the New Strategic Concept is marked by both continuity and change. Many of the basic themes characterising earlier Strategic Concepts are clearly present in the document: Article 5 – the Alliance’s so-called ‘musketeer clause’ – is once more highlighted as the bedrock of transatlantic security cooperation. Deterrence, in the shape of both nuclear and conventional capabilities, is yet again portrayed as ‘a core element of [NATO’s] overall strategy’ and, in line with the 1999 Strategic Concept, the new text puts great emphasis on NATO’s role in the business of crisis management. The section laying out the Alliance’s Core Tasks and Principles states that “NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of... political and military tools to help manage developing crisis.” Related to this is the Strategic Concept’s reaffirmation of NATO’s focus on partnership, cooperation and dialogue, what the Alliance of 2010 has dubbed ‘cooperative security’.

Nevertheless, the 2010 Strategic Concept differs in significant ways from its predecessors. Perhaps most importantly, the document conveys a collective intention to push NATO further in the direction of global engagement. NATO is becoming more global and also more political and concomitantly it is becoming less confined by regional and military considerations. Although the text does make it clear that the supreme task of the Alliance concerns the defence of NATO territory and Allied populations, which might seem a reincarnation of ‘regional NATO’, the Strategic
Concept contains far fewer geographical limitations to Allied activities than did both the 1999 and the 1991 Concepts; the predominant threats it singles out are unconventional and transnational or global. Political consultations with a wide range of actors and partners now figure prominently as a core activity. This is not an alliance focused on Europe or the Euro-Atlantic area; nor is it a global alliance because it remains Atlantic and invokes global threats and issues in relation to its own security; it is rather an Atlantic alliance focused on the globe. Finally, it is an alliance cognisant of public diplomacy and of the vital role played by strategic narratives: hence the short and relatively lucid Strategic Concept and the diplomatic fanfare surrounding its publication.

This introduction will do three things. It will first provide some background about what the Strategic Concept is to NATO and about what has led up to the 2010 Strategic Concept. It will then offer a quick guide to the New Strategic Concept. The Concept is reprinted in full at the back of this book and our quick guide will therefore confine itself to emphasising the ways in which ‘global’ and ‘political’ NATO have gained in prominence. Lastly, the introduction will connect these issues to the set of chapters that follow.

**What is NATO’s Strategic Concept?**

The Strategic Concept is the Alliance’s operational and dynamic view of its founding treaty. The Washington Treaty of 1949 is a generic document that lays out the core values (democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and free institutions) that the Alliance will ‘safeguard’ in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter. The Treaty does not in any way define threats or particularly important geographical zones of interest. Instead, Article 4 adopts a global perspective in so far as “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” This global outlook is balanced by Article 6, which defines the geographical area – essentially territory and forces in “the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer” – that is covered by the collective defence clause in Article 5.

Where the Washington Treaty thus leaves open the balance between global and regional tasks, the Strategic Concept must specifically interpret concrete geopolitical circumstances. What are the threats, and what are their military implications? These are the two basic and essential questions that the Strategic Concept must answer.
Since the inception of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949 NATO has produced six bona fide Strategic Concepts. The decision-making procedures leading to the final approval of these landmark documents have varied a great deal. In some cases, the process was protracted and complicated such as the events that led up to the adoption of the 1957 Concept, MC 14/2, while in other instances, such as in 1952 with MC 3/5, the process was swift and straightforward. Moreover, while all Strategic Concepts have been approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), there is no agreed or authoritative template for writing a Strategic Concept. Sometimes, as in 1968, the change in NATO’s overall strategy has been the product of American pressure; in other cases there has been no easily identifiable member state or body taking the initiative.

NATO’s first ‘Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area’ dates back to October 1949. It aimed to ensure “unity of thought and purpose insofar as the objectives of the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area are concerned”. While this ‘unity of thought and purpose’ has remained an enduring ambition from 1949 to the present and beyond, we need to distinguish between the Strategic Concepts of the Cold War and those of the post Cold War eras. The Cold War Strategic Concepts were explicit in almost every way that the post Cold War documents cannot be. The Cold War Concepts addressed an easily identifiable adversary, the Soviet Union, and set out to define guidelines for the Alliance’s military defence. It divided the Alliance into geographical regions and developed guidelines for each of them. Once this was done NATO’s military authorities – the NATO machine – went to work to implement the Concept and to provide for military defence.

The Strategic Concepts of the Atlantic Alliance have always served more than just one purpose. Today, we argue, the document has at least three major functions: two internal and one external. One of its internal functions is to codify past decisions and practices and thus solidify the Alliance’s foundation. As one senior NATO official put it, codification is ‘akin to doing the vacuum cleaning’: a new Strategic Concept summarises and formalises the string of ministerial communiqués and lesser decisions that have emerged since the preceding Strategic Concept. Every ministerial communiqué is in fact a miniature Strategic Concept, the official argued, and from time to time real world events will drive NATO so far down new paths that it becomes necessary to assemble all these miniatures and combine them into one overarching document. The exercise is meant to provide coherence to a record of decisions and engagements that may not always be coherent at first sight. This points us towards the other internal function, namely that of providing new strategic direction – of laying down the foundations for future coherence.
Strategic direction was a crucial purpose of the Cold War strategic concepts, of course, and it remains essential, albeit in a new context of public diplomacy and codification. It is in fact difficult to disentangle these functions. Strategic direction concerns most fundamentally the basic values of the Washington Treaty and their defence in global and regional contexts, which is also where this section began. Basically, the Allies must provide strategic direction by defining the balance between regional and global engagements, by identifying the types of threats the Alliance is likely to encounter and what it can do about them. In providing answers to these questions, and thus providing strategic direction, the Alliance inevitably conducts public diplomacy. Moreover, to move the world, the Alliance needs a place to stand, and so strategic direction begins where codification ends.

As touched upon above, the Strategic Concept has taken on a new and externally-oriented function since the end of the Cold War – that of public diplomacy. Evidently NATO’s post Cold War Concepts have been more ambiguous than their predecessors and of course part of the reason for this has to do with the new security environment, which is marked by risks that are difficult to predict: it is simply no longer possible to plan for a single threat in a single theatre. Another reason, however, behind the decision to publish these Concepts has been as one element of NATO’s efforts to communicate itself as a focused and indispensable Alliance to wider national audiences, i.e. as a part of NATO selling its product. Post Cold War Strategic Concepts must inform the world what NATO is about, now that its Cold War adversary has gone it must mobilise support at home and prepare the Alliance for engagements that cannot be predicted but which will surely be demanding. In short, the Strategic Concept must convey purpose.

The Strategic Concept adopted by NATO in November 2010 is the Alliance’s third post Cold War Strategic Concept, although in some ways it is number three and a half. NATO’s first such concept was published at the Rome Summit in November 1991. This was then updated and revised in time for the Washington Summit – and the Alliance’s fiftieth anniversary – in April 1999. This, the second post Cold War Concept, stood until the Lisbon Summit. However, by 2004–2005, following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and NATO’s growing engagement in Afghanistan, the issue of whether the second Concept was in need of revision or maybe even replacement was being raised. Given the lack of political agreement within the Alliance, symbolised, of course, in the disputes over the Iraq war, a decision was made to upgrade only that part of the Strategic Concept that dealt with military implications. The result was the approval of the so-called Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) at the Riga
Summit in November 2006. The post Cold War track record thus consists of three New Strategic Concepts and one Comprehensive Political Guidance.

‘The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept’ of November 1991 took note of the widening definition of security and of a transition from threats to risks: “In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess.”

There was little to codify in terms of post Cold War behaviour, given the pace of events and the short time that had passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall (the Soviet Union still existed in November 1991), but the 1991 Strategic Concept does explicitly make reference to the June 1990 London Declaration on a Transformed Alliance that promised a range of changes in order to provide for Alliance continuity.

The Strategic Concept then entered into the combined domain of strategic direction and public diplomacy by outlining four fundamental security tasks:

- “To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe”, which was another way of keeping the United States engaged in Europe
- “To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests”
- “To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state”, which related to Articles 5 and 6
- “To preserve the strategic balance within Europe” – a reference to the residual Soviet power in Europe.

Defence guidelines in this Strategic Concept essentially foresaw a change from a ‘comprehensive, in-place, linear defensive posture’ to a reduced and more flexible posture consisting of a “graduated triad of immediate and rapid reaction forces, main defence forces and augmentation forces”.

The Alliance’s Strategic Concept of April 1999 was a revised version of the 1991 Concept, which is why the word ‘new’ was removed from the title. The nature of the alteration can best be gauged in the ‘fundamental security tasks’. The first three tasks remained, although they were renamed – Security, Consultation, and Deterrence and Defence, respectively – and the fourth task was revised. It is perhaps not surprising that NATO in 1998–99 felt no need to be fundamentally concerned about Europe’s ‘strategic balance’, but the question that arose was what to put in its stead. NATO was divided between global and regional perspectives and ended
in a compromise position which is visible in two respects: firstly, emphasis was placed on ‘the Euro-Atlantic region,’ which includes more than NATO territory but is not a global NATO and, secondly, the fourth fundamental security task did not follow straight on from the three first tasks but was introduced with a single line effectively separating it:

- Security
- Consultation
- Deterrence and Defence
- And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:
  - Crisis management on a case-by-case basis and by consensus
  - Partnership, cooperation, and dialogue in the Euro-Atlantic area

This subtle hierarchy of fundamental tasks had to do with the fact that crisis management related to Article 7 of the Washington Treaty and the role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in providing for general peace and stability. As in 1948–49, NATO in 1998–99 was not about to deposit its decision making at the UNSC. However, invoking the council was good public diplomacy – and a fitting response to the crisis in which NATO found itself as the summit took place in the midst of the Kosovo bombing campaign.

If we are to pinpoint the origins of the New Strategic Concept that was adopted in November 2010 we must step back to November 2006 and the Riga Summit when Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer began to use his powers more assertively to define a new agenda. Noting a growing political demand for a New Concept, he said, “So looking to 2008 – and even beyond to our 60th anniversary in 2009 – I predict that the idea will gather momentum to draft a new, basic document outlining NATO’s grand strategy.” Various background interviews indicate that another key factor in moving the agenda of a New Strategic Concept forward was a loose coalition of transformation-minded nations – those most willing to invest in transformed forces and NATO reform. It is probably no stretch of the imagination to argue that the majority of the transformation-minded nations were those which have been most engaged on the ground in southern and eastern Afghanistan.

A tentative agreement had thus emerged by the time of the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 when the Heads of State and Government tasked the NAC to prepare a so-called Declaration on Alliance Security (DAS) for adoption at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009. This short and somewhat vague document, which
was duly presented and approved at NATO’s sixtieth anniversary summit, was the precursor to the New Strategic Concept. The DAS predominantly deals with global issues but it began where NATO texts normally begin – with Article 5 and Alliance enlargement. What this combination implied in terms of priorities and outlook was to be defined in the course of the next year and a half.

The summit had decided to delegate Strategic Concept matters for a little while to a group of experts, whose work was formally kicked off at a major Brussels conference in July. The Alliance had asked its Secretary General to convene and lead this group, which is why outgoing Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and incoming Anders Fogh Rasmussen were both present at the Brussels conference. Also present was former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, who was picked to chair the Group of Experts. The group was asked to run two distinct phases of ‘reflection’ and ‘consultation’ – whereby the NATO community of observers, experts and officials engaged in debate, after which the Group’s tentative conclusions were made the object of consultations with Allied governments and parliaments. In May 2010 the Group of Experts finalised its work with a strategic concept report on the Alliance’s future. The Group of Experts combined its broad evaluation of the security environment with a dissection of key problems and strategic options, identifying points of convergence with potential to become official NATO policy.

The process then entered its third and concluding phase of ‘drafting and final negotiations’. At this stage Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen came to play an unusually influential and central role in the context of the NATO historical record. In the past, Secretary Generals had merely assisted Allied governments who took the direct control of negotiations – with the permanent representations at NATO Headquarters drafting the document and national officials flying in for NAC meetings to solve sticky issues, of which there were always, predictably, many. Secretary General Rasmussen had a different mandate, which he set out to exploit. Having followed the Albright group’s work closely, the Secretary General himself drafted the first version of the Strategic Concept that was to serve as the basis for the final negotiations in the NAC. Expectations were that these negotiations would be like those of the past: drawn out and highly charged. There were some dramas to be sure, particularly in relation to nuclear deterrence versus nuclear disarmament, a debate inspired by President Obama’s ‘nuclear zero’ vision and one which pitched France against Germany, with Belgium and Norway seconding the latter. Other issues were difficult as well, notably the definition of new threats – from terrorism to cyber war – and the framing of the critical point at which they might
become Article 5 threats. Partnerships and their implications for NATO decision making, which might conceivably open up considerably, was another sore point. But the drama never erupted into acrimony. The process, it turned out, had done its job. Most big issues had been dealt with by the time of the run-up to the Lisbon Summit and it was just too difficult for any one ally to really question the Fogh Rasmussen draft, which was presented to the Allies on 17 September 2010. Within a few weeks of this presentation NATO officials could therefore argue that ‘98% was there’.15

**NATO’s New Strategic Concept**

The New Strategic Concept is in many respects an ambitious document. It delineates a comprehensive framework for transformation and introduces a wide-ranging number of initiatives tailored to set off the development of new political, military and civilian instruments. As such – and very much in line with the agenda of Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen – the New Concept is an activist and progressive document. Although it continues to codify past decisions and provide coherence to sometimes-disparate activities like the other strategic concepts, the primary function of ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’ is that of strategic direction and this is new. Moreover, the document is ambitious in terms of strategic communication. This is also new. The 1991 and 1999 Concepts were lengthy and anodyne. In 1999 the Allies saw this and tried to rescue NATO public diplomacy by attaching a short and crisp ‘Washington Declaration’ to the Strategic Concept. It was an odd manoeuvre that NATO wisely eschewed in 2010.

We noted in the introduction that with the New Strategic Concept NATO is becoming more political and global. The Concept affirms Article 5 but globalises the thinking behind it: NATO must, as always, ‘protect and defend’ but now against threats such as terrorism, weapons proliferation and cyber wars that know no conventional boundaries. The shift is perhaps most noticeable in the document’s presentation of NATO’s ‘three essential core tasks’. In contrast to the 1991 and the 1999 Concepts, the 2010 Strategic Concept lists ‘crisis management’ and ‘cooperative security’ as tasks almost on par with collective defence. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and the defence of NATO territory are still given precedence over less regionally anchored activities but crisis management and cooperative security are not, as they were in the 1999 Concept, listed as second order tasks. In 2010 they are registered on a par with collective defence as essential core tasks that the Alliance ‘must and will’ continue fulfilling effectively:
- **Collective defence**: NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty
- **Crisis management**: NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises
- **Cooperative security**: The Alliance is affected by, and can affect political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership

This subtle change in the hierarchy of tasks may appear trivial but it is not. It is one clear sign of a more global and political Atlantic Alliance. Other signs are found within each of the sections dealing with these ‘essential core tasks’.

The section outlining the Alliance’s approach to collective defence stresses that NATO must not only “deter and defend against any threat of aggression” – as also noted in the 1991 and 1999 Concepts – but also provide collective defence against “emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual allies or the Alliance as a whole”. Collective defence thus applies to the whole gamut of security challenges that are laid out in an assessment of the security environment – a section that follows the introduction to the Strategic Concept and precedes a treatment of the three core tasks. “The conventional threat cannot be ignored”, this section begins. However, in a tour de force, it then launches into a delineation of unconventional threats – beginning with nuclear weapons and proliferation and branching into terrorism, instability, trafficking, cyber attacks, and threats to vital channels of communication, transportation, and transit. This importance given to ‘emerging security challenges’ is reflected in the brand new Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD), based at NATO headquarters. The collective defence section of the Strategic Concept goes through some elaborate motions to give satisfaction to proponents of both nuclear deterrence and of nuclear disarmament, claiming that “the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote” but also that “as long as nuclear weapons exist NATO will remain a nuclear alliance” and “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance.” Otherwise the section serves as a kind of planning guidance regarding different operations that NATO must be able to engage in and the kind of capacities it therefore needs. In all this there is only one single reference to geography and it comes in the context of missile defence, where cooperation with Russia and Euro-Atlantic partners is noted as desirable.
Improving NATO’s ability to cope with new and unpredictable security challenges beyond NATO borders is the leitmotif of the section dealing with ‘security through crisis management’. Drawing on the lessons learned in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans the New Concept launches several new initiatives all crafted to advance Allied contributions to a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach. NATO must engage actively with other international actors to maximise operational coherence and effectiveness. A number of commitments follow: the Alliance must improve its ability to ‘monitor and analyse’ the international environment; it must “form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability”; “develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones”; “identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment”, and it must ‘broaden and intensify’ political consultations in all phases of a crisis. There are no references to geography in this section. Out-of-area is no longer applicable because there is simply no mention of privileged in-areas and less privileged out-of-areas. Moreover, all these measures are designed to strengthen the Alliance’s operational performance, which will make the Alliance a critical partner for any security-related organisation – from the United Nations on. Finally, these other organisations will not only encounter an Alliance with a better-equipped toolbox but also an improved brain – insofar as NATO’s ability to monitor, analyse and consult will be improved. NATO’s new ESCD division will form part of this cerebral improvement, but it seems inevitable that the policy unit inside the Secretary General’s private office now must be strengthened and tied into a new practice of political consultations anchored in the NAC.

The Strategic Concept’s third and last section on ‘international security through cooperation’ toes the line established in the 1990s. Most parts merely codify established principles. The section does contain a more ambitious wording on the Alliance’s willingness to “create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons” than did the 1999 document – given the aforementioned Obama ‘nuclear zero’ vision and the need to prop up the nuclear disarmament camp within the Alliance. There is strong encouragement of partnership with Russia, the United Nations and the European Union among others, and it is possible that the vague language on continued NATO enlargement is a nod in Russia’s direction, but the language of these sections mostly restates past priorities. In terms of principle and vision, not much is new here. This is no guarantee, however, that implementation will be easy.

The final section is noteworthy because it addresses the kind of organisation that NATO needs to be if it is to fulfil all of its ambitions, namely a reform-minded organisation
attuned to cost-effectiveness and ongoing transformation. The financial crisis has left its mark. Already in the preface, the Allies are reminded to stay committed to reforms so that “taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence”. Neither the 1991 nor the 1999 Concept made references to taxes or taxpayers. Effectiveness and streamlined commitment are also themes that run through the sections on the ‘essential core tasks’. These sections are followed by a short section on ‘Reform and Transformation’. This commits the Allies to maximise the deployability of their forces, ensure coherence in defence planning, develop capabilities jointly and engage in continual reform; all in order to use resources “in the most efficient and effective

At a Glance: NATO’s New Strategic Concept

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way possible". Put differently, it commits the Alliance to intelligent cost savings – to cut fat and not muscle, as the Secretary General admonished in the summit’s run-up – which is, in fact, a hard thing to do. Individual allies must cut excessive national infrastructure and revise political taboos. The Alliance as a whole must come together to focus on operational impact, not the distribution of national benefits. We will gain a first view of the state of affairs in June 2011 when the Alliance must begin to name those military headquarters that it will cut within the command structure (NCS). It put NCS rationalisation on the Lisbon agenda but did not name names, partly because the Lisbon JFC HQ is in the line of fire and the Allies could not afford to be seen to be affronting their host country, and partly because it needs more time to prepare brutal decisions. For the Alliance will indeed have to reach some brutal decisions if it is to meet its Strategic Concept commitment.

**So What is ‘NATO 3.0’ Really?**

This outline of the Strategic Concept has located the greater political and global ambition of the Atlantic Alliance. What remains are a number of questions relating to the coherence and wider potential of the Strategic Concept and indeed NATO ambition. Did NATO successfully manage to navigate the past and the present; did it successfully balance the globalisers and the regionalisers amongst its membership; did it find the kind of wording in respect to key challenges that will provide for strategic direction and did it craft a political message that will assuage former rivals, assure current partners, and inspire confidence in NATO publics?

The chapters in this book provide answers. There is no one answer to these questions, of course, and our task as editors has therefore been to organise the chapters into sections that illuminate key issues and stimulate debate.

We begin with a section of ‘bird’s eye’ views of the Strategic Concept and with two chapters that provide crosscutting and holistic assessments. The intention is that the reader can refer back to these two chapters and perhaps the overview provided in this introduction to recall the main contours and controversies of the Strategic Concept. We are fortunate to have two excellent analysts with great NATO insight as contributors to this section. One is Jamie Shea, the other is Klaus Wittmann; both practitioners with direct experience in NATO matters of strategic foresight and planning. In chapter one Jamie Shea argues that what is new about the Strategic Concept is the wider focus on new threats, the greater connectivity to other organisations, and the need to engage earlier in crisis prevention. Yet he also takes great care to anchor
such progressions in NATO's past. To meet the new security environment NATO must build on its own history and rediscover practices that it once had but which have withered. In chapter 2 Klaus Wittmann takes note of many contributions but also some problems that he believes were insufficiently dealt with in 2010. To Wittmann, partnerships, disarmament and crisis prevention are works in progress and reflective of a fragile consensus within the Alliance. This raises the question of whether there is too much ‘old NATO’ and too little ‘new thinking’ in the Alliance.

Section 2, Dynamic Power, Elusive Threats and Alliance Turbulence, addresses the traditional equation between power and threats on the one hand and Alliance cohesion on the other. Adrian Hyde-Price (chapter 3) first places NATO within broad geopolitical trends to dissect the New Strategic Concept and the kind of globally ambitious but yet moderately able Alliance that he perceives. Among these trends are the ‘unipolar’ position of the United States, the rise of new powers outside Europe and the financial crisis – all of which are driving Europeans outside their region, but with a lighter purse at the same time. One of the critical outside powers is Russia and Karsten Jakob Møller (chapter 4) warns us that NATO–Russia relations are best understood in a historical perspective. The two partners may claim to make diplomatic advances but concrete decisions are few and the potential for disruption is high. Clear threats tend to make for Alliance cohesion, Berit Børgensen notes in chapter 5, but not in the case of terrorism. Following a brief moment of unison in 2001–2003, terrorism has tended to raise questions that divide the Allies. Many of the policies that NATO defined in 2001–2003 to ‘transform’ itself – from new partnerships to new missions – therefore relate to a core that is no longer there. NATO thus has policies in search of a cause.

Section 3 looks beyond the traditional equation of power and Alliance cohesion to the dynamics of the cooperative security that NATO enthusiastically pursues. Niels Henrik Hedegaard reminds us in chapter 6 that NATO’s cooperative ambitions have a long history and are designed precisely to engender cooperation with, in particular, the UN and the EU. NATO is learning from the Afghan mission and it is working to create the concrete civil–military capacities that will make an operational impact and, moreover, it has no desire to tread into the domains of other organisations, Hedegaard writes. Cooperative security nonetheless runs into a host of critical observations, beginning with Peter Viggo Jakobsen’s dissection of the capacity issue. In chapter 7 he argues that the NATO approach is too little and, from the perspective of ongoing operations, too late. NATO needs to come up with a more robust organisational design if the civil–military ambition is to work, he argues. NATO robustness is also
a theme in Henrik Lindbo Larsen’s treatment of NATO’s partnership policy and the troubles it encounters in NATO’s near abroad – in Eastern Europe. NATO has lost out in recent years, Henrik Larsen concludes in chapter 8, and NATO must go further in incorporating into its cooperative security agenda a geopolitical dimension that can better align ambition and reality. The NATO robustness that these critical observers call for typically puts other organisations on their guard. Mark Webber probably speaks on behalf of many in the UN when, in chapter 9, he urges NATO to more visibly embrace the agenda of ‘human security’ that has found its way into the UN system. If NATO does so, it would align with the UN and its increased organisational capacity would provoke no anxiety. If NATO does not, however, anxiety will probably follow. Sven Biscop looks at NATO from an EU perspective in chapter 10 and finds little raison d’être behind NATO’s efforts. He argues that NATO should leave the crisis management business to the EU and open the door to a supposedly more productive EU–US relationship for a variety of reasons that are set out in the chapter.

Following these political designs and controversies, section 3 addresses military implications of the New Strategic Concept and the fit between NATO blueprints and operational reality. Strategic Concepts traditionally guide military planners but this New Concept is short, highly political and mentions Afghanistan in only one instance (as a source of the Comprehensive Approach). In chapter 11 Theo Farrell addresses this operational deficit in the Strategic Concept. The Afghan campaign reflects not only a challenge we know well by now, namely that of state building and crisis management, but also an evolving form of warfare that demands foresight and adaptability from intervening forces. NATO has become operationally more proficient, especially in the field of counterinsurgency warfare, but is notably passive strategically. NATO needs to get better at connecting politics and war, Farrell concludes. It is therefore interesting to engage with chapter 12 and Paal Sigurd Hilde’s dissection of Command Structure reform inside NATO. Not normally a topic with great public appeal, Command Structure reform ought to attract wider attention because it reflects how NATO, some years ago, decided to focus solely on the type of expeditionary warfare we see in Afghanistan but now also wants to build in the kind of regional defence concern that allies in proximity to Russia are clamouring for. The contrast between Afghan lessons, strategic ambitions and organisational reform certainly gives food for thought. In chapter 13 Thierry Legendre adds more to our plate, asking us to keep an eye on the big political and financial issues when addressing military change. NATO capacities depend on big changes on the European scene such as defence reform in Germany or Franco-British initiatives, just as NATO’s
relevance to the United States increasingly depends on a working relationship between NATO and the EU. In short, much work remains to be done. We finish with two contrasting views. Christopher Schnaubelt’s assessment in chapter 14 offers a downbeat view of the Strategic Concept’s ability to raise NATO efforts to the level where the big challenges can be successfully dealt with. Militarily speaking, NATO reform will continue along conceptual tracks that are well known and are captured under the header of expeditionary operations – but in a fashion that will do little to ameliorate the underlying burden sharing problem that bedevils the Alliance. Trine Flockhart offers a different, more upbeat assessment in chapter 15, as she engages the advances that NATO has, after all, made in relation to issues of nuclear doctrine, disarmament and missile defence. It is a large and complex package of politically charged issues, which accounts for inertia in some respects, but NATO is moving and it is not unlikely, Flockhart tells us, that NATO will continue moving and become an engine of improved security in areas of hard security.

In a concluding chapter (chapter 16) Karl-Heinz Kamp takes stock of the Strategic Concept and enumerates along with its many advances a number of important and unresolved problems relating to Russia’s status, nuclear disarmament, and new policies on the issues of proliferation, partnership and cyber defence. He also reminds us to read the Lisbon Summit Declaration in parallel with the Strategic Concept: the latter is short and visionary, the former contains all the work (‘tasking’, in NATO-speak) that now needs to be done. The Strategic Concept is a beginning, Kamp therefore concludes, and we should judge NATO by its ability to implement the work it has defined for itself.

We, the editors, will not write a separate conclusion to the book. We have had the opportunity in this introduction to outline what we see as the main driver behind the New Strategic Concept – the ambition to make NATO more global and political, less regional and military. Likewise, we have been able to allude to a number of challenges. The chapters raise many excellent questions and offer much food for thought. We have sought to advance thinking on NATO issues by organising the chapters into sections that, in effect, ask the reader to identify his or her own position in the debate: between the past and the present (section 1), between power and diplomacy (section 2), between cooperation and conflict (section 3), between military change and continuity (section 4), and between vision and implementation (conclusion).

By way of conclusion we encourage ongoing debate on NATO. This is a debate which really began during the Second World War when Theodore Roosevelt and
Winston Churchill crafted a vision of international peace with the Atlantic Charter and sought transatlantic cooperation to counter, as Churchill would later say, the ‘two great dangers’ which menaced: namely war and tyranny. Some might venture that not much has changed whereas others might object that everything has changed. One sure observation seems to be that NATO is at the crossroads of a great debate on change and continuity in international affairs.

Notes

2 The six Strategic Concepts are: DC 6/1 (1949), MC 3/5 (1952), MC 14/2 (1957), MC 14/3 (1968), the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept (1991), and the Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999).
5 Interview at NATO HQ, 31 October 2008.
8 See §20.
12 For the DAS, see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm?mode=pressrelease.
13 The Albright groups report was titled, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. For the full report, see http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf
17 ‘Active Engagement; Modern Defence’, §26.
18 Ibid, §37.
PART I

NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Bird’s Eye Perspectives
I. What does a New Strategic Concept do for NATO?
Jamie Shea¹, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, NATO.

Strategic concepts are usually difficult exercises for institutions. If they result in too much reaffirmation of the status quo they can be seen as an expensive waste of time and effort. If they produce too much innovation or new directions, the institution’s relevance can be questioned. Is it looking for a new role because its traditional tasks are now redundant? So the most successful strategic concepts tend to be those that reaffirm and renew at the same time. In this way an institution can remind its public (and often its own member governments as well) of all the reasons why it needs to continue to exist, while also initiating the necessary changes to keep the institution relevant in ten or twenty years time. But it can do this in a gradualist way that allows the institution time to adapt and implement the internal reforms and structural changes without which new policies cannot be carried out.

The Strategic Concept that NATO adopted at its Lisbon Summit in November 2010 reflects this balance between old and new and this gradualist and evolutionary approach, even though Alliance officials often speak in more radical terms such as ‘transformation’ or ‘NATO 3.0’, which are better at grabbing attention. Although the Concept itself is a radical departure from the previous 1991 and 1999 versions, in being short and written in clear, non-diplo-speak language, the contents themselves will be familiar to NATO watchers. The core functions and tasks remain largely the same. Article 5 collective defence is still NATO’s fundamental purpose. This must still be maintained through deterrence based on a mix of nuclear and conventional weapons, even though missile defence has now been added to this mix as the third leg of a new triad of capabilities. NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. Even if the Alliance endorses the ultimate vision of a nuclear free world, it is for others, especially the aspirant proliferators, to make the first move as NATO has already eliminated ninety per cent of its nuclear arsenal in Europe since the end of the Cold War. Moreover in an environment with multiple challenges, there is still the same, very traditional, requirement to maintain robust defence budgets and to invest in modernised expeditionary forces for the full range of NATO missions – even if the Strategic Concept makes no reference to the 2% of GDP benchmark or to an explicit level of ambition. Other hardy perennials of NATO concepts, communiqués, declarations and speeches over past decades are also reiterated. The call for solidarity, the importance of the transatlantic link, the appeal to all Allies to engage fully and
openly in consultations on security issues of common interest. And, last but not least, the relationship of NATO to the UN Charter (which is its basis in international law) as well as to the prerogatives of the UN Security Council.

There is of course nothing amiss in reaffirming these core values and principles of the Alliance. Indeed given that they have been part of NATO’s existential DNA for over six decades, it would not be only NATO’s future but it’s very raison d’être which would be in doubt were either North Americans or Europeans now to feel that these values today are less important. This said, to reiterate is also a way of repledging, especially in areas such as solidarity or consultations, which can never be taken for granted and where different allies have different expectations depending on which challenges they see as the most threatening to their national security. In this context some aspects of NATO’s New Strategic Concept can be viewed as much as an attempt to revive things that NATO did more frequently in the past as an attempt to introduce wholly new things onto the Alliance’s agenda. Take, for instance, the focus on arms control and using NATO as a forum to coordinate the views and positions of allies on the major arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations. Arguably NATO did this often and well during the Cold War with high level groups such as the Special Consultative Group and the High Level Task Force, albeit with the incentive of the US–Soviet talks on strategic, intermediate and tactical nuclear weapons and conventional troop and equipment numbers which were key to Allied security in Europe. This is a good habit that was lost somewhat after the fall of the Berlin Wall. NATO was less successful in applying the principle of coordination to the more global negotiations such as the NPT regime, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty or new forms of conventional arms control. So arms control is a habit to be relearned rather than discovered.

A similar case can be made for transatlantic consultations and NATO’s political role, which are central to the New Strategic Concept. This author can well remember discussions in the North Atlantic Council on the Middle East, Asia or Africa twenty years ago when virtually all international security crises were on NATO’s consultative agenda, even if there was no presumption of Alliance action. In recent years the focus on NATO’s military operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan or off the Horn of Africa have narrowed NATO’s political horizons – and consultations – to the immediate regions where NATO has troops on the ground. Consultation and action have become mutually dependent with political attention even following a military deployment, as in the case of Afghanistan. So again it can be argued that NATO needs not to invent but merely revive the practice of broad consultation and exchange of
analyses and information that it carried out successfully in the past – admittedly in a pre-1989 age when its agenda was less crowded than today.

In sum, a historian of the NATO of the 1960s or 1970s who reads the 2010 Strategic Concept will probably be struck as much by the continuity as the change. The first elements of NATO’s post Cold War transformation, which emerged in the mid-1990s, still largely dominate the New Concept: for instance, the emphasis on crisis management and out-of-area stabilisation operations. The Concept does not abandon these, despite the difficult times NATO has had in Afghanistan in transitioning from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency. Rather the focus is on learning the lessons in order to do these operations better in the future, especially in terms of developing the ‘comprehensive approach’ which will better coordinate and integrate the efforts of all the international actors. Another new emphasis is on developing NATO’s role in training, as the experience with the Afghan security forces and the Kosovo Security Force has clearly demonstrated that training – started earlier and done better – will be the only viable exit strategy for the Alliance’s overseas deployments. Another familiar policy concerns partnerships. The Partnership for Peace has been arguably NATO’s greatest if often unsung success story since the end of the Cold War. Today the Alliance has over 20 partners in ISAF in Afghanistan, constituting 15% of its overall force, and new forums, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and Global Partners, have sprung up alongside the older Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Unsurprisingly the New Strategic Concept salutes this success story and calls for these multiple and often very different partnerships to be developed further. But it does not create a new institution, or a single global partnership, or a new category of partner akin to an associate member or the like. This definitional work will be left to a new Partnership Concept to be developed after the summit. A third aspect of continuity is in the Open Door for further NATO enlargement. Notwithstanding widespread enlargement fatigue in Europe and the fall-out from the Russia–Georgia conflict in 2008, the Strategic Concept boldly reaffirms that NATO will accept further members in the future. However it does not give timelines.

Again there is nothing wrong in reaffirming well-established policies where they have demonstrated their effectiveness, where they remain obviously relevant to 21st century security and, last but not least, where NATO has shown its niche value. NATO is right to state that notwithstanding the current unpopularity of Afghanistan, it will most probably be involved in further operations in the future. For every ‘war of choice’ there is a ‘war of necessity’ and NATO has to get the formula right,
given the sacrifices – human and financial – involved. Similarly, partners these days are as essential to NATO as NATO is to its partners. They provide troops, bases, overflights, intelligence and expertise that are all the more useful as NATO ventures beyond Europe to areas such as Afghanistan where it has little prior knowledge. So clearly it would be foolhardy for the Alliance not to want to nurture and expand this invaluable partnership network reaching out to the new global actors, such as China and India. Finally, given the role played by NATO enlargement in stabilising Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, it would be counterproductive to walk away from the Open Door and lose thereby an invaluable source of leverage over the reforms and policies of potential candidate countries.

What then is really new about NATO’s New Strategic Concept? In the midst of so much continuity and reaffirmation, there are three areas of innovation that stand out. Whether they will transform NATO as fundamentally or as durably as the innovations of the Brussels Summit of 1994 or the Prague Summit of 2002 is something that only time will tell.

The first innovation lies in the new security challenges. NATO is to become more involved in dealing with cyber attacks, energy security, proliferation and terrorism. However, only the emphasis on cyber is really new, the other topics having already been on NATO’s agenda for some time. However, it is not originality that counts but seriousness. Will the Alliance now devote the resources, expertise and high-level political attention to be a serious player in these areas, alongside other relevant players such as the EU, UN, IAEA or Interpol? How can NATO complement, coordinate and enhance the already considerable national efforts in these areas? Will NATO find the time and space to address these challenges in a meaningful way when it is fully preoccupied with its military missions, particularly Afghanistan and the process of transition to Afghan responsibility? These are all important questions but NATO cannot afford not to be a major player on these issues. Terrorism in all its dimensions beyond Afghanistan, energy cut-offs, mounting cyber attacks, and proliferation are, after all, what our publics are most preoccupied with these days. They will not see NATO as key to their security protection if the Alliance does not progressively demonstrate its added value in responding to these already emerged challenges. The establishment by NATO of an entirely new division to tackle these issues is a good start.

The second innovation lies in the area of connectivity. Is this in fact an innovation or just the recognition of an international reality? When it wrote its last Strategic
Concept in 1999 NATO could just about fulfil its key security tasks with its own members and capabilities. Partners were useful but not essential. Today the reality is different. NATO and its military instruments remain crucial to a whole spectrum of security missions but the Alliance cannot succeed alone. In the past it needed only to leverage the commitment and contributions of its own members. Now it is even more urgent to leverage the commitment and contributions of others, such as the EU, the UN, regional organisations or the NGO community. The New Strategic Concept recognises this reality by agreeing to equip NATO with a number of civilian planners who can reach out to the civilian agencies and actors and try to involve them as early as possible in joint civil–military planning. In the future NATO’s effectiveness will be directly proportionate to its contact address book and its ability to be accepted by the other leading institutions as a natural and permanent interlocutor. But sometimes NATO seems keener on this connectivity than the others. How can a two-way street be instituted? In particular the most important relationship – that between NATO and the EU – remains obstructed by issues related to the participation of Turkey and Cyprus despite the efforts of both institutions to lift the obstacles.

Third, and finally, crisis prevention. The lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan is that interventions which last longer than the First and Second World Wars combined are no longer feasible for cash-strapped western governments with ballooning fiscal deficits. As prevention is always better than cure, NATO will need to be more agile in anticipating and heading off potential crises before they reach the stage where only prolonged, messy and expensive interventions remain as an option. For an institution used to leaving crisis prevention, or crisis management in its early stages, largely to other institutions (such as the EU or UN) or to its own member states, effective crisis prevention will involve something of a culture change. Allies will need to share more and better intelligence earlier; the NATO civilian and military staffs will need to prepare early warning analyses and options papers, and the NATO member states will need to be prepared to consult quickly – without being over-sensitive to the image vis-à-vis the outside world that such consultations may convey. For nothing will ever be achieved if all possible objections must first be overcome. Partners, who may be affected or whose interests may be affected, could also be brought into these consultations.

In conclusion, the most innovative aspect of the New Strategic Concept may well be in the way it was conducted. A consultation process lasted for nearly a year, led by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and a group of outside experts. They conducted several seminars and visited all NATO capitals as well as Moscow,
talking to innumerable security policy experts, political leaders and civil society representatives. The fact that the Allies also used this public outreach process to debate the key ideas among themselves undoubtedly helped them to understand each other’s positions better and to draw closer. Thus the consultation process was not only a useful reality check for the Alliance, in terms of meeting outside expectations, but also enabled the Allies to identify the crucial balances in the actual Strategic Concept text: between Article 5 collective defence and out-of-area operations; between nuclear deterrence and the need for arms control; between reassurance for NATO’s new member states and a new quality of engagement with Russia built around missile defence cooperation; and between what NATO can do itself and what it needs to do in partnership with others. This process of public outreach not only helped to make the contents of the New Strategic Concept more acceptable and accessible to NATO’s own stakeholders in government, parliaments and the wider strategic community; it also produced a better thought through and more intellectually coherent product than would normally be the case. Moreover the fact that such a thorough, prolonged and transparent analysis of NATO ‘warts and all’ should conclude that there is much that is good and right about the Alliance (evolution, not revolution) is a testament not only to NATO’s present leadership but to those NATO leaders who have gone before.

**Note**

1 The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
Klaus Wittmann

Self-ascertainment of the 60-year-old North Atlantic Alliance; a modern definition of NATO’s purpose, character and role in the 21st century; recommitment and reassurance of all Allies; answers to today’s and tomorrow’s security challenges; concrete goals for continuous reform and the rallying of public support: NATO’s New Strategic Concept, agreed by the November 2010 summit at Lisbon, has many functions to fulfil. How well does it succeed?

Needed: a new mission statement
The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, NATO’s founding document, finds its concretisation in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, which is constantly reviewed and periodically updated. The Treaty itself, with its commitment to international peace, security and justice, remains valid to the freedom, common heritage and civilization of its peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. It is still relevant to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and to the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Washington Treaty’s main provisions also endure: consultation (Article 4), mutual assistance in the case of armed attack (Article 5) and openness for new members (Article 10).

The first Strategic Concept was issued in 1991 after the end of the Cold War and revised in 1999. It stood outdated for quite some time, since it was agreed before the terror attacks of September 2001, NATO’s Afghanistan mission, the Iraq war and the Russo-Georgian conflict, but also prior to the growing awareness of globalised security challenges for which there are no military solutions. So the question that was posed was whether NATO, which had been so successful in protecting Western Europe during the East–West conflict, in helping to stabilise the developing ‘Europe whole and free’ and in pacifying the Western Balkans, would develop into an Alliance for the 21st century, and what that would require.

However, at NATO Headquarters and in member capitals there was, for some years, great reluctance to set about a revision of the 1999 document; some feared a ‘very divisive process’. The proponents of a new Strategic Concept countered this apprehension with the suggestion that the Allies were so divided on several central issues that
a ‘uniting effort’ was urgently needed\textsuperscript{1} and that in order to document its continuing relevance in the diffuse security environment of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century NATO was in need of a new and convincing mission statement.

**A public and participatory process**

That is what NATO finally embarked on during its 60\textsuperscript{th} anniversary summit meeting at Strasbourg/Kehl in April 2009, when its Heads of State and Government commissioned a new Strategic Concept. The new Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, chose a procedure drastically different from the way in which the last two Strategic Concepts had been developed – namely through a process of year-long negotiations among the member nations over numerous drafts, outside the gaze of the broader public, which resulted in texts fraught with diplomatic formulae, compromise language and ‘constructive ambiguities’.

This time particular difficulties had to be taken into account: first, NATO’s engagement in an ever more problematic mission in Afghanistan, where it has been left with the bulk of the tasks the international community has taken on. Second, the unwillingness of ‘post heroic’ societies, exacerbated by the financial and economic crisis, to sacrifice for security. Third, the disunity among NATO members about fundamental matters regarding its character, role, tasks and policy. Fourth, the impression that solidarity among allies was weakening. Fifth, with an Alliance membership now much more diverse, quite divergent threat perceptions among allies and, finally, NATO’s image – particularly in the Muslim world – of being an instrument of often problematic US policy or – in the perception of its own populations and media – of being a relic of the Cold War.

Since the questions of NATO’s continued relevance and its public support were so crucial the preparation of the New Strategic Concept was launched by the Secretary General adopting an ‘inclusive and participatory approach’ in an ‘interactive dialogue with the broader public’. A group of twelve experts was formed under the chairmanship of former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, which in mid-May 2010 presented its Report after a dense series of seminars and consultations. The document ‘NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement’ reflected agreement among the group members. This did not yet mean consensus among the 28 NATO governments and it can be argued that work on a draft cannot create consensus on controversial issues, but that, rather, the Concept should reflect the consensus built, or restored, in political consultations.
It must be recognised, however, that the Albright Group did a good job in ‘loosening the ground’ as it were, in preparing consensus, fuelling public debate and interest in NATO, getting the strategic community involved, providing transparency as well as inducing member states to clarify their positions and ‘show the colour of their cards’. And the Secretary General was probably right in keeping control of the draft developed by him and his closest collaborators, while taking on board comments from the nations and consulting discreetly about contentious aspects, thus avoiding negotiations proper, square brackets, involvement of several layers of the NATO bureaucracy, and many iterations of an ever more diluted text.

The New Strategic Concept was agreed at NATO’s Lisbon Summit by Heads of State and Government on 19 November 2010 under the title ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’. True, the eleven-page document, half the size of its predecessor, papers over some of the persisting divisions. But on the whole it is a credit to the Secretary General’s procedure and political energy. Analysts had always said that the process would be as important as the result: as significant as the outcome might be the fact that in the course of this work NATO member nations had to reflect about their own security policies, interests, priorities and the demands of Alliance solidarity. This resulted in many non-papers laying out national priorities, many of which the final draft has accommodated where appropriate. In sum, the New Strategic Concept is a good achievement in that it rallies the Allies behind NATO’s purpose, recommitting them to it and to Alliance solidarity. How solid that is will be discussed later in this chapter.

**Ambitious content**

The content of the document revolves around three core tasks: ‘defence and deterrence’, ‘security through crisis management’ and ‘promoting international security through cooperation’. They are introduced by a statement of enduring principles: that NATO’s purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members and that its character is one of being a unique community of values. The primary responsibility of the UN Security Council is affirmed, as is the critical importance of the political and military transatlantic link between Europe and North America. All of this is intended to ensure that ‘the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values’.

With regard to collective defence, the central character of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (mutual assistance in the case of armed attack) is restated unequivocally,
a commitment that ‘remains firm and binding’. This was important in the light of concerns expressed particularly by new allies who feared that this commitment could be diluted or taken less seriously by NATO members who, ‘surrounded by friends and allies’, might put out-of-area operations and harmony with Russia first. In drawn-out discussions, reassurance of all NATO member states came to be seen as a precondition for everything else NATO does.\(^2\) So it is significant that the Strategic Concept pledges to ‘carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies’.  

Not focusing this task too exclusively on NATO members’ territorial defence (‘The Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low’), the relevant section unfolds the array of security challenges of the present and the foreseeable future, including proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, cyber attacks, international terrorism, threats to critical energy infrastructure, and emerging technologies. These are all seen as areas for Alliance solidarity, without implying that they can be countered mainly with military means or necessarily fall under Article 5. So the threat assessment is very broad, the security challenges are seen as diffuse, volatile and unpredictable, and possible NATO action will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The reference to climate change, whose long-term consequences can have heavy implications for global security, is remarkably vague, though.

The New Strategic Concept does not prioritise between defence and crisis management tasks. Recognising that crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can impact Alliance security, it declares prevention and management of crises as well as stabilisation of post-conflict situations and support of reconstruction as necessary NATO engagements. Monitoring and analysing the international environment as a contribution to prevention is part of this, and it leads to the need to broaden and intensify political consultations among allies and with partners to deal ‘with all stages of a crisis’.

However, the statement that “NATO will be prepared and capable to manage ongoing hostilities” is a tall order, given the current Afghanistan experience. The one explicit lesson drawn from Afghanistan is that there is a need for a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach. In order to foster this, it was decided after controversial debates that NATO will create “an appropriate but modest civilian
management capability” as an ‘interface’ with civilian partners. Rightly, the training of local security forces is highlighted.

Characteristically, the elaboration of the third core task, ‘promoting international security through cooperation’, starts with arms control, but its commitment to “create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons” is limited to the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Further reduction of nuclear weapons is linked to concomitant steps by Russia. On conventional arms control, the statement (“to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe”) is rather bland and does not present the necessary novel ideas.

Partnerships (including, oddly, also cooperation with other institutions such as the UN and the EU) are emphasised, building on the existing formats (Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Ukraine, Georgia) and seeking to enhance them.

Regarding other security-relevant institutions, only the United Nations (with the intent to give life to the 2008 UN–NATO Declaration) and the European Union are mentioned. Some space is devoted to the relationship with the latter, but for as long as that cooperation is blocked for political reasons, these statements remain largely declaratory.

The Lisbon Summit was widely interpreted as a breakthrough in NATO’s cooperation with Russia and as a contribution “to creating a common space of peace, stability and security”. A ‘strategic partnership’ is sought with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia. Convinced that “the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined”, NATO proposes the enhancement of political consultations and practical cooperation in areas of shared interest, such as missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and counter-piracy as well as using the full potential of the NATO–Russia Council for dialogue and joint action. A cautious agreement to ‘exploring’ missile defence cooperation by the Russian President who came to Lisbon was also seen as an important advance in this regard. In turn, NATO did not overly emphasise its Open Door policy, limiting itself in the Strategic Concept to conventional statements of principle.

Finally, on ‘reform and transformation’, the Concept limits itself to stating intentions seen before: sufficient resources, deployability and sustainability of forces, coherent defence planning, interoperability, commonality of capabilities, standards, structures
and funding. Continual reform “to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency” is pledged, once again.

A courageous document
The New Strategic Concept is a courageous document because it contrasts with the zeitgeist in several regards: first, in spite of the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world, it emphasises the need for nuclear deterrence as long as such weapons exist. Second, although many global security challenges are not of a predominantly military nature, NATO enlarges its ambition as a security provider. Third, while it remains a regional organisation, it avoids an insular, euro-centric perspective and looks towards the global horizon. Fourth, in spite of recent problems with the enlargement process and Russian indignation about it, the Alliance maintains its Open Door policy for European countries fit for accession and able to make their contribution to European security; and, finally, without antagonising Russia, it takes the concerns of Central and Eastern European allies seriously.

The development of the New Strategic Concept ran counter to the general rule that such basic documents are neither particularly visionary nor forward-looking. Rather, they tend to codify previous decisions: theory follows events, concepts come after reality, as was the case with the 1999 Strategic Concept. The 1991 document was another exception because of the revolutionarily novel situation. It is to the credit of the Expert Group and the Secretary General that the Lisbon Strategic Concept is impressively programmatic and future-oriented.

Not all that shines is gold
A number of small but not unimportant flaws should have been avoided. The extension of the term ‘partnership’ to include cooperation with international organisations (e.g. the UN and the EU) dilutes and devalues NATO’s successful concept of ‘Partnership’ (with a capital P). Also, at a time when conflict prevention appears ever more important, it is difficult to understand why the Strategic Concept makes no mention of the OSCE, let alone the African Union. Furthermore, although the staunch stand on nuclear weapons is commendable, NATO’s characterisation as a ‘nuclear alliance’ goes somewhat over the top and might prove counterproductive. In addition, the document is weak on lessons from Afghanistan – lessons pertaining to the larger international community – which leaves many responsibilities to NATO, and internal lessons regarding command and control, coordination, multinationality, national caveats etc unaddressed. Finally, since
NATO’s much broader involvement with global security challenges proclaimed by the Strategic Concept will have to happen through a rigorous activation of Article 4 (consultation) of the Washington Treaty, it would have been logical to add ‘consultation’ as a fourth ‘essential core task’ to the triad proclaimed (collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security).

Moreover, it must be stated that the elegant text conceals that there is no really solid unity on a number of issues: namely whether NATO is a regional or a global organisation, predominantly political or military, how it must balance collective defence and expeditionary orientation, how it must assess certain security challenges and their emphasis in the view of individual allies, the NATO–EU relationship and its political ‘blockage’, the UN mandate issue, the approach to Russia, nuclear weapons policy etc. In some of these areas, the verbal consensus may quickly collapse in light of concrete tasks, requirements and challenges.

On NATO’s reach and character, one would like to be able to read from the Strategic Concept that NATO continues to regard itself as a regional organisation, but one with a global perspective, which brings emphasis to consultation among allies as envisaged in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. And the perennial debate on whether NATO is a military or a political organisation should at last be put to rest. It is a politico-military security organisation that puts its unique capabilities at the service of international security. These capabilities are its military forces, the integrated command structure, common defence and force planning, its experience in multinational military cooperation and its expertise in training. But to regard it as the ‘hub’ of the international system would be counter-productive, and its place in that system appears to require better explanation.

**The real task: implementation**

The New Strategic Concept will be only as good as its implementation. In the Lisbon Summit Declaration this is recognised with many quite urgent taskings to Foreign and Defence Ministers as well as to the Permanent Council. So the Strategic Concept must be read alongside the Summit Declaration and, for that matter, the NATO–Russia Council Joint Statement.

By way of an example, successful implementation of the principles and intentions is crucial in the following fields, and in some respects also requires more conceptual work. Regarding the first core task, deterrence and defence, definition is needed of
the added value that NATO can offer in combating the ‘new’ security challenges of terrorism, cyber threats, energy security, piracy, organised crime and trafficking in human beings. It is no secret that there continues to be great variance among allies concerning NATO’s role and the function of the military in these fields. With regard to the ‘assurance of all Allies’, it remains to be seen to what extent preparatory measures and contingency planning will be implemented, and how visible (and thereby effective) they will be. Wikileaks’ publication of documents regarding contingency planning for the defence of Poland and the Baltic countries has already sparked protest from Russia’s Ambassador at NATO.

This is one of the aspects where the relationship with Russia appears fragile. The interpretation of the NATO–Russia Summit in Lisbon is derived from the ‘breakthrough’ on missile defence (but the agreement ‘to discuss pursuing missile defence cooperation’ sounds rather cautious), on plans for concrete cooperation in various practical fields including a ‘Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges’, and on a very positive statement of intent about further use of the NATO–Russia Council.

Is that sufficient and sustainable? This author has thought for a long time that the term ‘reset’ of relations with Russia is a bad metaphor. It is not only a new start that is needed, but also an improved ‘programme’. That would include, on the Alliance’s side, the explicit acknowledgement of NATO’s share of responsibility for the worsening of the relationship with Russia: it failed to understand Russian political psychology and fear of marginalisation, it orchestrated the last enlargement push poorly, paid no attention to Russian proposals for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, failed to present the missile defence issue as a truly common cause and has not contributed sufficiently to making optimal use of the NRC, particularly when it was most needed in the Georgia crisis.

In turn, Russia should cease to see NATO as a ‘danger’ or even a ‘threat’, and not aim to constrain or split it but rather to share the same values, respect the principles of the Charter of Paris, overcome old geopolitical and geostrategic categories, abandon Cold War clichés about NATO, give up the idea of a ‘special sphere of influence’, not instrumentalise ‘Russians abroad’, renounce revisionism and fully support the sovereignty and independence of its neighbours and contribute itself to their ‘reassurance’, fully embrace cooperative (as opposed to confrontational) security, follow up first positive steps in its ‘history policy’ vis-à-vis Poland (and, in future, also others), and realise that Russia can only ‘isolate itself’. Together NATO and Russia must overcome zero-sum thinking in security policy, where one side can allegedly only gain at the expense of the other. In turn, a substantial NATO response to the Medvedev
proposals is overdue, given the awareness that Russia’s place in the European security order is still insufficiently defined.

On nuclear weapons policy, it is clear that the remit contained in the Summit Declaration to ‘review NATO’s overall posture’ points to the need for a fundamental debate about the role of nuclear weapons, about extended deterrence and forward stationing, about the shift from ‘deterrence by punishment’ to ‘deterrence by denial’ (of options), and about the future of ‘nuclear sharing’. The task for NATO and its member governments remains to reconcile public expectations for ‘global zero’ with the explanation of deterrence requirements in the (presumably very long) transition period. Conspicuously, the debate about a nuclear free world has until now been a Western soliloquy.

Conventional arms control is given importance in the Strategic Concept including, in the Summit Declaration, a revival of the High Level Task Force (HLTF) that accompanied the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations in the nineties. But there are no new ideas and “work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe” is not enough. The CFE Treaty, suspended by Russia, is all but dead and its confidence-building instruments of verification and transparency are corroding. Therefore a new departure in conventional arms control is required, which means broad talks among all European states, most prominently including Russia, about conventional military forces, their potential linkage to tactical nuclear weapons, threat perceptions, doctrines, force levels, weapon holdings – talks leading to negotiations about numerical limitations, regional constraints and transparency measures. Such a new approach would enhance confidence in the strictly defensive orientation of military postures, would advance cooperative security among the nations of Europe, and might support nuclear disarmament and missile defence cooperation.

Since the new security challenges are not amenable to mainly military responses NATO is not the sole actor and Alliance solidarity in this field does not automatically invoke Article 5; the ‘broadened and intensified’ consultation pledged by the Strategic Concept is of the essence. But is it realised that this will mean a genuine cultural shift in NATO? Until now many obvious security issues have never reached the Council table; not least for fear that disagreements would be interpreted as an internal crisis. Also, to bring about a qualitative improvement in consultation a much-improved analysis and assessment capacity is needed at NATO HQ. This appears to have been recognised through the establishment in the International Staff of a new ‘Emerging Security Challenges’ division. However, the extent to which it will produce valid political-military analysis or deal with all relevant issues (including the long-term
implications of climate change), and whether or not it will contribute to substantially broadening the Council agenda remains to be seen.

The task of developing “a more efficient and flexible partnership policy” is a massive one and it should involve a review of the basic Partnership for Peace document. One goal must be to strengthen the consultation clause for cases where Partners see menaces to their security. It is an open question whether NATO will achieve an improvement in the operation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which played no role whatsoever in the months prior to the outbreak of the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. Regarding the further development of ‘global’ partnerships with likeminded countries or those contributing to the Afghanistan mission, utmost transparency is required towards powers like India and China.

As noted above, it is striking that in a period when crisis prevention is gaining ever more significance, the Strategic Concept makes no mention of the OSCE. True, its Astana Summit was no success, but the need remains to strengthen the potential and the instruments of that organisation and to join forces with the OSCE’s emphasis on ‘soft security’ such as human rights, confidence-building and early warning, all Allies being also OSCE members, and to jointly strive for better crisis management and prevention of violent conflict. Also the African Union, an embodiment of the approach by Africa’s nations to take ownership of African problems, deserves all possible support from NATO, not only in concrete operations but also in being given access to the wealth of NATO experience in fields such as consultation, civil–military cooperation, education and training, security sector reform, force planning, arms control and confidence-building.

However, much space is devoted to the European Union with its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as an important complement to NATO that enables European countries to take responsibility for security and stability on their continent and at its periphery. But statements about strengthened strategic partnership, enhanced practical cooperation, broadened political consultation, and fuller cooperation in capability development will ring hollow for as long the cooperation is still blocked by individual allies. Success of the new effort by the Secretary General and the High Representative, to be reported to Ministers in April, is indeed pivotal for any progress.

Finally, cooperation with the UN, close to satisfactory on the ground in foreign missions, nevertheless requires the enhancement of consultation at the political–strategic level. The UN–NATO Declaration, concluded in 2008, needs to be enlivened. Liaison
procedures and effective consulting practices are necessary. The UN’s Peacebuilding Commission should be a venue for institutional cooperation. It remains to be seen how quickly these good intentions will overcome the prevailing mistrust at the East River towards NATO.

More than any further conceptualisation, the Comprehensive Approach requires convincing persuasion and better implementation. There is acknowledgement that missions like the one in Afghanistan cannot reach their goals by military effort alone and demand, in addition to their continued joint, inter-agency and multinational character, close and synergetic cooperation with International Organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This is not about hierarchy; NATO should not aspire to a dominant position, not want to coordinate others but to coordinate with them. Self-evident as the concept is, greater efforts are needed to make it work as a truly integrated civilian–military effort, overcoming national and institutional interests and bias. Improvement of NATO’s interaction with NGOs is crucial. It will mean the meeting of different, often opposing, institutional ‘cultures’, where the military wishes to take control, whilst the NGOs seek to preserve their independence and impartiality as critical to their success. Further efforts are needed towards better mutual understanding through dialogue as well as joint planning and training.

With regard to the development of NATO’s military capabilities, the Strategic Concept, the Summit Declaration and the ‘Lisbon Capability Goals’ do not contain more than the obvious goals (usability, deployability, sustainability etc.), well known from the 1999 Defence Capability Initiative (DCI), the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) or the Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG) of 2006. They all yielded very limited results and with the financial and economic crisis and the resulting drastic cuts in many national defence budgets, it is difficult to see how the gulf between ambitions and means will be bridged better than hitherto. Much more joint development of military capabilities and multinational, cost-effective approaches are needed.

Also in the field of missile defence, apart from the foreseeable resurgence of disagreements among allies and Russia’s mistrust, the cost may be a factor that will hamper the swift implementation of an important improvement of NATO’s defence capability.

For NATO’s internal reform, the Strategic Concept and the Summit Declaration give the Secretary General a broad mandate and great authority “to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency”. Implementation will again be the crucial test of NATO’s ‘continual reform’ and it is revealing that the Declara-
tion (in the context of Command Structure and Agencies Reform) twice refers to outstanding decisions about the ‘geographic footprint’, which means nothing other than the strong interest of individual nations to retain NATO commands, installations or institutions on their soil.

There are many more fields in which one will observe with interest the pace and scale of the New Strategic Concept’s implementation (or where, as noted before, further conceptual work is desirable). Beyond those mentioned here, these include: lessons from operations and guidelines for further NATO operations, the appropriateness of NATO’s Level of Ambitions, counter-insurgency in a NATO context, the development of the NATO Response Force (NRF) assessment and further development of multinationality, training assistance and NATO’s contribution to DDR and SSR, NATO’s contribution to non-proliferation, and public diplomacy.

Also, there are fields for particular study and formulation of common Alliance positions, such as developments in international law regarding defence in the light of potentially apocalyptic attacks with no pre-warning; ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in cases of genocide and massive human rights violations, problems of ‘humanitarian intervention’, implications of ‘failed states’, and the further development of a credible deterrence doctrine in a multipolar world with a multitude of state and non-state actors.

**Conclusion**

Notwithstanding this critical look at what it means and implies in practice, the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept does make a good case for NATO’s relevance in the 21st century, and after the amazing post Cold War adaptation of the Alliance it marks another significant transformational step – programmatically. Now Allies must afford the political will and provide the resources for implementing what they have courageously proclaimed.

**Notes**


PART 2

Dynamic Power, Elusive Threats and Alliance Turbulence
3. NATO’s Political Transformation and International Order

Adrian Hyde-Price

The Lisbon Summit (19–20 November 2010) marks another waypoint in NATO’s evolution from an alliance focused on East–West deterrence and defence to one re-tooled to address the challenges of a more fluid and uncertain international environment. Like previous summits in Prague, Washington and Strasbourg, it sought to answer the question posed by the end of Cold War bipolarity: what is the purpose and function of an Alliance designed, in the oft-quoted words of its first Secretary General, Lord ‘Pug’ Ismay, “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”. This paper focuses on the impact of the changing international political order on NATO, and the political challenges facing the Alliance as it seeks to make itself relevant to this new global power configuration. The most significant international trend affecting NATO is the shifting global constellation of power, which is creating a more complex and uncertain global political order. This is reflected in the ‘reset’ with Russia, the growing saliency of new global security concerns, the importance attached to ‘partnerships’ and the security challenges emanating from the ‘greater Middle East’. The complexities of the international environment are, in turn, exacerbating the political problems of consensus building within the Alliance, which is highly sensitive to domestic political and economic developments within member states. These domestic and international problems are placing growing pressure on the transatlantic relationship, within which the NATO Alliance is embedded.

NATO’s post Cold War evolution

Since the early 1990s NATO has adopted a multiplicity of new tasks and missions, from disaster relief to peace support operations and, more recently, counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism. This broadened agenda has, however, deepened the underlying ambiguity about the strategic rationale of the Alliance, and made consensus building and effective decision-making more difficult. “The more complex strategic landscape in which NATO operates”, Charles Kupchan has noted, “has diluted the solidarity that NATO enjoyed during the Cold War. Like it or not, NATO is growing more unwieldy and a consensus approach more elusive”. His solution is for the Alliance to adopt “a more flexible approach to decision making on most other issues apart from questions of war and peace” – a proposal
that would facilitate ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’, but further erode Alliance cohesion and political solidarity.

The recent summit in Lisbon (19–20 November 2010) was a further step forward in defining NATO’s place in the changing international order of the twenty-first century. It provided an opportunity for the twenty-eight member states to hammer out a consensus on their most pressing strategic concerns and their future role and profile in a changing international system. The most important manifestation of this was the New Strategic Concept, which sought to identify the challenges facing NATO and to specify the broad political and strategic response to them. In the Cold War, Strategic Concepts were classified documents dealing with military strategy. Since the end of the Cold War they have become instruments of public diplomacy, their purpose being to define a legitimate and politically acceptable role for NATO.

In order to evaluate the significance of the Lisbon Summit and its New Strategic Concept, it is helpful to situate Lisbon in its political and strategic context, and to view it in relation to previous ‘landmark’ summits. All Alliance summits are ‘children of their time’, reflecting the contemporary *Zeitgeist* and prevailing political mood. NATO itself has undergone some major changes since the end of the Cold War. The 1991 Strategic Concept addressed the end of the Cold War, and signalled a switch from what the NATO Public Affairs Division likes to term version 1.0 to version 2.0 (using the language of software programmes). The Washington Summit of 1999, when the last Strategic Concept was adopted, took place in the context of the Kosovo war and NATO’s first round of enlargement into East Central Europe, and marked a high point of the Euro-Atlantic’s ability to re-order the post communist East through the dual enlargement process (NATO and the EU) and humanitarian military intervention.

The Prague Summit of 2002 signalled the switch from NATO version 2.0 to version 3.0.¹ Taking place in the wake of 9/11 and in the context of the unfolding ‘war on terror’, it signalled a switch from concerns about ‘saving strangers’ and re-ordering Europe to collective defence and expeditionary warfare far from the heartlands of the Euro-Atlantic region (‘defending Europe on the Hindu Kush’). Prague was also billed as the ‘transformation summit’ that sought to re-tool NATO for the demands of power projection and joint expeditionary operations.

**The changing global power constellation**

The Lisbon Summit and the New Strategic Concept, ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’, were coloured by two key international developments: the shifting global
balance of power and the global recession. These two factors provide the key to understanding many of the political and strategic decisions reached in Lisbon, and are crucial in defining the structural context within which the Alliance now operates.

In the 1990s NATO operated in the context of the apparent triumph of Western values, ideas and institutions. ‘History’ had ended, and democracy and free market capitalism had no ideological contenders: post-communist Central and Eastern Europe could be reshaped by NATO and the EU, and the Alliance could focus on enlargement and ‘saving strangers’. In the following decade the mood darkened but there was still a lingering belief that the American ‘unipolar era’ had dawned and that capitalism was stimulating a new phase of economic growth and rising prosperity.

Lisbon signals the demise of these comforting illusions. The international system is experiencing a power transition from a unipolar to a multipolar order, characterised not so much by the ‘decline of the West’ but the ‘rise of the Rest’. With the emergence of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), established patterns of international diplomacy are being upturned, and the existing institutions of global governance are increasingly weak and ineffective. A ‘post-American world’ is emerging, as Fareed Zakaria has argued, “one defined and directed from many places and by many people”.

This power transition is now taking place against the background of the global recession that began in 2008, and which is creating a harsher and more competitive economic environment. This in turn is making international cooperation and global governance harder to achieve, as many states focus on their own interests and priorities.

The rise of the BRICs and the shifting global balance of power marks a further disintegration of the European/transatlantic dominium that shaped international society from the seventeenth century onwards, and which reached its apogee in the Western-designed and US-led international order forged in the late 1940s. In his Strasbourg speech of April 2009, President Obama noted that the world is now more complex than in the past, and that the days of Pax America or Pax Britannica have ended. “If there’s just Roosevelt and Churchill sitting in a room with a brandy, that’s an easy negotiation”, he noted. “But that’s not the world we live in, and it shouldn’t be the world that we live in”.

The shifting tectonic plates of the global power balance have had five major impacts on the Lisbon Summit and the New Strategic Concept. These are the reset with Russia, security threats beyond NATO’s borders, relations with the Mediter-
ranian and the Gulf States, NATO’s modest global ambitions and the emphasis on partnerships:

**1. The ‘reset’ with Russia**

One of the primary achievements of the Lisbon Summit and a key manifestation of the changing constellation of global power relations was the forging of a new, more cooperative, relationship with the Russian Federation. In the 1990s a weakened Russia could do little to resist NATO’s eastern enlargement and its military intervention in Kosovo. From Moscow’s perspective a newly enlarged NATO was engaging in offensive military operations to restructure the international order to its design. The unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration only reinforced this image, with the unilateral abrogation of the ABM treaty; NMD and bases in Poland and the Czech republic; the acquisition of new military bases in Central Asia, and the courting of Georgia and Ukraine as future NATO members. Since 2000, however, Russia’s strength has revived and a more confident Moscow has not hesitated to use energy as a tool for political leverage. More potently, the August 2008 Georgian war signalled that Russia was back as a great power, willing and able to use military power to defend its geopolitical interests.

After a brief cooling of relations with Russia after the Georgian war, the Obama administration has ‘reset’ relations with Moscow, focusing primarily on practical cooperation in arms control agreements (the new Start Treaty and the CFE re-negotiation). The Lisbon Summit was the occasion for re-setting the Russia–NATO relationship, based on three tangible areas of cooperation: first, revamping the **NATO–Russia Council**, which has long been regarded as an ineffective talking-shop. The Council met for the first time since the Georgian war in Lisbon, and will focus on talks to create “a common space of peace, security and stability”. Second, cooperation on **theatre missile defence**; a NATO–Russia Council working group on missile defence will be resumed, focusing on creating an ‘Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence’ (ALTBMD). Third, cooperation on **Afghanistan**; Russia will aid NATO by keeping open land supply routes for non-lethal materials and will provide assistance with helicopters to the Afghan security forces.

Working out a more cooperative and more balanced relationship will not be easy, given the powerful constituencies within both Russia and NATO that remain suspicious and mistrustful of each other. Nonetheless, as German Chancellor Angela Merkel noted, “the fact that we are talking to Russia about common threats and the
chance to cooperate with Russia on missile defence is an extremely important step. That could be proof that the Cold War has finally come to an end”.

2. Global security threats beyond NATO’s borders
The second significant impact of the shifting balance of global power is the awareness that NATO countries are increasingly vulnerable to security threats from beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, and that existing mechanisms of global security governance need refashioning. “Instability or conflict beyond NATO’s borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people”, the New Strategic Concept notes (§11). Furthermore, “all countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption” (13). The Lisbon Summit identified two relatively new issues that are increasing in saliency on the NATO agenda: energy security and maritime security. The importance of the latter has great potential significance, given the crucial need to keep open SLOC (Sea Lines of Communication) – the arteries of the global economy. For this reason NATO, in the future, may well find itself taking on additional responsibilities for maritime security, which will require a shift in resources towards naval capabilities and maritime power projection.

3. The Mediterranean and the Gulf States
NATO’s growing concern about the two interlocking issues of maritime and energy security have focused attention on the countries bordering the southern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East and Gulf region. The Gulf remains the key energy source for Europe, although North Africa’s importance in this regard is growing. The Mediterranean is already the site of a maritime counter-terrorism operation and the Gulf of Aden is seeing a counter-piracy initiative. In the light of possible confrontation over Iran’s nuclear programme, the SLOC running through the Straits of Hormuz will become vulnerable. More generally, the MENA region is the focus of many of NATO concerns about terrorism, nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts and failed states. Consequently, the Lisbon Summit stressed the importance of deepened cooperation within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue and of opening this up to other countries in the region. The New Strategic Concept also placed emphasis on the importance of NATO’s ‘security partnership with our Gulf partners’ and noted that it remained “ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative”. This focus on MENA and the Gulf is part of a broader geostrategic reorientation of
NATO away from its Cold War East–West focus to a new axis of concern running from North to South.

4. More modest global ambitions
One of the longest-running post Cold War debates in NATO has been that on ‘out-of-area’. The US has long advocated a more ambitious and far-reaching role for NATO beyond its traditional North Atlantic hunting ground. The current NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has also apparently advocated this. France and Germany, on the other hand, have sought to limit the scope of NATO’s reach to more regionally focused concerns. With the Afghan campaign NATO has clearly acted ‘out-of-area’, but the broader debate continues. The Lisbon Summit appears to have made relatively modest claims about a global role for NATO, stressing instead the importance of partnerships. Lisbon also seems to have reinstated the key role of the UN, which was weakened by both the Kosovo war and the US-led invasion of Iraq. The modest global ambitions of NATO reflect opposition from rising powers like Russia, China and Brazil, all of whom oppose a ‘global policeman’ role for NATO. Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, has explicitly noted that “Russia can’t be happy with NATO’s transformation into a world policeman” or “something like Orwell’s Big Brother”, whilst the semi-official Chinese People’s Daily voiced explicit fears in September 2006 about a ‘Global NATO’, capable of interference in hotspots around the world. In the run-up to the Lisbon Summit the Brazilian Defence Minister Nelson Jobim also mounted a concerted diplomatic offensive to signal his country’s strong opposition to any role for NATO in the South Atlantic (fears kindled by some rather inept Portuguese diplomacy).

5. NATO’s partnerships
Rather than trying to carve out a high profile global role for itself, the NATO Alliance has sought to shape the wider international system by developing a series of partnerships. This theme was reiterated over and over again at the Lisbon Summit, and the Strategic Concept also stressed the need for partnerships “so that it [NATO] continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners” (Preface). The importance of these partnerships is clear from the Afghan campaign, where there are currently some 3,000 troops from eighteen non-NATO countries participating in ISAF. These partners do not play a purely symbolic role (as with many of the US-led coalition’s partners in Iraq), but perform significant operational roles. More generally, NATO recognises the need to cultivate partners if it is to be able to respond to global security problems (from maritime security to crisis management).
The Lisbon summit and the global recession

The second ‘elephant in the room’ at Lisbon, alongside the changing global balance of power, was the global financial crisis that erupted with the financial crash of 2008. The euro has taken a battering following the crisis in Greece, then Ireland, and now Portugal. The European response to the recession has been economic austerity, fiscal retrenchment and budget deficit reduction. The American response, on the other hand, has been a policy of monetary expansion and a weaker US dollar, generating new fissures in the transatlantic relationship.

The real worry for NATO decision makers is that fiscal retrenchment in Europe has resulted in severe reductions in European defence budgets. Defence expenditure reductions in the ‘big three’ (Germany, France and the UK) are seen as particularly troubling. The German Defence Minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, for example, has been told to find savings of €14bn by 2013. Consequently conscription is to be ended, the Bundeswehr is to be reduced in size from 250,000 to 190,000, a number of barracks will be closed and a streamlined command structure will be introduced. Collectively, European NATO states have reduced their defence expenditure from €228bn in 2001 to €197bn in 2009 (despite Afghanistan, the Global War on Terror and a greater number of EU and NATO missions).

Given that defence cuts are politically and financially unavoidable in Europe, the key question is how European NATO allies will manage these cuts. Broadly speaking there are two choices: a series of ad hoc, uncoordinated cuts by different member states, which would further exacerbate existing problems of duplication, wastage and functional incompatibility; or coordinated cuts leading to more collaborative, and therefore more effective, defence procurement programmes and to a restructuring of defence industries. The latter approach would reflect the need for greater industrial defence specialisation, the pooling of resources, greater functional specialisation and more cooperation – resulting in leaner but more integrated European NATO militaries. “Every European government that is a member of the EU or NATO knows exactly what should be done”, as Kees Homan of Clingendael (Netherlands) notes. “We should pool resources. When it comes to military equipment, countries should specialise. But duplication continues. It means less efficiency and higher costs. NATO will go nowhere as long as the Europeans fail to harmonise their military equipment or specialise”.

The recent UK–France Defence Cooperation Treaty is a step in the right direction in this regard; it involves sharing equipment and nuclear missile research centres,
and establishing a joint force of 9,000 soldiers with air and sea support. However, across Europe as a whole defence cuts seem to be proceeding with little coordination and Europe’s defence industrial sector remains wasteful and inefficient. Europeans, for example, have 21 naval shipyards (the US has three) and 89 different weapons programmes (the US has only 27). The problems with the procurement process are highlighted by the travails of the A400M air transport carrier and the spiralling costs of the eurofighter jet. Until and unless the political will is generated in Europe to address the problems of declining defence expenditure, ineffective defence procurement and duplication in the defence industries, Europe’s military weakness will continue to create transatlantic disputes over burden sharing.

Conclusions

The New Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit noted that Alliance members face a ‘changing’ and ‘unpredictable’ world, which is generating a “broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and population”. The Strategic Concept itself was designed to “guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners”.

NATO remains a key pillar of European security and a factor of stability in an uncertain international system. As well as serving as an insurance policy for the territorial integrity of Alliance members, its greatest added value is that it serves as a military toolbox for pragmatic, ad hoc cooperation for addressing threats to Alliance members beyond their immediate borders. However, it faces a number of pressing problems that will require concerted political energy to manage.

The first problem is that NATO’s enlargement from the 16 Cold War members to the 28 of today has greatly exacerbated the difficulties in building consensus on a series of diffuse security threats in an unpredictable world. Despite claims that NATO is a ‘unique community of values’, the reality is that NATO members as diverse as Albania, Norway, Turkey and Spain share very few values in common and, more importantly, they see the world in very different ways and do not necessarily share common geostrategic interests. At the same time, the North Atlantic Council has failed to offer an effective forum for transatlantic debate on substantive issues of common concern, such as Iran, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen or North Korea. The NAC’s arteries are clogged with routine work, limiting the time available to discuss broader security issues.
Second, the Afghan campaign has highlighted the problems of burden sharing, not just between the US and Europe, but also between NATO’s European members. The UK, the Netherlands and Denmark have all engaged in major combat operations alongside the US and Canada. Germany, Italy and Spain, on the other hand, have sought to avoid significant risk to their troops by hiding behind a series of national caveats. This in turn is linked to a further worrying trend – the ‘demilitarisation’ of significant parts of Europe. Noting the deleterious impact of European defence cuts and the fact that only 5 of 28 NATO members had reached the agreed defence spending target of 2% of GDP, US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates warned in a speech in February 2010 that:

“These budget limitations relate to a larger cultural and political trend affecting the Alliance. One of the triumphs of the last century was the pacification of Europe after ages of ruinous warfare. But I believe that we have reached an inflection point, where much of the continent has gone too far in the other direction....

....The demilitarisation of Europe – where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it – has turned from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st...

....The resulting funding and capability shortfalls make it difficult to operate and fight together”.

Thus whilst the Lisbon Summit and the New Strategic Concept represent significant and important steps forward for NATO in adjusting to an unpredictable and increasingly complex security environment, the Alliance continues to face serious political, economic and strategic problems. Building a new relationship with Russia and fostering new partnerships are clearly important steps forward, but much work remains to be done in recalibrating transatlantic relations and establishing a more cooperative security relationship between NATO and the EU. NATO therefore remains a work in progress and, as Winston Churchill noted about European defence cooperation in 1948, “We’re not making a machine, we’re growing a living plant, and we must wait and see until we understand what this plant turns out to be”.

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Notes

4 Pedro Seabra, ‘South Atlantic Crossfire: Portugal in-between Brazil and NATO’, IPRIS Viewpoints, (Lisbon: Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security), November 2010.
4. Russia and NATO after the Lisbon Summit: a New Beginning – Once Again? ¹
Karsten Jakob Møller

The character of the NATO–Russian relationship is basically dependent on U.S.–Russia relations. After the nadir of the G.W. Bush period, especially in the wake of the Russo–Georgian War in the autumn of 2008, the takeover of the Obama Administration in January 2009 has brought along a significant improvement in the bilateral relationship between the two countries, the so-called ‘reset’.

It was therefore only logical that Anders Fogh Rasmussen, from his very first day as Secretary General of the Alliance, made NATO–Russian relations his first priority. But it was not a path without risks. It was no secret that the Russia question divided the Alliance seriously. The internal discussions on the New Strategic Concept are vivid proof of the profound disagreement. The ‘old’ members, e.g. Germany, France, Italy and now also the United States, wanted to expand cooperation with Russia in various fields while the new members, primarily Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, supported by the Czech Republic and Hungary, looked with deep scepticism on cooperation with Russia, a scepticism founded in their historical experiences. For years these countries have argued for NATO military contingency planning on their territories in order to counter a potential future Russian invasion.

This way of presenting the problem displays NATO’s Russian dilemma. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact the Alliance has claimed that Russia no longer constitutes a threat to its members, that Russia is a trusted partner. Nevertheless the Alliance has been expanding to include countries whose primary goal has been to seek protection against a Russia who, by them, is seen as a potential threat. How do we explain this in a credible way to our Russian partner? It is simply not possible and therefore the mistrust of the West by the Russian political and military elite has been considerable and probably still is. It has almost certainly not diminished after Wikileaks cables revealed that NATO had drawn up secret plans to defend Poland and the Baltic countries. According to The Guardian these plans were agreed in January 2010 by the Military Committee under silent procedure.¹ The East Europeans insisted on hard security guarantees but were curbed by Western Europe led by Germany, which did not want to antagonise Russia. The article quotes a so-called well-placed source: “We’ve found the way forward with Russia. The Baltic States have received strategic reassurance. That is backed up with contingency planning that did
not exist before. It is done now. We told them we'll give you your reassurance if you agree to the reset with Russia. That made it easier for the Germans”.

I doubt whether the Russians perceive this as a confidence building measure. On the other hand I am sure they had been informed in some way or the other during the process. Russia has many friends in NATO who are willing to tell them what is going on in every corner of the Alliance. So it is probably not a surprise for the Russian leadership but it is extremely inconvenient that it has been made public. There are many members of the political, economic and military elite who, deep in their hearts, are sceptical towards the West, a well-known phenomenon in Russian history. Moreover and on the other hand, I would be rather surprised if Russian contingency plans for the Baltic States do not exist.

The main purpose of the NATO Summit in Lisbon was to agree on the way ahead for the Alliance, especially concerning the future engagement in Afghanistan. The adaptation of a new strategic concept was intended to present a renewed NATO and an Alliance in agreement. The future relationship with Russia played a major role, which is reflected in the Lisbon Summit Declaration and the New Strategic Concept, ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’ and the following summit of the NATO–Russia Council and the NATO–Russia Joint Council Statement that was adopted there.

The Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, was invited to the Lisbon Summit and after some hesitation he agreed to participate but this only happened following the trilateral summit in Deauville in France between Medvedev, Sarkozy and Angela Merkel. The Russian president not only obviously wanted to explore the possibility of positive results at the NATO Summit but also at the following European Union–Russia Summit in Brussels. He was pursuing the most important mission of his foreign policy: namely to create favourable external conditions for ensuring the security and prosperity of Russia. Russia is interested in investments, the newest technologies and innovative ideas as well as stable and open markets so it can carry out a comprehensive modernisation of the country and this is reflected in the present pragmatic approach to NATO and the European Union.

For the Secretary General, who was staking a lot on cooperation with Russia, the result had to be a success and it was no surprise that he called the NRC meeting ‘historical’. This term was also used by the Russian president as it was important for him to be able to show some concrete results to his many sceptics back in Moscow.
In the Joint Statement Russia and NATO affirm that they have embarked on a new stage of cooperation towards a true strategic partnership, referring to the goals and principles set forth in the NATO–Russia Founding Act (1997), the Rome Declaration (2002) and the OSCE 1999 Charter for European Security, including the ‘Platform for Cooperative Security’. They recognise that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible and that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined. They will work towards achieving a true strategic and modern partnership based on the principles of reciprocal confidence, transparency and predictability, with the aim of contributing to the creation of a common space of peace, security and the stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

It is also stated that the NRC member states will refrain from threats and use of force inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and the principles found in the Helsinki Final Act, against each other or any other state.

There are many good reasons for the parties to remind themselves of the principles governing their mutual relations; solemn principles adopted at previous summits in different organisations. The NATO countries once again wanted to remind Russia of the unacceptability of the Russian response to the Georgian attack on South Ossetia, the following recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and probably also the so-called cyber attack on Estonia in 2007. Russia wanted to remind NATO of the attack on Serbia in 1999, which was a clear violation of the principles laid down in the NATO–Russia Founding Act as well as the US-led attack on Iraq in 2003, which was a violation of the UN Charter.

For the Russian president it is important to underline the indivisibility of the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and possibly also to demonstrate the need for an overarching legal security treaty unifying the guiding principles from the documents mentioned, something which he proposed in the summer of 2008 in Berlin.

The Joint Statement deals with the role of the NRC and underlines that it consists of 29 equal partners. This principle can be found in the Rome Declaration of 2002, which is the foundation of the NRC. It has been stated several times by the Russian ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, that Russia often has been met by a unified ‘wall of NATO members’ during the meetings in the Council.

This was certainly the case for the NRC’s predecessor, the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council, where the positions of the NATO members were closely coordinated.
prior to the meetings. This is not the case any longer, although the Russians have occasionally begged to differ. The Secretary General of NATO who chairs the meetings is making a difference in his way of conducting them.

The importance of the NRC as a forum for political dialogue at all times and on all issues is emphasised, including where the parties disagree. It will be interesting to see how the parties will live up to this promise. During the Kosovo crisis in 1999 Russia broke off all relations with the Joint Permanent Council when NATO started the bombardments in Serbia. Relations to NATO were only restored in 2002 at the NATO Summit in Rome in which President Putin participated and where the Rome Declaration was adopted, followed by the formation of the NRC. During the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008 NATO decided to cancel the meetings and they were only resumed in late spring the following year, even though it had been described as an ‘all weather’ council.

So what we can read from the first half of the Joint Statement is that the parties are promising each other to make an effort to live up to the principles they have agreed upon several times before. There are, however, substantial differences in the interpretations of the different documents mentioned in the Joint Statement and that will be the case for the foreseeable future, indicating that the road to a true strategic partnership might be very long and difficult.

The more positive signal, however, lies in the parties’ pragmatic assessment of their mutual interest, which is stated in the second half of the Joint Statement.

The Council endorsed a Joint Review of the 21st Century Common Security Challenges identifying common interests and important challenges. This review was more than a year in the preparation and has been the basis for the agreement on concrete practical cooperation activities.

The NRC agreed to resume Theatre Missile Defence Cooperation following an agreement on a joint ballistic missile threat assessment. NRC is tasked to develop a comprehensive Joint Analysis of the future framework for missile defence cooperation, to be assessed in the June 2011 NRC meeting of the defence ministers.

The decision on missile defence is crucial to the future cooperation of Russia and NATO. The Secretary General has audaciously claimed that it will be one of the cornerstones. Basically it is more a bilateral question between the United States and
Russia, but the involvement of NATO might be helpful in solving some of the more difficult problems concerning command and control. If this cooperation turns out to be successful it might profoundly contribute to the development of a true strategic partnership. If it fails, the consequences will probably cause a serious setback in US–Russia relations and thereby also NATO–Russia relations. This is an example of an issue where the Devil is hidden in the detail, especially when it comes to the more technical problems. It should be noted that President Medvedev, during his press conference after the NRC meeting, voiced rather serious reservations about whether the NATO members had realised the tremendous complexity of the problems that had to be solved. He stressed several times that Russia would cooperate, but only on the condition of being an equal partner in the system. “Our participation should be absolutely that of equals... we either participate in full, exchange information and are responsible for solving this and that problem, or we don’t participate at all. But if we don’t participate at all, then we for obvious reasons will be forced to protect ourselves”, the president said and continued: “It is quite evident that the Europeans themselves do not have a full understanding of how it will look, how much it will cost. But everybody understands that the missile defence system needs to be comprehensive”.

This is not the place to go into further details on the complexity of joint missile defence, but fundamental problems such as sensitive information sharing, technology transfer, a capacity for rapid decision making and solving the challenges of command and control issues should be mentioned. Multilateral control over a missile defence system will be an extremely difficult task. Launch decisions have to be made in a very short time span, actually only a few minutes. NATO has been working on the problems for more than ten years without obvious success. NATO–Russia cooperation will require that the problems of diverging technical standards and operational procedures are solved. It is evident that Russia will insist on exercising control over the use of Russian assets. The United States on the other hand would never rely on a system requiring immediate Russian authorisation for its use. It is difficult to imagine an agreement on one of the two main theoretical possibilities: a dual key system, which seems to be unacceptable for both the United States and Russia, or a US-led and NATO-integrated system with Russia as an add-on. This is certainly not acceptable for Russia. The firing systems must probably be a national responsibility, while launch monitoring and threat assessment could be integrated. It will be a difficult process to find viable solutions. It will require a high level of mutual trust, which is certainly not present for the time being but might be developed during the process. We can at least hope for that.
Russia and NATO have obvious common interests in Afghanistan and in Central Asia. The logistics arrangements between Russia and ISAF were confirmed and the scope of the NRC Project on Counter Narcotics Training was expanded and a Russian promise of assistance to further institutional capacity-building was noted, as well as the development of the NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund in order to facilitate the Afghan Air Force to operate efficiently. The Joint Statement underlines that the NRC will strengthen its cooperation on counter-terrorism and on fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea.

It should be noted that the Joint Statement also mentions the desire of the NRC to revitalise and modernise the conventional arms control regime in Europe and will be ready to continue dialogue on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation – some of the more traditional subjects for discussion between the two parties.

Seen from a NATO point of view the Lisbon Summit contributed to clarifying the Alliance’s position towards Russia. A compromise had been made beforehand: the Baltic countries and Poland got their strategic reassurance and contingency planning in return for a reset of the Alliance’s relationship with Russia. Russia was offered participation in the development of a Theatre Missile Defence System and it is now up to the Russians to contribute to a constructive solution. The Secretary General claimed that the summit was a fresh start for a positive and substantial cooperation in the NRC. But it should be noted that Russian influence in the Alliance continues to be limited. Russia will not be able to exercise decisive influence for as long as it doesn’t have the power to veto a decision.

From a Russian point of view it could be noted that the shadows of the Russo-Georgian war are fading away and are being substituted by a much more cooperative NATO. Both parties have decided to concentrate their efforts on mutual interests and on solving common security challenges, e.g. Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Russian proposal on closer cooperation in the area between NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) found no support. The summit, however, tacitly confirmed that Georgian membership of the Alliance is not on the agenda for the foreseeable future, although it was not excluded. The election of Viktor Yanukovych as the new president of Ukraine has decisively removed Ukrainian membership of the Alliance from the agenda. The planned deployment of missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic has been cancelled and Russia has been invited to participate in a Joint Theatre Missile Defence System with the possibility of exercising considerable influence on the development.
and configuration of the system. Seen from Moscow, Russia’s security situation has improved considerably over the last year, not so much because of the efforts of NATO but rather due to the reset of US–Russian relations.

In assessing the results of the NRC Summit it is difficult to ignore the fact that only a few concrete decisions were taken except from some details concerning the situation in Afghanistan and, to a certain extent, missile defence. There are some prospects for a resumed and hopefully fruitful dialogue in the NRC on various subjects. Dmitry Rogozin recently said that there was an obvious reason why no minutes from the NRC meetings existed: that they would reveal the absurd emptiness of the discussions. Let’s hope this will be changed in the future. There appeared to be an agreement that the two parties do not pose any threat to each other. “That alone draws a clear line between the past and the future of NATO–Russia relations” as a press release from NATO after the meeting stated. It will be interesting to see when this will be reflected in the relevant Russian documents, namely the National Security Concept and, in particular, in the Military Doctrine. In the meantime it can be noted that it is part of the New Strategic Concept, despite the secret contingency planning for the Baltic–Polish region. It was good fortune that this was leaked only after the NRC meeting. The damage could otherwise have been serious. So the issue remains of whether some of the NATO members still regard Russia as a potential threat, which might very well be the case. The same goes for the doubt regarding whether Russia considers the United States to be a long-term security threat. In spite of the much-publicised new strategic review the Alliance still represents a legacy of the Cold War period with very little vision of its long-term role in the developing world order. The few decisions at the NRC Summit did not contribute to the development of a much-needed single, undivided security space in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The two summits strengthened the possibility of the development of a strategic partnership. Small steps have been taken but there is a long way yet to go before the mutual trust between the Russian and the NATO members has reached the level of true strategic partnership. Still, the key to this goal is the continuation of the positive US–Russia relationship, which unfortunately is highly dependent on the future political fate of President Obama. With a Republican majority in Congress the room for optimism about the future is considerably limited.
Notes

1 Ian Trayno, 'Wikileaks cables reveal secret NATO plans to defend Baltics from Russia', *The Guardian*, 6 December 2010.

2 Nabi Abdulacv in *The Moscow Times*, 22 November 2010
5. NATO and International Terrorism: Can NATO Move Beyond Controversy?
Berit Kaja Børgensen

NATO’s New Strategic Concept illustrates that the Alliance has gone from being focused on the European territory and neighbourhood in the 1990s to an Alliance focused on unconventional and indeed global threats. The New Strategic Concept thus reflects and builds on developments in the security environment as they have unfolded since the terror attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001. It is also clear, though, that NATO’s momentum created by the fight against international terrorism, once both clear and irresistible, is now losing steam. Terrorism has in effect become everybody’s business and it is no longer clear what NATO can and should do.

The New Strategic Concept seeks among other things to strike a balance between different views on NATO’s future role in combating terrorism. All Allies have a stake in the issue but they are not fully aligned, and so the question becomes whether the Strategic Concept can be said to provide guidance for the years to come. As we shall see, there is certainly room for improvement.

NATO and terrorism before 9/11
When NATO adopted its first post Cold War strategic concept in 1991 terrorism hardly figured among its concerns. Although some allies had experienced the severe consequences of terrorist attacks, NATO considered these incidents domestic law-enforcement problems calling for national solutions rather than the mobilisation of an international security alliance.\(^1\) NATO’s focus was instead on instability in Central and Eastern Europe, the remaining Soviet threat and Europe’s strategic balance. However, cognisant of the wider security context, NATO did mention terrorism in the 1991 Concept as one among several security risks ‘of a wider nature.’\(^2\)

Given its ongoing and strenuous struggles with Kurdish separatists, Turkey was the most prominent advocate of a change of pace in NATO and the collective identification of terrorism as a serious threat. This resulted in the modification of NATO’s near neglect of terrorism at the Brussels Summit in 1994 when NATO condemned all acts of international terrorism as a threat to the peaceful conduct of international relations and called for effective counter-terrorist cooperation.\(^3\) Terrorism was thus
cautiously identified as an international phenomenon and problem and not merely a domestic problem. It remained a declaratory stance, though.

In the following years other security issues, such as the operations in the Balkans, captured NATO’s attention. Terrorism held a permanent position on the Alliance’s agenda but no major policy action followed. Still, partnership initiatives launched in parallel became a driver also within the counter-terrorism domain. Terrorism was one of the concerns and an area identified for cooperation and consultation in the partnership programmes launched with individual countries such as Russia and Ukraine and also within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The issues nourished each other: partnerships encouraged NATO to find common areas of interest, thereby advancing the role of terrorism on the agenda, whilst terrorism also generated a demand for closer cooperation between the partners.

The 1999 Strategic Concept reaffirmed collective defence but, reflecting the Balkan experience, clearly addressed crisis management and non-Article 5 operations. Though the United States was one of the driving forces behind the New Concept, US and Turkish attempts to include a whole paragraph on NATO’s role in countering terrorism did not succeed. In an almost identical fashion as in 1991, terrorism was once again mentioned as a risk that could affect Alliance interests, and Article 4 consultations were still the only measure of response. However, given lessons learned from the Balkan operations, the Concept did address the need to protect NATO’s forces and infrastructure against terrorism.

The Alliance thus did not seriously consider the issue of terrorism through the 1990s. According to Christopher Bennett “…there was no consensus on NATO’s role in what were seen by most allies as internal security problems. As a result, there was little or no sustained discussion of the nature of terrorism, of its sources, or its implications for Alliance concepts, policies, structures or capabilities.”

9/11 and NATO’s immediate response: urgent need for a new policy
This radically changed after 9/11. In what seemed like a split second, terrorism shot to the top of NATO’s agenda, starting with the first ever invocation of the Alliance’s collective defence commitment, Article 5. Terrorism was now central to NATO and nearly every aspect of the Alliance was in need of an overhaul. Though some countries,
especially France, were reluctant to raise the issue to the level of an Alliance core concern, terrorism clearly was at the heart of NATO’s matter.

The Allies soon agreed to a range of measures to meet the ‘new’ threat including, for instance, enhanced intelligence sharing and the provision of assistance to Allies and other states whose participation in the counter-terrorist campaign caused them to be threatened. The deployment of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern (and later the entire) Mediterranean through Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), and of five (later seven) NATO AWACS aircraft to the US to support operations against terrorism, was a consequence of some of these measures.8

In December 2001 the Alliance published NATO’s Response to Terrorism and stated that meeting the challenge of international terrorism was “fundamental to our [NATO’s] security”.9 For the first time the hybrid threat posed by terrorists and WMD was explicitly recognised, making disarmament and non-proliferation essential contributions to the fight against terrorism. This connection between terrorism and WMD has remained in NATO’s outlook to the present.

Although the 1999 Strategic Concept had recognised international terrorism as a risk to Alliance security and that Article 5 would cover an armed attack against the Alliance from whatever direction, it took 9/11 to connect these two dimensions of NATO’s strategic thinking. Consequently, in Reykjavik in May 2002 the old debate about whether NATO should act ‘out-of-area’ was finalised with the North Atlantic Council confirming that NATO would be ready to act when and wherever necessary in order to meet the fundamental challenge to security that terrorism posed.10

The Alliance affirmed from the outset that it could not do everything itself. Much was still up to national authorities and other organisations, and military tools were not sufficient. Broad and civil–military cooperation thus also became integrated into NATO’s counter-terrorism policy. Though cooperation was meant to apply across the board, NATO gave special emphasis to the EU.11 Other partnerships soon followed, though. The NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council was replaced by a new NATO–Russia Council in May 2002, with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson emphasising that, “What was lacking from the earlier NATO–Russia dialogue was a true sense of shared purpose and urgency. The events of 11 September provided that impetus...”.12 A new Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T) was adopted at the Prague Summit in November 200213 and a decision to upgrade the
political as well as the practical dimensions of the MD was made at the Reykjavik Summit in May 2002.\cite{14}

These rather radical policy reforms fostered an urgent demand for new capabilities. Although military reform had been on the agenda through the 1990s, 9/11 made international terrorism one of the primary drivers of NATO reform and inspired the urgency captured by reform’s new header: ‘transformation’.

At the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002 terrorism dominated the agenda and the many decisions adopted there all paved the way for NATO’s new role as an important actor in the fight against international terrorism with its own military concept for defence against terrorism.\cite{15} It defined four roles for NATO: anti-terrorism (defensive measures), consequence management (dealing with after effects of a terror attack), counter-terrorism (offensive measures) and military cooperation. This meant being ready to deploy its forces when and where required in order to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist attacks, or threat of attacks, directed from abroad against NATO. The Alliance should provide assistance to national authorities in dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks and, on a case-by-case basis, provide its assets and capabilities to operations in defence against terrorism undertaken by or in cooperation with other international organisations or coalitions involving Allies.\cite{16}

The reform effort reverberated through the NATO toolbox. A NATO Response Force (NRF) came into being as a “technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the [North Atlantic] Council”.\cite{17} Moreover, NATO streamlined its command structure, implemented a Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan and five nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defence initiatives, approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment, and set out to strengthen capabilities to protect against cyber attack.\cite{18} Some of these measures had been underway since the 1990s and were not directly related to international terrorism. The NRF, for instance, was in many ways an answer to an older – primarily US – push to make European forces more expeditionary. But 9/11 created the window of opportunity that allowed for political consensus. The decisions were, in the words of Secretary General Lord Robertson, far-reaching, and made NATO more effective in support of the common international fight against terrorism.\cite{19}
**Controversies**

Despite NATO and Allied efforts several member states were struck by terror attacks in the years following 9/11, both on home soil and in Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO maintained a strong and principled stand against terrorism, for instance by issuing a Declaration on Terrorism\(^20\) pointing out terrorism and proliferation of WMD as key threats to NATO and international security and approving a Defence against Terrorism Programme (DAT) in the first half of 2004.\(^21\)

NATO also found a vital role to play in the fight against terrorism by taking over command of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan in August 2003.\(^22\) The decision came on top of the transatlantic Iraq dispute and therefore came in handy as a way of demonstrating NATO cohesion and resolve in relation to terrorism and to the Prague ‘transformation’ agenda. Not only was it the Alliance’s first operation outside Europe; as ISAF’s mandate was expanded to include the whole of Afghanistan, the operation was soon described as NATO’s key priority and perhaps, as Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer argued, NATO’s litmus test.

Real operations and policy implementation took their toll and disagreements about burden sharing and the weight of counter-terrorism versus reconstruction and development in the Afghanistan operation arose and came to dominate NATO diplomacy. Some within NATO spoke up for a full-scale review of the Strategic Concept due at this point but consensus proved elusive. Instead, and in a nod towards terrorism’s ability to disrupt Alliance politics, the Allies adopted a Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG)\(^23\) setting out the priorities for the Alliance’s capabilities, planning disciplines and intelligence for the following decade. This was at the Riga Summit in late 2006.

Lessons learned from Afghanistan and international terrorism clearly influenced the CPG. NATO’s perception of international terrorism coupled with WMD as a principal threat to the Alliance was now deliberately mentioned. It also indicated the degree to which the meaning of collective defence had changed: 9/11 was explicitly used as an indication of what kind of scenarios could be expected in the future. Terrorism had become an Article 5 trigger. NATO therefore needed capabilities to meet challenges from wherever they might come, and to launch and sustain a greater number of smaller and large-scale high intensity operations within and beyond Alliance territory.

The CPG in many ways defined a path that the Alliance has followed and refined up until today. First, international terrorism became a more official and central part of
NATO’s strategic outlook and threat assessment. Moreover, it marked the beginning of a trend of embedding terrorism and NATO’s role in fighting it in a more global context. For instance, Afghanistan and the general emphasis on NATO’s ability to conduct operations wherever and whenever (evident in the 2009 Declaration on Alliance Security [DAS]24 as well) have pulled the Alliance in a more global direction. Expeditionary warfare is obviously an essential capability but Riga also launched new work on the political and practical potential of NATO’s partnerships.25 The Afghan footprint was notable but it did not make for NATO consensus: NATO remained seized by a difficult debate on the nature of collective defence and its contribution to global security. Still, it was largely uncontested that NATO needed to pursue the Comprehensive Approach in cooperation with international partners.26

A number of questions linger. Should the Alliance follow the globalist camp, led by the United States, and engage in global security issues such as crisis management beyond Alliance territory? Or should it keep its focus on the collective defence of its member territories as the regionalist camp containing, among others, some of the new Eastern European members, argue? Furthermore, what are the real lessons of Afghanistan? That NATO should prioritise counter-terrorism or development and reconstruction; and how do we fit counterinsurgency into this equation? In sum, NATO consensus peaked soon after 2001 and has deteriorated since. 9/11 opened a window of opportunity for radical policy changes but that window has closed. Fighting terrorism is everybody’s business today, and NATO has lost direction. This is where the new 2010 Strategic Concept can be of help.

**Compromise: NATO’s New Strategic Concept**

The newly assigned Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, steered the reflection and negotiation process from Strasbourg/Kehl in April 2009 to Lisbon in November 2010, but the underlying conditions did not change much. Rasmussen highlighted that in order for NATO to be relevant in the 21st century it needed to meet global challenges, including terrorism. In his view, globalisation is increasingly defining our security and “terrorism has mutated from a regional phenomenon into a global franchise”,27 and a whole new approach to security and collective defence is necessary.

It is obvious that terrorism has impacted on the work of the Expert Group convened by the Secretary General as well as on the final document. Many of the recommendations in the Expert’s report are in one way or another related to international terrorism. First of all unconventional threats are identified as the most probable
threats to the Allies in the coming decade, one of these being strikes by international terrorist groups. Though NATO’s core commitment to collective defence still stands, it needs to be rethought in light of changes in the security environment, making the Experts recommend that on a case-by-case basis unconventional threats such as cyber or terrorist attacks should be recognised as Article 5 threats. Furthermore, partnerships of global reach as well as the comprehensive approach were prominent recommendations.28

These elements figure in the New Strategic Concept but it also remains a compromise between post 2001 consensus on the one hand and wider terrorism controversies on the other. There is thus room for improvement, or, need for a continuous Allied engagement with the issue. There is no doubt that terrorism is a threat NATO takes seriously. There is equally no doubt that the fear of terrorists acquiring WMD remains. However, the Concept also mentions instability and conflict beyond Alliance borders as possible causes of terrorism and a direct threat to the security of the Alliance. At the same time terrorists are explicitly mentioned as possible sources of cyber attacks.29 These concerns hardly narrow the limits of NATO’s business: they instead invite more work beyond Alliance borders and in cyber space. Without clear definitions of when and where the Alliance should add value in these areas, the potential for controversy is significant.

Similarly, collective defence remains a core task in the Strategic Concept but its meaning and content has changed. The Strategic Concept states that NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression and emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of the Alliance. As in the context of regional instability and cyber attacks, this is not a clear guidance. While NATO maintains that collective defence of the territory of its member states is the core task, the Concept opens the way for an Alliance with global, non-Article 5 responsibilities.

Though controversial, the comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is also stated as necessary for effective crisis management. The decision to form a modest civilian capacity within the Alliance to interact and coordinate with other civilian organisations does at least outline a clearer role for NATO in crisis management operations: it is now obvious that NATO will be better suited to fill civilian gaps. But not much is clear beyond this point. NATO has yet to define its new and small civilian capacity and NATO’s relationship to other organisations remains dynamic. The Strategic Concept therefore settles for ‘flexible formats’ – which is politically astute but not of much use in planning the countering of terrorism and other threats.30
The Strategic Concept has in effect enlarged the space for political disagreement. Even if we accept the Comprehensive Approach, it is not clear how much NATO should actually do, and how much it should leave for other international actors. Nor is it quite clear how much NATO intends to get involved in counter-terrorism, crisis management and cyber security. It is clear that NATO intends to involve more partners but it is not yet clear exactly how NATO intends to involve them. Should the dividing line between NATO allies and non-NATO partners remain clear and visible, or should it recede into an almost invisible background depending on the nature of operational coalitions?

The next years will reveal whether the Alliance with Secretary General Rasmussen at the helm can agree on more than a ‘communiqué NATO’ and actually put into practice the many and diverse roles for NATO. Terrorism worked, for a short while, as a real glue in the Alliance; it increasingly no longer is. Much work is therefore to be done by member states that must provide military capabilities and political will and by NATO’s organisation that must tie the strings together and provide for effective policy implementation.

Notes

6 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington D.C., 24 April 1999.
7 Bennett, Christopher (2003).


15 NATO International Military Staff, ‘NATO’s military concept for defence against terrorism’, *Issues*.

16 NATO International Military Staff, ‘NATO’s military concept for defence against terrorism’.


22 Press Briefing by NATO Spokesman, Yves Brodeur, NATO Headquarters, 16 April 2003.


27 ‘NATO’s Role in the 21st Century and the New Strategic Concept’, Remarks by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at Vilnius University, 9 October 2009.


PART 3

A Comprehensive and Cooperative Alliance?
NATO operations in the Balkans and not least in Afghanistan have made it clear that we require a comprehensive approach by all parts of the international community involving a wide range of both military and civilian tools in order to effectively meet current challenges. Military means are of course essential to keep the peace or to fight insurgents, but they are not enough to create lasting stability and development. For that, local authorities capable of delivering basic services with the support of the local population are the only solution. In order to support local authorities, civilian expertise is needed in the form of advisors and trainers as well as aid and investments. When it comes to building local security forces, military and law enforcement expertise is of course required. All tools in the crisis management toolbox are needed and their employment has to be planned and coordinated based on a shared assessment of the local circumstances. Such an approach would be a truly Comprehensive Approach to crisis management, taking into account both military and civilian instruments. The lessons identified are often summarised in the statement: no security without development and no development without security.

The New Concept fully endorses the Comprehensive Approach
In the New Strategic Concept the Alliance fully endorses the need for a Comprehensive Approach and commits itself to working more closely with international partners, most notably the UN and the EU, in preventing crises, managing conflicts and stabilising post-conflict situations. The New Strategic Concept also contains a number of concrete steps to further improve NATO’s ability to engage with civilian actors. These include the formation of an appropriate but modest civilian crisis-management capability in NATO, which, among other things, will help NATO to interface more effectively with civilian partners.

A Danish priority
The Danish Government has been working to promote a more comprehensive approach to crisis management in NATO since 2005, when Denmark hosted a high
level seminar in Copenhagen on the topic. The Danish Defence Agreement of 2004 had underlined the need for an improved ability to coordinate Danish military and civilian tools in crisis management. The main conclusion from the 2005 NATO seminar was the need for a more systematic approach in NATO – fewer ad-hoc solutions and more planning and preparation. At the summit in Riga in November 2006 NATO decided to initiate work on how to achieve this by looking at NATO’s own procedures and at how to improve the cooperation with other international actors including NGOs. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 NATO Heads of State and Government endorsed an action plan containing a set of pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NATO’s contribution to a Comprehensive Approach. At the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in April 2009, a first stocktaking of the implementation of the Action Plan was done and further work in a number of areas was launched. At the Lisbon Summit this work resulted in a number of concrete decisions and directions for further work and, not least, in the New Strategic Concept where NATO commits fully to a Comprehensive Approach in crisis management. The overall message from Lisbon is that NATO is ready to engage with others when it comes to security – including meeting new threats and challenges.

What NATO has done
Implementing the Comprehensive Approach has and will continue to bring change both within the Alliance and in its relations with other actors. Over the last decade and a half NATO has developed its procedures and directives for planning to take better account of both military and civilian aspects of crisis management. Engagements with other actors including NGOs have also been in focus, but progress here has been more modest. Both areas remain high on the agenda. Inside the Alliance one can point to a number of improvements and results, which naturally mainly relate to the engagement in Afghanistan.

Building local support and contacts through the so-called CIMIC (Civil–Military Cooperation) teams was and is an essential tool for NATO forces in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. CIMIC teams are composed of military personnel but their function is to liaise with local authorities and civilian actors in the area in order to secure their support behind the military presence. The teams can support local projects of mutual benefit from the limited pool of development funds they normally administer. NATO has a Centre of Excellence for CIMIC in the Netherlands which provides training and advice, and CIMIC is one of the elements of the Comprehensive Approach as it promotes dialogue and contact between the military and civilian actors, not least
local authorities. NATO has also strengthened the identification of lessons learned from operations when it comes to civil–military cooperation through NATO’s Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), which is part of NATO’s Transformation Command (ACT). There is now a more systematic approach to collecting and analysing lessons learned, and lessons learned from Afghanistan have played an important role in the further development of the Comprehensive Approach.

NATO has furthermore established a database with national civilian experts available to advise and to assist in crisis management operations within their areas of expertise. The need for more civilian experts available at short notice and ready to work in theatre is a common challenge for all nations.

In Afghanistan the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) where civilian and military representatives work side-by-side to coordinate efforts to improve governance and secure development and stabilisation, has been developed and is supported by NATO. Both CIMIC teams and civilians representing national development and aid organisations as well as various ministries normally work in the framework of the PRT. There are now 27 such teams in Afghanistan working closely with the local Afghan authorities and the various international actors who are active in the regions. It is important to note that the PRT is only a vehicle for coordination. The leader of a PRT has no command and control over the other actors. The mission is to support the local authorities and ensure better coordination of efforts. Over time national and regional plans have been developed as a result of these efforts and they now guide the efforts of both the international community and the local authorities.

The post of NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan has also been strengthened and now plays an important role in the overall political–strategic coordination of NATO’s efforts with those of other actors, notably the UN and the EU and, not least, also with Afghan authorities. NATO’s Military Commander in Afghanistan and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative are working closely together to ensure a more Comprehensive Approach.

NATO has also embraced more fully a counterinsurgency strategy in its doctrines, plans and operations, combining military efforts with development and support to local authorities, not least in building local security forces. In this respect NATO has supported the Afghan Government in developing a transition plan for how progress in development and governance will result in the gradual transfer of responsibility for security to Afghan authorities.
What will NATO do in the future?

It is important to stress that NATO is not trying to take over responsibilities from others – neither in Afghanistan nor in future conflicts or crises. NATO will continue to do what it does best, namely to provide a robust set of political and military capabilities. This is the message from the summit in Lisbon. As a rule stabilisation and reconstruction are best undertaken by those actors and organisations that have the relevant expertise, mandate and competences – like the UN, EU and NGOs and of course local authorities. However, there needs to be close cooperation and coordination between all actors – both before and during a crisis management engagement. This is the core of a Comprehensive Approach. There can, however, be exceptions where circumstances may prevent other actors from undertaking their tasks, or from undertaking them without NATO support. NATO must therefore have the ability to plan for, employ and coordinate civilian as well as military crisis management capabilities that nations provide for agreed Allied missions. In other words, if the security situation keeps other actors away then NATO must ultimately be able to use national civilian capabilities in order to support stabilisation and reconstruction in the area, but this will remain an exceptional situation that will only last as long as other actors are not able to take on their normal responsibility. This is the situation in many areas of Afghanistan, notably in Helmand. Both the ‘rule’ and the ‘exception’ require NATO to have the necessary civilian expertise to engage with others in all phases of crisis management and, if necessary, to employ and coordinate civilian activities. This was one of the key decisions at the NATO summit in Lisbon. NATO’s headquarters in Afghanistan already have many civilian members of staff. This also needs to be the case ‘at home’ not least at the Operational Command in Mons and at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

Lisbon decisions on NATO’s ability to engage in a Comprehensive Approach

In order to appreciate the many decisions taken in Lisbon it is important to realise that the Comprehensive Approach starts at home – before engagement. NATO is therefore committed to engaging actively with other international actors before, during and after crises. The aim must be to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conducting of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort. Even when conflict comes to an end, the international community must often provide continued support to create the conditions for lasting stability.
The many concrete decisions taken at Lisbon to enhance NATO’s contribution to a Comprehensive Approach cover all phases of crisis management:

- NATO will aim to better predict when crises might occur and how they can best be prevented. Early warning means early and orderly planning but also, of course, early engagement to manage a crisis and prevent its deterioration.
- NATO will further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations including counterinsurgency, stabilisation and reconstruction efforts. This will continue to influence NATO’s defence planning process, capability building and doctrinal work.
- NATO will form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability may also, as already mentioned, be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors. The civilian expertise must become an integrated part of existing NATO structures and commands. NATO has yet to decide the precise number of experts and their location.
- NATO will further enhance integrated civilian–military planning throughout the crisis spectrum.
- NATO will develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are, as quickly as possible, able to maintain security without international assistance.
- NATO will identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment by allies for selected missions, to enable them to work alongside NATO military personnel and also civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions.
- NATO will, finally, broaden and intensify political consultations among allies and with partners, both on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis – before, during and after.

These decisions, which are set out in the New Strategic Concept and the Lisbon Summit Declaration, will now be implemented and turn the Comprehensive Approach into a reality visible in NATO bodies, policies, doctrines, capabilities etc.

**NATO’s relations with other actors**

Local authorities are of course the most important actors, as they will eventually have to take full responsibility. But in the initial phase they are often weak and
unable to engage effectively. A Comprehensive Approach will assist local authorities by engaging them in coordination and planning and thereby also building local capacity for the future. The need for civilian experts to advise and assist local authorities remains a key component, which is why NATO will do more to identify and train such national civilian experts. The NATO Defence Planning process is one vehicle for focusing nations’ efforts on the need for such capabilities and on the critical issue of availability. NGOs have often been in crisis areas for decades – they know the local situation and are important partners. They put great emphasis on preserving the humanitarian space – avoiding being seen as part of the conflict – as do many international organisations. This is a reality that NATO of course needs to respect and take into account, but it does not exclude engagement and cooperation, especially outside the area of conflict. Continued dialogue is essential to ensuring the broadest and deepest possible cooperation given local circumstances and the views and experiences of the NGOs. There will be no ‘one size fits all’ when it comes to developing NATO’s NGO contacts. The UN and the EU are very important partners for NATO. The New Strategic Concept underlines the importance of the UN Charter and affirms the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Further steps were taken in Lisbon to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN, as set out in the UN–NATO Declaration signed in 2008, including through:

- Enhanced liaison between the two headquarters
- More regular political consultations
- Enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are engaged

For some time NATO has had both a military and a civilian liaison officer at UN headquarters in New York. The presence of a civilian NATO representative in particular has served to stimulate interest in NATO and what NATO and the UN can do together.

The New Strategic Concept underlines that the EU is a unique and essential NATO partner. The EU and NATO share the majority of their members, and all members of both organisations share common values. There is a need for and space for both organisations and they should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. NATO recognises the importance of stronger and more capable European defence and welcomes the entry into force of
the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges.

But we all know that there are barriers to a closer cooperation. Where you stand in this discussion depends on where you sit. Seen from the EU it is a problem that NATO has not concluded a security agreement with one member state (Cyprus), which is consequently barred from all meetings and from receiving any NATO documents. Seen from NATO it is a problem that the original understanding that all Allies should be offered full involvement in the European security and defence cooperation (as they were in the Western European Union [WEU] and the Western European Armaments Group [WEAG]) has been partly ignored (even for European non-EU allies) and that one ally (Turkey) is barred from taking part in the European Defence Agency – again because of the lack of a security agreement. Members of both organisations would like to break through this deadlock. Both the NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative have been asked to work towards finding solutions and they are both very committed to this, but any progress requires full agreement in both organisations including on how to take the necessary steps in parallel. Clearly this is a very unsatisfactory situation. The rationale for close cooperation is a so-called ‘no brainer’ as the Americans would say. Fortunately informal contacts are tolerated and in operations there seems to be a growing acceptance that both informal contact and informal cooperation are needed. The alternative could be loss of lives and certainly a waste of resources, which naturally is wholly unacceptable. The New Strategic Concept sets out a number of objectives and principles which will hopefully serve to facilitate a breakthrough or at least substantial progress:

- NATO will fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations.
- NATO will enhance the practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field.
- NATO will broaden the political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives.
- Finally, NATO will cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.

NATO will also continue to engage with other international organisations such as the OSCE, The African Union and UN organisations like the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). In future crises and operations the ambition will be to
have contacts with all relevant actors – NATO needs to be able to ‘plug and play’ with all. Such contacts should be established in advance and then intensified when the need arises.

**New challenges**
It is not just the traditional challenges of bringing peace and stability to conflict areas that require a Comprehensive Approach. Twenty-first century challenges such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons and dangerous materials, the threat of cyber warfare, threats to energy supplies and to international transport routes can, likewise, only be met with a combination of military and civilian instruments. The mix of instruments and their relative weight will depend on the nature of the threat and the concrete circumstances. Thus, the Comprehensive Approach is likely to be at the core of the international community’s efforts to counter the challenges and threats to international security in the 21st century.

**Conclusion**
Experience from NATO operations has demonstrated that coordination among military and civilian actors is essential to achieving the key objectives of lasting stability and security. NATO is therefore working to improve its ability to ‘plug and play’ with other actors. These contacts need to be developed before they are needed, so that they can be activated for real when a concrete challenge arises. NATO is not aiming to coordinate or direct the work of others. Only the UN or the local authorities could take up such a responsibility. NATO’s ambition is that the various instruments in the crisis management toolbox are used in a coordinated and effective way so as not to waste resources and, especially, to achieve results. NATO is not out to compete with others but to ensure that the international community becomes better at employing the full range of tools from the toolbox we possess together. It makes perfect sense. Our public expects nothing less. But it is a challenge that will remain with us. With the new Strategic Concept, NATO is among the most forward-leaning actors when it comes to asking others to cooperate. NATO is ready but it takes two to tango, and other actors will hopefully also fully adopt and embrace the Comprehensive Approach.
7. NATO’s Comprehensive Approach after Lisbon: Principal Problem Acknowledged, Solution Elusive
Peter Viggo Jakobsen

“[A] comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.”

The Strategic Concept, Lisbon, November 2010
Since 2006 when the Comprehensive Approach (CA) was officially adopted at the Riga Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has time and again hailed CA as the key to successful crisis management and the Alliance’s operation in Afghanistan. The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept quoted above is no exception to this rule. In the meantime the gap between the collective CA vision espoused in NATO rhetoric and the practical realities on the ground in Afghanistan has widened. Here the Alliance and its partners have failed to play the roles that NATO’s CA vision assigns to them, a failure that throws the viability of the entire concept into doubt. Many, including the group of experts appointed by NATO’s Secretary General, urged the Alliance to address this problem in its New Strategic Concept, and the purpose of this article is to assess to what extent the Alliance has succeeded in doing so.

The good news is that the New Strategic Concept acknowledges the fundamental problem that the operation in Afghanistan has exposed; the bad news is that it does little to solve it. My argument has four parts. The first part provides a brief introduction to CA and its evolution to date. Part two identifies the gap between theory and practice that has opened up in Afghanistan. Part three explains why the New Strategic Concept does very little to address it before part four discusses how NATO could improve matters. A conclusion sums up the major points at the end.

CA and its evolution prior to Lisbon
CA is NATO-speak for the widely accepted idea that crisis management operations must combine civilian and military instruments in a coordinated and concerted manner in order to succeed in building the foundations for lasting peace. Denmark
put the need for an integrated civil–military approach to crisis management on the NATO agenda in 2004–2005; the Alliance embraced the CA concept at the Riga Summit in 2006 and two years later it agreed to a CA Action Plan pragmatically outlining a series of steps that the Alliance must take in order to implement its CA in practice.²

NATO learnt in Bosnia and Kosovo that it could not win the peace on its own, and that success in peace and stabilisation operations ultimately depends on civilian instruments that the Alliance does not possess. NATO therefore conceptualised its CA as a collective endeavour involving all the actors engaged in such operations. Unlike the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), both of whom have developed CA policies of their own, NATO does not envision itself in the driver’s seat when executing its CA. The CA is not conceived as NATO owned and should not be NATO driven. NATO’s CA is intended to foster cooperation and coordination between all the relevant actors involved in such operations – international organisations, individual states, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the private sector and host governments. In order to facilitate such cooperation, NATO has invited other actors to assume responsibility for overall coordination, it has pledged not to compromise any organisation’s independence, to respect the humanitarian space deemed essential by the humanitarian community and, finally, the Alliance has pledged to refrain from developing civilian capacities. The Alliance has, in other words, gone out of its way to reassure the civilian actors it considers essential to the success of its CA that it does not intend to trespass on their turf.

To implement this NATO has pursued a two-pronged approach. Internally, it has striven to enhance its own ability to conduct its military operations in accordance with CA requirements. Externally it has actively sought to establish better relations with the other actors it is likely to cooperate with on such operations, notably the EU, the UN and NGOs. The Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), the Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (2010), NATO’s Counterinsurgency (COIN) Doctrine (2010) and the Civilian Advisor (CIVAD) concept (2010) are all intended to enhance NATO’s ability to incorporate non-military aspects into its planning process and to facilitate practical cooperation with other actors. In addition, NATO has been very proactive in its attempts to establish closer relations with the EU, the UN and NGOs, both at the strategic level and in the field.

The principal driver of NATO’s implementation efforts has of course been its desire to succeed in Afghanistan with its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
Most CA innovations have resulted from attempts to address problems in the field. The variety of civilian advisers employed by ISAF at all levels in theatre, the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) introduced in 2003 and recently boosted from the two-star to the four-star level and provided with a much larger staff (up from 6 to 24), and the 27 joint civil–military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating across Afghanistan all illustrate this process. These successful operational practices have then trickled upwards towards the strategic level, influencing concepts, training and doctrine. EBAO and COIN were thus employed in ISAF before they were formally adopted by the Alliance, and the development of the CIVAD concept was influenced by the widespread use of civilian advisers in ISAF headquarters and PRTs as well as by the need to improve cooperation with the civilian actors in theatre.

The fundamental CA flaw highlighted by Afghanistan

However, Afghanistan has not just helped CA implementation, it has also been a colossal hindrance in other ways. NATO’s initial thinking on the CA was to a large extent shaped by its experience in Kosovo. Kosovo indicated a need for temporary NATO involvement in civilian tasks such as law and order, governance and humanitarian assistance that would be scaled back as the security situation improved, allowing civilian actors to move into theatre and take over. Kosovo pointed to an international division of labour whereby NATO took care of security, logistics and intelligence, the UN provided overall coordination and state building, and the NGO community took the lead in providing humanitarian assistance and in facilitating development and reconstruction. This template informed NATO’s initial involvement in Afghanistan but the Alliance’s inability to provide security pulled the rug from under the Kosovo model. NATO’s inability to provide security made its own members reluctant to provide troops and equipment and also meant that the civilian organisations were less willing to engage and less capable of performing their tasks. The result was a vicious circle of resentment and disengagement by the civilian actors and ever-deeper NATO involvement in governance issues, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction and development. This dynamics made it impossible for the Alliance to establish the deep cooperative relationships with other actors that its CA is premised on. Needless to say, the absence of a capable and legitimate government or transitional authority (which there was in the form of the UN in Kosovo) has compounded NATO’s problems.

The fundamental problem that Afghanistan poses for NATO’s CA is, in short, that none of its requirements for success have been realised. NATO has not been able to
provide military security, the UN and the local government have failed to provide legitimacy, good governance and overall coordination, and the civilian actors have failed to provide humanitarian assistance, rule of law and development and reconstruction. NATO’s aspiration to act in support of the international community and the local government has thus proved impossible to realise.

This failure not only raises uncomfortable questions on the prospects of success for the ISAF mission, it also calls into question the viability of NATO’s CA concept as a whole, and it is this broader conceptual issue that is of interest here. The problems encountered in Afghanistan of realising the international division of labour that NATO’s CA concept is premised upon force the Alliance to consider the following questions:

1. Is it viable and wise to employ a CA concept that depends on others for success?
2. Should the Alliance take on a leadership role in CA?
3. Should the Alliance develop civilian capabilities that will enable it to lay the foundations for success on its own?

**CA in the New Strategic Concept**

The answer that the New Strategic Concept provides to these questions can be summarised as: ‘In support when we can and in the lead temporarily if we must’. NATO’s preference for staying in the background and acting in support of others is reaffirmed. The Strategic Concept pledges to continue the existing NATO policy of pushing for closer cooperation with the EU and the UN. At the same time the Concept also signals a determination to take on civilian tasks temporarily if need be. The Alliance is to establish a ‘modest civilian crisis management capability’ that can be used “to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors”. The promise in the Riga Summit Declaration to not develop civilian capabilities has been broken and the door is now opened for the establishment of a capability that will allow NATO to implement CA on its own in war zones or insurgencies where civilian organisations find it difficult to operate.

It is good news that the Alliance members have at long last been able to agree on the need to establish civilian capabilities – a move vehemently resisted by France for a long time. The Riga decision not to develop civilian capabilities has now been
proven wrong by what has taken place in Afghanistan, which has demonstrated a clear need for a civilian capability that can enhance the Alliance’s ability to cooperate with external civilian actors and help to fill the gap temporarily in operations where the civilian support provided by others proves insufficient. It is crucial that NATO acquires such a capacity because the civilian capacities provided by others in future wars/insurgencies will remain limited. While the UN can be expected to provide a token presence, as is currently the case in Afghanistan, most NGOs will stay away as long as the security situation does not permit them to operate without military protection. If NATO wants to conduct counterinsurgency operations or engage in stabilisation in war zones in accordance with its own doctrinal and best practice requirements, it will have to bring its own civilian capacities.

Defining what ‘modest’ means in practice will not be easy, however. It will be determined by mission requirements and the ability and willingness of other actors to cooperate with NATO. Just as the problems in Afghanistan have paved the way for the establishment of civilian capabilities, so may future ones induce the Alliance to beef them up. It is not difficult to imagine future operations which would require a robust civilian capability to create the conditions necessary to allow NATO to transfer civilian responsibilities to other actors. This said, a decision to create a full-blown civilian capacity enabling the Alliance to go it alone would have been a bad mistake, as it would have alienated the civilian actors, fuelled organisational suspicions and rivalries and led to unnecessary duplication and waste.

Establishing even a modest civilian capability is easier said than done, however, and it is bad news that the approach to civilian capacity building proposed in the Strategic Concept essentially copies the ineffective approach employed by the EU. The Concept merely asks Alliance members to identify and train civilian specialists and make them available to the Alliance for rapid deployment. The problem with this approach is that the member states do not have civilian experts in the required numbers with the required skill sets. While several NATO member states have established their own civilian rapid reaction rosters or made individuals available to rosters established by other international organisations, such as the EU, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the UN, the vast majority of these experts are not trained to work in war zones in close cooperation with the military and are unlikely to volunteer to do so. The failure of the EU to find 400 police officers to go to Afghanistan illustrates the problem, as do the difficulties the United States is facing with respect to meeting its target of deploying 1,500 civilians to Afghanistan by 2012. If NATO wants a pool of capable civilian experts willing to deploy into
war zones to work together with its military forces, the Alliance will have to play a proactive role in creating and training it. How this could be done is the topic of the next section.

The road ahead: supporting CA capacity building

To succeed NATO must do a lot more than merely appeal to its members to create civilian rapid reaction capacities. This is the approach that the EU and the UN has employed with little success for the past decade, and there is no reason why NATO appeals to the same countries are likely to prove more successful. To speed up the process of capacity building NATO will have to establish a dedicated organisational entity tasked to promote CA within NATO both at the Alliance and at member state levels. Such an entity would have to act as a catalyst for implementing CA just as the Stabilisation Unit is doing in the UK. The entities set up, to date, in various places in NATO are not capable of performing this role effectively. The new CA entity should promote and develop CA doctrine, concepts and training at the Alliance level and also act as a one-stop shop for member states (and others) wanting advice on how to set up CA structures and civilian rapid reaction capacities, CA training, best practice and lesson learning in the field.

The work of such an entity would have to be supported by a decision taken by the Alliance making it mandatory for member states to provide their military contingents with the civilian personnel and support necessary to make CA work. To give an example, nations should not be allowed to lead PRT type units if they are incapable of providing the civil–military nucleus that is necessary for it to work effectively.

Needless to say, it is the national level that will decide the fate of NATO’s future efforts to implement the CA. While a CA entity at the Alliance level would greatly facilitate the creation of reliable civilian rapid reaction capabilities and other equally important CA components, it will not make much difference if member states do not make CA a real priority. Creating CA structures, capacities and mindsets takes time, and each member state will have to devise its own way of doing so, taking into account its own bureaucratic structures, culture and capacities.

Regardless of the model chosen, experience shows that it will require fundamental cultural change within the national bureaucracies involved, and that success is unlikely unless governments make CA implementation a priority and make it attractive for the relevant individuals and organisations to support the process. Individuals can be
attracted with money and fast track promotion schemes, organisations by additional resources permitting them to build up the extra capacity that is required to enable them to release talented individuals at short notice without compromising their primary day-to-day functions.

Experience also shows that it is crucial that civilian and military CA capacities are not developed separately but jointly. Civilian CA personnel should be trained jointly with military personnel from day one in order to break down cultural barriers and facilitate the creation of the joint CA mindset that is necessary for success. NATO would therefore do itself a favour by changing its terminology. Instead of distinguishing between civilian and military personnel, it should employ the phrase ‘CA personnel’ in order to put civilian and military personnel on an equal footing and emphasise the joint nature of the enterprise. The importance of joint civil–military training cannot be over-emphasised.

**Conclusion**

Since NATO adopted its CA at the Riga Summit in 2006, the gap between rhetoric and practice in Afghanistan has continued to grow. It has proved impossible for NATO to realise its vision of a collective CA where the Alliance acts in support of the international community, i.e. the variety of civilian actors typically involved in crisis management operations. Many therefore urged NATO to close this gap in its New Strategic Concept. While the decision in the Concept to establish a civilian crisis management capability is an important step in the right direction, its approach to civilian capacity building is too timid and unambitious. It is not enough merely to call on member states to make civilian specialists available to Alliance operations. Such specialists do not exist in the numbers required and the Alliance must make a proactive and sustained effort to convince member states to create them. A new dedicated NATO entity tasked to promote CA will be required to this end, but while such an entity can facilitate CA capacity building it cannot make it happen on its own. Effective CA capacity building ultimately depends on the political willingness of member states to build effective CA capacities at the national level. It will take time and money and no easy fixes exist – and there is far more to this than simply increasing the number of civilian specialists.
Notes

1 NATO 2020, ‘Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of
Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO’, NATO, 17 May 2010, pp.41-42.

2 For a detailed account of this process see my, ‘NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response

3 For an elaboration of these points see my, ‘Right Strategy, Wrong Place: Why Nato’s Comprehensive Approach
es/info/unisci/revistas/UNISCI%20DP%2022%20-%20JAKOBSEN.pdf

4 U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan Is Progressing but Some Key Issues Merit Further Examination as
Implementation Continues, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Audit-11-2 October
2010.

5 See my, ‘The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction: Adding Value is Harder than Expected’, European Security,
Conflict Trends, No 2 (ACCORD, 2010), pp.11–20; Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, ‘Can the EU Rebuild

6 http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/

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One of the real success stories of NATO in the post Cold War era has been its remarkable ability to establish strategic partnerships with a wide range of third countries and to leverage influence far beyond its borders. The 2010 Strategic Concept is an ambitious document to the extent that it tries to maintain the significant leverage that NATO has been able to uphold throughout the 1990s and early 2000s and in so far as it has now elevated this form of activity to being one of its core tasks. Indeed, the 2010 Strategic Concept states explicitly that Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe (§28). Strategic partnerships have therefore become a vital part of NATO’s strategy towards promoting security and political change beyond the borders of the Alliance.

‘Strategic partnerships around the globe as means of influence’, however, begs the question of whether NATO is able to obtain the real influence which the Alliance has outlined as its new vision in a number of strategically and politically important countries that are not located ‘around the globe’, but rather which are located on NATO’s own doorstep. The problem seems to be that whereas NATO retains significant international leverage as a security actor in the West Balkans, and certainly is aiming at a greater level of influence further afield, the influence of the Alliance has significantly decreased in another geographical area of strategic importance for NATO: the eastern neighbourhood. The four East European countries in the border zone with Russia: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, increasingly appear as ‘hard cases’ that are beyond Western influence and democracy promotion. This leaves NATO faced with serious questions about how to maintain a degree of influence in the eastern neighbourhood that matches the ambitions expressed in the New Strategic Concept.

Cooperative security

NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept draws attention towards one particular aspect of security, ‘cooperative security’, by which is meant NATO’s ability to promote security and political change beyond its borders through strategic partnerships with third countries. Cooperative security has risen markedly in the order of priority since the
1999 Strategic Concept, where the concept did not assume any central position, arguably reflecting a reorientation of NATO’s influence-seeking strategies. The 2010 Concept emphasises cooperative security as one of the three so-called core tasks for the Alliance (§4), hence in principle giving equal importance to collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. The concept is further reiterated in relation to NATO’s enlargement policy (§27). The aim of cooperative security must therefore be taken seriously as a key task through which the Alliance tries to define itself and seeks to exert international influence beyond its borders. The importance of cooperative security is particularly reflected in the Strategic Concept in paragraphs 4 and 27:

“Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can effect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnerships with relevant countries and other international organisations [...] and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.”

“NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies: the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security have advanced stability in Europe more broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing common values, would be best served by the eventual integration of all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures.”

Cooperative security follows a long established tradition in the Alliance introduced with the Harmel Report in 1966. The concept has a clear ideological underpinning, which became increasingly visible after the end of the Cold War where common values and democracy promotion became intrinsically connected to enlargement and as means of establishing strategic partnerships through a ring of democratic friends and a growing ‘zone of democracy’. Arguably, this has been one of NATO’s most successful policies resulting in an elaborate institutional framework for managing a wide range of different relationships with third countries and resulting in the enlargement of the Alliance to its present 28 member states. The 2010 Strategic Concept takes specific note of Ukraine and Georgia, reiterating the declaration of the 2008 Bucharest Summit that the two states, some time in the future, will become members of NATO. This is an interesting step in light of the obvious limitations that exist today with regard to any realistic integration of these two countries into NATO following the democratic backlashes and the political crises that have occurred in both countries. Moreover, in the cases of Belarus and
Moldova, the aim of affecting influence through cooperative security faces an even tougher challenge.

All four states represent ‘hard cases’ in the sense that they are increasingly immune to NATO’s self-declared intention of playing a role as a political and security actor and that they each present NATO with very specific challenges through differences in aspirations and domestic politics. A changed strategic balance in favour of Russia is part of the explanation for NATO’s declining influence. In all four cases serious doubts therefore exist about whether the ambitions expressed in the 2010 Strategic Concept are actually realistic.

**Georgia and Ukraine**

Both Georgia and Ukraine seemed on a fast track towards NATO membership in the mid-2000s after the initial positive experiences with the ‘colour’ revolutions against the old Soviet elites. A new pro-Western course coupled with democratic progress nourished high expectations for the integration of the two countries in Euro-Atlantic structures.

The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 occurred as a landmark event which revealed the real dangers of hasty enlargement plans to include geopolitically exposed countries. In a scenario where Georgia would have been a full-fledged NATO member at the time of the outbreak of the war, the result could have been a situation where the Alliance would either face military confrontation with Russia or refuse to bring military assistance to Georgia – which in turn would expose the enlargement plans as a huge bluff with the risk of undermining the credibility of the Alliance’s collective defence clause. As later certified by independent investigations, Georgia had a main responsibility in initiating the actual actions of war against South Ossetia, thus further nourishing the doubts about enlargement and the wisdom of issuing security guarantees to unstable countries with internal conflicts where it is hard to determine ‘who fired the first shot’. NATO accession now represents a distant promise for Georgia, which however maintains membership as long-term strategic goal.

Georgia is an interesting case as NATO continues to upkeep strategic leverage in the country in spite of Russian recognition of and de facto control over both Abkhazia and South Ossetia – and not least despite Georgia’s distant membership prospects. This is so primarily because of large amounts of, in particular American, assistance to the country, which allows Georgia to still look to the West for foreign support.
Georgian aspirations for closer association with NATO, however, are complicated by the democratic standstill in the country. It is increasingly evident that the ‘rose’ revolution in 2003 did not bring about the grand democratic changes that many had hoped for. President Saakashvili has been exposed to criticism for his increasingly authoritarian methods, especially regarding freedom of the media and his violent crackdowns on demonstrators. In addition, Saakashvili bears a strong personal responsibility for taking the first step towards the military invasion of South Ossetia in 2008, leading to the disastrous military defeat against Russia and the de facto loss of the two breakaway republics.

Ukraine’s political development bears many resemblances to Georgia’s. Ukraine’s ‘orange’ revolution in 2004–05 brought about important constitutional changes but quickly resulted in political rivalries between the coalition parties and their ability to deliver political results. This led to the return of Yanukovich from the ‘ancien régime’ already in the subsequent presidential elections in 2010, which was a significant blow in light of the widespread expectations of the ‘orange’ revolution as a spark of democratic change within the post Soviet sphere and as a means of anchoring Ukraine within the transatlantic security community. Contrary to his predecessor Yushchenko, who made NATO accession a foreign policy priority, Yanukovich has declared Ukraine non-aligned and has thus in practice ended Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership.

Moreover, Yanukovich has extended the agreement with Russia on her Black Sea fleet harbouring in Sevastopol for another 25 years, leading to significant improvements in the relationship with Russia. In addition, Ukraine has suffered particularly hard from the financial/economic crisis with a severe contraction of the economy and within the foreseeable future Ukraine is therefore likely to remain inwardly focused on economic recovery and stable energy provisions from Russia. While in Georgia NATO still seems to uphold leverage, the political development in Ukraine points first and foremost to close strategic partnership with Russia at the resulting expense of the kind of partnership that NATO aims at in the 2010 Strategic Concept.

Belarus and Moldova
Whereas Georgia and Ukraine have been examples in the eastern neighbourhood of rapid change and instability, Belarus has been characterised by marked political status quo ever since the country was set on the authoritarian path with the rise to power of Lukashenko in 1994. The gradual ‘disappearance’ of a viable political opposition and civil society in the country and the violent crackdowns on demonstrators
and arrests of leading opposition figures in spite of international condemnations in connection with the 2010 presidential elections are witness to the regime's practical immunity to outside interference. The recent elections, which unsurprisingly secured Lukashenko another term in power, and the remarkable stability of the regime, seem to indicate that NATO's (and the EU's) ability to leverage influence in Belarus will remain depressingly limited. For example, the EU's experiences with failing attempts to influence the Lukashenko regime with the use of both sticks and carrots (visa bans and trade incentives) is illustrative of the lack of influence of any Western power on Belarusian politics. The number one strategic partner for Belarus remains Russia – despite occasional political clashes, Belarus is highly dependent on the economic ties and energy supplies from the Russian neighbour. There seems to be little or nothing that NATO can offer to initiate any substantial partnership intended to affect Belarus's foreign strategies or alter the incentives for domestic reforms.

The fourth ‘hard case’ for NATO's ambitions of cooperative security is Moldova, which has also exhibited interesting political developments. Until recently Moldova was overwhelmingly dominated by the Communist party and seemed just as much outside the reach of Western influence as Belarus has always been. However, since the burning of the Moldovan parliament and the storming of the presidential building by angry anti-Communist demonstrators in April 2009, the country has been marked by considerable political instability. Several re-elections have failed to solve the constitutional deadlock by gathering enough parliamentary mandates behind the election of a candidate for the presidency, which controls the country's foreign and security policy. The country is headed by a coalition government, the ‘Alliance for European Integration’, which at least rhetorically advocates a ‘balanced’ foreign policy. The coalition, on the other hand, has opposed any move to join NATO.

The events in Moldova are interesting as they show how seeming stability with post-Soviet incumbents in power can come to an abrupt end offering possible windows of opportunity for reform. On the other hand, apart from ousting the Communists from office, the current government has so far been able to achieve little in terms of democratic progress. At the end of the day, Moldova is so economically integrated with the other CIS countries that political detachment from Russia is highly unlikely – Moldova is deeply dependent on Russia, both as an export market and as an energy supplier. Most important is, however, the breakaway republic of Transnistria, whose de facto independence from Moldova today remains militarily guaranteed by Moscow with the presence of a major peacekeeping contingent in the separatist republic – an obvious parallel to Georgia's pre-war situation. The Moldovan govern-
ment is therefore very unlikely to take any move that would upset Moscow. From NATO's perspective, strategic partnership with Moldova that would live up to the ambitions of the Strategic Concept seems far-fetched for as long as Russia maintains the zero-sum logic that NATO influence gained is equal to lost Russian influence in her ‘near abroad’.

**Partnerships for what?**

The Russo–Georgian war in 2008 and the broken illusions of the ‘colour’ revolutions in both Georgia and Ukraine became the turning point in NATO's relations with the eastern neighbourhood countries. Leaving the ‘hard’ geopolitics aside, Russia's influence in the eastern neighbourhood is also based on a shared history, strong cultural ties and a significant amount of soft power such as access to the Russian labour market, visa-free regimes and the dominance of Russian media\(^{12}\) in comparison with which NATO and the West presently have little to offer.

At the same time institutions in themselves seem to have limited influence on NATO's relations with third countries. All the ‘hard cases’ investigated in this chapter take part in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and all except Belarus take part in NATO's Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), setting the frame for dialogue and cooperation between the parties. In addition, the specifically designed NATO–Georgia and NATO–Ukraine Commissions provide an additional institutional framework and supposedly closer relations and more opportunity for leveraging influence. However, in both cases little or no progress can be detected since their establishment, which certainly underlines the necessity for real political will on both sides as the primary driving force behind international change.

In practice it seems that realistic membership prospects remain NATO's only effective tool to exert influence in the spirit of cooperative security. However, the only eastern neighbourhood country upholding this aspiration today is Georgia but as NATO is unlikely to initiate even the first steps towards membership (Membership Action Plan) within the foreseeable future, membership, and hence influence, seem rather distant. Distant membership for Georgia has always been advocated by NATO’s continental powers, notably France and Germany, and is now also supported by the Obama administration in a far more prudent approach to the question of NATO expansion eastwards. As a result the ambitions expressed in the 2010 Strategic Concept appear not to be directed towards NATO's eastern neighbourhood, as these enlargement plans seem to have been effectively shelved. This may leave states enthusiastic
for enlargement, notably Poland, disillusioned with NATO’s lack of ability to affect security development and spread democracy eastwards\textsuperscript{13} and it certainly raises serious questions about the prospects for actually achieving cooperative security in the ‘hard cases’ in NATO’s eastern neighbourhood.

**The implementation paradox**

The ‘hard cases’ point to clear geographic limitations to NATO’s ability to establish effective partnerships that could leave the Alliance significant leverage as international actor. The above has sought to demonstrate a growing paradox between vision and reality vis-à-vis the eastern neighbourhood countries, where NATO’s influence has been significantly reduced after having been present for some time.

NATO seems aware of the problems and it may be that the planned overhaul of NATO’s partnership structure to be presented at the April 2011 Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin\textsuperscript{14} will bring NATO’s ambitions and actual institutional structures for partnership more into line, if only for the reason that Georgia and Ukraine de facto no longer are prospective members. These ‘hard cases’ belong in the same category as other ‘hard cases’ – beginning with Moldova and Belarus – and not in the basket of willing NATO partners such as Sweden, Finland and Western Balkan countries. What NATO must do now is to work with these categories of soft and hard – easy and difficult – partners and align political possibilities and ambition. NATO may not be able to formalise the distinction for political reasons but it should operationalise it nonetheless.

The security landscape in the eastern neighbourhood now is best described as a geopolitical straitjacket made up of authoritarian political traditions and regimes and correspondingly declining ambitions to join or cooperate with NATO. NATO’s principle of cooperative security writ large is therefore challenged on NATO’s doorstep. Given that cooperative security is listed as a core task, on a level with crisis management and the crucial collective defence principle, it leaves the Strategic Concept vulnerable on yet another ‘implementation’ front. A stronger geopolitical dimension in NATO’s partnership policies seems pertinent not only in the relationship to Russia but also vis-à-vis ‘emerging’ powers like India and China.
Notes

1 ‘The Alliance’s Strategic Concept’, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington D.C., 24 April 1999.


3 Ibid., § 27.

4 ‘Bucharest Summit Declaration’, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest, 3 April 2008.


14 Lisbon Summit Declaration, § 27.
9. Three Questions for the Strategic Concept

Mark Webber

The subject of great expectation, NATO’s ‘new’ Strategic Concept was officially unveiled at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. Secretary General Anders Rasmussen, who had been tasked with finalising the document, noted at the time that the Concept would help “launch an Alliance that will be more effective, more engaged, and more efficient.”\(^1\) The summit’s final declaration was equally emphatic: the Concept, it proclaimed, laid out “a vision for the Alliance for the next decade.” On that basis NATO would be better placed “to defend its members against the full range of threats; [more] capable of managing even the most challenging crises; and better able to work with other organisations and nations to promote international stability.”\(^2\) It is too soon to judge the merits of these claims. Formally, NATO’s 2012 summit in the US has been mandated to measure progress on the Concept’s core themes – but already experts, politicians and commentators on both sides of the Atlantic have made their views known. This debate is, in fact, an extension of the discussions which accompanied the Concept’s gestation, a unique process by which NATO oversaw expert seminars, social networking and the measured labours of the Group of Experts, and which, in turn, encouraged a public debate that had been largely absent when the predecessor documents were conceived in 1991 and 1999.

Process should not, however, be mistaken for substance. The public and political attention given to the Strategic Concept could all too easily lead one to exaggerate its significance and to over-emphasise its qualities. The reality is that the document marks only a modest step forward. Politically exhausted by the campaign in Afghanistan, disoriented by the strategic ephemera of Iraq and the ‘war on terror’, and constrained by the new age of defence austerity, NATO has become victim to a marked crisis of confidence. It has thus avoided creative thinking and has failed to grasp quite reasonable possibilities for Alliance action.

Bearing these initial thoughts in mind, three questions are worth asking of the Strategic Concept. What’s different? What’s new? And what’s missing?

What’s different?

The Strategic Concept was intended to be ‘succinct and easily digestible’, a tool of public diplomacy able to convey to the sceptical or the unaware the purposes of
NATO and thereby to mobilise support for its activities. The Concept has done rather well in cataloguing concisely a variety of prior and known NATO positions, but to the well informed there are few surprises. Much of the Concept’s content was heralded in the 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance, in summit and other ministerial communiqués of the last few years, and in keynote national statements – the French Defence White Paper, the UK Strategic Defence and Security Review, and the US National Security Strategy.

This tendency toward repetition reflects the difficult task of reconciling national positions. In an inter-governmental organisation, a document such as this has to satisfy a large constituency, one which has grown by twelve states since the end of the Cold War. The Alliance is spared the agonising process of national approval that attends the adoption of historic documents in the EU (the Strategic Concept, in this sense, is not the Lisbon Treaty) but it has to address a problem all of its own – satisfying US demands while at the same time bringing together often discordant European positions. Constructive ambiguity is thus an ever-present possibility. To wit, on nuclear issues, Franco-German differences are elided in a bland statement that allows for both the latter’s desire for cuts in NATO tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and the former’s scepticism toward any move that might cast an unfavourable light on its own nuclear forces. Ballistic missile defence, meanwhile, is noted in a very short paragraph (admittedly, more detail is contained in the Lisbon Summit Declaration), that both masks the concerns of allies such as Norway and Germany and renders indiscernible the doubts of some about cost, technical difficulty and possible damage to relations with Russia. Perhaps most artful of all is the resolute insistence on the importance of Article 5 collective defence (paragraph 4). This is NATO’s essential and agreed bottom line. Expressed in the Concept as relevant to ‘any threat of aggression’ and any ‘emerging security challenges’, it is elastic enough to encapsulate the concerns of all Allies but sufficiently vague to avoid committing them collectively to a particular course of action.

Compromise and the affirmation of set positions are not without political merit but does this mean the Strategic Concept is devoid of substance?

What’s new?
NATO’s most recent Strategic Concept has a lineage that goes all the way back to the inception of the Alliance. Four Strategic Concepts were adopted during the Cold War (in 1949, 1952, 1957 and 1968). A fifth – and the first to be made
public – was released at the Cold War’s end in 1991. A major revision followed in 1999 and this, in turn, has now been replaced by the current document. The circumstances surrounding each of these keynote statements differ, yet all share the same essential purpose – they are ‘strategic’ in the sense of defining key priorities and orienting the Alliance toward the means of fulfilling them. During the Cold War this was a relatively straightforward task in that the functions of the Alliance were narrowly focused – to deter the Soviet threat and, if necessary, to engage in combat with the adversary. But providing focus has become that much harder since 1991 as NATO has lost its central point of reference. Its documents have thus become more conceptual than strategic, with a consequent tendency to map the external environment as a prelude to, and justification for, the variety of functions the Alliance is held to perform. This is an exercise that works well when that environment is in flux. The 1991 Strategic Concept was thus an important signifier of the birth of a new Europe, and the movement of the Alliance toward a ‘new strategic environment’ of ‘multi-faceted’ and ‘multi-directional’ risks. The 1999 Concept could not make such a claim to historical importance. Yet, in many ways, it too marked an important point of departure. What is striking in that document is the note of self-confidence, the assertion, after a decade of post Cold War turmoil, of NATO’s place at the centre of Europe’s military and security governance. That this came in the midst of a major NATO intervention in the Balkans advertised just how unsettled the environment continued to be, but equally, how purposeful NATO could be in response.

The two Strategic Concepts which bookmarked the 1990s were framed by reference to the ‘Euro-Atlantic area’. This Euro-centrism, however, did not sit comfortably with a US less and less inclined toward the continent’s affairs; neither did it entirely accord with NATO’s own proclamations on the proliferation of risks, many of which lacked a territorial base. The US had, in fact, been pushing a more globalist perspective for some time. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had spoken in 1997 of the need for NATO to face up to ‘challenges beyond Europe’s shores’ only to be rebuffed by European allies wary of the uncertainties surrounding a ‘global NATO’. The strains of operations in Bosnia followed in short order by Operation Allied Force over Kosovo, only added to this wariness. The Strategic Concept of 2010 is not a radical departure in this connection. Its ‘three essential core tasks’ of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security continue to be referenced to Euro-Atlantic security as, indeed, do other major tasks such as enlargement and partnerships with Russia and the EU. More eye-catching is the characterisation of a ‘security environment’ replete with problems of terrorism, instability beyond
NATO borders, cyber attacks, environmental and resource constraints, and threats to communication, transport and transit routes; all suggestive of a deterritorialisation or globalisation of security. Many of these challenges were noted in 1999 but here they are given greater prominence. What this means in practice, however, is less clear. Tellingly, those instances where NATO has already demonstrated an ability to go beyond traditional boundaries are barely mentioned. Afghanistan, to use a cliché, was the ‘elephant in the room’ in the framing of the Security Concept. The Afghan mission is not the only expression of how NATO has adapted to the post 9/11 strategic context (its naval operations are also important) but it is by far the most obvious. What it signifies – in the language of the 2010 Concept – is an acceptance among many allies, led by forceful US example, of the need to act ‘at strategic distance’. That this message is not articulated with any great enthusiasm, however, tells us two (possibly contrasting) things. Firstly that the Strategic Concept is striving to be ‘future proofed’, to rise above current, perhaps only temporary, predicaments. Secondly, and less generously, it reflects the impasse to which the Afghan war has led the Alliance. NATO’s emerging globalist perspective has for several years had to contend with an American-led agenda shaped by 9/11. The Alliance as an organisation did well to avoid the war in Iraq but its efforts since have become synonymous with the United States’ initial military response to the attacks on Washington and New York – the overthrow of the Taliban. From this the long, slow-burning Afghan war has followed. That it has been so controversial and that NATO is looking for life beyond is now obvious. The 2010 Concept allows for that possibility, although where it fails (and here the contrast with the 1991 and 1999 documents is clear) is to articulate how this approaching watershed should compel a new sense of direction.

What’s missing?
That the Strategic Concept is seemingly so predictable sits badly with the promise of the consultation exercise that preceded it. Perhaps this was to be expected. An inescapably political process of consensus building was never going to result in a clear statement on political hot potatoes such as a reform of NATO’s decision-making procedures (a very obvious omission in the Concept), burden sharing (also omitted) or force generation and defence capabilities (merely hinted at in paragraph 37). The Group of Experts Report, somewhat less mindful of these political realities, contains bolder statements on some of these matters (including an extensive section on capabilities). And an earlier but less noticed effort, the ‘Multiple Futures’ project overseen by Allied Command Transformation, provides an extended overview of
NATO’s urgent force transformation requirements. These two documents share the Strategic Concept’s preoccupation with the turbulent security environment facing the Alliance. But such awareness has led to self-defeating consequences, a fruitless quest on NATO’s part for ever-greater security. The irony of the Strategic Concept lies in the fact that an Alliance tested to the limits in a single theatre of war judges its relevance not by what it can do best or could do better but by how it can safeguard its interests against ever more abstract, distant and unvanquishable threats. Cataloguing multiple problems is not the same as willing the means to address them or, indeed, that the means when provided will be sufficient or even useful. In giving the go-ahead for a missile defence capability, for instance, the Alliance is about to embark upon an expensive and unproven system against a threat which, at present, barely exists. At the same time, it allows for only a ‘modest civilian crisis management capability’, in an area – the comprehensive approach to crisis management – where NATO has a solid track record.

In this light a degree of modesty would seem wise counsel. One possibility, reasonably well rehearsed before the Lisbon Summit, is for NATO to return to its principal function as a defence alliance, called into action when necessary “to deter and defend the North Atlantic from direct attack from other states.” This accords with NATO’s uncontroversial central purpose but would be against the grain of the transformational work, political and material, it has invested in over the last two decades. Indeed, the strategic culture within the Alliance is less and less attached to such a static role. NATO, rather, needs to continue in the direction of travel it has moved in during the post Cold War period but to do so in a manner that avoids the pitfalls of over ambition. The Strategic Concept hints at such a synthesis in its three core tasks. The importance of the first – collective defence – is clear. The second and third, however, lose focus owing to the panoply of tasks which then follow. What is missing is precisely the sense of vision which the Strategic Concept was meant to articulate.

The basis for that vision ought to be the notion of human security. Such a position has several advantages. First, it connects with NATO’s political roots. The preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty makes plain a commitment to the moral principles at the heart of human security – democracy and the rule of law. Article 2, meanwhile, commits the Alliance to promote ‘conditions of stability and well-being’ in international relations and thus, by implication, is a mandate to act in the face of genocide, ethnic cleansing and the systematic abuse of human rights. Second, it is a vision to which NATO has already steered. Recall here the justification given for
Operation Allied Force – “to avoid a humanitarian tragedy outside [of NATO’s] own borders.”15 The ISAF mission, meanwhile, is mandated to promote a ‘secure environment’ in Afghanistan for a very particular reason – so that the Afghan authorities, the UN and civilian NGOs can engage in ‘reconstruction and humanitarian efforts.’16 This important task has been largely superseded by kinetic operations, but NATO counterinsurgency (most obviously under erstwhile ISAF commander Stanley McChrystal) has, it is claimed, always been married to civilian protection, reconstruction and support for humanitarian relief.17 Third, NATO already has the potential capabilities to undertake such a role. As Berdal and Ucko have suggested, the recent emphasis on expeditionary combat has diverted the Alliance from the course of transformation it embarked upon during the 1990s in light of experience in the Balkans. Stability operations and peacekeeping, however, remain in their view “a profitable and perhaps Alliance-saving niche for NATO”, a more achievable goal of military transformation than expeditionary wars “for which there is insufficient will and capacity.”18 Fourth, NATO’s commendable efforts to develop partnerships would be best served by such a course. The Strategic Concept’s desire to “deepen [...] practical cooperation with the UN”, and to develop “partnerships through flexible formats” allows NATO the opportunity to offer those resources (high readiness force headquarters, strategic lift capacity, logistical support, security sector expertise, and rapid-reaction forces) which others sorely lack.19 Its humanitarian airlifts to Haiti and Kashmir, several years of cooperation with the African Union and the legacy of cooperation with the UN and the EU in the Balkans, point to what is possible here. Fifth, and finally, it is a course which is likely to have greater public support than the politically sapping mission in Afghanistan. One, moreover, which has moral standing, which connects to international legitimacy through the notion of responsibility to protect, and which demonstrates best NATO’s readiness to cultivate wide and inclusive partnerships.

In one of his final speeches as Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer suggested that the soon-to-be updated Strategic Concept should take account of “the new agenda of human security”. To do otherwise would be to ignore one of the main trends in “the evolution of the security environment.”20 Regrettably, the framers of that document have not taken his advice. The 2010 Strategic Concept is meant to last for at least a decade. Let us hope that in its actions the Alliance can make good that omission.
Notes

2 Lisbon Summit Declaration, 20 November 2010, §2.
4 Its reference to NATO missile defence was headline-grabbing but had been trailed in a speech by President Obama in September 2009 and accepted in principle by NATO as long ago as 1999.
7 'The Alliance’s Strategic Concept', 24 April 1999 at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm
9 Strategic Concept 2010, §19, bullet 2.
12 Strategic Concept 2010, §25, bullet 3.
14 What follows is based partly on the Citizens Strategic Concept – A NATO Strategy for Human and Sustainable Security’ elaborated by the virtual think tank NATO Watch at: http://www.natowatch.org/node/413
17 See NATO’s own overview of the ‘ISAF Mandate’ at: http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/index.html
19 Berdal and Ucko, pp.69–71.
10. From Lisbon to Lisbon: Squaring the Circle of EU and NATO Future Roles
Sven Biscop

NATO emerged from its 19–20 November 2010 Lisbon Summit with a New Strategic Concept (SC) that is concise and readable. That is an achievement in its own right, as those who, in preparing for the summit, struggled through the previous long-winded 1999 version will appreciate. The new text does not break a daring new path for NATO nor does it bridge any age-old divide, which perhaps explains why attention from the media and the general public outlasted the summit itself by just a day or two. Even so, the summit can be deemed successful, for NATO needed a new and clear mission statement as the public, and many governments, were growing restive about Afghanistan and were beginning to doubt whether that seemingly never-ending war did not put a mortgage on the Alliance’s reason for living: the collective defence of its territory.

The New Strategic Concept provides the answers that were to be expected. Of course, NATO must be capable of both Article 5, i.e. territorial defence, and non-Article 5, i.e. worldwide crisis management operations. Evidently, the Alliance must remain committed to nuclear disarmament while maintaining nuclear deterrence as a core element of Article 5: “As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance” (SC §17). Naturally, it is better to have a “strong and constructive partnership with Russia” (SC §34) than to steer an antagonistic course – Russia’s own interpretation of that will become clear soon enough. The Strategic Concept offers a neat expression of NATO’s mission and how it seeks to go about it in the years to come.

And yet, a forceful Strategic Concept has not generated a self-confident Alliance, and not just because at the same time as strategising NATO had to downsize as well. The NATO structure will be cut from some 13,000 to some 8,000 personnel. The much more fundamental reason for the existential unease that marks NATO today is its loss of centrality. The Strategic Concept contains a number of ambiguities as a consequence of trying to reconcile two ways of dealing with this loss of centrality: staying relevant by strengthening the core business, or staying relevant by adding new business lines.
The political centre of gravity has shifted
As long as the Cold War lasted it was logical for defence against the vital military threat to the territorial integrity of the Allies to be high on the political agenda, hence the centrality of NATO in the multilateral relations of Europe and North America. Now that there no longer is a vital threat it is equally logical that territorial defence and the Alliance that organises it have lost that central position; other issues have risen to the top of the agenda: climate change, energy scarcity, global economic and financial governance, the role of the emerging powers. These are not threats entailing an immediate risk of violence, but challenges. They cannot be tackled by military means, but require a mix of diplomatic, economic, technological and other instruments. In short, this is foreign policy – not defence.

The gradual shift of the political centre of gravity away from NATO should not be resisted. While unpleasant perhaps for NATO, it is in fact a luxury problem: there are no more vital threats to our territory, hence we can afford to prioritise other issues. NATO is not equipped to deal with those – NATO cannot do foreign policy. Trying to keep NATO relevant by artificially forcing all of these issues onto its agenda is counter-productive, for as the Alliance will not be able to solve them it only risks being discredited without hope of achieving success. At the same time means and efforts will be distracted from its core business of territorial defence and crisis management, which does in fact ensure NATO’s relevance – only in a less central position than before.

That does not mean that NATO cannot discuss climate change or energy scarcity, but only in so far as they have implications for security and defence. Nor does it imply that NATO should not have a dialogue with third states. Obviously, all those that deploy forces on operations are entitled to “a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute”. Perhaps NATO might even “develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organizations across the globe that share our interest in peaceful international relations” (SC §30). As long, that is, as NATO realises that it cannot be the main forum through which Europeans and Americans channel their relations with states such as China, India and Brazil, or even Russia.

The simple reason is best expressed in one of NATO’s own buzz phrases: the ‘comprehensive approach’. NATO is a politico-military organisation, which deals with one dimension of foreign policy only, i.e. security and defence. Responses to global challenges and relations with third states require a much broader, comprehensive
approach that encompasses all of foreign policy, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military. While NATO can contribute, it is not equipped to take the lead. That is up to the governments of its members, including notably the United States and those members and non-members that happen to have organised themselves into the European Union. The US and the EU: these are the true, comprehensive foreign policy actors in Europe and North America. The EU’s foreign policy institutions were greatly strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, and in Lisbon, back-to-back with the NATO Summit, the EU’s new President of the European Council met with the President of the US for bilateral talks. In an age where, fortunately, foreign policy challenges outweigh direct security threats, the EU and the US, and direct consultation between them, logically take centre stage. Focusing on the ‘hard’ core business

NATO must continue to play a leading role, by contrast, in what constitutes its core business: ‘hard security’ – both defence against threats to our territory and global military crisis management. Here lies the strength and the continued relevance of the Alliance.

If today there are no more vital threats to Alliance territory, it cannot be excluded that in the long term NATO will again see a major threat arise, or may have to ward off the consequences of inter-state war between other powers. To that end Article 5 functions as the ultimate insurance. The call, particularly from East European allies, to reconfirm Article 5 is understandable and legitimate, hence the firm statement: “NATO members will always assist each other against attack” (SC §4). However, the credibility of this commitment is not enhanced by those who seek to expand the scope of Article 5. What does the reference to ‘emerging security challenges’ (SC §4) mean? The North Atlantic Treaty is clear: “an armed attack against one or more [...] shall be considered an attack against them all”. Once one starts to add other types of contingencies than armed attack, such as energy or cyber security, a grey zone quickly emerges, making it more difficult to decide what constitutes sufficient grounds to invoke Article 5. For how long must the gas be cut – a day, a week, a month? How to react to cyber attacks perpetrated by fluid collectives of individuals, some of them underage? Once more the Alliance will not be kept relevant by trying to imagine military responses to non-military challenges: energy security, cyber security, even terrorism are best tackled by a holistic foreign and security policy, including notably the police and justice dimension, in the framework of which the military instrument is but a last resort.
In the absence of a vital threat, it can be doubted too whether missile defence of all Alliance territory constitutes an indispensable and effective contribution to collective defence. The actual threat of missile attack seems limited and certainly not markedly higher than other types of threat that cannot be stopped by missile defence, notably terrorism, which is currently the only direct threat of violence against our citizens on Alliance territory. Would not the combination of deterrence and a proactive foreign policy in cooperation with other powers suffice to contain, and ideally come to a mutual agreement with those states that acquire a significant missile capacity? As it is, the effectiveness of missile defence technology to protect our entire territory remains very much in doubt, while the financial burden will certainly be very heavy. At the moment though, that will mostly be borne by the US, which will contribute the actual missile defence capability, while the other allies will fund the required command and control system for an amount in excess of €700 million over ten years (including €200 million added in Lisbon to expand protection from troops deployed in theatre to Allied territory itself). Their contribution will hopefully remain at this level, for in the wake of the financial crisis European allies would better focus their reduced defence budgets on generating deployable capabilities for crisis management.

If after Afghanistan the appetite to undertake new large-scale operations has surely diminished, Europe and North America will nevertheless continue to have to engage in crisis management. For there will be crises in which vital interests are at stake, interests such as “the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend” (SC §13). Furthermore, there will sadly be instances of crimes against which Europe and North America have a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ populations in the context of the collective security system of the United Nations. Crisis management beyond the North Atlantic area thus also forms part of NATO’s core business.

However, which organisation Europeans and Americans will act through in which case cannot be decided beforehand. NATO, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the UN – the most suitable framework for military deployment will have to be selected on a case-by-case basis. On occasions when Europeans and Americans both want to engage, it will be NATO. But on other occasions Americans might have other priorities than Europeans, or might already be engaged elsewhere, or for political reasons NATO might be less welcome in a region. Alternatives are thus required if we want to be able to act in every contingency and deploy forces in the quickest and safest manner. The CSDP framework too, therefore, must be completely operational, including a permanent command and control structure that allows for
permanently ongoing contingency planning, a smooth planning process in crisis situations and the conduct of all types of crisis management operations, including combat missions if necessary. As the NATO command and control structure is being downsized by no less than 5,000 staff, nations should certainly be able to find the 300 or so officers that would have to be seconded to the EU to that end. At the same time, a permanent EU capacity would be a lot cheaper for those three EU member states that presently always have to multinationalise their national headquarters to run CSDP operations: France, Germany and the UK.

In crisis management too, the primacy of foreign policy is uncontested. The military end state aimed at by an operation is never an end in itself, but a step towards a comprehensive political end state. That is decided upon by the foreign policy actors: the governments and, when the European governments work in concert (which ought always to be the case), the EU. Regardless of the framework in which European troops are deployed – NATO, CSDP or the UN – Europeans discuss the wider foreign policy objectives in the EU framework. That is the case for Lebanon e.g., in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, even though the 8,000 European soldiers are there as Blue Helmets, under UN command. It is the case for Kosovo, where European military are deployed under the NATO flag. And it ought to be the case much more for Afghanistan, if Europeans want to have an impact on strategy towards the country and the region.

Crisis management requires capabilities. At the summit NATO adopted the Lisbon Capability Package, fixing the funding for a number of multinational projects. The boots on the ground however have to be provided by the nations. European allies are still struggling to improve the efficiency of their defence effort: their combined defence budgets ought to generate much more deployable capabilities. But they do not, because in reality they are not combined – the problem of European defence is fragmentation. The answer is integration: a combination of specialisation, pooling of efforts, and doing away with redundant assets. The answer, furthermore, is Europe: such integration has to, and can only, take place among Europeans – the US has no need to pool its military. Hence CSDP is the platform from which to launch a stepped-up European defence effort. On 9 December 2010 the Ministers of Defence of the EU agreed on the so-called Ghent Framework, referring to their earlier informal meeting in that city in September. Each EU member state will analyse its capabilities in order to identify: (1) those it will maintain on a national level; (2) those to which it will contribute through pooling with other member states; and (3) those to which it will no longer contribute, relying on specialisation and role sharing between member
states. If done in a permanent and structured manner, such a process will lead to true cooperation – as envisaged by Permanent Structured Cooperation, the new defence mechanism in the Lisbon Treaty. The end result will benefit everybody: more effective forces, no matter how integrated, will be available for national as well as CSDP, NATO and UN operations.

Avoid ‘soft’ branching-out
Crisis management is not exclusively military. In Lisbon, NATO decided to create “an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability” in order “to interface more effectively with civilian partners”, but it “may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors” (SC §25). Undoubtedly this ‘interface’ is highly necessary. An arrangement is needed that, whenever NATO is chosen as the framework for a military operation, allows from the very start for the involvement in NATO planning of whichever actor will take charge of the political, social and economic tasks, be it the EU or the UN. These can then implement those tasks in full coordination with the military – but under their own command. Once more, the primacy of foreign policy must be recognised. The highest political authority, which will set the comprehensive foreign policy strategy towards the country concerned, will always lie outside NATO, with the US and the EU and, ultimately, with the UN. It is not up to NATO to command the various civilian dimensions of this comprehensive strategy.

The added value of creating a NATO capacity to ‘plan, employ and coordinate’ civilian tasks is doubtful therefore. Certain civilian tasks will in any case have to be implemented from the start, simultaneously with military operations. That civilian capacity will in any case have to be provided by nations (e.g. police, gendarmerie, civil protection), by other international organisations (notably various UN agencies), and by NGOs, and will in any case require military protection. Building a NATO ‘civilian HQ’ would duplicate existing civilian command and control structures, notably the EU’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity (CPCC), without adding more capability. More importantly, this would be a useless duplication, for even if initially NATO itself would conduct some civilian tasks, eventually the other actors will always need to come in – certainly the Alliance will not create a development policy, a trade policy etc. Better then to leave the short term (i.e. civilian crisis management in its strictest sense) and the long-term civilian dimension in the same hands. Nor would it be very useful then to “identify and train civilian specialists from member states”
A plethora of national, EU and UN courses for civilian crisis management already exist. The problem is not how to train policemen, judges etc. for deployment abroad – the issue is where to find them.

**Conclusion**

NATO remains the forum where Europe and North America organise their collective defence and it remains one of the key actors through which they do crisis management and cooperative security. Those are the three ‘essential core tasks’ defined by the New Strategic Concept (§4). The more capable NATO will be of implementing those security and defence tasks, the more relevant it will be. Attempts to broaden NATO’s agenda beyond those core tasks and move into civilian crisis management and even into foreign policy cannot achieve success, for the Alliance is an alliance, not a foreign policy actor. Instead, such distractions will only serve to undermine the core tasks and thus to question NATO’s relevance. What this artificial broadening of the agenda will not do is bring back the centrality that NATO enjoyed during the Cold War. Fortunately – for to put it simply the fact that today the agenda of Europe and North America is no longer dominated by a vital threat to their territory is a good thing.

NATO’s loss of centrality does not affect the transatlantic relationship, however, for we should not make the mistake of equating transatlantic relations with NATO alone. Logically, if defence is no longer the main concern, the main debate moves elsewhere, particularly to the direct EU–US relationship. That transatlantic link, between the two fully-fledged foreign policy actors, needs to be deepened and operationalised. Within such a fundamental political partnership NATO remains a key asset, the executive organisation that Europeans and Americans use when they need to act together in the military field. Let us hope that an effective foreign policy can limit those occasions as much as possible.
PART 4

Military Operations and Challenges
II. Testing Times: NATO War-Making in Afghanistan and Beyond
Theo Farrell

The hard experience of war in Afghanistan has not put NATO off going global. On the contrary, the New Strategic Concept deepens NATO’s commitment to its global security role. So it is an opportune time to ask: how has NATO performed in Afghanistan, and what does this tell us about NATO’s ability to fight future wars?

Bosnia all over again?
Why back to the Balkans? In 1992, Bosnia presented the Western allies with a new strategic challenge, namely managing the humanitarian and geostrategic consequences of dramatic state failure. Bosnia also presented NATO militaries with a range of new operational challenges, especially protecting civilians in the midst of war, and working with a bewildering array of civilian partners in the operational space. In other words, Bosnia provided a window into the wars of a post-Cold War era that would involve the liberal West.

Of course, Bosnia was not a NATO mission. Bosnia was Europe’s mess to sort out, and Europe’s chance to prove itself as a strategic player. Bosnia quickly became the source and site of divisions between American and Europe. The new Clinton administration wanted more muscular action on Bosnia but was unable to commit American ground forces because the US military was preoccupied in Somalia up to September 1993, and thereafter with the consequences of the collapse of the Somalia mission. The Europeans wanted a more modest mission focused on support to aid operations. Thus, the Western forces that went into Bosnia were too small to do much. Too small even to protect the civilian population, as tragically demonstrated by the failure of Dutch forces to stop Serb forces from entering Srebrenica and slaughtering the male population. It took three years for the Americans and Europeans to agree on a common and coherent strategy, which was essentially to broker a coalition between the Croats and Muslims, and back them against the Serbs.

In short, Bosnia gave the Western allies plenty of warning on the kind of challenges it would face across the world in Afghanistan. Bosnia was characterised by transatlantic disunity of purpose and effort, and by a small force that was grossly inadequate for
the task and not prepared for its primary mission: to protect the population from the worst effects of the war. Ten years on, was NATO any better prepared? Did the Western allies do a better job of it?

**Saving states**

NATO was prepared at the most basic level of understanding why it was in Afghanistan. The 1990s saw western states fight a series of humanitarian ‘wars of choice’ – Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, and East Timor. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Iraq contained from 1991, surplus western military power was available for humanitarian use. At the same time, the west could pick and choose when to project that power. 9/11 changed everything. State failure and murderous regimes, even in the farthest reaches of the world, were no longer merely humanitarian challenges. Ill-governed spaces were launch pads for transnational terrorist attacks. 9/11 was a wake-up call for the west: it could no longer afford to ignore the most miserable parts of the world. This, in turn, created a new logic for western military intervention. Unlike the 1990s, when intervention followed a humanitarian logic of selective and often minimal commitment, post 9/11 western military intervention would follow a national security logic. The purpose is not to ‘save strangers’ but to save states – to stop terrorists from setting up shop in failing states. This is the logic underpinning the NATO effort in Afghanistan. NATO is clear: it is not waging war to make life better for Afghans, but to secure the country against the return of the Taliban and their erstwhile Al Qaeda allies. NATO’s New Strategic Concept affirms the place of this logic in Alliance thinking, in recognising the importance of state building, and of stabilising states beyond Europe through strategic engagement and partnership.

**The emerging character of conflict**

Was NATO prepared in terms of understanding the character of the wars it faced in the post 9/11 world? Scholars, statesmen and soldiers spent much of the 1990s trying to figure out the character of the ‘new wars’ that were demanding so much western attention. These wars were seen as new in that they were fuelled by a lethal mix of greed and grievance rather than driven by a clash of national interests, and were waged by irregular armed groups within and across state borders, rather than between states by their professional militaries. Of course, wars of this character are not really new, they have raged across history. But the emphasis on irregular war is new after two centuries of western preoccupation with major state-on-state war.
Last year the British Ministry of Defence produced a major study on ‘the Future Character of War’ (FCOC), which informed the 2010 British Security and Strategic Defence Review. Much that is in the FCOC is recognisable from the ‘new wars’ of the 1990s. Hence, the new British Chief of the Defence Staff, Gen. Sir David Richards, prefers the expression ‘the emerging character of war.’ Whilst immensely complex in actuality, the emerging character of conflict can be boiled down to three concepts.

The first is ‘3 Block War’. The Commandant of the US Marine Corps, Gen. Charles Krulak, minted this concept in order to capture the complexity of tasks for western forces engaged in stabilising states. The basic idea is that a marine unit must be prepared to simultaneously undertake a variety of operations – humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and war-fighting – all within an area of operations that is the size of three city blocks. Crucially, this concept highlights the need for intervention forces to be able to fight, even if deployed on a humanitarian mission.

The second concept, coined by retired British Lt. Gen. Rupert Smith, is ‘war among the people’. Of course, throughout history war has often gone on around and in populated areas. But the new wars are waged in populated areas to a greater degree than in the past. The ‘battlefields’ of these wars are simply cluttered with civilians and their objects. Populations are also often the target of the warring sides in new wars, to be exploited and coerced or, in the extreme, to be terrorised and slaughtered. In writing about new wars Smith was reflecting on his experience as the commander of the UN force in Bosnia in 1995. This led him to emphasise another aspect of such wars among the people, namely the glare of the world’s media. Hence, he notes wryly, one may speak of the ‘theatre of war’ in two senses – the conventional military sense of the overall area of operations, but also in the more real sense that new wars are played to audiences. Today’s wars involving western forces are invariably waged in media-rich environments and attract the attention of multiple audiences: local, regional, home, and international.

The third concept emerged in the mid-to-late 2000s and, in particular, from the lessons of the Israeli war against Hezbollah in 2006. When the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) launched an offensive against Hezbollah, they were prepared to fight against an irregular opponent. Hezbollah put up a largely conventional defence, involving fortifications and combined arms operations, and some surprisingly high-end capabilities including a missile attack on an Israeli warship. In essence, the IDF quickly became drawn into a conventional war but were slow to realise this, and slow to
respond appropriately. The 2006 Lebanon War showed the dangers of underestimating irregular opponents: technologically enabled, irregular opponents are able to present conventional threats. The lessons is that western militaries must be prepared for ‘hybrid warfare’, that is wars against opponents able to mix unconventional with conventional modes, means and methods of war in order to exploit vulnerabilities in western intervention forces.3

In Afghanistan NATO finds itself engaged in a war that requires forces to support humanitarian operations and engage in combat operations at the same time and in the same operational space. In other words, to win hearts and minds NATO forces must be prepared to start rebuilding within hours of clearing insurgents out of an area. This is war among the people. Indeed, the key terrain on which NATO is focusing the fight is precisely where people are concentrated. This is also a war that is being conducted under the close watch of the world’s media. Finally, in this war the opponent is waging a hybrid campaign, mixing conventional and unconventional tactics and capabilities. Indeed, it is hybrid in an even deeper sense in that behind the shield of its military campaign, the Taliban has sought to build a shadow government to threaten the very functions of the Afghan state.

NATO’s strategic performance

So how has NATO done in Afghanistan? We may keep two scorecards on this – one on NATO’s performance at the strategic level, and the other on NATO’s performance in operations.

As a global security actor NATO is a provider of military capability. Here we obviously need to distinguish between the US effort and the NATO effort in Afghanistan. In brief, NATO stepped in when the United States became distracted by Iraq. Even before the coalition had conquered Afghanistan in 2002, US Central Command was turning its attention to preparing for the 2003 war against Iraq. NATO took charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003, then confined to protecting Kabul. Hence NATO took responsibility for the whole of Afghanistan when ISAF expanded in stages to the north, west, south and east over 2005–06. ISAF encountered fierce resistance from insurgents when it pushed into the south and east. And here NATO held the line, especially the British, Canadians, Dutch and Danish in the south, as well as the Americans in the east. In sum, for all the criticisms of the scale of European military effort – that it did not match US force uplift under President Obama, and the caveats that prevent full use of German, Italian and
Spanish forces in the north and west – NATO held the insurgents in place while America was focused on Iraq.

On the downside, NATO has been a passive strategic actor. NATO has a political–military plan for Afghanistan. But in terms of strategy, it takes its lead from the United States. The transition strategy for Afghanistan has been defined by the United States. Formally, the Afghan government determined the end date for transition to Afghan security lead. In reality the transition process, conditions and timetable will be defined by the Obama administration with guidance from the American-dominated command in Kabul. Many European states – Britain and Denmark included – lack a proper national strategy for Afghanistan, defining national interests and purpose in the war, and matching resources to these. So perhaps it is not so surprising that NATO lacks a proper strategy and follows America’s lead.

A related problem is NATO’s failure to fashion a credible strategic narrative to explain to NATO’s publics, as well as to Afghan and regional publics, why NATO is fighting in Afghanistan. Most Afghans are mystified by the western states’ involvement in Afghanistan. Theories abound. A favourite is that the West wants to get hold of Afghanistan’s rich deposits of strategic minerals. European publics are little more convinced by the war, if declining support for the war is anything to go by. Certainly the British government has failed over a number of years to come up with a compelling storyline. The claim that Britain is fighting in Afghanistan to keep terrorists off the streets of Birmingham is widely ridiculed. And yet, the counter-terrorism mission is widely accepted in the United States. This suggests the scale of the challenge facing NATO. It is unlikely that one strategic narrative can be made to fit all member states. And yet, NATO needs a common account of what it is doing in Afghanistan and why, in order to avoid 28 national narratives, which risk contradicting each other.

**NATO’s operational performance**

If NATO has largely failed as a strategic actor in Afghanistan, it has got better at operations. From 2005–2009 there was poor unity of effort and poor practice in terms of counterinsurgency (COIN). When Gen. Stanley McChrystal took command of the campaign in the summer of 2009 he found ISAF waging not one war but five, with each regional command doing its own thing. Indeed, unity of effort was poor even within many regional commands. For instance, RC-South did little more than dish out assets not held at the national task force level, such as air power and the regional battlegroup. It did not command, in the proper sense, the American,
British, Canadian and Dutch task forces in its sector, nor did it have an overall plan for Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan. McChrystal imposed unity of command on the campaign, principally through a new three star headquarters – ISAF Joint Command – that was specifically tasked with managing the conduct of the war. Through this, ISAF has achieved improved unity of effort. This is most clearly seen in the designation of Helmand and Kandahar as campaign ‘main effort’ and, to this end, the concentration of forces in the south (see table 1).

Table 1. ISAF force levels by regional command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Command</th>
<th>March 2009</th>
<th>February 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RC-North</td>
<td>5080</td>
<td>7500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-West</td>
<td>2940</td>
<td>5500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-Capital</td>
<td>5740</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-East</td>
<td>25870</td>
<td>26500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-South</td>
<td>22330</td>
<td>54500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NATO forces have also got better in their approach to COIN. Here too, McChrystal deserves most credit. When he took over McChrystal discovered a campaign that had stalled. His initial assessment, delivered to Secretary of Defence Robert Gates in August, was that “the overall situation is deteriorating”; that ISAF faced “a resilient and growing insurgency” and “a crisis of confidence among Afghans”. Accordingly, McChrystal set out to ‘redefine the fight’. Under its previous US commander, General David McKiernan, ISAF was focused on defeating the insurgency, and this resulted in a fairly conventional military campaign. McChrystal brought the campaign back to classic COIN principles. He understood that the conflict was essentially a political struggle rather than a purely military one. The greatest threat to stability in Afghanistan was not from insurgent violence but from insurgent shadow government, as well as local power struggles. McChrystal concluded that the key to eventual success in the campaign was to demonstrate to the Afghan people that their government could protect and provide for them. He declared that “ISAF’s center of gravity is the will and ability to provide for the needs of the population ‘by, with and through’ the Afghan government”.
McChrystal brought in a whole new approach to operations, which he dubbed ‘population-centric COIN.’ The aim was to ‘connect with the people’, in order to build relationships with Afghan partners and the local population. Population-centric COIN involved two new operational priorities. First and foremost was for ISAF to ‘protect the population’ from violence, intimidation and corruption. The second imperative was to accelerate ANSF development and ownership of Afghan security through ‘embedded partnership’ of ISAF with ANSF. Both measures would enable ISAF to forge better relationships with Afghan stakeholders. Tactically this required ISAF forces to assume more tactical risk by getting out of forward operating bases and armoured vehicles, and getting closer to Afghans.

McChrystal was able to drive ‘population-centric COIN’ down into ISAF. A key priority in protecting the population was protecting civilians from misdirected ISAF force. A new culture of restraint, especially in the use of NATO air power, has ensured that civilian casualties did not rise over 2009 and into the first half of 2010, even though there was a major increase in the tempo of ISAF operations. All ISAF field commands practice embedded partnering with Afghan security forces with varying degrees of success. For instance, in a major operation to clear insurgent strongholds in central Helmand in early 2010, partnering between ISAF and ANA worked better in planning than in operations, and was more extensive with the British in northern Nad-e-Ali than with the US Marines in Marjah. Embedded partnering is especially important in the context of an army that is growing rapidly with some risk to force quality; indeed, the basic training regime was reduced from ten to eight weeks in order to speed up army growth. The Afghan National Police (ANP) is also growing fast and is in even worse condition in terms of corruption, drug abuse, poor discipline, and ethnic tensions within the force. And yet the ANP are even more important than the ANA to NATO’s transition strategy for Afghanistan, because ultimately it is the ANP that will be responsible for holding ground that has been cleared of insurgents by the army. In 2009 ISAF was focused on partnering with the ANA. In 2010 all regional commands now recognise the imperative to partner with ANP to improve them in the field.

Of course, there is still variation in roles and performance by individual NATO militaries in the field. The Germans in RC-North are still hindered by national caveats in their ability to get out and about on the ground. The Italians and Spanish in RC-West lack the capabilities to take the fight to the insurgents. But ISAF has got around this by deploying US task forces into these regions to undertake those parts
of the mission that European militaries are unable to perform. Thus American special operations forces have been hunting down insurgents in the North and the West with considerable success. Indeed, across the whole theatre, coalition special forces are operating at three to four times the tempo than they did in Iraq in 2005–2006. Over a 90-day period up to early November 2010 ISAF special forces killed or captured over 3000 insurgents.

The Chief of the British Defence Staff, Gen. Sir David Richards, recently told the House of Commons Defence Committee that the insurgents are ‘getting hammered’ in Afghanistan. And so it would seem, especially in the South. From late 2009 to mid 2010 ISAF cleared insurgents from key areas in the south and centre of Helmand. In designating Helmand as ISAF ‘main effort’, McChrystal hoped to inflict a ‘strategic defeat’ on the Taliban. This has happened, though it has taken longer than McChrystal hoped. ISAF has now turned its attention to Kandahar city and the surrounding districts of Damn, Arghandab, Panjwaye and Zhari. The insurgents have been cleared from Damn and Arghandab. A tough fight continues in Panjwaye and Zhari. Reports suggest a dramatic improvement in security in Kandahar city in October 2010. However, the sustainability of these gains in Kandahar province is unclear, especially as the clearout was helped by an earlier than usual migration of foreign fighters back to Pakistan, as customarily happens at the end of the fighting season. One presumes these fighters will return when the fighting season resumes.10

After Afghanistan
Afghanistan has tested NATO to its limits – politically, militarily and geographically. How has NATO performed? In some respects it has done pretty well. NATO held the line in Afghanistan when the United States was preoccupied elsewhere. And even though the United States now is fully engaged, NATO continues to deliver significant command, combat, logistical and training capabilities for the war effort. A war that lacked unity and was too conventionally focussed has been corrected. Improved unity of effort and better counterinsurgency practice came with a new American commander. NATO commands and forces in theatre have rolled under this revived American effort.

NATO has done poorly in other respects. In comparison to the United States, the European allies have generated far less military capability, in relative as well as absolute terms. Britain has done best, with 10,000 troops in Afghanistan in 2010.
Economies and militaries of comparable size, France and Germany, have deployed far fewer troops: France has sent around 3,800 and Germany about 4,300. In addition, many European militaries have sent far less capable, as well as smaller, task forces. For instance, the Italian force of almost 3,700 in Regional Command-West lacks the capability to clear routes of explosives. Finally, some European states have imposed national caveats on what their forces may be asked to do. Thus, German forces may not be deployed outside of Regional Command-North, and face restrictions on operating at night. As noted above, ISAF has mediated these operational limitations by deploying more capable US units to augment European forces in the North and the West.

NATO’s main failure in Afghanistan has been as a strategic actor, independent of the United States. NATO effectively follows American strategy for Afghanistan. Unlike, NATO’s Kosovo War, where Britain took the lead, this war is entirely American led. Any major change in strategy originates from Washington D.C. Hence, the war was allowed to drift from 2002–2005, during America’s Iraq adventure. The insurgents were allowed to regenerate in the South and East, embryonic moves by some insurgents to reconcile were ignored, Afghan government corruption was left to fester, and nobody got a grip of a failing military campaign. It took a change in leadership in the United States to reset the strategy. NATO has also failed to fashion a compelling strategic narrative for the war to explain to its publics why the war is necessary.

What of the future then? Afghanistan is indeed a window into the future for NATO. Future wars will have many of the characteristics of Afghanistan. NATO will be called upon again to stabilise failing states, and to secure their populations. NATO forces will find themselves conducting combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in the same areas of operation. NATO will struggle to bring decisive force to bear on irregular armed opponents. At the same time, thanks to increasingly porous borders in most unstable regions in the world, irregular opponents will be able to acquire conventional capabilities. In short, NATO will have to be ready to fight but will likely find fighting to be a frustrating experience. Overall, future wars are unlikely to be resolvable militarily. Rather military force will be required to create the space for a political solution. Rebuilding state institutions, especially security forces, will be central to this. All of this will unfold under the world’s gaze. Indeed, strategic communications is likely to increase in importance and complexity, thanks to the information revolution and the diversification of news media.
As it happens, NATO is transforming itself for the wars of the future. This programme of transformation has its origins in a high-tech American vision of warfare involving information-empowered, networked, modular forces, generating precise effects in the battle space. Afghanistan has challenged this vision. Information technologies (IT) – crucially UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and networks – have increased the situation awareness of friendly forces, but not in the way and to the extent required. In short, IT can light up a conventional battlefield, but less so the civilian-populated counterinsurgency space. The bottom line is that counterinsurgency wars are far more human-centric than techno-centric.

The American vision of military transformation has also brought in a new military doctrine of effects-based operations (EBO), which involves scientific modelling of how military capabilities may generate precise effects. EBO has also been challenged in Afghanistan and Iraq: both have revealed the true nature of war to be chaotic, impossible to predict, and involving a mix of rationality, passion and chance.11 The Europeans have always been more sceptical about modelling warfare. Their version of EBO has focused more on the importance of civil–military cooperation in counterinsurgency – what they call the ‘Comprehensive Approach.’ Progress on this has been slow in Afghanistan. Civil–military cooperation remains dogged by considerable disunity of effort. The main vehicles for the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan – the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) – do not even follow a NATO template, let alone NATO strategy and instruction. Instead they have been set up by individual NATO members; they vary greatly in size, formation and capability, and they follow national guidance and instruction.

In short, NATO has much to learn from Afghanistan, and indeed much to improve in Afghanistan. History reveals that states and militaries do learn from war, and get better at the business of war making. But Afghanistan has been a very different war for different NATO members. For those in the East and South – the Americans, British, Canadians, Danish, Dutch and French – it has been a high-intensity counterinsurgency war. For those in the North and West – the Germans, Italians, Norwegians, Polish, Swedes and Spanish – this has been more akin to a tough peacekeeping mission. The risk, therefore, is that different NATO members and their militaries will draw very different lessons from Afghanistan about the character of future wars, and what the Alliance needs to do to prepare for them.12
Notes

1. The UK MOD’s Future Character of Conflict study may be downloaded from: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/OurPublications/Concepts/FutureCharacterOfConflict.htm


12. The Strategic Concept and NATO’s Command Structure: Shifting Gears?
Paal Sigurd Hilde

There is little room for big surprises in a consensus-based strategic concept, nor is such a document intended to bring any. One expected adjustment to NATO’s declared priorities in the 2010 Lisbon Strategic Concept was a rebalancing of emphasis between crisis response operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area (referred to here as ‘out-of-area’), and attention to Article 5, collective defence and challenges in NATO territory and at its periphery (referred to as ‘in-area’). Most of the previous decade was marked by an increasing and, from about 2005, almost exclusive focus in NATO on ISAF and other out-of-area operations. The emergence, particularly from 2007, of a renewed, often bluntly expressed self-confidence in Russia’s foreign and security policy saw, however, several NATO members call for more attention in NATO to potential challenges ‘at home’. After the Russian intervention in Georgia in August 2008, consensus quickly emerged on the need to emphasise in-area ‘visible assurance’.

In line with the recommendations of the NATO Group of Experts, the New Strategic Concept on the one hand emphasises and develops NATO’s role in out-of-area operations, for instance by stressing the need for a ‘comprehensive political, civilian and military approach’ to crisis management. On the other, it places ‘collective defence’ as the first of three core tasks (deterrence and defence came third in 1999) and stresses that the conventional threat (against NATO territory) cannot be ignored.

The New Concept has been described as ‘a mercifully short, very plausible, and eminently readable document’. To a large part it achieves brevity by shifting into other documents, notably a new Political Guidance document due in March 2011. Most of the more detailed guidelines for NATO forces are found in Part IV of both the 1991 and 1999 concepts. The new concept thus gives limited insight into how NATO is going to implement the new balance in practice. The Lisbon Summit Declaration gives some more pointers. Notably, it states “We have agreed on a framework for a new NATO Command Structure, which will be [...] better able to deploy on operations, including Article 5 contingencies and providing visible assurance.”

The NATO Command Structure (NCS) indeed stands at the heart of measures to confer substance to NATO’s new balance. It has also done so in the Alliance’s visible
assurance efforts during the last two years, notably in terms of contingency planning. The Lisbon reforms shift the trend towards ever-greater emphasis on out-of-area operations that has marked the evolution of the Command Structure after the end of the Cold War. The NCS has never fully disengaged from in-area tasks. Commanding air policing, including the Baltic air policing mission, is just one example. However, the NCS’s overall focus has, over the last two decades, clearly and increasingly shifted towards out-of-area operations.

However, another goal has been even more important than NATO’s out-of-area ambitions in driving the latest round of command structure reforms: cost cutting. With defence budget cuts in most NATO countries, common funded budgets in NATO have also come under pressure with expenditures on the command structure a prime target. This strong emphasis on reducing the cost – the size – of the command structure begs the question to what extent extensive cuts are compatible with giving the NCS a range of new, or renewed, tasks.

The aim of this chapter is first to very briefly describe the process that led up to reemphasis on visible assurance in the New Strategic Concept and examine in some detail the latest rounds of NCS reform. Based on this, the chapter will attempt to assess the degree to which the command structure reform strengthens or weakens NATO’s ability to fulfil the rebalanced set of objectives in ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’. Does the current NCS reform entail a change in emphasis, a shift in gears, consistent with rebalancing? The chapter will thus not only aim to contextualise the guidance given in the Lisbon Strategic Concept, but also highlight an issue that deserves increased attention: the operationalisation of strategic level decisions in NATO.

**Visible assurance**

With the price of oil surging in the mid 2000s and peaking in summer 2008, Vladimir Putin’s Russia gained financial solidity. This solidity again spurred self-confidence in Russian foreign and security policy. 2007 marked a turning point and saw a number of expressions of the new, forward leaning Russia. These included Putin’s famous speech at the Munich Security Conference, a Russian moratorium on its CFE commitments, a surge in flights by Russian strategic bombers, a cyber attack on Estonia with suspected official Russian involvement, and a highly publicised flag planting on the sea floor below the North Pole. With NATO almost singularly focused on Afghanistan, calls emerged for renewed atten-
tion in NATO to security challenges closer to home, for both security and wider political reasons. At the first ministerial meeting after the August 2008 Russian intervention in Georgia, the informal defence ministers’ meeting in London in September 2008, several members called for active and visible measures. Suggestions included tasking the NATO Response Force with Article 5 deployments and initiating contingency defence planning for the Baltic States. Both these measures were later adopted. A further set of concrete proposals was focused on the NATO Command Structure. In a non-paper titled Strengthening NATO – Raising its profile and ensuring its relevance, Norway suggested several measures that, importantly but not only, would increase the NCS’ ability to react to in-area challenges. Two concrete proposals were central: the reintroduction of an in-area geographic focus for NATO’s operational level headquarters, the Joint Force Commands (JFCs), and the development of relations between JFCs and national, joint headquarters.

The size constraints of this chapter do not allow a closer look at what factors were important in the rapid emergence of consensus on a more visible, in-area profile for NATO. What is significant from the perspective of this paper is that that the two abovementioned, concrete measures proposed by the Norwegian non-paper were adopted and are specifically referred to in the Lisbon Summit Declaration. While details remain to be decided, the two measures thus form a core part of the decision to rebalance the focus of the NCS. Consequently, they also stand at the core of the overall NATO ‘in-area – out-of-area’ rebalancing act.

The evolution of the NCS
The NCS has changed fundamentally over the past 20 years. Just one expression of this is that the Peacetime Establishment (PE) – the total number of positions in the Command Structure – has been reduced from about 24,500 in the late 1980s, to about 13,900 in 2010. Political aspirations, military requirements (including new technologies), and cost cutting have all been important in shaping the NCS’s post Cold War evolution. The reform agreed at the Lisbon Summit constitutes the fourth major NCS reform since the end of the Cold War. The previous ones took place in 1991–92, 1994–97 and 2002–03. In addition, there were smaller, but significant adaptations between these. The adoption of two different concepts aimed to make the NCS more deployable, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 1994 and the Deployable Joint Staff Elements (DJSE) in 2008, are the two most important.
Reform in the 1990s and the Prague watershed

The first two rounds of post Cold War reforms were clearly marked by the gradual adaptation of NATO to the new security situation in Europe. A new, streamlined command structure, ‘adapted to the new environment’, was adopted in the wake of the 1991 Alliance’s Strategic Concept. Before it was implemented in 1994, however, it was evident that the reforms were inadequate. They reduced the size of a command structure still geared towards a Cold War threat that no longer existed. Even more importantly, NATO had from 1992 gradually committed itself to supporting peacekeeping operations, as well as to building a European security and defence identity. In January 1994, the Brussels Summit launched a more substantial revision of the NCS. At the core of measures to increase flexibility and capability stood the CJTF concept. CJTF was to provide NATO with a deployable HQ capability that would not only enable it to deploy headquarters to crisis response operations, but also to make command and control capability available for EU-led operations. Agreement on details proved very hard, however. A breakthrough came at a North Atlantic Council (NAC) ministerial meeting in Berlin on 3 June 1996; later forming the basis for the Berlin Plus arrangement. Full agreement on a new command structure was only reached in 1997.

The significance of the 1994–97 reforms, which were fully implemented in March 2000, lay in a clear reorientation on several levels. Most importantly, the nature of the main challenges NATO was seen to face in or close to the Euro-Atlantic region was such that it blurred the purely military distinction between non-Article 5 and Article 5 crisis response operations. Consequently the emphasis in the CJTF concept on flexibility and ‘jointness’, which was implemented in the new structure, was also applied to static, sub-regional commands.

While the 1997 reforms represented a change in emphasis, the third round of reforms following the 2002 Prague Summit represented a watershed. Apart from the new direction set by the 1999 Strategic Concept, the key driver behind the rapid and radical reform were the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001. Out-of-area now became the key task. An important expression of this was that on the operational level, former regional commands were no longer given a specific in-area geographic field of responsibility. The new structure saw the creation of a single strategic command for operations, Allied Command Operations (ACO), and a strategic functional command, Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Within ACO the two former regional commands were redesignated Joint Force Commands (JFCs). A third, smaller, Joint Headquarters was established in Lisbon. The operational level HQs were to be...
flexible and generic, and thus able to assume command of a NATO, or EU, operation anywhere. Finally, the number of tactical level commands was cut drastically. Only three single service component commands remained for each of the two JFCs. The overall structure adopted in June 2003 will remain in place until the Lisbon reforms are implemented. Not long after 2003, however, pressure again mounted for further reform. Several factors played a role. One was the guidance given by the Senior Officials Group (SOG) appointed by the Prague Summit to establish consensus on a new NCS. In its June 2003 report the group of senior representatives from all member states set the ambitious target of a 30% cut in NCS personnel numbers. This aim became a leitmotif of the 2006–09 Peacetime Establishment Review.

At least as important was that NATO’s Level of Ambition was changed in the 2006 version of Ministerial Guidance (MG 06), which gives political guidance for NATO defence planning. The previous (2003) version had established that NATO should be able to conduct three concurrent, major, joint operations. In 2006 the Level of Ambition was changed to two major and six small joint operations. Moreover, in line with the 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), which stated that, “Large scale conventional aggression against the Alliance will continue to be highly unlikely” (note the phrasing ‘large scale’), Article 5 operations were reduced compared to previous MG documents. Finally, whereas the 1999 Strategic Concept refers to out-of-area operations mainly in a Euro-Atlantic context, CPG takes a global perspective. Focus thus changed both from a few large to several smaller operations and from mainly in-area or close to it, to strategic distance. This had significant implications for the NCS.

The 2006–2009 Peacetime Establishment Review

The same June 2006 meeting of defence ministers that approved Ministerial Guidance 2006 also endorsed the start of a new, major Peacetime Establishment review. The review was to cover the NCS and the new NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA) established in 2004. It was to be based on the guidance given in CPG and MG 06 and thus be geared towards enhancing NATO’s ability to conduct out-of-area operations. Moreover, it was to make the NCS and NCSA more affordable. The review was to have two phases: phase 1 would cover mission, tasks and roles, and phase 2 the manpower requirements.

NATO Command Structure 2010, diagram

At least some member states and senior NATO officials sought to make the PE review into a larger reform. The 2002–03
reforms saw the closing of a number of major headquarters, but many saw room for further cuts, particularly in ACO. This was not to succeed due to a traditional obstacle in command structure reforms: geographic footprint. The insistence of many member states on having a NATO HQ on their territory has been a persistent factor shaping the Command Structure throughout its history. It was also the most important obstacle to more radical reform in the 1990s. In 2006–07 such opposition prevented the Military Committee from reaching consensus on a comprehensive reform package. New guidance from the NAC in July 2007 ended any hope of substantial reform as it held that neither the geographical footprint, nor the status of existing commands could be touched.

While much more limited in scope than some had hoped, the completion of phase 1 in September 2007 nevertheless saw a number of changes to the NCS. Two were particularly significant. First, the name and status of Joint HQ Lisbon was changed to JFC Lisbon to reflect that, though smaller, it basically had the same tasks as the two other JFCs. Secondly, and more importantly, phase 1 introduced the Deployable Joint Staff Elements concept. In many ways the DJSE was a refinement of a modified CJTF concept developed for the NATO Response Force (termed Deployable Joint Task Force, DJTF). The core idea was to field a small, easily deployable, forward HQ that would remain closely linked to a JFC, enabling the JFC to lead crisis response operations in situ. In February 2009 the recommendations of phase 2 were finally endorsed by the NAC. While substantially smaller in terms of personnel, the recommended structure was not cheaper to run. Individual member states have to cover the cost of their own officers working in NATO commands. Thus, a reduction in the PE hardly reduces NATO’s expenditures, only the member states’. While the latter was an important aim, so was a reduction in common funded expenditures. Given that no headquarters could be closed, and that the establishment of six DJSEs required investments and additional civilian technicians (who are paid by NATO, not member states), the new NCS became more expensive. With a global financial crisis just unfolding, pressure for more radical reform quickly emerged with force.

The 2010–2011 reforms
The fourth and latest round of NCS reform is distinguished by a shift in emphasis away from the ever-increasing focus on out-of-area operations. While this is a notable result of the reform, it was not in itself an important reform driver. The key driver was clearly cost saving.
At the informal defence ministers’ meeting in Istanbul in February 2010, US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates came out forcefully in favour of a reform of NATO structures, including the Command Structure. He gained support for tasking Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen with presenting a proposal for cuts by the June ministerial meeting. This was followed by a nine member state initiative, including the US, UK, Germany and France, presented in April 2010. Their non-paper called for an NCS that was “affordable, scalable, and able to support deployable operations”, that “the number of headquarters should be reduced substantially”, and the number of personnel should be “significantly less than 10,000 [...] (towards a 7,500 level)”. To fulfil his February tasking, Fogh Rasmussen turned to the Chairman of the Military Committee and the commanders of the two strategic commands, earning the group the nickname the ‘twelve-star committee’. Its proposals for drastically cut structures were presented to NATO defence ministers in June 2010. The models, A and B, were 7,500 and 9,500 strong respectively and both proposed cutting all component commands in ACO, retaining only two (A) and three (B) JFCs. Instead of accepting either of these, however, the ministers again appointed a Senior Officials’ Group to hammer out an agreement. The SOG convened on 30 June 2010 and worked until late September. The ‘geographically unconstrained’ model it proposed was subsequently endorsed by both the October meeting of defence and foreign ministers in Brussels and the Lisbon Summit. It retains the two strategic commands. While ACT is reduced somewhat in size, it is basically left untouched. ACO and to an even greater extent the NSCA see major change. In ACO, the number of JFCs is cut to two, and only one maritime and one air component command are retained. Deployable HQs are to be fielded by the JFCs, which are also to develop a regional focus and relations with national, joint HQs. A much-reduced NCSA is to become a NATO CIS Group under the command of ACO. Overall, the number of personnel is to be about 9,000. The approval of this model in Lisbon was only a first step. Many decisions must still be taken; the Lisbon Summit set a June 2011 deadline for a “final decision on a new NATO Command Structure, including its geographic footprint.” It is no coincidence that geographic footprint is specifically mentioned – it will probably, as usual, be the hardest nut to crack.

**Shifting gears?**

As argued above, the NCS stands at the core of NATO’s new balancing act between out-of-area operations and in-area challenges. By placing greater emphasis on in-area, the NATO Command Structure may improve and demonstrate the Alliance’s ability to deal with challenges in or close to NATO borders, and thus provide visible
assurance. One way this has been done, and something we are likely to see more of, has been to engage the NCS in efforts such as in-area contingency planning and relevant exercises.

Another approach is to (re)introduce tasks for NATO HQs, as the ‘regional focus’ and ‘a new relationship with our national headquarters’ entail. The details of what this would mean in practice, and what resources the NCS should devote to them, remain to be decided. Their implementation does, however, hold the promise of further re-familiarising the NCS with the geography and climate, and the potential challenges in and around NATO’s treaty area. Cost cutting was the single most important motive for the latest round of NCS reform. The Lisbon Summit Declaration appears to acknowledge this in the first sentence of the paragraph dealing with the NCS: “We have agreed a framework for a new NATO Command Structure, which will be more effective, leaner and affordable.” Given that the total cost of maintaining the NCS amounts to a mere fraction of a per cent of total NATO defence spending, even the most optimistic assessment of savings remains a drop in the ocean in terms of the overall defence resource challenge. This only serves to magnify the paradox that, at a time when the aim to “develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity” (Lisbon Strategic Concept) is held in such high regard, cooperation is being reduced in the NCS. Apart from the devoted membership of the United States, the NCS is perhaps the single most important element that makes NATO different from other international organisations engaged in security affairs, such as the UN and the EU. The NCS also plays an important role as the ‘glue’ that binds NATO militaries and member states together. Linguistic skills, cultural issues, varying emphasis on and quality of military education, and political caveats are all factors that will prevent NATO from becoming optimally efficient and the NCS is a key arena for levelling out such differences and for fostering interoperability. Learning about NATO procedures at a military academy is a far less intensive experience than learning by doing in a truly multinational NATO command. While the existence of large NATO HQs in operations, such as the massive ISAF HQ, makes the problem less acute, cutting the size of the NCS will not benefit the development of doctrinal, procedural and cultural interoperability among NATO officers. Moreover, this is a move that will hurt new members more than old and thus, given that many new members are particularly concerned about in-area challenges, be seen to work against rebalancing.

The establishment of links between NATO and national headquarters and cooperation with NCS HQs e.g. in organising exercises, may compensate. So may, even,
intensified cooperation between national headquarters using NATO procedures, and the plan to develop a system of certification of national HQs. All of these will, however, draw on scarce resources both in terms of finances and manpower, and thus compete with out-of-area operations – with out-of-area probably winning hands down until the end of ISAF.

The size of this chapter does not allow for an assessment of the degree to which the latest reform shifts the burden of fulfilling the still-valid 2006 Level of Ambition from the command structure to force structure and national headquarters, and the implications this has. In terms of the day-to-day workload, there is little evidence to suggest that the current NCS struggles significantly with meeting today’s operational tempo, although the workload is clearly unevenly shared. This despite – and this is a crucial point – the fact that the level of actual manning for many years has consistently been at 80–85 % – which is basically the personnel size of the newly adopted structure fully manned. Evidence thus suggests that with some synergy gained from concentration across fewer sites, even a much smaller NCS should be able to conduct on-going operations and even devote some resources to renewed, in-area ones.

If, however, as experience from the last two decades shows, member states continue to underman the new, smaller structure to the same degree, the new NCS may struggle to meet the full range of demands made of it. As long as NATO remains as heavily involved in high priority, out-of-area operations as it is today, in-area ambitions are likely to yield.

This returns us to the question this chapter set out to answer: namely, do the current NCS reforms entail a shift in gear consistent with the rebalancing act envisioned by the Lisbon Strategic Concept? The answer is that it is too early to tell and prospects are mixed. What does seem clear is that until the end of the Afghanistan operation, the shift will most likely only be a shift from first to second gear in the in-area, and from top gear down to fourth in the out-of-area operations.

Notes

1 Note that the out-of-area debate has changed character over the years. During the Cold War and most of the 1990s, out-of-area implied out of the NATO treaty area as defined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Though the term is still used in the literature on NATO, by the late 1990s and clearly after 2001, there was no real debate in NATO on whether or not the Alliance should have a role outside the Article 6 area. The use of ‘out-of-area’ might thus seem anachronistic, but as the issues involved today bear semblance to those of the Cold War and 1990s, and for the sake of simplicity, I choose to use this (vaguely defined) term and its antonym ‘in-area’. 
2 Active Engagement, Modern Defence, §21.
3 Ibid.; on collective defence see §4, on threat §7 and §8.
5 Lisbon Summit Declaration, 20 November 2010, §49.
8 §49.
9 It is worth noting that the PE includes (today) about 2,000 positions in NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control establishment and about 700 in the Allied Ground Surveillance unit.
10 Quotes from Defence Planning Committee Final Communiqué, 12–13 December 1991, §8.
12 See NAC Final Communiqué, 3 June 1996, §7. NAC implies Foreign Ministers’ meeting.
16 Details on the 2006 PE Review and 2010–2011 reforms are to a large part based on a series of interviews conducted at NATO HQ in June and October 2010, as well as with officers previously involved in the PE Review.
17 The Comprehensive Political Guidance, 29 November 2006, §5.
19 ‘Four Major Initiatives for NATO Reform, April 2010. The other signatories were the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway.
20 Lisbon Summit Declaration, §49.
21 Ibid.
22 §37.
13. **Military Change – Discord or Harmony?**

*Thierry Legendre*

**Transformation – not a new concept**

Military change is a constant in defence planning. Irrespective of changes in the security environment that can be more or less unpredictable, there will always be an element of change and hence a need to adapt capabilities. Transformation has been part of NATO’s evolution since its creation: for instance following its increased role after 1953–54, or given its strategic re-orientation from massive retaliation to flexible response in the 1960s. In particular after the end of the Cold War, now two decades ago, transformation has been integral to the Alliance. The Strategic Concept of 1991 and the follow-on changes led by former Secretary General Manfred Wörner amounted to a major and impressive shift, which prepared the Alliance for an operational role from 1995 and onwards.

The Strategic Concept of 1999 continued this trend, and major changes in NATO’s command and force structures followed at the summit in Prague in 2002. Simultaneously, agreement on the Alliance’s substantial enlargement was reached during these years. I think that the first Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, described military change and transformation best. In 2004 he described transformation as a continuous process recognising “that transformation doesn’t have a beginning or an end” – it’s not a destination in itself, rather a journey.

**The road to Lisbon – a three-step approach**

Some would claim – and maybe not entirely wrongly – that the Alliance stumbled into the new millennium, with broad transatlantic disagreement on the critical issues of capabilities (e.g. lack of burden sharing), operations (e.g. strife over Iraq) or the international security architecture (e.g. American EU-scepticism). As a transatlantic organisation in a time of European fragmentation and American unilateralism NATO had a hard time keeping its members united. It reminds us that NATO can only reflect the actual state of affairs amongst its members and between Europe and America; its dynamics are provided by its members, not by the institution per se.
In order to keep NATO on the transformation track it was important to construct a new path towards the modernisation of the Alliance. Luckily for the Alliance, many almost simultaneous changes had a positive effect on transatlantic relations. First of all the United States turned towards a more multilateral approach vis-à-vis its European allies – most visibly with Barack Obama in the White House but the trend began during the second Bush administration when a more cooperative approach to world affairs became discernable, although the Europeans were no longer in listening mode! Secondly, political changes in the Palais de l’Élysée had a positive effect on the transatlantic climate. France led by ‘Sarkozy l’Américain’ was now ready to fully re-integrate the military structures of NATO that it had withdrawn from in 1966.

This French rapprochement with NATO was completed at the NATO Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl in 2009. It was a summit loaded with symbolism. It was held on the banks of the Rhine between France and Germany and celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of the Alliance. The Heads of State and Government issued a Declaration on Alliance Security that was basically a ‘letter of intent’ underscoring solidarity amongst Allies and outlining some of the main elements that should be included in a new Strategic Concept, including the need for improved relations with other organisations, the need for improved relations with Russia, emerging security challenges, and a modernisation of the organisation and its capabilities. And even more importantly, this Declaration stipulated that a new Strategic Concept should be ready for the 2010 NATO Summit. Finally, the Allies appointed a new Secretary General, the Danish prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. This was the first time in the Alliance history that a prime minister had been appointed to this position, which has normally been occupied by foreign or defence ministers. It was a clear signal that the Allies meant business and were looking for results.

After the 2009 NATO Summit it was decided to create a Group of Experts, chaired by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In co-operation with the Secretary General and the policy planning staff in his private office, the Experts Group ran a series of international conferences. The process helped pave the way for a comprehensive Experts’ Report and also to clarify and, on occasion, clear out of the way, Allied disagreements. I guess the whole process was meant as a global, open and transparent brainstorming process that could be followed by the ‘NATO community and hang arounds’ on the Internet. This public diplomacy approach worked very well, though real decision-making and negotiations in NATO, of course, still took place behind closed doors and in the corridors of Boulevard Leopold III in Brussels.
Lisbon 2010 – a new strategic vision?
I believe that the New Strategic Concept and the decisions taken in connection with the NATO Summit in Lisbon offer a solid basis for the continued transformation of the Alliance in the 21st century.

First of all, I think that the New Strategic Concept offers a far better definition of the threats and challenges facing the Alliance, including new ones such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, failed states, cyber warfare and energy security. Additionally, the decision taken earlier in 2010 to establish a division in the International Staff at NATO Headquarters in charge of emerging security threats, should be seen as a clear sign of the attention given to these issues. Secondly, it is the first time that a Strategic Concept has such an extensive focus on reform and the transformation of NATO and its capabilities. It is made clear that the Allies now want value for money. The pressure on public funding and defence budgets due to the international financial crisis is not underestimated, and the crisis’ consequences are easily traceable in major defence reforms (e.g. Germany) and multinational co-operation (e.g. United Kingdom and France).

Thirdly, with the New Strategic Concept a Comprehensive Approach is now a declared and integrated part of international operations. This is a novelty. Additionally it was decided to create a new ‘modest and appropriate’ civilian capacity at NATO, able to interface with civilian partners. All of this is an achievement although one could have hoped for more – a point to which I shall return.

An additional number of important decisions were taken at the NATO Summit in Lisbon or in conjunction with it. First of all the important decision to have a NATO Missile Defence that ultimately, within about a decade, should give European allies a strategic missile defence. In the framework of the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) major steps have been taken to cooperate on, precisely, missile defence. Furthermore, it was agreed to cooperate on Afghanistan in the NRC framework. NATO’s reform and transformation process was likewise boosted, as decisions reached prior to the summit will reduce the existing fourteen agencies to just three and reduce NATO’s Command Structure by 35 per cent. Finally, NATO reached agreement on a policy on cyber defence.

In sum, the Lisbon Summit and the Strategic Concept reaffirmed an Alliance aware of the multidimensional aspects of the threats and challenges with which it is faced, and realising the need for more efficient, flexible and deployable force and command
structures and a leaner organisation more generally. It is a solid basis for further work. Now remains the difficult task of implementation: the fight over resources, geographical footprints and political influence. Director of Research at the NATO Defence College, Karl-Heinz Kamp, has often said that he had no illusion that a few pages of written paper would change everything but that a Strategic Concept could demonstrate solidarity amongst allies. I tend to agree and I think that the process has been as important as the document itself. In short, the Allies have reaffirmed solidarity with each other. The Allies needed that, notwithstanding that NATO has been through more troubled waters earlier in its history. To illustrate the importance of this procedural element I normally compare the process of drafting the Strategic Concept to Christmas Eve: we all know what to expect, the food is always the same, the Christmas tree hasn’t changed in size, the decorations are the same as ever and we roughly know which presents to expect from each other. In spite of all this, we will all leave the party feeling both better and happier and knowing we’re members of a good and strong family!

Now that we have ‘synchronised our watches’ with a successful summit and a good and adequate Strategic Concept, we should be ready for the demanding implementation. Within most of the areas I have just mentioned, a series of deadlines and benchmarks have been stipulated. Hence both the informal Defence Ministers’ meeting in March and the formal meetings in June 2011 will be interesting to follow, as further political guidance, action plans and implementation instruments are going to be produced and agreed beforehand. An impressive agenda lies ahead.

**Long-term challenges**

The biggest challenge for NATO allies emanates from the international financial crisis and notably the squeeze it exerts on public spending and defence budgets. In other words we need to, as Jamie Shea has said, get more ‘bang for the euro’, more value for money. This goes both for capabilities and for operations.

Let me begin with the capabilities. Europe is suffering from defence capability duplication, and governments must break this intolerable situation. To push the argument, it shouldn’t be carved in stone that all European allies should have three independent services – army, air force, and navy – organised with independent command structures and multiple platforms. The duplication of bureaucratic structures and even of real capabilities within armed forces is an area that simply needs to be looked into. We might very well be facing a paradigm shift because we cannot maintain the level
of quality and activity we know if we do not organise our military capabilities and structures differently. Multinationality is going to be a key element, and pooling and sharing of forces is being actively discussed in the European Union in the framework of the so-called recent Ghent Initiative.

In operations we also need to do better, and the comprehensive approach – ‘winning the peace and not only the war’ – is often presented as the silver bullet, not only by NATO but by the international community in general. What is needed is indeed a concerted approach to operations where civilian actors are included. Many have claimed that it has taken the international community and NATO six or seven years to find out that a comprehensive approach was the answer, and to formulate a policy for it. The claim underestimates the capacity of Western diplomats and forces to analyse and adapt strategies. Already during the Balkan wars in the 1990s (and probably long before that) these lessons were identified and well learnt! As I said earlier, it is positive that a civilian crisis management capability in NATO was decided in Lisbon; it builds on these previous lessons learned.

However we are far from the kind of strategic, concerted, headquarters to headquarters, pre-mission political and military planning that would be needed to conduct international operations successfully with a comprehensive approach. Or as they say in the forces, ‘a goal without a plan is nothing but a dread’! The co-operation or strategic partnership between NATO and the EU in particular is a key problem. The problem here does not concern learning – as if NATO had been wandering mindlessly about for the better part of 15 years (its Balkan IFOR deployment began in December 1995). Rather, the problem concerns political will, including the well-known Turkish–Greek Cypriot conundrum which arrests all movement in NATO–EU relations.

**Conclusion**

With the NATO Summit in Lisbon and the New Strategic Concept the Alliance has once again proven its survivability and maintained its relevance as the largest defence organisation in world history. It has once again managed to place itself at the centre of transatlantic relations, where common command and control arrangements and interoperability remain the smartest way for Europe and North America to cooperate militarily. It has managed to relaunch the transformation and modernisation process of its military and organisational capabilities. NATO has also improved relations with Russia and signalled awareness of emerging security challenges and thereby shown its willingness to shape its own security environment well into the 21st century.
NATO’s new and ambitious agenda now needs to be implemented. The underlying and longer-term challenge of maintaining European relevance through improved capabilities, novel approaches, and working relations between NATO and the EU – all of which must ensure better operational outcomes – should not be underestimated. The substantial defence reforms in Germany and the new French–British defence agreement indicate that lessons are being learned, but they remain tough lessons to digest. To paraphrase Danish philosopher, Villy Sørensen, ‘It’s good that we are doing better but it would be better if we were doing well’.

This presentation reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion or the policies of the author’s previous or present employers.
14. NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Implications for Military Transformation and Capabilities

Christopher M. Schnaubelt

“Our sophisticated, industrialised and complex world is under attack from a myriad of determined and deadly threats. If we do not take action soon, we will find ourselves, like Gulliver, pinned to the ground and helpless, because we failed to stop a series of incremental changes while we still could”. (Lord Peter Levene)

This chapter argues that the NATO document released during the Lisbon Summit on 20 November 2010 is unlikely to produce significant changes in capability requirements or in the present direction of transformation efforts. Although described as the ‘new’ Strategic Concept, it is actually much more about continuity than about change. The aspects that are truly remarkable concern its transparency, the process of its development, and the resulting confirmation of Alliance solidarity. It is difficult to identify another high-level political–military document that has been developed in such an open and public manner, considering such a wide array of views and gathering input from outside parties. However, its substantive content was at best barely evolutionary and certainly not revolutionary. It produced neither a bold shift in the remit of the Alliance nor a fresh approach towards achieving the security of its members.

This continuity, however, does not imply stasis. It instead means that the Alliance is continuing along a path that began to meander following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but was influenced by NATO’s mission in the Balkans, and then strongly shaped by the events of 11 September 2001 and operational experience from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The clear implication is that ongoing efforts at military transformation will continue along the same lines. This also implies that current shortfalls in the effort to achieve the capabilities that NATO requires to maintain its security still remain to be resolved. Furthermore, the budgetary pressures caused by the present financial crisis are likely to exacerbate the problem of capability gaps as the New Strategic Concept removes hardly anything from NATO’s plate.

Prior to its publication some analysts expressed the belief, if not the hope, that the New Strategic Concept for NATO would result in a significant reduction in the Alliance’s ambitions. Combined with the impact of the global financial crisis and
expected reductions in NATO common funding as well as cuts within the national
defence budgets of the individual members, it was frequently suggested that the
Alliance would be forced to look inward and focus almost exclusively upon Article
5 collective defence inside the Euro-Atlantic region. Such analyses implied that a
NATO that intended to accomplish less would, in turn, require fewer additional
capabilities: the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan would be
the last ‘out-of-area’ mission for NATO; the appetite for expeditionary operations
capabilities would quickly dissipate and transformation initiatives would be pared
down to measures that would primarily result in cost reductions.

Perhaps these predictions may yet come to pass, or perhaps the New Strategic Concept
is like a Rorschach blot in that it reveals more about the reader than it does about the
future direction of the Alliance. Nevertheless, it seems pretty clear that rather than
limiting the scope of NATO, both the Strategic Concept of ‘Active Engagement,
Modern Defence’ and the Lisbon Summit Declaration of 20 November 2010 are
intended to continue and reinforce the previous trend of taking a broader view of
security for the members of NATO, as well as the recognition that future security
threats are most likely to come from areas that are not contiguous with the territory
of Alliance states.

As summarised in the Summit Declaration, the New Strategic Concept envisions
an entity that is: “able to defend its members against the full range of threats; cap-
able of managing even the most challenging crises; and better able to work with
other organisations and nations to promote international stability. NATO will be
more agile, more capable, and more cost-effective, and it will continue to serve as
an essential instrument for peace.” Article 5 and the promise that members will
assist each other in case of an armed attack remains as the key foundation of the
New Strategic Concept. Yet rather than revert to a narrow focus upon the collec-
tive defence of member territory against ‘traditional’ threats, it takes note that the
most potent challenges may be posed by actors that are not nation states at all.
Indeed, it specifically states that:

- Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of NATO countries, and to interna-
tional stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread
to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance....
- Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance
security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal
activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics, and people.
These types of threats are the most challenging for an Alliance that is still, to a great degree, organised and equipped to fight large-scale conventional land battles of the kind anticipated during the Cold War. This, of course, is the reason that NATO’s current enemies, such as the Taliban and other extremists in Afghanistan, are presently engaging in asymmetric warfare and any future adversaries are likely to follow suit. Only the most foolish will have failed to note the following critical lesson from the Iraq War: while America and its allies are unmatched in their ability to engage in combined arms manoeuvre warfare supported by artillery, attack aviation, and deep strike and close air support against conventional armies and air forces they are, however, not nearly as dominant when it comes to fighting irregular combatants who indiscriminately use mortar and rocket fire in cities, or insurgents who hide amidst civilian populations and employ improvised explosive devices.

Among the responses to these and other threats (including conventional attacks, ballistic missiles, and cyber warfare), ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’ promises that NATO will:

- Maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
- Develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance’s expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;
- Further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilisation and reconstruction operations;

These are just a small sample of the “full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations” identified in paragraph 19 of the New Strategic Concept. Nevertheless, with the exception of committing to a NATO ballistic missile defence – along with the hope that it will be developed in cooperation with Russia – and taking the threat of cyber attacks much more seriously, virtually nothing was listed that NATO had not been pursuing well before the Secretary General was tasked to produce a new strategic concept in 2009 at Strasbourg/Kehl.7

A complete history of NATO’s evolution after the Cold War is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, a few brief examples may be useful to illustrate the continuity reflected by the New Strategic Concept and show why it is not likely to produce a
major shift in the military transformation efforts of the Alliance or significant changes in previously recognised capability requirements.

Interoperability and logistics challenges identified during operations in the Balkans led to the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) announced at the Washington Summit in 1999. The DCI listed 59 items for action with the intent to “not only improve NATO’s ability to fulfil NATO’s traditional Article 5 (collective defence) commitments, but also to prepare the Alliance to meet emerging security challenges that may require a variety of types of mission, both within and beyond NATO territory”. \(^8\) NATO’s foreign ministers agreed at their May 2002 meeting in Reykjavik that in order to execute “the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives”. \(^9\) This was closely followed by the Prague Capabilities Commitment at the November 2002 summit, which agreed to 400 specific improvements that built upon the DCI. \(^10\)

The Comprehensive Political Guidance agreed in 2006 found that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were the threats NATO would be likely to face in the following ten to fifteen years, emphasising the need to be able to “respond effectively to the full spectrum of threats, risks and challenges of the 21st century from wherever they may come.” Among the most important continuing requirements this assessment generated was “the ability to conduct and sustain operations far from home territory with little or no host nation support”. \(^11\)

Possibly most important in terms of military transformation, the New Strategic Concept is largely consistent with NATO’s *Multiple Futures Project 2030* (MFP) published in April 2009. \(^12\) The MFP’s views of future security conditions and their implications for the Alliance generated useful planning scenarios that remain valid. In particular, it found that asymmetric/hybrid threats would be among the Alliance’s top security challenges and that “it is more likely the Alliance will be threatened by instability and the weakness of others, than by invading conventional forces. Interstate conflicts in different regions of the world will remain likely: while they may not threaten NATO directly, the consequences of such conflicts may have a significant impact on the security of the Alliance”. \(^13\)

In his foreword, General J.N. Mattis wrote that his aim for the MFP was “to buttress the continuing strategic dialogue, serve as a catalyst to drive policy change, inform defence planning, and assist in prioritising capability development”. \(^14\) It is still too
early to judge whether these outcomes will be realised as desired. Nonetheless, the Multiple Futures Project should continue to be useful in helping to steer NATO's military transformation efforts.

As illustrated by the chart below,¹⁵ NATO’s post Cold War experience has been a trend towards lighter, smaller unit configurations rather than large, heavy combat formations. This shift in requirements needs to be matched with improved flexibility, better ability to project forces, and the capability to operate in diverse climates and harsh environments.

**Historical Reflection: Ability to Adapt is Critical**

Nevertheless, the scenarios developed by the Multiple Futures Project also indicate that the trend towards missions requiring small unit operations is not necessarily irreversible. It notes that ‘rogue states,’ which “act without respect for other states or global norms and rules” and ‘confrontational powers,’ which are those “quick to resort to force or threaten the use of force disproportionately to what is at stake and how it affects their vital interest” may require the capability to deploy forces of significant
size to deter acts that would threaten the security of NATO and to respond to such acts should deterrence fail.

This assertion connotes that, in contrast to greater relative certainty regarding the capabilities needed during the Cold War, NATO today cannot plan for a single or specific type of conflict. Contemporary requirements include the ability to engage in corps size Major Joint Operations (MJO), as well as Smaller Joint Operations (SJO) up to division size, while continuing to maintain a nuclear deterrent. Additionally, it is likely that missions will be blended rather than discrete events of a specific nature. The following chart depicts the overlap of missions and forces that NATO should be able to field in order to meet likely security challenges:

Main MFP Implication: No Preclusive View of War

The New Strategic Concept did not change this analysis nor alleviate the need for this range and level of capabilities. Perhaps most critically, the Alliance still needs forces that are highly deployable and able to conduct expeditionary operations. Indeed, the dichotomy that some analysts seem to see between Article 5 missions versus ex-
peditionary operations is illogical, even under the most restrictive interpretations of Article 5. In most of the conceivable scenarios involving a direct, conventional attack on the territory of a NATO member, other members will need to possess most of the same capabilities needed for expeditionary operations in order to assist the ally or allies under attack. As Daniel S. Hamilton of the Center for Transatlantic Relations has argued, “Forces that cannot deploy are almost of no use for Alliance missions”. Nonetheless, in many cases Alliance members do not meet the NATO goal that 50 per cent of their land forces be deployable.

At Lisbon only very broad guidance on reform and transformation was provided: “NATO must have sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to carry out its mission.... Those resources must, however be used in the most efficient and effective way possible”. There is much more that needs to be done. While this chapter is largely sceptical regarding the military implications of the New Strategic Concept, the Summit Declaration contains more than a dozen specific tasks for the North Atlantic Council. These may merely be an example of ‘kicking the can down the road’ to defer dealing with very difficult issues instead of resolving them. However, some may represent the kernel of a long-term solution to problems of matching resources to goals.

It seems unlikely that consolidation, reorganisation and reform of NATO command structures and agencies will produce substantial cost savings that can be re-directed towards efforts to attain the various needed capabilities. While theoretically possible, such an outcome would be contrary to the typical history of large organisations in the absence of a catastrophic event such as losing a war. Nonetheless, budgetary constraints might result in changes that significantly reduce overhead costs and lead to faster, more agile decision making as well as encouraging the more recalcitrant members to make the investments necessary to close capability gaps.

While not a ‘task’ per se, the statement in paragraph 44 that the Alliance “welcome[s] the outcome of the France–United Kingdom Summit on 2 November 2010 which will reinforce their security and defence cooperation by introducing innovative methods of pooling and sharing” alludes to the category of initiatives that probably have the most potential for both increasing net capabilities and improving cost-effectiveness. Successful pooling, sharing, and commonly funded efforts, to include NATO owned capabilities such as the E-3A Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, help the Alliance by improving interoperability and either reducing costs or spreading them more efficiently.
Besides the aforementioned French and British agreement, which among other things will result in sharing an aircraft carrier and infrastructure to support A400M transport aircraft, NATO success stories in this realm include the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (a sixteen nation consortium that leases AN-124 transport aircraft), the Strategic Airlift Capability (twelve nations that commonly purchased three C-17 aircraft), a ten nation consortium that provides ‘roll-on/roll-off’ sealift capability, and the HIP Helicopter Task Force in Afghanistan. Despite the several success stories, however, pooling and sharing programs face the same collective action problems and potential sovereignty concerns as other NATO efforts. Deciding on the specific military capabilities needed is the easiest part. The political questions of how to divide up the costs and whether a nation is willing to completely rely on others for a critical resource are by far the most difficult. For this reason most nations are likely to maintain a full spectrum of their own forces and jointly participate only when they absolutely cannot afford a capability on their own, or in order to have enhanced access to a reserve or surplus capability.

Among the many specific tasks contained in the Summit Declaration, the one with the most potential to have a large impact on military capabilities is probably paragraph 43, which assigns the Council “to develop Political Guidance for the continuing transformation of our defence capabilities and forces and the military implementation of our New Strategic Concept....” The potential for revolutionary change is limited because it will be circumscribed by the Strategic Concept and the Lisbon Summit Declaration, which, as argued above, are actually rather conservative documents. Nonetheless, the forthcoming Political Guidance may be the most likely place for addressing the apparent mismatch between fixed, if not increasing, ambitions in the face of declining resources.

Due by the Defence Ministerial Meeting scheduled for March 2011, the new Political Guidance will be the initial effort in the NATO Defence Planning Process that was agreed in April and June 2009 and will build upon the 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance and other agreements as well as the new Strategic Guidance. Still within the drafting and approval process at the time this chapter is being written, the new Political Guidance is likely to define marginal capability improvements while containing no surprises. It may urge allies who fall short of devoting 2% of GDP to increase their defence spending, and ask those that currently meet or exceed this goal to continue doing so, but provide no teeth to enforce this long-standing objective.
Arguably, the most valuable aspect of the new Political Guidance will be to specify Guiding Principles and Planning Assumptions for defence planning. These will set the stage for the next step in the process: the Capabilities Requirements Review 2010. They ought to contain unambiguous descriptions of the types of missions NATO should consider as being both viable and reasonably likely, and define the relationship between Article 5 collective defence operations and other missions such as Crisis Response Operations. In this author’s opinion, the guidance should clearly state that Article 5 has the highest priority but also that Article 5 and non-Article 5 operation capability requirements are equivalent to a very great extent. Thus, there should be a single force structure for the entire range of missions that NATO anticipates.

It would also be desirable to reiterate the agreed upon 50% deployable ground force ‘Usability Target’ and specify a mechanism that will do more to highlight the progress, or lack thereof, of individual members in this respect. However, as is the case with the proportion of GDP spending devoted to defence, the willingness of some members to restructure and modernise their armed forces and, more to the point, willingness to devote the resources necessary to reach this target, is problematic.

The classified ‘Lisbon Package’ of capability mentioned in the Summit Declaration is likely to contain a few new requirements that build upon existing efforts. Yet, the language used in the declaration implies that the package consists mostly of previously identified and agreed upon requirements: “We have endorsed the Lisbon package of the Alliance’s most pressing capability needs and thereby provided a renewed focus and mandate to ensure these critical capabilities are delivered....”

Developing specific military capabilities within their forces is the responsibility of NATO’s member nations. However, one of the functions of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is to help coordinate development, de-conflict where necessary, and identify and address shortfalls or gaps in military capabilities. To facilitate this process the two strategic commanders (Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation) have established a ‘top 50’ list of Priority Shortfall Areas (PSA). This document identifies the capabilities that the strategic commanders recommend as offering the greatest potential to improve Alliance mission effectiveness and interoperability in the near, mid and long terms.

Informed by Multiple Futures Project findings and recommendations, the PSA list has been developed from several sources that include the 2007 Comprehensive Political Guidance, the Defence Requirements Review, input from individual member...
states, and Urgent Requirements from Crisis Response Operations. Areas identified as needing improvement include:

- Counterinsurgency Training and Doctrine
- Organisations, Training, and Doctrine to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices
- Information Sharing with NATO Partner Nations
- Small Unit Development
- Strategic Communications and Information Operations
- Language and Culture
- Enabler Support
- Civilian–Military Teaming/Civil Affairs
- Professional Military Education
- Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination
- Security Force Assistance
- Ability to Defeat Precision Guided Munitions and High Technology Sensors

As can be seen at a glance many, if not most, of these shortfalls were derived from the experience of the ongoing ISAF mission. Given the 2014 target date for transitioning security responsibility to Afghanistan’s government, one may argue that regardless of what was agreed at Lisbon (and many earlier summits) these requirements will fade if not disappear before many nations can close the gaps. One might thus conclude it would make sense for some members to slow roll the rest of the Alliance and continue to lag in adequately developing the capabilities of their armed forces. However, such logic cannot be supported from a purely military perspective.

Aside from the overlap with requirements for meeting Article 5 responsibilities, these capabilities are necessary for most of the likely scenarios wherein NATO must react to threats that emanate from outside the Alliance’s immediate neighbourhood, whether called stability operations, peace enforcement, or crisis management. Moreover, as argued previously based upon the Multiple Futures Project and other analyses, these threats are much more probable than conventional cross-border attacks on a member’s territory.

The real challenge to NATO in being able to deliver what is desired in the New Strategic Concept is not a difference in military assessments, not disagreement on future threats and the capabilities needed to meet them and not the lack of a common
view regarding what the Alliance as a whole should be able to accomplish. Rather, it is another item of continuity, a political problem as old as NATO itself\textsuperscript{22} – that of attaining a fair distribution of the burdens that must be carried to achieve NATO’s security goals. Force transformation and building the capabilities needed to meet the vision laid out in the New Strategic Concept and prior agreements are expensive. In the wake of Lisbon the big questions remain: how many members will succumb to the temptation to free ride, and what will be the reaction of the states who perceive they are continuing to bear a disproportionate share of the load?

Notes

1 The author holds the Transformation Chair at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy. The opinions expressed here are his own and not the official position of NATO or the US Government.


4 For example, Benjamin Schreer has written that “After the operation in Afghanistan… many European allies will argue for a return to a less ambitious orientation towards Euro–Atlantic stability.” (‘Challenges and prospects for NATO Complex Operations’ in Complex Operations: NATO at War and on the Margins of War, NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy, July 2010.)

5 Available at: http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.


7 Interestingly, the penultimate item was one of the longest running refrains (and most frequent shortfalls) in Alliance pronouncements: NATO would “sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced.”


13 Page 53.

14 Ibid, p.ii.

15 Briefing by Allied Command Transformation Deputy Chief of Staff for Transformation, Lt. Gen Jim Soligan, to Conference of Defense Associations, 4 March 2010; http://cdacdai.ca/cda/uploads/cda/2009/06/soligan-

16 Ibid.


18 §37.
21 Paragraph §45. Emphasis added.
15. Nuclear Posture, Missile Defence and Arms Control – Towards Gradual but Fundamental Change

Trine Flockhart

NATO’s New Strategic Concept agreed in Lisbon in November 2010 follows in the footsteps of previous strategic concepts by considering the role of nuclear weapons and NATO’s overall deterrence posture. Granted the present strategic concept does so much more succinctly than previous (publicly accessible) concepts have done, and the document clearly indicates a decreasing role for nuclear weapons in the alliance of the 21st century, whilst it also indicates a strong connection between nuclear weapons and arms control. Yet despite the apparent clarity about NATO’s continued status as a nuclear alliance and despite the unquestionable brevity afforded the topic in the document, the precise message in the New Strategic Concept is somewhat ambiguous and can be interpreted in two fundamentally different ways – either as a rather conservative ‘business as usual’ approach to nuclear weapons, or as a prelude to fundamental change that will dramatically alter the Alliance by shifting emphasis from nuclear sharing to missile defence sharing and from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial.

On a first reading of NATO’s New Strategic Concept, the document sounds rather conservative on nuclear policy and the uninitiated reader could easily miss the significance of the brief mention of missile defence, and the rather brief and only slightly changed wording on the role of nuclear weapons. Yet, when reading NATO documents it is often just as important to pay close attention to what is not said as to what is said. Indeed, brevity and bland language in NATO documents should never be mistaken for a lack of importance – and should certainly never be assumed to indicate consensus. On the contrary, the general rule is that the less that is said about a subject the more controversial the issue is likely to be. It therefore seems safe to assume that the text of the New Strategic Concept represents the extent to which NATO’s Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen could generate consensus among NATO’s 28 members.

Yet although the actual text only contains limited references to nuclear weapons and nuclear posture, the nuclear issue actually has a much greater presence in the document than first meets the eye. To glean the ‘hidden’ presence of nuclear issues, it is necessary to adhere to the other principle that has to be used when reading NATO documents, which is to never assume that separately numbered paragraphs can be
read independently. In NATO documents issues are always interlinked, and in the case of nuclear posture, paragraphs about missile defence, arms control (conventional and nuclear) the relationship with Russia, capabilities and equal participation by allies are all linked to NATO’s nuclear policy and deterrence strategy, and represent a form of coded language that covers long established rules and practices related to burden and risk sharing and to long held (and arguably outdated) truisms about the role of nuclear weapons for ensuring cohesion in the Alliance and the credibility of Article 5.

The view presented here is that a close reading of the strategic concept together with a reading of the accompanying Lisbon Summit Declaration, along with being armed with some background knowledge about nuclear issues in the Alliance indicate that, actually, the New Strategic Concept is far from conservative but is intended to herald fundamental change in NATO’s nuclear thinking along with radical change in long-cherished principles about nuclear sharing and to directly address sensitive issues of Alliance cohesion and deterrence posture. As described by a NATO representative, the outcome of Lisbon in the field of nuclear policy is somewhat ‘enigmatic’. This would indeed seem to be the case and perhaps even to be an understatement as the intricate inter-linkage of all the issues clearly shows. To some extent this is a finding that is somewhat reassuring, as it really would be worrying if NATO intended to hang onto an archaic nuclear posture that was developed under the very different conditions of the Cold War, and which in any case was always based on a rather dubious logic.

**Reading the texts – the Lisbon documents**

The preface of the strategic concept agreed in Lisbon starts out with declaring implicit support for President Obama’s goal of ‘a world free of nuclear weapons’, by boldly declaring that “it commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons”. The word ‘conditions’ is important and can be interpreted to refer to the inter-linkage between NATO’s adoption of a missile defence and to a renewed and cooperative relationship with Russia and to reductions (perhaps elimination) of the non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe (§26). However, the boldness of the commitment expressed in the strategic concept is immediately watered down as the text continues with a loud ‘BUT’ by conditioning the commitment with the sentence ‘as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance’. Interestingly, however, the concept does not specify which nuclear weapons, thereby leaving the possibility for NATO’s nuclear status being premised only on the strategic arsenals of the US, Britain and France. Indeed this
view is underscored in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the strategic concept as it is declared that deterrence will be based on ‘an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities’ (§17) and that “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France” (§18). The indication that NATO may be moving towards greater reliance on its strategic forces is further indicated in §26, where it is stated that NATO will seek to “create the conditions for further reductions in the future” of non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe – which is linked in the same paragraph to Russia’s stock-pile of non-strategic weapons and to conventional arms control.

The issues are somewhat clearer in the Lisbon Summit Declaration as the inter-linkage between nuclear and conventional posture and missile defence is further specified in the Summit Declaration (§30), which states that “NATO will maintain an appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear and missile defence forces. Missile defence forces will become an integral part of our overall defence posture”. The Summit Declaration further tasks the Council to “continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats” and that essential elements of the review should include ‘NATO’s nuclear posture, and missile defence’ and that “this only applies to nuclear weapons assigned to NATO” i.e. not the strategic forces of the United States, Britain and France. This is indeed a point that has subsequently been backed up by events as President Obama recently informed the Senate that the United States, in consultation with NATO, expects to hold talks with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) within a year of the new START Treaty coming into force.²

The Summit Declaration also provides a little more detail on the issue of missile defence by specifying its aim as being to provide full coverage and protection of all NATO European populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by proliferation. The Summit Declaration hints at a more internal role of missile defence as a means of burden and risk sharing as it specifies that missile defence should be based on the “principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens”. This is indeed a reiteration of the view presented by the Group of Experts under the leadership of Madeleine Albright, which stated that “A NATO missile defence system would enhance deterrence and transatlantic sharing of responsibility, reinforce the principle that security is indivisible, and allow for concrete cooperation with Russia.”³ That the New Strategic Concept is indeed more wide-ranging than indicated by the text itself, can be glimpsed in remarks
made at the recent Munich Conference by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, where she indicates that the transatlantic relationship will continue to evolve according to a planned move “to modernise and enhance the European security architecture” that culminated with the approval of the New Strategic Concept. She goes on to say that “now that the strategic concept has been approved, we are reviewing its implications for the US force structure in Europe”.

**The New Strategic Concept – a bold but risky move**

The picture that emerges from the Lisbon documents, from subsequent remarks by key policy actors and from conversations with NATO officials, as well as from a careful reading of the background to the sudden emergence of nuclear issues on the NATO agenda, is that the renewed relationship with Russia, missile defence, arms control and the commitment to a nuclear posture review are all pieces of a carefully crafted puzzle that may lead to a NATO without American non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) based in Europe. Such a NATO would be a dramatically altered alliance, as the onus of risk and burden sharing would shift from nuclear sharing to missile defence sharing, which would effectively change NATO’s deterrence posture from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial. This would constitute a significant shift that would have wide-ranging repercussions on some of NATO’s most long-standing and most cherished practices and accepted truisms. With such a potential shift it is clear that the New Strategic Concept is not at all a conservative document, but rather a document that seems set to usher in radical change for the Alliance of the 21st century.

The strategy is however not without risks and the outcome of the planned nuclear posture review is far from certain. Although, a missile defence system may well seem to be a much more timely response to NATO’s most pressing security issues, missile defence itself raises a number of questions in relation to deterrence posture and arms control, and if the changed relationship with Russia fails, a missile defence may do more harm than good. Even so, under the conditions established in Lisbon a Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) nevertheless seems more appropriate than the current nuclear posture vis-à-vis the most likely security challenges of the 21st century, as deterrence by punishment relies on a number of assumptions about a known and rational opponent, which clearly is not necessarily going to be the condition for security in the 21st century. Furthermore, provided Russia is involved in a meaningful and mutually beneficial manner, the decision to install BMDS may finally endow the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) with real purpose as a site for practical missile
defence cooperation and thereby possibly contribute to lifting the NATO–Russia relationship to an entirely new level. In addition, and indeed assuming that all Allies will agree to such a significant change in NATO’s nuclear posture and to the complete reliance on strategic forces, the change is likely to fundamentally revise a number of established, but ultimately outdated and illogical practices related to deterrence by punishment and, not least, act as a means of maintaining Alliance cohesion and risk and burden sharing. The puzzling question is therefore why NATO did not seize the day in Lisbon to also decide on the withdrawal of the NSNWs that most agree are of little strategic value and which were intended to support a nuclear posture now widely seen as defunct. Such a move would undoubtedly have meant the document would have been hailed as truly historic. The reason has to be found in NATO’s rather unhappy experience with public nuclear decisions and with widespread reluctance among a number of allies to end the established practice of having American nuclear weapons based in Europe.

The return of the nuclear debate

The process leading towards the formulation and adoption of the New Strategic Concept was a very unusual one whereby a large number of stakeholders participated in several seminars discussing NATO’s role in the 21st century. In the very first seminar held in Brussels in July 2009 the issue of the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance was raised. However, it was very clear from the ‘icy’ reception of the question that NATO had no intention at this stage of taking up the always-tricky issue of nuclear weapons. This probably reflected the agreed knowledge in NATO that questions about nuclear weapons consistently have the potential for causing great controversy and disunity, which is why it is no accident that nuclear weapons have led a ‘quiet life’ in NATO since the question about stationing intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe caused a decade-long crisis in the 1970s and 80s. In fact, NATO’s more than 60-year history is littered with one crisis after another following in the wake of nuclear decisions. The absence of controversy about nuclear weapons over the last two decades has therefore been a welcome respite that NATO officials clearly were in no hurry to end.

Nuclear decisions are not only difficult for NATO because nuclear weapons have been of central importance for NATO’s strategy throughout the Cold War, but also because nuclear weapons have been endowed with a deeply symbolic value, seen as ‘the glue’ of the Alliance and as material proof of cohesion and of equal sharing of risks. The reason why NATO appeared reluctant to undertake change in its nuclear
posture at Lisbon, therefore, has to be found in NATO’s long held practice as a nuclear Alliance. The role of nuclear weapons in NATO has throughout NATO’s history been described as political: to deter potential adversaries and to ‘couple’ the defence of the European NATO allies with that of the United States. American NSNWs were placed in European NATO countries both to compensate for a chronic conventional inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but also to ensure that the United States would be drawn into any nuclear conflict and hence to deter any – inevitably disastrous – conflict from erupting. The deployment of American nuclear weapons in Europe was therefore partly intended to reassure European NATO members of the American nuclear guarantee and of the credibility of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, the nuclear weapons deployed in European NATO countries were seen as a symbol of NATO cohesion and solidarity through nuclear sharing, which meant that all members ‘dipped their fingers in the blood’ of a possible nuclear confrontation and that they shared risks and benefits as equally as possible through hosting nuclear weapons and by participating in nuclear planning. Since the 1960s all NATO countries except France have participated in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

By the early 1960s seven NATO countries hosted American nuclear weapons (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom). The number of NSNWs peaked in 1971 at around 7,300 after which it gradually declined and then fell dramatically after the Cold War. In 1991 the United States unilaterally withdrew all ground-launched, short-range NSNWs worldwide, including 2,400 artillery shells, surface-to-surface missiles and anti-submarine bombs in Europe. Over the last decade the number of NSNWs based in Europe has been further reduced as the US quietly withdrew all approximately 20 deployed warheads from Greece in 2001, followed by around 130 from Germany and 110 from the UK in 2004. Today around 150–200 NSNWs are held in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Holland and Turkey. These remaining B-61 gravity bombs, to be launched from dual-capable aircraft owned by the European allies, have remained in Europe in almost complete obscurity ever since, which probably was a fact that suited NATO perfectly. The NSNWs were referred to in each of the public strategic concepts since the end of the Cold War, but have nevertheless remained an almost forgotten part of NATO’s nuclear deterrence.

However, with President Obama’s Prague speech in April 2009 nuclear weapons were once again placed back on the global agenda. In addition, several other developments have combined to bring the nuclear issue back into policy debates and public awareness. Apart from the rebuffed question at the NATO strategic concept seminar in
July 2009, the issue was placed much more effectively on NATO’s agenda in October 2009 when German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle persuaded Angela Merkel that Germany should seek the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons stationed in Germany as part of a wider NATO effort to pursue nuclear disarmament and arms control. This was on many counts a surprising turn of events, and certainly seemed rather out of character from Angela Merkel, suggesting that perhaps the German proposal played to a domestic audience and was more an issue close to the heart of Westerwelle than to Merkel. Indeed, the raising of the issue might also have been connected with Germany’s choice of aircraft – the Eurofighter, which does not have a nuclear capability from the European manufacturers. In any case, Germany was highly successful in placing the issue on NATO’s agenda and has since lobbied actively for complete withdrawal of all NSNWs from NATO territory in general and from German territory in particular.

In addition three crucial agreements in the first half of 2010 have kept the issue high on the global agenda: the new START follow-up treaty which was finally ratified in the American Congress in December 2010; the nuclear security summit hosted by President Obama; and the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference reaffirming the commitment to eliminating all nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the delivery systems for NATO’s NSNWs (F-16 and Tornado dual-capable aircraft) are all due for modernisation or replacement within the next decade, which raised the issue in national capitals and which necessitated a decision about the future of existing NSNWs. The German choice of the Eurofighter is especially sensitive in this regard because a continuation of the dual-key system of operation would necessitate release of sensitive information to the manufacturers of Eurofighter thereby raising complicated issues of transfer of technical information on making the aircraft dual-capable. Clearly the issue of aircraft modernisation is intricately connected with questions about the future of the existing (and many would say outdated) NSNWs stationed in Europe.

Once the issue was brought out in the open several other NATO countries followed suit. Hence the role of NSNWs and the strategic relevance of the aging B-61s was firmly placed on NATO’s agenda at the urging of several member states (Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg) when foreign ministers discussed the nuclear issue at a meeting in Tallinn in April 2010. However, although the pressure now came from states, the proposal was once again firmly rebuffed at the meeting in a statement which declared that as long as nuclear weapons exist NATO would remain a nuclear alliance. At the meeting in Tallinn five principles were proposed by
Secretary of State Clinton, which show the inter-linkage between nuclear posture, missile defence and arms control and which are reflected in the final strategic concept – albeit in a more convoluted way. The five principles were:

1. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.
2. As a nuclear alliance, sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities widely is of fundamental importance.
3. A broad aim is to continue to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons while recognising that in the years since the Cold War ended, NATO has already dramatically reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons.
4. Allies must broaden deterrence against the range of 21st century threats, including by pursuing territorial missile defence.
5. In any future reductions, the aim must be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on NSNWs in Europe, relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members and include NSNWs in the next round of US–Russian arms control discussions alongside strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons.

The problem is that although NATO’s nuclear posture may seem archaic in the present strategic environment, there are still NATO allies who insist that the cohesion of NATO is dependent on sharing the nuclear burden. In addition many new NATO members feel insecure vis-à-vis Russia and insist on the continued need for nuclear deterrence. This is especially so as Russia has not reduced its NSNWs to the extent that NATO has, but is believed to still possess in excess of 3000 warheads. This makes the issue ripe for arms control, but as Russia claims that its holding of NSNWs counteracts Russian inferiority on the conventional balance (which used to be the case for NATO), the extra link to conventional arms control has already been made. This is a link that has cropped up in several remarks since the adoption of the strategic concept – mostly recently at the Munich Security Conference.

Regardless of the number of Russian NSNWs, it is widely agreed in NATO that NATO’s remaining nuclear weapons have little strategic value, and that their decommissioning could be seen as a valuable contribution to the overall goal of a nuclear free world and to be in line with the commitments entailed in the non-proliferation regime. It might be argued therefore that the value of NATO’s existing nuclear stance is upheld more for internal reasons of cohesion than for realistic and relevant threat perceptions and strategic considerations. Moreover, it follows that if nuclear weapons are a symbol of Alliance cohesion, disagreement about the role of nuclear weapons
is equally a sign of lack of cohesion. As all nuclear decisions in NATO’s history have inevitably led to crisis and threatened Alliance cohesion it is therefore not surprising that most member states have been reluctant to revisit the nuclear issue, despite the many factors in favour of such a discussion. Westerwelle’s suggestion for withdrawal of American nuclear weapons and his invitation to discuss the nuclear issue in the run up to the Lisbon Summit was therefore not received with enthusiasm by most member states, although the lack of enthusiasm probably has more to do with Westerwelle’s timing than with the substance of his suggestion.

A window of opportunity for change
That the Strategic Concept did not opt for an equally bold decision as the missile defence decision by agreeing to withdraw all NSNWs and thereby substitute nuclear sharing for missile defence sharing was always the expected outcome of the Lisbon Summit, as disagreement about the issue was simply too great to overcome in the time available. However, now that the Strategic Concept is in place, one may ask for how long a non-decision on NSNWs can be maintained? Close reading of the Lisbon documents reveals that the New Strategic Concept facilitates the complete withdrawal of NSNWs. The emphasis on NATO remaining a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist can be honoured by the nuclear guarantee provided by American (as well as British and French) strategic nuclear forces – hence there is no specific condition in the New Strategic Concept to maintain NSNWs. It therefore seems likely that the combination of the political aim of moving towards Global Zero, and the adoption of BMDS and practical security cooperation with Russia are only first, albeit important, steps towards changing NATO’s outdated nuclear posture and deterrence strategy. The puzzling question remains why it was not simply included in the Strategic Concept.

Danes, who have known Anders Fogh Rasmussen as Prime Minister, recognise that ‘chance’ and ‘coincidence’ are not words in his vocabulary and that it is fairly safe to assume that everything the Secretary General does has been carefully planned and very precisely scripted with insurances made that key allies – especially the United States – are in agreement with the overall plan. It seems likely that it is in recognition of the reluctance and worry of some NATO members that Fogh Rasmussen’s scripted plan is geared towards a gradual and discreet change on nuclear posture to be undertaken after the adoption of the New Strategic Concept and after the placement of the new BMDS but before the next strategic concept looms. Given NATO’s consistently bad experience with highly public nuclear decisions it is probable that
the ‘script’ of the Secretary General foresees a quiet and circumspect withdrawal of the remaining B-61 free-fall bombs as and when the dual capable aircraft to deliver the bombs are withdrawn. Such a timetable would mean that the Secretary General in cooperation with the Americans and other member states open to change have a few years to persuade the more reluctant to change members, and for them to adjust to the new situation as the number of NSNWs is quietly reduced. In this strategy the emphasis is on internal dialogue rather than potentially damaging public nuclear decisions. As NATO has no specified minimum necessary nuclear force level, the retention of a symbolic handful of NSNWs would be in line with the text on nuclear forces in the New Strategic Concept. This, along with the changed relations with Russia and the agreed installation of BMDS, indicates that the Secretary General’s strategic thinking goes well beyond the concept agreed in Lisbon. Anders Fogh Rasmussen is known to have been a close ally of the Americans in his capacity as Prime Minister of Denmark. He is also known to be a long-term strategic planner and never to tolerate departure from a carefully planned script. The fate of nuclear weapons and NATO’s move from nuclear sharing to missile defence sharing is no exception. As a result, the change on the horizon may well signal the beginning of the end of NATO’s over-reliance on NSNWs, but that a piecemeal approach has been chosen to make the change more palatable for the reluctant NATO members. Therefore, for those who found the Strategic Concept agreed in Lisbon dull and conservative – it may be that they read what was in the document – rather than what wasn’t in there!

Notes

3 NATO 20202: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, May 2010, pp.44.
4 Hilary Clinton, speech at the 47th Munich Security Conference, 5 February 2011.
5 Ibid
6 American nuclear weapons based in Europe are commonly referred to as ‘Tactical Nuclear Weapons’. However, this name is specific to planned military use during the Cold War. The more precise term ‘Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons’ is therefore used in this chapter.
7 NATO Parliamentary Assembly; US Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: a Fundamental NATO Debate
8 The five points are listed by Simon Lunn and Ian Kearns in NATO’s Nuclear Policy after Lisbon
CONCLUSION

The Strategic Concept and Beyond
16. The Alliance after Lisbon: Towards NATO 3.0?

Karl-Heinz Kamp

Even those who cannot subscribe to the NATO Secretary General’s assessment of the Lisbon Summit as the most important event in the Alliance’s history have to admit that this gathering was a particular one. Many previous summits from Riga to Strasbourg/Kehl either produced only limited content – at least from the meetings on the highest political level – or were characterised by bitter disputes inside and outside of NATO. Lisbon was an exception in the sense that it produced content without major arguments among the Allies or between NATO and Russia.

Moreover, the summit differed in another aspect from many of its predecessors; the atmosphere in the capital of Portugal was different. For the first time in many years participants felt a new sense of recommitment and new awareness of NATO as a ‘true alliance’ among the member states. This was probably not more than a nuance but is nevertheless a relevant detail.

One reason for the positive outcome of the summit – in its results as well as in the spirit of the meeting – was the fact that NATO had a long and open debate about its raison d’être, which led to a New Strategic Concept signed by all Heads of State and Government. Despite such a strategy being long overdue, it was far from sure that NATO would succeed in finding a rapid consensus on such a document, given the different historical, geographical and political backgrounds within the Alliance. Developing a new strategy was particularly difficult as it was obvious right from the outset that a strategic guidance for the 21st century would have to meet at least four partly conflicting requirements:

- First and foremost, it had to clearly define NATO’s roles and missions. This has been attempted time and again in recent years but only resulted in a plethora of functions in order to prepare the Alliance for all foreseeable contingencies.
- Hence, the second necessity of the strategy was to set priorities which would bring demands into line with scarce resources, even if this implied painful choices.
- Third, by defining a common vision for NATO, the New Strategic Concept had to become a tool for re-engaging all NATO member states with the core principles of the Alliance. This was necessary to counter the trend of a re-nationalisation of security policy – as currently can be observed in Afghanistan, where the ‘we’ in NATO’s operations seems crucially missing.
Fourth, NATO’s new strategy must contribute to winning the battle of narratives. It has to be seen as a strategic communications tool vis-à-vis an increasingly critical public.

**NATO’s New Strategic Concept**

When Secretary General Rasmussen presented the Strategic Concept in Lisbon on the evening of the first summit day, the reactions were mixed. NATO representatives praised the paper as pathbreaking and forward oriented. Outside experts or the media were less convinced. “Way too general and nothing new in it” was one of the verdicts of op-ed columnists. Others asked whether these few pages could really be the blueprint for NATO’s role in the 21st century.

However, these critics missed the point that NATO’s agreement on its own future is not only determined by a NATO document alone but also by the pathway which led to that document. The Alliance has evolved its new strategy in a long, open and transparent process, involving diplomats, the military, experts, journalists and the public. This was an intricate and time-consuming procedure and some NATO experts quipped that this was not the right way to build consensus and would lead to nothing more than long debates.

Nonetheless, these long debates had a clear purpose. In recent years NATO has been too focused on its ongoing operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere and lost sight of its raison d’être. Since an agreement on these basics of the Alliance cannot be directed from the top, NATO needed an intense debate among all members about its future role in a changed security environment. In that sense, the process towards the strategic concept was at least as important as the document itself. Even if the new strategy is inevitably generic, NATO found clarity in at least ten points, although some of the substance can only be found between the lines:

1) NATO is a political–military defence alliance with Article 5 of the Washington treaty – the mutual defence commitment – at its core. This is not new but has sometimes been forgotten. NATO’s eastern members reminded their allies of these basics of solidarity and mutual assurance.

2) NATO’s defence mission does not exclude a close and trustful partnership with Russia – however not at the expense of the security of any NATO country. Cooperation with Russia and reassurance from Russia are not contradictory. Only if all 28 NATO members feel reassured is a true partnership possible.
3) NATO defends three things: its territory, the people living there and the vital interests of its members. NATO’s defence function is primarily directed toward armed attacks or threats such as 9/11, where terrorists used civil aircraft as weapons to cause mass casualties.

4) There are numerous risks such as cyber attacks or energy crises, which can become vital threats. However, since they hardly have any direct military dimension, NATO might only have a supportive role in dealing with them. In such cases, though, NATO must function as the key forum for transatlantic consultations on who is doing what – as stipulated in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty.

5) This one is also a no brainer: the insight that today’s security challenges and crisis management operations require a combination of military and non-military efforts. However, it is easy to request such a ‘comprehensive approach’ in papers and speeches but it is much more difficult to make it work on the ground, where civil and military actors sometimes just don’t want to cooperate. And even if they want to cooperate, figuring out how to integrate their efforts can be problematic.

6) To say that NATO needs partnerships is to state the obvious. Equally important is that NATO needs close partnerships with politically likeminded countries like Australia, New Zealand and Japan among others. They are not only contributing to NATO’s mission, they also share NATO’s values. Thus, they need to be included in NATO decision-shaping processes as far as possible.

7) Notwithstanding its global activities, NATO is not a global institution and definitely not a world policeman or globo-cop. Rather, it is a regional institution which needs to take a global perspective given the realities of the 21st century.

8) If nuclear weapons remain a factor in international relations, nuclear deterrence remains relevant. Contrary to some popular views, the ultimate purpose of nuclear weapons is not that they should be scrapped. Instead, the function of nuclear weapons – like all other weapons – is to provide security. In cases where they don’t serve this purpose – and with respect to NATO’s nuclear weapons in Europe doubts are justified – they might be withdrawn and dismantled. Before scrapping, however, all NATO members have to agree upon how to provide sufficient deterrence without them.

9) The security toolbox contains not only diplomacy, arms control, deterrence and defence, but also protection from incoming ballistic missiles. Missile defence has always been contentious – some see it as a blessing, others as a curse. The fact is that the interception of missiles is possible and can save lives. Thus Missile Defence is a task for the entire Alliance.

10) NATO has always been quick at announcing adaptations of its structures and decision-making processes but it has been slow in implementing them. Some of
its procedures are still based on the situation of the Cold War. It has proved just too alluring for NATO members to push for prestigious positions, command posts or a strong representation in committees and agencies regardless of actual requirements. The coming dramatic cuts in all NATO defence budgets will be a catalyst for a change that is long overdue.

**How to proceed?**

Of course, these ten points do not answer all open questions. Rather, they raise the issue of how to implement all the intentions and objectives: how will cooperation with Russia be organised concretely? What to do with NATO’s nuclear forces in Europe? How to cope with the realities of financial scarcity?

NATO has avoided all these difficulties in the Strategic Concept but has mentioned them in the Lisbon communiqué, the so-called Summit Declaration. Some said that the NATO nations took revenge on the Secretary General who had guided them so rigorously to a short and concise strategy by putting all their national preferences and traditional positions in the Summit Declaration, which has made it a rather cumbersome document.

However, NATO does not dodge the controversial topics but intends to take them on in the forthcoming months. In that sense the 54 paragraph long Summit Declaration is a novelty in itself. Instead of just mentioning the open questions, NATO’s Heads of State have prescribed NATO a strict working agenda with concrete assignments and strict deadlines. There is no previous summit document that contains so many orders and obligations, almost all linked to the forthcoming meetings of NATO’s foreign and defence ministers in spring 2011. Among other things, NATO has to:

- Develop a new political guidance for military planning,
- Draft a new concept for non-proliferation,
- Work out a new partnership concept,
- Come up with a common cyber defence policy, and
- Flesh out the details of a common missile defence posture.

The only assignment that is not bound to the tight deadline of 2011 is the obligation to develop a new nuclear strategy that brings the requirements of deterrence and arms control into a balance.
This extremely ambitious agenda raises the question of whether or not NATO will really make progress in all the disputed areas. The fact that a summit meeting orders the debate of open questions does not mean that 28 member states will find agreement by the deadline set by their political leaders. However, it at least provides NATO with a new dynamism by addressing those topics which had been papered over for a long time in order not to widen existing cracks in the fabric of the Alliance.

Still there are issues where an agreement is currently difficult to imagine, among them the nuclear question and the problem of how to deal with Russia.

In the nuclear realm, there seems to be confusion on all sides. The United States have initiated a process towards a nuclear free world, labelled ‘Global Zero’ and have won international praise for this initiative. At the same time, the Obama administration acts as if nuclear weapons will be around for a long time to come. Russia supports the idea of a nuclear free world but at the same time regards its nuclear forces as compensation for a lack of conventional capabilities and particularly as a means to balance US military strength. Moreover, neither Iran nor North Korea seem terribly impressed by the global trend towards reducing the relevance of nuclear weapons and seem to be pursuing an exactly opposite course. Germany has pushed for the reduction of US nuclear weapons but has not specified yet how to deal with the need for deterrence expressed particularly by its eastern neighbours.

Confronted with all these inconsistencies, NATO will have to answer nothing less than the core nuclear question of how to deter whom with what?

With regard to Russia, the situation is not less difficult. Cooperation with Russia is a must but it still remains to be seen to what extent it will be possible and how it can be implemented. Whereas some allies still harbour concerns with regard to Moscow’s intentions, others seem to believe that cooperation with Russia could democratise or domesticate Russian policy. These ideas of a ‘change by cooperation’ ignore that Russia (legitimately) pursues its own national interests, which only partly overlap with those of NATO. Hence cooperation with Russia has to be guided more by political realities and less by wishful thinking. The already lurking debates on missile defence give a flavour of how difficult the relations with Russia might become.
Whither NATO?

So, what’s the conclusion? All problems solved? Of course not. This is hardly possible in an alliance of 28 members with different histories, geographies and cultures. At least NATO has dared to admit that there are different interests within NATO that have to be harmonised time and again. Therefore, the new strategy is not the end of a debate but rather the beginning. Topics like arms control, missile defence or nuclear deterrence have to be further elaborated in the coming months and years. This will not always be harmonious and might lead to disputes and heated arguments. As a result, there will be those who predict a transatlantic divorce or the end of NATO. However, the explanation for upcoming arguments is much simpler: NATO is about more than Afghanistan and remains a pretty agile and lively institution.

Still, NATO’s Litmus test will come in late spring 2011 when the first results of the Lisbon agenda have to be presented. Obviously, notwithstanding the strict deadlines given by the Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, there will be no final consensus on all open questions. The positions among the Allies are too disparate and some of the issues too hazy to be discussed for that. For instance, whether or not the Obama administration will be able to build up its missile defence project in the foreseen manner is increasingly dependent on the budgetary developments in the United States. The issue of nuclear arms control and the future of nuclear weapons will be crucially affected by nuclear developments in Iran and North Korea – both currently unpredictable. The NATO–Russia relationship will always remain a function of the US–Russia relationship, which in turn will be affected by the domestic debate within the United States.

Despite these uncertainties though, NATO will have to present to the foreign and defence ministers a work in progress that shows that the Alliance has taken on the critical issues without trying to dodge the divisive questions or to escape by burying itself in communiqué language. If the Alliance manages to present serious steps forward – albeit not fully fleshed out - it will rebut its critics and will confirm the position it already claims: that of the most successful political–military alliance in history.
NATO’s Strategic Concept – Active Engagement, Modern Defence

Preface
We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and security. This Strategic Concept will guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners:

- It reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our citizens.
- It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.
- It offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute.
- It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.
- It restates our firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement contributes to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.
- It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence.

The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe. While the world is changing, NATO’s essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.
Core Tasks and Principles

1. NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Today, the Alliance remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world.

2. NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been forged in NATO since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. We will continue to defend it together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.

4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:

   a. Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.

   b. Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.

   c. Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant
countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.

NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Any security issue of interest to any Ally can be brought to the NATO table, to share information, exchange views and, where appropriate, forge common approaches.

In order to carry out the full range of NATO missions as effectively and efficiently as possible, Allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, modernisation and transformation.

The Security Environment

7. Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a century.

8. However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. Many regions and countries around the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military capabilities with consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict. This includes the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.

9. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world’s most volatile regions.

10. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities.

11. Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal
activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people. 

12. Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organised criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be the source of such attacks.

13. All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption. Some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption.

14. A number of significant technology-related trends – including the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space – appear poised to have major global effects that will impact on NATO military planning and operations.

15. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

Defence and Deterrence

16. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.

17. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

18. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have
a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

19. We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will:

- maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
- maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
- develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance’s expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;
- carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;
- ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;
- develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
- further develop NATO’s capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
- develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;
- enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves;
- develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;
ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;
• sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced;
• continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

Security through Crisis Management

20. Crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.
21. The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.
22. The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO will continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.
23. Where conflict prevention proves unsuccessful, NATO will be prepared and capable to manage ongoing hostilities. NATO has unique conflict management capacities, including the unparalleled capability to deploy and sustain robust military forces in the field. NATO-led operations have demonstrated the indispensable contribution the Alliance can make to international conflict management efforts.
24. Even when conflict comes to an end, the international community must often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. NATO will be prepared and capable to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction, in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant international actors.
25. To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, we will:
- enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, to better predict when crises might occur, and how they can best be prevented;
- further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations;
- form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors;
- enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum,
- develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance;
- identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions;
- broaden and intensify the political consultations among Allies, and with partners, both on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis – before, during and after.

**Promoting International Security through Cooperation, Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation**

26. NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts:
- We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
- With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek
to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.

- In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.

- We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for stability. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity, transparency and host-nation consent.

- We will explore ways for our political means and military capabilities to contribute to international efforts to fight proliferation.

- National decisions regarding arms control and disarmament may have an impact on the security of all Alliance members. We are committed to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.

**Open Door**

27. NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies; the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security have advanced stability in Europe more broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing common values, would be best served by the eventual integration of all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures.

- The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.

**Partnerships**

28. The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks.

29. Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhancing international security, to defending the values on which our Alliance is based, to NATO’s operations, and to preparing interested nations for member-
ship of NATO. These relationships will be based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.

30. We will enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners together – across and beyond existing frameworks:

- We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organisations across the globe that share our interest in peaceful international relations.
- We will be open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of common concern.
- We will give our operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute.
- We will further develop our existing partnerships while preserving their specificity.

31. Cooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a substantial contribution to security in operations around the world. The Alliance aims to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN, as set out in the UN-NATO Declaration signed in 2008, including through:

- enhanced liaison between the two Headquarters;
- more regular political consultation; and
- enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are engaged.

32. An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which we will:

- fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations;
• enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
• broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
• cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.

33. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.

34. The NATO-Russia relationship is based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, especially regarding the respect of democratic principles and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area. Notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security.

We are determined to:
• enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security;
• use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia.

35. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are central to our vision of Europe whole, free and in peace. We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to:
• enhance consultations and practical military cooperation with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
• continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, based on the NATO decision at the Bucharest summit 2008, and taking into account the Euro-Atlantic
orientation or aspiration of each of the countries;
- facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with the aim to ensure lasting peace and stability based on democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations;
- deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region;
- develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Reform and Transformation

36. Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces able to operate together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere through its integrated military command structure; and that has at its disposal core capabilities that few Allies could afford individually.
37. NATO must have sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to carry out its missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and territory. Those resources must, however, be used in the most efficient and effective way possible. We will:
- maximise the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATO’s usability targets;
- ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary duplication, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements;
- develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity;
- preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding that bind us together;
- engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency.

An Alliance for the 21st Century

38. We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of our Alliance so that it is fit for purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges. We are firmly committed to preserve its effectiveness as the globe’s most
successful political-military Alliance. Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve.
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Niels Henrik Hedegaard is Defence Adviser in the Danish Delegation to NATO, a position he took up in September 2006. He studied Political Science and Soviet Studies at the University of Aarhus and the London School of Economics and Political Science and trained as a Russian language specialist in the Danish army. Mr. Niels Henrik Hedegaard worked briefly as a management trainee and assistant to the Technical Director in the municipality of Vejle before joining the Danish Defence Intelligence Service in 1990. From 1993 to 1995, Mr Hedegaard served as Head of Section in the Security Policy Department of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1995, he took up the position of Head of Section in the Ministry of Defence, with responsibility for Danish–Baltic military co-operation. In 1996 he was appointed Head of the Minister’s Office in the Ministry of Defence, where he served until 1998 when he was appointed Head of Department in the Ministry of Defence, responsible for NATO and European Security Policy. In March 2001 he was appointed Assistant Director (Operations and Analysis) in the Danish Defence Intelligence Service.

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Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp is the Director of the Research Division of the NATO Defence College in Rome. He is a member of numerous international institutions and academic bodies. In 2005 the German Minister of Defence appointed him to the Advisory Board of the Federal Academy for Security Policy. He has published extensively on security policy issues – including articles in *Foreign Policy, Financial Times, Survival, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, International Herald Tribune, Washington Quarterly, Internationale Politik, Strategic Review, International Defense Review, Die*

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Henrik Boesen Lindbo Larsen is currently a PhD Candidate with the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) and the University of Southern Denmark. His research area includes geopolitics and foreign policy, and his dissertation focuses on NATO as a democracy-promoting actor and how the Alliance increasingly experiences difficulties in pursuing this agenda. Henrik Lindbo Larsen has previously held temporary positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and in the UNHCR, and he has served as a research assistant at DIIS focused on the role of historical lessons in foreign policy and geopolitics vis-à-vis the eastern neighbourhood.

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Thierry Legendre is Special Adviser in the Danish Ministry of Defence, with responsibility for Missile Defence, NATO reform and Energy Security. Prior to this he was Policy Adviser in the Private Office of the Secretary General at NATO Headquarters (2005–2010), with responsibility for next generation partnerships, energy security, NATO–EU relations and the Alliance strategic future including the Strategic Concept. During these years he established himself as a well-known commentator and conference speaker on NATO issues. He has also worked as Assistant Defence Adviser to the Danish Delegation to NATO and Head of Section in the International Department at the Danish Ministry of Defence. In 1999–2001 Thierry Legendre served under the High Representative in Sarajevo as a Political Adviser and in 1995–1999 as a political analyst in the department for security policy, focused on the Balkans. A graduate of the University of Copenhagen, Mr. Legendre holds an MSc in Political Science and International Relations and is the author of a number of articles on the Balkans, energy security and NATO’s strategic future.

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Major General (Rtd.) Karsten Jakob Møller began his military education at the Army Language School (Russian) 1970, continued at The Royal Military Academy and at the Royal Defence Academy (General Staff Course). He served in the combat troops as company commander, battalion commander and brigade commander. In 1997 he was commander of the Nordic–Polish Brigade (SFOR) in Bosnia. He has been Head of the NATO Department in the Danish Ministry of Defence (1990–92) and Director of The Danish Defence Research Establishment (1993–96). From 1998–2000 he was
Defence Attaché in Moscow, Kiev and Minsk. In November 1998 he was appointed designated Head of NATO’s Military Liaison in Moscow, but never took over the post due to the Kosovo crisis. From 2001 to 2007 he was Commandant of the Royal Defence Academy. After his retirement from the armed forces in 2007 he has been a Senior Analyst at The Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) and from September 2009 he has been Head of the Research Unit Defence and Security at DIIS. His research area is primarily foreign and domestic politics of Russia and the former Soviet Republics.

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**Deputy Assistant Secretary General Jamie Shea**

Jamie Shea is the Deputy Assistant Secretary General, Emerging Security Challenges in NATO, where he is the Secretary General’s primary advisor on emerging security challenges and their implications for the security of the Alliance. He took up this position on 1 November 2010. He was previously (2005–2010) Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the Secretary General, where he was responsible for advising the Secretary General, senior NATO management, and the North Atlantic Council on strategic issues facing the Alliance. He was earlier Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, Public Diplomacy Division (2003–2005), Director of Information and Press
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Mark Webber is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Birmingham where he is also Head of the School of Government and Society. Having begun his academic career specialising in Russian foreign policy, he has spent the last ten years teaching and researching foreign policy analysis, security studies and international organisation. The specific focus of his current research is the politics of NATO and European enlargement. Professor Webber worked for nearly twenty years at Loughborough University before moving to Birmingham in January 2011. Recent publications include: ‘NATO: within and Between European International Society’, *Journal of European Integration*, Vol. 32(2), 2011 (special issue co-edited by Yannis Stivachtis and Mark Webber on ‘Europe after Enlargement’), ‘NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 85(3), 2009 and ‘NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan’, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol.11(1), 2009.

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Brigadier General (ret.) Dr. Klaus Wittmann was born in Lübeck in 1946. In October 2008 he ended 42 years of Bundeswehr service that included troop command (rocket artillery battalion and armoured brigade), academic phases (university studies in history and political science as well as a year at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London), political–military work in the German Ministry of Defence and at NATO Headquarters, and positions in higher military education (Director of the Faculty at the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg and, in his last assignment, Director Academic Planning and Policy at the NATO Defense College, Rome). He was closely involved in the creation of NATO’s 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts. His latest publication is ‘Towards a new Strategic Concept for NATO’ (NATO Defence College, Forum Paper 10,
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Defence and Security Studies at DIIS

This publication is part of Defence and Security Studies of the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS).

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