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Abstract. The probability that an agent takes a certain action or a certain event occurs depends often on the actions taken by some agents. If this probability depends not only on current actions but on the sum of all past actions, these stock-dependent risks imply an intertemporal effect. In the present paper, we analyse this problem using an example concerning the exploitation of a non-renewable, exhaustible common-pool resource. The paper discusses resource extraction policies under endogenous closure risks which depend on the accumulated stock of extracted resources. It turns out that the optimal time path of resource extractions requires a tax rate which surmounts both the no-risk and second-best tax which tackles the problem by a mere evaluation of the expected exhaustibility stock.

We wish to thank Kai Konrad for useful comments on a predecessor of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
1. Introduction

The probability that an agent takes a certain action or a certain event occurs depends often on the actions taken by some agents. If this probability depends not only on current actions but on the sum of all past actions, these stock-dependent risks imply an intertemporal effect. In the present paper, we analyse this problem using an example concerning the exploitation of a non-renewable, exhaustible common-pool resource. The paper discusses resource extraction policies under endogenous closure risks which depend on the accumulated stock of extracted resources. The notion of closure risks means that a certain resource may be no longer available although its physical stock was not completely extracted. Closure risks mirror two different, important phenomena which have not yet been considered in the literature in the context of stock dependency.

First, closure risks may originate from threshold effects. If a resource stock falls short of a certain level, this resource may have lost its quality and may have become useless for production and consumption. Alternatively, resource extraction may add to the stock of an environmental bad, and when this stock reaches a certain level, resource extraction has to be phased out completely in order to avoid an environmental disaster. The accumulation of greenhouse gases which is due to the production and burning of fossil fuels is an example. When the threshold is not known, we face a typical stock-dependent risk.

Second, closure risks may be due to potential political actions. Suppose for example that a certain common-pool resource in a foreign country is exploited by several domestic resource producers. In addition to exhaustibility, this resource may have an intrinsic value for the foreign country, and foreign policy makers may prohibit exploitation when a certain stock level is reached. When the level which implies policy intervention is not known, we face a typical stock-dependent risk as well.
In order to put our paper into the context of the literature on exhaustible resources and uncertainty, it should be emphasised that closure risks as modelled below are driven by the accumulated stock of already extracted resources. Without this stock externality, managing resource extractions under uncertainty would resemble the well-known standard problem of resource exploitation under the risk of expropriation [see, e.g., Long (1975)] and our paper would add nothing new to the literature. Additionally, we do not assume that the physical stock size is uncertain [see Gilbert (1976), Loury (1976)]. Hence, uncertainty applies only on the future availability of the resource. Compared to the famous problem of 'eating a cake of unknown size' [see, e.g., Kemp and Long (1980)], eating a piece of cake does not only imply a smaller cake in physical terms but also an increased risk that the cake will be stolen.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces our model and determines the (myopic) laissez-faire level of resource extractions. Section 3 contrasts this solution with the optimal time path and discusses the properties of an optimal tax scheme on resource extractions. Section 4 closes the paper with a summary of the main results and a discussion of possible extensions and alternative applications of our model.

2. The model

We assume that the economy needs a constant flow of materials $W^o$ for production. These materials may be provided by the resource under consideration and an alternative technology which does not employ resources (e.g. a recycling technology). Resource extraction involves constant extraction costs $q$. The total resource stock is given by $Q_0$. We assume that the risks that the resource is closed depends on past extraction policies. The accumulated stock of extracted resources is
denoted by $S$ and the probability of closure is given by the continuous probability function $P(S)$ with

$$P(0) = 0, \quad P(\Omega_0) \leq 1 \quad \text{and} \quad dP(S)/dS = p(s) \geq 0,$$

where $p(S)$ is the corresponding density function. (1) indicates that the closure probability, i.e. the probability that resources do not provide materials any longer, depends on the accumulated stock. It should be noted that (1) does not require that the closure probability equals unity if the resource limit $\Omega_0$ is reached. Instead, (1) may allow resource producers to use $\Omega_0$ completely if they are lucky. A specific probability function with $P(\Omega_0) < 1$ is:

$$P(S) = 1 - e^{-\pi S} \quad \text{with} \quad p(S) = \pi e^{-\pi S}. \quad (2)$$

In Section 3, this specific function will be used for deriving some conclusions which we cannot arrive at for the general case.

Alternative provision of materials is possible through a technology which does not use resources. This technology is assumed to have increasing marginal costs. For the sake of simplicity, we assume a quadratic cost function

$$C = \frac{\gamma}{2} (W^o - \dot{S})^2 \quad \text{with} \quad \gamma > 0 \quad (3)$$

where $\dot{S}$, the first derivative of the stock $S$ with respect to time, indicates resource extraction. We further assume that the number of resource producers is sufficiently large such that each individual producer does not take into account the risk-increasing effects as well as the resource depleting effects of his policy. The producers may even know that their production increases the closure risk and deplete the common-pool resource. But any individual denial on resource extractions merely generates strong positive externalities for the other producing firms. Thus, the individual benefits of reducing exploitation fell extremely short of the
corresponding individual costs. Consequently, a sufficiently large number of unregulated individual producers neglects exhaustibility constraints and closure risks. Then, perfect competition makes resource producers charge $q$ and resource users balance marginal costs of employing the alternative technology with the pure extraction costs $q$, $q < \gamma W^o$. Consequently, resource extractions $\dot{S}(t)$ are constant over time until the resource is closed or is completely exploited:

$$\dot{S}_m(t) = W^o - \frac{q}{\gamma} = \text{const.}$$

(4)

This solution, however, cannot be optimal not only because it neglects the exhaustibility constraint but also because it does not take into account the closure risks.

3. Optimising resource extraction

In the following subsection 3.1 we derive the conditions for an optimal solution in the presence of stock-dependent closure risks. However, in the general case, interpreting these conditions turned out to be extremely difficult. In subsections 3.2 and 3.3 we therefore provide two additional solutions which relate a) to the well-understood case of no risks and b) to a simplified second-best policy which relies on evaluating an 'expected closure stock'. These two additional solutions are then used as point of reference for analysing the behaviour of the optimal time path.

3.1 The case of stock-dependent risks

We assume that the regulating authority is risk-neutral and minimises the expected costs of providing materials. Additionally, we assume that future costs and benefits are discounted by a constant non-zero discount rate $r$. Since the alternative technology does not stand at risk, we can adopt the dual problem of maximising the expected profits of resource exploitation. Thus, using the definition
\[ F(\dot{S}, S, t) = e^{-rt}[1 - P(S(t))] \left[ \frac{\gamma}{2} W^o - \gamma (W^o - \dot{S}(t))^2 - q\dot{S}(t) \right]. \]

the socially optimal time path of resource extractions is given by the solution of the following maximisation problem:

\[
\max\limits_{\dot{S}(t), t^*} \int_0^{T^*} F(\dot{S}, S, t) \, dt \quad \text{s.t.: } S(0) = 0, \, S(T^*) = Q_0, \, P(0) = 0 \text{ and } P(Q_0) \leq 1. \tag{5}
\]

The corresponding Euler equation yields:

\[
\ddot{S}(t) = W^o - \frac{q}{\gamma} + \frac{\dot{S}(t)}{r} - \frac{p(S(t))}{2r[1 - P(S(t))]\dot{S}(t)^2}. \tag{6}
\]

Unfortunately, equation (6) does not generally fulfil the second-order-conditions because the second derivative of the integrand with respect to the stock, i.e. \( F_{SS} = -e^{-rt} \frac{dp}{dS}\left[W^o - \frac{1}{2}(W^o - q\dot{S}(t))^2 - q\dot{S}(t)\right] \), is only negative if \( dp/dS \) is positive. A negative \( dp/dS \), however, is a necessary condition which is not sufficient to guarantee the concavity condition of an always positive \( F_{SS}F_{SS} - F_{SS}^2 \). This is no minor requirement because it rules out many well-known density functions which exhibit a descending branch in the relevant range of stocks between 0 and \( Q_0 \) like, e.g., the normal distribution with a density function's maximum below \( Q_0 \).

However, the second derivative of the integrand with respect to resource extractions, i.e. \( F_{SS} = -e^{-rt}[1 - P(S(t))]\gamma \), is clearly non-positive and ensures that (6) meets the Legendre condition for local concavity [see, e.g., Chiang (1992)]. Hence, (6) turns out to represent at least a locally optimal plan, and we assume that it is the only locally optimal plan and therefore the globally optimal plan as well. Moreover, we can prove that the myopic path does not represent a local optimum since any marginal restriction on resource extractions shows up to improve on the myopic

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\(^1\) Compared to the Hamiltonian approach, the Euler equation turned out to be more suitable for the problem at hand.
outcome (the corresponding proof is available upon request). The remaining set of conceivable solutions, i.e. zero extractions and extractions which are \( W^0 \), can be disregarded for obvious reasons. This line of reasoning holds also for the specific probability function (2) because of \( dp/dS = -\pi^2 e^{-\pi S} < 0 \).

The differential equation (6) is not very convenient since the term which contains \( p(S(t)) \) prevents to solve it explicitly. This term signals that present resource extractions deteriorate the risks of future extraction options. A free \( T^* \) and a fixed closure stock induce the transversality condition that all expected opportunities should be exploited at time \( T^* \) which can be satisfied only by the condition \( \dot{S}(T^*) = 0 \). Hence, the optimal time path of resource extractions approaches zero when the resource will be completely exploited.

3.2 The case of no risk

Now suppose alternatively that risks are absent and consider regulation policies which aims at exploiting the limited common-pool resource efficiently. This assumption lets the risk term in (6) vanish:

\[
\dot{S}(t) = W^0 - (q/\gamma) + (\dot{S}(t)/r).
\]

Condition \( (6') \) represents a solvable second-order inhomogenous differential equation which has the following solution (note that \( 1 - e^{rt} \) is unambiguously negative):

\[
S(t) = [1 - e^{rt}] \left[ W^0 - \frac{q}{\gamma} \right] e^{-rT} + \left[ W^0 - \frac{q}{\gamma} \right] t.
\]

Differentiating (7) with respect to \( t \) provides the time path of resource extractions, \( \dot{S}(t) \), and its curvature:

\[
\dot{S}(t) = [1 - e^{r(t-T)}] [W^0 - (q/\gamma)] > 0,
\]
Comparing the unregulated path (4) with (8a) reveals that the latter path implies lower extractions at every moment of time. Thus, (8a) takes into account the resource-depleting effect but assumes that closure risks are absent for every level of accumulated stocks. Moreover, as can be seen from (8b) and (8c), the first and second derivatives with respect to time are negative. The description of the no-risk path is completed by equalising $S(T)$ and $\Omega_0$ according to (7).

### 3.3 The case of an expected closure stock

Now suppose that the regulating agency pursues a simplified second-best policy by evaluating an 'expected closure stock'. The line of reasoning goes as follows: The regulating agency knows that resource extractions add to the risks that the resource will be closed. Hence, it knows that resource producers are likely to face a stop of extraction policies before the resource is depleted in physical terms. The second-best policy determines the initially expected closure stock,

$$\hat{\Omega}(0) = \int_0^{\Omega_0} [1 - p(S)] SdS,$$

and introduces a policy which ensures that resource extractions are zero when the expected closure stock is reached. The second-best path is given by the solution of the maximisation problem:

---

2 In order to avoid confusion with time derivatives, the different paths are not yet distinguished by additional scripts. The only exception is the end of the planning horizon: $T$ relates to the case of no risk, $T^*$ relates to the case of stock-dependent risks, and $\hat{T}$ relates to the above case of an expected closure stock.
Maximising the expected utility according to (10) is obviously only a second-best treatment of the problem at hand as it transforms the risk effect of accumulated stocks into physical terms: $\hat{\Omega}(0)$ gives the lower expected closure stock and resource extractions are phased out when $\hat{\Omega}(0)$ is reached although the probability that the resource is still open is positive. For example, using the specific probability function (2), the initially expected closure stock is given by $\hat{\Omega}(0) = \Omega_o - (1 - e^{\pi\Omega_o})$.

It should be stressed that (10) serves only as a reference case for comparison with the optimal solution. Especially, it should be noted that (10) involves dynamic inconsistency because the evaluation of the expected closure stock changes in the course of time, i.e. $\hat{\Omega}(t) > \hat{\Omega}(0)$ for $S(t) > 0$. Consequently, the above second-best policy relies on an open-loop assumption in that policies depend only on time and neglect feedback effects.

The Euler equation which solves (10) is identical with condition (6') derived in the last subsection. As the resource stock is not exploited completely in physical terms, however, the determination of $\hat{T}$ changes the resulting time path compared to the case of no risk. In particular, for $\hat{\Omega}(0) \leq \Omega_o$ the following relationship holds:

$$S(\hat{T}) = \left[1 - e^{r\hat{T}}\right]W^o - \frac{q}{\gamma}e^{-rT} + \left[W^o - \frac{q}{\gamma}\right]\hat{T} = \hat{\Omega}(0) \iff \hat{T} \leq T.$$  

Differentiating (8a) to (8c) with respect to $T$ reveals that a lower $T$ which is due to a lower $\Omega_o$ decreases extractions and makes the slope of the extraction path more declining and more concave (see Figure 1):

$$\frac{\partial \hat{S}(t)}{\partial T} = T e^{r(t-T)}\left[W^o - (q/\gamma)\right] > 0, \quad (12a)$$

$$\frac{\partial \bar{S}(t)}{\partial T} = r T e^{r(T-t)}\left[W^o - (q/\gamma)\right] > 0, \quad (12b)$$
3.4 Analysing the behaviour of the optimal time path

In this subsection, the no-risk path and the second best path will serve as reference cases for analysing the behaviour of the optimal path. First, assume that the optimal path intersects both the no-risk and the second-best path. Let the optimal path variables be denoted by a star and both the no-risk and the second-best variables use no scripts. Intersection of these paths means equalising (6) and (6') which yields:

\[
\ddot{S}^* = \ddot{S} + \frac{p(S^*)}{2r[1-p(S^*)]}S^{*2} > \ddot{S}.
\] (13)

Condition (13) reveals that the first derivative of the optimal path, $\ddot{S}^*$, exceeds the first derivative of both the no-risk and the second-best path at the point of intersection. This condition, however, assumes intersection but does not prove it. Compara-

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3 Remember that both the no-risk and the second-best path satisfy condition (6').
ing the optimal path and the no-risk path, an easy line of reasoning proves the existence of an intersection: In both cases, the resource is planned to be exploited completely in physical terms. Thus, the area below the no-risk path and the optimal path must be of identical size. Moreover, as (6) and (6') differ, both paths must differ. An identical area and different paths, however, are only possible if both paths intersect. As intersection implies (13), the optimal path must intersect the no-risk path with a lower slope than the no-risk path as it is indicated in Figure 2:

\[ S(t) \]

\[ T \quad T^* \]

Figure 2. No-risk path and optimal path.

Figure 2 demonstrates that the optimal path must start below the no-risk path, that only one intersection is possible and that the optimal path plans to use the resource not shorter than the no-risk path. The start below and the unique intersection follow from (13), and the longer use follows from (13) together with the condition that the areas below both paths must be of equal size. In economic terms, the introduction of risks makes the regulating agency more reluctant with respect to resource extractions in the beginning because the negative intertemporal externality is taken into account.
The more patient the regulating agency is, i.e., the lower \( r \), the lower is the start level of extraction policies.

Figure 2, however, assumed a concave shape of the optimal path. This shape is an arbitrary assumption which cannot be justified on the basis of (6). Rearranging (6) and differentiating with respect to time gives

\[
\ddot{S} = \ddot{S} + \left[ r + \frac{P(S^*)\dot{S}}{1 - P(S^*)} \right] + \frac{\dot{S}^3}{2[1 - P(S^*)]^2} \left[ \frac{dp(S^*)}{dS} \right] + \left[ p(S^*) \right]^2
\]

(14)

the sign of which is undetermined due to the second term on the RHS. However, in the close neighbourhood of the terminal date \( T^* \), for which the transversality condition \( \dot{S}^*(T^*) = 0 \) holds, the second term on the RHS vanishes and (14) indicates that \( \ddot{S}^* \) has the same sign as \( \ddot{S} \). Consequently, the shape is either increasing and convex or decreasing and concave. Because the assumptions with respect to the probability function imply a steady and differentiable resource extraction path, it must be decreasing and concave in the close neighbourhood of \( T^* \), since an increasing, convex shape would conflict with \( \dot{S}^*(T^*) = 0 \). Moreover, an increasing, convex shape would imply a maximum and consequently \( \ddot{S}^* \times \dot{S}^* < 0 \) in its close neighbourhood. This, however, conflicts with the observation that \( \ddot{S}^* \) has the same sign as \( \ddot{S} \).

For the specific probability function (2), the decreasing, concave shape is guaranteed because \( \ddot{S}^* = \ddot{S}^* \left[ r + \pi \dot{S}^* \right] \) holds. In this case, the line of reasoning which proved the concave shape in the close neighbourhood of \( T^* \) applies on the whole optimal path. The shape of the path depicted in Figure 2 therefore relies on the specific probability function (2). In the general case, the shape may be either convex or concave except for the close neighbourhood of the terminal date \( T^* \).
Now, we turn to a comparison of the optimal path and the second-best path. We start by using the specific probability function (2) for which \( p(S)/[1 - P(S)] = \pi \) holds. As the area below the second-best path falls short of the area below the optimal path, either the optimal path lies above the second-best path or starts below the second-best path and intersects the second-best path once.\(^4\) Let the second-best variable be denoted by "\( \Lambda \)." If both paths intersect at time \( \tau \), the following condition holds:

\[
\dot{S}^* = \dot{S} + \frac{\pi}{2} \dot{S}^2 = \frac{\pi}{2} \left[ 1 - e^{r(t - \tilde{T})} \right]^2 \left[ W^o - \frac{q}{r} \right] - r e^{r(t - \tilde{T})} \left[ W^o - \frac{q}{r} \right] \tag{15}
\]

\[
= \left[ W^o - \frac{q}{r} \right] \left[ \frac{\pi}{2} \left[ 1 - 2e^{r(t - \tilde{T})} + e^{2r(t - \tilde{T})} \right] \right] \left[ W^o - \frac{q}{r} \right] - e^{r(t - \tilde{T})} \right].
\]

Condition (15) uses (8a) and (8b) with \( \tilde{T} \) substituted for \( T \). Integration of (15) gives resource extractions at \( \tau \) which - by assumption - must be equal for both paths:

\[
\dot{S}^* = \left[ W^o - \frac{q}{r} \right] \left[ \frac{\pi}{2} \left[ \tau - 2e^{r(t - \tilde{T})} + e^{2r(t - \tilde{T})} \right] \right] \left[ W^o - \frac{q}{r} \right] - e^{r(t - \tilde{T})} \right] = \dot{S}^*(\tau). \tag{16}
\]

Next, (16) can be rearranged and be written as an implicit function:

\[
\Phi(\tau, \pi) = \left[ W^o - \frac{q}{r} \right] \left[ \tau - 2e^{r(t - \tilde{T})} + e^{2r(t - \tilde{T})} \right] - \frac{2}{\pi} = 0 \tag{17a}
\]

\(^4\) If the second case holds, the line of reasoning which gives this result is quite similar to comparing the optimal path and the no-risk path. Additionally, \( \Omega_0 > \Omega(0) \) implies that the optimal path induces a later terminal date.
\[
\frac{\partial \Phi(\tau, \pi)}{\partial \tau} = \frac{\dot{S}^*(\tau)^2}{W^\omega - q} \frac{\pi}{2} > 0,
\]
(17b)

\[
\frac{\partial \Phi(\tau, \pi)}{\partial \pi} = \frac{2}{\pi^2} > 0,
\]
(17c)

\[
\Phi(0, \pi) = \left[ W^\omega - q \right]\frac{1}{2r} e^{-r \hat{T}} \left[ e^{-r \hat{T}} - 4 \right] \frac{2}{\pi} < 0.
\]
(17d)

Figure 3: No-risk path, second-best path and optimal path.

(17d) shows that \( \tau = 0 \) cannot solve the implicit function \( \Phi(\tau, \pi) \), and (17b) shows that \( \Phi(\tau, \pi) \) is increased by an increasing \( \tau \). This proves that the optimal path starts below the second-best path because a start above the second-best path would imply a negative \( \tau \) which contradicts \( \partial \Phi / \partial \tau > 0 \) and \( \Phi(0, \pi) < 0 \). As the optimal path aims at using the whole resource stock, a start below the second-best path further implies an intersection with this path for a positive \( \tau \). For a specific probability function like (2), all three paths are shown in Figure 3. Here, it should be noted that (17) implies \( d\tau / d\pi < 0 \), i.e. the higher the risk parameter \( \pi \) is, the earlier occurs the intersection between the optimal path the second-best path.

The above line of reasoning has used the specific probability function (2) for determining the relationship between the optimal path and the second-best path. Other or
more general probability functions, however, produce the same qualitative results if they satisfy the following condition (18), where \( \Pi(S) := p(S)/(1 - P(S)) \geq 0 \) denotes the probability term which is a constant \( \pi \) in the case of probability function (2):

\[
\frac{d\Pi(S)}{dS} = \frac{dp(S)}{dS} \left[1 - P(S)\right]dS + \left[\frac{p(S)}{1 - P(S)}\right]^2 \geq 0 \iff \frac{\left[p(S)\right]^2}{1 - P(S)} \geq \frac{dp(S)}{dS} \text{ for all } S \leq \Omega_0. \tag{18}
\]

Since \( \Phi(\tau, \pi) \) is still negative for \( \tau = 0 \) if \( \Pi(S) \) is substituted for \( \pi \), the optimal path starts always below the second-best path. Whether \( \frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial \tau} > 0 \) also holds, depends on (18) because the sign of

\[
\frac{\partial \Phi[\tau, \Pi(S(\tau))]}{\partial \tau} = \frac{\partial \Phi[\tau, \Pi]}{\partial \tau} + \frac{2}{\Pi(S(\tau))^2} \frac{\partial \Pi(S)}{\partial \tau} \frac{dS}{d\tau}
\]

depends on \( \partial \Pi(S) / dS \). If condition (18) holds, \( \partial \Phi[\tau, \Pi(S(\tau))] / \partial \tau \) is unambiguously positive. For all other cases, however, the sign of \( \partial \Phi[\tau, \Pi(S(\tau))] / \partial \tau \) is ambiguous.

Whether a higher closure risk lets the intersection date \( \tau \) be realised earlier, depends on (18), too. A higher risk is associated with an increased stock of accumulated resource extractions. If (18) holds, \( \left[\partial \Phi[\tau, \Pi(S)]/\partial \Pi(S)\right] \cdot \left[\partial \Pi(S)/dS\right] \geq 0 \) indicates that the same qualitative result is implied by the more general probability function under consideration.\(^5\) In any case, Figure 3 gives the relations between the different paths although the exact curvature of the optimal path is undetermined.

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\(^5\) Note that (18) does not make the optimal path concave in every case because a positive second RHS-term in (14) does not resolve ambiguity.
3.5 Implementing optimal resource extraction policies

Section 2 has assumed a sufficiently large number of resource producers who would not take into account the risk-increasing effect of resource extractions. The present section discusses how to charge resource extractions by a tax in order to cover both the exhaustibility rent and the risk-increasing externality. As a reference case, we start with the no-risk path. Suppose, the regulating authority introduces a tax on resource extractions the rate of which is given by \( \mu(t) \). In this case, profit maximisation by the resource producer to:

\[
\dot{S}_m(t) = W^\circ - q + \frac{\mu(t)}{\gamma}.
\]  

(4')

Equalising (4') and (8a) yields the tax rate for the no-risk case:

\[
\mu(t) = e^{r(t-T)}[\gamma W^\circ - q].
\]  

(19)

Analogously, the tax rate for the second-best case, \( \hat{\mu}(t) \), can be calculated as:

\[
\hat{\mu}(t) = e^{r(t-T)}[\gamma W^\circ - q].
\]  

(20)

Conditions (19) and (20) induce a progressive tax scheme because both paths imply overproportionally decreasing resource extractions. Moreover, the optimal tax in the case of stock-dependent risks is also a progressive one if probability function (2) holds, because (2) was shown to imply a concave resource extraction path.
Assuming a concave shape of the optimal time path of resource extractions, the corresponding tax rate, $\mu^*(t)$, follows a scheme which is shown in reference to the other taxes in Figure 4. Consequently, our model does not merely provide a rationale for taxing resource extraction with an increasing rate for a certain class of probability functions which satisfy condition (18). It also demonstrates that optimal policies may imply an even more rigid taxation scheme at the beginning of the time horizon if resource extractions do not only exploit an exhaustible resource but also increase the risks of closure as well. However, as the optimal path aims at using the resource longer than the other two paths, the tax falls short of the other taxes after the respective paths have intersected the optimal path.
4. Concluding remarks

In the present paper, we have analysed stock-dependent risks using an example concerning the optimal management of extractions of a non-renewable, exhaustible common-pool resource. The paper has demonstrated that a rationale for taxing resource extractions beyond charging pure exhaustibility rents exists when closure risks are endogenous in that they depend on the stock of extracted resources. It turned out that the optimal time path of resource extractions requires a tax rate which surmounts both the no-risk and second-best tax which tackles the problem by a mere evaluation of the expected closure stock.

Of course, the structure of our model can be used for analysing a large number of real world-problems which involve stock-dependent risks. For example, a firm's risk to be regulated may depend on the sum of its profits realised in the past. In this case, there is no restriction on profits such as a limited stock but increasing profits today implies a higher risk of being regulated for all future periods. Oligopolistic market structures initiated a differential game if potential regulation covered the whole industry because every individual firm's profits increase regulation risks for all firms in the industry. In any case, the firms can be expected to underexploit their market power compared to the no-risk case if regulation lowered their individual profits.

Obviously, stock-dependent risks result in changed activity patterns of agents who are endangered by these risks and who are able to reduce these risks. It may therefore pay for a regulating authority to build up a reputation which is materialised by the subjective probability beliefs of agents. In particular, a regulating authority has not to regulate all activities but to make potentially regulated agents believe both that regulation of activities will sometimes be introduced and that the chances to be regulated depend on the sum of all past activities which give rise to potential
regulation. Compared to regulation risks which depend only on current actions, the intertemporal link involves a more severe threat, and intertemporal reoptimisation leads to a more significant change of plans at the beginning of the planning horizon.

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