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**Working Paper**

## Cutting Bread or Cutting Throats? – Findings from a New Database on Religion, Violence and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990 to 2008

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# G I G A *Working Papers*

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Violence and Security

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## **Cutting Bread or Cutting Throats? – Findings from a New Database on Religion, Violence and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990 to 2008**

### **Abstract**

Despite the religious diversity in sub-Saharan Africa and the religious overtones in a number of African conflicts, social science research has inadequately addressed the question of how and to what extent religion matters for conflict in Africa. This paper presents an innovative data inventory on religion and violent conflict in all sub-Saharan countries for the period 1990–2008 that seeks to contribute to filling the gap. The data underscore that religion has to be accounted for in conflict in Africa. Moreover, results show the multidimensionality (e.g. armed conflicts with religious incompatibilities, several forms of non-state religious violence) and ambivalence (inter-religious networks, religious peace initiatives) of religion vis-à-vis violence. In 22 of the 48 sub-Saharan countries, religion plays a substantial role in violence, and six countries in particular—Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda—are heavily affected by different religious aspects of violence.

Keywords: religion, sub-Saharan Africa, violence, peace, conflict

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## **Zusammenfassung**

### **Religion – ein zweischneidiges Schwert?**

#### **Erkenntnisse aufgrund einer neuen Datenbank zu Religion, Gewalt und Frieden in Subsahara-Afrika von 1990 bis 2008**

Bislang haben – trotz der religiösen Vielfalt und religiös motivierter Auseinandersetzungen in Afrika – nur wenige Studien den Zusammenhang von Religion und Konflikt in Subsahara-Afrika systematisch untersucht. Insbesondere mangelt es an Untersuchungen, die den Einfluss von Religion in den Mittelpunkt stellen und die Stärke und Art der Beeinflussung von Konflikten durch Religion in Afrika analysieren. Der vorliegende Artikel soll diese Forschungslücke mit Hilfe der systematischen Auswertung einer neuen Datenbank zu Religion in Subsahara-Afrika (RSSA) für den Zeitraum von 1990 bis 2008 schließen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass religiös motivierte Konflikte in Afrika zahlreicher sind als oftmals angenommen. Ferner unterstreichen die Ergebnisse die Multidimensionalität (z.B. Gewaltkonflikte mit theologischen Gegensätzen, weitere Typen nicht-staatlicher religiöser Gewalt) und die Ambivalenz (z.B. interreligiöse Netzwerke, religiöse Friedensinitiativen) von Religion. Insgesamt spielt Religion in 22 der 48 Länder Subsahara-Afrikas eine bedeutsame Rolle bei gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen. Sechs Länder – (Äthiopien, Kongo-Brazzaville, Nigeria, Sudan, Tschad und Uganda) – sind besonders stark von unterschiedlichen religiösen Gewaltfaktoren betroffen.

# Cutting Bread or Cutting Throats? Findings from a New Database on Religion, Violence and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990 to 2008

Matthias Basedau, Georg Strüver and Johannes Vüllers

## Article Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Literature Review
- 3 The Database on Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa (RSSA)
- 4 The Role of Religion in Violence
- 5 Religion and Peace
- 6 Conclusion

Religion is like a knife: you can either use it to cut bread, or stick in someone's back.

Desmond Tutu

## 1 Introduction<sup>1</sup>

While the world was watching the World Cup final in South Africa on July 11, 2010, two bombs exploded in Kampala, Uganda, killing more than 70 people. The Somali Islamist group Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack. Religious violence in Africa<sup>2</sup> is not

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<sup>1</sup> Research for this article was funded by the German Foundation for Peace Research in connection with the research project "Religion and Civil War: On the Ambivalence of Religious Factors in Sub-Saharan Africa." The authors are also indebted to Peter Körner and Jessica Haase for their indispensable support with coding, as well as to Håvard Hegre for his useful comments.

<sup>2</sup> If not indicated otherwise, "Africa" denotes the 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa.

confined to Somalia or Uganda. In Nigeria, bloody clashes between Muslims and Christians have claimed hundreds if not thousands of victims over the last two years. Armed conflicts<sup>3</sup> in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan are also connected to religion. While in these cases religion apparently plays an important role, quantitative research on conflict has failed to find evidence for a significant causal influence of religious factors in Africa and elsewhere (e.g. Dixon 2009; Hegre/Sambanis 2006).

Given this gap, it seems useful to take a closer look at the role of religion in conflict in the region. We have developed a new database on religion in sub-Saharan Africa (RSSA) that provides the basis for a more in-depth and systematic analysis and investigates how and to what extent religion is connected to violence in Africa.

The paper proceeds as follows: First, we review the literature and show that research on the religion–conflict link suffers from a range of problems, particularly the lack of comprehensive studies on Africa and, closely related to that, a lack of adequate data. We then present the logic of our database, including methodological aspects. A systematic description of how and to what extent religion is connected to conflict or peace in different dimensions (e.g. identities, ideas, organizations, behavior) constitutes the main part of the contribution. The paper demonstrates that religion matters for conflict (in Africa) and that many more countries are affected than previously detected. Religion and armed conflict or other types of violence are connected at different levels in many countries, particularly through warring factors varying by religious affiliation, religious incompatibilities, armed religious groups and events of religious violence. Religion is also frequently connected to peace, a finding exemplified by religious peace initiatives and inter-religious networks. The final section summarizes the findings and draws conclusions for policy and future research.

## 2 Literature Review

Over the last decade, there has been growing interest in research on the religion–conflict link (e.g. Huntington 1996; Juergensmeyer 2008). Today, the “ambivalence of the sacred” has been widely accepted: religion may not only incite violence but also contribute to peace (Appleby 2000; Philpott 2007). Ambivalence also refers to the scope of impact. Sometimes religion may count more; in other circumstances, it may count less. It seems plausible that the ambivalence of religion depends on context (Basedau/De Juan 2008). Under certain religious and non-religious conditions, religion spurs conflict or fosters peace—or differs in regards to how much religion counts. Finally, it appears useful to consider different religious dimensions. “Religion” is a complex phenomenon that is difficult to define precisely (as argued by, for instance, Ter Haar 2005). We do not intend to solve this problem once and for all; we believe

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<sup>3</sup> According to UCDP/PRIO, armed conflict is a “contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” If not indicated otherwise, “conflict” refers to armed conflict.

that for analysis in *social sciences* it is useful to distinguish between different dimensions of religion (Basedau 2009; Harpviken/Røislien 2008). There are different ways to typologize these dimensions (or “factors,” as we prefer to say), but religion is not, as often intuitively thought, solely about religious ideas (and their respective discourses): therefore we will also include religious identity structures (e.g. demographic constellations), religious organizations (e.g. churches, networks) and related behavior of religious actors into our coding.<sup>4</sup>

## 2.1 Systematic-Descriptive Approaches

The relevance of religion for conflict can be demonstrated in two different ways. The first way can be labeled systematic-descriptive. Systematic-descriptive means that the relevance is not demonstrated through evidence of causal relationships between variables but rather through the systematic identification of phenomena which in themselves demonstrate a connection. For this purpose, it makes sense to make use of various religious dimensions (e.g. Harpviken/Røislien 2008).

As mentioned above, religious variables cut into several dimensions and operate at different levels. If conflict parties or warring factions differ by religious affiliation, this indicates relevance of religion in the identity dimension. In contrast, a common religious identity cross-cutting the differences between warring factions may be a resource for peace-building efforts. Religion is important for conflict in the ideological dimension, when religious ideas such as the introduction of religious laws or the domination of a particular religion in a given society are disputed among varying societal forces. Furthermore, conflict parties or religious actors can legitimize violence or peace with reference to religious ideas such as values and norms. The existence of armed groups with religious goals or inter-religious networks indicates the relevance of religion in the organizational dimension. Finally, the behavioral dimension includes certain forms of violence that can indicate the relevance of religion in conflict. Such events are attacks on clergymen or places of worship. In contrast, calls for peace or more pronounced activities such as peace initiatives or mediation approaches by religious actors can show their engagement for peace.

Regarding empirical studies so far, none has captured all these (or possible further) religious dimensions. In fact, variables connecting religion and peace are not included in comparative or quantitative empirical studies. In regard to the religion–conflict nexus, two studies in particular extend beyond the (common) identification of different religious identities of conflict parties. For the period 1989–2003, Svensson (2007) analyzes 218 conflict dyads worldwide and identifies those dyads with different religious identities in 68 cases (31.3%) and a religious component in the incompatibility of the conflict in 43 cases (19.8%). Such “religious” conflicts seem to occur at a below-average rate in Africa: Out of 87 African conflict

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<sup>4</sup> Please note that this paper conceptualizes religion in an abstract manner and does not primarily distinguish between different religious traditions like Christianity, Buddhism and Islam.



dyads, only 11 cases show divergent religious identities between the conflict factions (12.6%), and in 13 cases a religious component in the conflict incompatibility is present (14.9%). Of the 48 sub-Saharan African countries, 23 have experienced civil war. Approximately one-third of those 23 countries (seven) had a religious conflict dimension.<sup>5</sup> Another study captures the ideological and behavioral dimensions (Croissant et al. 2009). The study defines religious conflicts as a subtype of cultural conflicts. Verbal or active references to religious people or symbols in conflict-related events (e.g. assassination of a religious leader or a disputed visit to a temple by the head of government) indicate religious conflicts. Of all global conflicts from 1945 to 2007, 11% were religious; sub-Saharan Africa's percentage was no exception, standing also at 11%.

## 2.2 Causal Approaches

The second way to demonstrate the relevance of religion in conflict is to find theoretically plausible empirical evidence that religious variables and conflict are causally linked. The involved religious variables themselves—such as population-shares of religious communities—are not necessarily connected to violence. Theoretically, a number of hypotheses connect religious variables to conflict. Similar to ethnic and other social identities, diverse religious identities can result in escalating socio-psychological dynamics. Research demonstrates that people often privilege in-group members over out-group members (Seul 1999: 565; Stewart 2009). As a result, it becomes easier for (religious) elites to mobilize such identities for conflict (Fearon/Laitin 2000; Hasenclever/Rittberger 2003). Furthermore, religious identities are special: They are connected to certain religious ideas. Such religious ideas are shared values and norms legitimized by a transcendental source, and therefore they might hardly be subject to negotiation and compromise given their (accepted) supernatural origin. This can also entail a higher propensity towards violent behavior by religious actors: Non-believers and adherents to different religious traditions might be converted by force, especially if the religion in question claims universal validity. Furthermore, combatants might be motivated through specific religious rewards for participation in acts of violence (e.g. Toft 2007; Svensson 2007).

Empirically, there is no evidence that religious diversity as such increases the likelihood of conflict onset (e.g. Fearon/Laitin 2003; Tusicisny 2004). Furthermore, studies show mixed or non-significant results for more specific religious demographic structures. The results are consistent neither for a strongly fractionalized religious structure, nor for a so-called “polarized” structure, in which two more-or-less large religious groups coexist (e.g. Montalvo/Reynal-Querol 2005; Fearon/Laitin 2003). However, some studies find positive evidence that conflicts that are fought along religious boundaries may display a higher intensity and may endure longer than other conflicts that are not fought along such lines (Horowitz 2009: 167–172;

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<sup>5</sup> Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mali, Sudan and Uganda.

Svensson 2007; Toft 2007; Pearce 2005; Ellingsen 2005). Contested religious ideas as possible causes of conflict have not been systematically tested.

The peace dimension of religion in conflict is empirically and theoretically underdeveloped. The majority of theoretical works identify religious peace norms as the only explanation of religious peace engagement (e.g. Gopin 2000; Butselaar 2005), neglecting material or institutional sources of religious communities and institutions of peace-building such as interreligious networks. So far, empirical studies on religion and peace have yielded limited results regarding the structure and impact of religious peace initiatives (e.g. Little 2007; Appleby 2001).

### 2.3 Africa-specific Approaches

The majority of studies on religion and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa are single case studies (Basedau/De Juan 2008: 6). Comprehensive studies on religion and conflict are virtually nonexistent. This comes as a surprise since religion has a high social relevance in Africa, and it has apparently increased in recent years (Pew 2010; Ellis/Ter Haar 2007; McCauley/Gyimah-Boadi 2009). Global descriptive studies, as discussed above, find (below-)average relevance of religious dimensions in African conflicts. Africa-specific databases are merely nonexistent. Large-N studies on the causal religion–conflict link in Africa find no evidence for a significant influence of religious diversity (Collier/Sambanis 2005; Elbadawi/Sambanis 2000). Instead, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) find that high ethnic and religious fractionalization decreases the likelihood of civil war onset in Africa. Haynes (2005) estimates that socioeconomic and political factors better explain civil war (onset) value than ethnic and religious fragmentation. Basedau and Vüllers (2010) find initial support for a mobilization hypothesis. In particular, the overlap of religious and ethnic boundaries apparently makes armed conflict more likely (see also Stewart 2009).

The religion–peace nexus in Africa remains even more neglected than the religion–conflict link. The bulk of studies only discusses specific religious peace initiatives and gives no explanation for their occurrence, and at best anecdotal evidence of their impact (e.g. Haynes 2009; Abu-Nimer/Kadayifci-Orellana 2008). However, in the majority of conflicts, religion seems indeed to have an ambivalent influence, both in recent years (Basedau/De Juan 2008: 17) and from a longer historical perspective (Møller 2006).

Summarizing the global and Africa-specific state of the art, three observations are striking: First, there is a contradiction between the findings of single-case studies and the results of quantitative and cross-regional studies. While religion generally plays at best a minor role in armed conflict, religion evidently impacts armed conflict and its dynamics in particular countries such as Nigeria and Somalia. Second, the data available for large-N studies is hugely limited. Commonly, studies only measure the influence of religion with demographical constellations. Only a few studies go further and consider religious incompatibilities or

general remnants on religious symbols. Third and finally, the religion–peace link remains under-researched both empirically and theoretically.

### 3 The Database on Religion in Sub-Saharan Africa (RSSA)

The primary goal of the database we have constructed as part of our research project “Religion and Civil War: On the Ambivalence of Religious Factors in Sub-Saharan Africa” is to fill at least one of the gaps identified in the previous section: to make data available that exceeds the kind of data commonly used in comparative and quantitative studies on the religion–conflict/peace link. The original contribution of the database<sup>6</sup> to the field consists of a compilation of some 30 religion-specific variables, which we believe are theoretically important. Following a multidimensional understanding of religion, we collected data referring to ideational, organizational, and identity dimensions and also noted the behavior of religious actors (for an overview of variables used in this paper, see Annex A1). Identity structures refer, for instance,<sup>7</sup> to the finding that in a given armed conflict, conflict parties significantly differ by religious affiliation. Ideational variables are religious incompatibilities in armed or other conflicts or the resorting to religious ideas in peace efforts. Organizational religious variables include the existence of armed religious groups or inter-religious networks. With regards to the behavioral dimension, we raised data concerning (principally peaceful) politicization, escalation and de-escalation by religious actors. We further coded for whether religious violence (e.g. clashes between different groups) occurred and asked whether religious actors incited violence, called for peace or even engaged in peace initiatives. If possible, we made use of existing data sources that are largely confined to religious demographics and the role of religion and the state (e.g. Fox 2004). For almost all religious variables presented in this paper, hence, we had to gather the data on our own.

The database covers the years 1990 to 2008 and includes all 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Data were coded by year and we have a maximum of 909 observations per variable.<sup>8</sup> Usually, variables were constructed either dichotomously or on nominal or ordinal scales. We were keen to maintain a uniform, consistent basis of sources in order to avoid distorted information. We used annual Africa Yearbook editions, Religious Freedom Reports and Human Rights Practices Country Reports (the latter two compiled by the U.S. State Department) as well as Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Reports published on a quarterly basis. The next section gives a systematic overview on our findings on religion and violence, taking a closer look at four dimensions: identity, ideas, organization and behavior.

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<sup>6</sup> In its extended form, the database also includes conflict data and non-religious independent variables (e.g. UCDP/PRIO; Hegre/Sambanis 2006).

<sup>7</sup> We do not explain and discuss particular variables at this point. Variables will be explained within the text as soon as it becomes important to do so.

<sup>8</sup> Eritrea became independent in 1993.

## 4 The Role of Religion in Violence<sup>9</sup>

In the following, we look at three ways religion can be connected to armed and other violent conflict. First, we examine the role of religion in armed conflict according to the definition by UCDP/PRIO, capturing both the identity and the theological dimensions. Second, we look at the existence of religious armed groups, whether they are part of an armed conflict or not. Finally, we look at behavior and investigate four types of violent events or acts in which the involvement of religion is evident and assess both its incidence and intensity.

### 4.1 Religion in Armed Conflict

When is an armed conflict a religious conflict? One possible answer (e.g. Svensson 2007) is that the parties in armed conflicts differ with regards to their religious identity, e.g. one party is primarily Christian while the opponent is primarily Muslim. Another kind of religious armed conflict is that contested religious ideas are an incompatibility between the warring factions.

#### *Warring factions differ by religious identity*

In the database, we tried to identify constellations of armed conflicts in which the conflict parties differed substantially according to their religious identities. According to the evidence in our sources, we decided whether the opponents of these differences were not (or hardly) present, partially present or mostly present. Such parallel religious and conflict boundaries exist in more than half of the countries with incidences of armed conflict between 1990 and 2008 (56% of countries and 47% of conflicts, see Table A3 in the Annex). Remarkable exceptions are notorious civil wars in Sierra Leone and Somalia, where religious identities have not separated the warring factions. In a cluster of ten country cases, violent conflict and religious boundaries do partially run parallel. In four cases, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Sudan, we find that the boundaries between conflict parties run mostly parallel. All four countries are civil war cases and it comes as little surprise that Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Sudan are notorious examples for such identity conflicts. Until the comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan in 2005, Muslim government forces fought the Christian and African traditional Southern rebels. Such a religious North–South divide is typical of many West African countries. In Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria, we find bloody conflict mostly between Christians and Muslims.

#### *Religious ideas as incompatibilities in armed conflict*

Religious ideas might be contested between the conflict parties. Such religious incompatibilities refer to the role of religion within the state (e.g. dominance of a particular religion) or the

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<sup>9</sup> If not indicated otherwise, all information in the following sections derives from the above-mentioned sources in the database.

introduction of religious laws.<sup>10</sup> In the great majority of cases, religious ideas are apparently not contested between the conflict factions. However, in 9 out of the 25 sub-Saharan countries with at least one incidence of armed conflict during the sample period (36% of countries, 20% of conflicts, see Table A3 in the Annex), we identify conflict episodes in which religious incompatibilities separated the conflict factions. Religious incompatibilities characterize armed conflicts mainly in central and northeastern Africa (Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, the DR Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, see Table 2).<sup>11</sup> In Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia, the (attempted) introduction of Islamic law, *sharia*, played a role in the onset of armed conflicts. For instance, the Ethiopian rebels of the *Ogaden National Liberation Front* called for a holy war against the overwhelmingly Christian-orthodox government, in order to liberate the Ogaden region and establish an Islamic state. In contrast, the attempt to re-establish a Bakongo state in the DRC was connected to the idea of an African-Christian kingdom. The case of the DRC also reminds us of the fact that conflicts with such religious incompatibilities form only part of a more complex conflict structure within these countries. Main conflict cleavages in the DRC are not connected to contested religious ideas.

#### 4.2 Where Do We Find Armed Religious Groups?

According to the database, armed religious groups are groups that are a) involved in violence (not necessarily an armed conflict in the UCDP/PRIO sense) and b) have self-declared religious goals (though not necessarily exclusively religious goals). The use of a religious term in the name of a given group is an insufficient indicator for an armed religious group.<sup>12</sup>

Altogether, we identified such groups (see Table A3 in the Annex) in more than 25% of all sub-Saharan countries (13 cases). Yet, important differences between these groups exist in terms of their level of activity and their origin. Sometimes these groups did not emerge from the countries in which they were active. In Tanzania and Kenya, Al-Qaida activities were mostly confined to the attacks on U.S. embassies in 1998. In the Sahel from Mauritania to Chad, Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique, the North African affiliate of Al-Qaida and former Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), has been active and clashed with

<sup>10</sup> Coding of contested religious ideas between the parties derives from the self-ascribed goals of conflict actors. Such an assessment does not include any statement as to whether these ideas were merely exploited by leaders or whether they result from truly religious convictions.

<sup>11</sup> In Chad, UCDP/PRIO does not specifically count a confrontation between an extremist group and government in 2008 (see below). We assign this to the larger conflict.

<sup>12</sup> For instance, we did not code the Malian rebel group Front Islamique Arabe de L'Azouad (FIAA) as an armed religious group because we could not find positive evidence of religious goals. We did not code the Mungiki Sect in Kenya as an armed religious group either because no pronounced religious goals could be detected. In essence, it is an ethnic secret society (Kagwanja 2003). In contrast, Uganda's LRA and ADF were coded as armed religious groups because some LRA and ADF leaders claimed religious goals in interviews (Farmar 2006; Hovil/Werker 2005).

security forces in Mauritania, Niger, Mali and Chad. Its origin is Algeria. The Ethiopian Al-Ittihad uses neighboring Somalia as a base for military operations. The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement operates from safe haven Sudan. Islamic armed groups with a (more) pronounced national basis are found in Chad, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan. In particular, the Somali Al-Shabaab has engaged in fierce battles with African Union peacekeepers and government militias. In 2010, Al-Shabaab declared its affiliation to Al-Qaida. Armed groups are not an Islamic monopoly. Besides the Christian Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, we can identify in Congo-Brazzaville the Mouvement Nsilulu, which was led by Pasteur Ntoumi and which fought against the regime of President Denis Sassou-Nguesso from 1998 until a peace accord was reached in 2003.

### 4.3 Types and Intensities of Religious Violence

The behavioral dimension of religion in conflict may be best captured through the prevalence of religious violence. We define religious violence as any violent event or act in which the involvement of religious actors or organizations is evident. According to the understanding of the database, there are four types of such events:<sup>13</sup> assaults on religious targets, violent attacks by religious actors against non-religious targets, violent clashes between religious communities and government security forces, and violent clashes between religious groups. The database codes both whether and how many such events occurred and also estimates how intense the events were in terms of fatalities. Numbers of fatalities were estimated according to the RSSA sources.<sup>14</sup> According to our understanding, the four types are disjoint. We coded any given event of religious violence only once, assigning this event to the main type of violence that occurred. For example, we counted clashes between religious communities exclusively as inter-religious clashes although security forces often intervene in these clashes in order to end the violence.

#### *Assaults on religious targets*

The first type includes assaults on religious targets such as clergymen, places of worship or other sacred objects. In the period under investigation, we observed 301 assaults in 43 countries, and a total of 3,493 fatalities in 28 countries. Six countries were especially violent and responsible for 3,168 of those deaths: In three countries, assaults resulted in more than 200 deaths in each Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire and the DRC, followed by Liberia and Somalia with more than 500 deaths each. Assaults on religious targets in Nigeria left more than 1,100 persons dead.

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<sup>13</sup> Mob justice against alleged "witches" is not counted as religious violence. We only coded violent events in which a minimum of political relevance is evident or religious groups were targeted as such.

<sup>14</sup> Sometimes, sources were imprecise ("some", "several") or inconsistent. We estimated an equal minimum coding for this verbal quotation. All numbers of fatalities are minimum estimates.

The causes for attacks on religious targets were numerous and they depend on the specific sociopolitical context of the country. In the majority of cases, assaults on religious targets were isolated incidents. For example, 43 Christian students died in a fire in the Kilimanjaro region (Tanzania). The perpetrators were unknown but there were rumors that Muslims were responsible for the fire. In Cameroon's capital Yaoundé, a dispute over a building area for a mosque resulted in three deaths. In Côte d'Ivoire, the presidential elections in 2000 were marred by massive religious violence. Churches and mosques were set afire, and in the suburbs of Abidjan a mass grave was discovered with the bodies of more than 50 Muslims inside who had apparently been murdered by government forces.

Furthermore, assaults on religious targets in countries with an ongoing armed conflict seem to follow a rational logic. In Liberia, believers and churches were repeatedly targeted by the warring factions. In 1990, 600 refugees were slaughtered after they had sought refuge in a church in Monrovia. A second example is the armed conflict in northern Uganda. The LRA targeted clerics, especially in 2003 and 2004 in northern Uganda, after the *Acholi Religious Leader's Peace Initiative* (ARLPI) had tried to persuade some senior LRA commanders to leave the rebel group.

### *Attacks by religious actors against non-religious targets*

A second type comprises assaults by religious actors<sup>15</sup> against secular targets. We observed 66 attacks in 18 countries, and 9,497 fatalities in 12 countries. It makes sense to distinguish these attacks by the level of organization of the perpetrators. Attacks by rather unorganized religious fundamentalists in Africa were less violent. For instance, Muslim extremists attacked pork butcheries in spring 1993 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In Guinea, an angry crowd of Muslims assaulted a police station after a local imam had been arrested in 1997. In neither case was anyone killed.

The number of fatalities has been much higher whenever organized armed groups have been involved. An exceptionally violent single event was the double attack against the U.S. embassies in Nairobi (Kenya; 253 fatalities) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania; 10 fatalities) in 1998 by Al-Qaida. Two armed religious groups in one country are responsible for the majority of fatalities for the whole period in Africa: the LRA and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Uganda. Over the years, their fight against the government resulted in at least 9,021 deaths in Uganda. Especially the LRA targeted the civil population in northern Uganda. The raids started after the failed peace negotiations in 1995 and continued until 2005. The LRA apparently followed its own rational logic in which attacks on civilians are necessary to recruit fighters through abduction (e.g. Bevan 2007). The Islamic ADF started its insurgency in western Uganda in 1996. Starting its raids in late 1997, the ADF attacked, for example, the

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<sup>15</sup> In this paper, the phrase "religious actors" denotes both individuals (e.g. clergymen, leaders of religious organizations) and collective actors such as (armed) religious groups.

Kichwamba Technical College in Kabarole district and killed 50 students in June 1998. Generally, the logic of the attacks resembles LRA tactics.

### *Clashes between religious communities and government security forces*

Confrontations between religious groups and government security forces form a third type. Between 1990 and 2008, this type of religious violence occurred in 18 countries (69 clashes, 882 deaths in 13 countries). Mainly, the clashes were isolated incidents. In Chad in 2008, for instance, Sheikh Ahmet Ismael Bichara had called for a holy war against the government (and to conquer Denmark). Subsequent clashes between security forces and the group resulted in almost 70 deaths. In Mauritania in 2008, violent clashes between Islamic groups and government security forces left 16 persons dead. Nine persons died in a confrontation between the police and *Takfir wa Hijra*, an extremist Islamic group, near Wad Medani in Sudan in 1996. Christians also clashed with security forces. In Ethiopia in 1993, the Orthodox community in Gondar protested against the incursions by Muslims and Protestants into this traditionally Orthodox region. Thirteen people died in the subsequent violence between the community and security forces.

Nigeria and the DRC show exceptionally high numbers of victims. In Nigeria, 14 clashes resulted in altogether 381 deaths. The majority of the clashes occurred due to the *sharia* debate. Other important events were the demonstrations of Muslims against the Mohammed cartoons in 2006. Subsequent fighting between Muslims and security forces claimed 130 fatalities. In the DRC in 2007 and 2008, clashes between supporters of the *Bundu dia Kongo* (BDK) and the police resulted in at least 195 deaths. Prior to the 2006 elections, relations between BDK and the police took a turn for the worse. Members of the BDK continued in 2007 to call for resistance against the “illegitimate state authorities.”

### *Clashes between religious groups*

The fourth type refers to “intercommunal” confrontations between different religious communities. We observed 90 clashes between religious groups in 23 countries, and a total of 5,915 fatalities in 15 countries. This type of religious violence covers inter-religious confrontations (e.g. Muslims vs. Christians) but also clashes within one denomination in which religious subgroups confront each other. However, most clashes occur between Christians and Muslims. One example is a clash in 2004 between Christians and Muslims in the southern Chadian town of Bebedja, which left 12 dead. Most clashes (19) and fatalities (5,706) occurred in Nigeria. Besides a few intracommunal clashes, the most violence occurred between Christian and Muslim ethnic groups in Nigeria’s Middle Belt and north, at least partially caused by the dispute over the introduction of *sharia*. Arguably, these intercommunal conflicts are about both economic and political incompatibilities. Clashes in Nigeria are often also about land rights and political representation. In the forest region of Guinea, a land dispute in 2000 resulted in a confrontation between Christians and Muslims leaving at least 30 people dead.



Similarly, clashes between religious subgroups occurred due to theological incompatibilities, economic rivalries or power struggles. In Guinea-Bissau, members of the mainstream Muslim communities and of the Ahmadiyya sect clashed in February 2005. The Muslim crowd beat and detained Ahmadiyya members. In Nigeria, some clashes within religious groups occurred. In 2005, for example, violent clashes between Shia and Sunni Muslim sects in Sokoto claimed the lives of seven people. Such violent power struggles also occur in Christian communities. For example, in Nairobi (Kenya) in 2000 fighting between factions of the Buru Buru Church of God resulted in numerous injuries.

**Table 1: Fatalities of Religious Violence in Africa, 1990–2008**

<i>Fatalities</i>	<i>Country</i>
>9000	Uganda
>7000	Nigeria
500–999	Liberia, Somalia
100–499	Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan
25–99	Eritrea, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Tanzania
1–24	Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Djibouti, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe
0	Cape Verde, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Seychelles, Togo

*Source:* Authors' compilation.

Table 1 shows the violence intensity according to cumulative fatalities of the four types of religious violence for the whole period of investigation.<sup>16</sup> Altogether, we could identify such events of religious violence in all but five countries from 1990 to 2008 (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Zambia), though frequency and intensity differ substantially. In two-thirds of the countries, either no fatalities occurred or violence resulted in less than 25 estimated deaths. Five cases show between an estimated 24 and 100 religion-related deaths while in seven countries religious violence claimed up to 499 lives. In Liberia and Somalia, religious violence claimed between 500 and 1000 lives. Uganda (9,057 fatalities) and Nigeria (7,370) show the highest intensity of religious violence. In Uganda, armed religious groups, the LRA and ADF, were responsible for the bloodshed, while the Nigerian death toll is mainly due to inter-religious clashes.

<sup>16</sup> Please note that fatalities in armed conflicts in which conflict factions differ according to religious identity or in which religious incompatibilities exist (such as in Sudan) are not automatically counted as religious violence. In any incident, the religious character has to be proven.

#### 4.4 Religion and Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Summary

Summing up our descriptive findings on the role of religion in armed conflict and religious violence, we find in at least 22 cases a substantial link between religion and violence (see Table 2). Furthermore, in 19 out of the 25 countries with an ongoing armed conflict in the sample period—i.e. in 40% of all sub-Saharan nations—we discovered one or more religious dimensions; in 50% of the armed conflicts, we found one or two religious dimensions (see Table 2, and Table A3 in the Annex). These results suggest that religion plays a more important role in armed conflict than previously assumed (Croissant et al. 2009; Svensson 2007).

Yet, the picture has to be differentiated. In only six cases are religion and conflict connected in all four dimensions (“identity,” “ideology,” “organization,” “behavior”): Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda. Congo-Brazzaville, the DRC and Somalia show three affected dimensions. Five countries—Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, Niger and Tanzania—have two dimensions. The remaining seven countries show just one of the factors. Remarkably, none of these eight cases (and none of the countries with two affected dimensions either) displays a finding in the ideological dimension. Positive findings at the ideological level usually coincide with problems at all levels.

In geographical terms, African regions differ. Seriously affected countries are mainly found in northeast and central Africa, partly in western Africa, but not in southern Africa. To a certain extent, religion playing a role in conflict is more likely in areas close to the Arab world, suggesting that the traditionally moderate African Islam has undergone a certain infection by Muslim extremists from the Arab world. We have no evidence, however, that a religion–conflict link is a purely Muslim phenomenon. Although little points to a strong connection between Pentecostal and evangelical Christianity and violence, we have detected a good share of events and phenomena in which (mainline) Christians are involved in violence, too. Interestingly, we have detected almost no link between African traditional religion (ATR) and organized conflict. Apparently, ATR is connected to ritual violence only at an individual level.

Looking at dynamics from 1990 to 2008, no very pronounced patterns for the whole region or single variables emerge (see Table A2 in the Annex). In particular, we could not detect any evidence that suggests a sharp rise in religious violence since September 11, 2001. Diverging religious-identity boundaries and incompatibilities in conflict have remained roughly stable, at least since the late 1990s. Since 2006 there has been a rise in the severity of the activities of armed religious groups in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Otherwise, fatalities in religious violence, as detailed above, result mainly from “religion-flavored” rebel group activity in Nigeria and Uganda. No substantial evidence has emerged showing that Africa will be the future battleground of a clash between Christian and Muslim civilizations. Though inter-religious confrontations occur overwhelmingly between these two groups, the number of these confrontations did not increase until 2008. Increased bloodshed after 2008 is again due to events in a particular country (Nigeria).

**Table 2: Religious Dimensions of Armed Conflict and Violence in Africa, 1990–2008**

<i>Country/Dimension</i>	<i>Identity<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Ideology<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Organization<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>Behavior<sup>d</sup></i>
	Conflict parties differ by religion	Religious in-compatibility in conflict	Armed religious groups	High intensity of religious violence
Chad	X	X	X	X
Eritrea	X	X	X	X
Ethiopia	X	X	X	X
Nigeria	X	X	X	X
Sudan	X	X	X	X
Uganda	X	X	X	X
Congo-Brazzaville	X	X	X	
DR Congo	X	X		X
Somalia		X	X	X
Côte d'Ivoire	X			X
Kenya			X	X
Liberia	X			X
Niger			X	X
Tanzania			X	X
Angola	X			
Burundi				X
Central African Republic	X			
Guinea				X
Lesotho	X			
Mali			X	
Mauritania			X	
Senegal	X			
Total (rounded % Africa)	14 cases (29%)	9 cases (19%)	13 cases (27%)	15 cases (31%)

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Conflict parties in armed conflict differ by religious affiliation.

<sup>b</sup> Religious ideas as incompatibility in armed/violent conflict.

<sup>c</sup> Existence/activity of armed religious group.

<sup>d</sup> At least 25 deaths in incidents of religious violence (see Table 1).

Source: Authors' compilation

## 5 Religion and Peace

As already discussed at the beginning of the paper, religion may not only bring war but also peace (Smock 2006). The following section will look at two pertinent phenomena in which religion is clearly connected to peace.

## 5.1 Inter-Religious Networks

The database defines a religious network as an institution that refers to a more-or-less institutionalized cooperation of different religious communities (e.g. Christians and Muslims<sup>17</sup>). Cooperation includes at least (more-or-less regular) meetings for dialogue but can also include more sophisticated activities. The database captures their sheer existence but also probes for the degree of institutionalization (informal/formal) as well as its regional coverage (local/regional vs. national). Instances of regional and informal networks are relatively rare. In the Central African Republic, for example, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) was the driving force behind an informal inter-religious network (2000–2005). The CCJP co-conducted educational and developmental programs with other religious groups throughout the country. Mostly, however, inter-religious networks have a rather formal and national character. Commonly, the major religious communities in the countries participated in these networks (e.g. in Rwanda and Liberia). The activities of the inter-religious networks were often limited to common prayer ceremonies and talks between the religious leaders (e.g. Tanzania). Contrarily, some inter-religious networks were also very active in civil society and in politics (e.g. in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya). The Inter-Religious Council in Sierra Leone, for example, supported anti-corruption campaigns from civil society groups and supported reconciliation and rehabilitation efforts in the peace process after the end of the civil war in 2000.

Looking at the whole period from 1990 to 2008, we found such inter-religious networks in more than 75% of all cases. Their number has been constantly on the increase since 1990 (see Table A2 in the Annex). However, there is little initial evidence that inter-religious networks contribute to substantially avoiding armed conflict. In more than half of all cases where inter-religious networks operated, conflict also occurred (see Table 3).

## 5.2 Religious Peace Initiatives

Inter-religious networks must not be equated with (religious) peace initiatives. Peace initiatives differ as they necessarily aim to maintain or promote peace. The database defines a religious peace initiative as an enterprise by religious actors that aims to promote peace and exceeds a singular call for peace. Examples are mediations, education of local peace-promoters or lobbying for awareness of the conflict on national and international levels. A peace initiative should be explicitly (and mainly) established in order to maintain or promote peace. The promotion of peace is the main *raison d'être*. For example, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative was very active in the peace process in northern Uganda: it educated local peace-promoters and lobbied on the national and international levels for a conflict set-

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<sup>17</sup> If one religious community comprises more than 90% of the population, we also code networks as “inter-religious” in which different denominations below that level (e.g. different Muslim brotherhoods or Christian churches) are included.

tlement. A successful religious peace initiative was the People-to-People Peace Process of the New Sudanese Council of Churches. The peace initiative organized several local conferences between the warring ethnic factions in Southern Sudan.<sup>18</sup> In addition, we coded for whether or not the participation of religious actors was connected to the success of the peace initiative—that is, whether or not the armed conflict in question was settled afterwards, in the period of investigation.

**Table 3: Inter-Religious Networks and Religious Peace Initiatives in Africa, 1990–2008**

<i>Violent Conflict<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Existence of inter-religious networks and degree of institutionalization</i>		
	<i>No Networks</i>	<i>Informal Networks</i>	<i>Formal Networks</i>
Yes	Burundi Comoros Guinea-Bissau Somalia Togo	Central African Republic (s) Chad	Angola Congo- Brazzaville Côte d'Ivoire DR Congo Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Guinea Kenya Lesotho Liberia* Mali* Mozambique* Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Sierra Leone Sudan* Tanzania Uganda*
No	Burkina Faso Cameroon Cape Verde Mauritania São Tomé and Príncipe Seychelles	Benin Botswana Equatorial Guinea Gabon	Gambia Ghana Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Namibia South Africa Swaziland Zambia Zimbabwe

*Notes:* <sup>a</sup> Violent conflict denotes at least one active armed conflict (UCDP/PRIO) and/or religious violence which resulted in at least 25 deaths (see Table 1) in a given year. / Bold letters indicate a religious peace initiative. Cases of successful conflict settlement are marked by an asterisk (\*).

*Source:* Authors' compilation.

<sup>18</sup> The database also codes minor forms of religious peace initiatives if religious actors participate in a peace initiative founded by or mainly comprising secular actors.

Table 3 shows that such peace initiatives can be identified in 18 countries. It is no surprise that peace initiatives frequently coincide with armed conflict. Only in Kenya and Tanzania are religious peace initiatives present without armed conflict in the sense that UCDP/PRIO define it. However, in both cases, religious (and ethnic) violence occurred, as we have shown above. In more than half of all conflict cases, religious actors participated in peace efforts, suggesting that religious peace initiatives are a reaction to violence rather than proactive prophylaxis. However, we have little evidence that these peace initiatives are particularly successful. In only five countries did conflicts end after the peace initiatives were established (Central African Republic, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan and Uganda). The most well-known instance is certainly the settlement of the civil war in Mozambique. The Catholic laymen organization Sant'Egidio brokered the peace agreement in 1992 (Haynes 2009). Although the relative contribution of Sant'Egidio to ending the war in general remains subject to speculation, a substantial impact is likely in this case.

### 5.3 Calls for Peace and Violence

Religious peace efforts do not necessarily take the form of institutionalized efforts such as inter-religious networks and religious peace initiatives. We thus asked whether any religious actor issued at least a single call for peace. In order to get a full picture, we also captured the “dark side” of religion by asking for any evidence of calls for violence by religious actors and institutions. A religious actor had to at least legitimize violence in order to be coded.

The findings are grouped in a matrix in Table 4 and confirm the “ambivalence of the sacred” — although this does not suggest that the calls had a substantial impact. In just eight cases do we find neither pro-peace nor pro-violence verbal statements. In 15 cases, both escalation and de-escalation are present. In the Comoros and Eritrea, no calls for peace but rather calls for violence were identified. The cases showing exclusively pro-peace statements are much more frequent: Calls for peace but no escalating statements form the biggest group by far with 23 cases. Both forms of statements have increased since 1990 (see Table A3 in the Annex).

## 6 Conclusion

Despite the many religiously diverse societies south of the Sahara and the religious overtones in a number of African conflicts, little systematic research has been done on the religion–conflict nexus in Africa. Most global quantitative studies limit analysis to demographic variables. Systematic studies on Africa are completely absent. In-depth case studies focus on a limited number of countries. The question that thus remains is how and to what extent religion is connected to conflict or peace in Africa. This paper contributed to filling the gap by presenting the results of a new data inventory of all sub-Saharan countries for the period 1990–2008. The paper demonstrates that religion matters for conflict (in Africa) and that far more countries are affected than previously detected. Religion and armed conflict or other types of vio-

lence are connected at different levels in many countries, particularly through warring factors varying by religious affiliation, religious incompatibilities, armed religious groups and events of religious violence. Religion is also frequently connected to peace, a finding exemplified by religious peace initiatives and inter-religious networks. The results demonstrate not only the general relevance, ambivalence and multidimensionality of religion in Africa but also the marked differences between countries. Twelve countries are particularly prone to religious violence, while more than half of the countries are not really affected by any religious dimension of violent conflict.

**Table 4: Verbal Escalation and De-Escalation by Religious Actors in Africa, 1990–2008**

Verbal de-escalation by religious actors <sup>a</sup>	Verbal escalation by religious actors <sup>b</sup>	
	Yes	No
Yes	Chad Congo-Brazzaville DR Congo Ghana Guinea Kenya Mauritania Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Somalia Sudan Tanzania Uganda	Angola Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Republic Côte d'Ivoire Ethiopia Guinea-Bissau Lesotho Liberia Malawi Mali Mauritius Mozambique São Tomé and Príncipe Seychelles Sierra Leone South Africa Togo Zambia Zimbabwe
No	Comoros Eritrea	Botswana Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Gabon Gambia Madagascar Namibia Swaziland
Total	17	31

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Coded positive if national religious actors or institutions make calls for peace.

<sup>b</sup> Coded positive if religious actors or institutions degraded (adherents of) other beliefs or non-believers, legitimized or incited violence, or engaged actively in violence.

Source: Authors' compilation.

Any policy recommendation thus must primarily refer to the country level (or below) where case-specific conditions have to be taken into account. This is not to say that we have not detected more general patterns. In particular, contagion of the sub-Saharan area by Muslim extremism should be closely watched in the future. Though evidence for a “clash of Christian and Muslim civilizations” is fairly limited, according to our findings (and beyond), the potential for escalation clearly exists.

However, any impact on violence by religious factors will most likely also depend on the general, non-religious context; knowledge on these conditions remains deficient. Thus, in general, many challenges for future research persist. Although even a preliminary causal analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, this database will certainly be useful for causal analysis, as already partly demonstrated (see Basedau/Vüllers 2010). There is a multitude of research questions and methodologies such as logit regressions or configurational methods or comparative case studies that can make use of the database presented in this paper. It might be also very fruitful to expand the database regarding both the coverage of time and geography (e.g. other regions, subnational georeferencing). In any case, it would be particularly promising to have a close look at the micro level in order to really understand how religion may result in violence—or peace.



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## Annex

Table A1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Source</i>
Incidence of armed conflict	Incidence of intra-state conflict. Coded 1 in all years with at least one active conflict (> 25 battle deaths)	Harbom/Wallensteen 2009; Gleditsch et al. 2002
Assaults on religious communities and individuals (including symbols)	Equals 1 if at least one assault (e.g. destruction of churches or mosques) is reported in a given year, and 0 otherwise	RSSA
Fatalities in assaults on religious communities and individuals (including symbols)	Minimum number of fatalities	RSSA
Violent attacks by religious actors/ organizations against non-religious individuals, actors and property	Equals 1 if religious actors/organizations exerted violence against non-religious individuals, facilities, etc., and 0 otherwise.	RSSA
Fatalities in violent attacks by religious actors	Minimum number of fatalities	RSSA
Violent clashes between religious groups/communities and government security forces	Equals 1 if a violent clash between religious groups/communities and government security forces occurred in a given year, and 0 otherwise.	RSSA
Fatalities in violent clashes between religious groups/communities and security forces	Minimum number of fatalities	RSSA
Violent clashes between religious groups/communities	Equals 1 if a violent clash between religious groups/communities are reported for a given year, and 0 otherwise.	RSSA
Fatalities in clashes between religious groups/communities	Minimum number of fatalities	RSSA
Conflict parties differ by religion	Coded positively if conflict parties differ partially (=1) or largely (=2) by religious affiliation, and 0 otherwise.	RSSA
Religious ideas/ideologies as incompatibilities in conflict	Coded positive if religious ideas serve as an incompatibility in political conflict (=1) or armed/violent conflict (=2), and 0 otherwise; incompatibility means that the conflict parties differ about a religious idea (such as the role of religion in the state, religious laws, etc.)	RSSA
Existence of armed religious groups	Equals 1 if religious institutions have an armed wing or militias or if armed groups also have religious aims, and 0 otherwise.	RSSA
Existence of inter-religious networks and degree of institutionalization	Coded positive if inter-religious networks with an informal (=1) or formal (=2) character exist, and 0 otherwise.	RSSA
Peace initiatives by religious institutions	Coded positive if a "mono-religious" peace initiative (=1) or inter-religious peace initiative (=2) exists, and 0 otherwise.	RSSA

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Source</i>
Participation of religious actors/institutions in an attempted settlement of a violent conflict	Coded positive if religious actors participated passively (=1) or actively (=2) in the settlement of a violent conflict.	RSSA
Success of attempted settlement of a violent conflict	Coded 1 if attempt to settle a conflict is successful, i.e. there is a peace agreement and the conflict ends, and 0 otherwise.	RSSA
Verbal de-escalation by religious actors/institutions	Coded positively if religious actors made sporadic calls for peace (=1), consistent calls for peace or participated in a secular peace initiative (=2) or engaged actively in peace efforts (=3), and 0 otherwise.	RSSA
Verbal escalation by religious actors	Coded positively if religious actors degraded (adherents of) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- other beliefs/non-believers (=1),</li> <li>- legitimized violence (=2),</li> <li>- incited violence (=3),</li> <li>- actively engaged in violence (=4).</li> </ul>	RSSA

*Source:* Authors' compilation.

**Table A2: Cumulated Values of Variables per Annum, 1990–2008**

Variable/Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Incidence of armed conflict (UCDP/PRIO)	11	12	13	9	13	9	8	13	13	13	12	13	12	8	7	5	8	9	9
Assaults on religious targets	7	4	9	12	16	14	15	16	21	23	22	17	23	21	16	20	18	16	11
• Fatalities	607	1	18	5	91	33	653	70	207	71	252	64	178	26	1061	29	99	10	18
Violent attacks by religious actors against non-religious targets	1	2	1	4	5	2	2	3	6	6	4	3	4	5	2	5	5	3	3
• Fatalities	0	0	0	3	16	251	131	538	748	152	390	130	750	3001	3000	306	30	22	29
Violent clashes between religious groups and security forces	1	0	2	4	4	4	5	5	6	5	1	5	3	5	6	4	3	2	4
• Fatalities	0	0	0	13	28	0	123	21	43	12	0	10	14	8	56	8	124	138	284
Violent clashes between religious communities	1	3	3	5	3	3	3	5	4	8	9	4	6	7	8	7	3	4	4
• Fatalities	0	208	392	3	316	81	0	9	4	341	1775	780	325	130	1155	19	48	23	306
Conflict parties differ by religion (=1, 2)	19	19	19	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	21	21	21	21	21	21
Religious ideas/ideologies as incompatibility in armed/violent conflict (=2)	8	8	8	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Existence of armed religious groups	3	3	3	5	5	5	5	5	8	6	7	7	6	8	10	7	6	7	8
Existence of inter-religious networks (=1, 2)	9	9	10	11	12	11	11	14	14	22	25	26	29	31	34	35	36	34	34
Religious peace initiatives (=1, 2)	4	3	3	2	3	4	5	8	6	7	8	7	9	9	8	11	7	9	6
Participation of religious actors in attempted conflict settlement (=1, 2)	2	1	2	0	2	1	2	3	4	4	3	2	4	3	2	0	0	2	0
Verbal de-escalation by religious actors/institutions (=1, 2, 3)	10	6	8	10	11	8	9	13	10	14	13	20	15	17	20	24	19	13	17
Verbal escalation by religious actors (=1, 2, 3, 4)	2	2	5	5	6	5	4	4	9	7	6	9	11	7	9	7	7	7	8

Notes: If not indicated otherwise, data refer to the number of observed years with incidents of activity.

Source: Authors' compilation.

**Table A3: Religious Armed Conflict and Violence in Africa, 1990–2008**

Country	Incidence of intra-state armed conflict (UCDP/PRIO)	Parties in armed conflict differ by religious identity	Episodes of armed conflict with religious ideas as in-compatibility	Armed religious group	Fatalities of assaults on religious communities and individuals (including syn-bots)	Fatalities of violent attacks by religious actors/ organizations against non-religious individuals, actors and property	Fatalities of violent clashes between religious groups/ communities and government security forces	Fatalities of violent clashes between religious groups/ communities
Angola	Yes	Partially	No	No	3	0	0	0
Benin	No	n/a	n/a	No	0	0	0	2
Botswana	No	n/a	n/a	No	0	0	0	0
Burkina Faso	No	n/a	n/a	No	1	0	0	0
Burundi	Yes	No	No	No	293	0	0	0
Cameroon	No	n/a	n/a	No	8	0	0	0
Cape Verde	No	n/a	n/a	No	0	0	0	0
Central African Republic	Yes	Partially	No	No	7	0	0	0
Chad	Yes	Partially	Yes	Islamic Legion, GSPC, Sheikh Bichara	25	0	68	12
Comoros	Yes	No	No	No	0	0	0	0
Congo-Brazzaville	Yes	Mostly	Yes	Mouvement Nsilulu	2	5	0	0
Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	Mostly	No	No	279	0	0	0
DR Congo	Yes	Partially	Yes	No	274	3	209	0
Djibouti	Yes	No	No	No	3	0	0	0
Equatorial Guinea	No	n/a	n/a	No	0	0	0	0
Eritrea	Yes	Partially	Yes	Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Eretram (EIJM/EIS)	27	1	3	0
Ethiopia	Yes	Partially	Yes	ONLF, IFLO, Al-Ittihad al-Islami	11	33	91	61
Gabon	No	n/a	n/a	No	0	0	0	0
Gambia	No	n/a	n/a	No	0	0	0	0
Ghana	No	n/a	n/a	No	2	0	0	8
Guinea	Yes	No	No	No	0	0	0	32
Guinea-Bissau	Yes	No	No	No	0	0	0	0
Kenya	No	n/a	n/a	Al-Qaida	24	257	0	2
Lesotho	Yes	Partially	No	No	0	0	0	0
Liberia	Yes	Partially	No	No	619	0	0	19
Madagascar	No	n/a	n/a	No	2	0	0	0
Malawi	No	n/a	n/a	No	0	0	1	1
Mali	Yes	No	No	AQMI (GSPC)	3	4	9	9
Mauritania	No	n/a	n/a	AQMI (GSPC)	0	4	16	0
Mauritius	No	n/a	n/a	No	3	0	4	7
Mozambique	Yes	No	No	No	1	0	0	0
Namibia	No	n/a	n/a	No	0	0	0	0
Niger	Yes	No	No	AQMI (GSPC)	0	0	80	1
Nigeria	Yes	Mostly	Yes	Hisbah groups (sharia enforcement groups)	1183	100	381	5706
Rwanda	Yes	No	No	No	14	0	0	0
São Tomé and Príncipe	No	n/a	n/a	No	0	0	0	0
Senegal	Yes	Partially	No	No	0	6	8	0

<i>Country</i>	<i>Incidence of intra-state armed conflict (UCDP/PRIO)</i>	<i>Parties in armed conflict differ by religious identity</i>	<i>Episodes of armed conflict with religious ideas as incompatibility</i>	<i>Armed religious group</i>	<i>Fatalities of assaults on religious communities and individuals (including syn-bols)</i>	<i>Fatalities of violent attacks by religious actors/ organizations against non-religious individuals, actors and property</i>	<i>Fatalities of violent clashes between religious groups/ communities and government security forces</i>	<i>Fatalities of violent clashes between religious groups/ communities</i>
<b>Seychelles</b>	No	n/a	n/a	No	0	0	0	0
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	Yes	No	No	No	7	0	0	0
<b>Somalia</b>	Yes	No	Yes	Al-Ittihad al-Islami, UIC, Al-Shabaab, ARS, Jabhat al-Islam	520	53	0	0
<b>South Africa</b>	No	n/a	n/a	No	2	0	0	0
<b>Sudan</b>	Yes	Mostly	Yes	Government militia, JEM	80	0	9	44
<b>Swaziland</b>	No	n/a	n/a	No	0	0	0	2
<b>Tanzania</b>	No	n/a	n/a	Al-Qaida	75	10	0	0
<b>Togo</b>	Yes	n/a	n/a	No	0	0	0	0
<b>Uganda</b>	Yes	Partially	Yes	LRA, ADF	24	9021	3	9
<b>Zambia</b>	No	n/a	n/a	No	0	0	0	0
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	No	n/a	n/a	No	1	0	0	0

Source: Authors' compilation.



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