Gumbau-Brisa, Fabià

Working Paper
Heterogeneous beliefs and inflation dynamics: A general equilibrium approach

Working Papers, No. 05-16

Provided in Cooperation with:
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Suggested Citation: Gumbau-Brisa, Fabià (2005) : Heterogeneous beliefs and inflation dynamics: A general equilibrium approach, Working Papers, No. 05-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, MA

This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55620

Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
Heterogeneous Beliefs and Inflation Dynamics: 
A General Equilibrium Approach

Fabià Gumbau-Brisa

Abstract:
This paper looks at the implications of heterogeneous beliefs for inflation dynamics. Following a monetary policy shock, inflation peaks after output, is inertial, and can be characterized by a Hybrid Phillips Curve. It presents a novel channel through which systematic monetary policy can affect the degree of inflation persistence. It does so by altering the effective extent of strategic complementarities in pricing, and hence the role of higher-order expectations in the equilibrium. In particular, stronger inflation targeting reduces the impact of uncertainty on the economy and therefore the degree of inertia. It is possible to calibrate at around 25 percent the fraction of relevant information processed every period by the private sector. The imperfect common knowledge framework does not require any exogenous shocks to create heterogeneity. Despite the fact that prices can be adjusted at no cost in every period, there are nominal rigidities, and monetary policy has real effects.

JEL Classifications: D5, D8, E3, E5

Fabià Gumbau-Brisa is an Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. His email address is fabia@bos.frb.org.

This paper, which may be revised, is available on the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/index.htm.

The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or the Federal Reserve System.

The author is indebted to Giovanni Olivei, Michelle Barnes, Jeff Fuhrer, Jordi Gali, Julio Rotemberg, and Geoff Tootell for their valuable input. Excellent research assistance provided by Selva Baziki and Maria Giduskova is acknowledged. The author also wants to acknowledge advice from Alberto Alesina, Francesco Caselli, and David Laibson on an earlier version of the paper. Other thanks go to the participants at various seminars and talks for their comments. Any remaining errors are those of the author.

This version: November 2005 (first draft: November 2002)
1 Motivation

This paper presents a channel through which heterogeneous beliefs shape how monetary policy impacts the macroeconomy. In particular, it determines the importance of endogenous nominal rigidities in an imperfect common knowledge (ICK) environment with learning. Moreover, this rational expectations model displays realistic dynamics in several dimensions: inflation inertia, a Hybrid Phillips Curve, and inflation’s lagging the cycle after a monetary policy shock.

The Calvo-pricing mechanism assumed in New Keynesian (NK) models implies that inflation must lead the cycle. In particular, it generates a forward-looking Phillips Curve, in which inflation responds to current and forecastable future output gaps. Contrary to this prediction, evidence from estimated VAR models indicates that inflation has a maximal response to a monetary policy shock several quarters after output does. The NK paradigm requires prices to be rigid for unrealistically long periods of time, as reported by Chari et al. (2000). Additionally, empirical evidence seems to point to the need to motivate a backward-looking component in the Phillips Curve relationship in order to generate sufficient inflation inertia.

The complications that these empirical regularities imply for standard NK models have spawned a vast amount of empirical and theoretical research. There have been several attempts to sidestep these problems, by amending and expanding the NK framework. Others have focused on alternative modeling strategies for nominal rigidities. This paper adopts the latter strategy, avoiding the Calvo-pricing assumption.

The model presented here consists of a monetary DSGE model with rational expectations and ICK. It is able to generate substantial inflation inertia even though nominal contracts last only one period and can be adjusted without cost. Price rigidities are endogenous, in contrast with the main building block in NK models. The model contrasts also with the State Dependent Pricing literature, as here price-setters do not need to optimally choose the time for a price change. In particular, there is no marginal benefit from not re-optimizing prices in any given period.

Because prices can be adjusted every period, expected economic conditions do not need to affect pricing today. This makes it possible for the inflation peak to take place quarters after that of output. Here, systematic monetary policy can change the degree of inflation inertia. It does so by affecting the way price-setters base their decisions on higher-order expectations about the price level. In particular, policies that are more aggressive against inflation reduce the impact of ICK on the economy and hence the intensity of inflation persistence. Monetary policy is able to take the economy closer to the perfect information equilibrium.

This paper shows that it is possible to endogenize and sustain ICK in a general equilibrium.
rational expectations model, without exogenous idiosyncratic shocks.\(^8\) The producer/consumer households face cognitive constraints that result in heterogeneity of beliefs (ICK).\(^9\) The presence of a persistent policy shock provides incentives to accumulate any relevant information over time. Namely, it leads to endogenous learning. It is possible to calibrate the percentage of relevant information processed every period by the private sector. This measure appears to be in the neighborhood of 25 percent.

Inflation inertia arises endogenously because optimal pricing decisions are strategic complements. Price-setting requires learning about the behavior of aggregate inflation. History matters because the underlying shock is persistent, implying that learning can provide more accurate perceptions of the economy. Therefore, households accumulate information about this shock over time, leveraging the extent of inflation inertia. When households have a lower capacity to process information, beliefs are more heterogeneous. In this case, they rely less on their noisier observations when updating their beliefs, adjusting prices more slowly. Hence, the degree of inflation inertia depends on how much learning takes place in equilibrium. Taylor (1999a) suggests that persistence in the conduct of monetary policy might be the source of inflation inertia. In the model discussed here, this is a necessary but not sufficient condition to generate inertial behavior.

In order to understand why monetary policy affects the extent of inflation inertia, consider a Taylor rule that targets inflation more aggressively. This policy coordinates expectations around the known inflation target. In the equilibrium, the level of strategic interdependence in pricing is reduced. Learning about others’ decisions is now less important, and price adjustment takes place more quickly, resulting in less inflation inertia. Hence the extent to which households need to engage in learning is endogenous and dependent on the systematic part of monetary policy.

Summarizing these key intuitions, inflation persistence results from the interaction of two phenomena. In the first place, households’ limited capacity to process information leads to heterogeneous beliefs about the persistent shock. Second, monetary policy has some control over how that heterogeneity impacts the equilibrium level of inflation inertia. It does so by altering the effective degree of strategic complementarity in pricing, and hence the importance of learning. This indicates that Taylor rules are not only an answer to the central bank’s time-inconsistency problem, but also a mechanism that influences the impact of uncertainty on the equilibrium.

After a monetary policy shock takes place, the relationship between inflation and output takes the form of a Hybrid Phillips Curve (HPC), as it includes both past and future inflation. This relationship can also be expressed as a Backward-Looking Expectations-Augmented (BLEA) Phillips Curve. In both formulations, some of the coefficients of the Phillips Curve are not constant over time. Some of the coefficients in both relationships change as price-setters learn from their environment.

It is important to note that both the Hybrid and the BLEA Phillips Curves are obtained within a rational expectations framework. It is not necessary to assume adaptive expectations (or, more gener-

---

\(^8\)The exogeneity of those idiosyncratic shocks has long been the traditional way to sustain the existence of heterogeneous beliefs. Examples abound in the literature on global games, or more generally in any models with ICK. See, for instance, Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998, 2000), Hellwig (2002), and Angeletos and Calvet (2005, 2006), among others.

\(^9\)Similar motivations are used in the models by Sims (2003), Woodford (2002), and Adam (2005). Formally, the model here adds a general equilibrium structure in which the producer/consumer can observe both prices and quantities relevant for her optimization problem.
ally, bounded rationality), in order to make current inflation depend on its own past values/forecasts. The endogenous learning process discussed here shows that a purely rational framework is sufficient.

2 Structure of the Private Sector

Time is discrete and the economy is populated by yeoman producer households indexed by \( h \in H \equiv [0, 1] \). A household’s utility is given by

\[
U (\{C_t(h), L_t(h)\}_{t=1}^{\infty}) = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} \left[ u(C_t(h)) - \frac{1}{\nu} [L_t(h)]^{\nu} \right].
\]

The consumption index \( C_t(h) \) is defined below, \( L_t(h) \) is the household’s labor supply at \( t \), and the rest of the parameters are constrained as usual: \( \beta \in (0, 1) \), and \( \nu \in (0, +\infty) \). Each household \( h \) produces the differentiated good \( h \). The set of commodities produced in this closed economy is \( A \).

The notation \( x_t(h) \) indicates a variable that is a choice for household \( h \) at time \( t \). In contrast, the household-specific \( x_{h,t} \) is not a choice variable.

The consumption index for household \( h \) is given by

\[
C_t(h) = \left( \int_A [C_t(h,h)]^{-\frac{1}{\theta-1}} \, dh \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}},
\]

where \( C_t(h,h) \) denotes household \( h \)'s consumption of the differentiated good \( h \). Parameter \( \theta > 1 \) gives the elasticity of substitution between goods. With \( P_t(h) \) denoting the price of good \( h \), the aggregate price level is given by

\[
P_t = \left( \int_A [P_t(h)]^{-\frac{1}{\theta-1}} \, dh \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}.
\]

For simplicity, production of good \( h \) is given by

\[
Y_t(h) = L_t(h).
\]

Aggregate output and labor supply are related by the following expressions

\[
Y_t = \left( \int_H [Y_t(h)]^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \, dh \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}}
\]

\[
L_t = \left( \int_H [L_t(h)]^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \, dh \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}
\]

\[
Y_t = L_t.
\]

(1)
Demand for good \( h \) is given by

\[
Y^d_t(h) = \left( \frac{P_t(h)}{\bar{P}_{h,t}} \right)^{-\theta} Y_t,
\]  

(2)

where \( \bar{P}_{h,t} \) is the idiosyncratic average price level of the competitors of good \( h \) at time \( t \), which may or may not coincide with \( P_t \). I also assume that household \( h \) faces an idiosyncratic price \( P_{h,t} \) for its consumption basket, which needs not equal \( P_t \). The following equalities must hold

\[
P_t = \int_{H} \bar{P}_{h,t} dh = \int_{H} P_{h,t} dh.
\]  

(3)

Asset markets are incomplete. Nominally denominated riskless discount bonds, are the only asset traded in the economy. The nominal face value of the bonds carried from period \( t \) to period \( t + 1 \) is given by \( B_t(h) \).

The budget constraint is

\[
C_t(h) \leq \frac{B_{t-1}(h)}{P_{h,t}} - \frac{B_t(h)}{(1+i_{h,t}) P_{h,t}} + \frac{P_t(h)}{P_{h,t}} Y_t(h).
\]

Using (1) and (2), this constraint becomes

\[
C_t(h) \leq \frac{B_{t-1}(h)}{P_{h,t}} - \frac{B_t(h)}{(1+i_{h,t}) P_{h,t}} + \frac{P_t(h)}{P_{h,t}} \left( \frac{P_t(h)}{P_{h,t}} \right)^{-\theta} Y_t.
\]

Assuming that the utility of consumption is CRRA, and given \( \rho \in (0, +\infty) \), the problem of household \( h \) can be written as:

Choose \( \{P_t(h), B_t(h)\}_{t=1}^{\infty} \) to maximize:

\[
U \left( \{P_t(h), C_t(h)\}_{t=1}^{\infty} \right) = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} \left[ C_t(h)^{1-\rho} - \frac{1}{\rho} \nu L_t(h) \right]
\]

s.t. \( C_t(h) \leq \frac{B_{t-1}(h)}{P_{h,t}} - \frac{B_t(h)}{(1+i_{h,t}) P_{h,t}} + \frac{P_t(h)}{P_{h,t}} L_t(h) \)

\[
L_t(h) = \frac{P_t(h)}{P_{h,t}} \left( \frac{P_t(h)}{P_{h,t}} \right)^{-\theta} Y_t,
\]

\[
\lim_{T \to \infty} \frac{b_T(h)}{\Pi_{t=0}^{T} (1+i_{h,t})} \geq 0
\]

\[
B_0(h) = 0.
\]

3 The Imperfect Common Knowledge Economy

Each household faces an idiosyncratic information-processing constraint that limits its ability to fully perceive relevant macroeconomic variables. Given this constraint, households form expectations
and make decisions rationally. Because the information-processing constraints are specific to each household, beliefs are heterogeneous. In the relevant case analyzed, there is no common knowledge about macro aggregates. It is important to note that there is no bounded rationality; although agents may be “ignorant,” they are immersed in a rational expectations model.\textsuperscript{10}

The fraction of information processed by households per unit of time, denoted by $k^* \in (0, 1)$, is constant and endogenous. How this parameter is determined is discussed in detail in Section 4.

The structure provided below allows us to sidestep the introduction of the exogenous idiosyncratic shocks commonly used to sustain heterogeneity of beliefs.

Assuming that households can process a fraction of the information about the economy is conceptually inconsistent with allowing them to observe an infinite number of consumption goods (and prices). The most sensible modeling assumption is to impose the same cognitive limitation in perceiving the consumption space. Hence, consumption baskets are idiosyncratic and limited by each household’s capacity to process information.\textsuperscript{11} As a result, they do not observe the economy-wide price level, but rather an idiosyncratic one. The following definition formalizes this idea.

\noindent \textbf{Definition 1:} The commodity space for household $h$ at time $t$ is denoted by $A_{h,t}$, and determined as follows:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Consider the probability space $A \equiv (A, A_\sigma, M(\cdot))$, where $A_\sigma$ is the $\sigma$-algebra of $A$, and the probability measure $M(\cdot)$ corresponds to a uniform distribution.
\item Given $k^* \in (0, 1)$, define for each household $h$ the set: $\Theta_A(\mathbb{A}, k^*, h) \equiv \{ \mathbb{A} \in A_\sigma \mid M(\mathbb{A}) = k^* \text{ and } h \in \mathbb{A} \}$.
\item Then the commodity space for household $h \in H$ at time $t \geq 1$ is characterized as:
\[ A_{h,t} \in \Theta_A(\mathbb{A}, k^*, h). \]
\end{enumerate}

\[ \bigcup_{h \in H} A_{h,t} = A \text{ at each } t. \]

The endogenous consumption basket of household $h$, is therefore:

\[ C_t(h) = \left( \int_{A_{h,t}} [C_t(h, i)]^{\frac{1}{\theta - 1}} \, di \right)^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}}. \]

Result (5) plus the uniform distribution assumed in the definition of the probability space imply that:\textsuperscript{12}

\[ \int_H P_{h,t} dh = P_t \text{ at each } t. \]

Additionally, given the limited capacity to observe the consumption space, it is assumed that only a fraction $k^*$ of all goods is effectively competing against any given good $h$. This set of competitors is also assumed to vary over time for any given $h$, and does not need to equal $A_{h,t}$. Since the information

\textsuperscript{10}Alternatively, they can be said to suffer “rational inattention,” as in Sims (2003).

\textsuperscript{11}Rationality implies that households know that there are other goods in the economy. They are just unable to gather information about them.

\textsuperscript{12}If the household-specific consumption space does not change from one period to another, it is possible to learn over time the relationship between $P_{h,t}$ and $P_t$. This would lead to an increasingly accurate assessment of $P_t$.\noindent
set of household $h$ includes only goods in $A_{h,t}$, the price level of the competitors, denoted by $\bar{P}_{h,t}$, is not directly observed. Hence the following definition:

**Definition 2:** The price level of the competition of good $h \in H$ at time $t$ is denoted by $\bar{P}_{h,t}$ and defined as follows:

1- Consider the probability space $G \equiv (G,G_\sigma,N(\cdot))$, where $G_\sigma$ is the $\sigma$-algebra of $G$, and the distribution function $N(\cdot)$ corresponds to a uniform distribution.

2- Given $k^* \in (0,1)$, define:

$$\Pi_G(G,k^*,h) \equiv \left\{ \tilde{G} \in G_\sigma \mid N(\tilde{G}) = k^* \right\}.$$

3- Then the set of goods competing with good $h$ for each $t \geq 1$ is given by:

$$G_{h,t} \in \Pi_G(G,k^*,h,P).$$

4- Let $N_{h,t}(\cdot)$ denote the conditional distribution over subset $G_{h,t}$. Then the price level of the competition of good $h$ at time $t$ is given by

$$\bar{P}_{h,t} = \int_{G_{h,t}} x \, dN_{h,t}(x).$$

It is assumed that by the law of large numbers, for each $t \geq 1$

$$\int_H \bar{P}_{h,t} = P_t. \quad (7)$$

The following assumption is modelled in Section 4.1. It is justified by the households’ lack of capacity to process information.

**Assumption 1** Perceptions about the nominal rate $i_t$ are idiosyncratic.

In the ICK model discussed later, households can form estimates of $P_t$ over time, given the sequence of realizations of $P_{h,t}$, which amounts to facing idiosyncratic consumption-basket inflation rates $\pi_{h,t}$ that may differ from their believes on $\pi_t$. As explained below, they also face heterogeneous nominal rates. Hence in a given period, the intertemporal consumption allocation decisions are also heterogeneous. For instance, holding everything else constant, household $h$ increases its consumption if it believes that it faces a relatively low $P_{h,t}$. This also has an impact on price-setting, as the household’s desired labor supply is likely to be affected (depending on the extent of complementarity/substitutability of leisure with consumption).

---

13 The assumption that the idiosyncratic consumption space changes each period can be relaxed at the expense of more analytical complexity. If there were a systematic presence of a set of goods in the households’ consumption space, it would be easier to figure out an approximate relationship between the idiosyncratic price level and the aggregate one. According to the discussion that follows, this would increase the speed of learning and diminish the need to conjecture what others are doing. Hence the lack of common knowledge would have a smaller impact on the economy’s dynamics.
3.1 Private Sector Information Structure: Perceptions and Beliefs

In contrast with the previous literature on models with imperfect common knowledge, this rational expectations framework generates endogenously the observation noise that generates and sustains heterogeneity of beliefs.

As a simplification, the household optimization problem is completely symmetric. The two restrictions specific to each household are its budget constraint and its information-processing constraint. This last cognitive constraint is identical (by assumption) across households but is independent.

Once the economy is hit by an aggregate shock, the information-processing constraints introduce observation noise that is idiosyncratic. Household conjectures about the realization of the shocks are almost surely heterogeneous. The resulting endogenous imperfect common knowledge structure is sustained without deviating from the rational expectations framework. The necessary elements are definitions 1 and 2, plus Assumption 1.

A signal $F_{t,h}$ indicates the observation of variable $F_t$ by household $h$. The following vector summarizes the signals perceived by the household:

$$s_{h,t} \equiv (\pi_{h,t}, y_{h,t}, i_{h,t}).$$

The information set of household $h$ at time $t$ is defined as

$$I_t(h) \equiv \{I_{t-1}(h), s_{h,t}, i_{h,t}, P_{h,t}, B_{t-1}(h), \pi_{t-1}(h)\}.$$ 

It is necessary here to introduce further notation. The expectation operator $E^{h}{_t}$ indicates an expectation conditional on the information set $I_t(h)$. Expression $F^{h,(j)}_{s/t}$ is the expectation held at time $t$ by household $h$ of the average expectation of the average expectation... ($j$ times) of the aggregate stochastic variable $F_s$. The superscript $j \geq 0$ indicates the order of the expectation. The average expectation across the economy is given by $F^{(j)}_{s/t} = \int_H F^{h,(j)}_{s/t} dh$. Given an expectation of order $j$, the expectation of order $j + 1$ is given by $F^{h,(j+1)}_{s/t} = E^{h}{_t}\{\int_H F^{h,(j)}_{s/t} dh\}$.

By convention, $F^{h}_{s/t} = F^{h,(1)}_{s/t}$ and $F_s = F^{h,(0)}_{s/t}$. The argument $(h)$ still indicates household $h$’s choice variables, past and present, or a set containing them. Finally, define the operator $E_t\{F^{(j)}_{s/t}\} = \int_H F^{h,(j+1)}_{s/t} dh = F^{(j+1)}_{s/t}$.

It is assumed throughout the paper that at $t = 0$ the economy is at the deterministic steady state, which is common knowledge. Functional arguments are not specified when confusion is not possible.

---

14 Information sets are denoted by $I_t(h)$ instead of $I_{h,t}$ because they also contain household $h$’s choice variables. By definition, households cannot forget.

15 For instance, expressions such as $F^{h,(j)}_{s/t} (h)$ denote expectations of order $j$ held by household $h$ at time $t$, about the choice of $F_s(h)$.

16 With common knowledge, $F^{h,(j)}_{s/t} = F^{h}_{s/t} = F_{s/t}$ for all $h \in H, t \geq 1, s \geq 1$, and $j \geq 1$. 

7
4 Learning in The Private Sector

All relevant stochastic variables are normally distributed. The constraint adopted to model the household’s information-processing constraint is based on Sims (2003). Its particular functional form and a brief discussion of its statistical basis is given in Appendix A.1. This constraint places bounds on how much a rational decision-maker can reduce per period the uncertainty of her beliefs. It establishes that each decision maker can process a maximum of $K \in (0, +\infty)$ bits of information per unit of time. In controlling flows of information, it provides the foundation to model learning.

The following proposition introduces the main parameter of the learning process used throughout the paper, and is proven in Appendix A.2.

**Proposition 1** Let $k^*$ denote the fraction of all information that each household can absorb per period. Then, there is a one-to-one relationship between $K$ and $k^*$ given by

$$k^* = 1 - e^{-K \cdot 2 \ln(2)}.$$

Figure 1 presents this functional relationship. For relatively low values of $K$ the fraction of relevant information absorbed is already rather large ($K = 1$ already implies $k^* = 0.75$).

By assumption, the value $k^*$ is the same for all households and constant over time. Nonetheless, the noise in the observed signals is independent across households and over time, due to the idiosyncrasy of the constraints.

Given an imperfectly observed normally distributed variable $F_t$, household $h$’s optimal first-order conjecture is

$$F_{h,t} = (1 - k^*) F_{h,t-1} + k^* \cdot F_{s_{h,t}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

This last expression is a Kalman filter with a constant gain equal to the fraction of information processed per unit of time ($k^*$). Given symmetry of the problem, equation (8) governs learning from every variable in $s_{h,t}$, for all $h \in H$. Therefore, Proposition 1 provides an intuitive interpretation for the Kalman gain involved in the learning process.

4.1 Monetary Policy and Interest Rates in the Private Sector

Monetary policy follows a simple Taylor rule that is subject to persistent shocks:

$$i_t = \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_y l_t + \zeta_t,$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

where $i_t$ denotes the federal funds rate, $\pi_t$ is the (net) inflation rate, and $l_t$ is employment, all in deviations from their steady-state levels. It is therefore assumed that the target for $(\pi_t, l_t)$ is the
steady state. The shock $\zeta_t$ is given by:

$$\zeta_t = \delta \zeta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

with $\delta \in (0, 1)$ and $\varepsilon_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$, \hfill (10)

where $\varepsilon_t$ is the innovation to the policy shock. Rudebusch (2002) estimates the same Taylor rule, obtaining an AR(1) policy shock with $\delta = 0.92$ and standard error 0.06. Monetary policy is the only shock in the model, allowing for a much simpler exposition of the basic ideas.

In what follows I analyze the effect of a unique innovation at $t = 1$:

$$\varepsilon_t \neq 0 \iff t = 1,$$ \hfill (11)

which implies by rationality

$$\varepsilon_{t/t-1} = 0 \text{ for all } t.$$ \hfill (12)

The pair $\phi \equiv (\phi_\pi, \phi_y)$ is referred to as the coefficients of the systematic part of monetary policy.

In order to convey the main message of this paper, this specification presents some advantages over a Taylor rule with interest-rate smoothing. Adding a lagged interest rate to the right-hand side would introduce additional intertemporal dynamics. This makes it more difficult to separate out the source of inertia. The only variables that persist from one period to the next are asset holdings and the policy shock.

Now, Assumption 1 can be justified as follows. Each household perceives the federal funds rate $i_t$ with noise. Therefore $\{\hat{i}_t\}_{h \in H}$ denotes the conjectures of all households about the federal funds rate. I assume that households can only perform one financial transaction per period. Moreover, dealing with the central bank is subject to an arbitrarily small transaction cost $\varphi^C > 0$.

Each consumer-producer household observes only a fraction $k^*$ of the financial market participants. This set is assumed to change from one period to another. Any household can always

---

17 Note that because households understand that nominal rates are set according to (9), the vector of signals $s_{h,t}$ included in $I_t(h)$ can be alternatively defined as

$$s_{h,t} \equiv (\pi_{s_{h,t}}, y_{s_{h,t}}, \zeta_{s_{h,t}}, i_{s_{h,t}}).$$

This is because (9) implies that the four signals $(\pi_{s_{h,t}}, y_{s_{h,t}}, \zeta_{s_{h,t}}, i_{s_{h,t}})$ are linearly dependent.

18 Rudebusch (2002) obtains the following Taylor rule with serially correlated shocks

$$i_t = \frac{1.24}{0.24} \pi_t + 0.33 \hat{i}_t + \zeta_t,$$ \hfill (0.24)

$$\zeta_t = 0.92 \zeta_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$ \hfill (0.10)

with $\pi_t = 0.36$ and $\mathbf{R}^i = 0.96$

(his equation (18), page 1178). A Dickey-Fuller test rejects the hypothesis of a unit root in the policy shock process with a p-value smaller than 0.05.


20 Note that only cases where policy satisfies the Taylor principle are considered ($\phi_\pi > 1$). There is ample theoretical evidence of the desirability of $\phi_\pi > 1$ to ensure a stable inflation path. For more details, see Woodford (2003, Chapter 2), Leeper (1991), and Kerr and King (1996).

21 Data from several economic surveys indicate that the private sector does not fully absorb relevant market data that is easily available at low cost.

22 This rules out the possibility of arbitrage. In the equilibrium, each household can observe the rates corresponding to a fraction $k^*$ of the transactions.

23 This simplification avoids the introduction of a financial intermediation sector. In equilibrium, it makes the model more realistic, as producers/consumers do not deal directly with the central bank.
threaten to perform its transactions with the central bank if \( i_{h,t} \) departs too much from \( \bar{i}_t \). On the equilibrium path competition, optimality of consumption decisions, rationality, and the continuity of all the payoff functions with respect to \( \varphi^C \) ensure that, as \( \varphi^C \to 0 \),

\[
i_{h,t} = \bar{i}_t \quad \text{for all } t \text{ and } h \in H, \tag{13}
\]

and that no transactions with the central bank take place.

The average federal funds signal observed by household \( h \) is given by \( s_{h,t} = i_t + \eta_{h,t} \), where \( \eta_{h,t} \sim N \left( 0, \sigma^2 \right) \) is the observation noise. In aggregating over households, the noise vanishes and the average conjecture is given by

\[
i_{t/t} = (1 - k) i_{t-1} + k^* i_t. \tag{14}
\]

Equation (14) means that the central bank has control over the economy’s average interest rate, since (13) implies that \( i_{t/t} = \int_H i_{h,t} \).

### 4.2 Formulation of the Private Sector Problem

The specification of production and demand functions implies

\[
L_t (h) = L_t \left( \frac{P_t (h)}{\bar{P}_{h,t}} \right)^{-\theta}.
\]

The rate of inflation for commodity \( h \) is

\[
1 + \pi_t (h) = \frac{P_t (h)}{P_{t-1} (h)},
\]

and the economy-wide inflation rate \( \pi_t = \int_H \pi_t (h) \, dh \).

The inflation rate of the competitors of commodity \( h \) is given by

\[
1 + \bar{\pi}_{h,t} = \frac{\bar{P}_{h,t}}{\bar{P}_{h,t-1}}.
\]

Next, define the following endogenous state variables:

\[
\begin{align*}
1 + \tau_{t-1} (h) &= \frac{P_{t-1} (h)}{P_{h,t-1}}, \tag{15} \\
1 + \lambda_{t-1} (h) &= \frac{P_{t-1} (h)}{\bar{P}_{h,t-1}}, \tag{16} \\
b_t (h) &= \frac{B_t (h)}{P_{h,t}}.
\end{align*}
\]

\footnote{The payoffs of trading with the central bank and with other households are both continuous in \( \varphi^C \). As long as \( \varphi^C > 0 \), households’ payoffs from trading with other households are no lower than the payoffs of trading with the central bank. By continuity of the payoff functions, this must also be true in the limit as \( \varphi^C \to 0 \).}

\footnote{Defining \( \tau_t (h) \) and \( \lambda_t (h) \) allows us to express the household optimization problem in terms of inflation rates instead of price levels. It is possible then to define the problem around a steady state.}
After taking into account the presence of uncertainty, the problem (4) becomes

\[ \max \left\{ \pi_t(h), b_t(h) \right\}_{t=1}^\infty \text{ to maximize:} \]

\[
\bar{U}(z) = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^{t-1} E_t^h \left\{ \frac{C_t(h)^{1-\rho} - 1}{1-\rho} - \frac{1}{\nu} \left[ \left( 1 + \lambda_{t-1}(h) \right) \frac{1 + \pi_t(h)}{1 + \pi_{h,t}} \right]^{-\theta} L_t \right\} \\
\text{s.t. } C_t(h) \leq \frac{b_{t-1}(h)}{1 + \pi_{h,t}} - \frac{b_t(h)}{(1 + i_{h,t})} \\
+ \left[ 1 + \lambda_{t-1}(h) \right]^{-\theta} \left( \frac{1 + \pi_t(h)}{1 + \pi_{h,t}} \right)^{-\theta} L_t \left[ 1 + \tau_{t-1}(h) \right] \frac{1 + \pi_{h,t}}{1 + \pi_{h,t}} \]

(17)

The solution method has two stages. First, a linear quadratic (LQ) approximation to the economy is performed around its stationary zero-inflation deterministic steady state, solving the resulting household optimization problem. This yields the optimal decision functions for the household. The second stage uses these decision functions to solve the general equilibrium problem under imperfect common knowledge. The problem can be broken down into these two stages because the optimal decision function from an LQ-problem displays certainty equivalence.

5 First Stage: Optimal Decision Functions

The LQ approximation is standard and only the main results are presented.27 Note that in the deterministic steady state \( \pi_{h,t} = \pi_t \) for all \( h \) and \( t \), because all prices are observable at no cost. Define then

\[ W_t(h) \equiv (1, \pi_t, \pi_{h,t}, i_t, i_{h,t}, \lambda_{t-1}(h), \tau_{t-1}(h), b_{t-1}(h), \pi_t(h), b_t(h))^T. \]

The approximation to the felicity function, once the constraints are substituted into it, is a quadratic form28

\[ W_t^T Q W_t \]

and the corresponding deterministic Bellman Equation \( V(.) \) is29

\[ V(z_{t-1}, b_{t-1}(h), \lambda_{t-1}(h), \tau_{t-1}(h)) = \max_{(\pi_t(h), b_t(h))} \left\{ \frac{W_t^T Q W_t}{\beta V(z_{t-1}, \lambda_t(h), \tau_t(h))} \right\}. \]

The only state variables in the model are the exogenous policy shock and asset holdings (other than \( \tau_t(h) \) and \( \lambda_t(h) \), which are introduced for modelling convenience). Additional states could be introduced for modelling convenience). Additional states could be...

---

28 For the details of this method applied to a similar model, see Gumbau-Brisa (2003).
29 Note that the quadratic felicity function is bounded in the relevant domain and meets the conditions required to apply Theorem 4.8 in Stokey and Lucas (1989). This ensures the existence of \( V(.) \).
introduced, for instance, assuming habit formation or federal funds rate smoothing. The approach adopted here allows for a more direct analysis of the impact of policy shocks on inflation inertia.

In terms of deviations from the deterministic steady state, the resulting optimal decision functions for \((\pi_t(h), b_t(h))\) are

\[
\pi_t(h) = a_1 \pi_t + a_2 \pi_{h,t} + a_3 l_t + a_4 i_t + a_5 \lambda_{l-1}(h) + a_6 \tau_{t-1}(h) + a_7 b_{t-1}(h)
\]

\[
b_t(h) = d_1 \pi_t + d_2 \pi_{h,t} + d_3 l_t + d_4 i_t + d_5 \lambda_{l-1}(h) + d_6 \tau_{t-1}(h) + d_7 b_{t-1}(h).
\]

(19)

(20)

Household rationality implies an understanding of the relationship between the Taylor rule (9) and both inflation and output.\(^\text{30}\)

\[
\pi_t(h) = (a_1 + a_4 \phi_a) \pi_t + a_2 \pi_{h,t} + (a_3 + a_4 \phi_y) l_t + a_4 \zeta_t + a_5 \lambda_{l-1}(h) + a_6 \tau_{t-1}(h) + a_7 b_{t-1}(h)
\]

\[
b_t(h) = (b_1 + b_4 \phi_a) \pi_t + b_2 \pi_{h,t} + (b_3 + b_4 \phi_y) l_t + b_4 \zeta_t + b_5 \lambda_{l-1}(h) + b_6 \tau_{t-1}(h) + b_7 b_{t-1}(h).
\]

(21)

(22)

Let \(D \equiv \{a, d\}\) where \(a \equiv \{a_1, ..., a_7\}\), and \(d \equiv \{d_1, ..., d_7\}\). Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix B present the coefficients in \(D\) for several parameter value configurations.\(^\text{31}\) The parameter values considered are \(\rho \in \{0.5, 1, 2\}\), \(\theta \in \{4, 6, 8\}\), \(\nu \in \{2, 5\}\) for a quarterly model with \(\beta = 0.96\). The Taylor rule coefficients are \(\phi = (1.5, 0.5)\), as proposed in Taylor (1993).\(^\text{32}\) In the next sections, the benchmark set of parameters consists of \(\rho = 2\), \(\theta = 6\) and \(\nu = 2\).

The coefficients \((a_4, d_4)\) indicate the effects of changes in the federal funds rate on the choice variables. It should be the case that \(a_4 < 0\) and \(d_4 > 0\). According to Table 1, \(a_1 + a_2 = 1\), as in the perfect-information equilibrium each producer changes prices one-to-one with the aggregate price level. Moreover, Table 2 shows that \(d_1 + d_2 = 0\), indicating that the desired level of real savings does not depend directly on the current inflation rate.

\(^{30}\)Performing the LQ approximation with respect to \(\zeta_t\) instead of \(i_t\) results in the same coefficients with four exceptions:

\[
\tilde{a}_j = a_j + a_4 \phi_a \text{ for } j = 1, 3.
\]

\[
\tilde{d}_j = d_j + d_4 \phi_y \text{ for } j = 1, 3.
\]

Nonetheless, the approach used here allows us to obtain more analytical results regarding the impact of policy on the equilibrium.

\(^{31}\)The coefficients in \(a\) consist of elasticities and semi-elasticities \((a_4\) and \(a_\tau)\). The coefficients in \(d\) indicate the total effect on the units of real savings of percent changes of the right-hand-side variables. Coefficient \(d_7\) is a simple derivative, providing the unit change in the optimal choice of real savings, given a unit change in current real financial wealth.

\(^{32}\)Many authors have argued that these coefficients characterize well the conduct of recent U.S. monetary policy. See, for instance, Gertler (1999), Taylor (1999b), Rudebusch (2002), McCallum and Nelson (1999), and the references in the latter.
6 Second Stage: Imperfect Common Knowledge Problem

The constraint on households’ ability to observe economic variables is introduced now. It does not affect the optimal decision functions, given the LQ nature of the problem.33

Households understand the process that generates $P_{h,t}$ and $\bar{P}_{h,t}$. Hence, for all $h$ and $t \geq 1$:

$$E_t^h \left\{ \bar{P}_{h,t+j} \right\} = E_t^h \left\{ P_{t+j} \right\} \text{ for } j = 0, 1, \ldots \tag{23}$$

$$E_t^h \left\{ P_{h,t+j} \right\} = E_t^h \left\{ P_{t+j} \right\} \text{ for } j = 1, 2, \ldots \tag{24}$$

Note that they can observe $P_{h,t}$ but can only conjecture $\bar{P}_{h,t}$ from their sales.

From now on, given (23), $\bar{\pi}_{h,t}$ is substituted for the expectation of the aggregate variable $\pi_{t}^h$. This is done because

$$\pi_{t}^h = E_t^h \left\{ \bar{\pi}_{h,t} \right\}.$$ 

6.1 Forecasts and Higher-Order Expectations of the Shocks

The current average conjecture of the policy shock can be expressed as

$$\zeta_{t} = (1 - k^*) \delta \zeta_{t-1} + k^* \zeta_{t}. \tag{25}$$

In this case, $\zeta_{t}$ is exogenously determined by the stochastic process in (10).

The difference equation shows how information about policy is absorbed over time at a constrained rate ($k^*$). The accumulation of information over time improves the (cross-sectional) average estimates of the policy shock.34 Nonetheless, individual beliefs are affected every period by an idiosyncratic iid observation noise. This maintains heterogeneity in households’ conjectures of $\zeta_{t}$ (or equivalently, of $\varepsilon_{1}$).35

Solving the difference equation (25), it is possible to write the expectation of a shock as

$$\zeta_{t-a/t-b} = \zeta_{t-a} \left[ 1 - (1 - k)^{t-b} \right] \text{ for } t > b \geq a \geq 0, \tag{26}$$

given $\zeta_{0/0} = 0$, (11) and (12). For easier interpretation, set $a = 0$ in (26) and express the policy shock in terms of $\varepsilon_{1}$:

$$\zeta_{t/t-b} = \varepsilon_{1} \delta^{t-1} \left[ 1 - (1 - k^*)^{t-b} \right] \text{ for } t > b \geq 0, \tag{27}$$

This illustrates that the passage of time has two effects on $\zeta_{t/t-b}$. On the one hand, $\delta^{t-1}$ represents the diminishing impact of the innovation $\varepsilon_{1}$ on the shock $\zeta_{t}$. On the other hand, the term $(1 - k^*)^{t-b}$ indicates that accumulation of information has taken place between $t' = 1$ and $t'' = t - b$. As $b$ increases, conjectures are formed farther back in time; hence, households have accumulated less information. In this case, the forecast about the shock at $t$ is more inaccurate (closer to 0).

33 The solution displays certainty equivalence.
34 There is no household superscript in (25).
35 The shock can be expressed as $\zeta_{t} = \delta^{t-1} \varepsilon_{1}$. See equation (10) and condition (11).
Given \( \{\zeta_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}, \zeta_{0/0} = 0 \), (11), and (12), equation (27) for \( b = 0 \) yields the entire sequence of average conjectures \( \{\zeta_{t/t}\}_{t=1}^{\infty} \).

Repeating \((j-1)\) times the process of taking expectations of (26) with respect to \( I_{t-b}(h) \), and integrating over \( h \in H \) yields:

\[
\zeta_{t-a/t-b}^{(j)} = \zeta_{t-a} \left[ 1 - (1 - k)^{t-h} \right]^j \quad \text{for } t > b \geq a \geq 0 \text{ and } j = 0, 1, \ldots \tag{28}
\]

Therefore, higher-order expectations are less sensitive to changes in \( \zeta_{t-a} \). The higher their order, the smaller the adjustment after a shock. Forming the expectation of order \((j)\) requires processing information (learning) about the average expectation of order \((j-1)\). This introduces additional observation noise, which makes the expectation of order \((j)\) less responsive to shocks than the expectation of order \((j-1)\). This effect, plus the persistence of the underlying shock, constitutes the engine of the macroeconomic system’s sluggish adjustment.

### 6.2 Definition and Characterization of the ICK Equilibrium

The formal definition of equilibrium for this economy is

**Definition 3:** A Competitive Equilibrium in the ICK Monetary Economy at \( t \) consists of a plan \( \Lambda(h) = \{\pi_t(h), b_t(h)\}_{t=1}^{\infty} \) for each \( h \in H \), and sequences of prices

\[
P = \{\pi_t, i_t, \ (\pi_{h,t}, \pi_{h,t}, i_{h,t})_{h \in H}\}_{t=1}^{\infty}
\]

and of information structures

\[
I = \{(I_t(h))_{h \in H}\}_{t=1}^{\infty}
\]

such that:

1. Given \( P \) and \( I \), plan \( \Lambda(h) \) solves the problem (17) for all \( h \in H \).

2. \( \int_H b_t(h) \, dh = 0 \) for all \( h \in H \) and \( t \).

The economy’s equilibrium is Markov: the stochastic process of the shock is AR(1), the other relevant state variables are determined at \( t - 1 \) \((b_{t-1}(h), \lambda_{t-1}(h), \text{and } \tau_{t-1}(h))\), and learning takes the form of a Kalman filter. Hence, choices at \( t \) depend only on information about the shock available at \( t \), and the state variables inherited from \( t - 1 \).

Under ICK, household \( h \) is aware that its observations are *almost surely* different from those of a non-zero-measure set of households. It also knows that all other households are in the same situation, and that everybody knows this fact. It has to take this into account in forming its expectation about \( \pi_t \), and, correspondingly, choosing \( \pi_t(h) \). Hence, in conjecturing \( \pi_t \), household \( h \) has to take into account that the other households take into account that other households take into account... (iterated to infinity) that there are different perceptions of the economy-wide level

---

\(36\) The assumption that \( \zeta_{0/0} = 0 \) can be relaxed at the expense of lengthier expressions, without relevant offsetting gains.
of inflation. Given the structure of monopolistic competition, this affects price-setting (and hence inflation) in period \( t \).

Households form conjectures about the aggregate inflation level by processing information from their environment, including \( \pi_{h,t} \) and \( \bar{\pi}_{h,t} \). Therefore,

\[
\pi^h_{t/t} \neq \pi_{h,t} \text{ and } \pi^h_{t/t} \neq \bar{\pi}_{h,t} \text{ almost surely for all } h \text{ and } t.
\]

In period \( t \) household \( h \) can be saving or lending, depending on the values of \( \pi_{h,t}, \bar{\pi}_{h,t}, \) and \( \pi^h_{t/t} \), even though it knows that aggregate savings are zero. As discussed above, the relative movements in idiosyncratic prices lead to heterogeneous beliefs, which result in heterogeneous consumption/savings decisions.

### 6.3 ICK Equilibrium Solution

To simplify notation, define

\[
\begin{align*}
z^h_{t}(j)(h; n) &= n_1 b^h_{t-1}(j-1)(h) + n_2 b^h_{t}(j-1)(h) \quad \text{for } j = 1, 2, \ldots \quad (29) \\
z^h_{t}(0)(h; n) &= z^h_{t}(1)(h; n) \quad (30) \\
x^h_{t}(j)(h; n) &= n_3 \lambda^h_{t-1}(j-1)(h) + n_4 \tau^h_{t-1}(j-1)(h) \quad \text{for } j = 1, 2, \ldots \quad (31) \\
x^h_{t}(0)(h; n) &= x^h_{t}(1)(h; n) \quad (32)
\end{align*}
\]

for \( n = (n_1, n_2, n_3, n_4) \in \mathbb{R}^4 \).

The following property is proven in Appendix A.3.

**Lemma 1** for \( t_0 \geq t \)

\[
\begin{align*}
z^j_{t/t_0}(n) &= 0 \text{ for all } n \in \mathbb{R}^4 \text{ and } j \geq 0. \\
x^j_{t/t_0}(n) &= 0 \text{ for all } n \in \mathbb{R}^4 \text{ and } j \geq 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Appendix A.4 shows that higher-order expectations \((j \geq 1)\) of inflation are

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi^h_{t/t} &= \Gamma_1 \pi^h_{t/t} + \Gamma_4 \zeta^h_{t/t} + \Gamma \left( x^h_{t/t} (h; n^\pi) + z^h_{t/t} (h; n^\pi) \right) \quad (33)
\end{align*}
\]

and provides the functional forms for the endogenous parameters \( \Gamma_1(D, \phi), \Gamma_4(D, \phi), \) and \( \Gamma(D, \phi) \).

The parameter \( \Gamma_1 \) captures the effective degree of strategic interdependence in pricing under imperfect common knowledge.\(^{37}\) In particular \( \Gamma_1 > 0 \) because there is complementarity in price-setting. For the parameter values considered, \( \Gamma_1 < 1 \), which, as discussed below, is required to ensure the existence of equilibrium, and \( \Gamma_4 < 0 \).

---

\(^{37}\)Strictly speaking, it can be shown that the coefficient measuring the strategic interdependence of household actions is \( \gamma = \gamma_1 \cdot \Gamma_1 \), with \( \gamma_1 \in (0, 1) \) for the relevant parameter values. Coefficient \( \gamma_1 \) is given in Appendix A.4. Parameter \( \gamma_1 \) turns out to be of little relevance.
Iterated substitution of equation (33) for all \( j \geq 1 \), yields:

\[
\pi_{t/t}^h = \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} (\Gamma_1)^{j-1} \left[ \Gamma_4 \xi_{t/t}^h(j) + \Gamma \left( x_{t/t}^h(j) (h; n^\pi) + z_{t/t}^h(j) (h; n^\pi) \right) \right]. \tag{34}
\]

In order to find a reduced-form expression for \( \pi_{t/t} \), it is then necessary to solve (and aggregate) the series

\[
\Delta_{t/t}^h = \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} (\Gamma_1)^{j-1} \left[ \Gamma_4 \xi_{t/t}^h(j) \right]. \tag{35}
\]

Aggregating (34) and using Lemma 1 implies:

\[
\pi_{t/t} = \Delta_{t/t}.
\]

 Appendix A.4 shows that aggregate inflation can be expressed as

\[
\pi_t = \Gamma_1 \pi_{t/t} + \Gamma_4 \zeta_{t/t}. \tag{36}
\]

Consequently, \( \Gamma_1 \) determines how pricing is affected by the higher-order expectations of inflation. The weight placed in (35) on higher-order expectations increases geometrically with \( \Gamma_1 \). In particular, larger values of \( \Gamma_1 \) imply that the weights given to expectations of any order become more similar to one another.

\( \Gamma_1 (D, \phi) \) is endogenous and affected by the particular Taylor rule implemented. As shown in Section 7, monetary policy has an effect on the extent of persistence because it affects the degree of household interdependence in decision-making. When monetary policy is more aggressive in stabilizing the variable that creates strategic interdependence, conjectures about others’ decisions are less important. Information about what others are doing is less important, since the relevant variable becomes easier to predict. This reduces the extent of inertia, as households respond by placing a greater weight on low-order conjectures, which adjust more quickly.

The average of expectation (35) can be expressed recursively:38

\[
\Delta_{t/t} = E_t \left\{ \Gamma_4 \zeta_t + \Gamma_1 \int_H \sum_{j=2}^{\infty} (\Gamma_1)^{j-2} \left[ \Gamma_4 \xi_{t/t}^h(j-1) \right] dh \right\} \tag{37}
\]

and therefore

\[
\Delta_{t/t} = \Gamma_4 \zeta_{t/t} + \Gamma_1 E_t \left\{ \Delta_{t/t} \right\}. \tag{38}
\]

Appendix A.5 relies on this last equation to provide the proof for the next proposition.

**Proposition 2** For \( \Gamma_1 \in (0, 1) \) and \( k^* \in (0, 1) \), a solution for \( \pi_{t+j} \) exists, is unique, and is given by

\[ \pi_{t+j} = \zeta_{t+j} \cdot Z_{t+j} \text{ for } j = 0, 1, ... \]

---

38 An early version of Adam (2005) used a similar handling of higher-order expectations.
where

\[
Z_{t+j} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\Gamma_1 \left[ \mu_{t+j} \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)^{t+j-1} \right) + \mu_2 \right] \\
+ \Gamma_4 \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)^{t+j} \right) \end{array} \right\} < 0 \tag{39}
\]

\[
\mu_{t+j} = \frac{(1 - k^*)}{1 - \Gamma_1 \cdot \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)^{t+j} \right)} \left[ \frac{\Gamma_4}{1 - k^* \Gamma_1} \right] < 0 \tag{40}
\]

\[
\mu_2 = k^* \left[ \frac{\Gamma_4}{1 - k^* \Gamma_1} \right] < 0. \tag{41}
\]

The functional shape of \( \mu_1 \) illustrates the need for \( \Gamma_1 < 1 \) if an equilibrium has to exist. Equation (79) in Appendix A.5.4 establishes that \(^39\)

\[
\pi_t = \Gamma_1 \left[ \mu_{t/t-1} + \mu_2 \right] + \Gamma_4 \zeta_{t/t}. \tag{42}
\]

It is possible, then, to derive an expression for the forecast of inflation:

\[
\pi_{t-a/t-b} = \zeta_{t-a/t-b} \left\{ \Gamma_1 \left[ \mu_{t-a} + \mu_2 \right] + \Gamma_4 \right\} \text{ for } t > b \geq a \geq 0, \tag{43}
\]

where (26) allows us to provide a closed-form solution for \( \zeta_{t-a/t-b} \) as function of \( \zeta_{t-a} \).

Given that \( Z_{t+j} \) is deterministic for all \( t \) and \( j \), equations (28) and (43) indicate that the higher the expectation order of inflation, the milder is its reaction to a policy shock.\(^40\)

The comparative statics with respect to the information-processing parameter yields

\[
\left| \frac{\partial \pi_t}{\partial k^*} \right| > 0. \tag{44}
\]

Conditional on a policy rule \( \phi \), and for the same size of the shock, the aggregate inflation responds more on impact to the current shock, as it is easier to learn about it.

Dependence on higher-order expectations reduces the sensitivity of the inflation expectation to shocks, as well as the expectation of the shock. This slows down the adjustment of expectations and, given the relationship (36), it also slows down the adjustment of inflation. Hence, the degree of inflation inertia is increased. Both strategic complementarities in the nominal side and imperfect common knowledge about nominal values are necessary for this result. Nonetheless, the design of monetary policy plays also an important role, as discussed in the next section.

\(^{39}\) Some algebra shows that as \( k^* \to 1 \) this solution converges to the equilibrium under perfect information. The limit \( k^* \to 0 \) implies \( \pi_t = 0 \), the deterministic steady-state level of inflation.

\(^{40}\) Woodford (2002) also provides a closed-form solution for the higher-order expectations of inflation in his model with the same property.
6.4 Impact of Monetary Policy on Equilibrium Inflation

Definitions (59), (60), and (65) given in Appendix A.4 can be used to determine the following relationships between both $\Gamma_1$ and $\Gamma_4$ with respect to $\phi$:

$$\frac{\partial \Gamma_1 (\phi)}{\partial \phi_\pi} < 0; \quad \frac{\partial \Gamma_1 (\phi)}{\partial \phi_y} > 0; \quad \frac{\partial^2 \Gamma_1 (\phi)}{\partial \phi_y \partial \phi_\pi} > 0 \quad (45)$$

$$\frac{\partial \Gamma_4 (\phi)}{\partial \phi_\pi} = 0; \quad \frac{\partial |\Gamma_4 (\phi)|}{\partial \phi_y} < 0; \quad \frac{\partial^2 \Gamma_4 (\phi)}{\partial \phi_y \partial \phi_\pi} = 0.$$  

These signs hold for all the considered parameter values. Figure 2 (Appendix C) graphs $\Gamma_1$ for $\phi_\pi \in [1.05, 2.5]$ and $\phi_y \in [0.05, 2.5]$. The coefficient $\Gamma_4$ is an increasing and strictly concave negative function of $\phi_y$. The positive coefficient $\Gamma_1$ decreases with $\phi_\pi$ for given $\phi_y$. This indicates that stronger systematic responses to inflation reduce the relevance of higher-order expectations of $\pi_t$ for any price-setter. Strategic complementarities are weaker, resulting in a narrower channel for ICK to cause inertia.\textsuperscript{41} $\Gamma_1$ increases with $\phi_y$, conditional on $\phi_\pi$. A higher $\phi_y$ makes the nominal rate more sensitive to movements in employment around its natural rate, affecting the nominal rate and hence inflation. With a more volatile inflation, higher-order expectations play a greater role. This increases the role of strategic complementarities in pricing, as measured by $\Gamma_1$.

The negative coefficient $\Gamma_4$ is unaffected by $\phi_\pi$, but approaches zero with $\phi_y$. A higher value of $\phi_y$ decreases the impact of a shock on inflation going through $\Gamma_4$.

Using numerical simulation, it is possible to show the following two properties of $Z_t$. They are crucial in understanding the impact of monetary policy on the equilibrium:

$$\frac{\partial |Z_t (\phi)|}{\partial \phi_\pi} < 0; \quad \frac{\partial |Z_t (\phi)|}{\partial \phi_y} < 0.$$

Hence, $Z_t (\phi) < 0$ will be closer to 0 for higher values of $\phi_\pi$ and $\phi_y$. First, the systematic part of policy implies a larger response of the nominal rate to inflation (larger $\phi_\pi$) or output (larger $\phi_y$), allowing smaller departures of inflation from the target. And second, with a larger $\phi_\pi$, households understand the stronger anti-inflationary goal of policy and rely less on information coming from the behavior of others. In this case, the expectation of inflation stays closer to the target. Higher values of $\phi_y$ reduce the magnitude of $\Gamma_4$, implying a smaller reaction of prices to the expectation of the policy shock (see equation (36)).

7 The Phillips Curve

The Phillips Curve can be obtained starting from the expression for the equilibrium level of output, provided in the following proposition.

\textsuperscript{41} An additional interpretation would be that a high $\phi_\pi$ reduces the effect of potential control errors or other shocks in the monetary transmission mechanism.
Proposition 3 Given $k^* \in (0, 1)$ the reduced form for the equilibrium level of output is

\[
\begin{align*}
    l_t &= \zeta_t \cdot \Psi_t \\
    \Psi_t &= -\frac{a_4}{a_3} \left( \phi_x \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)^t \right) - \frac{a_2}{a_4} \left( 1 - k^* \right)^t \right) \cdot Z_t < 0.
\end{align*}
\]

The proof is provided in Appendix A.6.

It is possible to express the Phillips Curve in different ways. This results from the presence of a single shock and linearity of the model. At least two Phillips Curve relationships are worth mentioning, given their economic content and role in the literature. The first is a Hybrid Phillips Curve (with both backward and forward-looking terms), and the second a Backward-Looking, Expectations-Augmented (BLEA) Phillips Curve.

The Hybrid Phillips Curve takes the form

\[
\pi_t = \Omega_1 \cdot l_t + \Omega_{2,t} \cdot \pi_{t-1} + \Omega_{3,t} \cdot \pi_{t+1}
\]

with $\Omega_1, \{\Omega_{i,t}\}_{i=2,3} > 0$ for all $t$ and all relevant parameter values. The functional form of the coefficients is given by (83) – (85) in Appendix A.7, where there is a brief discussion on how to obtain this expression.

The analysis that follows is constrained to $\phi_x \in (1, 2.5)$ and to $\phi_y \in (0, 2.5)$. Coefficient $\Omega_1$ is constant through time, but $\Omega_{2,t}$ and $\Omega_{3,t}$ are not, and all three depend on $k^*$. Coefficient $\Omega_1 \in (0, 0.12)$, and is strictly increasing with $k^*$. The dynamic behavior of $\Omega_{2,t}$ and $\Omega_{3,t}$ is given in Figures 3 and 4 as a function of $k^*$. These two coefficients illustrate how, with the passage of time, new information is less relevant for price-setting. Since households keep learning in every period about the persistent shock, new information has a decreasing value relative to the accumulated stock of information. Conjectures formed exclusively with past information become increasingly precise over time, which explains the increasing value of $\Omega_{2,t}$. Future inflation is related to current inflation because there is common information absorbed at $t$ that is used for price-setting both at $t$ and at $t+1$. The larger $k^*$ is, the more common information is processed, increasing $\Omega_{3,t}$. Nonetheless, the importance of $\pi_{t+1}$ in the Phillips Curve is extremely small when compared with $\pi_{t-1}$. While $\Omega_{2,t}$ approximates the value 0.9 ($= \delta$) as households accumulate information, coefficient $\Omega_{3,t} \leq 0.07$ for $k^* \in (0, 1)$. Fuhrer (1997) estimates a similar Phillips Curve, obtaining a coefficient for an average of past inflation of 0.8, with 0.9 within the 5 percent confidence interval.

The BLEA Phillips Curve takes the form:

\[
\pi_t = \Omega_1 \cdot l_t + \Omega_{2,t} \cdot \pi_{t-1} + \Omega_{3,t}^* \cdot \pi_{t/t-1},
\]

where again $\Omega_{3,t}^* > 0$ for all relevant parameter values. The expression for this parameter is given by (86) in Appendix A.7, as a function of $(t, k^*, a, \phi, \delta, Z_t)$. Figure 5 displays the behavior of $\Omega_{3,t}^*$ over time after a policy shock. The forecast $\pi_{t/t-1}$ is important only for rather low values of $k^*$ and for a short time. This illustrates the high value of new information right after the shock takes place. As information accumulates, $\pi_{t/t-1}$ basically vanishes from the equation.
### 7.1 Impact of Monetary Policy on Inflation Persistence

Next, I define an index of inflation persistence (or inertia) and analyze its properties.

**Definition 4:** The Index of Inflation Inertia is given by

$$\Phi(.) \equiv \frac{\text{Corr}(\pi_{t+j}, \pi_t)}{\text{Corr}(\zeta_{t+j}, \zeta_t)} = \frac{Z_{t+j}}{Z_t} \text{ for } j = 0, 1, 2, ...$$

(48)

Figure 6 presents this index as function of both time and $k^*$. The most important property of this index is given by the following proposition.

**Proposition 4**

$$\Phi(.) > 1 \text{ for } j = 1, 2, ...$$

$$\Phi(.) = 1 \text{ for } j = 0.$$  

(49)

The proof, and the full expression of the index, are both provided in Appendix A.8.

For $j = 1, 2, ...$ the index also has the following relevant properties:

$$\Phi(t) > \Phi(t') \iff t < t' \text{ for all } t ; \lim_{t \to \infty} \Phi(.) = 1$$

(50)

$$\frac{\partial \Phi(.)}{\partial \Gamma_1} > 0$$

(51)

$$\frac{\partial \Phi(.)}{\partial k^*} < 0 ; \lim_{k^* \to 1} \Phi(.) = 1$$

(52)

$$\Phi(.) \text{ depends only on } (\Gamma_1, k^*, t).$$

(53)

Proposition 4 states that inflation is inertial, more persistent than the underlying shock. Nonetheless, the extent of inertia dies off monotonically over time, while the private sector learns about the policy shock (see (50)). Moreover as $t \to \infty$ it disappears completely; eventually, both the shock and inflation must return to their steady-state levels.

The partial derivative in (51) can be related to monetary policy through (45). Hence (51) indicates that stronger anti-inflationary systematic policy reduces the extent of inertia, while a stronger response to the output gap increases it. The degree of inflation inertia can be understood as a measure of the impact of imperfect common knowledge. Focusing policy on inflation brings the economy closer to the perfect information (or common knowledge) case by making heterogeneity less relevant in the equilibrium. In particular, knowing that policy keeps inflation closer to target diminish the importance of higher-order beliefs in equilibrium. This in turn translates into a lower need for learning about others' actions, and hence in smaller effective strategic complementarities in pricing. The extent to which households engage in learning is therefore endogenous and dependent on monetary policy ($\phi$).

The relationship between $\Phi(.)$ and policy is shown in Figure 7, since policy affects this index only through its impact on $\Gamma_1$ (see (53)). Stronger strategic complementarities (lower $\phi_n$ or higher $\phi_y$) lead to more inflation inertia.
Expressions (44) and (52) highlight the relationship between inflation persistence and the rigidity in the adjustments of inflation (Fuhrer and Moore (1995)). In particular, Section 6.3 establishes that a low \( k^* \) implies a small response on impact of inflation to the monetary policy shock. The analysis of \( \Phi(\cdot) \) shows that in that same case, there is more inflation persistence (or “stickiness” in the inflation rate).

### 7.2 Dynamic Behavior of the Economy: Impact of Taylor Rules and ICK

The equations used to determine the equilibrium dynamics of the economy are

\[
\begin{align*}
\zeta_t &= \delta \zeta_{t-1} \text{ for } t = 2, 3, \ldots \text{ with } \zeta_1 \neq 0, \text{ and } \zeta_0 = 0 \\
\pi_t &= \zeta_t \cdot Z_t \text{ with } Z_t \text{ given in (39)} \\
l_t &= \zeta_t \cdot \Psi_t \text{ with } \Psi_t \text{ given in (47)} \\
i_t &= \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_y l_t + \zeta_t.
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 8 displays the response of the economy to a monetary policy innovation in the first quarter, for several cognitive capacities (\( k^* \)). The series presented are the price level, inflation, output, and the federal funds rate. The shock at \( t = 1 \) is the same for all cases in the figure. This shock is set to increase on impact the federal funds rate by 25 basis points for the series with the lowest \( k^* \). The Taylor rule used is the benchmark \( \phi^0 = (1.5, 0.5) \), for which \( \Gamma_1 = 0.73 \).

The peak effect on the inflation rate takes place quarters after the onset of the policy shock. More “ignorance” (lower \( k^* \)) delays further the maximum impact of the policy shock on inflation. In all cases considered, the output response always peaks before the inflation response does, but never after the second quarter. For the most informationally constrained case plotted, \( k^* = 0.15 \), the trough of output takes place 2 quarters after the shock (\( t = 3 \)).

After the positive policy innovation, the dynamics of the federal funds rate are dominated mostly by the systematic part of policy. On impact the rate rises, due to the inertial behavior of inflation. After the onset of the shock, the Taylor rule dictates a drop in the federal funds rate, in an attempt to stabilize both output and inflation.

For the benchmark \( (\phi_\pi, \phi_y) = (1.5, 0.5) \), processing capacities of at most 25 percent \( (k^* = 0.25) \) are required if the maximum impact on inflation has to take place no sooner than the sixth quarter after the onset of the policy shock (\( t = 7 \)).

### 8 Conclusions

The dynamics of the rational expectations, monetary model with heterogeneous beliefs discussed here present certain realistic features, difficult to reproduce within the standard NK framework. After a
monetary policy shock, the inflation response peaks after the response of output does, inflation is inertial, and can be characterized by a Hybrid Phillips Curve. Moreover, the model shows that a Taylor rule with a stronger emphasis on inflation targeting reduces the extent of nominal rigidities and inflation inertia. This type of policy approximates the behavior of the economy to that of the perfect-information equilibrium.

Monetary policy and the extent of inflation inertia are linked through the effects of policy on the effective extent of strategic complementarities in pricing. In a setting with imperfect common knowledge (ICK) and monopolistic competition, price-setters need to form conjectures about the aggregate price level. In this way, price-setting depends on the beliefs of what others perceive. The importance of higher-order expectations for pricing reduces the size of nominal adjustments, as those expectations adjust more sluggishly to shocks. When price-setters know that policy is more aggressive in maintaining inflation around the known target, the dependence on others’ beliefs is reduced. Therefore, heterogeneity has a smaller impact on the equilibrium dynamics, reducing the extent of inertia and the real effects of monetary shocks. In this way, monetary policy can shift the equilibrium closer to the perfect information case.

The ICK setup used here does not require any exogenous shocks to generate heterogeneity. Therefore, the model presents a departure from the traditional strategy adopted to sustain ICK. There are nominal rigidities and monetary policy has real effects, despite the fact that producers can adjust prices at no cost in every period. This is another key difference from the commonly assumed Calvo-pricing mechanism and from State Dependent Pricing models.

It is possible to perform a rough calibration of the amount of information processed by the private sector. In particular, the degree of absorption of relevant macroeconomic information appears to be around 25 percent.

The analysis is limited to the case in which the only state variables are the exogenous policy shock and asset holdings. The purpose of this is to better assess the impact of policy on inflation inertia. Nonetheless, possible extensions of the model include interest-rate smoothing and habit formation. These can increase the level of inertia displayed by output after a shock.

The convenience of a strong focus on inflation targeting needs to be reassessed by introducing other shocks in the model. In particular, this is so for shocks that cause output and inflation to move in opposite directions (for example, an oil price shock). In such a case, aggressive anti-inflationary policy would lead to larger output gaps, with potentially detrimental welfare effects. A more general shock structure would then allow for the analysis of the optimal monetary policy.
9 References


A Appendices

A.1 Information-Processing Constraints and ICK

Suppose that at each point in time household $h$ chooses to observe a signal $F_{sh,t}$ about the relevant variable $F_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2_F)$. This is, $F_{sh,t} = F_t + \eta_{h,t}$, where $\eta_{h,t}$ is the household-specific observation noise.

Let $F_S$ and $F_V$ be the variance of household $h$’s estimate of variable $F_t$ before and after observing the signal $F_{sh,t}$, respectively. These variances are constant, as the problem is stationary by assumption. Let $K$ denote the maximum amount of information that the household can process per unit of time, measured in bits of information. The information-processing constraint that affects each household’s information set is

$$\ln F_S - \ln F_V \leq K \cdot 2\ln(2). \quad (54)$$

A household’s utility decreases with the uncertainty it faces (a smaller $K$), as its value function can be shown to be strictly concave. As long as information has value for the household, this expression holds with equality. Given $K$ and $F_S$, the choice is $F_V$, the variance of the ex-post estimate of $F_t$. Hence, $F_V$ is set to the minimum value that (54) allows for.

A.2 Proof of Proposition 1

Suppose that $F_t$ is an autocorrelated but normally distributed random variable that can only be observed subject to (54). The optimal filter used by the household to process this information is given by

$$F_{h/t} = (1 - k^*) F_{h/t-1}^h + k^* \left( F_t + F_{\eta_{h,t}} \right),$$

where again $F_{\eta_{h,t}}$ is the idiosyncratic observation noise. The parameter $k^*$ (the gain) determines how new observations of $F_t$ are incorporated into today’s estimate $F_{h/t}$. This updated estimate is also normally distributed (see Shannon (1948) and Adam (2005) for the details).

Let $\sigma^2$ denote the variance of the observation error, still to be determined. The gain in the

43If $Y$ is a random variable, this constraint is the result of the equation

$$\text{Entropy}_b^t(Y) - \text{Entropy}_a^t(Y) \leq K,$$

The entropy is the measure of uncertainty of a given distribution. The expression $\text{Entropy}_b^t(Y)$ denotes the uncertainty about $Y$ before the processing of the new $K$ bits of information absorbed in period $t$. The variable $\text{Entropy}_a^t(h)$ denotes the uncertainty after processing that information.

The entropy of a random variable $Y \sim N(0, \sigma^2_Y)$ takes the form:

$$\text{Entropy}(Y) = \frac{1}{2} \log_2 (2\pi e \sigma^2_Y).$$

Hence, because the model is linear and the shock is normally distributed, the information processing constraint is (54).

See Shannon (1948) or Cover and Thomas (1991) for the definition and properties of the entropy of a random variable. Sims (2003) discusses the use of the concept in economic modeling.
Kalman filter is then
\[ k^* = F^* S \left( F^* S + \sigma_n^2 \right)^{-1}. \] (55)

After processing the new observation, the \textit{ex-post} variance is given by
\[ F^* V = F^* S - \frac{F^* S^2}{F^* S + \sigma_n^2}. \]

Since all information is used, the information constraint (54) is binding. Note that setting \( F^* V \) as a function of \( F^* S \) and \( K \) is equivalent to minimizing the variance of the observation noise subject to (54). Substituting the last equation into the constraint yields:
\[ \sigma_n^2 = \frac{F^* S}{e^{K^* 2 \ln(2)} - 1}. \]

It is possible then to compute \( k^* \) clearing \( \sigma_n^2 \) from equation (55), obtaining
\[ k^* = 1 - e^{-K^* 2 \ln(2)}. \] (56)

This implies that the Kalman gain is in fact an exponential distribution with argument \( K \). Distribution functions are themselves uniformly distributed. Therefore, the same percentage of information is accumulated between equidistant values of \( k^* \in (0, 1) \). This measure then can be interpreted as the percentage of relevant information absorbed by the households.

\[ \square \]

A.3 Proof of Lemma 1

Rationality implies that each household \( h \) chooses its savings (borrowing) \( b_t (h) \) knowing that the rest of the economy is saving (borrowing) in total \( -b_t (h) \). Hence, expectations of order \( j \geq 2 \) about the economy-wide level of savings will be 0. For \( t_0 \geq t \), the fact that \( I_{t-1} (h) \in I_t (h) \) for all \( t \) means that
\[ z_{t/t_0}^{h,(j)} (h; n) = \begin{cases} n_1 b_{t-1} (h) + n_2 b_t (h) & \text{for } j = 0, 1 \\ 0 & \text{for } j \geq 2 \end{cases} \]

\[ \Rightarrow z_{t/t_0}^{(j)} (n) = \int_H z_{t/t_0}^{h,(j)} (h; n) dh = 0 \quad \text{for all } j \geq 0. \]

Finally, using definitions (15), (16), and expressions in (3), one obtains
\[ x_{t/t_0}^{(j)} (h; n) = 0 \quad \text{for all } n \in \mathbb{R}^4 \text{ and } j \geq 0. \]

\[ \square \]
A.4 Computation of $\Gamma$, $\Gamma_1$ and $\Gamma_4$

Using expressions (21) and (22) to characterize the equilibrium behavior of households, one obtains

$$\pi_t (h) = \gamma_1 \pi_{t/t}^h + \gamma_2 \pi_{h,t} + \gamma_4 \xi_{t/t}^h + \gamma_5 \lambda_{t-1/t} (h) + \gamma_6 \tau_{t-1/t} (h)$$ \hspace{1cm} (57)

$$l_{t/t}^h = \frac{d_1}{d_3} \pi_{t/t}^h - \frac{d_2}{d_3} \pi_{h,t} - \frac{d_4}{d_3} \xi_{t/t}^h - \frac{d_5}{d_3} \lambda_{t-1} (h) - \frac{d_6}{d_3} \tau_{t-1} (h)$$ \hspace{1cm} (58)

where the coefficients are given by

$$\gamma_1 \equiv \left( a_1 + a_4 \phi \right) / \left( d_1 + d_4 \phi \right) a_3 + a_4 \phi_y$$ \hspace{1cm} (59)

$$\gamma_n \equiv \left( a_n - d_n \frac{a_3 + a_4 \phi_y}{d_3 + a_4 \phi_y} \right) \text{ for } n \in \gamma \equiv \{2, 4, ..., 7\}$$ \hspace{1cm} (60)

$$\gamma_8 \equiv \frac{a_1 + a_4 \phi_y}{d_3 + d_4 \phi_y}$$, $\tilde{d}_1 \equiv d_1 + d_4 \phi_y$, $\tilde{d}_3 \equiv d_3 + d_4 \phi_y$.

Using definitions (29) – (32), equations (57) and (58) can be expressed as

$$\pi_t (h) = \gamma_1 \pi_{t/t}^h + \gamma_2 \pi_{h,t} + \gamma_4 \xi_{t/t}^h + x_{t/t}^h (h; n^\pi) + z_{t/t}^h (h; n^\pi)$$ \hspace{1cm} (61)

$$l_{t/t}^h = \frac{d_1}{d_3} \pi_{t/t}^h - \frac{d_2}{d_3} \pi_{h,t} - \frac{d_4}{d_3} \xi_{t/t}^h - x_{t/t}^h (h; n') - z_{t/t}^h (h; n')$$ \hspace{1cm} (62)

for the following parameter configuration:

$$n^\pi = (g_i)_{i=5}^8 \text{ and } n' = \frac{1}{d_3} (d_5, d_6, d_7, 1)$$.

Averaging equations (61) and (62) over $h$, and taking expectations with respect to $I_t (h)$ yields for $j = 1, 2, ...$

$$\pi_{t/t}^{h,(j)} = \gamma_1 \pi_{t/t}^{h,(j+1)} + \gamma_2 \pi_{h,t}^{h,(j)} + \gamma_4 \xi_{t/t}^{h,(j+1)} + x_{t/t}^{h,(j+1)} (h; n^\pi) + z_{t/t}^{h,(j+1)} (h; n^\pi)$$ \hspace{1cm} (63)

$$l_{t/t}^{h,(j+1)} = \frac{d_1}{d_3} \pi_{t/t}^{h,(j+1)} - \frac{d_2}{d_3} \pi_{h,t}^{h,(j)} - \frac{d_4}{d_3} \xi_{t/t}^{h,(j+1)} - x_{t/t}^{h,(j+1)} (h; n') - z_{t/t}^{h,(j+1)} (h; n')$$ \hspace{1cm} (64)

It is possible to define then

$$\Gamma \equiv 1 / (1 - \gamma_2) \quad \Gamma_1 \equiv \gamma_1 \cdot \Gamma \quad \Gamma_4 \equiv \gamma_4 \cdot \Gamma$$.
The household-specific equations for \( j = 0 \) are still given by (61) and (62).

For \( j \geq 1 \) it is possible then to write

\[
\pi_{t/t}^{h,(j)} = \Gamma_1 \pi_{t/t}^{h,(j+1)} + \Gamma_4 \zeta_{t/t}^{h,(j+1)} + \Gamma \left( x_{t/t}^{h,(j+1)} (h; n^\pi) + z_{t/t}^{h,(j+1)} (h; n^\pi) \right).
\]

Finally, note that using Lemma 1, equation (61) can be aggregated as

\[
\pi_t = \Gamma_1 \pi_{t/t} + \Gamma_4 \zeta_{t/t}.
\]

### A.5 Proof of Proposition 2

The equilibrium level of inflation is the solution to

\[
\pi_t = \Gamma_1 \Delta_{t/t} + \Gamma_4 \zeta_{t/t} \tag{66}
\]

\[
\Delta_{t/t} = \Gamma_1 E_t \{ \Delta_{t/t} \} + \Gamma_4 \zeta_{t/t} \text{ for all } t.
\]

Equation (26) provides the expression for \( \zeta_{t-a/t-b} \) with \( t > b \geq a \) as a function of the shock. Therefore, in order to prove Proposition 2, it is only necessary and sufficient to find a solution for \( \Delta_{t/t} \). In order to do so, the following Lemma is used.

**Lemma 2** For \( \Gamma_1 \in (0, 1) \) and \( k^* \in (0, 1) \), a solution for \( \Delta_{t/t} \) exists, it is unique, and given by

\[
\Delta_{t/t} = \mu_{1,t} \cdot \zeta_{t/t-1} + \mu_2 \cdot \zeta_t \tag{67}
\]

\[
\mu_{1,t} = \frac{(1 - k^*)}{1 - \Gamma_1 \cdot (1 - (1 - k^*) \Gamma_4)} \left[ \frac{\Gamma_4}{(1 - k^* \Gamma_1)} \right] < 0 \tag{68}
\]

\[
\mu_2 = k^* \left[ \frac{\Gamma_4}{(1 - k^* \Gamma_1)} \right] < 0. \tag{69}
\]

Its proof is divided in 3 steps given in subsections A.5.1-A.5.3. Subsection A.5.4 uses Lemma 2 to prove Proposition 2.

### A.5.1 Proof of Lemma 2, Step 1: Prove Existence and Uniqueness of \( \Delta_{t/t} \)

Time subscripts are omitted where doing so cannot lead to a confusion.

Consider the probability space \( \mathcal{O} = \{ \mathbb{R}, \mathbb{R}_\sigma, \omega \} \), where \( \mathbb{R}_\sigma \) is the \( \sigma \)-algebra defined over the real line \( \mathbb{R} \), and \( \omega \) is a \( N(0, \sigma^2) \) distribution function. Let \( O_{I_t (h)} \) denote the conditional distribution with respect to the information set \( I_t (h) \).

Let \( Z \) be the set of measurable functions with respect to \( \mathbb{R}_\sigma \). Then, define the linear mapping \( T : Z \rightarrow Z \) such that for \( f_1 \in Z \)

\[
f_2 = T f_1
\]

\[
f_2 = \int_{I_t (h)} (\Gamma_4 \zeta_t + \Gamma_1 f_1) dO_{I_t (h)} dh.
\]
Alternatively, the mapping $T$ can be expressed as $f_2 = \Gamma_4 \zeta_{t/t} + \Gamma_1 E_t \{ f_1 \}$. I need to show that there exists a unique $\overline{f} \in \mathbb{Z}$, such that

$$
\overline{f} = \Gamma_4 \zeta_{t/t} + \Gamma_1 E_t \{ \overline{f} \}.
$$

Note that it has already been shown in (38) that such a fixed point exists:

$$
\Delta_{t/t} = \Gamma_4 \zeta_{t/t} + \Gamma_1 E_t \{ \Delta_{t/t} \}
\implies \Delta_{t/t} = T \Delta_{t/t}, \quad \text{for } \Gamma_1 \in (0, 1). \tag{70}
$$

A tentative solution to the functional equation is found in Appendix A.5.2, and is verified as such in Appendix A.5.3 (it is shown that it solves (70)). Therefore, the conditions for Theorem 9.12 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) are met, and the solution obtained in Appendix A.5.2 is unique.\(^{44}\)

**A.5.2 Proof of Lemma 2, Step 2: Compute Solution for $\Delta_{t/t}$**\(^{45}\)

Since expression (35) is linear in the normally distributed expectations of $\zeta_t$, the optimal filter of the household’s signal is a Kalman filter. An educated guess is that the reduced form of $\Delta_{t/t}$ is linear in the shocks and its expectations. By inspecting expression (38), the educated guess for the vector of relevant variables determining $\Delta_{t/t}$ is given by

$$
X_t = \begin{bmatrix}
\Delta_{t/t} & \zeta_{t/t-1} & \zeta_t
\end{bmatrix}^T.
$$

Define then

$$
X_t = Mg_t \quad \text{where } M = \begin{bmatrix}
\mu_{1,t} & \mu_{2,t} \\
I_2 & I_2
\end{bmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad g_t = \begin{bmatrix}
\zeta_{t/t-1} \\
\zeta_t
\end{bmatrix}, \tag{71}
$$

which needs to be fulfilled in the equilibrium.

These definitions imply that

$$
\Delta_{t/t} = \xi X_{t/t} \quad \text{for } \xi = [\Gamma_1, \ 0, \ \Gamma_4].
$$

Therefore, the relevant filter that determines household-level learning is

$$
\xi X_{t/t} = (1 - k^*) \xi M g_{t/t-1} + k^* \xi M g_t. \tag{72}
$$

Using the fact that the first row of $M$ is simply:

$$
M_{1\bullet} = \begin{bmatrix}
\mu_{1,t} & \mu_{2,t}
\end{bmatrix},
$$

it is easy to compute

\(^{44}\)Note that here there is no optimization problem to consider.

\(^{45}\)The solution procedure used in this step of the proof of Lemma 2 extends work in an early version of Adam (2005).
\[ \xi M g_t = \Gamma_1 \mu_{1,t} \zeta_{t/t-1} + (\Gamma_1 \mu_{2,t} + \Gamma_4) \zeta_t. \]  

(73)

Note that the conditional expectation \( E_{t-1} \{ \zeta_{t/t-1} \} \) is a second order expectation. Using equation (27) for \( b = 1 \):

\[
E_{t-1} \{ \zeta_{t/t-1} \} = E_{t-1} \left\{ \zeta_t \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)^{t-1} \right) \right\} \\
= \zeta_{t/t-1} \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)^{t-1} \right).
\]

This last expression implies

\[ \xi M g_{t/t-1} = \left[ \Gamma_1 \left( \mu_{1,t} \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)^{t-1} \right) + \mu_{2,t} \right) + \Gamma_4 \right] \zeta_{t/t-1}. \]  

(74)

The initial guess (71) must be consistent with (72) plus (73) and (74). Therefore

\[
\mu_{1,t} = \{ \Gamma_1 \mu_1 + (1 - k^*) [\Gamma_1 \mu_2 + \Gamma_4] \} \\
\mu_{2,t} = k^* [\Gamma_1 \mu_{2,t} + \Gamma_4].
\]

Given that \( k^* \in (0, 1) \), the solution to the system yields (note that \( \mu_{2,t} \) is time independent):

\[
\mu_{1,t} = \frac{1 - k^*}{1 - \Gamma_1 \cdot \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)^{t-1} \right) (1 - k^* \Gamma_4)} < 0 \]  

(75)

\[
\mu_{2} = k^* \frac{\Gamma_4}{(1 - k^* \Gamma_1)} < 0. \]  

(76)

The law of motion for this last variable is then given by

\[ \Delta_{t/t} = \mu_{1,t} \cdot \zeta_{t/t-1} + \mu_{2} \cdot \zeta_t. \]  

(77)

In order to complete the proof, (77) needs to satisfy the functional equation (70).

A.5.3 Proof of Lemma 2, Step 3: Verify Functional Equation.

The solution to be verified is

\[ \Delta_{t/t} = \mu_{1,t} \cdot \zeta_{t/t-1} + \mu_{2} \cdot \zeta_t, \]

where \( \mu_1 \) and \( \mu_2 \) are given in (75) and (76).

It is necessary to check that this solution satisfies the recursive formulation given in (37), namely

\[ \Delta_{t/t} = \Gamma_4 \zeta_{t/t} + \Gamma_1 E_t \{ \Delta_{t/t} \}. \]
Using this last equation and (77) yields

\[
\Delta_{t/t} = \Gamma_4 \zeta_{t/t} + \Gamma_1 E_t \left\{ \mu_{1,t} \cdot \zeta_{t/t-1} + \mu_2 \cdot \zeta_t \right\} .
\]  

(78)

Expression (27) for \( b = 1 \) implies

\[
E_t \left\{ \zeta_{t/t-1} \right\} = \zeta_{t/t-1} \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)t \right),
\]

and hence (78) can be rewritten as

\[
\Delta_{t/t} = \Gamma_4 \zeta_{t/t} + \Gamma_1 \left[ \mu_{1,t} \cdot \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)t \right) \cdot \zeta_{t/t-1} + \mu_2 \cdot \zeta_t \right].
\]

Some algebra shows that

\[
\Delta_{t/t} = \frac{\Gamma_4}{1 - k^* \Gamma_1} \zeta_{t/t} + \Gamma_1 \mu_{1,t} \cdot \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)t \right) \cdot \zeta_{t/t-1},
\]

which, according to the learning rule used to form the expectation \( \zeta_{t/t} \), can be expressed as

\[
\Delta_{t/t} = \frac{\Gamma_4}{1 - k^* \Gamma_1} \left[ (1 - k^*) \cdot \zeta_{t/t-1} + k^* \cdot \zeta_t \right] + \Gamma_1 \mu_{1,t} \cdot \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)t \right) \cdot \zeta_{t/t-1}.
\]

This last equation can be simplified:

\[
\Delta_{t/t} = \left[ \frac{\Gamma_4}{1 - k^* \Gamma_1} \left( 1 - k^* \right) + \Gamma_1 \mu_{1,t} \cdot \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)t \right) \right] \zeta_{t/t-1} + \mu_2 \cdot \zeta_t.
\]

Some algebra shows that

\[
\left[ \frac{\Gamma_4}{1 - k^* \Gamma_1} \left( 1 - k^* \right) + \Gamma_1 \mu_{1,t} \cdot \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)t \right) \right] = \mu_{1,t}
\]

and therefore

\[
\Delta_{t/t} = \mu_{1,t} \cdot \zeta_{t/t-1} + \mu_2 \cdot \zeta_t,
\]

which means that the conjectured solution for \( \Delta_{t/t} \) satisfies the functional equation (70), completing the proof of Lemma 2.

\[\Box\]

A.5.4 Final Part of Proof of Proposition 2: Equilibrium \( \pi_t \):

It suffices to substitute the solution to Lemma 2, expression (67), into (66), obtaining:

\[
\pi_t = \Gamma_1 \left( \mu_{1,t} \cdot \zeta_{t/t-1} + \mu_2 \cdot \zeta_t \right) + \Gamma_4 \zeta_{t/t} .
\]  

(79)

Using (26) in this last equation yields

\[
\pi_t = \zeta_t \cdot \left[ \Gamma_1 \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)t^{-1} \right) + \mu_2 \right] + \Gamma_4 \left( 1 - (1 - k^*)t \right),
\]
which proves Proposition 2.

\[\Box\]

### A.6 Proof of Proposition 3: The Equilibrium Level of Output

Households form expectations about \(l_{t/t}\), optimally filtering their perceptions. After aggregation of the households’ filtering rules for \(l_t\), and rearranging the terms of the equation:

\[
l_t = \frac{1}{k^*} \left( l_{t/t} - (1 - k^*) l_{t/t-1} \right).
\]

Aggregating equation (21) under an ICK information structure yields:

\[
l_{t/t} = \frac{a_1 + a_4 \phi_x}{a_3} \pi_{t/t} - \frac{a_2 - 1}{a_3} \pi_t - \frac{a_4}{a_3} \xi_t.
\]

The reduced forms of the equilibrium level and any expectation of \(l_t\) must be linear in \(\xi_t\), as the model is itself linear.

Therefore, using Lemma 2 (Appendix A.5),

\[
l_{t/t-1} = \frac{a_4 \phi_x}{a_3} \pi_{t/t-1} - \frac{a_4}{a_3} \xi_{t-1},
\]

where the fact that \(a_1 + a_2 = 1\) has been used (see Table 1).

Next, substitute (81) and (82) in (80).

Finally, use the resulting expression with equations (26) and (43) to express \(l_t\) as a linear function of \(\xi_t\).

\[\Box\]

### A.7 Obtaining the Phillips Curves

The Hybrid Phillips Curve can be found starting out from (81) after imposing ICK.

Next substitute away \(\xi_t\) using (26) and (43). Then obtain \(\pi_{t+1}\) as one of the right-hand-side variables in (81) by using Proposition 2.

Taking expectations of equation (46), conditional on information at \(t\), substitute \(l_{t/t}\). Next, replace \(\xi_{t/t}\) by a linear function of \(\xi_t\) using (26). Finally, rearrange the terms in the resulting expression.

The HPC can be rewritten as a BLEA-PC by exploiting the relationship between \(\pi_{t+1}\) and \(\pi_{t/t-1}\) provided by equation (43) and Proposition 2 (compare the expressions of \(\Omega_{3,t}\) and \(\Omega_{3,t}^*\) below).

The coefficients in the two Phillips Curves discussed in the main text are:
\[ \Omega_1 = \frac{\tilde{a}_3 k^*}{a_1 - \phi_x a_4 k^*} > 0 \]  
\[ \Omega_{2,t} = \Omega_{1,t} \cdot \frac{a_1 (1 - (1 - k^*)^t)}{a_3 k^*} > 0 \]  
\[ \Omega_{3,t} = \Omega_{1,t} \cdot \frac{a_4}{a_3 \delta Z_{t+1}} > 0 \]  
\[ \Omega_{3,t}^* = \Omega_{3,t} \cdot \frac{a_4}{a_3 Z_t \cdot (1 - (1 - k^*)^{t-1})} > 0, \]

where \( Z_t \) and \( Z_{t+1} \) are defined in (39).

### A.8 Proof of Proposition 4: The Index of Inflation Inertia.

The case for \( j = 0 \) is trivial. For \( j = 1, 2, \ldots \)

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma_1 \cdot \left[ \frac{(1 - k^*) \cdot \left(1 - (1 - k^*)^{t-1+j}\right)}{1 - \Gamma_1 \cdot (1 - (1 - k^*)^{t+j})} + k^* \right] + [1 - (1 - k^*)^{t+j}] > 0,
\end{align*}
\]

which implies

\[
\Phi(.) = \frac{Z_{t+j}}{Z_t} \geq 1
\]

for \( j = 1, 2, \ldots \) Note that \( \Gamma_4 \) does not enter the expression of \( \Phi(.) \).

Hence,

\[
\Phi(.) > 1 \text{ for } j = 1, 2, \ldots
\]
### TABLE 1

Parameters | Household's Pricing Policy Function
---|---
Row | ρ | θ | ν | a1 | a2 | a3 | a4 | a5 | a6 | a7
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---
1 | 0.5 | 4 | 2 | 0.9853 | 0.0147 | 0.2320 | -0.0683 | 0.0039 | -0.9853 | -0.0147
2 | 0.5 | 4 | 5 | 0.9936 | 0.0064 | 0.2436 | -0.0240 | 0.0015 | -0.9936 | -0.0064
3 | 0.5 | 6 | 2 | 0.9904 | 0.0096 | 0.1584 | -0.0468 | 0.0026 | -0.9904 | -0.0096
4 | 0.5 | 6 | 5 | 0.9957 | 0.0043 | 0.1638 | -0.0162 | 0.0010 | -0.9957 | -0.0043
5 | 0.5 | 8 | 2 | 0.9929 | 0.0071 | 0.1203 | -0.0355 | 0.0020 | -0.9929 | -0.0071
6 | 0.5 | 8 | 5 | 0.9968 | 0.0032 | 0.1234 | -0.0122 | 0.0007 | -0.9968 | -0.0032
7 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 1.0359 | -0.0359 | 0.2329 | -0.0683 | 0.0070 | -1.0359 | 0.0359
8 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 1.0126 | -0.0126 | 0.2440 | -0.0240 | 0.0028 | -1.0126 | 0.0126
9 | 1 | 6 | 2 | 1.0246 | -0.0246 | 0.1589 | -0.0468 | 0.0047 | -1.0246 | 0.0246
10 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 1.0085 | -0.0085 | 0.1640 | -0.0162 | 0.0019 | -1.0085 | 0.0085
11 | 1 | 8 | 2 | 1.0187 | -0.0187 | 0.1206 | -0.0355 | 0.0035 | -1.0187 | 0.0187
12 | 1 | 8 | 5 | 1.0064 | -0.0064 | 0.1235 | -0.0122 | 0.0014 | -1.0064 | 0.0064
13 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1.1131 | -0.1131 | 0.2344 | -0.0683 | 0.0118 | -1.1131 | 0.1131
14 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 1.0467 | -0.0467 | 0.2446 | -0.0240 | 0.0052 | -1.0467 | 0.0467
15 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 1.0751 | -0.0751 | 0.1595 | -0.0468 | 0.0077 | -1.0751 | 0.0751
16 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 1.0310 | -0.0310 | 0.1643 | -0.0162 | 0.0034 | -1.0310 | 0.0310
17 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 1.0563 | -0.0563 | 0.1209 | -0.0355 | 0.0057 | -1.0563 | 0.0563
18 | 2 | 8 | 5 | 1.0232 | -0.0232 | 0.1236 | -0.0122 | 0.0026 | -1.0232 | 0.0232

- ρ - Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion.
- θ - Elasticity of Demand.
- ν - Elasticity of Disutility of Labor.
**TABLE 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>( \rho )</th>
<th>( \theta )</th>
<th>( \nu )</th>
<th>( d_1 )</th>
<th>( d_2 )</th>
<th>( d_3 )</th>
<th>( d_4 )</th>
<th>( d_5 )</th>
<th>( d_6 )</th>
<th>( d_7 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.5976</td>
<td>0.5976</td>
<td>0.2845</td>
<td>2.0625</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.5976</td>
<td>-0.5976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.5249</td>
<td>0.5249</td>
<td>0.2499</td>
<td>1.9241</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.5249</td>
<td>-0.5249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.6133</td>
<td>0.6133</td>
<td>0.1946</td>
<td>2.0924</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.6133</td>
<td>-0.6133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.5297</td>
<td>0.5297</td>
<td>0.1681</td>
<td>1.9332</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.5297</td>
<td>-0.5297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.6215</td>
<td>0.6215</td>
<td>0.1479</td>
<td>2.1080</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.6215</td>
<td>-0.6215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.5321</td>
<td>0.5321</td>
<td>0.1267</td>
<td>1.9378</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.5321</td>
<td>-0.5321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.5976</td>
<td>0.5976</td>
<td>0.2845</td>
<td>1.1379</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.5976</td>
<td>-0.5976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.5249</td>
<td>0.5249</td>
<td>0.2499</td>
<td>0.9995</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.5249</td>
<td>-0.5249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.6133</td>
<td>0.6133</td>
<td>0.1946</td>
<td>1.1679</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.6133</td>
<td>-0.6133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.5297</td>
<td>0.5297</td>
<td>0.1681</td>
<td>1.0086</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.5297</td>
<td>-0.5297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.6215</td>
<td>0.6215</td>
<td>0.1479</td>
<td>1.1834</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.6215</td>
<td>-0.6215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.5321</td>
<td>0.5321</td>
<td>0.1267</td>
<td>1.0132</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.5321</td>
<td>-0.5321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.5976</td>
<td>0.5976</td>
<td>0.2845</td>
<td>0.6756</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.5976</td>
<td>-0.5976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.5249</td>
<td>0.5249</td>
<td>0.2499</td>
<td>0.5372</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.5249</td>
<td>-0.5249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.6133</td>
<td>0.6133</td>
<td>0.1946</td>
<td>0.7056</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.6133</td>
<td>-0.6133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.5297</td>
<td>0.5297</td>
<td>0.1681</td>
<td>0.5463</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.5297</td>
<td>-0.5297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.6215</td>
<td>0.6215</td>
<td>0.1479</td>
<td>0.7212</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.6215</td>
<td>-0.6215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.5321</td>
<td>0.5321</td>
<td>0.1267</td>
<td>0.5509</td>
<td>0.9246</td>
<td>0.5321</td>
<td>-0.5321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \rho \) - Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion.
\( \theta \) - Elasticity of Demand.
\( \nu \) - Elasticity of Disutility of Labor.
C Figures

FIGURE 1

$k^*$ as Function of $K$

FIGURE 2

Parameter $\Gamma_1$ as Function of $\phi_x$ and $\phi_y$
FIGURE 3

\( \Omega_{zt} \text{ as Function of } k^* \text{ and Time.} \)

FIGURE 4

\( \Omega_{zt} \text{ as Function of } k^* \text{ and Time.} \)
FIGURE 5

$\Omega_{\alpha t}$ as Function of $k^*$ and Time.

FIGURE 6

$\phi(.)$ as Function of $k^*$ and Time.
$\Phi(t)$ as a function of $t_1$ for $\kappa=0.3$

FIGURE 7
Response to Federal Funds Rate Shock (in Basis Points): $\Gamma_t = 0.73$

FIGURE 8