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Race, Ethnicity, and Immigration in the 2005 Mayoral Elections in Los Angeles and New York

by

John Mollenkopf, Ana Champeny, Raphael Sonenshein, and Mark Drayse

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Introduction

The nation's first and second largest cities provide a home to highly diverse populations that give rise to some of the nation's most interesting local politics. Both cities are the highly dynamic cores of strongly performing regional economies with global reach. New York distinguishes itself in the global system of cities in terms of its financial markets, corporate headquarters, high level corporate services, the mass media, and large public and nonprofit sectors, but also has a history of garment manufacturing, port-related activities, and the consumption of goods and services. Los Angeles has a roughly similar profile, perhaps with less capital market activity and more emphasis on the entertainment industry, high technology, and competitive manufacturing.

Los Angeles is a relatively new city and New York an old one, but both had large populations by 1950. Los Angeles continued to grow, while New York at first seemed to be following the downward trend of other old northeastern cities, but then broke from that pattern and grew after 1980. Both cities had predominantly white populations with substantial black minorities in 1950 that have since been transformed by new immigrants. Each, on its own, has become a major national magnet for new immigrants – with New York City having 8.1 percent of the nation's foreign born and the City of Los Angeles 4.8 percent in 2005. Adding in the surrounding metropolitan areas, LA has 16 percent of the total foreign born and New York 14.8 percent. Thus almost one out of every three immigrants in the nation lives in or near these two cities. The demographic trajectories of the two cities were roughly similar between 1990 and 2000, with native whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asians declining in both cities and immigrant groups all growing. The major differences are that New York attracts black immigrants while LA does not and LA gets even more Hispanic migration than New York.

While the economies and populations of the two cities are roughly comparable, their political cultures and structures are quite different. Los Angeles is the quintessential “fragmented” and suburbanized metropolis. The City of Los Angeles is but one of 88 municipalities within the County of Los Angeles, which provides a wide range of social and other services that the City does not. (There is, of course, some overlap in functions between the two levels of government, but the City generally provides property-related services, including police, fire, zoning, and planning, while the County provides health and welfare services. Water and power are provided by a semi- independent authority heavily influenced by the city government, while the public schools at present also remain independent, at least until Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, negotiates with the state legislature to take significant control over the system.) Los Angeles city politics is formally non-partisan. It has relatively few city council members – 15 for a population of almost 4 million people – who are elected for staggered four year terms. Since most candidates for city office are Democrats, the Democratic party, which is at best weakly organized at the county level, does not play a major role in deciding the outcomes of the non-partisan primaries for elected office. In any case, no significant party organization operates at the city level. Many city agencies are overseen by commissions whose members are appointed for relatively lengthy terms, thus buffering direct mayoral control. A new city charter in 1999 began to erode some of that independence, giving mayors the authority to unilaterally remove most city commissioners (Sonenshein 2004). LA’s city budget for the year ending in 2006 was just under $6 billion, or about $1,500 per resident. (Other levels of government, such as the LA Water and Power, the Harbor, or the LA Unified School District, not to mention LA County government, also spend comparable amounts of money. When the proprietary departments are included, the city budget doubles.)

New York, on the other hand, is highly centralized and politicized, with a persistent “machine politics” style. New York City government covers five counties, whose top political officials, borough presidents, have only residual and largely symbolic powers. It has a strong mayor who exercises virtually untempered authority over a wide range of services. The current mayor, Michael Bloomberg, won authority to appoint the Chancellor of the New York City school system. Virtually all governmental

functions, save the mass transit system, the port authority, and the City University, are under his or her purview. The City Council is relatively numerous, with 51 members, or about 70 percent more council members per capita than Los Angeles. All elections are partisan, Democratic nominees win almost all elections for city office except for the mayoralty, and regular party organizations exercise a considerable degree over the outcome of the party primaries, sometimes by using arcane election regulations to knock challengers off the ballot. The city budget for the fiscal year ending in 2006 was $54 billion, or roughly $6,750 per resident, almost five times larger than the LA city budget.

The two cities therefore provide a theoretically alluring setting for comparison – one can "control" at least in rough terms for economic and demographic structure and examine the impact of varied political structure on the desired outcomes. This has led scholars to create a small post-industrial cottage industry of studies comparing the politics of the two cities (Halle 2003, Kaufmann 2003, Logan and Mollenkopf 2003, Mollenkopf, Olson and Ross 2001, and Wong 2006). Each city has, of course, generated large literatures of its own, including many works by two authors of this paper, many of which were done with a "weather eye" on the other city (Sonenshein 1993, 2004; Mollenkopf 1992, 2004). For example, perhaps making a virtue out of necessity, scholars at UCLA and USC have sought to create a "Los Angeles School" of urban studies that argues that the peripheries of LA, not the central core of New York, are the model for the world's urban future (Scott and Soja 1996, Soja 1996, Dear 2002). Meanwhile, scholars of New York blithely find fitter comparisons with London (Fainstein 2001).

Accepting the fact that city government, city politics, and indeed the content of civic engagement may take quite different forms in the two cities, and that these different forms may shape political outcomes in important ways, this paper seeks to use the 2005 mayoral elections in Los Angeles and New York to explore how race, class, ethnicity, nativity, gender, and place interact in the formation of a majority electoral coalition. In particular, we are interested in how the rise of new immigrant ethnic or minority groups may be altering the previous contours of racial political alignments in the two cities. The kinds of questions we want to answer include: to what extent have new immigrant voters become involved in city elections? How do they align with or differ from members of the native born groups, both

the fading white majority and the previously growing native minority groups, be they African American or Latino? Where do they fit into the historic pattern of racial alignments? To what extent is their growing presence likely to alter this pattern?

The Electoral Context

The 2001 and 2005 mayoral elections offer a wonderful lens on these questions. In 2001, term limits force popular incumbents out of office in both cities – Mayor Richard J. Riordan in Los Angeles and Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani in New York. Both mayors might be considered anomalous for their settings. Born not far from Giuliani's birthplace in New York City, Riordan was a wealthy white Catholic Republican attorney who was elected in the wake of long-serving African American mayor of LA, Tom Bradley and the Los Angeles riots of 1992. Similarly, Giuliani, a white Catholic Republican former federal prosecutor and Reagan administration official, displaced a black predecessor, incumbent Mayor David Dinkins. Both represented a determination to return government to basics, lower taxes, promote development, and reassert law and order after periods in which a more liberal coalition had held sway. Both largely succeeded in these missions. At the same time, the political momentum behind their coalitions and strategies seemed to have run their course by the 2001 elections, permitting new forces to emerge that might take their place.

The 2001 mayoral elections were momentous in both cities. In Los Angeles, the articulate and charismatic Antonio Villaraigosa, a past speaker of the California State Assembly, was seeking to become that city's first modern Latino mayor. In the primary, he was competing against a number of other candidates, including one that represented a competing faction of Latinos and several white candidates, including a popular City Attorney, James Hahn, whose father had long represented the black neighborhoods of LA on the County Board of Supervisors. Villaraigosa came in first during the primary, but lost the general election run-off to Hahn. According to the exit poll, whites cast a bare majority of votes in this general election, with blacks accounting for 17 percent and Latinos 22 percent of the total. The great majority of Latinos favored Villaraigosa, as did a minority of whites, but four-fifths of the black

voters favored Hahn; along with three-fifths of the white voters, that was enough to put him in office (Sonenshein and Pinkus 2002). Clearly something was moving under the surface, though. Only eight years before, in 1993, Latinos had cast only 8 percent of the votes. Table 1 shows the outcome of these two elections, summing the vote across precincts classified by the plurality racial group living in the precinct. Note that the open non-partisan primary draws relatively fewer voters than the general election. As the multi-candidate field was narrowed down to two, Villaraigosa gained across the field, but Hahn gained even more, attracting votes that had gone to other candidates in white areas, holding his commanding lead in black neighborhoods, and doing surprisingly well in Latino precincts.

The prospective election of a Latino mayor in New York City also did not transpire in 2001, but for different reasons. In the months leading up the Democratic primary election, slated to be held on September 11, 2001, candidate Fernando Ferrer, the Puerto Rican former borough president of the Bronx, built relatively strong support among African American elected officials and public opinion. This was based partly on his having participated in the protests against the murder of Amadou Diallo, partly on black leaders, particularly Rev. Al Sharpton, protesting against the Navy's use of the Puerto Rican island of Vieques as a bombing range, and partly on the desire among black leadership to supplant the Giuliani administration with a minority-friendly administration in which they had a large hand in putting in office. Ferrer's leading opponent, Public Advocate Mark Green, had historically gotten support from black voters in his previous campaigns. was well known as a white liberal, and had served as Consumer Affairs commissioner in the Dinkins administration before becoming Public Advocate. The presumptive Republican nominee, a billionaire former Democratic businessman, Michael Bloomberg, had never held public office and was considered by many to face a steep learning curve on the campaign trail. Yet he had growing support from the relatively conservative constituencies that had supported Mayors Giuliani and Edward I. Koch and an unlimited amount of money to spend on the campaign.

The September 11th attacks threw the primary and general election season into a fair degree of chaos and changed the political dynamics of the city (Mollenkopf 2004). (The Los Angeles mayoral election was already completed; candidate Ferrer had forged a friendship with candidate Villaraigosa.) In

the two weeks during which the primary was postponed, Ferrer continued to consolidate his black-Latino coalition and finished first, but not with enough votes to avoid a runoff. His strongest base was among voters in Latino areas, but he also drew strong black support (Table 2). Between the primary and the runoff election, this trend continued. In response, Green tacked furiously to the right, playing on concerns among the so-called "Giuliani Democrats" that a Ferrer victory would bring greater political influence to people like the Rev. Sharpton. In the event, Green narrowly won the runoff, mainly with white votes and diminished support from black voters. However, in the general election, many white Democrats who had voted for him over Ferrer chose instead to support Republican Mike Bloomberg, who loosed an overwhelming and effectively crafted media blitz in the days running up to the general election, winning narrowly. Among the factors determining the outcome of the election were the disaffection with Green among Latino and black voters concerned about how he defeated Ferrer, the shift in voter concern away from social issues to rebuilding the city in the wake of 9/11, and Bloomberg's record campaign spending.

In short, neither mayoral election in 2001 produced the new form of Latino-led minority political empowerment that some had anticipated. The valence of African American voters and the state of the black-Latino coalition played major roles in both elections. In LA, black voters helped the white candidate that they overwhelmingly favored to defeat the Latino challenger. In New York, black voters joined Latino voters in the Democratic primary to support a candidate who lost to one supported largely by white voters, and then gave more tepid support than originally expected to the white candidate of the party they normally favored by lopsided margins. In both cities, the white liberals who might have supported a minority challenger did not play a central role. They divided between Villaraigosa and Hahn in LA and backed a candidate in New York who could not quite pull together the traditional liberal coalition, in no small part because he had just defeated the minority candidate in the primary election. In 2001, therefore, two cities in which the 2000 Census had just revealed that native born whites were a small minority of the population and indeed probably less than half of the voting age citizens elected white mayors.

The political trajectories of Los Angeles and New York diverged even more sharply in the 2005 mayoral election. Villaraigosa and Ferrer both attempted to achieve in 2005 what they could not manage in 2001. Villaraigosa ran a successful campaign to displace an incumbent and gain a seat of the LA city council in 2003 and carefully positioned himself to broaden his constituency, particularly developing an even stronger relationship with the County Federation of Labor. Mayor Hahn, who clearly had been elected in part because of strong support from black voters, fired LA's African American police chief, Bernard Parks, and put former New York City police commissioner William J. Bratton in his place. Parks turned around and won a city council seat as well in 2003, becoming a thorn in the mayor's side. Hahn also played a major role in organizing voters against the secession movement in the San Fernando Valley; the defeat of this initiative also may have soured some white voters had supported him in 2001 (Sonenshein 2004).

In the 2005 mayoral race in Los Angeles, therefore, the incumbent was perceived to be facing some degree of political trouble. In addition to Villaraigosa, challengers to Hahn in the 2005 primary included councilman Parks, a second Latino candidate from the Valley, and a popular Jewish candidate from the Valley. As Table 1 shows, Villaraigosa once more emerged with a somewhat narrow lead from this crowded field, with 33 percent of the vote. The pattern of support was roughly similar to that of the 2001 primary, though he did less well in white neighborhoods and a little better in black ones. Since the race featured candidates appealing to every component of the electorate, the vote was fairly fragmented. As many black voters gravitated to Parks and many white Valley voters to Hertzberg, this sharply undercut Hahn's electoral base from the 2001 general election.

In the 2005 general election between Hahn and Villaraigosa, many black and white voters clearly shifted from "their own" candidates to Villaraigosa rather than reverting to Hahn, and Villaraigosa handily won the general election with 59 percent of the vote (Map 1). Compared to the 2001 general election, he made huge advances across the board, particularly in black neighborhoods (a 35.4 percentage point gain) and white neighborhoods (a 9.8 percentage point gain), particularly in the Valley. Although his strongest base remained among Latino voters, who surged in turnout, all the other constituencies shifted

his way (Sonenshein and Pinkus 2005). In short, a hard-working and attractive challenger managed to pick up all the pieces of the incumbent's delaminating electoral coalition between the primary and general elections and make them into a liberal, multi-racial coalition.

Just the opposite happened in New York in 2005. Mayor Bloomberg proved to be an effective leader in his first term. He reached out to those who had been disappointed by Ferrer's loss in 2001, met with Ferrer himself, and made a point of creating far friendlier relations with black leaders than had been the case under his Republican predecessor, Mayor Giuliani. He faced the economic downturn and fiscal stresses of 2002 by raising taxes rather than laying off unionized city workers, kept the crime rate down even while reducing the size of the police force, and eliminated the Board of Education and took direct control of the school system. Although public opinion was downbeat on the mayor as late as January 2005, fed perhaps by dismay among some of his supporters about property tax increases on their homes, the elimination of smoking from bars and clubs, and the Mayor's insistence on building an unpopular new stadium for the Jets football team on the West Side of Manhattan, the city experienced steady economic and psychological recovery during his term. Most established interests liked doing business with the mayor and felt he was doing a good job. Moreover, he could and would self-finance a campaign that would leave no stone unturned.

Meanwhile, on the Democratic side, Fernando Ferrer once more seemed to be the presumptive nominee. He faced three other candidates – the African American Manhattan Borough President, C. Virginia Fields, the impressive young white City Council Speaker Gifford Miller, and, late in the day, a Jewish candidate from Brooklyn, Congressman Anthony Weiner, who emerged as a favorite of many white Democrats who had defected to Republican candidates in previous elections. None was as widely liked or as experienced in city-wide elections as Ferrer. The relative weakness of the field reflected not only Ferrer's prominence, but the judgment among many political insiders that any Democratic nominee was going to have a hard time beating the incumbent. Ferrer ran a relatively low-key primary to avoid alienating any constituencies he would need in the general election, as Green had done. Whatever the merits of this strategy, a late surge by Anthony Weiner plus the presence of a black candidate drained

votes from Ferrer that he had been able to attract in the 2001 runoff. As Table 2 shows, he led the low turnout primary with a bare 39 percent of the vote. After thinking overnight about making a race of it, the second place candidate, Anthony Weiner, withdrew and proclaimed that Ferrer had the 40 percent of the vote necessary to preclude a runoff.

As in LA, the Latino candidate thus emerged as the challenger from a racially divided field. Unlike Villaraigosa's success in LA, however, Ferrer was unable to bring together the elements of a challenging coalition between the primary and the general election. The odds may well have been stacked against him, as Mayor Bloomberg increasingly consolidated support among white Democrats, African Americans, and immigrant constituencies as well as his (small) core of white Republicans. But Ferrer made one move that had a lingering adverse impact on his campaign. It was probably one of the few things that might shape the election over which he had control. In March, Ferrer had remarked to a meeting of the police sergeants union that he did not think the police shooting of Amadou Diallo was a crime and that it had been over-indicted. This produced a furor, with many African American leaders criticizing his words (Cardwell and Hicks with Archibold 2005). Although many in the black establishment ultimately endorsed Ferrer, some did not and the remark clearly had a negative impact on his standing in black public opinion. In the primary, black support for Virginia Fields over eroded Ferrer's position compared to the 2001 runoff election (a decline of 26 percentage points). Despite receiving many endorsements from the black political establishment, he was never able to create the same degree of mass support he had in 2001.

The general election became a blow-out of historic proportions for Mayor Bloomberg. He won 58.4 percent of the 1.3 million ballots cast (again, a relatively low turnout), having spent a new campaign spending record of $84 million, or almost $112 for every vote he received. Though no traditional exit poll was mounted, it appears that Mayor Bloomberg won almost three-quarters of the white vote, nearly half the black vote, more than half of the Asian vote, and surprising minority of the vote in Latino areas, many of whom were immigrant voters (more on this below). Ferrer's base was largely restricted to Puerto Rican neighborhoods, with a somewhat broader reach in the Bronx (Map 2). While the Latino challenger

triumphed in Los Angeles by adding support from white and black voters disaffected by the incumbent mayor to his mobilized Latino base, the Latino challenger in New York failed to attract those black and white supporters and failed even to energize his own base. In a telling sign, Mayor Villaraigosa withheld an endorsement from his friend Ferrer, perhaps thinking that this would improve his relations with the man who would be sitting in the City Hall "bull pen" for the next four years. It also helped dissipate any perception that a nationally-oriented alliance of Latino political forces was being mounted at the moment when Villaraigosa was poised to win power in Los Angeles.

The Context of Political Demography

Behind the political positioning and maneuvering evident in the four years leading up to the 2005 mayoral elections in the two cities lies the deeper and longer term question of which racial and ethnic groups will occupy the halls of urban political power. In both cities, the native white population has been declining steadily. From the 1950s through the 1980s, they were being supplanted by native born minority groups. Increasingly, from the 1980s to the present, all native born groups, including African Americans, Puerto Ricans, and third generation or later Mexican-Americans are being supplanted by new immigrant groups. This has set the stage for what might be called a new phase for the civil rights struggle.

The basic political cleavages of any city will tend to reflect its demographic composition and will be reorganized over time as that composition changes, especially when change finally reaches the active electorate. In the immediate post World War II period, when the minority populations of both cities were small relative to the native white population, city politics was dominated by intra-white cleavages, such as protestant Republicans versus Catholic and Jewish Democrats in LA or Catholics versus Jews within the Democratic party in New York. LA had a Republican mayor between 1953 and 1961 who was succeeded by a conservative Democrat, Sam Yorty, between 1961 and 1973. In New York, the post-war mayors were white Catholic Democrats (William O'Dwyer, Vincent Impellitteri, and, for three terms, Robert Wagner) more or less aligned with the regular Democratic organizations (McNickle 1993).

As their native minority populations grew to substantial size in the population and the electorate, but not their cadre of elected officials, the intra-white political dynamic changed into one in which bi- or multi-racial challenges emerged to replace the white political establishment with one where African Americans, Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans – and white liberal reformers – would hold more offices and exercise more power. From the late 1960s through the 1980s, the civil rights era was marked by these struggles in cities across the country (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 2003). While they did not achieve everything civil rights activists wanted, they nonetheless made quite real gains.

In LA, a coalition of African Americans and liberal whites, many of whom were Jewish Democrats living on the West Side, elected and supported Mayor Tom Bradley, that city's first African American mayor, for five terms between 1973 and 1993 (Sonenshein 1993). African Americans and Mexican Americans slowly joined the City Council and LA County Board of Supervisors. (Arguably, Mexican Americans remained under-represented compared to their presence in the population.) The 1992 riots and the succession of Bradley by a white Republican, Richard Riordan, for two terms, put the bi-racial minority coalition at bay for a while, but, as described above, the question of its future came back on the table in 2001 and 2005.

Results were even more mixed in New York: only in 1989, for one term, was a coalition of African Americans, Puerto Ricans, and liberal whites able to elect a black mayor, David Dinkins. In the remainder of the period between 1977 and the present, relatively conservative mayors have held office, including four successive victories by white Republicans between 1993 and 2005 (Mollenkopf 1992). At all other levels of office holding, however, native minority groups made gradual but steady progress in terms of gaining seats in the city council, state legislature, borough presidencies, and city comptroller.

Somewhat out of political sight, however, however, immigration was already shifting the ground underneath the cleavage between native whites and native minority groups. By the 1980s, it was evident that native born minority populations (counted as native born people with native born parents) were declining alongside those of native whites in both cities. Indeed, immigration has been the main force

driving population growth in the two cities since 1980, as many immigrants arrived and native born groups of all races gravitated away (Frey and Liaw 2005).

LA and New York have both attracted immigrants from many national origins, but in different mixes. Mexicans and Central Americans and Asian Americans have dominated immigration to Los Angeles, while New York has drawn from the English and Spanish Speaking Caribbean, other parts of Latin America (including Mexico), East and South Asia, and the former Soviet Union. This has dramatically altered the composition of both cities' populations, yielding a current situation as of the 2000 Census summarized in Table 3. Comparing the two cities, it is evident that New York City has many more foreign born blacks than LA as well as more white and Asian immigrants, while LA has far more Latino immigrants, who make up two-fifths of its population. The native born white share of the two cities is about the same – a quarter of the population, and less than two-fifths of the eligible electorate. The native born black share is also roughly comparable, but New York's population is almost half people living in immigrant-headed households, while that of Los Angeles is almost totally native stock.

In the City of Los Angeles, people of Mexican descent are clearly the largest immigrant group. They make up 42 percent of those living in households headed by a foreign born person. The next biggest groups are Salvadorans (7.2 percent), Guatemalans (3.9 percent), Armenians (2.7 percent), Iranians (2.0 percent), Filipinos (4.0 percent), Koreans (3.9 percent), and Chinese (2.4 percent). The Mexican migration to Los Angeles has been of sufficiently long standing that many Mexican Americans are third generation and beyond; at the same time, very recent migration from Mexico has been massive. Thus the Mexican origin population in LA includes highly assimilated people whose parents were born here as citizens along with people who arrived just yesterday. This has sometimes created a level of cleavage between the two groups (Acuña 1996, Gutiérrez 1998). While the comparison is hardly exact, third generation Mexican Americans in LA might be compared with Puerto Ricans, while recent Mexican immigrants may have more in common with other recent immigrants from Latin America.

As noted, New York has a more diverse immigrant population that is not dominated by any one group as is the case in LA. Those hailing from the Dominican Republic make up the single largest

national origin group of those living in households headed by foreign born people at 11.7 percent of the total, but Afro-Caribbeans, taken together, are even larger (15.9 percent). Those whose families hail from Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are also a significant group (5.8 percent), while the city's Mexican origin population has also been growing rapidly in recent years (4.1 percent). Asian groups are also large, with the Chinese leading (9.1 percent), South Asians following (Indians 4.2 percent, Pakistanis 1.3 percent), and Koreans (2.2 percent) and Filipinos also contributing a significant presence (1.4 percent). Finally, like the Armenians and Persians in LA, New York has some large white immigrant populations, particularly Jews from the republics of the former Soviet Union (5.2 percent) and the former Yugoslavia. They join traditional European immigrant groups like the Italians (3.0 percent).

The clear major differences emerging from this comparison is that Latino immigrants, particularly Mexicans, dominate the immigrant population of Los Angeles to the degree that advocacy of their own interests can almost be taken as equivalent to the advocacy of the interests of all immigrants. By contrast, the immigrant population of New York is extremely diverse in terms of race, class, culture, and language, and no one group can claim to represent it. When one "controls" for cities with large immigrant populations by selecting these two cases, therefore, one must note that LA is a much more predominantly Latino city than New York, and that most of these Latinos are of Mexican origin. A major similarity is that both cities have growing Asian communities that, like Latino communities, stand ambivalently between blacks and whites and do not fit comfortably into either. As heterogeneous and artificially combined as the Asian groups are, they share certain characteristics, including relatively high rates of human and financial capital accumulation across the generations, as well as some detachment from ethnic and racial politics American style (Wong 2006).

The immigrant stage of the long historical process of ethnic succession will thus surely differ from that of the Civil Rights era, where African Americans, as a relatively homogeneous minority group, or at least one often characterized by a "linked racial fate" (Dawson 1994) approach to politics. Although many of the immigrant groups are classified as non-white, most have occupied a subordinate position in the social structure, and virtually all face various forms of discrimination, the vast differences among

immigrants in terms of class, culture, communal organization, and political heritage suggest a much more fragmented, varied, and perhaps halting progress towards political empowerment. Certainly, their varied paths to political incorporation will have to negotiate the contours of the terrain established by native minority groups during the Civil Rights struggle. In some cases this may constitute a barrier, as when a long-serving African American political establishment resists the political rise of new Latino immigrant groups. In others, it may provide opportunities, as when Afro-Caribbeans in New York take advantage of black studies programs within CUNY or Puerto Ricans enlist and promote Dominicans in order to bolster the Hispanic vote.

Looking at the right panels of Table 3, it is apparent, too, that by now between a quarter and a third of all the eligible voters in New York and Los Angeles are of immigrant origin. In LA, foreign born Latinos alone make up 16 percent of the voting age citizens and Asians almost 8 percent. As Wong has recently explored (2006), a critical question will be how they are mobilized in relationship to whites and blacks and how the two groups will relate to each other. (Clearly, black-Asian tension and conflict has been a major issue in Los Angeles, but also one that has sparked significant efforts to build new working relationships across racial boundaries.) The potential electorate of New York also has substantial shares of immigrant Hispanic and Asian people, but with the added feature of a large black immigrant population (Rogers 2006). Let us turn to the results of the 2005 mayoral elections in Los Angeles and New York to see how the various native born and immigrant racial and ethnic groups line up.

An Ecological Analysis of the 2005 Mayoral Elections

We begin by modeling turnout in the mayoral elections in New York City and Los Angeles as a function of the socio-demographic characteristics of the population and the composition of specific immigrant and ethnic groups. (We have used various statistical techniques, including King's method of EZI and various forms of spatial statistics, such as ESDA, to examine such data in the past [Sonenshein and Drayse 2006]. Here, however, we stick with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis because it allows us to compare a great many different variables within a common framework. We know,

for example, that when the data is characterized by spatial autocorrelation, as is likely to be the case here, it is appropriate to run spatial regression models to take this into account and plan to do so in future iterations of this work. However, we believe that OLS coefficients are sufficient to help us compare patterns of turnout and candidate choice across the two cities, since the level bias from this source is likely to be comparable in both. Except in one instance, the estimates developed in the models given below do not violate common sense (i.e. are above 1 or below 0.)

Turnout in New York

In New York City, turnout as a percentage of registered voters was low – the average was under 40 percent in both elections. (We use registered voters as the denominator in these calculations as a matter of convenience, knowing that the rolls contain many registrants who may no longer reside in the jurisdictions, multiple registrations – with slightly different name spellings for the same person – and people who never vote despite having been registered at some point. In future versions of this paper, we may refine the base to include all those who voted in any election over more than one election cycle.) As Table 2 indicated, the 2001 race drew 1.5 million voters to the polls and the mean turnout for all precincts was 39 percent. Fewer voters, just below 1.3 million, voted in 2005, with an average turnout of 34 percent. The patterns were similar in Los Angeles, with 568,000 voters casting ballots in 2001, but just 493,000 in 2005.

We begin by exploring the association between turnout and demographic and economic measures in Model 1. Here, the five variables we use are homeownership, college graduation, single mother households, population density and median family income. Model 2 adds to the first model variables for the percent of the population that is non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic Asian, and Hispanic (with non-Hispanic whites as the excluded group). In Model 3, we explore the impact of the specific racial, ethnic and Hispanic origin groups that figure in the population in either city. Since the racial and ethnic composition of the two cities is not the same, the variables differ between New York and Los Angeles for the third models.

Let us consider the models for New York City first. Homeownership and the percent of the population over 25 that has graduated from college (or higher) are both positively associated with turnout in both years. The percent of households that are single mother households is negatively associated with turnout. The effect for single mother households appears stronger in 2001 than 2005. Election districts that are more densely populated had greater turnout, with a stronger effect in 2005. Median family income does not behave as one would expect in these models. The variable is negatively signed in 2005, while the positive sign in 2001 is not at all statistically significant. The model for 2005 is fairly robust, with an R^2 of .273. The model for 2001 is extremely robust, with an R^2 of .609. In short, levels of asset-holding, education, household structure, and density all have strong relationships with turnout patterns.

Neither the signs nor the relative intensity of the effects of the economic and demographic variables changes from model 1 to model 2 in 2005. The negative effect of higher median income becomes stronger compared to the other variables. Turnout is predicted to be higher in districts that have a larger share of residents who are non-Hispanic white. In 2005, there were pretty strong negative effects on turnout based on the proportion of a district that was non-Hispanic Black or non-Hispanic Asian. The share that was Hispanic was also negatively associated with turnout, though the effect was weaker than the others in the model in 2005.

Upon adding the racial and Hispanic origin variables to the model for 2001, the sign for the coefficient for median family income is reversed to be negative and becomes statistically significant. The pattern for non-Hispanic blacks is similar as 2005. The coefficient for the share that is non-Hispanic Asian is negative. Unlike 2005, the standardized coefficient for the share of a district that is Hispanic is a much stronger predictor of turnout in 2001. These additional variables do not greatly increase the explanatory power of the two models. For 2005, the R^2 increase from .273 to .315 while in 2001, the increase is from .609 to .657. In each year, the additional variables for explain about another 4 to 5 percent of the variation in turnout.

In Model 3 for 2005, the economic and demographic variables continue to behave in the same way with the exception of the median income measure which again becomes weaker and less statistically

significant. In 2001, the same pattern is visible though more apparent, with median family income losing statistically significance in the fully specified model. In 2005, mobilization of blacks in New York City was divided, with a positive sign for native born blacks and a negative sign for blacks of West Indian origin. In 2001, both groups were demobilized and the demobilization was more pronounced among native born blacks than West Indians.

We next considered Hispanic origin groups. We included measures for the five largest Hispanic origin groups in New York City. In 2005, the coefficients for the variables representing the percent Puerto Rican, Dominican, and Colombian were all positive suggesting increased mobilization. There were weaker, negative effects for Mexicans and Ecuadorians. These results differ from the 2001 election. All Hispanic origin groups except Colombians were demobilized in 2001. Given the racially charged nature of the runoff campaign between Mark Green and Fernando Ferrer in 2001, it was not surprising that black and Hispanic turnout was below that of other groups in the general election.

Districts that are more predominately Chinese had lower turnout in the two elections. There was a sign of mobilization among Koreans in 2005, though the coefficient was insignificant in 2001. there is a relatively strong negative effect on turnout for Asian Indian populations. The share that is Filipino is positively signed, but barely significant in 2005 and not significant in 2001.

Last, we look at some ethnic white groups that figure prominently (or did historically). The percent of a district that is Italian did not have a statistically significant effect on turnout in either election. Living up to their reputation for being political, Irish ancestry had a relatively strong positive relationship with turnout in both 2001 and 2005. The percent of the population over 18 who speaks Yiddish at home, an indicator of Orthodox or Ultra-Orthodox Jewish families, had a significant positive relationship with turnout in 2005, but was barely significant in 2001. Lastly, the percentage born in Russia was positively associated with turnout in both elections.

In 2005, Model 3 has an R^2 of .362. The additional specific ancestry and origin measures explain nine additional points of the variation in turnout. The addition of the Hispanic origin, race, and ancestry variables in 2001 increased the R^2 from .609 to .680, a gain of about seven percentage points. Clearly,

certain underlying and relatively fixed socioeconomic and demographic factors, such as homeownership, single motherhood, educational attainment, and density, have a strong effect on patterns of political participation and turnout in New York. In these two elections, the effects of these variables were consistent in direction and size. They are clearly important in understanding participation in New York. Variables measuring the racial/ethnic/immigrant composition of the districts had a less consistent role, but they were not irrelevant. Variables that were important in 2001 were not always significant in 2005 and the effects on occasion reversed. It seems that social group membership has a more variable effect on political participation that may be very closely related to the candidates and tenor of the political campaign.

Turnout in Los Angeles

We can now turn to the models for the Los Angeles elections. As in New York City, homeownership is positively associated with turnout and the effect is strong in the basic demographic and economic model in both elections. However, unlike New York City, the coeffecient for the percent of the population with a Bachelor's degree or higher is negatively signed in both years. These effects are very strong. In 2001, the proportion of single-mother households was not significant, though in 2005 the effect was negative but borderline significant. Again, unlike New York City, in Model 1, density is negatively associated with turnout in both elections. Lastly, again in contrast to New York, the sign for the median family income coefficient is positive and significant. The R^2 for Model 1 is .258 in 2001 and .160 in 2005. These models explain less of the variation in turnout in Los Angeles than the New York City models. Another way of putting this is that factors that influence turnout in New York have less impact in LA.

In Model 2, we added variables for the percent of the district that is non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic Asian, and Hispanic. The direction of the effect of homeownership remains positive and becomes stronger in both 2001 and 2005. The educational attainment effect is reversed when racial and Hispanic origin makeup variables are included; it becomes positive and significant. The coefficients for single-female parent households are negatively signed in Model 2 in both elections. Density and median

family income behave the same way in Model 2 and in Model 1, except that the impact of median family income is smaller in 2001 in the second model.

These models contain the racial and Hispanic origin measures. In 2001, higher proportions of non-white residents were associated with higher turnout, though the standardized coefficients suggest the effect is weaker than the demographic and economic measures. The situation is different in 2005. Black and Hispanic voters were strongly mobilized in the 2005 election, especially the proportion of Hispanic origin. The Asian population was also mobilized but not as heavily. The R^2 increases from Model 1 to Model 2. from .258 to .333 in 2001 and from .160 to .241 in 2005. Compared to the New York models, we are still explaining less of the variation in turnout in Los Angeles, even with measures for racial and ethnic composition.

Model 3 uses specific racial and ethnic group variables. In 2001, native born blacks in Los Angeles were mobilized. While they remained positively mobilized in 2005, the effect was weaker. The proportion of Iranian and Armenian residents in were negatively associated and significant in both elections. While Russians were mobilized in 2001, they were not in 2005. The coefficients show that turnout was positively associated with the proportion who are Chinese; in 2001, the effect was significant, but not so in 2005. The same pattern is visible for Koreans, with weak significance in 2001 and no statistical significance in 2005. It appears that immigrants from the Middle East and Asia have been less consistent over the elections.

The last groups we consider are Hispanics in Los Angeles. The largest Hispanic population in the city are Mexicans. Mexicans are well mobilized in both elections; looking at the standardized coefficients we see that the positive effects are the strongest in the models. Salvadorans and Guatemalans are also mobilized into Los Angeles politics and the effects appear strong. The R^2 for Model 3 increases to .354 for 2001 and .273 in 2005. The increase is only a slight improvement over the second model.

We conclude from this analysis that, while underlying features of social structure pertinent to each setting, but roughly similar across the settings, explain the continuities of electoral engagement across

the geographies of the two cities, that each election has a specific ethnic dynamic in terms of which groups are engaged by the competition and how. These ethnic dynamics in turnout vary considerably across elections and places. In other words, the content of politics has an important relationship to the question of which groups turn out, whether they turn out, and how vigorously they turn out. Specifically, the contrast between 2005 in Los Angeles and New York is pertinent: the Villaraigosa victory helped to produce, and was in turn powered by, voters living in Latino immigrant neighborhoods, but the candidacy of Fernando Ferrer was not able to achieve a comparable mobilization in New York City.

Candidate Choice in New York

We focus on the 2005 mayoral election in New York because the 2001 was, if anything, an exercise in disappointment for minority empowerment, leading to a race between two candidates who both could reasonably be seen as not building their constituencies on the basis of an appeal to members of minority groups. The 2005 election, by contrast, represented the first time in which the dominant Democratic party nominated a Latino for mayor. Given that most New Yorkers, including most white New Yorkers, are Democrats and that Democratic nominees almost always win city-wide elections, that should have given Ferrer a strong edge. In fact, we know that a city where only a quarter of the voters favored the Republican candidate in the 2004 presidential election, three-fifths supported the Republican candidate in the 2005 mayoral election. Clearly, a lot of people who normally vote Democratic did not do so in the 2005 mayoral election.

As expected, basic demographic controls (which are, admittedly, strongly related to race and ethnicity as well) have a strong association with candidate choice. It could hardly be otherwise in a campaign that pitted a Latino who campaigned on behalf of “the other New York” against a billionaire. As the first panel of Table 6 shows, more than two-thirds of the variance in candidate choice can be explained by some basic demographic factors, including homeownership, per capita income, college education, density, and especially the share of households made up of single mothers with children. The

first three factors have a clear and negative relationship with support for Ferrer, while the last two are associated with support for him.

Next we add the basic racial characteristics of the election district, excluding whites as the comparison group. This boosts the explanatory power of the equation substantially, to an adjusted R^2 of .855. Compared to whites, voters in Hispanic neighborhoods were exceedingly likely to support Ferrer and blacks were also highly likely to support him; voters in Asian election districts seem only slightly more likely than those in white election districts. (According to the model, even after controlling for socio-economic characteristics, only about 20 percent of the voters in completely white election districts supported Ferrer, so it did not take much for a group to be more supportive of him than voters in white neighborhoods.) Note that the sign on college education shifts from negative to positive, indicating that once we control for race, education is positively associated with voting for Ferrer across groups.

Finally, we substitute all the specific native born and immigrant ethnic groups for the broad categories used in the previous model. It once more slightly increases the overall explanatory power of the model and each ethnic group has a slightly different rate of support, but all are positively related except for Filipinos and Russian immigrants. As expected, voters in more Puerto Rican election districts are most supportive of the Puerto Rican candidate, but voters in more Dominican election districts also strongly supported Ferrer. Blacks were also about as supportive as Dominicans, but voters in West Indian election districts were a bit less supportive than those living in areas where native born blacks predominated. Other Latino immigrants were statistically more likely to support Ferrer than whites, but much less likely than voters living in areas predominated by Puerto Ricans, African Americans, or Dominicans.

Candidate Choice in Los Angeles

In Los Angeles, 2005 did turn out to be the year of Latino empowerment. As the previous discussion has made clear, Antonio Villaraigosa successfully emerged from the primary election with a strategy for adding support from all the defeated candidates to his own Latino base. In examining the

demographic dynamics of this race, we begin as in New York with a basic set of characteristics relating to owner occupancy, per capita income, college education, female headed households with children, and density. Right away, the left panel of Table 7 shows that these basic factors explain less than half the overall variance they did in New York. In other words, income, education, family form, and physical mode of living are much less linked to political cleavages in LA than New York. (Adding in the share of workers communing alone by car boosts the model's R^2 to .315 and that factor has by far the largest coefficient.) In particular, the share of households made up of single mothers and their children has no significance in the LA equation; the other factors have similar signs and levels of significance, the coefficients are just half the size as in New York. Another way of saying this is that Antonio Villaraigosa was not the distinctive candidate of the dependent poor the way Ferrer turned out to be in New York. This was obviously a good thing for Villaraigosa's political prospects.

As in New York, adding the basic racial categories (with whites as the excluded group) substantially enhances the explanatory power of the model, more than doubling the adjusted R^2 to .535. If class counted less than race in the mayoral election in LA, race and ethnicity counts as much, or perhaps a bit more, considering the increment to the variance explained. Compared to voters living in non-Hispanic white precincts, who are the excluded group, voters living in Hispanic areas gave Villaraigosa extremely strong support; those living in black areas also gave him moderately more support; and those living in Asian areas gave him less support. Although these patterns are generally similar to those in New York, the overwhelming nature of support from the more Hispanic precincts is what one might expect for a breakthrough Latino candidate, while the level of support for Ferrer in New York may not be. (The higher coefficient for black population in New York than Los Angeles is just another way of saying the election was more racially polarized in New York than LA, and Villaraigosa got more white votes than did Ferrer.)

Comparing the middle panel of Table 7 with that of Table 6, several interesting things emerge. First and foremost, the residual level of support for Villaraigosa, as indicated by the constant, remains at 32.2 compared to 4.4 for Ferrer. This can be interpreted as the level of support from voters in a white

precinct with modal characteristics on the demographic variables. So even though voters in Hispanic and non-Hispanic black areas supported Villaraigosa more than those in white areas, he still did reasonably well – and certainly far better than Ferrer - in those white areas.

Second, net of behavioral differences across racial groups, one basic demographic factor operated favorably toward Ferrer but not toward Villaraigosa: the share of households that are single mothers with children. This factor is strongly associated with poverty and more likely to be found in black and Puerto Rican families than white families. But having controlled for race, it also indicates families that are less likely to hold jobs and more likely to depend on social provision than others. Voters in areas where this group was prevalent leaned strongly toward Ferrer (and away from Mayor Bloomberg), while the exact opposite was true in LA: they Mayor Hahn, not his Latino challenger. The other five factors operated in the same direction and had clear statistical significance in both settings. Owner occupancy is a traditional indicator of conservative leanings and opposition to property taxes, so it is not surprising that it worked against the candidate perceived to be more liberal in each case. Similarly, per capita income should have the same effect and apparently does, although it is neither large nor significant in the Los Angeles case.

Education also works in the same direction in both cities but, having controlled for race, is much stronger in Los Angeles than in New York. In other words, once one sorts out the fact that voters living in whiter areas were less likely than those living in more black or Hispanic areas to favor the Latino challengers, voters living in the better educated parts of any these areas were more likely to vote for Ferrer or Villaraigosa. Thus while class has not been so influential in terms of property ownership or income, it does have a strong influence through education and the occupational differences associated with that. This suggests the need for a nuanced understanding of the political consequences of location within the matrix of industries and occupations – those requiring more education, such as the professional, social, and public services, may dispose their workers toward more liberal directions, while those characterized by less education, such as blue collar work or lower level service work, may not. It is

notable in Los Angeles that, aside from support from the candidate's own ethnic group, this is the factor with single most strongest association with voting for him.

Finally, when we move to the right panel of Table 7, further interesting differences emerge. First, as in New York, it is clear the large pan-ethnic categories hide some important differences across the individual groups that make them up. Particularly interesting is that although Villaraigosa did well both in areas with more assimilated Mexican Americans and with voters in areas with more Mexican immigrants, he did much better in the latter. (Considering the volume of Mexican migration to LA, this might have been a positive factor for his campaign.) Exactly why his appeal was greater in areas with more immigrants than less is unclear, but it may relate to the prior discussion about the political dimensions of generations and class within the Mexican American community. In scatterplots of the Villaraigosa vote share against the share of a precinct's population that is Mexican American or Mexican born, there is a clear sub-population that tracks well below and is somewhat separate from the main trend of close association. This phenomenon certainly bears closer inspection.

Just as Ferrer did well among Dominicans as well as Puerto Ricans, Villaraigos exerted a strong draw among voters living within LA's second largest Latino immigrant group, Salvadorans. Interestingly, his support was apparently weaker in Nicaraguan areas and apparently less strong in Guatemalan areas than among whites, although the difference was not statistically significant in the latter case. In short, while the political rhetoric in Los Angeles is all about Latinos, not individual Hispanic immigrant groups, there are clear differences of political inclination across the groups, at least in this election. Finally, the finding that voters living in more Asian areas leaned against Villaraigosa also needs to be unpacked. Perhaps as a legacy of past conflict between Koreans and their black and Latino neighbors, voters in more Korean areas were significantly less likely than whites to vote for Villaraigosa. On the other hand, the Chinese were fairly favorable, while the other two groups were statistically indistinguishable from whites. Of the other immigrant ethnic groups, voters living in more Iranian areas were less likely than whites to favor Villaraigosa, while voters in Russian immigrant and Armenian areas were more likely than other whites to support him.

Comparing the two cities, we can draw a number of important conclusions – beside the obvious ones that Villaraigosa had far more widespread support than Ferrer, that Mayor Hahn was a much less popular incumbent than Mayor Bloomberg, and that the 2005 election was more racially polarized in New York than Los Angeles. First, even after controlling for basic features of social structure, such as how much people make, whether they own their homes, how educated they are, and what kind of families they live in, the voters living in different racial and ethnic contexts vote differently from one another. Voters in whiter areas were consistently less likely to favor the Latino challengers in these races and voters in black and especially Hispanic areas were more likely. Second, as the previous discussion has underlined, blacks were a swing constituency in these two cities between 2001 and 2005. In New York, they swung toward the incumbent (though still far less likely to vote for him than whites) and in LA they swung away from him. Third and finally, the larger racial categories hide important differences within their component groups. While such categories are useful, perhaps unavoidable, for analysis, it is also necessary to look at specific national origin groups in order not to overgeneralize.

The Impact of Institutions and Political Culture

This paper has explored the impact of various demographic and racial/ethnic variables on turnout and candidate preference in the 2005 mayoral elections of the nation's first and second largest cities. Some results were as expected but others were surprising. In terms of the ultimate outcome, the biggest difference between the two cities was that Latino empowerment took a major leap forward in Los Angeles as it elected a Latino mayor, while the Latino mayoral candidate fell short in New York City. On the other hand, at the smallest unit of political representation, that of city council members, several immigrant ethnic groups – West Indian, Dominican, and Chinese Americans – have a level of representation that appears to be a long way away in Los Angeles. The two cities present a kind of paradox: the system that deters immigrant ethnic representation at the local level (Los Angeles) has produced it at the city-wide level.

On the face of it, we would have assumed that the greater importance of partisan affiliation and partisan activity in New York, combined with the overwhelming enrollment of the voters in the Democratic party and the fact that it put forward a Latino nominee in 2005 for the first time, would have produced greater groundswell of support for this candidate, all other things being equal. Of course, all other things are not equal. In particular, Mayor Bloomberg had broad support, was perceived to be doing a good job, and had effectively unlimited campaign resources, while Mayor Hahn had alienated some key constituencies, particularly African Americans and, to a lesser extent, white Valley voters. Another confounding factor was that white voters in New York generally appear to have more strongly negative feelings toward a Latino mayoral candidate than they do in Los Angeles. Last but not least, there are simply more Latino voters in Los Angeles than New York.

Our paper began by noting how their differences in institutional structure and political culture may contrast with the similarities between these two cities in terms of overall economic structure and demographic make-up. New York City is a complex political organism with numerous opportunities for office holding, high levels of public interest in local politics, and strong mayoral authority. At least until recently, Los Angeles has been a simpler political setting with fewer political opportunities and with more horizontal division of authority among elected officials. (This may be changing as term limits on the state legislature expands the number of political opportunities for local politicians [Sonenshein 2006])

How do these differences play out in the two cities? Do they help explain some of the patterns we have found? While both cities have diverse populations and electorates, New York City's politics reflects that diversity with far more fidelity than does that of Los Angeles. Despite its image as the most diverse city in America, ethnic distinctions seem to have a lower profile in Los Angeles. For example, New York has experienced clear political competition between African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans, as in the current primary election in Brooklyn's 11th Congressional districts, which pits, among others, a second generation Jamaican American woman who serves on the City Council against Chris Owens, the son of the African American incumbent, Major Owens. Despite the heterogeneity of Latino immigrant groups in Los Angeles, it has not (yet) generated major political divisions among those groups. In Los

Angeles, the terms “Hispanic” and “Latino” seems to encompass groups in political terms that might, like Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, be generating their own, competing council candidates in New York.

These differences in the sensitivity with which their political cultures and structures reflect ethnic difference may relate to the differences in city-wide outcomes. It may be that the extraordinarily rich range of political opportunities for emerging ethnic groups in New York City , with its 51 member council and a mayor with huge public resources at his or her command, encourages even relatively small immigrant ethnic groups to organize for access. This may mean convey political meaning to ethnic distinctions that currently do not seem to matter in Los Angeles, perhaps because only big groups can hope to be political players. By contrast, the large council districts in Los Angeles may put pressure on minority groups to conceptualize themselves as broadly as possible. The LA city council has perhaps four or five “Latino” seats of the total fifteen. The two Hispanic origin politicians who hold citywide office today in Los Angeles are seen as Latinos, not Mexican-Americans, even though Mayor Villaraigosa presents himself as more liberal than city attorney Rocky Delgadillo.

Asian Americans have also been more successful in gaining representation within the smaller-scale representation in New York, and to have their mobilization encouraged, than in Los Angeles. With such large council districts and their lower rates of residential concentration, Asian Americans have had little success in winning city council seats in Los Angeles. The only Asian American ever elected to city council, Mike Woo, represented a diverse and not predominantly Asian Hollywood district. Today, no Asian American holds elected office in Los Angeles. Even with their definition as a pan-ethnic group (Asian American rather than Chinese or Japanese or Korean), they have been unable to overcome the structural barrier created by large districts.

New Yorkers were more amenable to increasing the size of their city council in a 1989 charter reform, with all these attendant effects, than were Los Angeles voters. Indeed, a primary aim of the 1989 charter reform was to make the city council far more responsive and representative by increasing the number of seats from 35 to 51. In 1999, Los Angeles voters voted two to one against two charter amendments that would have increased the city council’s size; one from 15 to 21, and another from 15 to

25, despite their association with a popular more general charter reform that was on the same ballot and passed.

Paradoxically, though, the institutional and cultural factors that help create the fine-grained political diversity of New York City's elections may limit the ability of minority and immigrant communities to reach the summit of urban power by heightening ethnic and racial cleavages. After all, the same question arose decades ago when conservative Los Angeles elected a black mayor with a stable coalition relatively early in the civil rights era while more liberal New York City was unable to do so (Sonenshein 1993, Mollenkopf 1992).

A complex system with numerous opportunities for partial incorporation and strong party organizations that can pick off and absorb new leaders may make it hard for emerging minority groups to attain citywide political success. Furthermore, the mayor's great strength in relation to other office holders in New York City may greatly enhance what white voters perceive to be at stake in mayoral elections. In Los Angeles, fewer eggs are in the mayoral basket. Los Angeles may thus create fewer opportunities for more, if partial, city-wide success. Even to get to the main event, one has to win an immensely powerful council seat representing a quarter of a million people. The jump from there to the mayoralty or other citywide office is shorter than in New York City. And if the need to define ethnicity in a broad-brush fashion encompassing the most voters encourages aspiring politicians to keep sub-group identities submerged, the resulting city-wide candidates may appeal to wider groups of people and suffer from fewer inter-ethnic liabilities. Once having gotten into the game, minority and immigrant candidates in Los Angeles may find fewer obstacles to citywide success, certainly including party organizations. Councilman Michael Woo, for example, made it into the final mayoral election in 1993.

Some of these factors may also contribute to the greater white unity against minority empowerment in New York City than Los Angeles. In general, whites in Los Angeles seem less likely to see themselves as members of ethnic groups, nor does their political behavior divide as sharply along ethnic lines (Waldinger and Bozorghmehr 1996). Whites in Los Angeles seem divided more by ideology than ethnicity and are not organized into ethnic enclaves, apart perhaps from Jews. One does not see

identity politics impinging as intensely on Los Angeles whites in the same way, for instance, that the 1968 New York City school strikes profoundly altered the outlook of New York City whites.

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Tables and Maps

Table 1
Vote by Precinct Race, 2001 and 2005 Primary and General Elections, Los Angeles

	White	Black	Latino	Asian	Total
2001 Primary	194151	34822	158925	5915	393813
Villariagosa	33.7%	19.4%	48.5%	37.5%	38.5%
Hahn	23.9%	83.7%	29.6%	37.3%	31.7%
2001 General	281277	48297	229891	8263	577699
Villariagosa	41.7%	22.1%	57.5%	43.4%	46.5%
Hahn	58.3%	77.9%	42.5%	56.6%	53.5%
2005 Primary	213853	33344	152272	6335	405804
Villaraigosa	26.6%	21.5%	46.1%	31.8%	33.6%
Hahn	25.5%	18.9%	22.1%	40.0%	23.9%
2005 General	239860	38629	206869	7705	498709
Villaraigosa	51.5%	57.5%	67.5%	48.0%	58.6%
Hahn	48.5%	42.5%	32.5%	52.0%	41.4%

Note: Absentee ballots allocated to precinct totals

Table 2
Vote by Precinct Race, 2001 and 2005 Primary and General Elections, New York City

	White	Black	Latino	Asian	Total
2001 Primary	340629	229057	184320	22229	780396
Ferrer	13.4%	57.4%	64.8%	30.0%	35.8%
Green	35.7%	35.3%	17.6%	29.6%	31.1%
2001 Runoff	346853	224547	192790	20796	790019
Ferrer	22.5%	66.3%	76.7%	45.8%	49.0%
Green	87.5%	33.7%	23.3%	54.2%	51.0%
2001 General	840719	325702	255491	52509	1519303
Green	35.9%	73.5%	55.0%	45.7%	47.9%
Bloomberg	62.4%	24.6%	43.0%	52.7%	50.3%
2005 Primary	212205	135132	121167	12316	493459
Ferrer	25.0%	40.3%	64.1%	43.6%	39.0%
Weiner	48.5%	13.8%	10.5%	28.4%	28.2%
Fields	7.5%	33.3%	10.6%	8.9%	15.4%
2005 General	671162	295181	269269	44661	1289919
Ferrer	22.9%	51.3%	66.3%	35.7%	39.0%
Bloomberg	73.6%	47.1%	32.1%	62.0%	58.4%

Note: Percentages do not sum to 100 due to minor candidates

Table 3
Race and Nativity by City
(People living in households classified by head of household)

Group	Total Population			Voting Age Citizens		
	New York City	City of LA	Rest of LA County	New York City	City of LA	Rest of LA County
NHW NB	25.2%	23.0%	28.2%	35.9%	38.9%	40.9%
NHW FB	10.2%	7.3%	4.6%	8.9%	7.8%	4.4%
NHB NB	14.6%	10.1%	8.2%	17.6%	14.8%	10.3%
NHB FB	10.4%	1.0%	.5%	7.7%	.8%	.4%
Latino NB	11.5%	6.9%	11.5%	13.2%	9.0%	13.6%
Latino FB	15.4%	39.4%	31.2%	7.8%	16.0%	15.5%
NHA NB	.7%	1.5%	1.8%	.9%	2.6%	2.5%
NHA FB	10.0%	8.9%	12.0%	6.3%	7.9%	10.2%
Other NB	.7%	.9%	1.1%	.9%	1.4%	1.5%
Other FB	1.4%	1.1%	1.0%	.9%	.9%	.7%
Total	7822712	3613128	5736374	4527490	1771897	3068344

Source: 2000 Census 5% Public Use Microdata Sample

Table 4A

	OLS Regression Models for 2001 Turnout in New York								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig
Constant	33.73		0.000	42.66		0.000	37.273		0.000
% Owner Occupied	0.126	0.266	0.000	0.101	0.214	0.000	0.098	0.208	0.000
% BA or Greater	0.189	0.361	0.000	0.138	0.263	0.000	0.138	0.264	0.000
% Single Mothers with Children	-0.405	-0.34	0.000	-0.221	-0.186	0.000	-0.217	-0.182	0.000
Population Per Square Mile	0.000	0.064	0.000	0	0.094	0.000	0.000	0.082	0.000
Median Family Income (1000s)	0.003	0.009	0.565	-0.014	-0.041	0.005	-0.007	-0.022	0.130
% NH Black				-0.1	-0.274	0.000			
% NH Asian				-0.161	-0.17	0.000			
% Hispanic				-0.153	-0.316	0.000			
% Native Black							-0.051	-0.106	0.000
% West Indian							-0.043	-0.043	0.000
% Puerto Rican							-0.154	-0.154	0.000
% Dominican							-0.057	-0.041	0.001
% Mexican							-0.218	-0.064	0.000
% Ecuadorian							-0.283	-0.047	0.000
% Colombian							0.193	0.029	0.012
% Chinese							-0.104	-0.078	0.000
% Korean							0.005	0.001	0.897
% Asian Indian							-0.448	-0.132	0.000
% Filipino							0.178	0.017	0.061
% Italian							0.015	0.016	0.248
% Irish							0.304	0.154	0.000
% Yiddish Speaking							0.042	0.021	0.031
% Russian born							0.240	0.054	0.000
R^2	0.609			0.657			0.680		

Table 4B

	OLS Regression Models for 2005 Turnout in New York								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig
Constant	29.472		0.000	33.87		0.000	27.236		0.000
% Owner Occupied	0.095	0.259	0.000	0.096	0.262	0.000	0.100	0.274	0.000
% BA or Greater	0.111	0.273	0.000	0.094	0.231	0.000	0.092	0.227	0.000
% Single Mothers with Children	-0.185	-0.2	0.000	-0.151	-0.164	0.000	-0.241	-0.261	0.000
Population Per Square Mile	0.000	0.171	0.000	0	0.183	0.000	0.000	0.172	0.000
Median Family Income (1000s)	-0.018	-0.07	0.001	-0.032	-0.124	0.000	-0.013	-0.050	0.015
% NH Black				-0.061	-0.216	0.000			
% NH Asian				-0.161	-0.219	0.000			
% Hispanic				-0.033	-0.088	0.000			
% Native Black							0.041	0.108	0.000
% West Indian							-0.045	-0.058	0.001
% Puerto Rican							0.108	0.138	0.000
% Dominican							0.100	0.094	0.000
% Mexican							-0.099	-0.037	0.007
% Ecuadorian							-0.262	-0.057	0.001
% Colombian							0.370	0.071	0.000
% Chinese							-0.087	-0.083	0.000
% Korean							0.159	0.050	0.000
% Asian Indian							-0.363	-0.138	0.000
% Filipino							0.235	0.029	0.024
% Italian							0.005	0.008	0.709
% Irish							0.301	0.196	0.000
% Yiddish Speaking							0.186	0.120	0.000
% Russian born							0.320	0.093	0.000
R^2	0.273			0.315			0.362		

Table 5A

	OLS Regression Models for 2001 Turnout in Los Angeles								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig
Constant	35.3		0.000	20.275		0.000	21.879		0.000
% Owner Occupied	0.094	0.291	0.000	0.114	0.352	0.000	0.131	0.405	0.000
% BA or Higher	-0.147	-0.351	0.000	0.073	0.175	0.004	0.074	0.177	0.005
% Single Mothers with Children	0.029	0.081	0.568	-0.202	0.062	0.001	-0.190	-0.122	0.002
Population Per Square Mile	-2.675	-0.131	0.000	-3.348	-0.555	0.000	-3.946	-0.193	0.000
Median Family Income (1000s)	0.09	0.299	0.000	0.087	-0.013	0.000	0.064	0.211	0.000
% NH Black				0.14	0.015	0.000			
% NH Asian				0.084	0.021	0.000			
% Hispanic				0.207	0.016	0.000			
% Native Black							0.118	0.252	0.000
% Iranian							-0.248	-0.100	0.000
% Armenian							-0.133	-0.057	0.011
% Russian							0.233	0.097	0.008
% Chinese							0.154	0.061	0.005
% Korean							0.094	0.051	0.028
% Mexican							0.174	0.427	0.000
% Salvadoran							0.802	0.256	0.000
% Guatemalan							0.751	0.135	0.001
R^2	0.258			0.333			0.354		

Table 5B

	OLS Regression Models for 2005 Turnout in Los Angeles								
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig
Constant	35.5		0.000	18.99		0.000	24.779		0.000
% Owner Occupied	0.071	0.213	0.000	0.095	0.286	0.000	0.097	0.291	0.000
% BA or Higher	-0.203	-0.473	0.000	0.040	0.093	0.156	0.031	0.071	0.287
% Single Mothers with Children	-0.112	-0.071	0.050	-0.272	-0.171	0.000	-0.204	-0.128	0.002
Population Per Square Mile	-1.322	-0.063	0.036	-2.065	-0.098	0.001	-1.898	-0.091	0.003
Median Family Income (1000s)	0.072	0.233	0.000	0.065	0.212	0.000	0.064	0.207	0.000
% NH Black				0.117	0.252	0.000			
% NH Asian				0.088	0.093	0.000			
% Hispanic				0.219	0.694	0.000			
% Native Black							0.045	0.093	0.012
% Iranian							-0.383	-0.151	0.000
% Armenian							-0.331	-0.139	0.000
% Russian							-0.263	-0.107	0.006
% Chinese							0.076	0.029	0.202
% Korean							0.077	0.041	0.095
% Mexican							0.146	0.350	0.000
% Salvadoran							0.411	0.128	0.004
% Guatemalan							0.596	0.105	0.017
R^2	0.160			0.241			0.273		

Table 6

OLS Regression Estimates for Ferrer Support, New York City Mayoral Election 2005									
	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig
Constant	35.3		.000	4.4		.006	8.5		.000
Owner Occupied	-.174	-.190	.000	-.068	-.075	.000	-.106	-.116	.000
Per Capita Incom	.000	-.136	.000	-8.9E-05	-.081	.000	.000	-.106	.000
BA+	-.0332	-.032	.042	.142	.141	.000	.133	.132	.000
Single Mothers with Kids	1.350	.586	.000	.280	.122	.000	.184	.080	.000
Log of Pop/Mi^2	2.11	.101	.000	.689	.033	.001	.895	.043	.000
NH Black				.349	.493	.000			
NH Asian				.129	.071	.000			
Hispanic				.674	.720	.000			
Native black							.309	.329	.000
West Indian ancestry							.370	.190	.000
Puerto Rican Ancestry							.847	.436	.000
Dominican Ancestry							.847	.319	.000
Born in Mexico							.463	.070	.000
Ecuadoran Ancestry							1.073	.093	.000
Colombian Ancestry							.721	.055	.000
Chinese race							.114	.044	.000
Korean race							.157	.020	.000
Indian race							.539	.082	.000
Filipino race							-.532	-.026	.000
Born in Russia							-.677	-.079	.000
Adjusted R2	.680			.855			.863		
Std Error	12.04			8.08			7.85		

Table 7

OLS Regression Estimates for Villaraigosa Support, Los Angeles Mayoral Election, 2005									
	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	Sig
Constant	52.5		.000	32.2			15.9		.000
Owner Occupied	-.091	-.203	.000	-.055	-.122	.000	-.018	-.039	.152
Per Capita Income	6.9E-05	.094	.019	-3.3E-05	-.045	.173	-4.7E-05	-.064	.064
BA+	-.233	-.401	.000	.354	.610	.000	.423	.729	.000
Single Mothers with Kids	-.030	-.014	.678	-.323	-.150	.000	-.288	-.134	.000
Log of Pop/Mi^2	1.62	.123	.000	.213	.016	.508	1.384	.105	.000
NH Black				.174	.283	.000			
NH Asian				-.059	-.049	.013			
Hispanic				.486	1.164	.000			
Native black							.204	.314	.000
Mexican Anc - Mexican born							.416	.334	.000
Mexican Born							.696	.739	.000
Born in El Salvador							1.21	.402	.000
Born in Guatemala							-.047	-.010	.731
Born in Nicaragua							1.75	.065	.001
Chinese race							.365	.108	.000
Korean race							-.319	-.126	.000
Filipino race							.011	.003	.870
Indian race							-.102	.008	.698
Born in Iran							-.076	-.021	.313
Born in Russia							1.033	.084	.000
Armenian ancestry							.290	.090	.000
Adjusted R2			.245			.535			.556
Std Error			9.98			7.83			7.65

TO COME: Maps 1 and 2

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