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Living in two neighborhoods: Social interaction effects in the lab

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LIVING IN TWO NEIGHBORHOODS – SOCIAL INTERACTION EFFECTS IN THE LAB

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13 January 2009

Abstract

Field evidence suggests that people belonging to the same group often behave similarly, i.e., behavior exhibits social interaction effects. We conduct a laboratory experiment that avoids the identification problem present in the field and allows us to study the behavioral logic of social interaction effects. Our novel design feature is that each subject is simultaneously a member of two randomly assigned and identical groups where only members ('neighbors') are different. We study behavior in a coordination game with multiple equilibria and a public goods game, which has only one equilibrium in material payoffs. We speak of social interactions if the same subject at the same time makes group-specific decisions that depend on their respective neighbors' decisions. We find that a majority of subjects exhibits social interaction effects both when the game has multiple equilibria in material payoffs and when it only has one equilibrium. (JEL: C91; H41; K42; H26)

Keywords: Social interactions, identification, experiments, coordination, cooperation.

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1. Introduction

It is a long-standing and fundamental problem of the social sciences to understand whether and in what way humans are influenced by the behavior exhibited by the members of the social group to which they belong. We speak of a “social interaction effect” if an individual changes his or her behavior as a *function of his or her respective group members’ behavior*. Social interaction effects are economically important because they may be present in many decision domains.¹

From a theoretical viewpoint there are at least two potentially important sources for social interaction effects even in otherwise identical environments; both are studied in this paper. A social interaction effect can occur if the game that people play in their group has multiple equilibria which are due to the *material payoff structure* of the game. Behavior across groups can be different simply because different groups coordinate on different equilibria of the same game. A second and less straightforward source of social interaction effects concerns those interactions that operate via *non-material psychological payoffs*, like conformism, social approval, fairness, reciprocity, or guilt aversion. These motives can induce players to adapt their behavior to that of others, even if the material payoff structure does not provide any incentive to do so.

The identification of social interaction effects requires several problems to be overcome (e.g., Manski (1993), (2000); Akerlof (1997)): (i) identifying the reference group for which social interaction effects are sought to be established, (ii) circumventing the problem of self-selection of group members by investigating randomly composed groups, (iii) controlling for correlated effects that affect all group members in a similar way, and (iv) controlling for contextual effects like exogenous social background characteristics of group members. In this paper we present the design of an experiment that circumvents these problems and therefore allows us to study the behavioral logic of social interactions.

We argue that the experimental laboratory provides the researcher with a valuable tool to study social interactions because it guarantees more control than any other available data source. The ideal data set would observe the same individual at the same time in different

¹ Documented examples comprise welfare participation (e.g., Bertrand, et al. (2000)), work place behavior (Ichino and Maggi (2000); Falk and Ichino (2006)) and unemployment [e.g., Topa (2001)], the dynamics of urban poverty and crime (e.g., Glaeser, et al. (1996); Katz, et al. (2001)), academic success (e.g., Sacerdote (2001)), savings behavior (e.g., Duflo and Saez (2002)) and choice under uncertainty in general (Cooper and Rege (2008)).

groups or neighborhoods, which are identical – apart from different neighbors. Obviously, this is impossible in the field. By contrast, it is possible to come very close to this ‘counterfactual state’ in the lab. In our experiment, we are able to *observe decisions of the same subject at the same time* in two economically identical environments. The only reason to behave differently in these two environments is the presence of social interactions, i.e., the fact that a person is systematically and differentially affected by the behavior of his neighbors in the two environments. Our within-subjects two-group design circumvents the above-mentioned identification problems. Using the terminology of Manski (2000), in our study reference groups are well-defined; the set-up avoids self-selection; subjects make simultaneous decisions in two economically identical environments, which controls for correlated effects, including experience; the decision problem is abstractly framed and decisions are taken anonymously, which avoids contextual effects. Moreover, our laboratory approach has the added advantage of eliminating measurement errors.

We investigate social interaction effects in two experimental games, which represent the two broad classes of strategic situations mentioned above – a coordination game which possesses multiple equilibria in material payoffs, and a cooperation game which has only one equilibrium in material payoffs. The *coordination game* we study is a version of the “minimum-effort game” (e.g., van Huyck, et al. (1990); see Camerer (2003), Chap. 7, for an overview). In this game the lowest effort of a group member determines the payoff everyone will achieve. The incentives are such that all effort constellations where every player chooses the same effort are strict Nash equilibria and the Nash equilibria are Pareto ranked. Thus, since there are many Nash equilibria, different groups may play different equilibria or, in the case of mis-coordination, may exhibit different out-of-equilibrium behaviors. Evidence for a social interaction effect in this setup occurs if the *same* individual adapts his or her behavior to that of his or her respective group members. This may entail the same individual coordinating on different equilibria across his or her two groups.

Our choice of a *cooperation game* is a linear public good game with full free riding as the unique equilibrium in material payoffs. If none of the mentioned psychological payoffs plays a role there cannot be a social interaction effect since this game has only one equilibrium in material payoffs. If some people care about psychological payoffs, however, social interaction effects might occur because these people want to reciprocate others’ contributions, or avoid letting others down, or simply conform to what others do. If the game is repeated the presence of these motives might even induce the cooperation of individuals who are only interested in

maximizing their material payoffs. Thus, to the extent that groups differ in their composition with respect to how important material and psychological payoffs are to , its members, social interaction effects can be observed if individuals differentiate their contributions depending on their neighbors' contributions in their respective groups.

Our data lend strong support for the importance of social interactions. In both the coordination game and the public good game the *same* individual adapts his or her behavior to that of his or her respective group members. In many cases this entails coordinating on different equilibria across the two groups in the coordination game or displaying different cooperation levels across the two groups playing a cooperation game. The behavioral patterns of social interaction are surprisingly similar in the coordination and the cooperation game.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design, procedures and hypotheses. Section 3 presents our results, and Section 4 concludes.

2. Design, Procedures and Hypotheses

2.1. Design

The philosophy and novel feature of our experimental design is to put the same person at the same time into two different, yet economically identical environments. Thus, it is only the behavior of other neighbors in these environments that can explain possible behavioral differences in the two environments. Finding such a different behavior is therefore evidence for social interaction effects.

The implementation of the 'two neighborhood' design was straightforward (see Figure 1): nine participants formed a so-called matching group. Within such a matching group, all participants were simultaneously members of two neighborhoods called 'groups'. Participants were told that they were members of a 'group 1' and a 'group 2' (see the instructions in the Appendix). The two groups were formed such that each subject had two different neighbors in each group. For example, in Figure 1, subject 4 formed a group with subjects 1 and 7 and another group with subjects 5 and 6.² Likewise, subject 9 formed a group with subjects 3 and 6 and another group with subjects 7 and 8. Let G_i^1 be the set of the members of player i 's group 1

² In the experiment subjects had no labels. We use the numbering of subjects in Figure 1 only for expositional reasons.

and let G_i^2 be the set of the members of player i 's group 2. For example, individual 4 from Figure 1 belongs to the two groups $G_4^1 = \{1,4,7\}$ and $G_4^2 = \{4,5,6\}$.




FIGURE 1. Our two-group design.

Note: Numbers represent different subjects in the experiment.

The matching structure shown in Figure 1 was used to study behavior in two different economic environments, a coordination game and a voluntary contribution game.

Coordination game. As a workhorse for studying coordination and social interaction in our two-group design we developed a variant of the so-called minimum effort coordination game (van Huyck, et al. (1990)). In our version of the minimum effort coordination game each player can choose an integer number c between 20 and 100. All group members receive the minimum of the three chosen numbers (min) as payoffs. Those group members whose numbers exceed the minimum receive the minimum minus the difference between their chosen number and the minimum. Thus, for each subject i the payoff function was as follows:

$$(1) \quad \pi_i = \min^1 - (c_i^1 - \min^1) + \min^2 - (c_i^2 - \min^2); \quad c_i^l \in [20, 100]$$

where 1 and 2 are indices for groups 1 and group 2, respectively. The coordination games of the two groups were technologically completely independent of each other. Subjects took two decisions, between 20 and 100, one for each group.

Cooperation game. In the cooperation game subjects made a contribution to a standard linear public good, one for each group. The public goods of the two groups were technologically independent of each other. Each subject was endowed with 20 tokens in each

group and could invest up to 20 tokens into the public good of the respective group. Let G_i^1 be the set of the members of player i 's group 1 and let G_i^2 be the set of the members of player i 's group 2. Let c_i^1 (c_i^2) denote i 's voluntary contribution to group 1 (group 2). For both groups the following budget constraints had to hold: $0 \leq c_i^1 \leq 20$ and $0 \leq c_i^2 \leq 20$. If a subject decided, for example, to invest 10 tokens in group 1, she could nevertheless only invest at most 20 tokens in group 2. Any token not invested in the public good of the respective group was automatically invested into a private good. Thus, for each subject i the payoff function was as follows:

$$(2) \quad \pi_i = (20 - c_i^1) + \alpha \sum_{j \in G_i^1} c_j^1 + (20 - c_i^2) + \alpha \sum_{k \in G_i^2} c_k^2,$$

where j and k are indices for neighbors of group 1 and group 2, respectively. In our experiment, α , the marginal per capita return of the public good, was set equal to 0.6; the social marginal return was therefore 1.8. Thus, since $\alpha < 1 < 3\alpha$, a selfish individual has a dominant strategy to free ride completely, while total payoffs are maximized if everybody fully invests into the group account.

In both treatments, the minimum game and the public goods game, it was commonly known that subjects were randomly allocated to the groups and remained paired for 20 periods. The experiment was computerized using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). At the beginning of each period, subjects had to make their choices for both groups on the same screen. The decision screen was separated into two vertical parts (called 'group 1' and 'group 2') and contained an input box for each group. On the same screen where subjects had to simultaneously take their decisions, subjects were also informed for both group 1 and group 2 about the average outcome of all respective group members and their respective incomes in the previous period. Full anonymity between subjects was maintained throughout the whole experiment.

2.2. Discussion of the two-group design

The purpose of our study is to identify social interaction effects, which requires extensive control. First, we control for any *self-selection effect*. This is achieved by the fact that subjects were randomly allocated to their groups and that we observe the same subject's behavior in two

different groups.³ Even without random allocation, this latter feature alone circumvents self-selection problems. Second, we control for *correlated effects*, i.e., for the possibility that neighborhood characteristics influence behavior (Manski (1993)). In our experiment the two environments in which subjects make their decisions are economically exactly identical. In each group all subjects have the same action space, the same endowment and budget constraint, the same information conditions and the same material incentives. Both groups are completely independent of each other – a decision in group 1 does not change the endowment, the action space or the incentives in group 2. Moreover, groups are equal in size and each neighbor faces the same economic incentives. The two-group design also controls for correlated effects that might be caused by the fact that different sessions are conducted at different dates and times. Even more importantly, it controls for experience and learning. When a subject takes a decision in both groups she has exactly the same experience for both decisions. This cannot be achieved in a one-group design.

Third, we control for *contextual effects*, that is, for the fact that a person may show a different behavior in the two groups because of the socio-economic composition of the two groups (Manski (1993)). Control in this respect is ensured by the fact that experimental subjects were very homogenous with respect to their socio-economic background and, more importantly, interaction was anonymous. Fourth, while in the field one can only hypothesize about the relevant comparison group and try to find some good proxy (language group, neighbors of the same block, zip code etc.), the lab environment controls the available information. Subjects receive information only about the behavior of those groups to which they actually belong. This implies, for instance, that subjects cannot compare to any other group.⁴ Fifth, our computerized lab environment excludes measurement errors.

2.3. Procedures

In total, 198 people participated in our experiments. In the two-group coordination game 72 subjects participated in 8 independent matching groups of nine members each (see Figure 1). They took 2880 decisions in total. In the two-group public goods game 126 subjects made a

³ See Friedman and Cassar (2004) for a general discussion of related designs.

⁴ Relaxing this information condition could be an interesting treatment condition since it would allow insights with whom subjects choose to compare. This could be implemented, e.g., by giving subjects the possibility to inform themselves about the behavior of groups to which they do not belong.

total of 5040 contribution decisions. They formed 14 independent matching groups of nine members each. No subject participated in more than one treatment. We conducted the experiments in the computer labs at the Universities of St. Gallen and Zurich. Most participants were undergraduate students from various fields. After reading the instructions subjects had to solve a set of computerized control questions that tested their understanding of payoff calculations. The experiment started only after all participants had answered all questions correctly.

During the experiments income was counted in ‘Guilders’, which were translated to Swiss Francs at the end of the experiment (at an exchange rate of 100 Guilder = 0.70 Swiss Francs in the minimum game and 1 Guilder = 0.03 Swiss Francs in the public goods games). On average, subjects earned 29.90 Swiss Francs in the minimum games and 33 Swiss Francs in the public goods games (1 Swiss Franc $\approx$ US\$ 1.21-1.70 $\approx$ € 1.50 at the time of the experiments). The experiments lasted between 60 and 80 minutes.

2.4. Hypotheses

In the minimum effort coordination game there are multiple equilibria, which are characterized by all players choosing the same number. Deviating in any direction lowers a player’s payoff. In contrast, the material game structure of the public goods games is such that there is a unique equilibrium: under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality and selfishness, players are predicted to contribute zero to both public goods, that is, we should see full free riding. In the stage games this is obvious since it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. In our finitely repeated games it holds with backward induction. In contrast to this prediction it is known from many public goods experiments that some people cooperate, at least in the early periods of an experiment. An important motive that explains cooperation is reciprocity in the form of conditional cooperation as discussed, e.g., in Sugden (1984); Guttman (1986); Andreoni (1995); Keser and van Winden (2000); Fischbacher, et al. (2001))⁵,. Guilt aversion (e.g., Dufwenberg, et al. (2006)) and conformism (e.g., Carpenter (2004); Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005); Alpizar, et al. (2008)) are further motivations leading to conditional cooperation. In the presence of conditional cooperation the prediction of a unique equilibrium with complete free-riding no longer holds. Instead, some players now prefer

⁵ More recent evidence in different setups is presented in Croson (2007), Fischbacher and Gächter (forthcoming), Galbiati and Vertova (2008), Duffy and Ochs (forthcoming) and Grimm and Mengel (forthcoming).

cooperating over defecting as long as others also contribute. In other words there are multiple equilibria in the public goods game as long as there are a sufficient number of reciprocally motivated players.

In both the minimum effort game and the public goods game, social interaction implies that subjects' choices of numbers or contributions, respectively, are affected by the choices of their neighbors. Let us state this hypothesis more formally for the minimum effort game. Let c_i^1 denote subject i 's chosen number in period t to group 1 and let g_i^1 denote the minimum in group 1 in period $t - 1$. Analogously, c_i^2 denotes subject i 's number in period t to group 2 and g_i^2 denotes the minimum in group 2 in period $t - 1$. *Social interactions* require that $\text{corr}[(c_i^1 - c_i^2), (g_i^1 - g_i^2)] > 0$, i.e., the larger the difference of the minima in both groups in the previous period, the larger is the difference in current chosen numbers of a group member to the two groups. In contrast, if there are *no* social interactions, we should see no such correlation. In the public goods game, social interactions can be defined analogously, where c_i^1 then denotes subject i 's contribution in period t to group 1 and g_i^1 denotes the average contribution of i 's neighbors in group 1 in period $t - 1$. Moreover, c_i^2 denotes subject i 's contribution in period t to group 2 and g_i^2 denotes the average contribution of i 's neighbors in group 2 in period $t - 1$.

3. Results

In our discussion of the results we first discuss the aggregate-level findings from the coordination game (section 3.1) and the public goods game (section 3.2). In section 3.3 we look at individual heterogeneity in both games.

3.1. Coordination game

In our version of the coordination game the average minimum number in the first five periods was 60.9, rising to 79.7 in the last five periods. The coordination rate (that is, the fraction of cases where group members in a group of three coordinated on the same number) rose steadily from 27.1 percent in the first five periods to 68.8 percent in the last five periods.

Our main result in the minimum game concerns the presence of social interaction effects, however. We find strong and systematic social interaction effects: on average, subjects

systematically chose a higher number in the group that had the higher minimum in the previous period. Support for this result comes from Figures 2 to 4 and Table 1. Figure 2 plots the average difference in current numbers ($c_i^1 - c_i^2$) as a function of the difference of the neighbors' minima in the respective groups in the previous period ($g_i^1 - g_i^2$). In the absence of social interaction this graph should fluctuate around 0; instead we observe a very strong positive relationship between ($c_i^1 - c_i^2$) and ($g_i^1 - g_i^2$) with observations lying almost exactly on the 45-degree line.




FIGURE 2. Social interaction effects in the minimum effort game: Difference in own number chosen c^1 - c^2 as a function of the neighbors' minima in the two groups g^1 - g^2 .

Figure 3 looks at social interaction from a different angle. As a function of ($g_i^1 - g_i^2$) it shows three graphs, indicating the probability of choosing a higher or lower number in group 1 than in group 2, or the same in both groups, respectively. Figure 3 is based on all data from all matching groups and uses intervals for ($g_i^1 - g_i^2$). The intervals were determined such that each interval contains roughly the same number of observations. For each interval the three graphs add up to a probability of 1.




FIGURE 3. The probability of choosing higher numbers in group 1, in group 2 or the same numbers in both groups as a function of $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$.

Figure 3 conveys several observations. First, the probability of contributing more to group 1 than to group 2 is very low if $g_i^1 < g_i^2$ and is slightly increasing in $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$. For $g_i^1 - g_i^2 = 0$, the probability is well below 10 percent. For $(g_i^1 - g_i^2) > 0$ the probability is strongly and monotonously increasing in $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$, reaching 100 percent for high values of $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$. Second, the probability of choosing higher numbers in group 2 than in group 1 as a function of $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$ is almost exactly the mirror image of the probability to invest more in group 1. Third, the probability of contributing the same amount in both groups is higher the smaller the absolute value of $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$. It reaches its maximum of almost 95 percent for $g_i^1 - g_i^2 = 0$. Note that even for very small deviations from $g_i^1 - g_i^2 = 0$, the probability drops sharply. Taken together, Figure 3 strongly supports the existence of social interaction effects.

Remember that our design involves matching groups of nine subjects each. These matching groups form the strictly independent observations of our data set. Figure 4

investigates social interactions at the level of matching groups by providing scatter plots of $(c_i^1 - c_i^2)$ as a function of $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$ for each of our eight matching groups.




FIGURE 4. Social interaction effects per matching group in the minimum effort game.

The first observation from Figure 4 is that the relationship we find at the aggregate level holds for all eight matching groups. In all our matching groups the bulk of observations lies on the 45-degree line. Thus, the observation of Figure 2 is not an artifact of aggregation. Further analysis also reveals that social interaction effects are stable over time. In all periods, the difference in numbers in period t is positively correlated with the difference of minimum numbers in period $t-1$.⁶

In the following we test the statistical significance of social interactions. As a first test, note that we observe a strictly positive correlation between $(c_i^1 - c_i^2)$ and $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$ in all

⁶ We also ran regressions of the difference in numbers in period t on the difference of minimum numbers in period $t-1$ for every period. We used robust standard errors with matching groups as clusters to take the dependency of observations within matching groups into account. All regressions reveal a highly significant ($<1\%$) positive relationship between the two variables.

eight matching groups. The probability of finding a strictly positive correlation in one matching group is (slightly) smaller than $\frac{1}{2}$ in the absence of social interactions. The probability of finding a positive correlation in all eight matching groups without social interaction is therefore smaller than $\frac{1}{2}^8 \approx 0.004$. As a second test, Table 1 (first column) records the results of OLS regressions. Since within a matching group contributions are not independent, we calculated robust standard errors that allow for correlated errors within matching groups. The dependent variable is $(c_i^1 - c_i^2)$. We regress this variable on $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$, i.e., the difference in neighbors' chosen numbers in the previous period. To study possible time effects, we also include the period index and interact "period" with $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$. The regression strongly supports our previous arguments. The coefficient on $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$ is positive and the robust standard errors are extremely low, with a very high t -value ($t = 11.25$).⁷

So far we have shown that subjects differentiated their contributions according to the contributions of their respective neighbors such that $\text{corr}[(c_i^1 - c_i^2), (g_i^1 - g_i^2)] > 0$ holds. However, we have not yet looked at *how* this positive correlation comes about. In particular it is interesting to know whether the behavior of the neighbors in group 2 had an impact on contribution behavior in group 1 and vice versa. For example, it could be that the more the neighbors contributed in group 2 the less a person was inclined to contribute in group 1. In order to study the impact of the neighbors' contributions in group 1 (group 2) on own contributions in group 2 (group 1) we report two further regressions in Table 1.

The regression in column 2 shows that while the contribution decision in group 1 (c_i^1) is strongly and positively influenced by the behavior of neighbors in group 1 (g_i^1), the behavior of neighbors in group 2 (g_i^2) has only a slightly positive and insignificant effect. Likewise, the third regression model shows that only g_i^2 but not g_i^1 , strongly influences c_i^2 .⁸ Even though the coefficient on g_i^1 is significant, it is more than 20 times smaller than the coefficient on g_i^2 .

⁷ Because the groups are identical we expect an intercept of zero (measured by the constant) and we do not expect that the intercept will be different from zero in later periods (measured by the variable 'period'). This is also what we observe.

⁸ Note that the correlation between, e.g., c_i^1 and g_i^1 is not a strict test for the existence of social interactions. Finding such a correlation could be due, for example, to correlated effects with respect to time. If all subjects for whatever reason were to reduce their contributions from one period to the next we would find such a correlation.

TABLE 1. Social interactions: Explaining behavior in the minimum effort game with the behavior of neighbors.

Independent variable	Dependent variable		
	$c_i^1 - c_i^2$	c_i^1	c_i^2
$g_i^1 - g_i^2$	0.643*** (0.061)		
period	-0.043 (0.052)	-0.460*** (0.070)	-0.516*** (0.072)
period * ($g_i^1 - g_i^2$)	0.0195*** (0.003)		
g_i^1		0.881*** (0.027)	0.041*** (0.009)
g_i^2		0.023 (0.013)	0.908*** (0.031)
constant	0.426 (0.687)	16.122*** (2.206)	13.379*** (1.612)
	N=1368 F(3,7)=2536.73*** R ² =0.89	N=1368 F(3,7)=372.97*** R ² =0.88	N=1368 F(3,7)=1374.63*** R ² =0.90

Note: ($c_i^1 - c_i^2$) measures own difference in the number to group 1 and group 2 in period t ; ($g_i^1 - g_i^2$) is the difference in minimum number in group 1 and group 2 in $t - 1$; *** denotes significance at the 1-percent level; robust standard errors clustered on matching groups in parentheses.

When we only consider g_i^1 and the constant in the second regression, we observe that in the possible range, i.e. between 20 and 100, the model predicts that the number is chosen above the previous minimum ($16.112 + 20 \cdot 0.881 > 20$ and $16.112 + 100 \cdot 0.881 > 100$). Actually, this is also what is observed at the beginning of the experiment. However, since the coefficient on ‘period’ is negative and highly significant, this effect decreases over time, i.e. the increase slows down and in the experiment, the numbers converge. Taken together the regressions in columns 2 and 3 reveal that there are hardly any spillover effects from one neighborhood to the other. A subject’s decision in group 1 is not strongly influenced by the behavior of group 2 neighbors and vice versa.

In our two-group design we observe two contribution decisions at the same time, thereby ruling out correlated time effects. Ruling out these correlated effects is impossible in a standard one-group design

3.2. Public goods game

The pattern of contributions over time is in line with previous findings: on average people contributed 11.3 tokens in the first five periods and contributions steadily declined to 7.0 tokens in the last five periods. There was also a strong endgame effect: in the last period contributions dropped to 3.4 tokens on average.

However, our main interest is not in the temporal contribution patterns but in social interaction effects. In our public goods game we find strikingly similar results as in the minimum game. This finding also supports the importance of social interactions for voluntary contributions games with a unique equilibrium. On average, subjects contributed more to the group that had contributed more in the previous period. Support for this result comes from Figures 5 to 7 and Table 2, which are constructed analogously to Figures 2 to 4 and Table 1.




FIGURE 5. Social interaction effects in the public goods game: Difference in own contribution as a function of the neighbors' contributions in the two groups.

Figure 5 plots the average difference in current contributions ($c_i^1 - c_i^2$) as a function of the difference of the neighbors' contributions in the respective groups in the previous period ($g_i^1 - g_i^2$). As before, we find a very strong positive relationship between ($c_i^1 - c_i^2$) and ($g_i^1 - g_i^2$); that is, people tended to contribute more to group 1 than to group 2 (i.e., $c_i^1 > c_i^2$) if $g_i^1 > g_i^2$ and vice versa. Note, however, that the correlation is somewhat weaker than in the minimum

game. An explanation for this is that material incentives favor social interaction effects in the coordination game but do not in the context of the public goods game.




FIGURE 6. The probability of contributing more to the public good of group 1, more to the public good of group 2 or the same amount in both groups as a function of $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$.

Figure 6 shows that the likelihood in the current period to contribute more to group 1 than to group 2 depends positively on $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$ (and vice versa for group 2). The figure is based on data from all matching groups and uses intervals for $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$. As in Figure 2, the intervals were determined such that each interval includes roughly the same number of observations. For each interval the three graphs add up to a probability of 1. The figure is remarkably similar to Figure 2: the probability of contributing more to group 1 than to group 2 is very low if $g_i^1 < g_i^2$ and is slightly increasing in $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$. For $g_i^1 - g_i^2 = 0$, the probability is about 10 percent. For $(g_i^1 - g_i^2) > 0$ the probability is strongly and monotonously increasing in $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$, reaching roughly 85 percent for high values of $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$. The probability to invest more in group 2 than in group 1 as a function of $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$ is the mirror image of the probability to invest more in group 1. Finally, the probability to contribute the same amount in both groups is the higher the smaller the absolute value of $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$, reaching its maximum of roughly 85 percent for $g_i^1 - g_i^2 = 0$. Note that, as is the case for the coordination game, even for very

small deviations from $g_i^1 - g_i^2 = 0$ (intervals $[-2,0)$ and $(0,2]$), the probability sharply drops from 85 to about 50 percent.

Similar to Figure 4, Figure 7 reveals the existence of social interactions at the level of matching groups by providing scatter plots of $(c_i^1 - c_i^2)$ as a function of $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$ for each of our fourteen matching groups. In all fourteen matching groups we observe strong social interactions, indicated by the fact that the bulk of observations is in the upper right and the lower left quadrants (defined by $(c_i^1 - c_i^2) = 0$ and $(g_i^1 - g_i^2) = 0$). The likelihood of finding a positive correlation in all fourteen matching groups without social interaction is extremely small – $\frac{1}{2}^{14} \approx 6 \cdot 10^{-5}$. In all matching groups, however, there are also a certain number of contribution decisions with $c_i^1 - c_i^2 = 0$ for $g_i^1 - g_i^2 \neq 0$. These are contribution decisions that are unaffected by social interactions. We will return to this observation in our analysis of individual behavior.




FIGURE 7. Social interaction effects per matching group in the public goods game.

Further analysis also reveals that social interaction effects are stable over time. In all periods, the difference in contribution in period t is significantly positively correlated with the difference of the contributions of the other players in period $t-1$.⁹

We study the statistical significance of the observed social interaction effects in the public goods game in Table 3, which is constructed analogously to Table 2. The dependent variable is $(c_i^1 - c_i^2)$, which is regressed on $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$, i.e., the difference in neighbor's contributions in the previous period. We study time effects, by including the period index and an interaction term “period* $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$ ”. It turns out that the coefficient on $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$ is positive and highly significant ($t = 11.25$). Moreover, the social interaction effect is not affected by experience, as can be inferred from the insignificant interaction term period* $(g_i^1 - g_i^2)$.¹⁰

It is interesting to compare coefficients and explanatory power across our coordination and cooperation games. It turns out that social interaction effects are stronger in the coordination game context. Both coefficients as well as the R^2 are considerably higher in the latter than in the former. A potential explanation could be the fact that material incentives favor social interaction in coordination games with multiple equilibria but favor unconditional behavior in voluntary contribution games.

As in Table 1, we also check whether the behavior of the neighbors in group 2 has an impact on contribution behavior in group 1 and vice versa. The regression in column 2 shows that contribution decisions in group 1 (c_i^1) are strongly and positively influenced by the behavior of neighbors in group 1 (g_i^1); the behavior of neighbors in group 2 (g_i^2) has virtually no effect. A similar picture arises from the third regression model showing that c_i^2 is strongly influenced by g_i^2 but not by g_i^1 .¹¹

⁹ We ran for this experiment the analogous regressions as those described in footnote 6. We also find in this case for all periods a highly significant (<1%) positive relation between the difference in contributions of the other group members in the previous period and the difference in the own contributions in this period.

¹⁰ Because the groups are identical we expect an intercept of zero (measured by the constant) and we do not expect that the intercept will be different from zero in later periods (measured by the variable ‘period’). This is also what we observe.

¹¹ Note that the correlation between, e.g., c_i^1 and g_i^1 is not a strict test for the existence of social interactions. Finding such a correlation could be due to, for example, correlated effects with respect to time. If all subjects for whatever reason were to reduce their contributions from one period to the next we would find such a correlation.

TABLE 2. Social interactions: Explaining contributions in the public goods game with the behavior of neighbors.

Independent variable	Dependent variable		
	$c_i^1 - c_i^2$	c_i^1	c_i^2
$g_i^1 - g_i^2$	0.605*** (0.054)		
period	0.007 (0.023)	-0.103*** (0.018)	-0.121*** (0.024)
period * ($g_i^1 - g_i^2$)	0.005 (0.005)		
g_i^1		0.750*** (0.061)	0.069 (0.045)
g_i^2		0.021 (0.037)	0.663*** (0.046)
constant	-0.022 (0.416)	2.901*** (0.672)	3.418*** (0.776)
	N=2394 F(3,13)=144.9*** R ² =0.44	N=2394 F(3,13)=101.4*** R ² =0.46	N=2394 F(3,6)=185.0*** R ² =0.37

Note: ($c_i^1 - c_i^2$) measures own difference in contribution to group 1 and group 2 in period t ; ($g_i^1 - g_i^2$) is the difference in neighbors' contributions in group 1 and group 2 in $t - 1$; *** denotes significance at the 1-percent level; robust standard errors clustered on matching groups in parentheses.

As in the minimum effort game there are little if any spillover effects from one neighborhood to the other. This suggests that when deciding on an action that affects people in a particular group, behavior of this group's members is very important but behavior of people in the other group is largely irrelevant. As an example, consider a person's decision to provide public goods in his or her(?) tennis club: these contributions will strongly depend on the behavior of other tennis club members but are not affected by the behavior of his or her fellow soccer club members. As long as groups are separated and external effects are confined to a particular group, we expect social interactions to be confined to that very group as well. Put

In our two-group design we observe two contribution decisions at the same time, thereby ruling out correlated time effects. Ruling out these correlated effects is impossible in a standard one-group design.

differently, multiple memberships should not lead to a different cooperation behavior than a single membership.¹²

In order to investigate this hypothesis directly we compare the contribution patterns of our two-group design with that of additional experiments run under a standard one-group design. Parameters in the one-group experiments are exactly identical (see Section 2). The only difference is that while subjects make two decisions in two different groups in the two-group design, they make just a single contribution decision in the one-group design.¹³ Forty-eight subjects who formed 16 independent groups participated in the one-group experiments. Figure 8 shows the evolution of average contributions in both treatments by pooling data from all matching groups.




FIGURE 8. Cooperation patterns in the two-group and the one-group design: Average contributions over time.

The result is striking: the contribution patterns between the two treatments are almost indistinguishable. In both treatments, average contributions started at about 12 tokens (60 percent of the endowment), showed a slow downward trend until period 17 and a sharp drop in

¹² Of course, if there would be a joint budget constraint for the contributions to the two public goods, then spillovers would likely occur. However, such a budget constraint implies constraint interaction in the sense of Manski (2000).

¹³ There are some public goods studies where subjects could observe what members of another group contributed (e.g., Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005); Carpenter and Matthews (2005)). In Carpenter and Matthews subjects could even punish members of another group. The goal of these studies is different from ours. Bardsley and Sausgruber want to disentangle conformism and reciprocity; and Carpenter and Matthews investigate “social reciprocity”.

the final three periods. Final average contribution levels were about 3 tokens (15 percent). A Mann-Whitney test on matching groups reveals that contributions in both treatments are not significantly different ($p=1.000$). Thus, the fact that subjects interacted in two groups did not lead to a contribution pattern different from that which we usually see in single-group public goods experiments.

This result confirms our hypothesis derived from the findings reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2. Methodologically this is good news because it shows that the abstraction to study public goods behavior in games where people are only acting in one group is a good approximation for behavior outside the lab, where subjects simultaneously interact in more than one group.

3.3 Individual heterogeneity

In our aggregate analysis we have provided unambiguous evidence for the importance of social interaction effects both in the minimum and the public goods game. On average, subjects are very strongly influenced by the decisions of their respective neighbors. In this section we study social interactions at the individual level. We investigate to what extent subjects are affected by social interactions. We expect social interaction effects to be more widely present in the coordination game because in this game social interaction effects are predicted for any type of player while in the public goods game, selfish players are not expected to exhibit social interaction effects. Figure 9 documents this individual heterogeneity. It shows the relative frequency of subjects who exhibit a particular intensity level of social interactions in our coordination game (left panel) and in the public goods game (right panel). This intensity level is measured with simple OLS-regressions for each individual, where $c_i^1 - c_i^2$ is regressed on $g_i^1 - g_i^2$ for periods 2 to 20, setting the constant to zero.¹⁴ Figure 9 shows the distribution of these coefficients, where each individual coefficient is rounded to a multiple of 0.2. A coefficient equal to one means that a subject perfectly matches the difference $g_i^1 - g_i^2$, while a coefficient of zero implies no social interactions.

¹⁴ In the coordination game, g^i denotes the minimum number in group i in the previous period and in the public goods game; g^i denotes the average contribution in group i in the previous period.

Figure 9 offers several interesting insights. In the coordination game only one out of 70 subjects had a negative coefficient, five had a coefficient of exactly zero and all other subjects had a positive coefficient.¹⁵ This is not surprising since coordination is in the interest of all players. Interestingly, also in the public goods game, where selfish players are not interested in coordination, 89 percent of the subjects show a positive coefficient. Thus, in line with our previous arguments, the majority of individuals show social interaction effects. Nevertheless, in particular in the public goods game, there is pronounced individual heterogeneity – subjects are very differently affected by social interactions. There are 14 subjects (11 percent) with a (rounded) coefficient of zero. Five of these 14 subjects have a coefficient of exactly zero (see the light grey part of the column at 0).¹⁶ Thus, roughly 11 percent of the subjects show no social interactions at all.




FIGURE 9. Social interaction effects at the individual level.

Rounded regression coefficients ($c^1 - c^2$ on $g^1 - g^2$) for each individual (periods 2 to 20). Left panel: minimum game, g^i =minimum number in group i in previous period; right panel: public goods game, g^i =average contribution in group i in previous period. The lighter bar at 0 represents the coefficients exactly equal to 0.

¹⁵ Two subjects never observed a difference between the groups and have to be left out of the analysis.

¹⁶ Of these five subjects three are completely selfish, i.e., they always defect while two always contribute independently of the other group members' decisions.

4. Concluding Remarks

Identifying social interaction effects is a notoriously difficult task (Manski (1993), (2000)). After reviewing the problems, Manski (1993, p. 541) writes: “The only ways to improve the prospects for identification are to develop tighter theory or to collect richer data. (...) Empirical evidence may also be obtained from controlled experiments (...). Given that identification based on observed behavior alone is so tenuous, experimental and subjective data will have to play an important role in future efforts to learn about social effects”.

In recent years, the availability of rich microeconomic field data sets has led to considerable progress. In the typical field research paper, identifying a social interaction effect usually amounts to finding a significant coefficient of the group dummy variables (that capture the social groups one is interested in) – after circumventing self-selection problems and after controlling in a multiple regression model for variables that arguably capture the most important correlated and contextual effects. Yet, the approach is only *indirect*: any variance that cannot be attributed to the correlated and contextual effects is attributed to social interaction effects. The problem of omitted variables can never be completely circumvented.

In our paper we introduce an experimental design that provides us with *direct* evidence of social interaction effects in the context of two important types of games, coordination and public goods game. Our results are clear and unambiguous. First, subjects’ average behavior is systematically influenced by social interactions both in the coordination and the public goods environment. Interestingly, social interaction is more pronounced in our coordination game, reflecting strong material incentives to coordinate, i.e., to exhibit social interaction. This is not the case in the public goods game where material incentives dictate zero contributions irrespective of the behavior of other group members. Second, our individual data analysis in the public goods game reveals substantive heterogeneity. Subjects’ inclination to display social interaction effects is very different and roughly 10 percent show no social interactions at all. The finding of two classes of subjects, those whose behavior is influenced by the behavior of their neighbors and those whose behavior is independent of others, is consistent with the assumption put forward in Glaeser, et al. (1996). In their model there is a group of agents whose decision to become criminal is influenced by the behavior of their neighbors while others, the so-called ‘fixed agents’, are affected by others.

Finally we show for the public goods game context that the fact that subjects interact in more than one group does not lead to a contribution pattern that differs from the one exhibited in a single-group environment. This is an important finding from a methodological point of

view. It suggests that studying contribution behavior in single-group designs is appropriate despite the fact that in reality subjects are typically members of many groups.

Acknowledgments

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Appendix: Experimental Instructions

The following instructions were originally written in German. We document the instructions we used in the two-group design of the public goods experiments. The instructions in the single-group design were adapted accordingly. The instructions of the minimum effort game are available upon request.

You are now taking part in an economics experiment, which has been financed by various science foundations. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions with care.

The instructions that we have distributed to you are solely for your private information. **It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment.** Should you have any questions please ask us. If you violate this rule, we shall have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.

During the experiment we shall not speak of Francs but rather of Guilders. During the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in Guilders. At the end of the experiment the total amount of guilders you have earned will be converted to Francs at the following rate:

1 Guilder = 3 Rappen.

At the end we will pay in cash the money you have earned during the experiment.

The experiment is divided into different periods. In total, the experiment consists of 20 periods. Every participant is always a member of **two groups** (group 1 and group 2). Both groups contain 3 participants, that is, besides you there are two further participants in each group. Please notice that the two participants in group 1 are other participants than the two participants in group 2. **Therefore, besides you there is no further person who is also a member of group 1 and of group 2.**

The composition of the groups will stay the same during the whole 20 periods. **Therefore you will be for 20 periods with the same participants in group 1 and in group 2.** The following pages describe the course of the experiment in detail:

Detailed Information on the Experiment

At the beginning of each period each participant receives **20 points** for group 1 as well for group 2. In the following we call this his or her **endowment**. Your task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide in group 1 as well as in group 2, how many of your 20 points you want to contribute to the **project** and how many you want to keep for yourself.

Your period income in a group depends on how many points you contribute to the project and how many points are contributed to the project by the two other participants. **Your income in a group** consists of two parts:

- (1) The points which you have kept for yourself ("**Income from points kept**") whereby **1 point = 1 Guilder**, and
- (2) The "**income from the project**". This income is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Your income from the project} = 0.6 \times \text{the total contribution of all group members to the project.}$$

Your income per period in group 1 or group 2, respectively, is therefore:

$$(20 - \text{your contribution to the project}) + 0.6 \times (\text{total contributions to the project}).$$

The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way. This means that each group member receives the same income from the project. Suppose the sum of contributions of all group members is 50 points. In this case each group member receives an income from the project of $0.6 \cdot 50 = 30$ Guilders. If the total contribution to the project is 8 points, then each group member will receive an income of $0.6 \cdot 8 = 4.8$ Guilders from the project.

For each point, which you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 Guilder. Suppose you contributed this point to the project instead. The total contribution to the project would then rise by one point. Your income from the project would rise by $0.6 \cdot 1 = 0.6$ points. However, the income of each other group member would also rise by 0.6 points each, so that the total income of the group would rise by $0.6 \cdot 3 = 1.8$ points. Your contribution to the project therefore also raises the income of the other group members. On the other hand you earn an income for each point contributed by the other members to the project. For each point contributed by any member you earn $0.6 \cdot 1 = 0.6$ points.

The calculation of incomes is exactly the same in group 1 and group 2.

At the beginning of each period the following **input screen** will appear:

Gruppe 1		Gruppe 2	
Ihr Beitrag in der Vorperiode	12	Ihr Beitrag in der Vorperiode	20
Durchschnittsbeitrag in der Vorperiode	5.0	Durchschnittsbeitrag in der Vorperiode	6.7
Ihr Einkommen in der Vorperiode	17.0	Ihr Einkommen in der Vorperiode	12.0
Durchschnittsbeitrag über alle früheren Perioden	5.0	Durchschnittsbeitrag über alle früheren Perioden	6.7
Ihr Beitrag zum Projekt		Ihr Beitrag zum Projekt	

In the top left corner of the screen appears the **period number**. In the top right corner there is a **clock in seconds**. It shows how much time remains for you to make a decision on the distribution of your points.

The screen is divided into two parts. On the left, you find the information concerning group 1, and on the right the information for group 2. First you can see the amount you have invested into the project in the previous period (“Your contribution in the previous period”). Beneath you find the average contribution of the respective group in the previous period. If in the previous period the contributions of the three group members have been, for instance, 10, 15 and 20, the number beside “average group contribution in the previous period” will be 15. Beneath you will find your income in the previous period.

A bit further down you can see the “average group contribution of all previous periods”. This number shows the total average contribution of all group members of a respective group over all previous periods. If, for example, the average contribution in period 1 were 3, in period 2 it were 2 and, e.g., 1 in period 3, in the fourth period the number in this line would be 2. The “group average contribution over all previous periods” is therefore a short summary of the previous history in a group. The higher the average contribution in a group has been up to now, the higher the value in this line will be.

Still a bit further down you can enter your contribution. As already mentioned, your **endowment in each of the two groups will always be 20 points**. You choose in each of the two groups your contribution for each group, by entering a number between 0 and 20 in the particular window. You can activate this window with a mouse-click. As soon as you have defined both of your contributions, you have also decided how many points you are going to keep for yourself, that is to say (**20 – your contribution**). If you have entered your contribution in both groups, you have to press the **OK-button** (mouse-click). As long as you have not pressed the OK-button, you can still revise your decision in this period.

Please notice: **group 1 and group 2 are two totally independent groups**. Therefore you can make your contribution decisions in group 1 and group 2 absolutely independently from each other, i.e., you decide separately for both groups. **Your contribution in group 1 can be higher, equal or lower than your contribution in group 2**. You have an endowment of 20 points in each group and each period.

Remark: In the first period your screen contains only the possibility to choose your contribution. Since in the first period there is no previous period and therefore further information (like “your contribution in the previous period”) cannot yet be shown.

After all group members have made their decisions, a period is over. After that you get back to your input screen. On this screen you can see the contributions of the previous period of both groups and your income in both groups. You can also see the average contribution of both groups up to now. You can then make your new contributions in group 1 and group 2. In total there are **20 periods**. Do you have any questions?

Control questionnaire

Please answer all the questions and write down the whole calculation process. If you have any questions please contact us!

1st Question

In group 1 neither you nor the other participants contribute to the project.

In group 2 you contribute 20 points and also the other group members contribute 20 points. What is

Your income in group 1? ...

The income of the other members in group 1? ...

Your income in group 2? ...

The income of the other members in group 2? ...

2nd Question

In group 1 all the members together contribute totally 30 points to the project.

In group 2 also all the members contribute totally 30 points to the project. What is

Your income in group 1, if you contribute 10 points on top of the 30 points? ...

Your income in group 2, if you contribute 0 points on top of the 30 points? ...

3rd Question

In group 1 you contribute 16 points to the project. What is

Your income in group 1, if the other participants contribute 34 points on top of the 16 points? ...

Your income in group 1, if the other participants contribute 4 points on top of the 16 points? ...

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