Brunhart, Andreas

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Evaluating the effect of "Zumwinkel-Affair" and financial crisis on stock prices in Liechtenstein: An unconventional augmented GARCH-approach

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Evaluating the Effect of “Zumwinkel-Affair” and Financial Crisis on Stock Prices in Liechtenstein: An “Unconventional” Augmented GARCH-Approach

Andreas Brunhart

Preliminary Version
(Last Update: June 2011)
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Evaluating the Effect of “Zumwinkel-Affair” and Financial Crisis on Stock Prices in Liechtenstein: An “Unconventional” Augmented GARCH-Approach

Andreas Brunhart∗

Preliminary Version#  
(Last Update: June 2011)

Abstract

Liechtenstein’s economy has been heavily affected by the international economic downturn during the financial crisis. Additionally to the deep world recession, Liechtenstein’s financial sector was challenged by the “Zumwinkel-Affair” (data of thousands of tax evaders were sold to several international tax authorities by a whistleblower). This paper investigates the impact of this affair, separated from the financial crisis, on the daily stock prices of two banks from Liechtenstein: “Verwaltungs- und Privatbank” (VPB) and “Liechtensteinische Landesbank” (LLB). The econometric analysis involves an “unconventional” augmented GARCH-model to analyse the dynamical pattern and other influences on the risk measured by the conditional variance of the stock returns. To evaluate the impact of financial crisis and Zumwinkel-Affair on risk, additional explaining variables have been incorporated into the (therefore augmented) variance equation. As an additional (yet unconventional) feature the lagged squared residuals have been dropped from the GARCH-specification and replaced by squared lagged observed variables such as past stock returns and past stock market performance (this replacement appears to be the superior specification here). Besides other findings, it is shown that both the financial crisis and the Zumwinkel-Affair have a significant (accumulating) effect on risk/volatility of both stocks, but the impact on the volatility of VPB’s stock returns is considerably higher compared to LLB’s stocks.

Keywords: Financial Crisis; Tax Affair; Liechtenstein; Financial Institutions; Stock Prices; Stock Price Volatility; Augmented GARCH-models; Augmented Conditional Variance Equation

JEL-Classification: C01; C22; C32; G01; G21

∗ Andreas Brunhart, Liechtenstein Economic Institute (Konjunkturforschungsstelle Liechtenstein, KOFL), University of Liechtenstein (Vaduz), E-Mail: andreas.brunhart@kofl.li.
# This research paper is not part of funded KOFL-research but originated from an empirical project by the author, which was the starting point for the writing of this working paper. Most of the results of this contribution have already been presented on January 18th (2011) at the University of Vienna (Department of Economics) as part of the doctoral course “Nonlinear Time Series Analysis” hosted by Prof. Robert Kunst. As holds for all working papers: Comments regarding this paper are very welcome!
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1. Introduction

On February 14th (2008), German authorities arrested Klaus Zumwinkel, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of Deutsche Post, in a very spectacular way at his home and in front of several TV-cameras: He was accused of tax evasion and resigned from office just a few days afterwards. Zumwinkel was convicted by the beginning of 2009. Along with 600 other German tax evaders, Zumwinkel’s tax fraud was unveiled by data provided by a whistleblower named Heinrich Kieber, a Liechtenstein citizen, who was a former employee of the LGT Bank. He sold the data to the German Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst BND) for an estimated 5 Million Euros and also distributed the data to 13 other countries. Even though the identity of the whistleblower was unveiled very soon, he could not be arrested yet and his domicile remains unknown despite the issue of an international arrest warrant in March 2008 by Liechtenstein’s national police department.

This affair, named “Zumwinkel-Affair” or “Liechtenstein Tax-Affair” (or “German Tax Affair”) by the press, led to strong pressure on countries that were often called “tax-havens” especially Liechtenstein (but as an indirect consequence later also on Luxemburg, Switzerland, Monaco and even Austria). The timing of the arranged arrest of Zumwinkel was presumably not a coincidence, but most likely in line with the visit of Liechtenstein’s Prime Minister Otmar Hasler to Berlin, which was only one week later. The dramatic arrest of Zumwinkel ensured that the topic dominated the media for weeks (not only in Germany and Liechtenstein), while harsh statements by several politicians and political pressure by Germany played an important role ensuring that the issue of tax information exchange remained on the diplomatic agenda of both countries (and it still does).

Both international pressure and political debates within Liechtenstein, which had already been started before the data sale emerged, resulted up to now in 25 tax information exchange agreements within the last three years and these new agreements (among other things) led to a still ongoing transformation process affecting all actors within the financial sector of

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1 The “Liechtenstein Global Trust” (LGT) was founded in 1920. It is owned by the princely family of Liechtenstein (“von und zu Liechtenstein”). LGT has 1’985 employees (2010) worldwide. The “Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG” (LLB) is the oldest bank in Liechtenstein (founded in 1861) and employs 1’068 people (2010). The state of Liechtenstein is in hold of the majority of LLB’s shares. The “Verwaltungs- und Privatbank AG” (VPB) was founded in 1956, is privately owned and has 766 employees (2010).

2 A good current example is the negotiations between Deutsche Bank and LGT about the sale of the BHF-Bank (which belongs to Deutsche Bank). The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) subsequently delayed and as a consequence blocked the negotiations between the two banks. Therefore, the sale did not take place: An event which can be seen as being a direct consequence of the Zumwinkel-Affair (see FINANCIAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND [2011]) and reflects possible retentions towards banks from Liechtenstein.
Liechtenstein\(^3\). Combined with the already bad economic aftermath of the financial crisis, the affair was a strong challenge especially for the financial sector but also for the whole economy of Liechtenstein. The financial sector’s challenge is still supplemented by the effort to pursue the now ongoing transformation process\(^4\).

The present paper\(^5\) puts emphasis on the impact of the Zumwinkel-Affair which arose from the data theft, and which was followed by political pressure, irritated investors and was accompanied by a transformation process within Liechtenstein (and its recent tax information exchange agreements)\(^6\). It is very important to clarify that the aim of this paper is not to judge which the main driving force behind the consequences of the data theft was: The international pressure on Liechtenstein, the insecurity of investors, the capital outflows, or the tax information exchange agreements (and the causal relations between these factors). The emphasis is entirely on the empirical investigation whether the data theft had an impact on the stock price risk/performace and not what the driving forces behind this impact were, not to mention the question if any of these negative consequences were avoidable at all (or even reversible). This question, which one the main impact was, might be easier to answer in a few years, maybe also leading to the conclusion that some factors, while with a negative impact in the short-run, might exhibit a positive effect in the long-run on the banks’ performance and the stock prices (factors such as the transformation process or the tax information exchange agreements).

\(^3\) Even though Liechtenstein’s industry sector has a very high share of the national Gross Value Added (2008: 36%) and of total employment (2008: 46%) - both are considerably higher than in its surrounding countries such as Switzerland, Germany or Austria (where industrial employment usually is around 25%) - it is internationally mostly recognized for its financial sector. The financial sector in turn also has a comparable high share of the national Gross Value Added (2008: 33%) and of total employment (2008: 16%). The total national value added measured by the GDP was 5’495 million Swiss Francs (in 2008). The total employment in Liechtenstein was 33’265 (2008). For further detailed statistics see OFFICE OF STATISTICS [2010].

\(^4\) Also the industrial export sector was strongly affected by the world recession, which combined with bad performance within the financial sector led to Liechtenstein’s highest real annual GDP-decrease (2008: -2,9%, 2009: -6,1%) since the first oil crisis in the mid-70s. These findings rely on estimates of the Konjunkturforschungsstelle Liechtenstein (2009-2010, see SCHLAG [2011]), National Accounts (1998-2008, see OFFICE OF STATISTICS [2010]) and estimated figures by the author (1972-1997, these figures can be obtained by request). Following the estimations of the Konjunkturforschungsstelle Liechtenstein (KOFL), the year 2010 was the economic turning point featuring positive real GDP-growth (+2,3%).

\(^5\) I would like to thank Prof. Robert Kunst (University of Vienna) for insightful comments contributing to the development of the chosen GARCH-approach and his feedback after having read this paper. I also want to thank Angelika Stöckel and Hendrik Breitenstein from VP Bank for kindly and promptly providing me all the relevant time series. An additional gratitude goes to Prof. Dr. Carsten Schlag (University of Liechtenstein), PD Dr. Kersten Kellermann (Liechtenstein Economic Institute, KOFL), Dr. Berno Büchel (Saarland University), Philippa Kitchen and Walter Sinn, who took the time for carefully cross-reading this manuscript.

\(^6\) See the conclusions for additional comments on this important point and the lucrative idea to re-estimate this project in a few years.
As a reliable and very frequently available indicator for the impact of the affair on Liechtenstein’s financial sector, share prices of companies within the financial sector have been chosen: Daily return of stock prices of the financial institutes whose shares are traded at the Swiss stock market (“Swiss Exchange”) are in main focus. These banks are “Verwaltungs- und Privatbank AG” and “Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG”.

To separate the effect of the financial crisis on the market (and on the investigated stock prices) from the effect of the data theft, other factors, which account for the impact of the financial crisis, are included (such as the SMI and other measures capturing the financial crisis). Though the impact of the financial crisis is also of interest, its analytical and econometric inclusion mainly carries the importance of isolating the effect of the “Zumwinkel-Affair” from other interference.

The econometric analysis carried out in the next section implies an augmented Generalized Autoregressive Heteroskedasticity (GARCH)-model. The basic GARCH-approach was introduced by Engle [1982] and Bollerslev [1986]. This popular class of models has its main advantage in the explicit modelling of the conditional variance. These models basically feature two linked regression equations: One to estimate different influences on the investigated dependent variable (conditional mean equation) and a linked second equation to evaluate the influence of different sources on the residuals’ conditional variance (conditional variance equation). As additional yet “unconventional” feature of this analysis the lagged squared residuals have been removed from the GARCH-specification and replaced by squared lagged observed variables such as past stock return and past stock market performance. This replacement revisits to some extent the approach of Weiss [1984]7. It turns out that the specification featuring this replacement is superior in this application, which is rather exceptional. To evaluate the impact of the financial crisis and the effect of the Zumwinkel-Affair on the risk, additional explaining variables have been incorporated into the (therefore augmented) variance equation.

After this introduction, the second section deals with the estimation of the augmented GARCH-models for different stock prices. Following a descriptive and visual investigation of the used data series, further econometric considerations are presented and the estimation

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process of the daily stock prices of the banks Verwaltungs- und Privatbank and Liechtensteinische Landesbank (from 2006 until 2010) are presented and the impacts of the financial crisis and the Zumwinkel-Affair on performance and risk are assessed. Also, the results are compared between the two investigated stocks. In the third section, the text will be completed by some concluding remarks.
2. Investigating the Impact on Stock Prices and Stock Price Volatility (Risk)

After having shortly introduced the main motivation and goals of this paper's economic examination using (linear and nonlinear) econometric techniques, the first step would be to carry out visual explorations and to calculate descriptive statistics of the relevant time series. The used data series in the present paper are the two stock prices of the two banks “Verwaltungs- und Privatbank AG” (VPB) and “Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG” (LLB) which have their headquarters in Vaduz (Liechtenstein). Both stocks are traded at the Swiss Stock Exchange in Zürich. Also, the Swiss Market Index (SMI) is taken into account to capture the fluctuations of the whole market. The investigated time span is from 2006 (January 1st) until 2011 (January 4th). Additional to these variables two time dummy variables are introduced to capture the impact of the “Zumwinkel-Affair” and the additional effect of the financial crisis on the banks’ stock prices (which was not already captured by the impact of the financial crisis on the SMI, that in turn is correlated with the stock prices of the two investigated financial institutes). Also their impact on the conditional variance (volatility) of the stock prices is analysed.

2.1. Visual and Descriptive Analysis of Data Series and General Model Setup

Before the adopted model will be illustrated in further detail, it is important to pay deeper attention to the used data series. Inspecting the graphical movement of the employed time series (plotted in figure 1) provides a few crucial insights. After the economic expansion phase that affected the most sectors of the economy up to 2007, there is a clear downward tendency beginning to be evident from the end of that year. There was a certain period of consolidation during 2008, before the historic worldwide downturn on the international stock markets took place, following the crash of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 that led to a long lasting decrease. In the Swiss Market Index the financial crisis (which had its origin already in the American sub-prime crisis) is clearly visible with its extremum at the trough in March 2009.

---

8 The Swiss Market Index (SMI) is an index including the values of the twenty most important Swiss stocks (called blue chips) which normally account for approximately 90 percent of the whole trading volume at the Swiss Exchange.
FIGURE 1: Daily stock prices of the VPB and the LLB compared to the Swiss Market Index (SMI)

The two arrows in the graph of figure 1 mark the chosen time periods for the two important time dummies (accounting for the financial crisis and the “Zumwinkel-Affair”) which are used in the regressions later on. To identify the time period of the maximum of the financial crisis the SMI has been chosen as reference (say from October 6th 2008 until October 16th 2009). It is important to note that the time span also includes the period of recovery to the level, where the beginning of the crisis has been detected.

It is important to stress some facts which might not be fully apparent at first sight due to the different scaling of both axes in figure 1: On the one hand, it is easily visible that the SMI and the two banks’ shares are strongly related and that all of them experienced a sharp decrease in their stock values after the peak in the middle of 2007 until the trough in March 2009. But on the other hand, the investigated banks had to suffer from even more dramatic losses than the market. While the SMI lost around 55%, the LLB-stock decreased around 75% and the VPB-stock value even diminished around 85%. Inspecting the two stocks an additional breakdown is visible in February 2008, exactly when the “Zumwinkel-Affair” started. It is evident from figure 1 that the recovery of the SMI after the financial crisis was stronger compared to the LLB and VPB. One possible explanation could be the data theft that resulted in the “Zumwinkel-Affair”, which was followed by high international pressure on Liechtenstein leading to a deep and still ongoing transformation process within the financial sector (as reasoned in the introduction of this paper)\footnote{Once again, the relevant remarks made in the introduction (related to footnote 6) apply.}.
The three used data series are all integrated of order one\textsuperscript{10}, so if we just plug them in original form into the estimation process, we are running a high risk of generating estimates which have been affected by spurious regression, an instance that could result in misleading estimation results\textsuperscript{11}.

The original data series have been transformed in order to obtain the daily percentage change (from now on denoted as $\%\Delta SMI$, $\%\Delta VPB$ and $\%\Delta LLB$). The plot of the transformed series is shown in figure 2. Even though the transformation into percentage differences makes it difficult to judge the long-term effects (which are not in main focus, anyway), especially of the “Zumwinkel-Affair” on the performance of the stock prices\textsuperscript{12}, it has one important benefit compensating for the just mentioned shortcoming: It provides a sort of “standardized” conditional variance since the models all contain the included series (and most importantly the dependent series) in percentage figures which make the conditional variances directly comparable over the whole time span and also between the two stocks used as dependent variables.

\textsuperscript{10} Augmented Dickey Fuller-test (\textsc{Dickey and Fuller} [1979]), KPSS-test (\textsc{Kwiatkowski et al.} [1992]) and Phillip/Perron-test (\textsc{Phillip and Perron} [1988]) all suggest that the series feature a unit root (follow a random walk). After differencing, the series are integrated of order zero (same tests indicate no unit root anymore). If a cointegration test (following the procedure proposed by the nobel price laureates \textsc{Engle and Granger} [1987]) is carried out, one can conclude that the two series VPB and SMI are not cointegrated, while LLB and SMI are. Still, no (univariate) error-correction specification of the mean equation with LLB as regressand was applied in order to maintain the entire comparability between the results of the mean and variance equations of both regressions with the VP Bank-stock and the LLB-stock as dependent variables. As mentioned in \textsc{Kunst} [2009, p.21] and \textsc{Asteriou and Hall} [2007, p.317], the procedure of Engle and Granger, which is essentially an Augmented Dickey Fuller-test on the residuals of the regression of the first on the second variable (and a constant and optionally some trend function), is often carried out falsely by using ordinary ADF significance points. \textsc{Phillips and Ouliaris} [1990, p.189-192] supply applicable (tabulated) quantiles.

\textsuperscript{11} \textsc{Granger and Newbold} [1974] pointed out the problem and consequences of spurious regression potentially leading to falsely low p-values and high $R^2$. They also proposed a rule of thumb for the detection of spurious regression: If the goodness-of-fit measure $R^2$ is almost equal to 1 or higher than the reported value of the Durbin-Watson statistic, then spurious regression “must” be present. The Durbin-Watson test checks the presence of serial correlation of first order among the errors of the model and was introduced by \textsc{Durbin and Watson} [1950]. Especially the high $R^2$ or the very low durbin-watson statistics (of different specifications of the model, also with and without incorporation of a GARCH-specification) led to only one possible conclusion that spurious regression is existent if we use the variables in levels. The durbin-watson test should be treated with care if there is a lagged dependent variable (or the constant dropped) in the estimated equation. Nonetheless, the impression of spurious regression was independent from different executed specifications excluding/including a constant or a lagged dependent variable.

\textsuperscript{12} Long-run effects: For example captured by some measure of the level of the stock prices averaged over a certain time period.
If we compare the plot of the daily percentage change of the three time series, we recognize that all the series feature visible volatility clustering. A rise of volatility is detectable during the period of the financial crisis (October 2008 until October 2009), but also (albeit comparably lower) at the time point when the data theft became public (in February 2008). We can also observe that both stocks have a higher range and volatility than the Swiss Market Index (especially the VPB-stocks), something that also becomes apparent when the descriptive statistics are calculated and compared (expressed in the table of figure 3). The standard deviations of the two stocks are higher than the standard deviations of the market index, while all are alike when it comes to comparing their fourth moments: They all have a kurtosis that is considerably higher than 3 (that would correspond to a normal distribution). Thus, the three series have leptokurtic properties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptive statistics</th>
<th>%ΔLLB</th>
<th>%ΔSMI</th>
<th>%ΔVPB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean (1st moments)</td>
<td>0.0149</td>
<td>-0.0035</td>
<td>-0.0224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0496</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>10.0000</td>
<td>11.3910</td>
<td>24.1782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>-11.3918</td>
<td>-7.7881</td>
<td>-16.5276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. dev. (2nd moments)</td>
<td>2.0472</td>
<td>1.3427</td>
<td>2.4599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skewness (3rd moments)</td>
<td>-0.0167</td>
<td>0.3070</td>
<td>0.2726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurtosis (4th moments)</td>
<td>6.3034</td>
<td>11.0651</td>
<td>15.0161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More on the leptokurtic features and the pattern of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity regarding the two investigated stock series will be discussed in the next sections.

Neglecting the presence of ARCH (autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity)-effects in regression models results in inefficient ordinary least squares estimates (yet, the estimation
results are still consistent). Thus, the covariance matrix of the parameters would be biased, with invalid t-statistics as a consequence (see Asteriou and Hall [2007, p.252-253]). Besides the loss of asymptotic efficiency it might also lead to over-parameterization of an (ARMA)-model and to over-rejection of conventional tests, for example tests for serial correlation (see Fan and Yao [2005, p.165]). Setting up a model which explicitly accounts for the presence of ARCH-effects leads to an efficient estimator and will ensure the calculation of a valid covariance matrix: However, such a model is usually not estimated by an ordinary least squared estimator, but by the iterative solving of a nonlinear maximation problem, namely by using a maximum-likelihood procedure. The prementioned GARCH-approach was originally developed by Engle [1982] and Bollerslev [1986].

Apart from the afore-mentioned econometric advantages, there are also analytical reasons why a GARCH-approach is used here, since there is direct economic interest in the impact of certain events, such as the financial crisis and the “Zumwinkel-Affair”, on the volatility (which is measured by the conditional variance equation explained later on).

The influence on performance, in a first stage of the price of the VPB-stock and in a second stage of the price of the LLB-stock, is modelled as follows:

- **Dependent variable**: The daily percentage change of the stock price (either %-change of VPB-stock price or %-change of the LLB-stock price) is used as regressand.
- **Controlling variables**: The present performance of the Swiss Market Index (%-change of SMI-value) and the past performance of bank’s stock price (%-change of VPB or LLB) are used as regressors.
- **Additional impact of financial crisis**: A time dummy from October 6th (2008) until October 19th (2009) is generated to cover the impact of the financial crisis. In the case of the mean equation, the time dummy can be interpreted as the additional effect of the crisis (beyond the influence which is already captured by the bad performance of

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13 The maximum likelihood estimation procedure basically chooses the optimal coefficients within the (conditional) mean equation by maximizing a log likelihood function term, which is mainly dependent on the error term and the error variance. The (conditional) variance equation itself is not really a regression equation in the usual sense, the chosen parameter values are found by the fact that they affect the (conditional) error variance, which appears in the log likelihood function of the mean equation. The log likelihood function is also of further importance with respect to the determination of the lag order of the GARCH-specification as it is the main element of the information criteria mentioned later on.

14 The prefix “%Δ” (in the text) and “PD_” (in estimation output tables) are applied to label the percentage change/percentage difference of a variable. The suffix “(-1)” in the estimation outputs highlights the lagged variables indicating the usage of the observed value from one trading day in the past (in time point t-1) compared to the dependent variable’s observation in time point t.

15 The estimation consists of two linked equations: The mean equation models the daily percentage change (return performance) of the stock value and the variance equation contains the conditional variance as a measure for the risk of the stock value.
the SMI). So, this dummy tries to check if the stock value has suffered more severely (or less) compared to the market regarding the average returns. The detailed interpretation will be given in the next two sections.

- Additional impact of data theft (“Zumwinkel-Affair”): Another time dummy from February 15th (2008) until January 4th (2011), which is the end of the sample, is integrated to measure the additional impact of the “Zumwinkel-Affair”, separated from the impact of the financial crisis. The incorporation of the financial crisis dummy and %-change of the SMI allows the estimated impact of the “Zumwinkel-Affair” not to be heavily biased by the financial crisis.

Of particular interest is the augmented GARCH-specification of the variance equation: The past squared residuals and the past conditional variances are augmented by squared control variables\(^\text{16}\) (the same one as in the mean equation) and by the time dummy variables (“financial crisis” and “data theft”).

The chosen time span also includes the period of recovery to the level, where the beginning of the crisis’ peak has been detected. It would be unreasonable to argue that the crisis was overcome after the lowest trough. The decision to include some amount of recovery will surely affect and lower the estimated (presumably negative) impact of the crisis on the conditional mean of stock values, since they are highly correlated with the SMI. The consequences of the inclusion of the recovery period on the conditional variance are hard to guess in an early stage, but this seems to be fairly reasonable and will be explored later on.

Different specifications of the variance equation have been exercised and compared with the applied augmented GARCH(0,1)-model: An augmented GARCH(1,1)-model, where the lagged squared observations of the stock returns and the SMI-performance have been removed from the variance equation and the typical “non-augmented” GARCH(1,1)-model are applied as benchmarks. It turns out that the chosen augmented GARCH(0,1)-specification is not only justified by the aim of the analytical investigations but also proves to be superior to the alternative specifications (see the appendix for the details). The also popular GARCH-M specification (proposed by Engle, Lilien and Robins [1987]), which allows the conditional mean to depend directly on its own conditional variance, has also been estimated: The coefficient estimates of the independent variables in variance and mean equation were

\(^{16}\) The reason for taking squares is to ensure that both past negative and past positive outbursts have the same (presumably increasing) effect on volatility measured by the conditional variance.
only slightly changed and the significance conclusions remained unchanged, while the GARCH-M-component in the mean equation appeared to be insignificant\textsuperscript{17}.

In the following estimations, the variance equation will be in main focus (the determinants of the volatility of the stock prices) rather than the mean equation (the determinants of the percentage change of the stock prices), as stock returns are usually hard to model and predict, while the evaluation of the expected risk is more promising and yields more relevant information about investment decisions.

**FIGURE 4: Included variables (within the variance equation) and expected signs of influence**

Figure 4 summarizes all the variables, which are incorporated into the variance equation and therefore capture the influences of primary interest, namely the various determinants for the prediction of risk (volatility) of the investigated stock return: As already explained, in main focus are the effects of the data theft and of the financial crisis. A priori, it is expected that both influences of primary interest have an accumulating effect on risk (hence marked with a positive sign in the figure), so it is assumed that both events have increased volatility. The observable volatility clustering suggests high positive autocorrelation of risk itself. Past

The analytical interpretation of this result could be that the stock prices are not directly dependent on risk in this case. The economic reasoning of an eventual significance of the GARCH-M-component lies in the “value at risk”-argument: A (usually rather risk-avers) investor would desire better returns in order to compensate for higher risk, following usual finance theory such as Capital Asset Pricing Models.
shocks (captured by high values of past residuals within the mean variance) will presumably result in higher risk. Also high absolute values of past percentage changes of the SMI and of the inspected stock value assumably have an accumulating effect on risk (but this should be estimated first before we stick to this claim). The interrelation of the past market performance and the financial crisis with the past stock performance is being dealt with within the mean equation.

2.2. Stock Prices of “Verwaltungs- und Privatbank”

As already outlined in the last section, the three regarded series feature leptokurtic patterns (the reported kurtosis is for all the three series considerably above 3). This can also be shown by comparing the series’ sample distribution with the adjusted normal distribution and quantiles. In the left graph of figure 5 we can perceive that the occurrence of extreme values is more likely compared to the normal quantile, while the right graph shows the higher kurtosis of the series compared to the normal distribution.

The setup of the estimation has already been introduced in the last section. Carrying out the estimation of the mean equation (without GARCH-modelling) delivers already in an early stage important conclusions that highlight the econometric suitability of the inclusion of a GARCH-structure. The regression of the daily percentage difference of the VPB-stock prices (denoted as PD_VPB) yields autocorrelated squared residuals. On the other hand, the non-squared residuals show no clearly significant serial correlation. Positive dependency of the
residuals’ second moments indicates that the variance is not constant over time (heteroskedasticity, volatility clustering). Results are shown in the following figure\textsuperscript{18}.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure6}
\caption{Results of “ordinary” estimation (without GARCH-specification) and correlogram of squared residuals}
\end{figure}

To verify the presence of autoregressive heteroskedasticity in a more formal way, an ARCH-test (as proposed by ENGLE [1982]) is carried out. Both the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and the F-test are computed using an auxiliary regression of the “ordinary” model’s squared residual against squared lagged\textsuperscript{19} residuals plus a constant. While Engle’s LM-statistic is calculated by multiplying the estimated $R^2$ with the number of observations, the F-test checks the joint significance of the squared lagged residuals. Both statistics reject the null of non-existence of ARCH-effects clearly, as indicated by the p-values (both 0.0000) reported in figure 6. Thus, the obtained results of the ARCH-test are entirely in line with the prior findings and strongly notify the existence of ARCH-effects:

\textsuperscript{18} Also the autocorrelation function of the series $\%\Delta\text{VPB}$ itself unveils no autocorrelation, while the autocorrelation function of $\%\Delta\text{VPB}^2$ shows significant autocorrelation and therefore heteroskedastic characteristics.

\textsuperscript{19} The lag length has been chosen as subject to the Akaike [1974] and the Schwarz [1978] Information Criteria, but it was found that the clear test results were insensitive to varying lag lengths anyway.
FIGURE 7: Results of „ordinary” estimation (without GARCH-specification) and ARCH-test

The existence of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity makes the introduction of a variance equation (GARCH-approach) particularly lucrative, besides the fact that we are directly interested in influences not only on the performance but especially on the risk (measured by the conditional variance).

The econometric setup of the used GARCH(p,q)-model with a mean equation (with $\%\Delta VPB_t$ as dependent variable) and a variance equation (with the conditional variance $h_t$ as dependent variable) is depicted below:\n
$$\%\Delta VPB_t = \alpha_t + \beta_1 \cdot %\Delta VPB_{t-1} + \beta_2 \cdot %\Delta SMI_t + \beta_3 \cdot DATATHEFT_t + \beta_4 \cdot FINANCIALCRISIS_t + \mu_t,$$

$$h_t = \alpha_2 + \sum_{i=1}^{p} \delta_i \cdot h_{t-i} + \sum_{j=1}^{q} \gamma_j \cdot \Delta VPB_{t-j}^2 + \beta_4 \cdot %\Delta SMI_t^2 + \beta_5 \cdot DATATHEFT_t + \beta_6 \cdot FINANCIALCRISIS_t,$$

The lag lengths in the variance equation, namely of the past variances and the past squared residuals (obtained from the mean equation) have been determined with respect to different information criteria, also keeping in mind the conditions for a valid GARCH-model and the significance of the GARCH-coefficients.$^{21}$

---

$^{20}$ The time period of the financial crisis time dummy lies entirely within the time span of the data theft dummy: The included dummy variable $FINANCIALCRISIS_t$, is therefore fully equivalent to the interaction variable $DATATHEFT_t \ast FINANCIALCRISIS_t$. This reasoning is also supported by the empirical results, which are the same for both specifications. In the forthcoming econometric analysis in this paper, the variable $FINANCIALCRISIS_t$ is used instead of the interaction term.

$^{21}$ The information criteria (even though they can sometimes have problems with finding a minimal extremum in the context of GARCH-models) deliver very important insights (see NEUSSER [2006, p.145]): The criteria clearly suggest a very parsimonious GARCH(0,1)-specification. Higher GARCH-orders (especially of past squared residuals) generate unacceptably many insignificant estimates and even negative coefficients (which
The following passage repeats the setup of the model and already points out the main results obtained from the augmented GARCH(0,1)-model, whose output is visible in figure 8.

The influence on daily percentage change of stock price ($%\Delta VPB$, denoted as PD_VPB in figure 7) is captured by the mean equation:

- **Controlling variables:** The performance of the Swiss Market Index (%-change of SMI) is highly significant meaning that general market fluctuations are closely related to the VPB-stocks, while the past performance of the bank’s stock price (lagged %-change) plays only a minor role\(^{22}\).

- **Additional impact of financial crisis:** The insignificance of the time dummy indicates that there is no additional effect. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to conclude that there was no impact of the financial crisis at all, since it is reasonable to argue that the financial crisis was already captured by the bad performance of $%\Delta SMI$ (which significantly affects the %-change of the VPB-stocks)\(^{23}\). Additionally, another fact contributes to the insignificance of the crisis, which even remains if the SMI-variable is removed from the estimation: Inspecting figure 1 we observe that not only the SMI fully recovers from the sharp downturn (the time span was set according to this fact on purpose) but also the VPB-stock price recovers as both variables are highly correlated. Thus, the effects during the downturn and the upturn cancel out. If the duration of the crisis is shortened, such that only the downturn of the market is included until the trough in March 9\(^{th}\) (2009), then the financial crisis dummy gets significant (this is shown in the appendix). Hence, we conclude two things: First, the financial crisis had no impact on the VPB stock average returns if the recovery phase is included into the financial crisis time definition. Second, it suffered from the financial crisis during the downturn phase and even more than the market.

- **Impact of data theft:** This time dummy captures the impact of the “Zumwinkel-Affair” (separated from the impact of the financial crisis and the ordinary market

\[^{22}\text{The constant was excluded since it was insignificant and led to worse information criteria. However, the main results remained insensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the constant.}\]

\[^{23}\text{Thus, the financial crisis had a negative impact on the daily returns. But this is also incorporated into the influence via the SMI. So there was no impact of the financial crisis that was bigger than the effect of the crisis on the whole stock market (ceteris paribus).}\]
fluctuations) on the daily returns (\(\%\Delta VPB\)). No significant additional effect can be discovered consulting the estimation results of the mean equation.

The influence on volatility (as a measure for risk) is modeled by the variance equation with the conditional variance as explained variable:

- All coefficients are statistically significant and with expected positive signs.
- The constant and the past conditional variance as explanatory variables within the variance equation are both highly significant. So, there is a generally existent average risk (not explained by the market risk or the other considered variables).
- The squared control variables (\(\%\Delta VPB(-1)^2\) and \(\%\Delta SMI(-1)^2\)) are also significant but contribute to a lower extent than the other included variables to the conditional variance.
- Most interestingly, the two dummy variables are highly significant and intensify the variance: Thus, it can be concluded that the financial crisis had a very strong effect on the volatility during the period when the crisis took place. Additionally, the data theft/"Zumwinkel-Affair" also intensified the volatility/risk of the daily VPB-stock returns to a high extent. These central results are also illustrated in the plotted conditional variance in figure 10.

![FIGURE 8: Estimation output of applied GARCH-model (%\(\Delta VPB\))](image-url)
The augmented GARCH(0,1)-model therefore suggests that there is a certain path dependency (serial correlation) of volatility of the examined dependent variable %ΔVPB, but there is no autocorrelation of the variable %ΔVPB itself. This means that even though the stock return itself cannot be well predicted by its own observable past (which is conform to the often quoted market efficiency hypothesis), the risk, measured by the conditional variance, can be to a certain extent predicted using the past observed variables within the variance equation24.

It is important to refer to other specifications that have been executed in order to obtain a more general base to draw the central conclusions. These modifications shall be outlined in the following.

- **SPI (financial institutes) instead of SMI to capture market fluctuations**: As an alternative indicator for the market fluctuations a sub-index has also been used. This sub-index “SPI (financial institutes)” captures all financial institutes that are present at the Swiss Stock Exchange. However, the usage of this alternative indicator does not yield any changes worth mentioning. This result is not very surprising as visual and descriptive statistics suggest that both series are highly correlated.

- **TED Spread as alternative indicator for the financial crisis**: The TED spread is the calculated difference between the interest rates of the 3-months dollar-LIBOR (interbank loans) and the interest rates of 3-months U.S. treasury bills. It captures the observed credit risk and is therefore a good indicator for the trust in the financial market. As it turns out, the inclusion of the TED spread does not affect the sign or the significance of the dummy capturing the Zumwinkel-Affair. More detailed results are outlined in the appendix.

- **Different lengths of the financial crisis dummy**: Along with the originally chosen time span used for the financial crisis time dummy other identifications of the relevant time span have been executed. The crucial finding that the Zumwinkel-Affair had a significant (accumulating) effect on the risk of the banks’ stock values is insensitive to the different lengths of the time span of the financial crisis dummy. The detailed results will be discussed in the appendix.

One can conclude that the most important findings (such as the highly significant effect of the Zumwinkel-Affair on risk) do not change across the various alternative specifications.

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24 If the stock prices follow a random walk, then the current stock price in time point $t$ will always be the best forecast for the stock price in $t+1$ since $p_{t+1} = \delta p_t + \epsilon_{t+1}$ (in the case of a random walk: $\delta = 1$, $\epsilon_t$ follows a white noise process). So, if we are interested in the return $\Delta p_t$ (or in our case the percentage return) we can deduce the expected return from the just quoted equation: $\Delta p_{t+1} = p_{t+1} - p_t = \epsilon_{t+1}$. The expected return $E_t [\Delta p_{t+1}] = E_t [\epsilon_{t+1}] = 0$ is purely stochastic (white noise) and therefore not predictable in a meaningful way. Therefore, the best prediction of the stock prices tomorrow would be the stock price today.
After the incorporation of the variance equation complementing the “ordinary” mean equation that accounts for the autoregressive heteroskedasticity (through the just outlined GARCH-approach) we observe that the squared residuals of the improved model are not autocorrelated anymore.

![Correlogram of squared residuals of the GARCH-model (%ΔVPB)](image)

**FIGURE 9: Correlogram of squared residuals of the GARCH-model (%ΔVPB)**

Plotting the graph with the estimated conditional standard deviations, one can clearly observe the higher level of volatility beginning with the “Zumwinkel-Affair” and the even higher risk during the financial crisis.

![Estimated conditional standard deviation of %ΔVPB](image)

**FIGURE 10: Estimated conditional standard deviation of %ΔVPB**

The conditional standard deviation plot also reflects the already mentioned strong volatility clustering, meaning that risk is time-dependent (heteroskedasticity of %ΔVPB)\(^{25}\).

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\(^{25}\) The correlogram of the estimated conditional variance series exhibits strong autocorrelation.
As an alternative, a GARCH(1,1) approach, which excludes the two variables $\%\Delta \text{VPB}(-1)^2$ and $\%\Delta \text{SMI}(-1)^2$ from the variance equation but includes one past squared residual, has been estimated as well. The computed output results applying the GARCH(1,1)-model are analogue to the augmented GARCH(0,1)-model from figure 8 if we compare the estimates of the mean equation and the high significance of the two dummy variables in the variance equation (for further details and results see the appendix).

2.3. Stock Prices of “Liechtensteinische Landesbank”

As explained in section 2.1., the three regarded series show a leptokurtic pattern (the reported kurtosis is for all the three series considerably above 3). If the LLB stocks’ sample distribution is compared with the adjusted normal distributions and quantiles, as done with the VPB-stocks in section 2.2., we can follow that the occurrence of extreme values is more likely compared to the normal quantile and that the kurtosis of the series is higher compared to the normal distribution:

![Figure 11: Comparison of the sample distribution/quantile with the normal distribution/quantile](image)

The estimation without GARCH-modelling yields autocorrelated squared residuals. Hence, the variance is not constant over time (heteroskedasticity and volatility clustering). The reported results are shown below:\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{26} Also the autocorrelation function of $\%\Delta \text{LLB}^2$ shows a significant degree of autocorrelation and therefore a strong heteroskedastic pattern.
Again, an ARCH-test (as proposed by Engle [1982]) is carried out. The reported results of the ARCH-test, as shown in figure 13, strongly indicate the existence of ARCH-effects since the null of insignificance of the lagged squared residuals can be clearly rejected executing both the LM- and the F-test:

\[ \text{null of insignificance of lagged squared residuals} \]

Therefore, also for the LLB-stock a GARCH-approach seems fruitful, in order to properly account for the existence of autoregressive heteroskedasticity. But as already explained, the analytic advantages of modelling the conditional variance also justify the use of a GARCH-model.

\[ \text{null of insignificance of lagged squared residuals} \]

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27 The lag length was determined according to the Information Criteria of AKAIKE [1974] and SCHWARZ [1978]. Additionally, the clear test results were insensitive to varying lag lengths.

28 The test procedure has already been explained in further detail in the last section (2.2.).
The econometric approach of the used GARCH\((p,q)\)-model with a mean equation (with \(\%\Delta LLB_t\) as dependent variable) and a variance equation (with the conditional variance \(h_t\) as dependent variable) is illustrated below:

\[
\%\Delta LLB_t = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \cdot \%\Delta LLB_{t-1} + \beta_2 \cdot \%\Delta SMI_t + \beta_3 \cdot DATATHEFT_t + \beta_4 \cdot FINANCIALCRISIS_t + \tilde{u}_t
\]

\(u_t|\Omega_t \sim \text{id} \ N(0, h_t)\)

\[
h_t = \alpha_2 + \sum_{i=1}^{q} \delta_i \cdot h_{t-i} + \sum_{j=1}^{q} \gamma_j \cdot \tilde{u}_{t-j}^2 + \beta_3 \cdot \%\Delta LLB_{t-1} + \beta_4 \cdot \%\Delta SMI_{t-1} + \beta_5 \cdot DATATHEFT_t + \beta_6 \cdot FINANCIALCRISIS_t,
\]

The lag lengths in the variance equation, namely of the past variances and the past squared residuals (gained from the mean equation) have been determined with respect to different information criteria but also considering the conditions for a valid GARCH-model and the significance of the GARCH-coefficients\(^29\).

The estimation output of the augmented GARCH\((0,1)\)-model is visible in figure 14.

The mean equation covers the influence on daily percentage change of stock price (\(\%\Delta LLB\), denoted as PD\_LLB in figure 14):

- \textit{Controlling variables}: The performance of the Swiss Market Index (\%-change of SMI) is highly significant, so the general market fluctuations are an important influence. The past performance of the bank’s stock price (past \%-change of LLB) plays also a role\(^30\): Even though the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is rather small, it is significant and negative.

- \textit{Impact of financial crisis}: The estimated coefficient and standard deviation of this time dummy indicate no additional effect (beyond the influence of the crisis via weak market performance measured by \(\%\Delta SMI\)). However, the financial crisis was already captured by the bad performance of \(\%\Delta SMI\) (which significantly affects the \%-change of the LLB-stocks). As in the case of the VPB-stocks an additional reason is responsible for the insignificance: If we inspect figure 1 we see that not only the SMI fully recovers from the sharp downturn (the time span was chosen considering exactly this fact) but also the LLB-stock price recovers since they are highly correlated.

\(^{29}\) See the comments of footnote 21 since they are also valid in this context. The alternative approach of dropping \(\%\Delta LLB(-1)^2\) and \(\%\Delta SMI(-1)^2\) out of the variance equation (and including past squared residuals) is shown in the appendix and achieves very similar results compared to the approach outlined in this and the last section. Also a “non-augmented” benchmark model has been estimated. As already pointed out, the chosen augmented GARCH\((0,1)\) turns out to be the best specification (see the appendix).

\(^{30}\) Again, the constant was excluded since it was insignificant and led to worse information criteria. However, the main results remained independent of the inclusion or exclusion of a constant.
Hence, the negative influence during the downturn and the positive impact of the upturn cancel out. This insignificance is also the case if the time span of the financial crisis time dummy is shortened to leave out the recovery period but not if the SMI-variable is dropped within the estimation using the shorter period definition. So there was an impact on the returns on the LLB (during the decline period), but not a more severe one compared to the impact on the market (for detailed results see the appendix A.3.). Thus, the insignificance tells us two things: First, the financial crisis had no impact on the LLB stock average returns that was more severe compared to the market not in the downward phase and not if the recovery period is included into the time definition of the financial crisis. Second, it only suffered from the financial crisis during the downturn phase (very similar to the market).

- **Impact of data theft**: This time dummy captures the impact of the “Zumwinkel-Affair” (separated from the impact of the financial crisis and the ordinary market fluctuations) on the daily returns (\%ΔLLB). No significant additional effect can be found consulting the estimation results of the mean equation.

The variance equation with the conditional variance as explained variable expresses the different influences on the risk (measured by the volatility):

- All coefficients are statistically significant and with the expected positive signs.
- The constant and the past conditional variance as explanatory variables in the variance equation are both highly significant: Thus, there is a certain general average risk (not explained by the market risk or the other included variables) and risk is autocorrelated.
- The squared control variables (\%ΔLLB(-1)^2 and \%ΔSMI(-1)^2, where the latter captures the market risk) are also significant but have a lower impact on the conditional variance.
- The dummy variables are highly significant and intensify the variance: So, the financial crisis had a very strong effect on volatility. The data theft also intensified the volatility/risk of the daily LLB-stock returns, but the effect is rather weak (this can also be seen in the plotted conditional variance of figure 16). Both the effect of the Zumwinkel-Affair and of the financial crisis are considerably lower compared to the effect on the conditional variance of \%ΔVPB estimated earlier (see regression results in figure 8).
The augmented GARCH(0,1)-model shows that there is a certain path dependency (serial correlation) of volatility of the examined dependent variable %ΔLLB and that there is autocorrelation of the variable %ΔLLB itself\(^{31}\). This means that the stock return itself can be predicted to a certain extent by its own observable past (which is not in line with the often quoted market efficiency hypothesis)\(^{32}\). Also the risk, measured by the conditional variance, can be predicted using the past observed variables within the variance equation.

As in the case of the VPB-stocks also the estimations concerning the LLB-stocks have been subject to various modifications. The alternative specifications are the same as already explained in section 2.2. (on page 20). Again, it appears that the most important results (such as the highly significant effect of the Zumwinkel-Affair on risk) do not change as subject to the various alternative specifications like the usage of the SPI (financial institutes) instead of the SMI, the inclusion of the TED spread (see appendix A.2.) and various time spans of the financial crisis dummy (see appendix A.3.).

\(^{31}\) The lagged dependent variable %ΔLLB(-1) is significant and the negative autocorrelation exhibits a significant Ljung-Box-Q-statistic, with a p-value of 0.028, for the first lag (and only for the first lag). The Q-statistic tests the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation up to the regarded order (see LJUNG AND BOX [1979]).

\(^{32}\) See also footnote 24 and the related comment in the conclusions.
After the inclusion of the variance equation that captures the autoregressive heteroskedasticity, the squared residuals of the modified model are not serially correlated anymore:

![Correlogram of squared residuals](image1)

FIGURE 15: Correlogram of squared residuals of the GARCH-model (%ΔLLB)

Plotting the graph with the estimated conditional standard deviations (as shown in figure 16) it can be observed that the volatility is slightly rising with the beginning of the “Zumwinkel-Affair” (considerably less compared to the conditional variance graph of %ΔVPB in figure 10). This observation underlines the earlier findings from the estimation output before. The financial crisis clearly had a cumulating impact on the risk:

![Estimated conditional standard deviation](image2)

FIGURE 16: Estimated conditional standard deviation of %ΔLLB

The conditional standard deviation plot also exhibits the already mentioned strong volatility clustering: The risk is time-dependent (heteroskedasticity of %ΔLLB)\(^{33}\).

\(^{33}\) The correlogram of the estimated conditional variance series also shows strong serial correlation.
As an alternative, a GARCH(1,1)-regression, which excludes the two variables \(\%\Delta\text{LLB}(-1)^2\) and \(\%\Delta\text{SMI}(-1)^2\) from the variance equation but includes one lagged squared residual, has been carried out. The computed output results from the GARCH(1,1)-model are similar to the augmented GARCH(0,1)-model from figure 14 if we compare the estimates of the mean equation and the high significance of the two dummy variables in the variance equation (for further details and results see the appendix).
3. Conclusions

During very good performance in the middle of the first decade of this century the financial sector in Liechtenstein was flourishing, also in line with a general national and international economic expansion phase. But with the peak in 2007 and the ongoing start of the American sub-prime crisis the banking sector has faced rising pressure. The following financial crisis and the depicted Zumwinkel-Affair (affecting Liechtenstein as a whole) was a huge challenge, maybe the most turbulent time in Liechtenstein’s recent economic history and came along with a deep transformation process of its whole financial sector.

The main analytical findings of this empirical paper, which applied an augmented GARCH(0,1)-model, can be summed up as follows:

- **Accumulating effect of Zumwinkel-Affair on risk**: While the data theft dummy showed no significant impact on the average return performance of the two stock values, there is striking evidence that it had a deep impact on risk. The impact of the data theft time dummy on risk is significant for both stocks. However, the impact is considerably higher for the VPB-shares than for the LLB-shares. This main finding answering the main object of investigation was independent of different specifications. These modified specifications are discussed in the main text and in particular in the appendix and consist of different specified GARCH-models, the inclusion of the TED spread, the replacement of the SMI by the SPI (financial institutes) and differently chosen lengths of the financial crisis dummy.

- **Financial crisis had an effect on risk**: Volatility (measured by the conditional variance) is affected by the financial crisis, indicated by the significant dummy. This holds for both stock returns series. In addition, the significant effect of financial crisis dummy and “Zumwinkel-Affair” dummy are both not really sensitive to changes in the chosen time period of the financial crisis time dummy considering the impact on risk.

- **Strong volatility clustering is present for both stocks**: The conditional risk is clearly time-dependent and prediction of the risk is also subject to the estimated past risk. This has been shown in different tests indicating heteroskedasticity, by the significant lagged variables within the estimation of the variance equation and by the conditional
variance graph (and strong autocorrelation of the generated conditional variance series).

- **Past (negative or positive) shocks boost volatility:** Both stocks’ conditional variances are very sensitive to past shocks, which is expressed by the highly significant positive coefficients of the lagged squared observations of the percentage change of SMI and the percentage change of the stock prices in the variance equation. This finding holds for both inspected stocks and is of course related to the statement about the volatility clustering made before.

- **Closely related to the market:** Both the performance and the volatility of the two stocks are closely linked to the general market fluctuations (the influence of the SMI is significant in the mean and in the variance equation).

- **No effect of Zumwinkel Affair and the financial crisis on daily returns:** Surprisingly, the Zumwinkel Affair does not seem to have a strong effect on the stock returns of both banks (at least not when it comes to their daily percentage changes). Also the financial crisis had no effect on the expected daily return as the financial crisis dummy is not significant in the mean equation due to the cancelling out effect already explained. The financial crisis features a significant negative impact during the downturn period (fall 2008 until spring 2009) and a significant positive effect during the recovery period on the daily stock returns. It should be stated again, that the included financial crisis dummy captures only the additional effect of the crisis beyond the connection of the SMI and the banks’ stock prices. The financial crisis therefore had an effect in the downward period on both stocks’ daily return beyond the impact already covered by the bad SMI-performance: The VPB stock suffered even more from the crisis than the market and than the LLB stock (which also suffered but not more severely than the market). Note that both the Zumwinkel Affair and the financial crisis dummy are highly significant within the variance equation, which was stated earlier.

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34 The following comment was already outlined in the section 2.2. and 2.3., but should be made here to summarize a few important points within the context of the financial crisis time dummy: The insignificance of its coefficient is not extremely surprising, as the recovery period was also covered by the time dummy, leading to a cancel out effect in total as the stock values are highly correlated with the SMI (which was used to define the financial crisis time span including downturn and recovery). This is well acceptable since the main emphasis is on the variance equation as we are particularly interest in the determinants of volatility. Moreover, the originally chosen time period for the financial crisis seems very plausible: The inclusion of some recovery into the chosen time period seems fairly reasonable as the financial crisis was surely not overcome by the reaching of the lowest trough of the Swiss Market Index in March 2009. During the recovery period afterwards, the market was still affected by high insecurity and volatility, which are of main interest here.
- *Market efficiency*: While the daily VPB-stock returns feature no significant autocorrelation, we can observe serial correlation of the LLB-stock returns (also expressed through the significant lagged dependent variable in the mean equation). However, the latter finding is not in line with the efficient market hypothesis, which states that a stock price cannot be predicted using past observations, since all observable information has already been processed by the market and transferred into the stock prices.

In the course of this econometric project it has been shown that insecurity concerning the examined stock prices rose within the analysed time period, expressed by increasing risk or volatility (besides a strong volatility clustering). The effect of the “Zumwinkel-Affair” played an important role in this process. Within the chosen model, this effect could successfully be separated from the market insecurity and other effects such as the financial crisis. It is not easy to judge how immediately this insecurity came from the data theft itself, but it is very reasonable to argue that it occurred from a combination of the already mentioned factors, such as the high political pressure, capital outflow, political reforms, and the transformation process within the financial sector (in this context it is important to keep in mind the comments made in the introduction\textsuperscript{35}). Even though the causal relationships between these factors would be very interesting to investigate, it is almost impossible to analyse this question only in an econometric/statistic frame. To answer this question other analytical tools should also be used. However, such considerations are not of central importance in this scientific context. The mentioned factors all contribute in a combined form to a common influence resulting in the effects shown in the econometric analysis. Along with the other included variables, the two introduced time dummies manage to capture the volatility clusters very well.

It would be very interesting to incorporate other sources of influence on the performance and the risk of the investigated stock series. However, as the model takes advantage of the daily

\textsuperscript{35} The comment made in the introduction shall be repeated here: “It is very important to clarify that the aim of this paper is not to judge which the main driving force behind the consequences of the data theft was: The international pressure on Liechtenstein, the insecurity of investors, the capital outflows, or the tax information exchange agreements (and the causal relations between these factors). The emphasis is entirely on the empirical investigation whether the data theft had an impact on the stock price risk/performance and not what the driving forces behind this impact were, not to mention the question if any of these negative consequences were avoidable at all (or even reversible). This question, which one the main impact was, might be easier to answer in a few years, maybe also leading to the conclusion that some factors, while with a negative impact in the short-run, might exhibit a positive effect in the long-run on the banks' performance and the stock prices (factors such as the transformation process or the tax information exchange agreements).”
availability of stock data, which enables a better capture of short-run dynamics, it is complicating to find other potentially influential data that are also available at such a high frequency.

Apart from the analytical conclusions arising from this empirical investigations there are also other (econometrically) important features of the applied setup: There exists convincing evidence that the chosen augmented GARCH(0,1)-model (with squared past observations of the daily different SMI-value and the bank’s stock return plus the two time dummies for the “Zumwinkel-Affair” and the financial crisis) is superior to the popular, ordinary and “non-augmented” GARCH(1,1)-approach without any additional explanatory/control variables in the variance equation. It is also superior to the augmented GARCH(1,1)-specification without the additional squared lagged variables, albeit with similar coefficient estimates considering the two variables of interest (namely the two time dummies). This econometric finding could not have been expected in the first place (since it is an exceptional case) but supports the chosen approach beyond its analytical advantages.
Appendix

A.1. Alternative GARCH-Approaches within Main Model

As already mentioned and explained in sections 2.2. and 2.3., a different GARCH-approach has been applied as an alternative to the augmented GARCH(0,1)-specification with lagged squared observations of the stock prices and of the SMI (%ΔVPB(-1)^2 or (%ΔLLB(-1)^2 and %ΔSMI(-1)^2). The relevant results appear insensitive to the distinction between the augmented GARCH(0,1) or the GARCH(1,1) specification without lagged squared observations: The evaluation of the effects of the “Zumwinkel-Affair” and the financial crisis on performance and risk, which was the main objective of investigation in this paper, remains unaltered. The statement made in footnote 21 can be repeated here, as its holds for the estimation process of %ΔVPB and %ΔLLB: It seems that it is problematic in this case to include past observations (of variables from the mean equation) and past squared residuals (of the mean equation) into the variance equation. Higher GARCH-orders in the original augmented variance equation (especially of past squared residuals) generate unacceptable many insignificant estimates and even negative coefficients (which is invalid here). Dropping the lagged variables from the variance equation removes these problems. But as figure 17 and 19 show, the two alternative approaches generate analogue results.

![Figure 17: Estimation outputs of the augmented GARCH(0,1)-model and alternative GARCH(1,1)-model (%ΔVPB)](image-url)
The significance structure of the variables within the mean and the variance equation and the estimated coefficients (same signs and comparable magnitude) remains nearly unchanged. Also the patterns of the estimated conditional standard deviation shown in figure 18 and gained from the variance equation are comparable between the two approaches:

Both estimated conditional standard deviations show similarly timed volatility outbursts, especially during the financial crisis (end of 2008 until end of 2009) and in the beginning of the “Zumwinkel-Affair” (in the beginning of 2008). Both graphs feature a strong and similar volatility clustering.

![Figure 18: Conditional standard deviation (%ΔVPB) applying a GARCH(0,1)-model with squared past observations (left graph) and a GARCH(1,1)-model without squared past observations (right graph)](image)

![Figure 19: Estimation output of the augmented GARCH (0,1)-model and alternative GARCH(1,1)-model (%ΔLLB)](image)
The former findings from inspecting the GARCH(1,1)-regression of \(\%\Delta VPB\) also hold for the regression of \(\%\Delta LLB\). The significance of the variables is unchanged with same signs and comparable magnitude of coefficients.

Also the pattern of the estimated conditional standard deviations shown in figure 20 and gained from the variance equation is comparable between the two approaches, namely the augmented GARCH(0,1) and the GARCH(1,1):

![Figure 20: Conditional standard deviation (%ΔLLB) applying a GARCH(0,1)-model with squared past observations (left graph) and a GARCH(1,1)-model without squared past observations (right graph)](image)

As already stated in the main section of this text, also an ordinary, popular benchmark model has been estimated: The “non-augmented” pure GARCH(1,1), whose output is listed in the following figure.

The highly significant coefficients of the explanatory/controlling variables and the better information criteria (as shown in figure 17, 19 and 23) indicate that the chosen augmented GARCH(0,1)-model is an improvement to the more parsimonious specifications.
FIGURE 21: Estimation output of a pure GARCH (1,1)-approach as benchmark model applied for
\%ΔLLB (right table) and \%ΔVPB (left table)

Figure 22 shows the estimated conditional standard deviations of the stock returns of the two banks applying the ordinary GARCH(1,1)-benchmark model. In both graphs the beginning of the “Zumwinkel-Affair” in the first half of 2008 and the financial crisis (especially during 2009) are visible through higher volatility.

Figure 23 exhibits an overview of the described competing models with the different specification of the variance equation. It features the various GARCH-specifications, which were just outlined. It is visible that the coefficient estimates of the important variables are not really different considering the sign, significance and magnitude of the coefficients.
### Table 1: Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(%\Delta VPB_t)</th>
<th>(%\Delta LLB_t)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(%\Delta VPB_{t-1})</td>
<td>-0.0102</td>
<td>-0.0108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%\Delta LLB_{t-1})</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0869***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%\Delta SMI_{t-1})</td>
<td>0.5941***</td>
<td>0.5652***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Crisis</td>
<td>-0.0196</td>
<td>0.1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Theft</td>
<td>-0.0179</td>
<td>-0.0421</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### (Conditional) Mean Equation

\[
\begin{align*}
1\% - \Delta tVPB & = -0.0102 - 0.0108 - 0.0083 \\
1\% - \Delta tLLB & = -0.0869*** - 0.0810*** - 0.0799***
\end{align*}
\]

#### (Conditional) Variance Equation

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Constant} & = 0.3073*** 0.3679*** 0.0478*** 0.4217*** 0.5704*** 0.2655*** \\
ARCH(1): h_{t-1} & = 0.1577*** 0.0937*** 0.2259*** 0.1910*** \\
GARCH(1,1): k_{t-1} & = 0.6452*** 0.6585*** 0.9046*** 0.5331*** 0.5315*** 0.7491*** \\
\%\Delta VPB_{t-1} & = 0.1085*** \\
\%\Delta LLB_{t-1} & = 0.1699*** 0.1639*** \\
\%\Delta SMI_{t-1} & = 0.1699*** 0.2450*** \\
Financial Crisis & = 1.9821*** 1.8850*** 1.2248*** 1.5489*** \\
Data Theft & = 0.4550*** 0.4786*** 0.1617** 0.1821**
\end{align*}
\]

#### Measures of Fit

\[
\begin{align*}
R^2 & = 0.1255 0.1224 0.1230 0.0774 0.0776 0.0774 \\
\text{Adjusted } R^2 & = 0.1192 0.1167 0.1188 0.0707 0.0716 0.0729 \\
\text{Akaike Info Criterion} & = 4.1479 4.1695 4.1948 3.9493 3.9694 4.0006 \\
\text{Schwarz Info Criterion} & = 4.1887 4.2063 4.2234 3.9901 4.0062 4.0293
\end{align*}
\]

1) Past squared residual from the mean equation (past shocks).
2) Lagged conditional variance (serial time dependency of risk).

The magnitude of the relevant p-values are marked with stars and therefore reflects the significance of the respective parameter (*: p-value \(\leq 0.10\) and \(> 0.05\), **: p-value \(\leq 0.05\) and \(> 0.01\), ***: p-value \(\leq 0.01\)). The p-value denotes the lowest significance level at which the null hypothesis (of insignificance in this case) could be rejected regarding the regressor’s t-value (which is here the estimated coefficient of the regressor divided by the estimated standard error of the coefficient).

See sections 2.2. and 2.3. for the theoretical equation setup and estimation results of the main GARCH-models.

### FIGURE 23: Competing models with different specification of the variance equation

#### A.2. Inclusion of TED Spread

As an alternative proxy for the financial crisis (apart from the financial crisis time dummy), one could also include the TED spread. The TED (“treasury bill euro difference dollar”) spread is the calculated difference between the interest rates of the 3-months dollar-LIBOR (interbank loans) and the interest rates of 3-months U.S. treasury bills. The spread is expressed in base points, so if, for example, the LIBOR’s interest rate is one percentage point higher (e.g. 6%) than the treasuries’ interest rate (e.g. 5%), then the TED spread is 100. The TED spread captures the observed credit risk and is therefore a good indicator for the trust in the financial market. As it turns out, the inclusion of the TED spread does not affect the sign or the significance of the dummy capturing the Zumwinkel-Affair.
Figure 24 shows the TED spread since 1982 (left graph) and in more detail covering the investigated time period (right graph). Different recessions or shocks are visibly expressed by the TED spread time plot: The second oil shock around 1981/1982, the Black Monday in 1987, the Iraq War in 1990, the Asian Crisis by the end of the 90th century and the turbulences in 2001. But most importantly, the outburst reflects the financial crisis in a striking way.

Carrying out the estimations including the daily percentage change of the TED spread, we see that the clear significant effects of the financial crisis and the Zumwinkel Affair within the variance equation remain untouched\(^{36}\). If we consult the output tables showing the main models in section 2.2. and 2.3., we see that also the other important variables are unaffected inspecting the sign and significance of their coefficients.

But it should be noted that the percentage change of the TED spread is significant within the mean equation of the LLB-stocks and slightly significant within the variance equation of the VPB-stocks. At first sight, it is not easy to identify particular reasons why the TED spread seems to have an impact on the return of the LLB-stock in mean and on the risk of the VPB-stock but not directly on the level of the returns of VPB and not on risk of LLB. This will not be examined here in further detail but would sure be worth being investigated in future research.

\(^{36}\) The sample had to be slightly adjusted as the trading days in the US sometimes differ from the trading days in Switzerland. Also, daily percentage changes of the TED spread have been calculated and used in the estimations because of analytical reasons and since various tests indicate that the TED spread contains a unit root and therefore follows a random walk.
**Figure 25:** Competing models including the TED spread’s percentage change

### A.3. Evaluation of Alternative Time Spans of Financial Crisis

As already stated in the main text, it is lucrative to allow for different lengths of the chosen time period of the financial crisis captured by the financial time dummy. Along with the original time span (labelled with “Financial Crisis”), from October 6th (2008) to October 16th (2009) with the SMI as reference, two other time spans have been applied: As second time span covered, a shorter period is applied and just covers the sharp decline from October 6th (2008) until March 9th (2008), again with the SMI as reference for the downturn. A longer period, which now relies on the TED spread as reference, has also been considered. Apart

---

37 The explanation and the plotted time series of the TED spread can be found in section A.2. of the appendix.
from the visual detection of the visible beginning of the financial crisis by inspecting the TED chart, the median of the TED spread serves as a useful threshold for a more precise detection of the timing of the financial crisis (see figure 26). The TED spread exceeds the median of 38 on April 25th (2007) and does not score below 38 until August 24th (2009). This time span has been chosen to set the length for the longest period of the financial crisis time dummy (labelled in figure 26 as “Financial Crisis (long)”). The three different time periods chosen are marked in the following figure.

![Figure 26: Different specifications of the financial crisis time dummy's length](image)

All the relevant estimation results are listed in the output table of figure 27 and are summarized in the following. The crucial finding that the Zumwinkel-Affair had a significant (accumulating) effect on the risk of the banks’ stock values is insensitive to the different lengths of the time span of the financial crisis dummy. Also the financial crisis’ effect on the conditional variance holds for all chosen lengths of the financial crisis. The effect of the financial crisis on risk vanishes in longest time period specification of the financial crisis time dummy. This is the case within the variance equation of both stock values.

An additional observation is that only for the shortest period (the downturn phase without recovery) the financial crisis dummy shows significance in the mean equation of the VPB-stocks, while it shows no significance within the mean equation of the LLB-stock (for all various lengths of the financial crisis dummy). If the SMI is removed from the mean equation, then the financial crisis dummy gets also significant in the equation with the LLB-stock as dependent variable. So, the financial crisis had no impact on the LLB- and the VPB-stock average returns that was worse compared to the market (not in the downward phase and not if
the recovery period is included into the time definition of the financial crisis). Second, they only suffered from the financial crisis during the downturn phase. The LLB-stock was hit to a very similar extent as the market, the VPB-stock performed even worse than the market. The originally chosen time period appears to be the most appropriate as the emphasis should be on the most suitable time period concerning the variance equation which is of main interest in this contribution’s analysis. The longest period seems too long in this context. The recovery should also be included as it was still a very insecure period affecting returns and especially volatility on the financial markets\textsuperscript{38}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>(%\Delta VP_B_t)</th>
<th>(%\Delta LL_B_t)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Conditional) Mean Equation</td>
<td>(-0.0102)</td>
<td>(-0.0022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%\Delta VP_B_{t-1})</td>
<td>(-0.0869\text{***})</td>
<td>(-0.0895\text{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%\Delta LL_B_{t-1})</td>
<td>(-0.0313\text{***})</td>
<td>(-0.0904\text{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%\Delta SMI_t)</td>
<td>(-0.5941\text{***})</td>
<td>(-0.5849\text{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Crisis</td>
<td>(-0.0196)</td>
<td>(0.0784)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Crisis (Short)</td>
<td>(-0.8684\text{***})</td>
<td>(-0.5173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Crisis (Long)</td>
<td>(-0.0392)</td>
<td>(-0.0246)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Theft</td>
<td>(-0.0179)</td>
<td>(0.0310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Conditional) Variance Equation</td>
<td>(0.3073\text{***})</td>
<td>(0.0585\text{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>(0.0692\text{***})</td>
<td>(0.4217\text{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\text{GARCH}(1)\text{past}\cdot h_{t-1})</td>
<td>(0.6452\text{***})</td>
<td>(0.8560\text{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%\Delta VP_B_{t-1})</td>
<td>(0.0633\text{***})</td>
<td>(0.5331\text{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%\Delta LL_B_{t-1})</td>
<td>(0.1699\text{***})</td>
<td>(0.1714\text{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%\Delta SMI_{t-1})</td>
<td>(0.0588\text{***})</td>
<td>(0.2450\text{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Crisis</td>
<td>(1.9821\text{***})</td>
<td>(1.2248\text{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Crisis (Short)</td>
<td>(0.2207\text{**})</td>
<td>(1.2306\text{***})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Crisis (Long)</td>
<td>(0.0332)</td>
<td>(0.0960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Theft</td>
<td>(0.4550\text{***})</td>
<td>(0.1091\text{***})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\multicolumn{6}{|c|}{Measures of Fit} \\
\hline
\(R^2\) & 0.1255 & 0.1365 & 0.1267 & 0.0774 & 0.0818 & 0.0771 \\
Adjusted \(R^2\) & 0.1192 & 0.1303 & 0.1204 & 0.0707 & 0.0752 & 0.0704 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{1)} Lagged conditional variance (serial time dependency of risk).

The magnitude of the relevant p-values are marked with stars and therefore reflects the significance of the respective parameter (*: p-value \(\leq 0.10\) and > 0.05, **: p-value \(\leq 0.05\) and > 0.01, ***: p-value \(\leq 0.01\)). The p-value denotes the lowest significance level at which the null hypothesis (of insignificance in this case) could be rejected regarding the regressor’s t-value (which is here the estimated coefficient of the regressor divided by the estimated standard error of the coefficient).

See sections 2.2. and 2.3. for the theoretical equation setup and estimation results of the main GARCH-models.

\textbf{FIGURE 27: Competing models with different time periods of the financial crisis dummy}

\textsuperscript{38} The high level of stock prices in 2007 can be seen as overshooting rather than being a good “average benchmark”. 
It should be stated again (shortly) that the SMI-variable also contains the impact of the financial crisis on the whole market, to which the banks’ stocks are heavily linked and correlated. The financial crisis dummy in the mean equation therefore measures if the impact was stronger or less strong compared to the market.
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