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The distributional implications of a carbon tax in Ireland

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The Distributional Implications of a Carbon Tax in Ireland

Tim Callan\textsuperscript{a}, Seán Lyons\textsuperscript{a}, Susan Scott\textsuperscript{a}, Richard S.J. Tol\textsuperscript{a,b,c,d} and Stefano Verde\textsuperscript{e}

Abstract: We study the effects of carbon tax and revenue recycling across the income distribution in the Republic of Ireland. In absolute terms, a carbon tax of €20/tCO\textsubscript{2} would cost the poorest households less than €3/week and the richest households more than €4/week. A carbon tax is regressive, therefore. However, if the tax revenue is used to increase social benefits and tax credits, households across the income distribution can be made better off without exhausting the total carbon tax revenue.

Key words: Carbon tax, Ireland, income distribution

JEL Classification: D31, H23, Q54

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The Distributional Implications of a Carbon Tax in Ireland

1. Introduction

Climate policy necessarily increases the price of energy, either explicitly through taxes or tradable permits or implicitly by mandating the use of different fuels from those that a free market would choose. As energy is a necessary good, climate policy is regressive: it will disproportionally harm poorer households.\(^1\) Therefore, there should be additional policy reform to offset the negative effects of climate policy on the distribution of income. This paper investigates this issue for a carbon tax and revenue recycling for the Republic of Ireland.

The *Programme for Government 2007-2012* states that “[a]ppropriate fiscal instruments, including a carbon levy, will be phased in on a revenue-neutral basis over the lifetime of this Government.”\(^2\) Details of the carbon tax will not be decided before late 2009, but it seems likely that the carbon tax would be levied on carbon dioxide emissions that are not already regulated by the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), and that the tax would be roughly equal to the expected permit price in the EU ETS. We will work on these assumptions.

In contrast to other policy instruments, a carbon tax has the distinct advantage that it generates tax revenue that can be used to even out undesired side-effects of greenhouse gas emission reduction. The purchasing power of households can be targeted through income taxes and, as the negative effects of a carbon tax are concentrated in the lower income groups, social welfare payments. This is essential for the political acceptability of a carbon tax. The previous attempt to introduce such a tax in Ireland was abandoned (in 2004) at least partly due to distributional concerns.\(^3\)

This paper is not the first to look at these issues, as shown by the literature review in Section 2. However, there are only a few papers, and none on Ireland using recent data. As each country is idiosyncratic in its taxes and benefits, this paper does add useful information. Section 3 discusses the distributional implications of a carbon tax, using data from the latest Household Budget Survey. Section 4 shows the results for income recycling, using a detailed model of direct taxes and transfer payments. Section 5 concludes.

2. Previous literature

The impact of energy and carbon taxes on household income distribution has been investigated in a number of studies, although almost all of them refer exclusively to developed economies. This is arguably the case because in developed economies “green”

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1. At the same time, the long-term benefits of climate policy will be reaped by poorer countries. However, this paper is focused on domestic distribution.
taxes have been implemented more extensively and because the consumption of CO2 related fuels is more even across the population, which fact is at the root of the equity problem.\(^4\) In fact, the literature on developed economies suggests that energy and carbon taxes tend to be regressive, whereas for developing economies it has been concluded that such taxes are either neutral or progressive.\(^5\) Here follows a brief review of the literature on developed economies, with a focus on the studies that concern Ireland.

Among the earliest works is one by Poterba (1991), who analyses the distributional effect of a gasoline tax in the US. Using the data from the US Consumer’s Expenditure Survey, Poterba (1991) calculates the fractions of household income and expenditure that are devoted to gasoline purchase.\(^6\) He finds that the tax is only slightly regressive, especially when expressed as a share of expenditure. On the other hand, Safirova \textit{et al}. (2004) find that the burden of congestion falls disproportionately on the rich (in and around Washington, DC), so that road pricing or fuel taxation would be strongly regressive.

With a view to the project of a European carbon tax, Pearson and Smith (1991) estimate the distributional impact of the tax in seven European countries, namely France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, the UK and Ireland. Augmenting Poterba’s approach by including price elasticities (although they do not estimate any demand system), they find that in the first five countries the tax would be weakly regressive, whereas it would be significantly regressive in the UK and strongly regressive in Ireland. By means of a substantially more comprehensive model (the E3ME model, a sectoral, regionalized, econometric model of the EU), Barker and Köhler (1998) upgrade Pearson and Smith’s work and draw similar conclusions,\(^7\) although they also point out that the outcome would be progressive if the yield were recycled as lump-sum transfers.

A study for Canada was conducted by Hamilton and Cameron (1994), who use an input-output model of the economy to translate the carbon tax into all consumer prices and then apply Statistics Canada’s micro-simulation model to assess the distributional impact of the price increases.\(^8\) The simulated tax turns out to be moderately regressive. Similarly, Cornwell and Creedy (1996) investigate the distributional impact of a carbon tax in Australia. Again, the approach adopted is a combination of input-output analysis and estimation of the demand response of consumers, in this case based on the Australian Household Expenditure Survey. Cornwell and Creedy (1996) find that “The carbon tax

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\(^4\) The difference between developed and developing countries can be explained not only by the difference in household expenditure patterns: Shah and Larsen (1992) argue that “[in developing countries] factors such as market power, price controls, import quotas, rationed foreign exchange, the presence of black markets, tax evasion, and urban-rural migration, may cast doubt on the regressivity of environmental policies” (p.8).

\(^5\) Boyce \textit{et al}. (2005) find, however, that the burden of a carbon tax in China would be borne more by rural households than urban ones. A study worthy of mention, especially for its innovative approach, is the one by Yusuf and Resosudarmo (2007) on the distributional effects of a carbon tax in Indonesia.

\(^6\) The implicit assumptions in this approach are that \(a\) the tax is fully translated into the price of the fuel, and \(b\) the price elasticities of demands for fuels are zero. In addition, the supply side of the economy is not considered. Thus, this method is suited for the analysis of the so-called first-round effects.

\(^7\) “The most regressive impact is on West Germany, the UK and Ireland, although the impact is weak” (p.400).

\(^8\) Actually, as the first step they determine the tax level that would bring about a given CO2 emissions cut. This is calculated by means of a Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) model of the Canadian economy.
involves an increase in total tax revenue and a reduction in the degree of progressivity, with an increase in inequality” (p.35).

More studies have been conducted with reference to European economies. Labandeira and Labeaga (1999) explore the effect of a carbon tax on Spanish household income. The authors use an input-output demand model to calculate the price changes induced by the tax, and then simulate consumers’ response via an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) estimated with the data from the Spanish Household Expenditure Survey. In contrast with other studies (in addition to those previously mentioned, see Symons et al. [2000]), they do not find that a carbon tax in Spain would be regressive.

Tiezzi (2001) simulates the welfare effects of the carbon tax implemented (de facto only for one year) in Italy in 1999. Such effects are calculated using True Cost of Living indices and compensating variation; the parameters are obtained by estimating an AIDS with household consumption data. Surprisingly, Tiezzi (2001) finds that the Italian carbon tax is not regressive, but explains that this might be due to the fact that the tax mainly hits transport fuels because of the way it has been conceived. Indeed, in developed economies the pattern of household spending on transport fuels typically increases with income, as opposed to that of heating fuels, which is relatively flat instead.

Brannlund and Nordstrom (2004) analyse consumer response and welfare effects due to changes in energy or environmental policy in Sweden, where a carbon tax has existed since 1991. Thus, the authors are able to estimate an econometric model for the demand of non-durables (a quadratic AIDS). They then assume a doubling of the Swedish carbon tax and compare the outcomes of two alternative recycling options, namely a lower general VAT and a lower VAT on public transport (equivalent to a subsidy to public transport). Both reforms are found to be regressive, although the second one also has a regional distributional effect, in the sense that households living in less populated areas would carry a larger share of the tax burden.

Wier et al. (2005) assess the distributional impact of the Danish carbon tax. The method is standard, as it combines an input-output model and national consumer survey, but the data nicely “incorporate” the substitution effects, since the tax was introduced in 1992. The tax is found to be regressive, particularly to the disadvantage of rural households.

Van Heerden et al. (2006) is probably the most advanced study, using a detailed computable general equilibrium model with multiple households for South Africa. The authors compute the marginal excess burden by income class, and find a triple dividend for selected ecological tax reforms: certain mixes of increased energy taxes and reduced food taxes reduce emissions, increase economic output, and reduce the income gap between rich and poor.

Finally, one relatively recent study has been devoted to Ireland, where the tax has been on the government’s agenda for a few years. Using the data from the Irish Household Budget Survey, Scott and Eakins (2004) derive the pattern of household consumption of

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9 For a comprehensive macroeconomic analysis of an Irish carbon tax, see Bergin et al. (2004). Also, one may want to consult the earlier work by Fitz Gerald and McCoy (1992), inspired by the project (never realised) of a European carbon tax.
CO₂-related fuels and calculate the distributional impact of a €20 tax per ton of carbon. The result is that the tax before compensation would be markedly regressive because consumption of heating fuels is almost the same across the household income distribution. The compensation strategies explored overcame this except for certain households that were difficult to target, where other means were suggested including promising energy efficiency retrofits (Healy 2003; Clinch and Healy, 2000).

In this study we use more recent data than do Scott and Eakins (2004). We use a simpler method for estimating the impact of the carbon tax – we ignore demand effects and indirect impacts. However, we pay explicit attention to the distributional impacts of tax recycling.

3. The impact of a carbon tax on income distribution

A carbon tax is a tax on energy use, that is, a tax on a necessary good. One would expect that a carbon tax would be regressive. Figure 1 shows that this is the case for a carbon tax of €20/tCO₂. A carbon tax would thus further skew the income distribution.

The data in Figure 1 are based on the Household Budget Survey 2004-5 (CSO, 2007), using the micro-data on quantities of energy used for home heating, quantities of electricity used, and expenditures on motor fuels. Price data and emissions coefficients are taken from SEI and Scott and Eakins (2004). Note that we include direct emissions only. Indirect effects – for example, retailers passing on their carbon taxes to consumers – are not included.

Figure 1 shows that the richest households emit only 37% more carbon dioxide than do the poorest households – while the equivalised disposable income of the richest households is eight times that of the poorest. It also shows that electricity, already regulated under the EU ETS, is only a small part of the total burden of climate policy. Electricity use is rather flat across the income distribution: The top decile use only 26% more electricity than do the bottom decile. The distribution of “other energy”, mostly for

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10 No input-output model of the Irish economy is used. This means that the “indirect” effect of the tax, which operates through the price changes of all goods other than fuels, is not captured.

11 Results broadly similar to those in Fitzgerald and McCoy (1992) were found. A household in the first income decile would pay a tax that corresponds to roughly 3% of its disposable income, while for one in the tenth decile the figure would be 0.5%.

12 Note that we do not have data by income decile on fuel used in international travel, but it seems likely that aviation emissions will be regulated under the EU ETS in the future which will raise the price of air travel.


14 Households differ in size across the income distribution. The distribution of simple household income therefore gives a distorted picture. Equivalisation corrects for that by expressing the household income as income per adult equivalent, and re-ranking the households. All figures of deciles are here formulated on this basis.

15 The EU ETS has raised the price of electricity since 2007. This has been included in the relevant price indices that are used for setting benefits and in wage negotiations. We will therefore not consider it further.
home heating, is even flatter: The top decile use 8% more than the bottom. O’Doherty et al. (2008) show that energy saving behaviour is more common at the top end on the income distribution. The big difference between income deciles is in motor fuels: The top decile use 132% more than the bottom one.

Figure 2 splits the implications of the carbon tax for rural and urban households. Because in the countryside houses are bigger, distances are longer and more transport is by car, rural households tend to use more energy and more (carbon-intensive) solid fuels than urban households in the same income decile. Therefore, a carbon tax would weigh more heavily on rural households. Note that the absolute difference is small: less than one euro per household per week in the lower income deciles. Note also that the Irish tax and benefit system does not distinguish between rural and urban households. Rural households can therefore not be compensated straightforwardly.

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

Figure 3 shows the carbon tax per person and per household, as a function of household size and Figure 4 repeats this for each household type. Energy is a common good within a household. This is obvious for space heating, but it also, to a lesser extent, for transport. Children add somewhat to the energy use of a household, but relatively little. Therefore, a carbon tax would hit people in a smaller household harder – but the absolute differences between households are small.

[Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here]

Figure 5 shows the carbon tax relative to the total benefits received and the total direct taxes paid (before revenue recycling; all data for 2005). The crucial insight in this chart is that the carbon tax is measured in euros per week, while benefits and taxes are measured in hundreds of euros per week. For the bottom four deciles of the income distribution, the carbon tax is at most 2.0% of total benefits. For the top four deciles, the carbon tax is at most 2.6% of total direct taxes. Therefore, one can compensate for the impact of a carbon tax with a relatively small increase in benefits, and a relatively small decrease in income taxes.

[Insert Figure 5 about here]

4. The impact of revenue recycling on income distribution

We use the SWITCH model (Callan et al., 2008) to study the distributional implications of revenue recycling. SWITCH is a model of direct taxes and welfare payments. It is based on the CSO’s Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC, CSO, 2006) This nationally representative survey captures the variability in the household population across such dimensions as age, household composition, income, employment, and disability. Results are grossed up to provide information on incomes, taxes and benefits

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16 The difference between the average married couple with two children and three children is due to income. Richer families tend to be larger.
17 In the middle parts of the income distribution, people would benefit from both higher benefits and lower taxes.
that represents the national situation. SWITCH is regularly used by the Department of Finance for distributional analysis of the impact of the annual budget.

Income taxes in Ireland are relatively straightforward. A 20% tax is paid on income below €35,400 per year. Above that, a tax of 41% is paid. There is a standard tax credit of €3,660, so that the first €18,300 earned is essentially tax-free. There are additional tax credits for mortgage and rent, for family circumstances, and for disabilities. The Irish benefit system is considerably more complex, with income supplements, child benefits, maternity and homemaker benefits, carers benefits, illness and disability benefits, jobseeker and training benefits, pre-retirement allowances and pensions; many of these benefits come in both an entitlement and a means-tested mode.

Using the SWITCH model, we increased social welfare payments, and decreased taxes. The social welfare package would involve a €2 increase per week in personal rates for all social welfare payments (pensions, unemployment compensation, short-term illness and long-term disability, one parent families). The qualified adult allowance (QAA), which covers spouses without an independent income, is also increased by €2 per week. Optionally, a further €0.80 per week is allowed in respect of each qualifying child of a social welfare recipient. For income taxes, we consider two scenarios. In the first, the basic personal tax credit is increased by €104 per year. Tax credits for one-parent families are adjusted in line with this. In the context of compensation for carbon taxes, a tax credit increase is more suitable than a tax rate cut, as the amount of carbon tax paid by taxpayers is broadly constant, whereas compensation via tax rate cuts would be concentrated towards the top of the income distribution. Nonetheless, in the second scenario, we reduce the tax rate in the lower band from 20.0% to 19.5%.

Figures 6 and 7 show the results, per income decile, of higher benefits and higher tax credits. The increase in social welfare payments benefits households in the lower half of the income distribution, and the increased tax credit benefits households in the upper half (Figure 6). Subtracting the carbon tax, there are gains across the income distribution but the gains are minimal for deciles 1, 4, and 10. Figure 7 adds an increase in the qualified child allowance for social welfare recipients, which has clear benefits for the lower incomes.

Turning to tax rates, Figures 8 and 9 show the results of higher benefits and a lower tax rate. Again, there are gains across the income distribution, but minimal ones for deciles 1 and 4. Rich households gain more (Figure 8). Figure 9 adds an increase in the qualified child allowance for social welfare recipients. As this mainly benefits households at the bottom of the income distribution, the distribution of gains is more equitable.

Note that SWITCH estimates suggest that about 35,000 households in the bottom 3 deciles (and about 55,000 in total, all in the bottom half of the income distribution) would not be assisted by the tax/welfare compensation package. Some of these would be households with a low self-employment income, subject neither to tax nor eligible for social welfare payments. Figures 6-9 suggest that these households are concentrated in the income deciles 1 and 4.

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18 Recall that we exclude the indirect effects of carbon taxes on the income distribution.
Table 1 shows the effects on the government budget. The increase in social welfare would cost €122 million per year, or €138 million if child benefits are raised too. An increase in tax credits would cost the exchequer €222 million, and a decrease in the lower tax rate would cost €301 million. This compares with carbon tax revenue of €551 million, €266 million of which would come directly from households. Overall, the tax and benefit reform in Figure 7 would bring €191 million net to the exchequer, and the reform of Figure 9 would yield €112 million net. The remaining revenue can be used for other purposes, for instance lowering labour costs for businesses.

5. Discussion and conclusion

In this paper, we studied the impact of a carbon tax reform on the income distribution in Ireland. A carbon tax is regressive, as one would expect. This is more pronounced for home heating than for motor fuels. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme has the smallest distributional effect. The impact of a carbon tax of €20/tCO₂ is small compared to pre-existing taxes and benefits. A modest increase in welfare payments would offset the negative impacts of a carbon tax in the lower half of the income distribution. It is important that benefits for dependent children of welfare recipients are increased too. People in the top half of the income distribution can be compensated by a small increase in the tax credit or a small decrease in the base rate of the income tax. Higher tax credits are slightly progressive, while lower tax rates are slightly regressive. These compensation schemes use between 65% and 80% of the expected revenue of the carbon tax. Therefore, in a country like Ireland, distributional concerns need not deter the introduction of a carbon tax.

These findings are in line with the results for other countries as reviewed above. A carbon tax is regressive, but well developed tax and benefit systems mean that this can be remedied. This is no surprise as developed economies differ in detail but less so in broad terms. Expenditures on energy are a small share of total expenditures throughout the OECD, and therefore an increase in the price of energy can be readily compensated – if the tax revenue is available, which is true for the introduction of a carbon tax but not for a rise in the world market price of oil.

Further research is needed on the impact of carbon taxes on fuel poverty (Healy and Clinch, 1992, 1994); on the range of effects within deciles (Ekins and Dresner, 2006), the indirect effects of carbon taxes on income distribution; on the general equilibrium effects of carbon taxes on income distribution; and on the effects of carbon taxes on economic growth and hence income distribution.

References


Table 1: Budget implications a carbon tax reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Budget¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carbon tax, non-ETS, €20/tCO₂</td>
<td>+€551 mln</td>
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<td>of which on households</td>
<td>+€266 mln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare increase, €2/person/week</td>
<td>-€122 mln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child benefit increase, €0.80/child/week</td>
<td>-€16 mln</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tax credit increase, €104/person/year</td>
<td>-€222 mln</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tax rate decrease, to 19.5%</td>
<td>-€301 mln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare + child, tax credit, carbon tax</td>
<td>+€191 mln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare + child, tax rate, carbon tax</td>
<td>+€112 mln</td>
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¹ In 2007, Gross National Income was €161,000 mln, while Exchequer Receipts were €48,000; the carbon tax would thus be 0.3% of GNI and 1.2% of government revenue.

Source: Own calculations.
Figure 1: The impact (euro per household per week) of a €20/tCO2 carbon tax per income decile, split between electricity, motor fuels and other energy
Figure 2: The impact (euro per household per week) of a €20/tCO2 carbon tax per income decile, split between urban and rural households; non-electric energy only.
Figure 3: The impact (euro per household per week) of a €20/tCO2 carbon tax per income decile, split between urban and rural households; non-electric energy only.
Figure 4: The impact (euro per household per week, and euro per person per week) of a €20/tCO2 carbon tax per household type; non-electric energy only
Figure 5: The impact (euro per household per week) of a €20/tCO2 carbon tax (right axis), and total benefits received and total direct taxes paid (left axis) per income decile; non-electric energy only
Figure 6: The effect of a carbon tax, social welfare increase, and tax credit increase per income decile, in euro per household per week; the net effect is also shown.
Figure 7: The effect of a carbon tax, social welfare increase, child benefit increase, and tax credit increase per income decile, in euro per household per week; the net effect is also shown.
Figure 8: The effect of a carbon tax, social welfare increase, and tax rate reduction per income decile, in euro per household per week; the net effect is also shown.
Figure 9: The effect of a carbon tax, social welfare increase, child benefit increase, and tax rate reduction per income decile, in euro per household per week; the net effect is also shown.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Title/ Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>Measuring Material Deprivation in the Enlarged EU <em>Christopher T. Whelan, Brian Nolan and Bertrand Maître</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>247</td>
<td>Incorporating GHG Emission Costs in the Economic Appraisal of Projects Supported by State Development Agencies <em>Richard S.J. Tol and Seán Lyons</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>246</td>
<td>A Carton Tax for Ireland <em>Richard S.J. Tol, Tim Callan, Thomas Conefrey, John D. Fitz Gerald, Seán Lyons, Laura Malaguzzi Valeri and Susan Scott</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>245</td>
<td>Non-cash Benefits and the Distribution of Economic Welfare <em>Tim Callan and Claire Keane</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>244</td>
<td>Scenarios of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Aviation <em>Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>243</td>
<td>The Effect of the Euro on Export Patterns: Empirical Evidence from Industry Data <em>Gavin Murphy and Iulia Siedschlag</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>242</td>
<td>The Economic Returns to Field of Study and Competencies Among Higher Education Graduates in Ireland <em>Elish Kelly, Philip O’Connell and Emer Smyth</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>241</td>
<td>European Climate Policy and Aviation Emissions <em>Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>240</td>
<td>Aviation and the Environment in the Context of the EU-US Open Skies Agreement <em>Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>239</td>
<td>Yuppie Kvetch? Work-life Conflict and Social Class in Western Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Frances McGinnity and Emma Calvert


Alan Barrett and Yvonne McCarthy

237 How Local is Hospital Treatment? An Exploratory Analysis of Public/Private Variation in Location of Treatment in Irish Acute Public Hospitals

Jacqueline O’Reilly and Miriam M. Wiley

236 The Immigrant Earnings Disadvantage Across the Earnings and Skills Distributions: The Case of Immigrants from the EU’s New Member States in Ireland

Alan Barrett, Seamus McGuinness and Martin O’Brien

235 Europeanisation of Inequality and European Reference Groups

Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître

234 Managing Capital Flows: Experiences from Central and Eastern Europe

Jürgen von Hagen and Iulia Siedschlag


Charlie Karlsson, Gunther Maier, Michaela Tripl, Iulia Siedschlag, Robert Owen and Gavin Murphy

232 Welfare and Competition Effects of Electricity Interconnection between Great Britain and Ireland

Laura Malaguzzi Valeri

231 Is FDI into China Crowding Out the FDI into the European Union?

Laura Resmini and Iulia Siedschlag

230 Estimating the Economic Cost of Disability in Ireland

John Cullinan, Brenda Gannon and Seán Lyons

229 Controlling the Cost of Controlling the Climate: The Irish Government’s Climate Change Strategy

22
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>228</td>
<td>The Impact of Climate Change on the Balanced-Growth-Equivalent: An Application of FUND</td>
<td>David Anthoff, Richard S.J. Tol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227</td>
<td>Changing Returns to Education During a Boom? The Case of Ireland</td>
<td>Seamus McGuinness, Frances McGinnity, Philip O'Connell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>226</td>
<td>‘New’ and ‘Old’ Social Risks: Life Cycle and Social Class Perspectives on Social Exclusion in Ireland</td>
<td>Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>225</td>
<td>The Climate Preferences of Irish Tourists by Purpose of Travel</td>
<td>Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224</td>
<td>A Hirsch Measure for the Quality of Research Supervision, and an Illustration with Trade Economists</td>
<td>Frances P. Ruane and Richard S.J. Tol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td>Environmental Accounts for the Republic of Ireland: 1990-2005</td>
<td>Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222</td>
<td>Assessing Vulnerability of Selected Sectors under Environmental Tax Reform: The issue of pricing power</td>
<td>J. Fitz Gerald, M. Keeney and S. Scott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221</td>
<td>Climate Policy Versus Development Aid</td>
<td>Richard S.J. Tol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>Exports and Productivity – Comparable Evidence for 14 Countries</td>
<td>The International Study Group on Exports and Productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218</td>
<td>The Public/Private Mix in Irish Acute Public Hospitals: Trends and Implications</td>
<td>Jacqueline O'Reilly and Miriam M. Wiley</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
217 Regret About the Timing of First Sexual Intercourse: The Role of Age and Context
Richard Layte, Hannah McGee

216 Determinants of Water Connection Type and Ownership of Water-Using Appliances in Ireland
Joe O'Doherty, Seán Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol

215 Unemployment – Stage or Stigma?
Being Unemployed During an Economic Boom
Emer Smyth

214 The Value of Lost Load
Richard S.J. Tol

213 Adolescents’ Educational Attainment and School Experiences in Contemporary Ireland
Merike Darmody, Selina McCoy, Emer Smyth

212 Acting Up or Opting Out? Truancy in Irish Secondary Schools
Merike Darmody, Emer Smyth and Selina McCoy

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Frances P. Ruane, Xiaoheng Zhang

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Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol

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Patrick McCloughan, Seán Lyons and William Batt

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Tim Callan, A. Van Soest, J.R. Walsh

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Tim Callan, Tim Smeeding and Panos Tsakloglou