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**Which Variables Explain Decisions on IMF Credit?
An Extreme Bounds Analysis**

Jan-Egbert Sturm, Helge Berger and Jakob de Haan



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Which Variables Explain Decisions on IMF Credit?

An Extreme Bounds Analysis [#]

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Abstract

This paper analyses which economic and political factors affect the chance that a country receives IMF credit or signs an agreement with the Fund. We use a panel model for 128 countries over the period 1972-1998. Our results, based on Extreme Bounds Analysis, suggest that it are mostly economic variables that are robustly related to IMF lending activity, while most political variables that have been put forward in previous studies on IMF involvement are non-significant. To the extent that political factors matter, they seem more closely related to the conclusion of IMF agreements than to the disbursement of IMF credits.

Key words: IMF credit, political economy

JEL code: F33

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1. Introduction

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created toward the end of World War II. One of its main objectives is to help governments resolve temporary balance of payments problems. At present 184 countries are members of the IMF and eligible to take out loans from the Fund. However, not all borrowing is automatic. At a certain level of borrowing, a government must commit to adjustment programs in exchange for access to IMF funds (Mussa and Savastano, 2000).

How does the IMF decide on its lending? Article I of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF states that the activities of the Fund should, among other things, “facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade” and “promote exchange stability”. In other words, one should expect IMF lending to be based on mainly economic considerations. Indeed, various studies, many of which will be reviewed in the present paper, find that the chance that a country receives IMF support depends on the economic situation in the country concerned. Notably variables like a country’s reserve position, its debt service, and its real growth rate are often found to be important determinants of the likelihood that a country receives IMF credit.

However, it would be hard to deny that—at least to some extent—political-economic factors may also play a role in the Fund’s lending decisions. As the Financial Times reports, this view is shared by the new managing director of the IMF, who regards the IMF “primarily as a political institution”, in which “technical analysis must play a secondary role to politics”.¹ In his recent discussion of the debate on the IMF, Willett (2001, p. 595) even argues that “in a number of instances the IMF has been forced to abandon its economic principles in order to do the political bidding of its major shareholders, the governments of the United States and the other industrial countries.” Indeed, Thacker (1999) and Barro and Lee (2002) report evidence suggesting that access to IMF funds is skewed towards countries that are aligned with the US. The alleged political manipulation of the IMF has led some scholars to recommend that it be given greater formal independence, similar to the independence nowadays granted to central banks (see, for instance, De Gregorio et al., 1999).²

In addition, political factors are likely to come into play from the demand side. To ensure that adjustment programs be implemented in countries receiving funds, the IMF must take factors that drive domestic political processes into account. For instance, reaching an agreement with the authorities that stands little chance of being approved by the legislature of

¹ Financial Times, May 3, 2004, p.6.

² See Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) and Berger et al. (2001) for reviews of the literature on central bank independence.

the country concerned seems futile (Willett, 2001).³ Furthermore, ethnic, political, and other divisions may weaken government's resolve to undertake reforms. Special interest groups that benefit from the continuation of distortionary policies that emerge during any process of economic reform may put pressure on the government (Mayer and Mourmouras, 2002).

The empirical literature on the determinants of IMF credit suffers from some drawbacks. First, a wide variety of variables has been suggested as determinants of IMF involvement and there is little consensus in the literature which variables really matter. Second, most authors do not carefully examine the sensitivity of their findings. Thus it is hard to tell whether the variables reported to be significant in a particular regression are really robustly related to the likelihood that a country has an agreement with the Fund. Third, although some papers include political variables, most studies do not offer a systematic analysis of the role that political factors may play.⁴ Authors, who take political factors into account, generally focus on a limited number of political variables only.

The aim of this paper is to analyse to what extent various economic and political variables that have been suggested in the literature as influencing IMF decisions are robust determinants of the chance that a country receives credit supplied by the IMF or signs an adjustment program with the Fund. In line with most of the literature, we focus on binary choice models of IMF activity. For this purpose, we estimate a panel model for 128 countries over the period 1972-1998 relating dummy variables indicating IMF involvement to economic and political data.

We use the so-called Extreme Bounds Analysis to examine to what extent variables are robust determinants of the likelihood that a country will receive IMF credit or signs an adjustment program in a particular year. To the best of our knowledge, this approach to check for the robustness of a relationship has not been used in this line of literature, although it has been widely employed in the economic growth literature. As pointed out by Temple (2000), presenting only the results of the model preferred by the author(s) of a particular paper can be misleading. Extreme Bounds Analysis is a fairly neutral means to check robustness and compare the validity of conflicting findings in empirical research.

Our results suggest that most of the political variables that have been put forward in previous studies on IMF involvement in a member country are non-significant. However,

³ Mayer and Mourmouras (2002) have developed a model in which the Fund's financing and the conditionality attached to it change the incentives of the borrowing government and affect the political economy equilibrium in the recipient country. In this model government is subject to pressure by interest groups. Likewise, in Drazen's (2001) model the government must contend with domestic veto players. The number and power of veto players depends on a country's political and constitutional institutions.

⁴ An exception is Rowlands (1995).

some political variables affect the likelihood that a member country signs an agreement with the IMF, while decisions on IMF credit disbursement are primarily based on economic considerations.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the variables that we take into account on the basis of previous studies. Section 3 explains the modelling strategy, while Section 4 contains the empirical results. The final section offers some concluding comments.

2. Economic and political determinants of IMF involvement

Appendix A1 summarizes studies that have been published since the beginning of the 1990s dealing with the determinants of IMF credit (for a review of the older literature, see Bird (1995) and Knight and Santaella (1997)).⁵ These studies generally use a binary choice model (logit, probit) to distinguish between countries and time periods where an IMF program was in place and those where it was not, in order to determine which economic and political factors influenced IMF involvement.⁶ As Knight and Santaella (1997) point out, the regressions can be interpreted as the reduced form derived from the “demand” for an IMF program by a recipient country and the IMF’s “supply”.⁷ As we will point out below, previous studies have used a wide array of explanatory variables. Furthermore, the results for particular variables are often mixed.

On the basis of previous studies we have selected a number of **economic variables** for further empirical analysis. Selecting those variables that have been included in at least two studies gave the following list:

- International reserve holdings scaled to imports (*INTRESERV*). Countries with relatively low levels of international reserves relative to imports will be less able to meet balance of payments difficulties through reserve use and hence will be more likely to request and receive IMF credit (Knight and Santaella, 1997). This variable has been included in almost all studies summarized in Table A1 and is generally reported to have a significant coefficient.

⁵ There is another line of literature that examines the impact of IMF adjustment programs; see Bird (2001) for a survey.

⁶ Bird and Rowlands (2003b) have used non-parametric tests for 161 countries for the years 1965 to 2000. They find that countries that sign an IMF agreement have a significantly worse current account balance than other countries, although this pattern is time variant. Signing countries also had more problems with their reserves, especially if they had a more fixed exchange rate regime. High government budget deficits were also associated with an increasing likelihood of signing an agreement with the IMF.

⁷ As far as we know, only four studies (Knight and Santaella, 1997, Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000 and Vreeland, 1999, 2001) have tried to disentangle both factors, but the separation of demand and supply factors in these studies remains a rather difficult task that has drawn severe criticism (see Dreher and Vaubel, 2000).

- Real GDP growth (*GGDP*). Countries experiencing relatively weak growth in real GDP probably demand more credit. Various studies (including Barro and Lee, 2002 and Dreher and Vaubel, 2004) find this variable to be significant, but Bird and Rowlands (2001) find that it is not. As there is a possible endogeneity problem with this variable, it enters with a one-period lag in our models (*GGDPI*).
- Debt service scaled to exports (*DEBTSESV*). A heavy debt burden relative to exports increases countries' need for external finance to service that debt. Many authors have included this variable in their models.⁸ The results for this variable are mixed, however. While, for instance, Rowlands (1995) finds it to be significant, Joyce (1992) concludes that it does not affect the chance that a country is involved in an IMF program.
- Current account balance/GDP (*CURACC*). A country that has a balance of payments need for financial resources will be more likely to demand IMF credit. The results for this variable are surprisingly mixed: various authors conclude that the balance of payment did not affect the chances that a country has an IMF program (see, for instance, Knight and Santaella, 1997, and Vreeland, 2001). Given the possible endogeneity problem with this variable, it enters with a one-period lag in our models (*CURACCI*).
- External debt/GDP (*DEBT*). A high debt ratio may not only lead to more demand for IMF credit, but also to more supply as a high debt ratio may give a country bargaining leverage over the IMF because of its importance for global financial stability (Strom, 1999). On the other hand, a high debt ratio may reduce the creditworthiness of the country concerned. The results for this variable are, again, rather mixed. Whereas various studies (including Rowlands, 1995 and Thacker, 1999) find no effect of this variable, Bird and Rowlands (2001) find that it has a significant negative impact in their probit model. This variable is included with a one-period lag in our models as well (*DEBT1*).
- Income per capita (*GDPCAP*). Low-income countries may be more likely to seek Fund assistance.⁹ Interestingly, various authors report a negative impact of income per capita in their probit models, Rowlands (1995) and Barro and Lee (2002) being the exceptions. The first study finds no effect, while the latter reports a positive impact, in combination with the square of GDP per capita, suggesting that the relationship is non-linear. In our model we use the lagged value of income per capita (*GDPCAPI*).

⁸ Sometimes GDP is used as scaling factor (see, for instance, Vreeland (1999, 2001) and Przeworski and Vreeland (2000)). We prefer using exports as a scaling factor as interest in outstanding debt will have to be paid for by the receipts from exports.

⁹ Knight and Santaella (1997) mention two reasons for this. First, poor countries have limited access to private international capital markets. Second, they may need technical assistance to develop well-functioning

- Log of (1+inflation) (*INFL*). Countries experiencing high inflation are more likely in need of IMF credit. However, the willingness of the IMF to provide funds may be lower in case of high inflation. The results for this variable vary from negative (Dreher and Vaubel, 2004), no effect (e.g. Joyce, 1992) to positive (Bird, 1995). Also this variable is included with a lag (*INFL1*).
- Lagged value of the growth rate of the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar (*XRATE1*). Countries faced with a speculative attack are more likely to turn to the IMF for assistance (Knight and Santaella, 1997).
- Lagged government budget deficit/GDP (*DEFICIT1*). Governments with high budget deficits are more likely to turn to the Fund (Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000).¹⁰ However, the Fund is more likely to enter into an arrangement with a country when its budget constraint is less binding. While some studies find no effect (e.g. Vreeland, 2001), others report a negative impact (e.g. Vreeland, 1999) of this variable.
- Lagged growth rate of the terms of trade (*GTOT1*). A worsening of a country's terms of trade is likely to weaken a country's external position, thereby increasing the likelihood that it will need to seek Fund assistance. Conway (1994) finds a negative impact of this variable, while Knight and Santaella (1997) find no effect.
- Lagged investment/GDP (*INVI*). A low ratio of investment to GDP may indicate limited access to international capital markets, thereby making it more likely that it requests Fund assistance. Knight and Santaella (1997), Vreeland (1999), Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and Vreeland (2001) find support for this view.
- *LIBOR*. An increase in the world interest rate may cause countries to turn to the IMF for assistance. Some authors report support for this view (e.g. Dreher and Vaubel, 2004), while others do not (e.g. Rowlands, 1995).
- Lagged government expenditure/GDP (*GOVSPEND1*). Some studies have included a variable for government spending sometimes also found to be significant (see e.g. Joyce, 1992).

Turning to the IMF for financial assistance is a political decision. However, for an IMF program to be agreed on, not only does a government have to apply for funds, the IMF must also agree to the loan. From the demand as well as the supply side, the literature has suggested

institutions. Some critics of the IMF would perhaps interpret a significant effect of an income variable as support for the claim that the IMF has become to much of an aid agency (Rowlands, 1995).

¹⁰ Bird and Rowlands (2003b) conclude that ignoring fiscal imbalances is unacceptable in an analysis of IMF program adoption.

various **political factors** that may influence the decision-making process on IMF loans. In selecting political variables to be used in our empirical model, we will systematically discuss political factors that have been recently suggested in the literature and identify proxies that can be applied to test the various hypotheses. Many of the variables can be interpreted both as determinants of government's demand for IMF credit and as criteria by which the IMF may judge the creditworthiness of countries demanding credit.

It is well-known from the literature that there is a high degree of persistence in IMF involvement (Hutchison and Noy, 2003). To capture this, we follow Przeworky and Vreeland (2000) using the lag of a 5-years moving average of a dummy indicating whether or not a country was under an agreement (*YRSUNDER51*).

Not all countries that would be eligible to draw resources from the IMF would decide to do so to the extent that they perceive some loss of discretion over their choice of adjustment policy. Especially, as argued by Bird and Rowlands (2000), governments that perceive a large gap between their preferred policies and those expected in the context of IMF conditionality are the least likely to turn to the Fund. However, the more countries turn to the Fund, the less costly the 'sovereignty costs' may be perceived to be. Following Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) we therefore include a variable reflecting the number of other countries in which the Fund is involved (*NRUNDER*).

Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) suggest that governments are more likely to enter an agreement early in the election term, hoping that any perceived stigma of signing an agreement will be forgiven or forgotten before the next elections. In other words, demand for IMF credit might be higher after election years. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) report evidence in support of this view. While various safeguards against the misuse of IMF resources are routinely incorporated into IMF lending programs, Dreher and Vaubel (2004) suggest that the availability of IMF credit might indirectly help to finance electoral campaigns. They find that net credit supplied by the IMF is generally higher around election time.¹¹ To test for the effect of elections, we include two election dummy variables: one for election years for the executive (*ELECEX*) and one for election years for the legislative (*ELEXLEG*). As previous studies argue that there should be an effect before and/or after the election, we take the lag and the lead of the election dummies.

The possibility of blaming the IMF for the necessary adjustment policies may be an incentive to resort to the Fund. By involving the Fund in the decision-making process, national politicians may be able to shield themselves from the political fall-out of unpopular

policies (Vaubel, 1986). Countries with more unstable and polarized political systems will have more difficulties to arrange a credible adjustment program and will, therefore, have a higher incentive to turn to the Fund. In this way, they will obtain a seal of approval for a political program and, thus, gain in credibility. We have applied a number of proxies to capture this argument: the number of political assassinations (*ASSAS*), and revolutions (*REVOL*), and guerilla problems (*GUERIL*), the (lagged) number of government crises (*CRISIS*)¹², and instability within the government (*GOVCHANGE*). On the other hand, the IMF might be less willing to provide its seal of approval when there is less than full political support of such a program. The issue whether international organizations such as the IMF should or should not seek broad local support for the policies they endorse or incorporate in lending conditions is at the heart of the debate on ‘country ownership’ (see, for instance, Helleiner, 2001). In the end, the existence and direction of the relationship between the above listed variables with the disbursement of IMF resources is, therefore, an empirical question.

In general, the decision to involve the IMF crucially depends on government’s assessment of the political costs that may result from the adjustment policies. A high level of social unrest (proxied by three variables: the number of demonstrations (*DEMON*), strikes (*STRIKES*) and riots (*RIOTS*)) *prior* to the disbursement of IMF funds to a country might indicate a pronounced need for outside resources—no matter what strings are attached—to help calm an ongoing economic and political crisis.¹³

Another implication of this line of reasoning is that autocratic regimes—proxied by an executive index of competitiveness (*EXCOMP*)—will have a smaller incentive to request IMF assistance as they can more easily withstand unpopular adjustment programs (Bird and Rowlands, 2001, Edwards and Santaella, 1993). On the other hand, Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) argue that as dictatorships are less constrained by public opinion and competitive elections, they may make easier negotiation partners for the IMF, and are therefore more likely to get credit. Which, if any, argument prevails is again an empirical question.

Political interests of its principal shareholders may be seen to influence decisions by the IMF. An 85 percent majority is required for the most important Fund decisions. Since voting power is—broadly speaking—allocated on the basis of economic size, the US (which controls 17.83 percent of the voting power in the IMF), as well as small coalitions of industrialized

¹¹ Dreher (2004) reports that governments that conclude an IMF arrangement within 12 months prior to an election generally increase their re-election probability.

¹² As government crises may also occur due to an IMF stabilization program, we take the lagged value of crises to circumvent endogeneity.

countries hold veto power in the Fund's decision making (Thacker, 1999).¹⁴ Another argument as to how the interests of large industrial countries may influence IMF credit supply has been put forward by Oatley and Yackee (2000) and Oatley (2002). These papers find evidence suggesting that IMF lending decisions are responsive to these interests as larger loans went to countries in which commercial banks from industrial countries were highly exposed. Still, Oatley (2002) concludes that not all commercial banks benefit to the same degree. Commercial banks based in Japan do not seem to benefit at all, while banks based in France benefit less than banks based in Germany, the UK, the US, and Switzerland. We include in our model the variable *USBANKS* that shows the exposure of US banks to the various countries under consideration. We also include a variable reflecting the importance of the US as a trading partner: imports and exports from/to US as share of total trade of a particular country (*TRADEUS*). It may also be true that the main stakeholders in the IMF have stronger preferences for countries in a certain region. For instance, the US may be more concerned with countries in Asia than in Africa, say. We therefore include *regional dummy* variables in our model.

Bird and Rowlands (2000) also suggest that the IMF could prefer lending in general to countries that are more liberal—proxied by *LIBERAL*, i.e. the total of the political rights index and the civil liberties index of the Freedom House—and those with good governance—proxied by corruption indicator (*CORRUPT*), a rule of law indicator (*RULELAW*), an indicator for the risk of repudiation of government contracts (*REPUDIATION*), and an indicator for the quality of the bureaucracy (*BURQUAL*). All these indicators are provided by ICRG.

The size of a country requesting support may also matter: larger countries—proxied by (lagged) relative size (*RELSIZE*)—may more easily get support to the extent that the 'systemic' or 'contagion' risk of a balance of payments problem in these countries is higher than in smaller countries.

Of course, the influence of a country in the IMF may also affect the chance that it will receive a loan. For given economic conditions, an IMF loan is more likely the higher the quota of a country. Following Barro and Lee (2002), we therefore include share of IMF quotas (*IMFQUOTA*) as explanatory variable.

¹³ All these variables enter with a one-period lag. This also helps to avoid the possible endogeneity problem. Demonstrations, strikes, and riots may contemporaneously increase if the government has to take unpopular measures as part of an IMF stabilization program.

¹⁴ There is evidence suggesting that the degree to which countries vote in line with the US in the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) might affect the chance that a country will receive IMF credit (Thacker,

Finally, some other variables reflecting supply considerations may be found in the recent literature on the determinants of success and failure of IMF or World Bank-supported programs. Dollar and Svensson (2000) conclude in their study of Bank-supported adjustment programs that success can be predicted by a small number of domestic political economy variables, including ethnic divisions, government instability, and undemocratic governments. Likewise, Ivanova et al. (2003) conclude in their study of success and failure of IMF-supported programs that the strength of special interests in parliament, political cohesion and ethnic diversity affect the probability of successful program implementation. Therefore, we have included the following variables:

- Ethnic fractionalization (*ETHNIC*). Ethnic fractionalization leads to conflict in society, which is a threat to reform efforts.
- Special interests (*INTERESTS*): the maximum share of seats in parliament held by parties representing special interests (religious, nationalistic, regional and rural groups). This variable is also used by Ivanova et al. (2003).
- Political cohesion (*IPCOH*). Lower political cohesion introduces more uncertainty regarding the implementation of reforms.

Appendix A2 describes all variables employed in the present paper in more detail and gives the sources, while appendix A3 shows the correlation matrix. As Table A3 shows, the correlation between the variables is generally quite low, except for the inflation rate and the exchange rate.

3. Modeling approach

We employ (variants) of the so-called Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) as suggested by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) to examine which explanatory variables are robustly related to our dependent variable. To the best of our knowledge, this has never been done before in the literature on the determinants of IMF credit, although there are some very good reasons to apply this methodology.

The EBA has been widely used in the economic growth literature (see Sturm and De Haan, 2004 for a further discussion). The central difficulty in this research—which also applies to the research topic of the present paper—is that several different models may all seem reasonable given the data, but yield different conclusions about the parameters of interest. Indeed, a glance at the studies summarized in Appendix A1 illustrates this point. The

1999 and Barro and Lee, 2002). Unfortunately, we could not test this hypothesis as we did not have access to the proper data.

results of these studies sometimes differ substantially, while most authors do not offer a careful analysis to examine how sensitive their conclusions are with respect to model specification. As pointed out by Temple (2000), presenting only the results of the model preferred by the author can be misleading.

The EBA can be exemplified as follows. Equations of the following general form are estimated:

$$Y = \alpha M + \beta F + \gamma Z + u \quad (1)$$

where Y is the dependent variable; M is a vector of ‘standard’ explanatory variables; F is the variable of interest; Z is a vector of up to three (here we follow Levine and Renelt, 1992) possible additional explanatory variables, which according to the literature may be related to the dependent variable; and u is an error term. The extreme bounds test for variable F states that if the lower extreme bound for β —i.e. the lowest value for β minus two standard deviations—is negative, while the upper extreme bound for β —i.e. the highest value for β plus two standard deviations—is positive, the variable F is not robustly related to Y .

As argued by Temple (2000), it is rare in empirical research that we can say with certainty that some model dominates all other possibilities in all dimensions. In these circumstances, it makes sense to provide information about how sensitive the findings are to alternative modeling choices. The EBA provides a relatively simple means of doing exactly this. Still, the EBA has been criticized in the literature. Sala-i-Martin (1997a,b) argues that the test applied in the extreme bounds analysis poses too rigid a threshold in most cases. If the distribution of β has some positive and some negative support, then one is bound to find at least one regression for which the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions are run. We will therefore not only report the extreme bounds, but also the percentage of the regressions in which the coefficient of the variable F is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. Moreover, instead of analyzing just the extreme bounds of the estimates of the coefficient of a particular variable, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997a,b) suggestion to analyze the entire distribution. Following this suggestion, we not only report the unweighted parameter estimate of β and its standard deviation but also the unweighted cumulative distribution function (CDF(0)), i.e. the fraction of the cumulative distribution function lying on one side of zero.¹⁵ We will base our conclusions on the Sala-i-Martin variant of the EBA.

¹⁵ Sala-i-Martin (1997a) proposes using the (integrated) likelihood to construct a weighted CDF(0). However, the varying number of observations in the regressions due to missing observations in some of the variables poses

Another objection to EBA is that the initial partition of variables in the M and in the Z vector is likely to be rather arbitrary. Still, as pointed out by Temple (2000), there is no reason why standard model selection procedures (such as testing down from a general specification) cannot be used in advance to identify variables that seem to be particularly relevant—an approach that we have followed as well. We use the 13 economic variables as discussed in section 2 (see Appendix A2) and a general-to-specific selection procedure to come up with our basic model. We first examine how robust this basic model is. Next, we check whether the other economic and political variables discussed in section 2 are robustly related to the chance that a country receives IMF credit or signs an IMF agreement.

4. Results

Explaining the Use of IMF Credit

The first dependent variable considered is based on the “use of IMF credit” as reported in the World Bank Development Indicators 2003.¹⁶ We have created a dummy variable that is one when the use of IMF credit is positive. So, this variable measures whether or not a country receives IMF credit in a specific year.

Our data set includes annual data for 128 IMF member countries over the period 1972 to 1998. We have employed a panel model and estimate binary choice probit models by maximum likelihood. We use White (1980) errors to correct for potential heteroscedasticity.

In line with the view that decision-making within the IMF should be primarily based on economic considerations, we start by identifying a basic model using standard model selection procedures (general to specific) using the 13 economic variables as discussed in section 2. An extensive analysis of the data based on a general to specific approach yielded the two variables that we selected for our M vector: international reserve holdings scaled to imports (*INTRESERV*) and lagged real GDP growth (*GGDPI*). These variables (or variables akin to these) are also present in most models of IMF lending behavior in the literature (compare Table A1 in the appendix). A decrease in available international reserves signals pressure on the value of a national currency on the forex markets. Arguably, extending credit to member countries that experience exchange rate problems is part of the traditional IMF mission. A possible explanation of the negative correlation between IMF credit disbursement

a problem. Sturm and De Haan (2001) show that as a result this goodness of fit measure may not be a good indicator of the probability that a model is the true model and the weights constructed in this way are not equivariant for linear transformations in the dependent variable. Hence, changing scales will result in rather different outcomes and conclusions. We therefore restrict our attention to the unweighted version.

and real growth is that countries suffering a severe real shock are more likely to turn to the IMF for help. However, real shocks might also lead to financial and exchange rate crises (Allen and Gale, 2000), triggering IMF support for member countries.

Panel A of Table 1 shows the outcomes of the sensitivity analysis of the basic model. The first two columns show the extreme lower and upper bounds, while column (7) shows the specification of the models yielding the upper and lower extreme bounds. Column (3) reports the percentage of the regressions in which the coefficient of the variable of interest differs significantly from zero. Column (4) shows the CDF(0). Columns (5) and (6) present the unweighted parameter estimate of the variable of interest and its standard deviation, respectively.

It follows from Table 1 (panel A) that the explanatory variables have an unweighted CDF(0) of close to 1—satisfying the criterion suggested by Sala-i-Martin—and are significant in almost all regressions underlying this CDF(0). However, according to the very stringent EBA the variables do not qualify as being robustly related to our dependent variable, since the upper and lower bound change sign—which illustrates the advantages of applying the Sala-i-Martin approach rather than the original EBA approach proposed by Leamer (1983).

Table 1 here

Panel B of Table 1 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis for all other economic and political variables discussed in section 2. As Appendix A3 shows, the correlation between the variables in the Z-vector is not unacceptably high, except for inflation and the growth rate of the nominal exchange rate. Panel C of Table 1 therefore shows the results for these variables if either inflation or the exchange rate is dropped.

In view of the long list of factors that have been claimed to influence IMF credit in previous studies it is quite remarkable that only a limited number of variables are actually robustly related to our dependent variable. To be more precise, apart from the variables in the base model (i.e. *INTRESERV* and *GGDPI*) only *DEBTSERV*, *CURACCI*, *GDPCAPI*, *INVEST1*, *YRSUNDER51* and *REPUDIATION* have a CDF(0) > 0.95. The economic variables reflecting real activity, debt service and the current account position were also found to be significant in many other studies. Interestingly, IMF decision-making on credit disbursement is hardly, if at all, influenced by political factors. Moreover, the two political variables that

¹⁶ The World bank data set is similar in most respects to the IFS data set but offers a greater variety of variables with a political economic interpretation.. Alternative specifications of the dependent variable are used later on in this section.

seem to play a role here, *YRSUNDER51* and *REPUDIATION*, might well be interpreted as reflecting persistence of IMF involvement and default risk, respectively, and not so much purely political economic factors.

Our conclusions are not influenced by the inclusion of either the exchange rate or inflation in the *Z*-vector. As follows from Panel C of Table 1, the CDF(0) of inflation and the exchange rate does not exceed 0.95.

Explaining the Signing of IMF Agreements

As pointed out in section 2, a large number of previous studies focuses on the likelihood that a country in a particular year has an **adjustment program** with the Fund. It should be interesting to see whether the results on IMF credit disbursement extend to an analysis of the determinants of the adoption of IMF agreements. To that end we apply the approach developed above to a new dummy variable indicating whether an IMF agreement was signed in a particular year.¹⁷ While we would expect the determinants of actual credit disbursement and the signing of IMF agreements to be similar, these two variables still describe two fairly distinct decisions: the signing of an agreement between the IMF and a member country and the disbursement of IMF credit to a particular member country. These decisions are likely to be influenced by different considerations. Furthermore, an agreement will often lead to more than one year of credit flows. Credit flows can be changed or interrupted if certain conditions specified in the adjustment program are not fulfilled. Finally, countries can borrow from the IMF up to their quota without an agreement.

Table 2 shows the results. We have employed the same basic model as in our previous analysis, i.e. *INTRESERV* and (lagged) *GGDP* are the explanatory variables. As shown in panel A of Table 2, the variables in the basic model have a CDF(0) larger than 0.95. Still, the CDF(0)s and the percentage of the regressions in which the coefficients of *INTRESERV* and (lagged) *GGDP* are significant are somewhat lower than in Table 1.

Interestingly, it follows from panel B of Table 2, that there are more variables, including some political variables, with a CDF(0) > 0.95. While some of the economic variables that we found to be robust before (*DEBTSERV*, *INVEST1*) still are, others are not. The (lagged) current account (*CURACCI*) and *GDPCAPI* are not as robustly related to the LHS-variable as before. Our results suggest that—other than in the previous model—various

¹⁷ The Fund has different facilities, like Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), the Enhanced Fund Facility (EFF), the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), and the Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). Whenever there is an agreement signed in a particular year so that a country can borrow from any of these four facilities the dummy is one, and is zero otherwise. We thank Dane Rowlands for providing data that have been used to construct this dummy variable.

political variables also affect the likelihood of IMF involvement in a member country. To be more precise, in addition to *YRSUNDER51*, the CDF(0) of *GOVCHANGE*, *ELECLEGLAG*, *ELEXEXLAG* and *ETHNIC* exceed 0.95, while *REPUDIATION* no longer plays a significant role. Based on the estimated average coefficients, our results suggest that elections increase the likelihood that an agreement with the IMF will be signed. A plausible interpretation – and in line with our results with respect to *GOVCHANGE*¹⁸ – is that new governments are more likely to agree to the conditionality encompassed in IMF lending agreements. This result lends some support to the findings of Dreher and Vaubel (2004) and Dreher (2004). Somewhat surprisingly, Table 2 also reports a positive coefficient for *ETHNIC*—a result that is not particularly robust, however (see below).

Table 2 here

Overall, it would seem that political economic considerations—in particular changes in government—play quite an important role when it comes to signing an agreement between the IMF and a member country, while decisions on credit disbursement seem to be primarily based on economic considerations.

Robustness Checks

To test the robustness of our conclusions, we conducted further sensitivity analyses. First, we split the overall sample along the time dimension. Arguably, the world has changed considerably since the end of the 1980s and this may also have affected IMF policies. Broadly speaking, our general conclusions are similar in the pre-1989 and the post-1989 subsamples. Still, in the model of the likelihood that a country receives an IMF loan some variables do not have the same impact in the two sample periods. For instance, the CDF(0) of *GDPCAPI* drops to 0.90 in the period before 1989, suggesting that income levels have become more important in IMF credit policies post 1989. The CDF(0) of *XRATE(1)* in the period before 1989 is 0.99 while the CDF(0) of *DEBT1* is 0.96 suggesting that exchange rate and debt crises may have been more important in the earlier days in receiving IMF loans than in more recent periods. Overall, however, the findings on credit disbursement are remarkably stable across the split sample. The results for the model of the likelihood that an agreement with the IMF is signed change even less. The only major difference is that in the period after 1989 the CDF(0)

¹⁸ The CDF(0) of *GOVCHANGE* is 0.95, suggesting that—given the positive sign of the average coefficient estimate—countries with many government changes are more likely to sign an agreement with the IMF. Specific results available on request.

of the variable *CRISESI* becomes 0.98; the coefficient of the variable is negative, in line with the theoretical prediction.

Second, we have dropped large credits from the analysis.¹⁹ The decision-making process about huge loans to countries like Brazil, Turkey, Argentina and Korea may have been very different from that of loans that are of ‘going-concern’ nature. However, it turned out that the results reported in Table 1 hardly change. In two cases the CDF(0) drops slightly to below 0.95 (*DEBTSEV* (0.94), *CURACCI* (0.94)), while in two other cases the CDF(0) is now above 0.95 (*GTOTI* (0.96) and *USBANKS* (0.96)). If we drop the same observations and redo the regressions yielding Table 2, we even find less changes (the CDF(0) of *ETHNIC* drops to 0.93), while the CDF(0) of *ELEXEXLEAD* rises to 0.95).

5. Concluding comments

The activities of the IMF continue to draw attention both in the public sphere and among economists and political scientists. In recent years, the discussion has increasingly focused on political economic factors possibly influencing IMF lending. However, despite an abundance of empirical research investigating the interaction of various political factors and IMF behavior, there is hardly a consensus which of these forces might matter, casting doubt on the general robustness of these results. To some extent this is also true for the question of which economic variables are robustly linked to IMF activity. The present paper provides a thorough robustness analysis of both economic and political determinants of IMF activity.

A first result is that IMF agreements are more likely to be concluded and IMF credit is more likely to be disbursed when real economic activity is depressed and current account problems arise. This finding supports the idea that the IMF is (still) pursuing its traditional goal of fostering economic and balance-of-payment stability among its members.

Secondly, we find that political economic factors influence IMF activity, but only to a minor degree. In fact, many of the political variables reported in the empirical literature to influence the Fund’s behavior are not significantly related to either IMF lending or the conclusion of IMF agreements.

Thirdly, to the extent that political variables matter, there is a remarkable difference between factors helping to explain the conclusion of IMF agreements and the disbursement of IMF credit. It would seem that political factors—especially elections—play a significant role

¹⁹ All observations with an increase in outstanding IMF credit > 2.5 per cent of GDP (which in the base line model implies roughly 2.5 per cent of all observations) were dropped from the sample. Specific results available on request.

in the conclusion of IMF agreements. Elections increase the probability of an IMF agreement being concluded. However, the likelihood that a country actually receives IMF credit is primarily driven by economic considerations. According to our analysis, the only not strictly economic variables that have some importance in explaining IMF credit disbursement are the presence of IMF programs in the past five years, indicating persistence of IMF involvement, and the risk of repudiation. The higher the risk of repudiation, the less likely it is that a country receives IMF credit.

Finally, an interesting question is, why political factors seem to matter more for the conclusion of IMF agreements than for the actual disbursement of IMF credit. A possible explanation is the greater post-election willingness of governments to embrace IMF conditionality: from a demand side perspective new governments are more likely to invest their political capital into an IMF-supported adjustment program than governments later in their term because they are more likely enjoy the fruits of their efforts. For the same reason the Fund might deem new governments more credible “owners” of the adjustment packages attached to the typical IMF agreement. Once signed, credit disbursement is conditional primarily on economic conditions.

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Appendix A1: Summary of studies since 1990

Study:	Type of model:	Economic Variables included:	Effect:	Political Variables included:	Effect:
Joyce (1992)	logit analysis of participation in IMF program; 45 countries; 1980-84	Growth CB holdings of dom. assets Gov. expenditure/GDP Current account/exports Inflation Reserves/export GDP per capita Private loans/imports Debt service/exports	+ + - 0 - - 0 0	No political variables included	
Edwards and Santaella (1993)	probit analysis of participation in IMF program; 48 countries; 1948-71	Relative GDP per capita Change in real exchange rate Change in current account deficit Net foreign assets ratio	- 0 0 -	Political strikes, riots, demonstrations Political assassinations, attacks, deaths Frequency of coup attempts Dictatorial regime Ideology indicator	0 0 + - 0
Conway (1994)	tobit/probit analysis of participation in IMF program; 74 countries; 1976-86	Reserves/imports Contractual date of expiration of IMF program Growth rate GNP Current account/GNP World real interest rate Terms of trade International debt Share of output from agriculture	- + - + - - + 0	No political variables included	
Rowlands (1995)	Probit analysis of signing of IMF agreement 109 countries; 1973-89	Per capita GDP relative to US Population Dummy for eligible for SAF/ESAF Debt service/exports (official and private) Debt (official and private) (Change to previous year's) Reserves/imports Change Export earnings Payments restrictions Inflation (Growth rate of) GDP LIBOR Debt rescheduling (official and private) Payment arrears	0 0 0 + 0 - - + 0 0 - + 0	Political freedom Unrest/conflict dummy Concessional loans (soc. orientation) US assistance Industrial country's export Share in world imports Voting power in IMF Regional dummies Dummy previous IMF program	0 0 0 0 - + 0 + +
Bird (1995)	Drawings on IMF; 40 countries; 1980-85	Debt service ratio Inflation GDP per capita Real imports Balance of payment/(exports+imports) New private loans/imports Reserves/imports (reserves)	0 + - + 0 + 0 (+)	No political variables included	

Study:	Type of model:	Economic Variables included:	Effect:	Political Variables included:	Effect:
Knight and Santaella (1997) ^{a)}	probit model for approval of IMF arrangement; 91 countries; 1973-91	Reserves/imports Current account/GDP Inflation Debt service/exports External debt/GDP Non-Fund financing/imports Growth GDP per capita Growth of terms of trade Growth export markets Investment/GDP Balance of payments/GDP Real effective exchange rate GDP per capita Previous fund arrangement Nominal depreciation >5% Change in gov. revenues/GDP Change in gov. expenditures/GDP Growth in real domestic credit Arrears to IMF IMF arrangement	- 0 0 + 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 - - - + + + - 0 0 0	No political variables included	
Thacker (1999)	logit analysis of participation in IMF program; 78 countries; 1985-94	(Change in) balance of payment (Change in) current account (Change in) debt/GNP (Change in) debt service/GNP (Change in) reserves/debt GNP per capita Default dummy Money supply (growth) Budget deficit Openness	- 0 0 + - - + 0 0 0	US exports to a country US direct investment in a country Index for political agreement with US Movement in political agreement Energy production Democracy indicators	0 0 +/0 + 0 0
Vreeland (1999)	Probit model for participation in IMF program	Foreign reserves/imports Debt service/GDP Investment/GDP Budget deficit/GDP Balance of payments/GDP (in model for IMF willingness to start program)	- + - - -	Years under IMF program Number of other countries under IMF program Lagged election Dictatorial regime	+ +/- + +
Oatley and Yackee (2000)	Model for amount of credit (in SDR), 1986-98 (stand-by and extended fund facility)	GNP External debt/GDP Current account/GDP Current account/reserves External Debt/Exports Reserves/Imports	+ 0 0 0 0 -	Two US bank exposure measures (Bank) US alignment based on UN voting (Foreign) Bank*Foreign	+ +/0 +/0

Study:	Type of model:	Economic Variables included:	Effect:	Political Variables included:	Effect:
		Loan dummies Dummies for countries with exceptional crisis	- +		
Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) ^{b)}	Probit model; 135 countries; 1951-90	Reserves/import Budget deficit/GDP Debt service/GDP Investment/GDP Real balance of payments	- - + - -	Years under IMF program Other countries in IMF program Election in previous year Dictatorship	+ + + +
Dreher and Vaubel (2004)	New credit by IMF/GDP; 106 countries; 1971-97	Monetary expansion Budget deficit/GDP Government consumption/GDP Real GDP growth Inflation Reserves/import Foreign short-term private debt/foreign debt FDI/GDP Current account/GDP LIBOR Share exports to other IMF supported countries War dummy IMF quota review dummy	- - 0 - - - + - - + + - +	Pre- and post-election dummies Democratic regime dummy	+ -
Bird and Rowlands (2001)	probit model; 80 countries; 1965-95	GNP per capita GDP growth Reserves/imports Current account/GDP Change in reserves Real exchange rate Debt service ratio Change in debt service Debt/GDP Arrears/debt Past reschedulings Real LIBOR Change in real LIBOR	- 0 - - - +/- + 0 - 0 + 0 0 +	Exports US/France Communist links Recent government Level civil freedom Change civil freedom Coup frequency Past incomplete programs Imminent quota review IMF liquidity Real GDP Imminent rescheduling Imminent new government Past IMF agreements	-/0 - 0 0 + + 0 0 0 0 + + - +
Vreeland (2001)	Probit model for participation in IMF program 179 countries; 1975-96	GDP per capita Foreign reserves/imports Current account/GDP Debt service/GDP Investment/GDP Budget deficit/GDP Balance of payments/GDP interacted with Size (in model for IMF willingness to start program)	- - 0 + - 0 -	(Log of) number of veto players Type of democratic executive-legislative relationship Number of other countries under IMF program (in model for IMF willingness to start program)	+ + -
Oatley (2002)	Model for amount of credit	External debt	+/0	Political ally of US (based on UN voting)	0

Study:	Type of model:	Economic Variables included:	Effect:	Political Variables included:	Effect:
	(in SDR), 1985-98 (stand-by and extended fund facility)	External debt/GNP Current account Current account/GNP Debt service/exports Standby arrangement IMF credit World bank credit	+ - + -/0 - +/-0 -/-0	Change in UN voting Commercial bank debt (excl. Japan) Commercial bank debt US Commercial bank debt UK Commercial bank debt Germany Commercial bank debt Switzerland Commercial bank debt France Commercial bank debt Japan	0 + + + + + + -
Barro and Lee (2002)	Probit/tobit models for approval of short-term stabilization program and participation in IMF program 131 countries; 1975-99 using 5 years intervals	Currency crisis Banking crisis GDP per capita Square of GDP per capita Foreign reserves/imports Growth rate of GDP	+ + + - - -	Share of IMF quotas Country's nationals among IMF staff Fraction of votes cast in UN along with US	+ + +
Dreher (2004)	Pobit model for conclusion of IMF program; 54 countries; 1976-97	Monetary expansion Expansion of overall budget deficit Government consumption/GDP Change in real GDP growth Short-term/Total debt Inflation Change of Reserves/Monthly Imports Current account balance Quota review LIBOR	0 0 + 0 0 0 - 0 0 0	Part of year is within six months prior to election Part of year is within six months prior to election	- 0

a) The results for the bivariate probit model are shown.

b) The results for the determinants of entering an IMF program are shown.

Appendix A2. List of variables and their sources

Variable:	Sign:	Description:	Source:
<i>INTRESERV</i>	(-)	International reserves (current US\$) / imports of goods and services (current US\$)	World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
<i>GGDP</i>	(-)	Growth of real GDP	World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
<i>DEBTSERV</i>	(+)	Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services)	World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
<i>CURACC</i>	(-)	Current account balance (% of GDP)	World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
<i>DEBT</i>	(?)	External debt, total (DOD, current US\$) / GDP at market prices (current US\$)	World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
<i>GDPCAP</i>	(-)	Log (GDP at market prices (constant 1995 US\$) / population)	World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
<i>INFL</i>	(?)	Log (1+inflation (consumer prices))	World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
<i>XRATE</i>	(+)	Growth rate of nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis \$	World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
<i>DEFICIT</i>	(?)	Overall budget deficit, including grants (% of GDP)	World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
<i>GTOT</i>	(-)	Growth rate of terms of trade	World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
<i>INVEST</i>	(-)	Gross domestic fixed investment (% of GDP)	World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
<i>LIBOR</i>	(+)	LIBOR: 3 month rate	IFS June 2002
<i>GOVSPEND</i>	(+)	Total government expenditure (% GDP)	World Bank Development Indicators 2003 CD-Rom
<i>YRSUNDER5</i>	(+)	5-years-Moving Average of dummy indicating that a country was under an agreement	Rowland data set
<i>NRUNDER</i>	(+)	sum of the countries under an agreement	Rowland data set
<i>ELECEX</i>	(+)	Dummy for executive election-years	World Bank database of political institutions, version 2
<i>ELECLEG</i>	(+)	Dummy for legislative election-years	World Bank database of political institutions, version 2
<i>ELECEXLAG</i>	(+)	Lag of <i>ELECEX</i>	World Bank database of political institutions, version 2
<i>ELECLEGLAG</i>	(+)	Lag of <i>ELECLEG</i>	World Bank database of political institutions, version 2
<i>ELECEXLEAD</i>	(+)	Lead of <i>ELECEX</i>	World Bank database of political institutions, version 2
<i>ELECLEGLEAD</i>	(+)	Lead of <i>ELECLEG</i>	World Bank database of political institutions, version 2

Variable:	Sign:	Description:	Source:
<i>ASSAS</i>	(+)	Number of politically motivated murders or attempted murders of high government officials or politicians	Banks' International Archive
<i>REVOL</i>	(+)	Number of revolutions (illegal or forced changes in the top governmental elite, attempts at such changes, or (un)successful armed rebellions)	Banks' International Archive
<i>GUERIL</i>	(+)	Guerilla warfare: any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings aimed at the overthrow of the present regime	Banks' International Archive
<i>CRISES</i>	(+)	Number of major government crises that threaten to bring the downfall of the present regime	World Bank database of political institutions, version 2
<i>GOVCHANGE</i>	(+)	Percentage of veto players who drop from the government	Banks' International Archive
<i>DEMON</i>	(+)	Number of peaceful anti-government demonstrations	Banks' International Archive
<i>STRIKES</i>	(+)	Number of strikes (1,000 or more workers) aimed at national government policies or authority	Banks' International Archive
<i>RIOTS</i>	(+)	Number of violent demonstrations or clashes of more than 100 citizens	Banks' International Archive
<i>ECXOMP</i>	(?)	Measure of dictatorship (executive index of electoral competitiveness ≤ 2)	World Bank database of political institutions, version 2
<i>USBANKS</i>	(+)	Exposure of US banks	Treasury Bulletin
<i>TRADEUS</i>	(+)	Trade relations with US (export to and import from US / total export and import)	OECD ICTS database, World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
<i>ASIAE, OECD, SAFRICA</i>	(?)	Regional dummies
<i>LIBERAL</i>	(+)	(Political rights index + Civil liberties index)/2	Freedom House
<i>CORRUPT</i>	(-)	Indicator for corruption in government	International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data
<i>RULELAW</i>	(+)	Rule of law (law and order tradition) indicator	International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data
<i>REPUDIATION</i>	(-)	Indicator for repudiation risk of government contracts	International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data
<i>BURQUAL</i>	(+)	Indicator for bureaucratic quality	International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data
<i>RELSIZE</i>	(+)	Relative size of country (GDP / World GDP)	World Bank 2000 CD-Rom
<i>IMFQUOTA</i>	(+)	Share of IMF quota	IMF
<i>ETHNIC</i>	(-)	Presence of ethnic tensions	International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data
<i>INTERESTS</i>	(-)	= (special interest groups in government + opposition)/(# government + opposition seats)	World Bank database of political institutions, version 2
<i>IPCOH</i>	(-)	Index of Political cohesion	World Bank database of political institutions, version 2

Note: The expected sign is shown in parentheses. See main text for further explanation.
A 1 following the variable indicates the first lag of the variable concerned.

Appendix A3. Correlation matrix of explanatory variables

Obs/Correlation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)	(43)	(44)	(45)	
(1) INTRESV	2644	0.09	-0.01	0.20	-0.13	0.15	0.01	0.04	0.30	0.05	0.06	-0.11	-0.05	-0.10	0.09	-0.04	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.04	-0.04	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.05	-0.02	-0.05	0.12	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.13	-0.13	0.17	0.31	0.29	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.22	-0.14	0.03	
(2) GGDP	2598	3425	-0.04	-0.04	-0.08	0.04	-0.24	-0.15	0.14	0.09	0.23	0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.12	-0.06	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	-0.06	-0.13	-0.01	-0.13	-0.13	-0.07	-0.08	-0.04	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.11	0.01	-0.07	-0.01	0.11	0.18	0.27	0.17	0.05	0.01	0.12	-0.08	0.03	
(3) DEBTSERV	2607	3132	3222	-0.04	0.10	0.06	0.07	0.11	-0.07	0.00	-0.13	0.10	-0.10	0.18	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.03	-0.01	0.05	0.00	0.07	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.06	0.00	0.21	0.02	0.02	0.06	-0.07	-0.04	-0.08	-0.08	-0.12	0.03	0.25	0.21	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01	
(4) CURACC	2178	2642	2560	2703	-0.32	0.18	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.12	-0.32	-0.04	-0.18	-0.01	-0.06	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.09	0.06	0.09	0.00	0.13	0.06	0.10	0.05	-0.18	-0.05	0.01	0.15	0.14	0.22	0.17	0.21	0.05	0.02	0.03	
(5) DEBT	2586	3285	3181	2651	3364	-0.28	0.26	0.24	-0.21	-0.03	0.04	-0.13	0.12	0.13	0.25	0.05	0.00	0.04	-0.01	0.05	0.00	-0.04	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.04	-0.03	0.03	-0.05	-0.01	-0.09	-0.08	-0.09	-0.05	0.14	0.10	-0.07	-0.17	-0.25	-0.21	-0.14	-0.13	-0.11	0.17	-0.07	
(6) GFPCAP	2612	3365	3132	2649	3284	3406	-0.01	-0.03	0.19	0.02	0.27	-0.01	0.10	-0.14	0.05	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.05	0.10	-0.15	-0.05	0.04	0.01	0.09	0.08	0.01	-0.27	0.31	0.35	0.16	0.09	-0.53	-0.47	0.27	0.35	0.46	0.42	0.15	0.13	0.42	-0.14	0.10	
(7) INFL	2312	2725	2604	2321	2691	2709	2852	0.91	-0.13	-0.07	-0.08	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02	0.10	0.06	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.07	0.08	0.03	0.13	0.05	0.06	0.17	-0.01	-0.04	0.19	-0.01	-0.09	0.06	-0.05	0.01	0.02	-0.12	-0.18	-0.06	0.11	0.13	0.00	0.02	0.01	
(8) XRATE	2533	3144	2980	2619	3119	3123	2755	3495	-0.09	-0.07	-0.08	-0.10	-0.03	0.03	0.16	0.04	-0.01	0.07	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.15	0.03	0.06	0.18	0.01	-0.06	0.19	0.01	-0.07	0.05	-0.04	-0.01	0.02	-0.11	-0.17	-0.05	0.08	0.11	-0.01	0.00	0.00	
(9) DEFICIT	1753	2017	1942	1745	1986	1994	1833	2023	2065	0.10	-0.02	-0.13	-0.54	-0.05	0.08	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.05	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.00	-0.02	0.12	0.09	-0.03	-0.08	-0.13	0.10	0.32	0.27	0.19	0.03	0.02	0.23	-0.21	0.03	
(10) GTOT	2242	2677	2634	2223	2640	2677	2281	2579	1699	2677	-0.02	0.01	-0.04	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.03	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.06	0.08	0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.05	-0.01	0.00	
(11) INVEST	2569	3158	3081	2571	3096	3132	2634	3010	1996	2634	3238	0.04	0.25	-0.20	0.08	-0.04	0.02	-0.06	0.01	-0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.14	-0.11	-0.07	-0.06	-0.01	-0.08	-0.04	-0.10	0.02	0.06	0.20	-0.02	-0.28	-0.09	0.18	0.24	0.34	0.22	0.10	0.03	0.16	-0.05	0.04	
(12) LIBOR	2644	3425	3222	2703	3364	3406	2852	3495	2065	2677	3238	4120	0.03	-0.15	-0.29	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.06	-0.05	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.06	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.11	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.13	-0.17	-0.29	-0.32	-0.16	0.03	0.01	-0.12	-0.02	-0.11	
(13) GOVSPEND	1757	2023	1946	1751	1993	2001	1841	2032	2050	1704	2001	2072	2072	-0.03	0.04	-0.02	0.02	-0.04	0.00	-0.04	0.01	-0.08	-0.03	-0.12	-0.05	-0.06	-0.08	-0.09	-0.07	-0.04	-0.16	-0.21	-0.14	-0.04	-0.04	0.02	0.20	0.12	0.05	0.06	-0.18	-0.17	0.05	0.22	-0.02	
(14) YRSUNDERS	2369	3036	2867	2635	2982	3028	2577	3157	1923	2449	2886	3420	1934	3420	0.24	0.09	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.09	0.03	0.01	0.01	-0.04	0.03	0.00	0.09	0.10	0.06	-0.09	0.10	0.05	-0.06	0.00	0.09	-0.10	-0.08	-0.04	-0.01	-0.09	-0.04	0.03	0.03	-0.05	0.01	
(15) NRUNDER	2644	3284	3099	2585	3225	3267	2737	3361	2005	2561	3110	3974	2012	3281	3974	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.03	0.07	-0.06	-0.03	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.01	-0.21	-0.08	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.19	0.13	0.37	0.44	0.17	-0.05	0.01	0.22	-0.01	0.20
(16) ELECCEX	1964	2302	2198	2022	2259	2291	1971	2418	1567	1883	2222	2567	1576	2567	2567	0.32	-0.08	0.02	-0.08	-0.05	0.05	0.01	-0.02	0.04	-0.05	-0.01	0.03	-0.01	-0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.05	-0.04	0.02	-0.04	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.08	-0.04	-0.02		
(17) ELECCEX	1964	2302	2198	2022	2259	2291	1971	2418	1567	1883	2222	2567	1576	2567	2567	0.32	-0.08	0.02	-0.08	-0.05	0.05	0.01	-0.02	0.04	-0.05	-0.01	0.03	-0.01	-0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.05	-0.04	0.02	-0.04	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.08	-0.04	-0.02		
(18) ELECCEXLAG	1984	2345	2239	2109	2301	2333	2014	2438	1578	1932	2262	2582	1585	2582	2582	0.32	-0.09	-0.07	0.04	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.20	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.16	0.06	0.05	-0.05	-0.04	0.02	-0.08	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.09	-0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
(19) ELECCEXLAG	1984	2345	2239	2109	2301	2333	2014	2438	1578	1932	2262	2582	1585	2582	2582	0.32	-0.09	-0.07	0.04	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.20	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.16	0.06	0.05	-0.05	-0.04	0.02	-0.08	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.09	-0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
(20) ELECCEXLEAD	1938	2256	2154	1921	2213	2245	1924	2401	1555	1834	2179	2550	1564	2448	2550	2438	2438	2325	2325	2550	2550	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.08	0.06	0.04	0.02	-0.08	0.05	0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.05	-0.08	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.00	0.01	
(21) ELECCEXLEAD	1938	2256	2154	1921	2213	2245	1924	2401	1555	1834	2179	2550	1564	2448	2550	2438	2438	2325	2325	2550	2550	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.08	0.06	0.04	0.02	-0.08	0.05	0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.05	-0.08	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.06	0.00	0.01	
(22) ASSAS	2016	2338	2238	1839	2301	2326	1973	2466	1537	1807	2274	2767	1544	2347	2767	2193	2193	2082	2082	2298	2298	2767	0.20	0.30	0.13	0.06	0.16	0.14	0.20	-0.04	0.10	0.15	-0.02	0.08	-0.15	-0.08	-0.04	-0.13	0.04	-0.01	0.11	0.13	0.01	-0.05	0.07	
(23) REVOL	2016	2338	2238	1839	2301	2326	1973	2466	1537	1807	2274	2767	1544	2347	2767	2193	2193	2082	2082	2298	2298	2767	0.20	0.30	0.13	0.06	0.16	0.14	0.20	-0.04	0.10	0.15	-0.02	0.08	-0.15	-0.08	-0.04	-0.13	0.04	-0.01	0.11	0.13	0.01	-0.05	0.07	
(24) GUERIL	2016	2338	2238	1839	2301	2326	1973	2466	1537	1807	2274	2767	1544	2347	2767	2193	2193	2082	2082	2298	2298	2767	0.20	0.30	0.13	0.06	0.16	0.14	0.20	-0.04	0.10	0.15	-0.02	0.08	-0.15	-0.08	-0.04	-0.13	0.04	-0.01	0.11	0.13	0.01	-0.05	0.07	
(25) CRISES	2114	2461	2354	1956	2423	2448	2082	2570	1607	1912	2389	2883	1613	2466	2883	2315	2315	2208	2208	2405	2405	2741	2741	2741	2883	0.25	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.14	-0.14	-0.05	-0.05	-0.08	-0.07	-0.04	0.11	0.12	-0.11	0.04	0.15	
(26) GOVCHANGE	1868	2188	2089	1975	2146	2177	1876	2286	1484	1790	2108	2421	1492	2421	2421	2411	2411	2411	2289	2289	2058	2058	2058	2174	2421	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.01	0.07	-0.01	0.10	-0.11	-0.12	-0.04	0.00	-0.04	-0.05	0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.07	0.14	0.14	
(27) DEMON	2113	2461	2354	1956	2423	2448	2081	2570	1607	1913	2389	2883	1613	2466	2883	2315	2315	2208	2208	2405	2405	2741	2741	2741	2881	0.21	0.14	0.11	0.21	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.12	0.04	-0.15	0.03	-0.08	-0.28	-0.14	-0.09	0.12	0.16	-0.30	-0.01	0.04	
(28) STRIKES	2114	2461	2354	1956	2423	2448	2082	2570	1607	1912	2389	2883	1613	2466	2883	2315	2315	2208	2208	2405	2405	2741	2741	2741	2883	0.25	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.14	-0.14	-0.05	-0.05	-0.08	-0.07	-0.04	0.11	0.12	-0.11	0.04	0.15	
(29) RIOTS	2114	2461	2354	1956	2423	2448	2082	2570	1607	1912	2389	2883	1613	2466	2883	2315	2315	2208	2208	2405																										

Table 1. Economic and political determinants of IMF credit: Extreme Bounds Analysis
(dependent variable: dummy indicating that a country receives IMF credit in particular year)

Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)					
	Low.Ex.	Up.Ext.	% Sign.	CDF(0)	Beta	Std.	Variables in the model that yield the extreme:					
							Lower bound:		Upper bound:			
Panel A: Base model												
<i>INTRESERV</i>	-0.02	0.00	99.84	1.00	-0.010	0.002	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>INFLI</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>
<i>GGDPI</i>	-0.08	0.01	99.54	1.00	-0.031	0.007	<i>INFLI</i>	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>GTOTI</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>

Panel B: Other variables

<i>DEBTSERV</i>	-0.02	0.03	74.47	0.97	0.010	0.005	<i>CURACCI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>OECD</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>CURACCI</i>	-0.07	0.03	70.86	0.96	-0.016	0.006	<i>REVOL</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEBTI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>DEBTI</i>	-0.01	0.01	41.83	0.86	0.001	0.001	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>STRIKES1</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>OECD</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>GDPCAPI</i>	-0.48	0.10	94.90	1.00	-0.177	0.040	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>RULELAW</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>
<i>INFLI</i>	-0.02	0.01	8.96	0.57	-0.001	0.001	<i>XRATEI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>ASIAE</i>	<i>DEBTI</i>	<i>XRATEI</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>XRATEI</i>	-0.01	0.02	12.91	0.80	0.001	0.001	<i>INFLI</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>INFLI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>OECD</i>
<i>DEFICITI</i>	-0.11	0.03	60.33	0.90	-0.020	0.010	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>ASIAE</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEBTI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>GTOTI</i>	-0.02	0.01	55.46	0.93	-0.005	0.003	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>CORRUPT</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>STRIKES1</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>INVESTI</i>	-0.05	0.03	69.15	0.96	-0.013	0.005	<i>CURACCI</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>ASIAE</i>	<i>GUERIL</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>LIBOR</i>	-0.16	0.07	12.06	0.78	0.011	0.126	<i>GUERIL</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEBTI</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>	<i>CORRUPT</i>
<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	-0.04	0.02	14.49	0.70	-0.004	0.004	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>GDPCAPI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>
<i>YRSUNDER51</i>	-0.28	0.77	87.22	0.99	0.300	0.095	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>BURQUAL</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>
<i>NRUNDER</i>	-0.03	0.04	47.35	0.80	-0.005	0.004	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>YRSUNDER51</i>	<i>REVOL</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>ELECEX</i>	-0.83	0.58	0.17	0.63	-0.046	0.126	<i>GUERIL</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>ELECLEG</i>	<i>ETHNIC</i>
<i>ELECLEG</i>	-0.50	0.39	0.00	0.57	-0.023	0.097	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>BURQUAL</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>ELECLEGLEAD</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>
<i>ELECEXLAG</i>	-0.56	0.49	0.00	0.55	-0.019	0.126	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>ELECLEGLAG</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>ELECLEGLAG</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>ELECLEGLAG</i>	-0.33	0.57	7.41	0.78	0.087	0.096	<i>GOVCHANGE</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>ELECEXLAG</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>ELECEXLEAD</i>	-0.43	0.62	0.00	0.55	0.022	0.126	<i>ELECLEGLEAD</i>	<i>GUERIL</i>	<i>BURQUAL</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>ELECLEGLEAD</i>	-0.35	0.54	0.13	0.59	0.027	0.097	<i>ELECEXLEAD</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>ASSAS</i>	-0.21	0.06	18.11	0.92	-0.052	0.031	<i>GOVCHANGE</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>RULELAW</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>CRISES1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>
<i>REVOL</i>	-0.47	0.31	0.00	0.58	-0.024	0.083	<i>NRUNDER</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>GUERIL</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>GUERIL</i>	-0.45	0.39	0.03	0.65	-0.039	0.087	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>IMFQUOTA</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>CRISES1</i>	-0.89	0.25	40.67	0.87	-0.184	0.103	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>ASIAE</i>
<i>GOVCHANGE</i>	-0.46	0.91	1.05	0.77	0.113	0.139	<i>GTOTI</i>	<i>ELECLEGLAG</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>OECD</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>DEMONI</i>	-0.09	0.12	0.62	0.59	-0.004	0.020	<i>YRSUNDER51</i>	<i>ELECEXLAG</i>	<i>RIOTS1</i>	<i>DEBTI</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>STRIKES1</i>	-0.12	0.34	4.86	0.84	0.065	0.057	<i>GTOTI</i>	<i>YRSUNDER51</i>	<i>GOVCHANGE</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>
<i>RIOTS1</i>	-0.10	0.11	3.62	0.54	0.003	0.019	<i>DEMONI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>CURACCI</i>	<i>DEBTI</i>	<i>DEMONI</i>
<i>EXCOMP</i>	-0.50	0.97	13.24	0.78	0.100	0.097	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>REVOL</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>USBANKS</i>	-0.05	0.19	22.39	0.94	0.044	0.026	<i>DEBTSERV</i>	<i>YRSUNDER51</i>	<i>RELSIZE1</i>	<i>GDPCAPI</i>	<i>ASIAE</i>	<i>RELSIZE1</i>
<i>TRADEUS</i>	-0.01	0.02	27.10	0.80	-0.003	0.003	<i>INFLI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>BURQUAL</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>ASIAE</i>	-0.91	0.62	7.26	0.75	-0.128	0.143	<i>INFLI</i>	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>OECD</i>	-2.13	1.14	0.23	0.50	-0.045	0.326	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>GUERIL</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>CURACCI</i>	<i>GDPCAPI</i>	<i>STRIKES1</i>
<i>SAFRICA</i>	-1.21	0.80	24.25	0.76	0.089	0.097	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>LIBERAL</i>	-0.19	0.20	35.86	0.86	0.035	0.025	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>ASIAE</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>CORRUPT</i>	-0.21	0.22	8.10	0.83	-0.046	0.042	<i>CURACCI</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>BURQUAL</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>RULELAW</i>	-0.22	0.24	7.11	0.69	-0.025	0.040	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>GUERIL</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>REPUDIATION</i>	-0.26	0.00	99.97	1.00	-0.106	0.028	<i>NRUNDER</i>	<i>RULELAW</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>GDPCAPI</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>
<i>BURQUAL</i>	-0.31	0.15	29.16	0.89	-0.066	0.042	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>CORRUPT</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEBTI</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>RELSIZE1</i>	-1.11	0.73	3.91	0.60	0.033	0.105	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>IMFQUOTA</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>IMFQUOTA</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>IMFQUOTA</i>	-0.54	0.73	4.66	0.62	0.035	0.086	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>RELSIZE1</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>RELSIZE1</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>ETHNIC</i>	-0.14	0.16	0.01	0.66	-0.014	0.032	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>GDPCAPI</i>	<i>REVOL</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>INTERESTS</i>	-0.01	0.01	3.30	0.56	0.000	0.002	<i>INFLI</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>LIBERAL</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>
<i>IPCOH</i>	-0.33	0.28	0.60	0.68	-0.029	0.057	<i>ASIAE</i>	<i>BURQUAL</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>ASIAE</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>

Panel C1: EBA for *INFLI* in case *XRATEI* not in Z-vector

<i>INFLI</i>	-0.01	0.00	3.12	0.54	0.000	0.001	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>CURACCI</i>	<i>GDPCAPI</i>	<i>NRUNDER</i>
<i>INTRESERV</i>	-0.02	0.00	98.14	1.00	-0.009	0.002	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEFICITI</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>
<i>GGDPI</i>	-0.09	0.01	99.54	1.00	-0.032	0.008	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>ETHNIC</i>	<i>GTOTI</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>

Panel C2: EBA for *XRATEI* in case *INFLI* not in Z-vector

<i>XRATEI</i>	0.00	0.00	6.90	0.78	0.001	0.001	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>GDPCAPI</i>	<i>NRUNDER</i>	<i>CRISES1</i>
<i>INTRESERV</i>	-0.02	0.00	99.84	1.00	-0.010	0.002	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>GTOTI</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>
<i>GGDPI</i>	-0.08	0.02	98.49	1.00	-0.027	0.007	<i>GOVSPENDI</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>ETHNIC</i>	<i>GTOTI</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>

Note: Each row is based upon 12,384 (Panel A) resp. 11,522 (Panels B, C1, C2) regressions

Table 2. Economic and political determinants of IMF involvement: Extreme Bounds Analysis
(dependent variable: dummy indicating that a country signed an agreement with the IMF in a particular year)

Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)					
	Low.Ex.	Up.Ext.	% Sign.	CDF(0)	Beta	Std.	Variables in the model that yield the extreme:					
							Lower bound:		Upper bound:			
Panel A: Base model												
<i>INTRESERV</i>	-0.02	0.00	99.86	1.00	-0.008	0.002	<i>RIOTS1</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>
<i>GGDPI</i>	-0.07	0.02	97.89	1.00	-0.027	0.007	<i>CURACCI</i>	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>ASIAE</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>

Panel B: Other variables

<i>DEBTSERV</i>	0.00	0.07	99.79	1.00	0.026	0.005	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>
<i>CURACCI</i>	-0.08	0.02	53.92	0.94	-0.013	0.006	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>ASIAE</i>	<i>DEBT1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>DEBT1</i>	0.00	0.01	37.68	0.86	0.001	0.001	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>GUERIL</i>	<i>OECD</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>GDPGAPI</i>	-0.30	0.26	3.68	0.73	-0.030	0.042	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>INFL1</i>	-0.01	0.02	7.50	0.62	0.000	0.001	<i>XRATE1</i>	<i>RIOTS1</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>	<i>XRATE1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>XRATE1</i>	-0.01	0.01	20.66	0.75	0.001	0.001	<i>INFL1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>INFL1</i>	<i>REVOL</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>
<i>DEFICIT1</i>	-0.05	0.06	2.23	0.51	0.001	0.009	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>RIOTS1</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>GTOT1</i>	-0.02	0.01	19.80	0.75	-0.002	0.003	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>ETHNIC</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>ASIAE</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>INVEST1</i>	-0.05	0.03	81.30	0.98	-0.016	0.006	<i>CURACCI</i>	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>SAFRICA</i>	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>LIBOR</i>	-0.14	0.10	7.97	0.83	0.014	0.014	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>YRSUNDER51</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>RULELAW</i>
<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	-0.03	0.02	0.29	0.58	-0.001	0.004	<i>EXCOMP</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>YRSUNDER51</i>	0.04	1.11	100.00	1.00	0.641	0.104	<i>ELECEXLAG</i>	<i>ETHNIC</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>NRUNDER</i>	-0.02	0.04	6.27	0.56	0.000	0.004	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>OECD</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>ELECEX</i>	-0.91	0.58	1.40	0.80	-0.133	0.138	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>ETHNIC</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>ELECLEG</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>ELECLEG</i>	-0.94	0.22	31.72	0.93	-0.186	0.106	<i>ELECEX</i>	<i>ETHNIC</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>ELECLEGLAG</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>
<i>ELECEXLAG</i>	-0.28	1.09	97.06	1.00	0.385	0.128	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>ELECLEGLAG</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>ELECLEGLEAD</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>ELECLEGLAG</i>	-0.30	0.81	81.31	0.98	0.264	0.101	<i>GTOT1</i>	<i>ELECEXLAG</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>BURQUAL</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>ELECEXLEAD</i>	-0.43	0.72	18.90	0.93	0.200	0.129	<i>ELECLEGLEAD</i>	<i>ETHNIC</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>ELECEXLAG</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>ELECLEGLEAD</i>	-0.30	0.65	2.62	0.80	0.102	0.102	<i>ELECLEG</i>	<i>ELECEXLEAD</i>	<i>OECD</i>	<i>ELECEXLAG</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>ASSAS</i>	-0.28	0.10	0.03	0.58	-0.013	0.034	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEBTSERV</i>	<i>GUERIL</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>
<i>REVOL</i>	-0.32	0.50	0.53	0.73	0.059	0.087	<i>NRUNDER</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>ETHNIC</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>GUERIL</i>	-0.56	0.37	1.09	0.72	-0.070	0.094	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>CRISES1</i>	-0.94	0.27	39.94	0.90	-0.201	0.117	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>ELECLEGLAG</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>GOVCHANGE</i>	-0.43	1.06	39.92	0.95	0.266	0.145	<i>ELECLEGLAG</i>	<i>CORRUPT</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>OECD</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>DEMON1</i>	-0.08	0.13	0.08	0.53	-0.001	0.020	<i>GTOT1</i>	<i>YRSUNDER51</i>	<i>BURQUAL</i>	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>RIOTS1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>
<i>STRIKES1</i>	-0.24	0.23	0.00	0.54	-0.007	0.060	<i>INFL1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>ASIAE</i>	<i>CURACCI</i>	<i>DEBT1</i>	<i>DEFICIT1</i>
<i>RIOTS1</i>	-0.19	0.07	14.62	0.86	-0.031	0.023	<i>DEMON1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>ASIAE</i>	<i>DEBTSERV</i>	<i>RELSIZE1</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>EXCOMP</i>	-0.48	1.45	0.96	0.53	0.008	0.105	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>LIBERAL</i>	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>CORRUPT</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>USBANKS</i>	-0.10	0.18	2.29	0.77	0.024	0.028	<i>DEBTSERV</i>	<i>REVOL</i>	<i>ETHNIC</i>	<i>NRUNDER</i>	<i>RELSIZE1</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>TRADEUS</i>	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.67	-0.001	0.003	<i>REVOL</i>	<i>ASIAE</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>CORRUPT</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>ASIAE</i>	-1.08	0.45	21.78	0.85	-0.233	0.161	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>IPCOH</i>	<i>DEBT1</i>	<i>INVEST1</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>
<i>OECD</i>	-1.77	1.36	0.00	0.53	-0.053	0.348	<i>GTOT1</i>	<i>GOVCHANGE</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>GTOT1</i>	<i>YRSUNDER51</i>	<i>GUERIL</i>
<i>SAFRICA</i>	-0.97	0.59	3.78	0.63	0.045	0.103	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>REVOL</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>LIBERAL</i>	-0.22	0.13	0.03	0.59	-0.008	0.027	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>BURQUAL</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>INFL1</i>	<i>ELECLEGLEAD</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>CORRUPT</i>	-0.16	0.33	1.04	0.79	0.042	0.046	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>REVOL</i>	<i>BURQUAL</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>RULELAW</i>	-0.17	0.29	2.46	0.75	0.034	0.043	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>ETHNIC</i>	<i>REVOL</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>REPUDIATION</i>	-0.22	0.07	21.47	0.91	-0.046	0.029	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEBT1</i>	<i>INVEST1</i>	<i>LIBOR</i>
<i>BURQUAL</i>	-0.30	0.21	1.65	0.57	-0.012	0.044	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>CORRUPT</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>DEBT1</i>	<i>REVOL</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>RELSIZE1</i>	-1.21	0.60	4.83	0.80	-0.127	0.123	<i>INFL1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>IMFQUOTA</i>	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>IMFQUOTA</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>IMFQUOTA</i>	-0.72	0.62	5.71	0.70	-0.068	0.094	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>CORRUPT</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>CRISES1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>RELSIZE1</i>
<i>ETHNIC</i>	-0.06	0.23	48.47	0.96	0.067	0.034	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>YRSUNDER51</i>	<i>RIOTS1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>INTERESTS</i>	-0.01	0.01	16.43	0.91	-0.003	0.002	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>CURACCI</i>	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>
<i>IPCOH</i>	-0.20	0.38	8.53	0.79	0.057	0.060	<i>ELECLEGLEAD</i>	<i>OECD</i>	<i>ETHNIC</i>	<i>CRISES1</i>	<i>ASIAE</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>

Panel C1: EBA for *INFL1* in case *XRATE1* not in Z-vector

<i>INFL1</i>	-0.01	0.01	2.83	0.63	0.000	0.001	<i>DEBTSERV</i>	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>ETHNIC</i>	<i>CURACCI</i>	<i>GDPGAPI</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>INTRESERV</i>	-0.03	0.00	99.50	1.00	-0.012	0.002	<i>ELECEXLAG</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>
<i>GGDPI</i>	-0.08	0.02	97.78	1.00	-0.035	0.008	<i>DEBTSERV</i>	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>GUERIL</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>

Panel C2: EBA for *XRATE1* in case *INFL1* not in Z-vector

<i>XRATE1</i>	0.00	0.00	6.84	0.55	0.000	0.001	<i>DEBTSERV</i>	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>ETHNIC</i>	<i>GDPGAPI</i>	<i>ASSAS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>
<i>INTRESERV</i>	-0.03	0.00	99.85	1.00	-0.013	0.002	<i>ELECEXLAG</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>	<i>GOVSPEND1</i>	<i>TRADEUS</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>
<i>GGDPI</i>	-0.08	0.02	97.96	1.00	-0.033	0.008	<i>DEBTSERV</i>	<i>DEFICIT1</i>	<i>USBANKS</i>	<i>GUERIL</i>	<i>REPUDIATION</i>	<i>INTERESTS</i>

Note: Each row is based upon 12,384 (Panel A) resp. 11,522 (Panels B, C1, C2) regressions