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Working Paper
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Working Paper, No. 2007,14

Provided in Cooperation with:
University of California Berkeley, Institute of Urban and Regional Development (IURD)

Suggested Citation: Weir, Margaret; Rongerude, Jane; Ansell, Christopher K. (2007) : Collaboration is not enough, Working Paper, No. 2007,14, University of California, Institute of Urban and Regional Development (IURD), Berkeley, CA

This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59399

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Collaboration is Not Enough

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April 2007
For more than half a century, critics have pointed to the baleful effects of transportation policy on American metropolitan areas. For example, in 1960, with the interstate highway program operating at full bore, future Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan sharply criticized the outsized promises of the highway builders. Instead, of bringing “city and country closer together… [making] us “one country and a united people,” Moynihan warned that the unplanned approach to highway building would create “chaos in concrete.” Its effects would be particularly harmful for cities where “plans have been thrown together and the bulldozers set to work” (Moynihan 1960). Moynihan predicted that, without metropolitan planning to guide transportation decisions, highway builders would let “suburbs eat endlessly into the countryside” and destroy cities with ill-conceived highway projects.

Three decades later, as a Senate subcommittee chair, Moynihan reentered the same debate, spearheading the passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), legislation that aimed to reverse the harmful impact of transportation on cities. Hailed as a revolution in transportation policy-making, the law provided a combination of institutional reform and new requirements for participation, which, together, it was hoped, would make transportation policy responsive to the needs of cities. ISTEA’s central institutional reform carved out a space for regional decision making by enhancing the power of Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs), regional entities that had existed since the 1960s but which exercised little authority. By granting MPOs new power over spending, reformers hoped to shift substantial decision making authority away from state highway departments, where urban transportation needs typically received short shrift (Gage and McDowell 1995; McDowell 1999).
ISTEA also initiated participatory innovations, requiring “early and continuous” public participation in MPO deliberations. Additional provisions stipulated that MPOs and state transportation agencies make special outreach efforts to traditionally underserved populations (Sanchez, Rich, and Ma 2003) By mandating public participation in the planning process, the legislation aimed to elevate the concerns of transportation consumers and rein in the powerful interests that profited from highway construction. Reformers hoped that the revamped institutional setting for decisionmaking and the addition of new voices would alter the existing policy bias that favored expansive development at the expense of cities and would prod policymakers to consider the broader social and economic impacts of transportation.

In some ways, the new law was a striking success. In metropolitan areas across the country, the provisions for opening participation provoked new debates in the once largely closed arena of transportation policymaking. Emergent policy networks brought together bicycle advocates, environmentalists, advocates for improving access for the elderly and low-income people, and supporters of improved public transit. Regional convenings and planning processes elicited fresh visions of metropolitan areas and solicited input that went well beyond the usual narrow coalition of highway builders, real estate interests, and developers.

Despite the hopes that the initial legislation roused and the passage of two subsequent reauthorizations in 1998 and 2005 reinforcing and extending the novel thrust of the 1991 law, most assessments concur in labeling the results of transportation reform disappointing. In a wide-ranging evaluation of the law’s impact, Katz, Puentes and Bernstein, for example, charged that implementation of federal transportation statutes had
been "seriously flawed -- and in basic ways unresponsive to metropolitan needs" (Katz, Puentes, and Bernstein 2005). One of central problems in, their view, is that even though “ISTEA and TEA-21 were designed to move transportation decision making out of the back rooms and board rooms of the highway establishment, many state DOTs still wield considerable formal and informal power, retaining authority over substantial state transportation funds” (Puentes and Bailey 2005).

How can the disappointing assessments of the legislation be reconciled with the range of new activity that it inspired? This paper examines that question by comparing the fate of transportation reform in the Los Angeles and Chicago regions since the passage of ISTEA in 1991. In both regions, we show, the transportation field saw the emergence of new actors and regional networks dedicated to changing the processes and outcomes of policymaking in transportation. However, in Los Angeles, the network that emerged around regional transportation reform began to peter out after a decade of activism. In Chicago, by contrast, the regional reform network grew stronger over time.

The divergence in reform trajectories, we argue, is due to the greater centralization of the Chicago reform network and the participation of powerful actors in it. These features of Chicago’s network laid the groundwork for a virtuous cycle between expanded participation and institutional reform of the MPO, which was essential for strengthening regional governance capacities. In Los Angeles, the absence of powerful actors and the decentralized nature of the network generated a new regional conversation about transportation but failed to promote reform of the MPO. Lacking a virtuous cycle between participation and institutional development, the impetus for participating in regional venues withered and Los Angeles’s reform network began to atrophy.
This article develops this argument in four parts. The first section examines the literature on policy feedbacks and participation, showing how the multi-tiered context of decisionmaking creates challenges for launching a virtuous cycle of reform between participation of new constituencies and institutional reform. The next two sections document the initial successes in opening participation in both regions as new groups entered the transportation arena and began to coalesce into reform networks. The final section shows how the differences in the structure of the regional networks and their ability to promote institutional change caused the trajectory of reform to diverge in the two regions.

Policy Feedbacks, Collaboration, and the Development of Regional Governance Capacities

Scholars from diverse theoretical traditions have sought to assess the ways that policy design influences participation and policy outcomes. One strand of institutionalist theory argues that new policies can create virtuous cycles in which new policies give rise to constituencies whose support sustains the policy in the future and prevents opponents from rolling it back. Other approaches examine how policy can alter the terms on which different groups engage with one another around policy goals. Arguments about collaboration and the networked policy, for example, highlight possibilities for mutually beneficial engagement in which policy brings actors together to collaborate on problem solving. A closer look at the assumptions in these literatures reveals that neither pays adequate attention to the way a multi-tiered political context influences the dynamics of participation, institutional change, and policy development.
The idea that policy can change politics has a long pedigree in the study of American politics, from E.E. Schattschneider’s analysis of the impact of policy reform on tax politics to Theodore Lowi’s depiction of three discrete policy arenas that create distinct styles of politics (Schattschneider 1983, Lowi 1963). Recently, scholars have posed the question more broadly as one of “policy feedbacks” (Pierson 1993, Campbell 2005). Typically drawing on analyses of social welfare policies, this work shows how specific features of policy design shape constituencies, reframe future perceptions about the purpose or scope of the policy, and help recast interests in ways that build or obstruct supportive coalitions. In this perspective, policy not only creates new constituencies, it also can set the terms on which groups interact, giving some groups a leg up, making some kinds of outcomes more possible and others less likely. Moreover, the virtuous linkage between a policy and its beneficiaries alters politics in enduring ways. Policies can strengthen groups, which in turn use their power to defend and strengthen the policy. At their tightest, these linkages create “lock-in” in which even widespread opposition may not be able to dislodge a policy (Pierson 1994). This intertwined impact of policy on constituency formation, ideas about policy, and coalition formation create a distinctive political landscape and shape the terms in which future public problems are perceived and addressed.

Although much of this literature examines American social policy, it rarely considers how the operation of the federal system affects the impact of policy on politics. One important exception is Mara Sidney’s study of community reinvestment and fair housing policies (Sidney 2003). Sidney shows that cross-scale policies require analyzing how distinctive local conditions mediate the influence of national policy on politics; she
also highlights the role of nonprofit organizations as critical intermediaries in determining the local impact of policy. In an era of devolution, she notes, much of local implementation is carried out by advocacy organizations, not local governments. Therefore, to assess the impact of policy in this context, we must assess distinctive local conditions and evaluate the strategic capacity and creativity of the local organized groups in whose hands implementation rests (Mollenkopf 1983; Sellers 2002).

A second literature examining regional collaboration and networked governance encounters similar problems in explaining the trajectory of reform in the field of transportation. This work argues that the active engagement of society can be an effective means for achieving public goals by linking functionally distinct groups in new horizontal networks (Ansell 2000). Within this context, it becomes more possible for diverging interests to identify points of commonality and to craft policy approaches of mutual benefit. Theories about collaboration and networked governance highlight the need for brokers, such as nongovernmental organized intermediaries, to connect diverse stakeholders to one other and to the state (McQuarrie, Guthrie, and Hess 2005).

A glance at the impact of transportation reforms in the 1990s, shows that after federal reform, some features of networked governance took shape in many metropolitan areas. In line with the depiction of networked governance, organized intermediaries sought to take advantage of the new possibilities for horizontal networking created by the legislation. Acting as network brokers, newly-created nonprofit organizations fostered connections across diverse groups and promoted new ways of thinking about transportation’s role in the metropolitan area. These brokers sought actively to expand the network by showing different groups how transportation affected their interests. In this
way, groups with little history of prior cooperation forged new connections through intermediaries.

Despite these encouraging signs, the new regional transportation networks did not lead the way to collaborative governance because they never gained the power to make authoritative decisions. In the literature on networked governance, the state’s role is to “empower stakeholders and facilitate cooperation among them” (Ansell 2000). When the state fails to perform this role, networks may emerge but there is no mechanism to link their ideas to outcomes.

The problem with networked governance for analyzing transportation reform is its core assumption about the way that higher levels of government structure local decision making. In these theories, the central government’s role in setting the terms of local interaction is not itself in contention. In contemporary metropolitan politics, by contrast, a key element of the political task is to ensure that higher levels of government enforce provisions that enhance network effectiveness and promote more inclusive local action. This problem suggests that the literature’s emphasis on horizontal collaborative relationships is inadequate. Instead, the ability of local network members to exercise vertical power is key in determining the effectiveness and inclusivity of regional collaborative processes (Swanstom 2006; Hamilton, Miller, and Paytas 2004).

In the analysis that follows, we show that cross-level political dynamics and regional network power were key to the diverging fate of transportation reform in Los Angeles and Chicago. In the context of weak reforms, we argue, two specific aspects of cross-level political dynamics and local networks become critical in determining whether changes in national policy launch a trajectory of policy change at lower levels of
government. The first is institutional: To what extent do competing channels of
decisionmaking continue to flourish and allow entrenched groups to block newly-
empowered challengers? In their design and implementation, we show, transportation
reforms failed to cut off competing channels of influence in national, state, and local
politics, which the entrenched pro-growth coalition of real estate and building industries
used to achieve its goals. The second factor determining the local impacts of national
reform relates to participation. To what extent do new provisions for broader
participation create powerful reform networks capable of the institution-building needed
to nurture and sustain reform? Only when a powerful local group, capable of exercising
influence in multiple arenas, seizes on the reform as a way of achieving its goals is such a
network likely to emerge.

Methodology and Case Selection

To assess the way variations in local social and political organization affect
transportation reform, we compared the networks that emerged after 1991 to influence
transportation in the Chicago and Los Angeles regions. Drawing from a universe of
groups initially assembled through an internet search and extended through a snowball
sample, we interviewed 30 groups active in transportation issues in the Los Angeles
region and 35 in the Chicago region. We began our internet search with MPO, noting the
groups listed on the MPO website, tracing groups connected to those groups through web
links, and extending our sample with responses to the interview question “what other
actors are important in regional transportation decisionmaking?”
Our interview sample was designed to ensure representation from a range of groups that identified their primary interests in one of five main issue areas, including industry/economic development, environmental protection, public transportation, social justice/community organizing, and the overarching issues of regional livability or sustainability. In each issue area, we interviewed from 6-9 organizations. (See Tables 1 and 2 for a list of organizations in each issue area.) To ensure that we were collecting authoritative information about these groups, we sought to interview the chief executive officers, and where that was not possible, we interviewed other high ranking representatives. The semi-structured interviews were conducted in 2003 for Los Angeles and 2005 for Chicago. Selected qualitative interviews were also conducted before the survey in 2000 and 2001 and to follow up in 2006 and 2007.

In collecting network data on these groups, our goal was to understand the overall structure of transportation policy networks. First, we wanted to understand the extent to which these organizations actually engaged in horizontal collaboration. Second, we wanted to understand the articulation of this network. For example, did organizations collaborate across issue areas or only with organizations representing the same types of issues? To measure this collaboration, we showed organizations a list of organizations and asked them to “check every name on the list that your organization has worked with as part of its transportation work.” We expected this question to generate an inclusive network, because “working with” another organization does not necessarily connote very extensive or intensive relationships. In network-theoretic terms, this question captures “weak ties” between organizations (Granovetter 1973).
We were concerned, however, that merely “working with” other organizations was too low a threshold, thereby indicating the existence of a “network” when in fact the relationships were infrequent and casual. Moreover, we knew that network ties could represent something more than simply patterns of collaboration; they could also represent political alliances. To tap this more restricted network, we followed up on our initial question by asking interviewees to specify the organizations they had just named with whom they worked “closely.” This question was intended to identify the “strong tie” network, which we expected to more closely represent the pattern of political ties in each city (Krackhardt 1992).

The Los Angeles and Chicago regions were selected because they present significant contrasts in social organization and political coordination that imply different capacities to take advantage of new opportunities to build new alliances and displace existing coalitions. Los Angeles has long been famed as a fragmented political setting where Progressive era reforms limited the power of political actors and depressed political participation (Fogelson 1967). In the past decade, however, there has been significant mobilization of groups advocating on behalf of Los Angeles’s very large low-income, and often immigrant, communities. By contrast, the Chicago region has often been depicted as consisting of two more centralized antagonistic political forces: a Democratic patronage regime centered in the Chicago and strongly Republican suburbs in which the DuPage Republican party provided the organizational muscle. In addition to its centralized politics, the Chicago region is noted for a relatively organized social sector – both in the business community and among community-based organizations (Hamilton 2002).
These differences between the two regions suggest that change from below may be easier in Los Angeles, where bottom-up initiatives may more readily coalesce among mobilizing community groups and where the fragmentation of political power reduces the obstacles they confront. In Chicago, where centralized political power can make it more difficult for bottom-up initiatives to gain traction, the power of the political sector may also stifle initiatives from organizations with diverse social perspectives.

Creating New Networks

In both Los Angeles and Chicago, federal transportation reforms, combined with growing interest in regional solutions to metropolitan issues, helped generate new regional policy networks. New groups formed expressly to influence transportation decisions and many existing groups added transportation to their issue portfolio. Federal reforms helped to reframe transportation by expanding the agenda to include discussion of alternative transportation modes and to highlight the importance of transportation in achieving multiple regional goals, not simply efficient mobility. In both regions, newly formed intermediary organizations, whose central mission was to promote ideals of regional liveability or sustainability, were keys to making new connections across distinct functional groups and for recasting transportation issues into a broader framework.

These developments accord well with arguments about policy feedbacks. In both regions the new interest in transportation was evident in the entry of established groups into transportation as well as in the formation of new groups (See Figures 1 and 2). On balance, the groups in the Los Angeles network tended to be more recent entrants into the debates about transportation than the Chicago groups. Only 42 percent of the Los
Angeles groups we interviewed were founded before the national reforms in transportation policy in the 1991 and only 21 percent of them had worked on transportation before that time. In Chicago, 60 percent of the groups had been organized before 1990 but, in contrast to Los Angeles, 75 percent of them had worked on transportation before that time. Moreover, in Chicago many of the new groups were spin-offs of organizations that had much longer histories. For example, Chicago Metropolis 2020, a business-oriented organization formed in 1999 to promote a regional agenda, emerged as a project of the Commercial Club, an elite business organization founded in 1877. The Campaign for Sensible Growth, launched in the late 1990s, was a project of the 70-year-old Metropolitan Planning Council (Hamilton 2002).

Not only did new groups form and older organizations enter the transportation field after the passage of federal reforms, these groups also began to work together in new ways that enhanced possibilities for recognizing common interests. Between 2003 and 2005 when we conducted our semi-structured survey, these diverse groups formed networks in both cities. At the center of the networks, serving as connectors, were organizations that explicitly defined their mission as that of promoting regional sustainability and liveability. Most of these intermediary organizations formed after the initial 1991 transportation reform.

In analyzing the network data generated by our interviews, we sought a way to represent the main tendencies in the structure of these networks. Even a fairly sparse social network can create a visually uninterpretable spaghetti of relationships and that was certainly the case here. Therefore, we sought to represent a “reduced form” of the overall network, inspired by block modeling (White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976;
Instead of generating blocks inductively, however, we used our five issue categories—industry/economic development, environmental protection, public transportation, social justice/community organizing, and regional sustainability/livability—as blocks. We assigned organizations to blocks based on their response to an interview question that asked them to describe their central mission.

Using UCINET 6 (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002), we then analyzed the density of network ties within and between these issue blocks. In the resulting “image matrix,” a relationship between two blocks is only reported if the density of ties between the blocks is greater than the overall density of the entire network. This “reduced form” network does not have the fine-grained detail of the original network data, but permits visual identification of the central tendencies in the network. Figures 3 and 4 present the image diagrams for the “strong tie” networks in Chicago and LA. Consistent with the underlying data, the relationships in these diagrams are “asymmetric”—e.g., it is possible for a block to report a relationship with another block without that relationship being reciprocated.

To understand the brokerage or intermediary role different organizations might play in our two networks, we also assessed their network centrality. Social network theory has developed a family of centrality measures that capture different aspects of the centrality of actors. Among the three types of centrality identified by Freeman (1979)—degree, closeness, and betweenness—betweenness centrality is regarded as the best measure of the potential that an actor will have to play a brokerage role within a network.

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1 Density is the number of actual ties between a set of actors divided by the total number of possible ties between them.
2 See Borgatti and Everett (2006) for a discussion of how these centrality measures are related to one another.
Betweenness centrality measures the degree to which an actor lies on the shortest path between other actors in the network. To the extent that organizations must go through that organization to communicate with other organizations, betweenness identifies the likelihood that the intermediary organization will operate as a broker. This ability to serve as a broker is often assumed to be a source of power for the intermediary actor.

One of the limits of betweenness centrality as a measure of brokerage is that it only takes into account the “shortest path” between any two actors. In other words, an organization’s betweenness centrality score increases only to the extent that it is on the shortest path between other actors. But organizations may also mobilize more circuituous routes, particularly if they wish to avoid the influence of powerful gatekeepers. Therefore, we also analyzed the “information centrality” measure developed by Stephenson and Zelen (1989). This measure treats centrality as a function of the information available from all possible paths between actors—not just along the shortest path. Their measure, however, takes account of the increasing cost of obtaining information through more circuitous networks by treating information availability as proportional to the length of the network between any two actors.

Given our concern about whether new organizations are gaining access to the decisionmaking process, we also included a measure of the “power” of actors in the network. Bonacich (1987) has argued for the need to distinguish between centrality and power in social networks. The basic intuition is that power is a function of how a well-connected actor is connected to other well-connected actors. Actors may be more powerful if connected to actors who are themselves only weakly connected to other actors (and thus dependent upon that actor for connections). Or an actor may be more
powerful if connected to other well-connected actors. Bonacich’s power measure uses a parameter ($\beta$) to reflect whether power arises from relationships to weakly or well-connected actors. When $\beta$ is negative, power is a function of whether you are connected to weakly connected (and hence dependent) actors. When $\beta$ is positive, the power measure increases to the extent that you are connected to other well-connected people. Our interviews suggested that power in our networks was skewed toward a few well-connected actors, so we used both a neutral value ($\beta = 0$) as a baseline and a positive value ($\beta = .5$) to reflect the importance of being connected to other well-connected organizations.\(^3\)

While the block model analysis uses asymmetric data, we used symmetrical data (where all ties are assumed to be reciprocated) for our four power/centrality measures. Although it would be desirable to use asymmetrical data, the reason for using symmetrical data is technical: these measures are designed for symmetrical data (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). Tables 1 and 2 report the results for the four centrality and power measures. For ease of visual interpretation, we also indicate the actors with the five highest betweenness centrality and Bonacich power scores ($\beta = .5$) and the average Bonacich power score ($\beta = .5$) for each block in Figures 3 and 4. In both the block model and centrality analyses, groups that defined their mission as promoting regional sustainability occupied a central position in the Chicago and Los Angeles networks. As such, they served as network brokers, connecting a diverse array of functional organizations, including environmental groups, industry and economic development groups, organizations concerned with public transportation, and groups

\(^3\) As many have noted, a liability of Bonacich’s measure is that the value of $\beta$ is arbitrary and must be set by the analyst. We follow Hanneman and Riddle (2005) in reporting the absolute value of the Bonacich power measure.
whose central mission was social justice and community organizing. Indeed, without these regional sustainability groups, the ties among the different organizations in the network would have been much more attenuated.

Our four measures of centrality and power measures are broadly consistent with each other in that they identify roughly the same actors as central in the two networks (see the rank ordering of actors within and between blocks in Tables 1 and 2). Perhaps the most interesting contrasts arise from a comparison of betweenness centrality—the standard measure of brokerage potential—with the Bonacich power measure that relates power to connectedness to other well-connected actors. For example, the average betweenness centrality of the public transportation block (10.22) actually exceeds that of the regional sustainability block (9.48) and one of its organizations—Citizen Action Illinois—is the most central organization in the entire network. However, in terms of the Bonacich power measure, the regional sustainability block is ranked first (3.66) and the public transportation block last (1.05). Moreover, Citizen Action Illinois is only ranked 19th in terms of the Bonacich power measure. A similar kind of contrast is at work within blocks. For example, the Center for Neighborhood Technology is ranked number one within the regional sustainability block on the basis of betweenness centrality, but Metropolis 2020 is by far the top ranked organization using the Bonacich measure with rewards links to well-connected organizations. The substantive meaning of these contrasts is that citizens groups like Citizen Action Illinois and the Center for Neighborhood Technology are doing a good job of linking other weakly connected actors together, but they are less connected to other well-connected organizations. By contrast, in terms of connections to other well-connected actors, Chicago Metropolis 2020 really
stands out, as do two other organizations—the Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce and the Metropolitan Planning Council. These findings are consistent with our interviews, which found these organizations to be particularly important.

The contrast between power and betweenness centrality is not as great for the Los Angeles network. The regional sustainability block generally has the highest centrality/power. The exception is the information centrality measure, which ranks public transportation first. In terms of individual organizations, the Alameda Corridor Jobs Coalition is ranked first ranked on betweenness centrality and third in information centrality, but drops to 22nd place in terms of the Bonacich power measure that captures the importance of links to well connected actors. However, another similar organization, the Southern California Transportation and Land Use Coalition, retains its high rankings across all the different power and centrality measures. Nor does there does not seem to be an equivalent to Chicago Metropolis 2020 in Los Angeles. The California Futures Network does jump from 8th place in betweenness centrality to first place on the Bonacich power measure ($\beta = .5$), but our interviews indicate that it has nowhere near the influence of Chicago Metropolis 2020.

Our interpretation of these findings is that the value of being connected to well-connected others is probably not as important in Los Angeles as in Chicago. Moreover, our interviews suggest that the Los Angeles policy network is more fragmented than the Chicago network, perhaps undermining the value of connectedness to other well-connected organizations.

While we do not have data prior to the federal reforms that would directly show the impact of policy on the pattern of connection among these diverse groups, several
features of the most central groups in each region strongly indicate that federal reforms were key in facilitating new networks and spreading new ideas about transportation. The first is the age of these organizations: 68% of the regional sustainability organizations were founded after 1991, the year the first federal reform was enacted.

Second is how closely the stated objectives of these organizations correlate with those of the federal reform: the groups with the highest measures of network centrality uniformly included among their central goals objectives that coincided with the goals of federal transportation reforms, including promoting transportation alternatives, creating livable urban regions, empowering the public to determine how local governments spend their money, and promoting greater public awareness and participation. For example, the group with the second highest betweenness centrality in Chicago, the Center for Neighborhood Technology, describes its mission as “promoting environmentally sustainable economic development and to create tools to help the general public realize the benefits of those things and put them into effect” (Interview 6/28/05) The group with the highest Bonacich power score ($\beta = .5$) in Los Angeles, the California Futures Network, likewise stressed broad aims including “changing state policy so what we see on the landscape is different,” and “creating more location choices, more transportation choice, more open space protection, and a more equitable society” (Interview 8/18/03).

The developments in the Chicago and Los Angeles regions after 1991 thus fit well with theories about the influence of policy on politics: new groups emerged to participate in transportation, existing organizations entered the arena, brokers forged connections among them, and actively promoted new ways of thinking about the role of transportation in metropolitan development. But two very different kinds of networks formed: In
Chicago a more centralized network with powerful actors at its core emerged, whereas in Los Angeles, a more fragmented network with weak actors at its core took shape.

**Opening Up the MPO**

As the transportation networks took shape in each region, the groups at their center worked to make the regional MPO comply with the new provisions for participation. Faced with considerable resistance at first, they succeeded in making MPOs more responsive despite the reluctance of the federal government to assist them. Despite these successes, as they assessed their gains in 2003 and 2005 after more than a decade of pressure, a majority of network members in both regions observed that increased access to regional venues had not given them much power to influence transportation priorities.

Promoting broad public participation in MPO deliberations was an essential element of the federal reform’s effort to enhance the regional capacity. The main levers for enforcing the law’s objectives were certification reviews. Conducted every three years, the reviews required MPOs to demonstrate that they were in compliance with ISTEA’s planning and participation provisions, as well as its directives to conform to air quality standards and Title VI anti-discrimination provisions (McDowell 1999). The Department of Transportation was empowered to withhold funding from MPOs that failed to become certified for two years or more.

Despite these requirements, during the first decade after national policy reform, neither the Los Angeles nor the Chicago regions’ MPOs took serious steps to ensure public participation in transportation decision making. Instead, they structured participation so that it had the least impact on their bureaucratic routines. In both regions,
advocates struggled simply to get the planning agencies to hold meetings during times when the public could attend. And in both regions, advocates sought to use federal power – by challenging federal certification – as a way to enforce responsiveness. In neither case did the federal lever prove especially useful.

In Los Angeles, a subset of local groups drawn from the environmental justice and social justice blocks of the network formed a temporary alliance in 2001. Calling themselves the Los Angeles Transportation Equity Network (LATEN), they sought to expand the public voice in drawing up the regional plan. LATEN challenged the MPO for failing to engage the public, citing its practice of holding meetings in the middle of the day on a weekday. Their complaint briefly put the federal certification in jeopardy but the federal regulators were not willing to use their power to do more than put the agency on notice (Interview 3/14/03).

For the first decade after the passage of ISTEA, Chicago’s Center for Neighborhood Technology, the group ranked first in betweenness centrality, played a critical role in attempting to open the region’s MPO, the Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS), to public participation. Because the business organizations that became so central to the network after 1999 had not yet mobilized to participate in this domain, CNT’s main allies in this effort were community based organizations, including the Metropolitan Alliance of Congregations. As in Los Angeles, the advocates’ initial objectives were basic: getting the agency to hold meetings in the city, in a venue accessible to public transportation instead of the suburban office that could only be reached by car (Interview 6/28/05; (Rothman, Beckwith, and Stolz 1998). Allowing the public to testify was only the first step. Once CATS accepted broader participation, it

4 MAC was not included in the network analysis.
strictly followed the letter of the law, showing little substantive interest in public views. For example, in order to show that the public had been consulted, the agency produced a 15-pound compilation of public comments that had never been analyzed. As CNT’s transportation expert Jan Metzger noted, “they were weighing it, instead of saying what it meant.” CNT took up the challenge of analyzing the comments to produce a report about public priorities (Interview 6/28/06).

The CNT advocates made it their business to sit through all of the CATS meetings, take minutes and use their vigilance to hold the agency accountable. In addition to their efforts to hold the MPO accountable, the CNT created alternative venues for soliciting public views about transportation, running an extensive public involvement process on their own with a game called Transopoly, designed make the participation entertaining and to help people clarify their transportation priorities.

CNT also sought to make CATS more responsive by challenging its certification status in 1999. Charging that CATS had not complied with the environmental justice regulations, CNT sought to persuade the federal government to withhold certification until CATS had taken strong steps to incorporate environmental justice into its analyses. Although CATS received a conditional certification, federal authorities required only minimal changes to authorize certification (Interview 4/23/01).

Around the country, dissatisfaction with MPO responsiveness prompted the creation of a campaign that joined local community activists in a national Transportation Equity Network, organized by national advocacy and technical assistance organization, the Center for Community Change. In Los Angeles and Chicago, community-based organizations participated, urging their congressional representatives to support changes
in the federal law to make participation more meaningful (Rothman, Beckwith, and Stolz 1998). When ISTEA came up for reauthorization in 1998, this multi-level coalition not only successfully defended the participation requirements against opponents in the powerful highway lobby, they strengthened those provisions. The new law now required metropolitan and statewide planning agencies to consult with users of public transportation and it mandated that the public be involved in certification reviews of MPOs (Kruglik and Stolz 1999).

Under this combination of local and national political pressure, MPOs ultimately became more attentive to new voices. Even though federal regulators never actually decertified an MPO, a decade of pressure from local groups and clear signals in the new legislation made the MPOs more willing to solicit public input in the planning process. In Los Angles, the MPO (SCAG) launched a broad public visioning process that created a set of principles designed to guide future growth in the region (Interview 3/13/03). In Chicago, the Center for Neighborhood Technology felt that after a decade of dogging the MPO, they had earned the agency’s respect and were now viewed as a legitimate voice (Interview, 6/28/05).

Our interviews reflected this new sense that the Metropolitan Planning Organizations were now more willing to open their doors to the public. By 2003, advocates in both regions reported that they had succeeded in making the MPOs more receptive to public participation. Of the 65 interviews we conducted only 20 respondents claimed that the decision making arena remained unchanged. As they assessed the outcome of their participation, several respondents noted that transportation bureaucracies had become more responsive. Despite this increased bureaucratic
responsiveness, however, almost half the respondents expressed reservations about the impact of public participation. And when respondents evaluated the political environment for transportation decision making, they typically said that not much had changed (see Appendices 1 and 2).

One California advocate working for a transportation organization assessed the changes as follows: “The outlook for public involvement has improved in the last 10 years. A majority of agencies have interpreted the requirements as allowing 2 minute responses at public meetings. However, technology is changing that. It allows planners or agencies to use scenarios in public meetings that give real time responses for projecting how different options would play out in the future. It is engaging people in more interactive and meaningful ways.” When asked about the impact of ISTEA on public engagement, this advocate went on to grade the public involvement effort: “Changes in public involvement I would give a ‘B.’ There are some things I would give an “A,” but that’s a “B.” It’s a hard thing to do. A lot of agencies have been resistant, but that’s changing. ISTEA is as important for its mythology as its changes to the law” (Interview 9/3/03). Another transportation advocate noted that: “I have not seen a marked increase on legislator’s understanding” but went on to observe that “advocacy has gotten thicker. There are more people and more people from other fields.” The pattern of new group collaboration but little policy change was summed up by one activist: “Stakeholder groups can progress internally -- reaching agreement, making recommendations -- but there is no authority to implement them. Or we can get builders and environmentalists to agree, but elected officials still say no.” (Interview 6/23/03).
In the Chicago region, responses were similar. For example, one advocate responded that ISTEA was fundamental to her organization’s engagement in transportation: “it got us our foot in the door.” She went on to note that there had been generational change in the public transportation and planning agencies that made them more receptive to public participation. Even so, she noted that the potential of ISTEA had not been completely realized (Interview 6/28/05). A respondent from a business-sponsored organization stated that enhanced participation had promoted bureaucratic change: "mid-level agency staff people knew they have been doing it wrong. And they have been given some backbone to push their bosses” (Interview 6/27/05). When asked how decision making had changed, another respondent replied “I don't know if it's changed too much, maybe conversations are a lot more open. But as far as decision making, it is still City Hall making decisions relative to Chicago and is still the state/federal government making decisions on funding priorities. But we have more of a voice, but how it is realized is the same” (Interview 7/18/05). An advocate from a public health organization responded that ISTEA had changed transportation politics so that "people have the ability to participate and complain but they can't change old policies.” He went on to note that participation "slows the process down a little and allows the public to get irate and do something about it” (Interview 7/22/05).

These assessments underscore the limits of regional capacity even with substantial network mobilization and institutional reform. Increased institutional responsiveness in the region did not translate into significant changes in decision making. To understand why, we must look more closely at the way competing arenas of decision making shrank the scope of MPOs’ influence over transportation decisions.
Making Participation Matter: Participation and Institution-Building

Successful reforms not only promote new networks and enhance bureaucratic responsiveness; they must also displace competing venues of decision making, or at least, insulate their decisions from the impact of policies adopted in other venues. These tasks are especially challenging in the federal context where multiple decision making arenas operate according to different principles and where reform opponents can engage in venue shopping to achieve their objectives.

Although ISTEA laid the groundwork for more powerful MPOs, state and local governments continued to dominate transportation decision making since they controlled the preponderance of spending decisions. In California, the authority of subregional governments over transportation created significant obstacles to building regional power. In California, counties are key decision making venues because California’s policy of devolution guaranteed counties a minimum level of funding (Innes and Gruber 2001). Localities also make critical decisions about transportation because local sales tax measures are so important in California transportation funding (Giuliano 2004).

In the Chicago region, the problem was not the power of subregional governments but the refusal of the state government to devolve funds and responsibility to the region. Despite the clear intent of the federal legislation to give MPOs authority over a portion of the transportation funds, control remained firmly in the hands of the Illinois Department of Transportation and its allies in the road building industry. These forces resisted efforts to open up their tight circle of decision making. One reason they succeeded so well in holding onto power was the anomalous status of the Chicago Area Transportation Study
(CATS) the Chicago region's MPO. Set up in 1955, CATS was a pioneer in transportation modeling, but it operated as an arm of the Illinois Department of Transportation, not as an independent agency. Even after the federal transportation policy reforms in the 1990s, CATS remained under the direct control of the state Department of Transportation.

Faced with institutional competitors from above and below, the region cannot become an important venue for transportation policy-making unless regional actors can exercise power in these competing arenas to directly achieve their policy goals or to gain more autonomy for regional decision making. As a result, the reform network’s ability to exercise vertical power is a critical component in carving out the space for regional governance. A coherent horizontal network may contribute to building vertical power—but whether it does so depends on the nature of the horizontal ties. Below we compare the horizontal and vertical ties of the Los Angeles and Chicago networks. The activities and development of the Los Angeles network show that broad horizontal ties but no access to vertical power provides a weak foundation for building regional capacity. Chicago’s experience demonstrates the possibility of using vertical power to promote institutional reform that enhances possibilities for regional governance.

The striking feature of the Los Angeles network was its disconnection from the levers of power. The regional sustainability block at the center of the Los Angeles network focused its efforts on regional agenda-setting and dialogue. Groups, such as the California Futures Network (CFN) and the Southern California Transportation and Land Use Coalition (SCTLUC)5 – the two top scoring organizations in the Bonacich power

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5 Since our interviews, the Southern California Transportation and Land Use Coalition has changed its name to the Transportation and Land Use Collaborative of Southern California, changed offices, and
measure -- defined their missions as promoting regional networking and spurring possible new collaborations. Given their aim of encouraging diverse interests to rethink their priorities regarding transportation, these organizations were more disposed to bringing together stakeholders or engaging in community education rather than entering into political arenas. When asked to name the top three issues on which they worked, interviewees in Los Angeles groups were much more likely than those in Chicago to frame their issues in terms of complex regional sustainability, including smart growth, infrastructure improvements, and transit-oriented development. These frames connected transportation to big questions about how the region is built and how transportation connects to regional lifestyles.

This combination of vision and political caution is reflected in the remarks of several of the most central groups. For example, a representative from the Southern California Transportation and Land Use Coalition described the organization’s strategy as “a process of showing people the possibilities and then teaching them how to do it” (Interview 03/13/03). These groups hoped to expand the way the region thought of transportation. The Los Angeles County Bicycle Coalition explained, “We are trying to put bicycling in a bigger context so people can relate even if they do not ride a bike. We try to take a partnership approach. We try not to burn bridges (interview 06/20/03).”

The groups at the core of the Los Angeles network were further limited by unreliable funding, small staffs, and little connection to political power. Most of these organizations owed their existence to an infusion of foundation funds, reflecting the interest in building regional capacity in the 1990s. When these funds dried up as

changed leadership. While the similarities between the two names reflect a likely continuity of purpose with the organization, we use the older name in this paper to accurately the moment in the organization’s history when we interviewed organizational representatives.
foundation priorities shifted, the core block in the Los Angeles network all but disappeared. Of the four most connected groups in that block (California Futures Network, Los Angeles County Bicycle Coalition, the Southern California Transportation and Land Use Coalition, and Surface Transportation Policy Project), one no longer exists, one has been transformed into a new group with a new name, and one has closed its Los Angeles office. With such precarious groups at the center of the network, the fate of the new visions for transportation that the network brought into public debate stood little chance of being implemented.

Especially telling was the disconnection from the network of key social interests with financial resources and political influence. The block model analysis of strong ties in Los Angeles (reflecting replies to the question “who do you work closely with?”) shows that the regional sustainability block operated as a distinctive group that had not been factionalized into its separate components (See Figure 4). This cohesiveness reflected a potential to generate a broad regional agenda that cut across issues. However, the business block’s connection to the network was weaker than that of any other group, leaving the regional sustainability block without the resources and influence typically associated with urban business leaders.

The Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce did bring groups together to push for renewed transportation funding in 2002, but building regional governance capacity was not part of its agenda. Instead, the Chamber used its vertical power to lobby for state and federal transportation funds for Los Angeles County, only a part of the region (Interview 3/14/03). This limited business agenda reflected the atrophy of the once powerful City of Los Angeles business community. Indeed, in the Los Angeles region,
the most notable business voice is represented by the dispersed pro-development groups most likely to oppose strengthening regional capacity and inviting new voices in (Gottlieb et al. 2005; Adler 1987). Likewise, organized labor, which has more recently built substantial power in Los Angeles city and county politics, was only loosely connected to this network. Labor’s main link was through its support for advocacy groups, such as the Bus Riders Union, which was itself only weakly tied to the network’s core regional sustainability group.

As a consequence, the Los Angeles network was able to promote innovative ideas about regional transportation but it could do little to increase regional authority in transportation decisions. As a representative from California Futures Network, a nonprofit dedicated to enacting state policy that enhance transportation choice and equity, put it, “Social equity groups are inspiring, but in political reality, groups need to have money or voters. The Building Industry Association has money. Labor has voters. CFN has moral righteousness on their side. That is the weakest kind of leverage... We hope that by having a broad enough coalition, we can overwhelm better financed and better organized groups (Interview 8/18/03).”

The potential for vertical power at the core of the Chicago network presents a sharp contrast to the Los Angeles case. At the heart of the Chicago network are organizations tied to the city’s powerful business community, which enjoys close connections to Chicago’s mayor. Business groups did not always occupy such a central

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6 The Innes and Rongerude study of Collaborative Regional Initiatives in California found that while these foundation-funded network-based regional collaborative organizations were successful in terms of creating research, education, and dialogue, they were consistently unable to effect political change (Innes and Rongerude 2005). The Los Angeles network suffered a similar fate.
position in the transportation network, but with the creation of Chicago Metropolis 2020 in 1999, the business community signaled its interest in promoting regional perspectives. As Figure 3 shows, the groups in the core regional sustainability block that hold the network together include business-linked organizations such as Chicago Metropolis 2020 and long standing elite civic organizations such as the Metropolitan Planning Council. This core block also includes an important new political actor, the Metropolitan Mayor’s Caucus. Formed in 1997 at the instigation of Chicago mayor Richard M. Daley, the organization seeks to find common ground among local governments throughout the entire Chicago region. Although the caucus has little power to act on its own, it can provide a forum for brokering compromises among the 272 local governments in the region that belong to the group.

In addition to the presence of these powerful groups in the core block, the network analysis shows that other business and economic development organizations are strongly connected to the core regional sustainability block. The engagement of these powerful political actors enhances the possibilities for using vertical power to promote institutional reforms that support regional capacity.

The entry of the Chicago business community into the politics of transportation planning in the late 1990s created new possibilities for building regional capacity to govern transportation. Chicago’s unusually organized and active business sector is a significant political resource missing in many regions. In the early 1990s, Chicago’s business leaders had played a central role in passing a massive state bond issue to fund infrastructure. A decade later, they turned their attention to the institutional issues involved in transportation planning. By some accounts, business became engaged in
reform because it feared that the region’s disunity – especially competition for funding among different agencies -- was undermining its ability to get funds from Washington (Interview 5/3/06).

In Chicago, in contrast to Los Angeles, this concern led business-linked groups -- most centrally Chicago Metropolis 2020 and the aligned Business Leaders for Transportation -- to join likeminded elite civic organizations, such as the Metropolitan Planning Council, in a campaign to strengthen the regional MPO. Concern about the weakness of planning capabilities was a key element in the cornerstone 1999 report of Chicago Metropolis 2020, “Preparing Metropolitan Chicago for the 21st Century” (Johnson 1999 48-50). In 2004, with Democrats controlling all branches of state government for the first time in 26 years, proponents believed that the political setting was favorable for an effort to enhance regional institutional capacity.

The state legislature quickly approved the creation of a task force to study transportation in northeast Illinois chaired by the powerful Democratic Congressman Bill Lipinski, whose district straddled the city and its immediate suburbs. The task force’s initial proposals envisioned a major reorganization including a regional super agency that merged the region’s transit providers, its two planning agencies and the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority (widely seen as part of a suburban Republican patronage machine). This strategy of consolidating planning functions, combining planning and operational capacities, and uniting city and suburban agencies under a single central authority provoked swift and sharp opposition. The task force quickly retreated to a still-controversial set of recommendations that combined the bus and rail suburban transit
agencies into a single agency and merged transportation planning and land use forecasting responsibilities into a single organization.

Supporters hoped that by combining planning and operational capacities and consolidating planning functions, they would create the institutional preconditions for greater regional capacity. A single stronger regional MPO could also more easily assert its independence from the state Department of Transportation. As such, it would provide an arena for devising and promoting regional Chicago’s vision, not the interests of highway builders and developers in the state capitol. Yet, the very concept of a regional vision aroused intraregional suspicions that ultimately blocked significant institutional reform. Suburban mayors charged that the proposal was a power grab orchestrated by the city of Chicago. As one Republican legislator remarked, "This would put the power with the city of Chicago. We have to stand up. This would shift who gets their hands on the money and where it goes" (Lord 2004).

The legislation that finally passed in 2006 after a year of maneuvering simply merged the two regional planning organizations into a single agency, Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP). The new agency combined land-use and planning functions but had no operational authority (Shoffner 2004; Biemer 2004).

The Chicago’s business community’s power and initiative in state politics was key to getting the issue of regional capacity onto the state legislative agenda. But business leaders did not have sufficient power to build a majority coalition in the state legislature to support their more far reaching vision for regional institutional reform. The legislation that passed strongly reflected the influence of the Metropolitan Mayors Caucus, which facilitated the final negotiations of the bill, including representation on the
new regional planning agency. The Mayors Caucus ensured that locally-elected officials had strong influence in the new body while Chicago Mayor Daley used his five appointees to assure business and nonprofit representation on the CMAP board.

The power at the core of the Chicago network and its ability to exercise influence in higher-level political arenas produced an institutional reform long sought by regionally-oriented reformers in the Chicago area. The specific organizational reform that passed is, as one commentator observed, "a declawed version" of what the business community originally wanted (Mammoser 2006). But in a policy area traditionally dominated by the state and long characterized by sharp divisions between city and suburban interests, the reform succeeded in establishing an institutional focal point for regional planning. As such, it created new possibilities for more effective participation and for building a virtuous circle between participation and institution-building. Advocates for strengthening regional transportation policymaking will still need to rely on power at the state level to secure resources for transportation and to press for ongoing development of regional institutions. The recent reform represents a first step toward a more cohesive region that advance its interests in higher political arenas.

Federal transportation reforms were thus driven by quite different core groups in Los Angeles and in Chicago. The greater openness of politics in the Los Angeles region, which might be expected to facilitate policy innovation, did indeed foster discussion of a fresh set of ideas about how transportation should connect to metropolitan development. But the groups that emerged to promote regional capacity had little vertical power to carve out a domain in which regional institutions could exercise influence. In the Chicago region, Chicago’s powerful business community saw a strengthened MPO as a tool for
realizing its vision of building regional competitiveness for the twenty-first century. In
Chicago, the local group ecology and cross-level political dynamics produced a more
promising start in which participation and institutional reform may launch a virtuous
cycle that builds regional governance capacities.

**Conclusion**

The reformers who initiated ISTEA hoped that the changes they made in federal
policy would help create a very different kind of transportation politics by strengthening
regional capacity and requiring broader participation. In once sense they succeeded: new
groups with previously unrepresented perspectives emerged to participate in
transportation decision making. These groups joined with existing organizations to create
new networks designed to share information and promote collaboration. Exercising
power over decision making, however, proved far more elusive. Although the aspirations
of federal reform were far-reaching, the laws themselves were too weak to provide local
actors with the tools to override decisions in competing arenas. State and local decision-
makers proved difficult to dislodge as traditional real estate, homebuilding and
construction interests resisted encroachment from the new regional arena.

In this context, horizontal collaboration by itself can do little more than promote
new ideas and hope for the best. Horizontal collaboration in regions may help build
consensus and alliances that can work in more powerful state and federal venues to
promote regional capacity, as in Chicago. Whether such efforts are successful depends
not only on the horizontal consensus building process but, more critically, on the power
relationships – alliances, coalitions, enemies -- that prevail in these alternative venues.


FIGURE 1:

Start Dates for Organizations and Their Transportation Work (Los Angeles)
FIGURE 2: Start Dates for Organizations and Their Transportation Work

(Chicago)
Table 1: Chicago Centrality and Power Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<th>Bonacich Power ( \beta = .5 )</th>
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* Rank orders indicated in parentheses.
APPENDIX 1: CHICAGO RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ABOUT CHANGES IN THE DECISION-MAKING ARENA SINCE YOUR GROUP BEGAN WORKING ON TRANSPORTATION

Things Have Improved

- A lot more people are involved in it. The political competition between agencies caused political problems -- it caused the business community to weigh in -- the CTA and Metra were going to Washington and competing in 2002 and 2003.
- There has been a move in this region towards greater transparency in decision making. I would say for procedures in the recent revision, the CATS process has been much more open in this one than in others. There are more players in transportation now than before. General public awareness is increasing that more people understand the impact that transportation can have on their lives. Historically in the Chicago region there has been more openness to risk taking that more cutting edge organizations can take the credit for. They are more open, more transparent, and a little less risk averse than in the past.
- There has been a leadership change at the RTA and opportunities for more community partnerships with regard to legislation and the need for allies.
- As it pertains to O’Hare there was unprecedented cooperation between Daly and Ryan that led to a regional agreement on aviation transportation. Which (this cooperation) fell apart after the mayor closed Migs Field. We are still working on a regional streamline decision-making process. On the flip side, mass transit decision-making has become more contentious with Metra and CTA competing for limiting funds and RTA not being able to solve these disturbances.
- It’s gotten better recently. Metropolis 2020 really carried things. I shouldn’t say it got better: the framework to make it better has been laid; we’re going to merge NIPC and CATS into one organization and hopefully that will streamline the process and help the local municipalities to coordinate their planning. There’s been an acknowledgement in recognizing the regional nature of the transportation network. Dupage works better with Cook County. There is greater integration. Land use and building planning, that has gotten better.
- Personalities are the driving force in bureaucracies. The generation of white guys who were unquestioned have been replaced by a new group of decision makers. There’s been generational change. Additionally, CNT has earned the respect of their opposition.
- Ideas that we and our allies have pushed, have spread.
- In Chicago and in some other areas in the State, transportation accessibility has had a higher profile since we’ve been focusing more attention on it…And I think that has raised the level of awareness in a variety of ways about a lot of our issues.
- There have been tremendous changes - environmental organizations are more sophisticated. Presently, getting decisions made is not about fighting. Environmental organizations work with agencies on meeting mutual agreements.
- They have done some things. There have been changes. The agencies have changed their leadership. Still it goes back to that political thing between the city
and the suburbs. I am hoping that new RTA chairman will be able to make this [project] happen. I also know federal funding is just a part of it. The City and State have to come up with matching funds. The RTA has to approve the bonds. They were aware of the project and certainly when the recommendations came through about which projects should be funded. Even with that knowledge they wanted to do their own projects.

- William Lipinski was fired. Before Lipinski was federal advocate for transportation, had a lot of power as a democrat. Now his son is taking on this toll, but no one has worked like him in Congressional delegation. Before, if you needed to affect funding, you would go to this guy. Second reason is that CTA Board is a lot more transparent.

- I think the CTA is listening more to the community organizations around the Douglas Blue Line than it was in 1997. Oh, we’ll just cut it and see what happens, there’s not real political power there, there’s no big voting base, so let’s cut it. We could never cut this in Lake View or Evanston but we could cut it there. They’ve learned that isn’t true. We’ve had more opportunity for community input into CTA decision-making even if the CTA won’t admit it.

- Become much more of a state-wide issue, CTA was very comfortable with just dealing with Chicago. But when RTA got in, then CTA had to make changes in order to get their money. Now it’s more statewide.

- Within agencies, mid-level staff people know they have been doing things wrong and are looking for change.

- I think the transportation planning process is more transparent today than it was 2 transportation bills ago. ISTEA and T21 have both been pieces of legislation that have opened the process up to more actors and gotten people more involved. I think organizations like CATS have involved a lot of these people and organizations in their processes where they weren’t before. I think it’s a more transparent process, at least in the Chicago region.

- The CATS and NIPC merger has created more of a focus on transportation also leading in planning as opposed to placing these concerns on the periphery. This made evident by the creation of the committee on transportation.

- There is a growing degree of involvement of government on city and state level. From mid to late 1990’s, officials are getting educated, and there has been a major quantum leap of getting alderman and elected officials in convincing how important public transportation is. They are more open to their constituents, who will turn to their residents of their districts, and more reception has been a huge mobilization of citizens, business groups, etc.

- I think that leaders are finally waking up to the fact that they have made a huge mistake in spending millions and millions of dollars on airports and highways and very little money on public transportation.

- There is more of an awareness of including public opinion, especially with regard to the planning agency. CATS is more attentive to public opinion and in the past; the CTA as well, perhaps.

- There has been an emergence of a regional sensibility. It really is taking hold in a variety of ways. So there really is a sense that there is one economy. It’s been a phenomenon of recent years that there is a sense of common future (as opposed to
city democrats versus republicans or big city versus small suburbs), but there still is the politics.

**Few or No Changes**

- Process for funding greater consciousness in decision makers mind that they do have to deal with conflict. Having to go through conformity (that has been institutionalized in the process. It is questionable whether it has really changed. But things have not really changed much with transportation inertia.
- I don’t know if it’s changed too much, maybe conversations are a lot more open. But as far as decision making, it is still city hall making decisions relative to Chicago and it is still the State/federal government making decisions on funding and priorities. But we have more of a voice, but how it is realized is the same.
- No, it has been a very similar process, although knowing the process is difficult to learn.
- The approach is top-down still, and there is very seldom thoughtful planning. There are causes of hope, larger communities of people, more than before.
- It has not changed in the slightest.
- Thinking about it from a framework perspective I don’t really think it has. We have had victories on certain points of substance, but I don’t think the overall policy making process has seen any structural changes.
- The only change I can think of is that Julie Hamos was telling us that the state legislature hadn’t really looked at the budget of CTA in I don’t know how many years. Their commitment to monitoring it a little more is the one thing I can think of off the top of my head. I don’t know if there have been any changes in terms of CTA’s decision making. What we did see was when they published the five different options of what they would do if they didn’t get the funding, either cut service or increase fares, all of them claimed to have had looked at the whole neighborhood and guaranteed that there wasn’t going to be any disproportionate cutting in communities of color or people of color, so at least they are claiming to have improved that aspect, which I’m not sure they analyzed before.
- I don’t know if it has. There is more community voice into the situation, but we don’t know if that has impacted the decision making process in any way.
- Players have changed, the issues haven’t. Also, in the mid 70’s we got the RTA was set up with new boundaries, but they kept CTA around which resulted in city versus suburb transportation conflict. They didn’t think far too beyond transit; which did not consider Metra issues.
- State of Illinois entering in has heightened levels of ability. CTA did an effective job to make it a crisis…. But this has not changed who makes decisions on this level…
- I don’t think it has changed. Frank Kruze and Carol Brown and the CTA are just as protected as they always were and they are wanting to protect the Mayor as much as always. We had a campaign in past to get the City of Chicago to up their contributions to $50M, which is what our new campaign is about, and they
couldn’t get Kruesi to agree. They are all protecting each other. It’s hard to get through to anything.

**Things Have Become More Difficult**

- It has become more difficult because the state is dominated by 1 party. When one party has all the power it is harder to get a situation addressed.
- In the last 10 or 15 years that time to get projects implemented is a little longer. It takes so long to implement projects now so the cost escalates. That makes it difficult to plan.
- More people are involved with less consensus being built. All planning has become more project specific rather than system specific. Long term plans include many projects but no prioritization as to timeline, when some projects should be done as opposed to others. The state hasn’t had a major infrastructure/road program since Illinois First, which is now completed. The federal government seems to be project specific but no tied to plan for the region → seems to be great appetite for new programs over rehabilitation and maintenance of existing system (less political support).

**APPENDIX 2 : LOS ANGELES RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ABOUT CHANGES IN THE DECISION-MAKING ARENA SINCE YOUR GROUP BEGAN WORKING ON TRANSPORTATION**

**Things Have Improved**

- With the gold line, the construction authority wrestled it away from MTA. Transit oriented development is very popular. Using existing right of ways, People looking “out of box.”
- There is a new spirit or different spirit of not buckling upon the first incidence of “public outrage” but instead trying to evaluate a project on the merit of the total community benefit – not just on one group of protesters. We have bolstered the public agencies on that. It’s the right thing.
- I don’t know how to answer this, Transit agencies do. Are there new players? By this coalition being housed in the Chamber, it is bringing a whole new group to transportation issues. That is why it has a different approach and why people are excited. Is this coalition something new? We did have a coalition out of the Chamber in the 1980s around the Red Line.
- Transportation decision-making occurs in 2 or 3 areas: (1) Discrete projects; and (2) Larger regional planning-level discussions (increasing mobility in a corridor is a high level discussion. Not much is happening in those areas). Discrete projects are harder because they are more engineering oriented and the outreach is done in an old-fashioned way. Since I have been at OCBC, with the 91 freeway project, we have had lots of input. We recognize that this is a long term process and civic engagement is crucial.
- The Corridor Project is talking about local hiring. It was not an issue until TEN was working on it. Success on that project has changed the thought process of
people – how can project this benefit the community through employment. It is an example project.

- We have been able to shift the debate around transportation and transportation equity (such as the claim that light rail is better for the environment). Now it is a key issue. Diesel buses were a huge victory. That was political education work. We had to make it a do or die issue. The choice is between our lives and diesel. We have helped to shift the focus.

- The BRU has really made a difference. They have been a prominent voice on issues. People know and respond to them. They play a role in LA that is unique and different from other cities.

- Regional decision makers are more aware of the need to incorporate low income people in their decisions. Also, LA County and the city has seen the value of improved bus service to decreasing automobile dependency, particularly through the introduction of the Rapid bus.

- Agency staff are getting EJ. Caltrans now has an EJ document. They are learning that transportation cannot happen in a vacuum. (Norman Deng at Caltrans – EJ desk Guide 2003)

- Over the last few years, more people get it. Caltrans is putting out lots of money for community building transportation planning grants and environmental justice grants. They know that they need to think more holistically. They decisions at the agencies have begun to shift. The elected officials are still stuck. It is figuring out how to influence them that’s the challenge.

- We have more say now on freeway projects. There is more public input on projects through public hearings. There are also more non-engineers within the planning department.

- You’ll have to ask the people in our transportation group. People are becoming aware that the problem is getting worse. People are becoming more willing to consider alternatives.

- Interactive planning approach (SANDAG, SCAG, ABAG/MTC, SACOG). Not yet integrated with investment strategies, still boutiqued for TOD, etc; 2) Begun to understand the importance of the public will and of an engaged and informed public beyond the usual public interest groups. Stakeholders are part of the community of interest and larger interest parties are necessary for profound change. For example, the Livability Footprint process (in the Bay Area) and growth visioning projects (Compass, etc). People are beginning to understand that the public involvement matters. This has made it easier for those supporting it to do good and harder for others to stop it. Of course, public participation is no substitute for good decision-making by conventional electeds.

- MTA staff has made greater strides in getting community development by holding multiple workshops for the RTP or the LRTP. They try to have it at their headquarters, they giver people food and drinks, they pay for parking, they hold meetings both during the day and at night.

- I like to think that the legislation we have been advocating (there was one last session – SB806) laid a good framework on creating incentives and removing disincentives for smart growth. We are now trying to put more teeth into it.
• It has helped to create more openness from MPOs and COGs (RTP bodies) to look at issues related to land use. This region is telling. I worked at SacOG in the early 1990s. You could not say “land use” then. In the last two years, the timing has been right (they have a new director). They are now doing their Blueprint project studying growth patterns in the region. They are doing local workshops where they use modeling as a way to look at different alternatives.

• Now there is a lot more public support, more public awareness. Transportation especially in LA has been a more well thought-out process. Ten years ago no one thought they could change anything.

• We have a different role. We have a seat at the table now and we’ve gotten even more respect as our support has grown.

• In the last 10 years there have been some changes. Senate Bill 45 encouraged a shift to a regional focus from the state level. Term limits have had a huge impact. You no longer have the “transportation champions.” It’s harder to educate elected officials on transportation issues, so there’s been a shift from working directly with officials to working with lobbyists and their staff. Finally, at the level of the federal government, there is more money for rail rather than buses.

• There is a great understanding about the problems, needs, and solutions that affect bicyclists. The Bike Coalition has made great strides, but we still have miles to go. The needs of bicyclists are no longer ignored, but now we know better how to increase the understanding of how to do multimodal transportation in Los Angeles than seven years ago. And about connecting transportation to land use.

• Increased awareness of pedestrian safety—through the media, through MTA and SCAG, and through the efforts of local cities such as Santa Monica and Glendale. Increased funding for non-motor transportation

• I have not seen a marked increase on legislators’ understanding. Advocacy has gotten thicker. There are more people and more people from other fields.

• It is no longer seen as being an arcane, unimportant thing. People now see that it is an economic thing. For example, the Alameda Corridor Project highlighted the need for mobility. (It took 20 years to do it because it took 20 years to pull together the coalition). One of our problems is that every city wants something because they think that they will have to pay for it.

• We have seen a shift away from the MTA. Before it was all about building systems and not thinking about land use. MTA has a new director and LA has a new mayor. They are now trying to get SCAG to link land use with their transportation modeling. With incremental projects, they are beginning to do it on their own with prodding.

• I have not been at this long enough, so I can’t say personally. I have only heard stories. I do think that it has changed. There is more openness to going beyond cars versus transit. The transportation enhancements program has become very popular. Regional planning agencies are in a better position. Environmental justice seems like the issue that has put equity on transportation planners’ radar screens. That also is due to the Clinton administration’s work on the issue and the executive order. The outlook for public involvement has improved in the last 10 years. A majority of agencies have interpreted the requirements as allowing 2 minute responses at public meetings. However, technology is changing that. It
allows planners or agencies to use scenarios in public meetings that give real time responses for projecting how different options would play out in the future. It is engaging people in more interactive and meaningful ways. We have been able to take control of policy ourselves and push for changes ourselves once we know how local politics works

- I do think it has changed. There used to be a single issue focus. Now there is a broadening of focus on transportation planners and decision-makers to consider smart growth, to take a more balanced approach to transportation policy. There are enhancements they are keeping as part of the overall mix.

Things Have Become More Difficult

- It has gotten worse. There is more work to be done and not enough public transportation is worsening air quality. And there has not been much change in our ability to have an input.
- With the budget crunch, our policy issues have taken a back seat. There is no money for incentives. Lots of community groups are waking up to the opportunities at the same time the funding is drying up.

Few or No Changes

- I can’t say. It has not changed since I have been working on this. I am not always focused on transportation.
- It hasn’t.
- Can’t say.
- I don’t have a perspective on this.
- Not at all – except Danny Zane and his strategy with the airport.
- Don’t know.
- I don’t know that it has. The city and transportation agencies are using the same methods that they did before.
- It has not really changed.
- It has not. We have done a bad job communicating the size of the problem and the benefits of transportation.
- I don’t think it has changed much. The agency comes up with a plan, and only then propose it to the community. There is no serious or meaningful participation of the community. And there is also little recognition of the need for intermodal solutions.
- None. The real power is in the Riverside County Transportation Commission – groups of elected officials that make these decisions (Caltrans, etc). All of their groups are net responses to parochial interests. These is no regional accountability. There is no land use authority outside their area. There is no regional accountability – they run for office on a different scale. Stakeholder groups can make progress internally – reaching agreement, making recommendations – but there is no authority to implement them. Or we can get builders and environmentalists to agree, but elected officials still say no.
Table 2: Los Angeles Centrality and Power Scores

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*absolute values reported

**rank orders indicated in parentheses
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