Divito de Paauw, Lori

Working Paper
Institutional entrepreneurship in constructing alternative paths: A comparison of biotech hybrids

Manchester Business School Working Paper, No. 586

Provided in Cooperation with:
Manchester Business School, The University of Manchester


This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50666

Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.
Institutional entrepreneurship in constructing alternative paths: a comparison of biotech hybrids

Lori Divito de Paauw

Manchester Business School Working Paper No 586
[September 2009]
Abstract
This paper investigates how firms adapt their innovation strategies to cope with constraints in national institutional environments. It is a comparative case study of Dutch and British dedicated biotechnology firms focusing on a particular type of strategy, the hybrid model. Patterns of skill accumulation and learning present in the Dutch hybrids are indications of how they use institutional advantages to focus on low-risk innovation and build deeper competences while also pursuing high-risk innovation strategies. The Dutch hybrid offers insight into how firms comply with the dominant logic of the biotechnology field even when their institutional frameworks encourage the pursuit of low-risk innovation strategies.

Keywords
biotechnology, national business systems, national innovation systems, varieties of capitalism, institutional entrepreneurship

How to quote or cite this document
Introduction

Since the birth of the biotechnology in the 1970s, entrepreneurs have been trying to exploit the potential of these promising technologies and investors, universities and governments have supported them in the process. The success of the US biotech industry, and especially the Silicon Valley model (Casper, 2007b) has stood out as an example to other nations and provided a blueprint to jumpstart an industry. Yet the question that continues to be raised is: can economies that have fundamentally different institutional environments orchestrate the Silicon Valley model through policy? What happens to firms and institutions when policy initiatives encourage innovation strategies that are incoherent with their national systems? And what kinds of adjustments do firms make to compensate for the shortcomings in the system?

The central premise of the comparative capitalism stream of literature is that institutional systems influence national economic activity. These systems develop slowly and historically and create different institutional configurations that result in diversity among capitalist economies. Scholars (Amable 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Tylecote and Visitin, 2008; Whitley, 1999) working in this tradition have identified different ideal types, or typologies, of economic coordination of national economies. A major feature of this work is how it accounts for innovative specialization on a national level, showing how different configurations of institutional systems, such as the financial, corporative governance, labour or public science systems, affect the ways different types of firms create technological advantages in different national contexts.

In the last few years, comparative capitalism, and neo-institutional theory in general, has been criticized for being too deterministic in its view of path dependence (Crouch, 2005) and its lack of recognition of actors’ capabilities in changing institutional frameworks or creating alternatives to the dominant paths. The process of institutional change and of the hybridization of institutional systems as actors seek alternatives to dominant paths is gaining more attention from scholars as well as the role of individuals and firms, or institutional entrepreneurship, in this process of institutional change.

One of the concerns that this paper addresses is that prior studies (Casper and Whitley, 2004; Hall and Soskice, 2001) have focused primarily on the national level and neglected to take into account how entrepreneurs at the firm level change institutional configurations, for example by accessing functional equivalents, or substitutes, for financing or skills. A problem that scholars have not yet resolved is the integration of the different levels of analysis in an effort to explore in much greater depth the various innovation strategies in different sub sectors of ‘high technology’ industries. For informed policy making, it is necessary to understand the more complex interrelationships between institutional systems and industries at a finer level of analysis than what previous studies have attempted to do.

Studies on the biotechnology industry cross over several areas of interest, including networking, innovation, technology or knowledge transfer, strategic alliances and clustering.

---

1 Hybridization of institutional systems implies the combination of institutional systems characterized by liberal market economies or coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Hybridization of institutional systems is highly debated and some comparative systems scholars believe that hybrid national economies actually constitute different types (Hostho, 2009).

2 Institutional entrepreneurs are defined as actors, individual or collective, that recombine elements of institutional systems in order to produce change (Crouch, 2005).
In the last decades, our knowledge has increased greatly on inter-firm and university-industry alliances (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Bozeman, 2007; Gittelman, 2006; Kenney, 1986; Powell et al, 1996; Powell et al, 2005;) and the changing institutional environment that created the conditions for dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs) to flourish (Coriat et al, 2003, Marsili, 2000, Quéré, 2003). From this work, we know that a particular institutional framework, consisting of (but not limited to) financial systems that provide access to high-risk venture capital, liquidity and shareholder corporate governance and of labour systems that support mobility and flexibility, encourages firms to engage in high-risk innovation strategies (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Casper, 2007b; Casper and Whitley, 2004; Saxenian, 1994; Tylecote and Visitin, 2008; Whitley, 2007). Questions remain, however, about how DBFs, which are not located in this type of institutional environment, access critical resources to follow high-risk innovation strategies.

This study extends the literature on comparative capitalism by contributing to our knowledge about institutional entrepreneurship on the micro level. The study investigates the affect of national institutions on the development of innovative firms in the biopharmaceutical industry and aims to understand how institutional configurations change in the context of access to broader international institutions. It challenges the idea that entrepreneurs and firms are bound to follow dominant paths by investigating on a firm level the alternative paths that actors create when faced with national institutional constraints.

In the paper I argue that the British and Dutch DBFs that follow hybrid business models, which combine elements of both high-risk (radical) and low-risk (incremental) innovation, do so for completely different reasons and because of different institutional circumstances. I also argue that the institutional persistence of either radical or incremental innovation specializations dominate these hybrid DBF strategies. Nonetheless, the findings show that for Dutch DBFs, a hybrid model presents an alternative path for DBF founders to follow more high-risk strategies within institutional contexts that constrain more than facilitate this specialization and makes a case for how Dutch DBF founders engage in institutional entrepreneurship in an attempt to follow the dominant logic of their organizational field.

The paper is structured as follows. First a review of the relevant literature related to the variation of national institutional systems and how these configurations account for radical and incremental innovation on national and sector level is discussed. The research setting and the methodology are presented in the following section. Section four follows with a discussion of the findings from the British and Dutch cases and the paper closes by presenting the theoretical implications and concluding remarks.

**Variation in economic coordination and innovation strategies**

An essential concept put forth in Hall and Soskice’s *Varieties of Capitalism* (2001) (henceforth VoC) is that of the theory of *comparative institutional advantage*. Hall and Soskice posit that two ideal types, liberal market economies (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME), are enduring forms of capitalism because each national economy has institutional systems that provide advantages for pursuing specific types of economic activity. The argument is essentially that institutional systems in LMEs support the radical innovation of ‘new’ industries and that those in CMEs support the incremental innovation of ‘old’

---

3 The definition of dedicated biotechnology firms that is used in this study refers to biotechnology firms that are active in the biopharmaceutical industry and engaged in therapeutic product development and/or technology services based on proprietary technology platforms.
industries. Furthermore, Hall and Soskice (2001) posit that institutional coherence and complementarities in liberal market or coordinated market economies to the extent that they are ‘pure’ (or having coherently liberal or coordinated institutional characteristics) will perform better than those economies that do not ‘fit’ into one of these pure types. However, scholars (Kenworthy, 2006; Kogut and Ragin, 2006) have challenged this claim and the empirical evidence showed no support for the institutional coherence hypothesis. Kenworthy (2006) used a measurement for institutional coherence developed by Hall and Gingerich (2004) as well as a measurement of his own and correlates institutional coherence with economic performance from 1974 to 2000. In all of his tests the results show a weak correlation between macroeconomic performance and institutionally coherent, pure types of economic coordination. The results leave open to discussion and debate whether mixed forms of economic coordination contribute to better macroeconomic performance, a point that Campbell (2007) makes in his call for researchers to investigate the merits of more hybrid forms of economic coordination.

Hall and Soskice (2001) claim that institutional systems in LMEs have certain features that are better suited to high-risk radical innovation. Labor markets in LMEs are generally more flexible with low wage bargaining and low employment protection providing high labour market flexibility and mobility. Because high labour mobility reduces the incentives for employees to invest in skills with high firm specificity, employees tend to develop general skills, which can be applied to different firms in the same or different industries. As a result, there is less investment in building firm-specific competences, making it easier for firms to adapt and respond to radical innovations. The capital-based financial systems in LMEs also support easy access to and switching of resources. Stock markets play an important role in allowing firms to access public equity and in allowing investors to exit investments (although there are also trade sale exits) and redirect financial capital into other, newer areas of innovation.

The CME argument is the opposing institutional configuration that encourages low-risk incremental innovation. Because labor institutions encourage long-term employment due to high employment protection, employees and firms invest in firm-specific skills and build firm-specific competences that are difficult to change. Firms in this type of labor environment accumulate skills and knowledge and theoretically have institutional comparative advantages in pursuing strategies of incremental innovation. The bank-based financial system prominent in CMEs provides patient capital on low risk investments, which again is most likely to be invested in incremental innovation.

The underlying premise of this argument is that institutional systems, the rules of the game, encourage firms to follow organizational strategies that take advantage of their national institutional systems. Therefore, firms in either LMEs or CMEs face isomorphic pressures because their respective institutional systems as a whole offer comparative advantages in either radical (high risk) or incremental (low risk) innovation, respectively. The historical nature of the institutional systems and the path dependence that they encourage suggests that firms have little choice but to follow the dominant path.

Crouch (2005) has criticized the VoC framework as being too deterministic, a criticism that many scholars have applied to institutional theory in general. Crouch’s main criticism,

---

4 Hall and Soskice recognize that there may be other aspects of comparative institutional advantage than only innovation. However, their focus is primarily on innovation since over time it is crucial that firms innovate in order to survive.
however, is the general assumption underlying the two ideal types: that the LME, which is based more on market mechanisms, is the type more likely to survive because investment is focused in newer industries. Crouch continues his criticism of the VoC approach stating that it is a framework that is static, or fixed in time. Logically, since institutional systems are difficult to change and highly path dependent, this static nature means that German firms, and by extension the German national economy, were always pursuing incremental innovation and that they were never radical. This is simply false as there were periods of time in Germany’s economic history when firms were innovating at the forefront of technology, for example, in chemicals or motor vehicles.\(^5\)

The reverse argument can be made for firms operating in LMEs. For radical innovation to take place often years of incremental innovations have preceded it. Yet, the VoC framework offers little room in their model to explain how the ideal types of LMEs and CMEs support varying levels of radical and incremental innovation in industries over time or to account for an organization’s capability to engage in both radical and incremental innovation. The following section offers a more detailed account of how radical and incremental innovation is associated to liberal and coordinated market economies.

**Radical and incremental innovation in the varieties of capitalism**

In the introduction of the *Varieties of Capitalism*, Hall and Soskice (2001) present empirical data based on patent analysis that show the industries in which a number of OECD countries are the most innovative. From this data they conclude that the innovative industries in LMEs are those that are related to ‘new’ industries, such as medical engineering, biotechnology, semiconductors and telecommunications. In the same way, they conclude that the innovative industries in CMEs are related to ‘old’ industries, such as mechanical engineering, product handling, transport, consumer durables, and machine tools. The ‘new’ industries are associated with radical innovation and the ‘old’ industries with incremental innovation.

This is an important association and begs the question why industries are either purely radical or purely incremental. Hall and Soskice provide a brief explanation as to how they define radical and incremental innovation and how they apply it to the industries in their empirical data.

“… radical innovation … entails substantial shifts in product lines, the development of entirely new goods or major changes to the production process, and incremental innovation, marked by continuous but small-scale improvements to existing product lines and production processes.” (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 38-39)

A study from Taylor (2004) challenged this premise in the VoC framework and conducted empirical tests on both the categorization of industries as either radical or incremental and the categorization of national economies as either radical or incremental. Taylor identifies several problems with the approach used by Hall and Soskice: i) the assumption that some industries are inherently characterized by the nature of their innovation, ii) the time period of patent data, being only four years, iii) the use of simple patent counts that do not distinguish between how innovative each patent may be, and iv) the lack of non-patent measures of innovation such as publications. Unsurprisingly Taylor concluded that simple patent counts do not provide a good measure of the radical importance or potential of an innovation and therefore uses a forward citation count to indicate this importance. He finds that the association between ‘new’ and ‘old’ industries with radical or incremental innovation holds, respectively. However, more importantly, his findings show that over time (20 years) the patenting of firms

\(^5\) Germany is used as an example because it is commonly referred to as the quintessential example of CMEs.
in specific national systems does not follow the patterns that the VoC framework predicts and that the VoC results hinge on a major outlier, the U.S.A. When the U.S.A. is excluded, the VoC framework loses its predictive power and LMEs appear to be less radically innovative than some CMEs (such as Japan).

Understanding why some countries are more technologically innovative than others is an important question for scholars to answer. Technological innovativeness is associated with national economic growth. The new products, processes and production efficiencies that are the outcomes of technological innovativeness drive economic growth and as such national and supranational (EU) governments are investing heavily in encouraging higher innovative capacity. Yet, there are still many unanswered questions regarding innovative behavior among nations and why certain countries are more productive than others in technological innovation. This is a very important endeavor as policy makers in many advanced economies are eager to understand the underlying mechanisms so that they can stimulate innovation in their economies.

Regional and sectoral systems of innovation
In recent years not only have scholars of comparative capitalism studied institutional systems with the purpose of connecting them to innovation strategies but also scholars working on national and sectoral systems of innovation (Carlson, 2006; Lundvall, 2002; Malerba, 2002; Nelson, 1993, 2002) have been investigating the topic to understand how institutional systems affect innovation and how innovation may also affect institutional change (Hage, 2006). At the core of these studies is the distinction between radical and incremental innovation and the configuration of systems that encourage one or the other.

One of the most imitated models of an innovation system is that of the Silicon Valley model (Casper, 2007b; Saxenian, 1994), both within the United States and abroad. The Silicon Valley model is the standard for policy makers when they consider orchestrating the institutional systems needed to engage in radical innovation. The close proximity of firms to a knowledge base and the availability of venture capital to seed and grow a new venture are intended to entice entrepreneurs to commercialize new scientific knowledge or inventions. However, only a few regions have been successful at replicating the model.

Casper’s (2007a) recent study on the emergence of the San Diego biotechnology cluster, poses the question why so few biotechnology clusters with radically innovative firms have succeeded in the United States. There are many regions in the United States with world-class universities and medical research. Yet, only the San Francisco, Boston and San Diego regions have been able to create and sustain successful biotechnology clusters. The VoC perspective does not provide an adequate explanation as to why there is regional heterogeneity in the institutional systems of national economies. The explanation that Casper offers lies in the social network within a cluster that creates a ‘flexible recycling mechanism’ (Bahrami and Evans, 1995) of knowledge and labor. Unsuccessful clusters that remain small and do not generate a critical mass of firms are unable to create this social network that is not only used to share information and ideas but also to lower the risk that employees face in accepting a high-risk position in biotechnology firms that have high failure rates.

Countries outside of the United States, for example Germany, the Netherlands and other continental European countries, have also tried to replicate parts of a Silicon Valley model in an effort to increase radical innovation in ‘new’ industries. From a VoC standpoint, the German biotechnology industry is an intriguing case to study as it represents a stark contrast with the incremental innovation in ‘old’ industries that the German institutional systems
support. According to the VoC framework, one would expect that the comparative institutional advantage of Germany’s institutional framework would not support the radical innovation associated with biotechnology firms and the findings from Casper and Whitley (2004) concur, suggesting that German biotechnology firms follow strategies of incremental innovation within the biotechnology industry. Since many characteristics of the Dutch institutional framework are similar with the German systems, the same assumptions hold for the Netherlands.

**Variation in biotechnology business models**

The extent of the differentiation among technological specializations of biotechnology firms that scholars use differ greatly. Early studies, in the 1990s, focusing primarily on how new biotechnology firms acquired resources (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Baum and Silverman, 2004; Deeds et al, 1997; Deeds et al 2004; Junkunc, 2006) generally studied the biotechnology industry as an aggregated whole and made very little distinction between the types of innovation strategies these firms followed. Other studies (Casper and Karamanos, 2002; Casper and Whitley, 2004; Swann et al, 1998) distinguish between biotechnology firms usually on dichotomous terms, those focusing on therapeutics, which is assumed to be radically innovative, and those focusing on other general purpose technology e.g. diagnostics or platform technologies such as bioinformatics software and gene sequencing equipment, assumed to be incrementally innovative.

In recent work on the biotechnology industry, scholars (Hopkins et al, 2007; Malerba and Orsenigo, 2002; Nightingale and Martin, 2004; Pisano, 2006) have begun to call into question the ‘radical’ nature of biotechnology and assert that biotechnology is “following a well-established incremental pattern of technological change and ‘creative accumulation’ that builds upon, rather than disrupts, previous drug development heuristics” (Hopkins et al, 2007, p. 566). Experts and academics continue to point to the lagging performance of the industry as a whole in relation to the amount of money invested through venture capital and equity markets. In the thirty-year history of the industry, only a handful of firms, and these are mostly the first generation biotechs like Genentech, Amgen or Genzyme, have been successful in bringing a product to market and becoming profitable. In Pisano’s book *Science Business* (2006), he argues that the poor aggregate performance of biotechs is structural and due to the ‘anatomy’ of the industry. The institutions used to commercialize biotechnology inventions have been ‘borrowed’ from other technological disciplines such as the semiconductors industry, which has a very different nature of technological innovation than biotechnology. Pisano points to three aspects that make biotechnology a challenging sector: the uncertainty of the science or technology, the heterogeneous and complex nature of the science, and the need for cumulative learning. On the surface, the dominant paradigm of liberal market economies that theoretically encourages radical innovation tends to work against these factors primarily because of the focus on competence destruction rather than competence accumulation in LMEs.

In general, the distinction between radical and incremental innovation in the biotechnology industry has been treated rather lightly in the literature with most studies assuming that the biotechnology industry as whole is radically innovative. In a few studies, radical, or high-risk, innovation is associated with drug discovery and incremental, or low-risk, innovation with platform technologies (Casper and Whitley, 2004) and then these are tied to the national institutional configurations (LMEs or CMEs) that support either radical or incremental

---

6 This term is used here rather loosely and applies to biotechnology innovation for pharmaceutical applications in a very general manner.
innovation. Yet, in both contexts DBFs follow both high- and low-risk innovation strategies. This leads to the question of how DBFs access requisite financial and labor resources to follow innovation strategies that theoretically are discouraged by certain institutional configurations.

Methodology

Research Design

This research uses a comparative case study design in order to understand how institutional factors affect the strategies of newly formed DBFs. By using multiple cases with embedded units of analysis the case study approach is an appropriate method for the research question as it allows an in-depth rigorous comparison of the two national contexts. The replication logic includes both literal logic, that the cases predict similar results, and theoretical logic, that the cases predict contrasting results but for predictable reasons (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). To guide the sample selection and analysis, ideal types were created that defined particular business models and the expectations of the characteristics of these models. These ideal types serve as a conceptual tool to categorize the organization of DBFs a priori and help to interpret the collected data.

To identify the DBF business models, several secondary data sources of firm listings were used to compile a list of DBFs in both countries. In the Netherlands this was fairly straightforward. The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (Ministerie van Economische Zaken), having initiated a five-year BioPartner program to stimulate the growth of biotechnology industry, published five annual reports on the state of the industry (Life Science Sector Report, Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2002 to 2005). This report included a summary of various developments within the sector, such as entries and exits of firms, venture capital funding, mergers and acquisitions, as well as a comprehensive list of Dutch DBFs. In the UK, compiling an initial list of DBFs was more difficult as there is no single listing of biotechnology firms publicly available and several sources had to be used to compile the British DBF list. The main sources include: i) British BioIndustry Association; ii) regional biotechnology associations; iii) company listings from science parks; and iv) portfolio listings from venture capitalist firms. Only DBFs focused on pharmaceuticals were selected from these associations’ listings. The lists were consolidated and duplicates were removed.
To classify the business models, a general distinction between products (e.g. therapeutics, diagnostics) and services was used, as has often been used in prior studies. However, this main category distinction was further refined through an inductive and iterative analytical process as components of the business models became clearer. Product business models were further subdivided into three distinct groups: i) drug discoverers and developers, ii) diagnostics and iii) equipment or reagent suppliers. Service business models were subdivided into two sub-categories: i) services based on proprietary technology and ii) services based on generic technology. Furthermore an additional main category of hybrids was identified. The hybrid model contains DBFs that mix models or form combinations of any of the five other models and is the model that is the focus of this paper. Table 1 provides an overview of the characteristics used to classify business models. The resulting categorized list of pharmaceutical DBFs consisted of approximately 200 firms in the UK and 70 firms in the Netherlands; table 2 presents a count of the firms according to business models.
### Table 2
Count of DBFs per classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Hybrid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discovery</td>
<td>Diagnostics</td>
<td>Suppliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own data compiled from list of DBFs and corporate information

### Sample

This paper focuses on one of these models: hybrids that combine both drug discovery and services. The sampled hybrid DBFs primarily combined a discovery model and a platform technology model; however a few of the DBFs combined the discovery model with services based on generic technology. The sampling strategy can be best described as quota sampling in which a set number of cases (firms) were selected from the sub-group of hybrid firms.

DBFs were selected for in-depth interviews based on business model fit, number of employees (more than 10), age (at least two years old) and type of ownership. The number of cases was determined by saturation, the point at which additional cases revealed relatively few new insights. The sample is not representative of the total population of biotechnology firms and there are a total of eleven hybrid DBFs included in the sample: five British cases and six Dutch cases (see appendix A for an overview of the hybrid DBFs included in the sample).

### Data Collection

In-depth, semi-structured interviews were held with company founders and executive management as well as with institutions. Secondary sources such as industry reports, databases, company web sites, press releases, trade articles, annual reports and company documentation were used to verify the data collected from interviews, determine chronological event histories of the DBFs selected and to build individual career histories of executive management teams.

The interviews were held on-site and focused on gathering information about the founding model and the current model, financing, labor relations, coordination and control, product development and inter-firm relations with collaborators, competitors and suppliers. An emphasis was placed on uncovering the changes that had taken place from the founding to the time of data collection (2006-2007). To gather sufficient detail on the founding and financing history, an original founder of the DBF was interviewed. Often this founder was also a current member of the executive management team, usually the chief scientific officer; however in the few cases in which the founder was no longer employed by the DBF, either the longest tenured employee was interviewed or the original founder was contacted. Since information about the initial founding is often anecdotal, it was crucial to ensure validity by gathering data retrospectively from a person who was personally involved in setting up the firm. In the cases where the founder was no longer involved in the current operational activities of the DBF, an additional interview was held with a current executive level manager, such as the chief executive officer or chief operating officer. Fifteen interviews of an average duration of 90 minutes were conducted, plus approximately twenty interviews were held with venture capitalists and other institutional organizations such as technology transfer offices and policy
makers. The latter interviews were primarily informative in nature; however, whenever possible and appropriate the interviews were used to validate and triangulate data from the hybrid DBFs. This was particularly the case with several interviews held with venture capitalists that had invested in the selected DBFs.

**Data Analysis**

All the interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed, and coded using binary or categorical codes. The coding aided the identification of patterns among the variables and these were then compared to determine the degree to which they were consistent with expected explanations and inconsistent with alternative explanations. This follows the pattern matching logic recommended for case studies (Yin, 2003). Reliability was established by using a detailed interview schedule and a case study database. These techniques ensured that the data collection focused on gathering facts.

Having written case summaries of each DBF and coded the transcribed interview data, the process of identifying themes and patterns in the data took place by creating various types of data matrices (Miles and Huberman, 1994) and drawing conclusions from these matrices by contrasting and comparing the data. The approach taken most closely resembles what Langley (1999) refers to as a ‘synthetic strategy’. This approach entails taking the data from the narratives and transforming them into ‘variables’ that synthesize critical components of the events. The constructs (or variables) used to analyze the data are developed through a combination of inductive exploration and coding. This approach enables researchers to also trace causal links and draw richer conclusions based on multiple cases that show how and why the identified variables lead to specific outcomes.

**Discussion of the findings**

The hybrid business model has been used by DBFs in the UK and the Netherlands with varying degrees of success. From evidence in the data set, the use of this model dates back to 1996 in the UK and 1992 in the Netherlands. This section probes deeper into the reasons why these firms chose hybrid strategies and examines the changes that the DBFs experienced while following this strategy.

**Access to external financial resources**

The most cited reason for choosing a hybrid strategy was the immediate financial benefits. Hybrids that combine services and product models generate revenue, perhaps a modest revenue stream, but generally enough revenue to sustain the service operations of the hybrid DBF. Founders following hybrid strategies realized, however, that retained earnings from their revenue would not cover the costs associated with developing drug products and needed to search for external financing.

There are very distinct patterns of external financing between the British and Dutch DBFs. Three of the British hybrids raised their first round of external financing through the public equity markets, essentially bypassing venture capital investment. The motivation to turn to the IPO market for initial rounds of funding was to maintain control of strategic decision-making and avoid diluting equity. Perhaps unsurprisingly these three British hybrids have executive managers who all have prior experience in biotech start-ups and as a result successfully lead

---

7 The first round of financing refers to early stage funding in excess of £1 million or €1.5 million from external sources. All of the firms in the sample, in one way or another, raised seed financing from informal investor or government grants. The amount raised in seed financing is excluded from the first round of financing.
IPOs at a very early stage of firm development (within the first two years of founding). The other two hybrid DBFs, which spun out of universities with academic founders, relied first on venture capital funding, one of them raising more than £50 million in venture capital to finance drug discovery programs and was eventually acquired by a larger biotech firm. The other DBF has since lead a successful IPO once it was able to recruit industry-experienced managers.

The ability for British hybrids to raise external financing quickly after their founding also shows that British hybrids are able to focus and dedicate resources to drug discovery and development. In fact, the majority of their financial resources have been earmarked for developing new drug products. The revenue from their services was described as ‘covering overhead’, ‘an early revenue stream’, ‘something to retreat to if the necessity arose’. The services business is a ‘nice-to-have’ revenue source, but not a *raison d’être*. Funding drug discovery requires a large amount of financial capital and only the very large pharmaceuticals that have deep pockets of retained earnings are able to finance this type of R&D from internal sources. Hybrid DBFs that earn marginal amounts of revenue from service activities cannot feasibly fund discovery with this revenue stream. Since the strategic objective of these hybrids is to bring a new therapeutic product to market, acquiring financial resources remains a critical activity for these firms. As British hybrids secure external funding quickly, they are generally much more ‘product-focused’ in the sense that they are developing a therapeutic product than service-oriented providing mainly services for customers.

Raising a first round of external financing through initial public offerings represents a path that is primarily accessible in liberal market economies with liquid stock exchanges. Of the four British hybrids that followed this path, three of them floated in the first year of founding. In order for these firms to follow this strategy, they had founding management teams with extensive industry experience. These managers found the public equity markets a more attractive financing path than involving venture capitalists. There are a couple reasons for this. First, one of the advantages of involving venture capitalists is to gain access to the industry knowledge and managerial expertise provided by the VC or through their networks. Since the management teams of the three hybrids all had extensive industry and managerial experience, the additional benefit of the expertise of venture capitalists would be limited. Secondly, hybrids generate revenue and the immediate need to raise funding to continue operations is lower. If necessary, they are able to sustain their services business and delay the progress of drug programs. The founders of these DBFs also speculated that the combination of revenues (even though limited) with drug development was attractive to shareholders because it provided cash flow to cover operational overhead so that the funding raised through the IPO could be dedicated to drug programs. It also reduces some of the risk. If the drug programs fail there is still a business that offers some value to the shareholders.

This discussion on the external financing of British hybrids leads to the following proposition.

**Proposition 1.** The British financial system supports the funding of high-risk innovation that allows British hybrids to be primarily focused on drug discovery and development.

Dutch hybrids gave different reasons for following hybrid strategies and their strategy tended to emerge from the contingent institutional conditions. In the data set, there are six Dutch DBFs that followed hybrid strategies at some point either as a founding model, as a present model or as a transitory model. Only two of these six DBFs have had stable models, having had a hybrid model at founding and presently still pursuing this strategy. A number of these

---

8 In 2006 the average cost of drug development, from discovery to launch, was $1.2 billion.
DBFs cite the immediate need to generate sales for survival as the reason for pursuing a hybrid strategy.

“…generating revenues was very important because it was obvious from the start that we could not and we didn't want to survive on VC money. During that period, economies were worse than now. Then VC money, we couldn't get that easily so we wanted to generate revenues to make sure we could survive in the long run.”

“…the model was very simple you get a contract and do the job. It was fee for service. That was at that time not the most popular concept and actually it was a concept that nobody, hardly anybody had tried before in this area. Everybody was at that time focused on new technologies and getting VCs on board as soon as possible. But in our case, VCs were not interested and the banks were not interested.”

The immediate need for revenues was not the only reason to offer services. In a couple of the cases, a lack of technology or an insufficient knowledge of using the technology for discovery purposes was also a reason for Dutch DBFs to follow services models until they were able to identify drug targets and compounds. This process of experimentation was an important part of understanding the boundaries of their technology. Although the founders of the Dutch hybrids had perhaps ambitions to discover and develop drug products, they lacked the means, both financial and technological, to pursue this goal. Eventually, four of six Dutch hybrids secured external financing from venture capitalists but none of these raised this first round of financing within the first two years of its founding. In fact it took Dutch hybrids on average 6.5 years to secure their first round of external financing. Obviously the need for external financing is a crucial factor in this difference. The Dutch hybrids may not have needed external financing for several years because they first followed services model in order to generate revenue as they searched for not only access to financial resources but also, possibly, technology on which to build a drug product pipeline.

A striking difference with the British cases is that Dutch hybrids do not access public equity markets for the first round of funding. A possible explanation for this is that the management in Dutch hybrids lack the experience of raising capital through public equity markets, the cumulative experience of most founding management teams in the Dutch cases being heavily academic. Additionally, for the DBFs that did successfully raise the first round of venture capital financing, the majority of these firms (three out of the four) accessed these resources internationally, essentially using functional equivalents to compensate for constraints in the national financial system.

This leads to the following proposition.

Proposition 2. The use of public equity markets (or initial public offerings) as a first source of external financing and as an alternative to venture capital requires DBFs (British or Dutch, hybrids or otherwise) to have a founding management team with extensive biotech industry knowledge and experience.

**Competence destruction and competence enhancement**

Competence destruction or enhancement is generally associated with radical or incremental innovation, respectively. One of the arguments in the comparative capitalism literature is that certain configurations in the labor systems, e.g. high or low employment protection, general or specific skill development, encourages patterns of competence destruction or enhancement. Generally a low level of employment protection, coupled with general and transferable skills is associated with competence destruction and allows firms to engage and adopt high-risk...
(radical) innovations more easily. The converse holds for competence enhancement, or accumulation, and low-risk (incremental) innovation. Given the differences between the British and Dutch labor systems, the expectation is that there is a higher level of competence destroying behavior in British DBFs than in Dutch DBFs, for which it follows that British DBFs would be engaging more in high-risk innovations.

I look at competence destruction in the form of reconfiguring resources. The ability to reconfigure resources implies that a firm has some flexibility to adapt to its changing environment and respond strategically. Among the sampled DBFs, the British hybrids reconfigured their resources more often. There were periods of building up resources, for example to develop a technology platform, followed by a contraction of resources when the project was finished or progressed to a different stage (Whitley, 2006). Among the British cases, there are two hybrids that experienced major reconfiguration of their resources. One of these started out primarily as a services-oriented DBF and after raising funding expanded their discovery division. Shortly thereafter, the managers and investors of the DBF realized that its informatics division had become unsustainable and unnecessary and reduced its workforce drastically in that area. Then a few years later, raising additional financing became difficult, and the investors and managers closed down the discovery division to make the DBF a more attractive acquisition based on its platform technology. The story of the other British hybrid echoes this series of events; the DBF faced difficulties in raising financing and in this case, chose to divest its services division, selling off its contracts and platform. The money raised from the sale has been reinvested in continuing its lead drug program. In essence this hybrid DBF is now following a pure drug discovery model. These two examples show how British hybrids respond to technical and market uncertainty using external flexibility, or the firing of resources when discontinuing activities.

From the sampled Dutch hybrids, there are no similar accounts of reconfiguration of resources. This is not to suggest that Dutch DBFs do not reorganize because there are a couple of cases where Dutch service-oriented DBFs reduced their workforce substantially because of a decrease in sales. However, reconfiguration of resources based on the progression of a project was absent among the cases. In most of the cases, Dutch hybrids followed a slow-growth path and instead of hiring specific resources for discovery projects, shared resources between customer service-based projects and internal drug discovery projects. In one account, a Dutch hybrid changed from a hybrid to a pure-discovery model. The process of shedding excess resources related to the platform technology was slow, based on attrition and took several years. The DBF did not specifically ‘fire’ resources but they changed their jobs and responsibilities, using internal flexibility, and in most cases these employees left on their own will.

From this discussion, it seems that competence destruction as associated with high-risk innovation strategies takes place more commonly among British hybrids rather than Dutch hybrids. This supports the proposition that British hybrids are more discovery oriented than services oriented. It would follow then that Dutch hybrids engage in more competence enhancement and accumulate knowledge and skills from their services activities. This accumulated knowledge could provide learning advantages but depends on how extensively human resources are shared between services and drug discovery programs.

Looking at how the British and Dutch hybrids managed and allocated resources shows a substantial difference in coordination and control. The British hybrids emphasized the difficulty in managing the inherent conflict of interest of allocating resources to internal (drug
discovery) or external (service) projects. British hybrids carefully define the external boundaries as well as the internal boundaries of their services. All of the British hybrids elaborated on the difficulty of controlling and monitoring resources; some had more sophisticated monitoring routines and dedicated sets of resources while others were more informal or used shared resources. The following quotation highlights the balance of managing resources, 50% to internal and 50% to external projects.

“[Customers tend to get priority, but this is] the reason we keep such good metrics so that we’re able to analyze this … this situation came along and we had to deliver and we did deliver. And, I thought, that must have burned up so much resources and then went back to the timesheets and looked and we’re still keeping the 50/50 balance. So, it’s got a bit of a buffer in it, the resource planning that we have.”

Allocating resources to projects is not purely a matter of internal conflicts but of external ones as well. A founder acknowledged that the hybrid model was successful but almost too successful, because as the firm gained recognition in the market, its discovery efforts created conflicts with customers:

“…drug discovery came first but what happened is ... we had good awareness very quickly across the pharmaceutical world because of the contract research we put out there and we went to conferences and the profile was very high very quickly. People saw us as a contract research company and then once they saw there was also a bit of drug discovery in there that created a bit of conflict.”

This theme of external customer conflict surfaced in the other British hybrids as well. Another founder elaborated on their strategy:

“… we look at orphan diseases where big pharma are not interested. So I've avoided again any conflicts because they know which diseases we're looking at and they're not looking at the same set. So they are happy. They don't feel that they cannot tell us anything. Orphan diseases are not big enough for big pharma; they are not going to make enough money. But to a small company like mine, an orphan disease is fantastic.”

The emphasis on managing conflict of interest in British hybrids may limit some of the potential benefits of knowledge sharing and spillovers. The founders and management of Dutch hybrids perceive the inherent conflict in this strategy quite differently than their British counterparts. Instead of managing the resource allocation for internal and external purposes, they refer to the potential learning benefits. One of the Dutch hybrid DBFs attributed the learning process as one of the advantages of licensing their technology and selling services; the iterative learning helped them to understand and discover the limitations of their technology and improved their own process of drug discovery.

A striking difference with British hybrids is that there is a transition process that Dutch hybrids experience as they evolve from a services-oriented model to a more discovery-oriented one. Whereas in the UK, hybrids had the financing, skills and technology to start with discovery from the founding, the Dutch hybrids were involved in iterative learning processes to improve their technology for discovery purposes or they were involved in searching for in-licensing opportunities.

“That was a continuous struggle. We started with an idea about products that failed. Then we refocused on other products that we stopped. Then we decided to focus on vaccines and acquired Firm A and had their antibodies and that failed. Eventually we settled on [our current programs] but that was very late after all the different reiterations. The one constant factor was the technology which was strong and increasingly generated revenue, not just revenue but also reputation for the company. But the best way for us to generate our own products and the struggle from being a platform technology company to [becoming] a product company was a very, very big one.”
This particular hybrid had also been able to raise a substantial amount of external financing to fund this transition process from a ‘platform to a product’ company. However, one of its investors admittedly acknowledged that they probably invested too early in the company and that there were many years and a lot of effort spent on finding the right technology, drug programs and candidates. In this context of learning and experimentation, the accumulation of knowledge is necessary to progress and to, eventually, be successful in drug discovery. Yet, often investors do not have the patience to fund this type of cumulative learning, especially for high-risk innovation. By also offering services, Dutch hybrids sustain their existence while engaging in long-term learning. This leads to the following propositions:

**Proposition 3.** Dutch hybrids have relatively large service operations that require a substantial commitment of their resources and are therefore in comparison to British DBFs more focused on low-risk innovation.

**Proposition 4.** By sustaining and sharing resources across internal and external projects (competence enhancing behavior), Dutch hybrids create advantages insofar that cumulative knowledge for their own in-house drug discovery is created, retained and improved by working with customers. Institutional systems that support knowledge accumulation, or competence enhancing behavior, such as that in the Netherlands, provide comparative institutional advantages for the hybrid model.

**Theoretical implications of the hybrid model**

This deeper investigation into the differences between British and Dutch hybrids has shed light on why they are followed. In the Netherlands one is quick to assume that the hybrid model is used to compensate for the lack of available private and public equity; yet this deeper investigation has shown that learning is a key element for pursuing this strategy. It also suggests that Dutch founders start hybrid DBFs based on younger, less ‘ripe’ platform technologies and through this iterative learning process improve their technology while also learning drug development skills, a time-consuming and costly process. Another important implication of this analysis on the hybrid model is that it shows that the Dutch labor and skills systems have indeed promoted skills that support the knowledge and skill accumulation, as the majority of these hybrids start with a services-oriented strategy, regardless whether it is based on proprietary or generic technology and grow into discovery or hybrid models (Casper and Kettler, 2001).

The evidence on the British hybrids suggests that the British national financing system encourages the prevalence of discovery-oriented models through its inherent institutional selection mechanisms and isomorphic processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). As new firms enter the market, they follow the patterns of the successful firms before them, creating a shared understanding of what is ‘successful’ and a dominant institutional logic in the organizational field (Battilana, 2006). In the British biotechnology sector, the financial system perpetuates the use of the discovery model, encouraging firms to engage in high-risk innovation strategies and providing financial capital and governance for investments in high-risk innovation. The flexibility and mobility in labor system also complements the financial system in supporting high-risk innovation strategies.

In the case of the Netherlands, we would expect the financial system to deter Dutch DBFs from following innovation strategies with high levels of risk and uncertainty; yet, a number of service-oriented DBFs have transitioned to more discovery-oriented models in an attempt to create more value in the firm and follow the dominant logic of the organizational field. The
constraints that Dutch DBF founders face in the financial system have encouraged Dutch entrepreneurs to follow alternative paths to funding by accessing venture capital on a transnational level and in essence created a functional equivalent to their national financial system. Dutch founders also use the services model as a transitional strategy while they search for appropriate platforms and knowledge to acquire in order to pursue more high-risk strategies in drug development. Most of these DBFs maintain their services division once they have acquired the resources to engage in drug discovery. Even though the Dutch institutional systems encourage investment in low-risk innovation, Dutch founders of DBFs in an attempt to follow the institutional logics of this international sector are transitioning to more high-risk innovation strategies. This raises the question then if the hybrid model is a form of innovation strategy for which the Dutch systems provide comparative institutional advantage and one which, given the current debate of the nature of innovation in drug development, provides advantages by emphasizing learning over short-term performance or is it a transitional strategy that will give way to either a focus on products or services.

Conclusion

Incorporating institutional change into the comparative capitalism framework is a challenge for future research. This study has attempted to explain how firms adopt alternative strategies when faced with institutional constraints and how firms follow strategies consistent with the dominant logic of the organizational field. Several scholars (Crouch, 2005; Hage and Meeus, 2006; Morgan et al, 2005; Oliver, 1991; Thelen, 2003, 2004) have begun to focus on questions associated with change in institutional systems and the effects on organizational coordination. As institutional complementarities sustain the use of a set of institutional systems from which benefits are derived, scholars have claimed that changing parts of an institutional system may have adverse affects on the efficiency of the whole system. Yet, as Crouch (2005) argues institutional heterogeneity within institutional systems is necessary for institutional change to take place. Without it institutional entrepreneurs would have no alternative paths to follow and would not be able to provide innovative ways of coordinating or organizing economic activity. In this perspective the Dutch example shows how entrepreneurs recombine elements of coordinated market economies to provide firms with new paths to follow. However an important implication of piecing together these parts is the degree to which they conflict or agree with existing institutional complementarities. Institutional complementarity is the central mechanism that can limit institutional change (Jackson and Deeg, 2006). The hybrid model seems to be an example of how institutional entrepreneurs are recombining institutional elements but given the limited use of this model in the biotech industry, the extent of institutional change remains to be seen.

This study has some limitations and, as a case study, is not intended to make inferences to a larger population. However, considering it is intended to be an industry specific case, it does have a certain amount generalization. First, the constructs of the ideal types, or business models, were based on a larger sample. The study was also designed to provide insight into the specific hybrid model, for which the eleven cases represent 50% of all identified hybrids in the UK and Netherlands. The hybrid model should be viewed as an exceptional model and as such inferences to the larger biotechnology industry are limited. Another limitation is the possibility of sample bias since only DBFs that have survived could be interviewed. However, since the time of data collection a number of firms a couple of the British hybrids have been acquired or liquated and now cease to exist in the same form in which they were interviewed. This provides some perspectives on the firm development and outcomes of hybrid model. A final limitation is that data was gathered retrospectively and respondents may have rationalized the events or interpreted the events differently over time.
This study contributes to the extant literature on comparative capitalism by providing a firm level analysis of the transition between high and low risk innovation strategies and by offering an initial understanding of the firm level influences of institutional entrepreneurship. Given the fact that governments, particularly those in Europe, are investing substantially in schemes to stimulate the growth of biotechnology clusters, a deeper understanding of the supportive institutional systems is needed. The general assumption of government policy is that the Silicon-Valley model is importable; yet very few regions have been able to duplicate it successfully. In this sense, the study also aims to inform policy makers in their efforts to ‘orchestrate’ biotechnology clusters.
References


# Appendix A

## List of DBFs included in the sample and job titles of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Date founded</th>
<th>Number of founders</th>
<th>Origin of technology</th>
<th>Model of founding</th>
<th>Year of first round funding</th>
<th>Type of funding</th>
<th>Year of first round funding to date of latest round</th>
<th>Public/private?</th>
<th>Formal company name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK101</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>TSP</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>PUD</td>
<td>PRIV</td>
<td>COO (founder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK102</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>UNIV</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PRIV</td>
<td>CSO (founder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK103</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>PUD</td>
<td>PUB</td>
<td>CSO (founder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK104</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNIV</td>
<td>TSP</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PRIV</td>
<td>CSO/CEO (founder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK105</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNIV</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>PUB</td>
<td>CSO/CSO (founder)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>Date founded</th>
<th>Number of founders</th>
<th>Origin of technology</th>
<th>Model of founding</th>
<th>Year of first round funding</th>
<th>Type of funding</th>
<th>Year of first round funding to date of latest round</th>
<th>Public/private?</th>
<th>Formal company name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NL1003</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNIV</td>
<td>TSP</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>PUB</td>
<td>CSO/CEO (founder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL1004</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>TSP</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>PRIV</td>
<td>CSO (founder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL1005</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNIV</td>
<td>TSP</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>PRIV</td>
<td>CSO (founder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL1006</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>IND</td>
<td>TSP</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>VC</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>PRIV</td>
<td>CSO (founder)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Origin: UNIV=university department, INST=government funded research institute, IND=industry, other firms
Model: TSP=Technology service providers, D=Discovery, H=Hybrid
Type of funding: VC=venture capital, BA=Business angel, CVC=Corporate venture capital, Rev=revenue from sales
Ownership: PRIV=private ownership, PUB=public listed company