Cargo Cult in Africa
Remittances and the State in Tanzania

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines remittance and diaspora policy formation in Tanzania as cargo cult. Both migration-development policy formation and cargo cults express the belief in the miraculous transformation of the local by the arrival of wealth emanating from the outside. The paper is based on ethnographic research in Dar es Salaam, and adds to our understanding of the links between migration and development in Tanzania, and to our understanding of the relationship between remittances and the state, where the underlying cultural values, ideas and imaginaries expressed in remittance policies and thinking have been ignored.
INTRODUCTION

Within the past decades, political and economic reforms have changed the ways in which the Tanzanian government relates to its nationals residing outside the boundaries of the nation-state. During socialist Tanzania, international migration was restricted, and the relatively small number of Tanzanians that lived abroad were either not given much attention or seen as challenging the political and economic life of the nation-state. Today, government officials talk of the Tanzanian diaspora as a valued member of the Tanzanian nation, and as a vital source of human and financial capital that can spur economic growth and development. Tanzania is not alone in having turned its developmental gaze towards remittances and diasporas. International development institutions, researchers, donors and developing countries are also celebrating remittances and the transformative powers of diasporas. Latin-American, Caribbean and North-African countries have had remittance and diaspora policies for decades, and within the past few years an increasing number of sub-Saharan countries have also explored policy opportunities within the migration-development field. The celebration of remittances as the new magic bullet for development has been characterized as representing a mantra in the sense of expressing the strong belief among development institutions that remittances will succeed where traditional forms of development have failed (Kapur 2005).

In this paper I explore the phenomenon of remittances from the perspective of the Tanzanian state that has only recently joined the growing global celebration of remittances. Taking the characterization of the celebration of remittances as representing a mantra a step further, I argue that the Tanzanian state perceives and relates to remittances in ways that are quite similar to the various religious movements that developed across Melanesia in the 40s, 50s and 60s and came to be known as cargo cults. In short, during the Second World War, the arrival of American troops to Melanesia brought consumer goods and money to island communities that had hitherto largely been isolated from the outside world. With the end of the war, a number of religious movements engaging in particular rituals intended to bring back goods originally introduced by the Americans, developed across Melanesia. Cargo cults have been found in many different forms but are all characterized by people engaging in the miraculous transformation of local societies through the arrival of goods sent from the outside (Lindstrom 1993, 2004).

One version of cargo cult describes a situation where a prophet is sent a message that distant ancestors have promised to send planes or boats of cargo, most often western-produced goods such as tinned food, clothes, tools, vehicles and refrigerators (Lindstrom 1996: 85). However, the cargo is not arriving as whites have taken control of the ancestors (Lattas 1998: xi). Another variant describes the belief that ancestors are already sending goods but that these goods have been hijacked by westerners and therefore need to be reclaimed or lured back to their intended recipients. As such, one of the defining features of cargo cults is the belief that it is possible to bring back wealth and goods that have been hijacked by powerful outsiders.

Cargo cults are no longer as fashionable as they were decades ago but nevertheless continue to inform anthropological analysis. Within the past decade cargo cults have been identified outside their Melanesian origin and have also come to be associated more broadly with processes of modernization and societal transformation (Friedman 1994; Jebens 2004). For example, materialism during Ronald Reagan (Huizer 1992), the belief in UFOs in western societies (Wagner 2000), the quest for eco-
nomic recovery and development in post-war Germany (Kohl 2004), shopping and the quest for eternal love (Lindstrom 2004) have all been identified as representing western forms of cargo cults. In this sense, cargo cults represent a fundamental desire that is shared by all humans but take on diverse forms, all depending on time and location (Lindstrom 1993). Cargo cults are also highly debated within anthropology and there are those who believe that the concept should be discarded altogether, as it is more telling of anthropologists than of Melanesian realities and only represents a particular Melanesian form of orientalism (Lindstrom 1995).

It is the argument of this paper that the belief in remittances as a source of development and transformation displays a number of cargo cult characteristics. Most importantly, both remittances and cargo cults display the belief that the transformation of the local rests upon the arrival of wealth and goods that are produced, owned and sent by distant or non-present members of these local communities – be they Melanesian ancestors or members of the Tanzanian diaspora. Moreover, both remittance policy thinking and cargo cults emphasize technical solutions and communication when trying to attract or redirect cargo and wealth back to local communities. For example, cargo cults often tried to attract cargo by regimented walking and ritualistic dancing and by setting up imitated radio stations whereby they could talk to their ancestors. Similarly, it is the belief among policy makers in Tanzania that by reforming the banking sector, setting up special bank accounts and by making public appeals to the diaspora, remittances will increase and the diaspora will start to send back funds to support development projects in Tanzania.

Naturally, there are also important differences between the Tanzanian remittance cult and Melanesian cargo cults. Most importantly, the Tanzanian remittance cult represents the desire for money rather than goods. However, as remittances are interchangeable with all other goods they have become the most important object of desire (cf. Kohl 2004: 87). In taking cargo cult outside its Melanesian origin, there is a risk of seeing cargo cults everywhere and hence of draining the concept of its analytical value (Lindstrom 1993: 183). However, the similarities between remittance thinking and cargo cults are striking, and the analytical optics of cargo cults enables us to better understand the phenomenon of remittances as seen from the perspective of a third world country that is still waiting for cargo and development to arrive.

The aim of the paper is both to contribute to our knowledge on the links between migration and development in Tanzania and to expand our understanding of the relationship between remittances and the nation-state where research has mostly focused on how remittances may or may not generate economic growth, alleviate poverty, increase inequality and in overall affect the macro-economy of any particular country. In this sense, focus has been on what remittances do to nation-states rather than on the underlying cultural values, ideas and imaginaries expressed in remittance policies and thinking. The paper only examines migration-development thinking and policy formation from the perspective of mainland Tanzania and union government officials and politicians. The semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar has its own particular history of migration and its own complicated relationship with the Zanzibar diaspora that deserves its own analysis elsewhere. The paper is based on four months of fieldwork in Dar es Salaam in 2007.
MIGRATION, REMITTANCES AND THE DIASPORA IN TANZANIA

The emergence of remittances and the diaspora within the development field in Tanzania reflects global policy trends rather than local realities or knowledge on how transnational flows of people, goods and capital currently affect Tanzania. In fact, Tanzania is not characterized by a strong tradition for international migration and therefore has a relatively small diaspora estimated at around 200,000 people or around 0.5 percent of the entire Tanzanian population (World Bank 2006).1 On a regional scale, migration into and out of Tanzania is enabled by the East African Community that offers a political and economic framework for the mobility of labour between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (Adepoju 2008). The relatively small diaspora reflects that Tanzania is primarily an agricultural country that has mostly served as a country of immigration from other East-African countries and where out-migration has never been a well-established livelihood strategy. The small diaspora also reflects that Tanzania is and has been a peaceful country that has not generated any substantial outflow of refugees. Moreover, from the late 60s to the early 80s leaving Tanzania was seen as challenging the ideals of the socialist state and made difficult or outright impossible for the large majority of the population. Even migrating within socialist Tanzania was often impossible, as people were forced by the government to live in particular regions or villages as part of the overall development plans of the country.

Migration within Tanzania, particularly from rural to urban areas, has always been more pronounced than international migration. The process of urbanization started already in the 40s and 50s with the growth of urban administrative and commercial centres (Gould 1995; Sabot 1979). After independence in 1961, the patterns of urbanization established during colonialism continued. The state tried to counter urbanization by stimulating rural development and decentralizing public institutions. Moreover, the government establish growth centres in rural areas in the late 60s, and in 1972 a policy of building infrastructure, schools and health clinics in rural areas was adopted (Mbonile 1995). These anti-urbanization efforts intensified in the 80s (Mbonile 1996) but large urban areas, and in particular Dar es Salaam, continued to attract migrants in large numbers (Gould 1995). The structural adjustment programs of the 80s and 90s that led to the rollback of the state in economic affairs, retrenchment of civil servants and the privatization of state enterprises, increased the pace of urbanization (Mbonile 1995). Today, rural youths still move to town in order to get an education, look for employment, and get married, or simply to get away from the countryside where they are often forced by their relatives to work the family land (Karlsson 2008). Children and young people with HIV/AIDS also move to urban areas and look for employment in situations where their families are unable or unwilling to support them (Evans 2005).

The political and economic reforms of the 80s and 90s have made it easier for Tanzanians to leave the country, and for the diaspora to invest and in overall to engage itself in its homeland. Especially among Tanzania’s youth, the wish to live, study and work abroad is growing, but so far only a small proportion of the population has access to international migration. Only around three percent of the population has a passport, and general poverty prevents the large majority of the population from leaving the country. Today, it is mostly members of the political, intellectual and economic elites that benefit from a liberal Tanza-

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1 Major countries with Tanzanian migrants are Uganda, United Kingdom, Canada, Mozambique, Malawi, United States, Australia, Rwanda, Germany and the Netherlands (World Bank 2006).
nia, and enjoy increased access to international mobility. For example, it is quite normal for politicians, high-level bureaucrats, private business people and senior university staff to send their children abroad for university training. In overall, however, mainland Tanzania has not adopted migration, and in particular international migration, as a livelihood strategy, as the large majority still remain within the village or region in which they were born (Beegle et al. 2008).

More than anything, remittances to Tanzania is a phenomenon characterized by great optimism and general lack of knowledge. As for most of Africa, data on remittance flows in Tanzania is missing or of poor quality which is caused by poor reporting by banks and money transfer operators (MTOs) and by the widespread practice of sending remittances informally via social networks. The lack of knowledge on remittance flows is reflected in the different estimates given by different institutions and observers. The Bank of Tanzania estimates that official remittances were around USD 9 million in 2006. Estimates from the World Bank vary from around USD 8.5 million (World Bank 2009: 120) to USD 15 million for the same year (World Bank 2008: 374). In a publication that drew some attention in Tanzania as well as in the Tanzanian diaspora, the International Fund for Agricultural Development estimated that informal and formal remittances for 2006 were as high as USD 313 million, meaning that remittances account for 2.4 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (IFAD 2007).

Formal banks, micro-finance institutions, such as the National Microfinance Bank of Tanzania, post offices and MTOs (e.g. Western Union) all offer remittance services, but the majority of remittances is still sent informally using personal networks, local transport companies, or simply hand-carried by the individual remittance sender (Sander 2004; Sander et al. 2001). Informality is caused by the existence of a poorly developed financial infrastructure, the high cost of using MTOs and past experiences in socialist Tanzania where recipients of external funds were often met with suspicion by the government. Moreover, there is a strong wish among remittance senders and recipients to keep private money private, and as such out of the reach of the state and other external observers.³

The very different estimates show that no one really knows how much money is being sent to family members or invested in Tanzania by the diaspora. However, everyone seems to agree that something is going on, and that the flow of resources from the diaspora is increasingly affecting the country. In urban centres such as Dar es Salaam remittances are used to pay for food, medicine, weddings and funerals and also invested in plots and houses, often intended for retirement. Moreover, investments are often made by mixed couples with either the husband or wife being of Tanzania origin and the spouse typically being from Europe or North America. The volume of these investments is difficult to estimate, as they are often made informally using kin and friends as front men, whereby bureaucratic and legal formalities can be circumvented. Even if people do not receive remittances personally they often know or have heard of someone that does. As such, the potentials of migration are slowly but surely spreading, not only among policy mak-

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² This includes data from Bank of Tanzania, commercial banks and MTOs. Top five source countries are USA, Democratic Republic of Congo, UK, Zambia and Kenya (personal correspondence with Bank of Tanzania, October 2007).

³ This was made clear to me during my fieldwork when senders and recipients of remittances refused to participate in a questionnaire on the issue of remittance practices and perceptions.
ers, but also among larger parts of the population.

Whereas international remittances sent to Tanzania most likely only play a minor role in the overall economy of the country, internal remittances sent from urban to rural areas constitute a much more significant flow of resources. In this sense, the role of rural-urban migration is more significant in terms of contributing to development than international migration (Mercer et al. 2008). However, the flow of internal remittances is not monitored and therefore remains unknown. Not only individual, but also collective remittances are sent within the boundaries of mainland Tanzania. These collective remittances are often sent by migrant associations located in urban centres that support their rural hometown communities. These associations, typically referred to as district development trusts, are often based on shared origin and have been important in the delivery of education, health and infrastructure in rural districts in Tanzania (Kiondo 1993, 1994; Mercer et al. 2008). The number of district development trusts has grown within the past decades where there has also been a more general increase in the number of civil society organizations in Tanzania. The engagement of urban-based migrant associations in rural development shows that Tanzanians are not unfamiliar with the benefits and potentials of migration. However, the sending of collective remittances from urban to rural areas is not replicated on an international level, as there are few if any diaspora associations that engage in development in Tanzania.

The absence of diaspora associations in development is a defining feature of migration-development dynamics in Tanzania, and is related to a range of factors. Firstly, there are not many Tanzanian migrant associations in the diaspora to start with. This not only reflects the relative small size of the diaspora, but also the legacy of socialist Tanzania where the diaspora was considered a threat to the homeland and migrants therefore kept their heads low in order not to draw too much attention to themselves and their families back home. Moreover, the legacy of the socialist state that effectively monopolized associational life and civil society in post-independence Tanzania also prevents the existence of diaspora associations and their engagement in development in Tanzania (cf. Kiondo 1995: 111). Secondly, several migrants stay in their host countries illegally and therefore wish to remain as invisible as possible. Some Tanzanians are known to have been granted asylum on the grounds of being Somali refugees, and others are known to simply overstay their tourist visas. Thirdly, findings from the UK suggest that Tanzanian migrant associations are based on the rather general identity of being Tanzanian rather than on specific local or ethnic identities, and that this principle of organization prevents developmental engagements in Tanzania (Mercer et al. 2009: 149). Fourthly, and most importantly, the development field in Tanzania is well established with the state, international donors and thousands of local and international NGOs being responsible for the delivery of development. As such, the diaspora is simply a new agent within a rather conservative development field where working relationships between development partners are well-established.

The existence of a well-established development field has important consequences for the engagement of the diaspora in development in Tanzania. Firstly, initiatives that actually do emerge from the diaspora are often taken over by more traditional development institutions and agents. Secondly, existing civil society organizations in Tanzania do not embrace or think of the diaspora as an agent of change or development, as they are accustomed to look for funding from traditional donors. In other words, local NGOs contact embassies or development institutions located in Dar es Salaam
and not the Tanzanian diaspora when looking for funding or development partners. Thirdly, the lack of collective remittances also reflects the lack of trust in existing organizations and institutions engaged in development work in Tanzania. In a country popularly referred to as Bongoland, which connotes that only those with cunning skills and shrewdness will survive (Sommers 2001: 2), few people trust local associations or partners with their money.

The lack of collective remittances sent by diaspora associations does not mean that collective remittances are not transferred to Tanzania. Outside formal migrant associations are family-based networks that include individuals living in- and outside Tanzania. These loosely organized family networks pool resources together and support more needy members of the family living inside Tanzania. These funds are not intended for development as such, but are used to support individuals on an ad hoc basis when they need to pay for medicine, operations, weddings, funerals, etc. These transnational networks are not formally registered and the extent and importance of their activities are not well-documented.

REMITTANCE AND DIASPORA POLICIES AS CARGO CULT

More than being ongoing empirical phenomena of which there is limited knowledge, remittances and the diaspora are phenomena that have caught the interest of the Tanzanian state that is looking for ways to finance development and to create economic growth. Within the past few years the Tanzanian state has taken a few initial steps in order to work with remittances and the diaspora as tools for development. In 2004, the government of Tanzania launched a special migration-development initiative called "Migration for Development in Tanzania". The title of the initiative suggest activities similar to migration for development programs implemented by UNDP and IOM around the world, but are essentially restricted to presenting an overview of human and financial remittance flows in and out of Tanzania. In 2007, the government formed a multi-institutional taskforce endowed with the purpose of developing a national labour migration policy and of exploring issues relating to migration and development. Among other things the taskforce works on developing mechanisms for identifying Tanzanians working abroad, analyzing the status of remittances and proposing better methods of recording remittances. The taskforce includes the Ministry of Labour and Youth Development, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and the Bank of Tanzania.

It is the argument of this paper that remittance and diaspora policy formation and thinking is similar to Melanesian cargo cults in sharing the belief in the existence of an external transformative power. Moreover, cargo cults and remittance imaginaries are similar in sharing a sense of local ownership over the flow of resources emanating from the outside. Melanesian cargo cults often expressed the belief that it was possible to lure back western consumer goods that were essentially theirs but had been hijacked by white people. The notion of cargo cults intending to bring back something that has been lost to powerful outsiders is reflected in Tanzanian remittance and diaspora policy formation where emphasis is on winning back the brains, identities and capital that have been lost to western countries. By reversing the brain drain, reinstalling patriotism and nationalism in the Tanzanian diaspora, and by reforming the financial sector, the state seeks to win back human and financial resources that exist beyond the boundaries of the nation-state.

In Tanzania, the perception that powerful outsiders have taken control of distant mem-
bers of local communities is most clearly seen in the debate regarding the emigration of doctors, nurses and university lecturers. No accurate statistics exist on the magnitude of any possible brain drain affecting Tanzania, but one characteristic of the diaspora is that it is relatively well-educated (OECD 2005). However, as in relation to remittances, the lack of knowledge does not prevent policy makers and the wider public from imagining that the country currently loses its best brains to powerful outsiders. In fact, one of the few concrete policy initiatives that have emerged from the Ministry of Planning in relation to migration and development focused on the reversal of the brain drain, and as such on winning back human resources that have been lost to foreign countries. The program was submitted to the European Union for funding, but did not secure support and therefore was not taken any further.

Dual citizenship is also discussed as a strategy that could win back Tanzanian minds and capital, as it is thought to strengthen national sentiments and to make it easier for the diaspora to invest and engage with Tanzania. The general feeling among policy makers and state officials is that dual citizenship will be accepted in the future and will be part of the modernization of the nation-state. However, there are also strong voices against dual citizenship. The main concern is that dual citizenship would enable refugees, migrants and other non-nationals to obtain Tanzanian citizenship. Therefore, issuing identity cards for Tanzanian citizens is seen by many as a necessary first step in the process of allowing for dual citizenship, as this would help create some form of control over who is and who is not eligible for citizenship.

Whereas dual citizenship is still being discussed, the government already implements a policy of publicly praising the diaspora and of reminding it of its Tanzanian identity — a soft or symbolic form of diaspora politics that is applied by a number of developing countries (Fitzgerald 2008; Fullilove 2008). Union government officials publicly stress that the country benefits from the transfer of knowledge, remittances and information and also from the ways in which members of the diaspora are able to promote Tanzania as a tourist site around the world. For example, when giving speeches or attending meetings outside Tanzania, the president and foreign minister often take the opportunity to praise and encourage the diaspora to come and invest, to take responsibility towards the development of their homeland, and to remember that they are still part of the Tanzanian nation. Such symbolic politics aim at reinforcing a sense of membership to an imagined transnational community and promotes the notion that the state cares for Tanzanians living abroad (cf. Levitt & de la Dehesa 2003).

Most importantly, the president and the political establishment encourage the diaspora to form associations whereby the state can communicate more easily with the diaspora and whereby the diaspora can more effectively contribute to the development of the country. Addressing the Tanzanian diaspora at a meeting in London, the president underlined that the government “…is committed to continuing the process of engaging the Tanzanian Diaspora in its national development efforts” and encouraged the diaspora to form “…professional kinship and common-placed organizations…” whereby the diaspora could more strongly “…contribute to

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4 It is estimated that out of the 70,000 Tanzanians living in OECD countries, 41 percent have a higher education (OECD 2005).
the development effort of Tanzania...". The lack of migrant or diaspora associations clearly makes it difficult for the union government to enter into formal discussions with the diaspora and thereby to promote, support and essentially manage ongoing diaspora activities.

The themes of winning back the Tanzanian diaspora and of increasing the flow of individual and collective remittances through communication and public appeals made to the diaspora is similar to Melanesian cargo cults that also used symbolic radios, short-wave radio masts, flag poles and other communication equipment in order to communicate with their ancestors and to attract cargo. The belief shared by many Tanzanian government officials is that if only members of the diaspora knew that their money would make a difference, that their skills and money are needed and that they have a lot of opportunities for making lucrative investments in Tanzania, they would start sending more money. The problem then becomes one of communicating with the diaspora, and of “raising its awareness”. The belief is that by setting up diaspora associations and creating a formal leadership, Tanzanian politicians and government officials are able to communicate more directly with the diaspora and thereby to engage it more directly in the development of Tanzania.

Apart from emphasizing communication, cargo cults also engaged in traditional dancing, the construction of imitated airfields, planes, docks and warehouses, and military-style marching and drilling in order to attract and bring back cargo. Tanzanian diaspora and remittance policy formation displays some of the same features, as emphasis is also on the technicalities of trying to capture land and store the flow of resources existing beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Rather than the creation of symbolic airfields and warehouses intended to land and store cargo, the Tanzanian government has initiated a process of liberalizing the financial sector and thereby quite literally to build more and better financial warehouses for Tanzanian citizens living in- and outside the country. The government believes that by liberalizing the financial sector and establishing more banks with better services, remittances will automatically increase and flow via the formal sector rather than via informal social networks. At the moment the concern of the government is that those remittances that are already entering Tanzania have been hijacked, not by the white man, but by the domain of the family. The problem for the state is that remittances are mostly sent within informal social networks and with the purpose of supporting individual families, whereby they exist outside the domain of the nation-state and outside the formal development field. The state believes that by simply strengthening the formal banking sector, it can lure remittances from the informal to the formal sector and from the sphere of the family into the sphere of the nation-state.

Another strategy intended to land, capture and store remittances has been to open special bank accounts catering specifically for Tanzanians living in diaspora – instead of putting their money in western banks, the diaspora is encouraged to put its money in Tanzanian banks. For Tanzanians living in Tanzania it is also quite common to have a savings account in a foreign bank. Foreign savings are estimated at 2.5 USD billion whereas local savings are estimated only at around USD 1.7 billion (Hatibu 2007). The fact that Tanzanians living in Tanzania have more money in foreign banks than in Tanzanian banks illustrates the lack of trust people have in Tanzanian banks. Moreover, it helps explain why the government has taken an interest in the human and finan-

5 The speech was given at the Tanzania Diaspora Investors & Skills Forum held in London on 18th April 2008. A transcript of the speech was accessed at http://africarecruit.com/Tanzania_Event/index.php on 14.03.09.
cial resources exiting outside Tanzania. One strategy that aims as winning back Tanzanian capital is the Tanzanite Account provided by CRDB Bank that is designed for non-resident Tanzanians. Another example is the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) that was created by the government in 1997 and that assists the diaspora and other external investors with making their investments inside Tanzania. As such, TIC is not exclusively targeting and assisting the diaspora but any potential investor interested in investing in Tanzania. Among other things, TIC assists investors with obtaining the required documents, licenses and clearances that are often a hindrance for investors with little knowledge of bureaucratic practices and legal formalities needed when investing in Tanzania.6

In the study of cargo cults, what has almost always drawn attention and been made the object of analysis, has been cult rather than cargo, as everyone seemed to agree that it was quite natural for Melanesians to desire western goods and to strive for development and modernity. What needed explanation was the irrational, naïve and cultic way in which people tried to obtain goods and prosperity (Lindstrom 2004: 24). The Tanzanian remittance cult is similar to Melanesian cargo cults in the pursuit of goals such as ‘development’ and ‘economic growth’ deemed sound and rational by means that are most unlikely to be effective. First of all, it is highly unlikely that members of the diaspora will send remittances through formal banks, as few remittance senders or recipients trust the state and the formal banking sector that has seen a series of corruption scandals. In other words, it is highly unlikely that remittances will suddenly flow through the formal banking sector simply because there are now more banks than there were ten years ago.

Secondly, it is unlikely that remittances will move from the informal to the formal domain as few Tanzanians have access to the formal banking sector, because opening an account requires a series of formal identity papers possessed only by a minority of the population. Thirdly, some of the financial services provided by Tanzanian banks that are intended to increase the level of formal remittances are simply not accessible to the diaspora. For example, the Tanzanite Account provided by CRDP Bank is only accessible to Tanzanian citizens residing overseas which essentially cuts off the large part of the diaspora that is no longer, or never was, Tanzanian citizens. Fourthly, it is quite naïve to believe that the diaspora will suddenly start investing in a country characterized by excessive bureaucracy, widespread corruption and weak political institutions simply by making appeals to their cultural and national identity without granting them political rights such as dual citizenship or at a minimum the right to vote at elections in Tanzania. Finally, the belief that remittances in themselves have the power of bringing about development is highly questionable. Empirical studies show that in order for remittances to contribute to development they need to be coordinated with other development policies (Castles 2007). In Tanzania there is a marked lack of coordination between migration-development initiatives and other development strategies reflecting diverse interests in and perceptions of migration.

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6 Required documents for investors are: residency permit, certificate of incentives, company registration, memorandum and articles of association, evidence of business promises, sectoral approval from any relevant sectoral ministry, tax clearance certificate, business license and a copy of passport. In order for investors to receive the support of TIC, Tanzanian nationals need to invest a minimum of USD 100,000 and non-Tanzanian investors a minimum of USD 300,000 (personal correspondence with TIC).
THE EMERGENCE OF THE TANZANIAN REMITTANCE AND DIASPORA CULT

The Tanzanian state has a number of interests in trying to capture and store the human and financial resources of the Tanzanian diaspora. First of all, the state has an obvious economic interest in remittances, as they are thought to reduce poverty, increase investments and generate economic growth, and because they offer the opportunity of generating increased revenues through taxation. Secondly, remittances and the engagement of diaspora associations in development in Tanzania correspond with the overall emphasis on the privatization of social service provision and the reduction of public spending (cf. Green 2003). As such, migration and development policies are simply ways in which the government is able to create economic growth and improve social service delivery and thereby to regain renewed legitimacy in the eyes of the Tanzanian population. As argued by Bubandt in his analysis of the desire for modernity in Indonesia, many third world states deliberately turn the desire for progress and development into cargo cults of modernity (Bubandt 2004: 105). Similarly, the Tanzanian state links an increase in the flow of remittances and the formation of diaspora associations with the arrival of development and modernity in an attempt at strengthening its legitimacy vis-à-vis its own citizenry.

Migration-development policies to a large extent focus on the technicalities of attracting more remittances and on channelling remittances from the informal to the formal banking sector. The belief is that by setting up better channels for communicating with the diaspora, providing new financial product to the diaspora, by banking the unbanked and in overall reforming the financial sector, people will send more money and through the formal financial sector rather than through informal social net-works. In this sense, one perhaps unintended consequence of the use of remittances as a tool for development is the depoliticization of development (cf. Ferguson 1990). The issue of remittances is simply reduced to a question of creating more banks, providing better bank accounts and reducing remittance fees, whereby other factors such as the lack of trust in the formal banking sector and the state are overlooked. Also, the creation of economic growth, the reduction of poverty and the delivery of social services to the Tanzanian population no longer rest on the redistribution of resources and as such on socio-political questions and dilemmas, but on designing technical financial solutions that will bring cargo, wealth and development to Tanzania.

Tanzanian remittance and diaspora policy formation also reflects a global trend or cult set in motion and headed by international development institutions and western donors who support, encourage and fund migration-development research and policies around the world. Tanzanian government employees engaged within the migration-development field regularly travel to Geneva, Washington and London to participate in meetings, workshops and conferences exploring how best to ‘harvest’ the human and financial resources of diasporas. The fact that Tanzania’s engagement with remittances and its diaspora is a reflection of larger global policy trends means that migration-development policy formation is primarily based on globally circulated myths about the links between migration and development (cf. de Haas 2005) rather than on knowledge on how migration currently affects Tanzania, or on the composition and potentials of the Tanzanian diaspora. As powerful donor countries and important development institutions are increasingly looking towards remittances and diasporas as tools for development, it is quite rational for the Tanzanian state to do the same, as it presents an opportunity to fund
development programs. Moreover, familiarizing oneself with the discourse on remittances and diaspora engagement can be seen as a rational strategy applied by individual policy makers and bureaucrats interested in securing their own fields of expertise and ultimately their own livelihoods. In other words, remittance and diaspora policy formation is a field whereby individuals assert their own authority as employees and representatives of the state.

Looking towards the emergence of Melanesian cargo cults we are able to identify other important reasons for the recent emergence of the Tanzanian remittance cult. The most widespread interpretation of cargo cults sees them as local responses to colonial oppression and as seeking a new era of equality with white people, with Melanesians sharing the goods and wealth that villagers saw arriving on ships and planes coming from Europe or North America. Similar to cargo cults that grew out of global inequalities between local Melanesian societies and powerful western forces, the continuing lack of development is important to the recent emergence of the Tanzanian remittance cult. In Tanzania, there is a growing awareness that the country is increasingly missing out on the benefits of globalization, that they find themselves in the shadows of globalization (Ferguson 2006). So far traditional development strategies such as trade liberalization and the use of NGOs in development have not been effective in bringing prosperity to Tanzania. The hope that is associated with remittances and the diaspora is linked to the notion that these phenomena provide a new and more effective way for Tanzania to reverse the flow of capital and to better access the riches of the world.

Cargo cults also represented the desire for a new Melanesian self and a new social order with a higher degree of local ownership over economic and political processes (cf. Lindstrom 2004: 15). In this sense, cargo cults are often interpreted as providing a language of anti-colonialism, emancipation and nationalism (Lattas 1998; Worsley 1968). Similar to Melanesian societies in the 40s and 50s, Tanzania is continuously being transformed by external economic and political powers leaving a sense of deprivation and loss of financial and political control in large parts of the population (Hydén & Mmuya 2008: 12). One of the most important implications of the political reforms of the 80s and 90s was the extent to which donor agencies and international finance institutions managed to get a hold on Tanzania’s destiny (ibid: 37). In other words, development and the power of transformation no longer rest with the Tanzanians, but with outsiders such as the World Bank, western donor countries and multinational companies. Remittance and diaspora policies simply provide an avenue for local ownership over development and a Tanzanian way out of underdevelopment. Even if the diaspora lives outside the Tanzanian nation-state, it is still symbolically part of the Tanzanian nation. Remittances and the human resources of the diaspora are thereby quite similar to the status of cargo in having been produced and sent by someone with whom local communities feel intimately related.

At an individual level, recipients of remittances are known to feel and exert a certain degree of ownership over members of the family living in diaspora. Similarly, at the level of the state the optimism that is associated with remittances is tied to the notion that they originate from within the Tanzanian nation rather than from western donors or external investors with whom Tanzania is not related and therefore has little control and essentially no ownership. The notion that remittances are Tanzanian, as opposed to foreign investments and development aid, appeals to policy makers and the larger public, as it promises a home-grown way out of underdevelopment and thereby fuels and feeds on nationalist sentiments. The
existence of a strong patriotic or nationalistic discourse in relation to migration and development is strongly reflected in the ways in which the government tries to engage the diaspora by appealing to its Tanzanian identity, and by reminding them of their responsibility towards the development of the homeland.

The notion that remittances offer a way out of aid dependency needs to be looked upon with critical eyes. Rather than providing an avenue for emancipation, research show that recipients often grow dependent on remittances which may have negative effects on local entrepreneurship and work moral (Maimbo & Ratha 2005; Nyberg Sørensen 2004; Tanner 2005). In fact, the sending of remittances is known to increase inequalities between sender and recipient, as remittances are not only ways in which people share what they have, but also means of establishing hierarchy and difference (Hansen 2007: 170). In this sense, remittances and gifts share the nature of simultaneously being acts of generosity and violence (cf. Godelier 1999: 12).

Most importantly, the discourse on remittances as a Tanzanian way out of underdevelopment, the emphasis on the formation of diaspora associations, the theme of local ownership over development and the existence of a strong nationalistic discourse appeal to the government and larger parts of the public, as they resonate with the political past of the country and previous efforts at linking human mobility with development. Already in the pre-independence era, the colonial administration used the relocation of people into planned villages as a way to instigate rural development and to modernize the nation-state (Jennings 2008: 38). Following independence in 1961, development planning was heavily influenced by the World Bank and continued to use the resettlement of farmers as an important development strategy (ibid: 38-41). The Arusha Declaration published in 1967 marked a Tanzanian way towards development and was cast as the moment when Tanzania broke the chains of colonialism. The Arusha Declaration presented the development ideals of African socialism, or Ujamaa as it was also known, where emphasis was on democracy, self reliance, the nationalization of industries and services and the formation of rural villages as the most important unit of development in Tanzanian society (ibid: 47). Ujamaa policy was heavily influenced by socialist ideals, but also anchored in notions of traditional African culture, emphasizing community and mutual support within extended families. Most importantly, Ujamaa also introduced the Villagization Campaign that essentially was an intensification of the use of human mobility as a development strategy. The Villagization Campaign that took place from 1967 to 1977 relocated millions of Tanzanians in an effort to create growth and rural development through the creation of small cooperative farms (Gould 1995; Scott 1998) and was the largest resettlement scheme ever seen in Africa with more than 95 percent of the Tanzanian population living in villages by 1976 (Jennings 2008: 51). Initially, resettlement was voluntarily, but as people were reluctant to participate and the state became more and more authoritarian, the state ended up relocating people by force.

The use of remittances and the diaspora as a Tanzanian way towards development is quite similar to previous experiences with the use of human mobility and development thinking as seen during socialist Tanzania. The discourse on remittances and the diaspora as tools for development also highlight nationalist and socialist sentiments, as well as self-reliance and a Tanzanian way towards development. The emphasis on the formation of diaspora associations is also similar to the creation of rural villages as a development strategy. In this sense, remittance and diaspora policy formation can
be seen as a global or transnational reinterpretation of Ujamaa development policies where emphasis is also on patriotism, self-reliance, mutual support across international boundaries and the ordering of people into smaller units as a development strategy. Naturally, there are also important differences between socialist and transnational Ujamaa which basically have to do with the changed role and capacity of the Tanzanian state. During socialist Ujamaa the state was highly authoritarian and forcibly relocated people living inside the boundaries of the nation-state. Today, the state governs the diaspora through appeals and flattery rather than through intimidation and violence, reflecting both its limited governmental capacity and changed identity.

**CONCLUSION**

The emergence of remittance and diaspora policies exemplify how states increasingly try to govern and exert their sovereignty outside the boundaries of the nation-state (Bernal 2006; Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Fitzgerald 2008; Larner 2007; Sharma & Gupta 2006). However, more than illustrating the successful exertion of global governance, the Tanzanian example illustrates the difficulty for poor developing countries to capture, store and manage human and financial resources of diasporas. This difficulty not only relates to the lack of capacity on behalf of the Tanzanian state to work with migration-development issues, but also to the ambiguous nature of transnational flows and migration.

As argued by Bubandt, cargo is often ambiguous in bringing about both positive and more destructive forces (Bubandt 2004). In Indonesia, the arrival of ‘America’ which is associated with modernity and prosperity is also thought to lead to an increase in violence and destruction (ibid). Similarly, in Tanzania, more than simply providing an opportunity for development and the creation of economic growth, remittances and the diaspora are also seen by both policy makers and the wider public as challenging the development and identity of the country. In relation to remittances the concern is that they only benefit the political and economic elites that already enjoy access to international travel and the riches of the West and thereby increase social inequalities and conflicts – a concern shared by many observers and analysts of remittance flows (Adams 1989; Ahmed 2000; Maimbo & Ratha 2005). Moreover, there is some concern that remittances primarily benefit members of the Asian and Arab communities that are more strongly embedded within transnational family networks than the Tanzanian majority. As such, the flow of remittances has the potential of increasing racial conflicts within the Tanzanian nation. Finally, the informal and private nature of remittance flows challenges the state by highlighting the importance of the domain of the family as a refuge to state policies and intervention (cf. Giblin 2005).

The status of the diaspora more generally is also ambiguous. More than simply representing an important source of capital and transformation, the diaspora is also looked upon with scepticism and some resentment and essentially as outside the Tanzanian nation. The ambiguous status of the diaspora is seen in relation to the debate on dual citizenship. Whereas some see dual citizenship as an effective development strategy, others argue that dual citizenship will only benefit a small elite that already enjoys access to international travel and the privileges and resources of the West. With the large majority of Tanzanians being cut off from access to international travel there is something elitist and unpatriotic about dual citizenship that runs contrary to the communal ideals of the nation-state. Adding to the perception of dual citizenship as an elitist project is the widespread
belief both among policy makers and the public that requests for dual citizenship primarily come from the diaspora that already enjoys the riches and opportunities of the West. In the eyes of many, being able to both reap the socio-economic benefits from access to the West as well as the emotional and cultural benefits of full membership to Tanzania is simply asking for too much.

The ambiguity of the diaspora as being both in- and outsiders reflects a more fundamental ambivalence towards migration as both representing something positive and essentially as challenging the nation-state. In the past, international migration was looked upon by the state as challenging the ideological and economic fabric of the nation-state. One of the few state-sanctioned forms of migration that did exist in socialist Tanzania was the enrolment of students in overseas universities (Sumra & Ishumi 1980). The scholarship programmes were important in building a qualified civil service and, as scholarships to the Eastern Block were concerned, as an effective process of politicization where students were brought closer to the socialist ideals of the homeland (ibid: 41). The legacy of looking upon international migration as challenging the nation-state and as unpatriotic is reflected in ongoing concerns over the influx of refugees and illegal migrants from neighbouring countries. Between 1993 and 1998 it is estimated that around 1.3 million refugees came to western Tanzania from the conflict zones of the Great Lakes Region (Black et al. 2006). The massive influx of refugees from Congo, Burundi and Rwanda, primarily to western parts of Tanzania, is generally believed to be a great strain on the meagre resources of the country and to increase unemployment and poverty. From the government’s perspective, much emphasis has been put on repatriating these refugees and on the negative effects caused by this refugee population (Landau 2004). The free mobility of labour within the East African Community has also caused some concern among policy makers, as Tanzania has experienced a substantial influx of Kenyans and Ugandans who come to work, do business and study in Tanzania. Another concern of the government is the trafficking of young women, particularly from the mainland to Zanzibar where they are said to work as domestic workers. The negative perception of international migration is reflected in national development plans and poverty reduction strategy papers where focus is on the negative effects of urbanization and on the challenge of taking care of a large refugee population.

At the moment, remittance and diaspora policies collide with widespread perceptions of migration as harmful and with policies that actively prevent the mobility of both Tanzanians and non-Tanzanians. One way in which the government tries to counter the negative effects of migration is to restrict peoples’ access to travel by restricting their access to passports. Passports are not issued automatically upon request but only after applicants have gone through a long bureaucratic process of arguing why they need a passport. For example, passports are only issued on the background of a specific purpose considered legitimate by the authorities (e.g. attending a specific course at a foreign university). Moreover, applicants will have to verify their identity, for example with birth certificates or other official documents issued by the state. In this sense, not only the costs of passports but also bureaucratic proce-

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7 The number of Tanzanians studying abroad varied, but in the period from 1961 to 1975 an average of 1000 students per year were enrolled in universities, primarily in the United Kingdom, United States of America, Canada, German Federal Republic and India but also in countries of the Eastern Block, such as Romania, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, U.S.S.R. and Poland (ibid: 48-51).
dures in practice prevent the large majority of Tanzanians from leaving the country.

The ambiguous nexus between migration and the Tanzanian nation-state reflects the changing status of the external to Tanzanian selfhood and local identity formations (cf. Friedman 1994: 184). The hope that is associated with remittances, the diaspora and migration shows that the external is no longer denied but looked upon as an important virtual or imagined outside that has the power of transforming local identities and essentially the entire Tanzanian nation-state. As such, the flow of human and financial capital emanating from the diaspora no longer challenges the nation-state, but provides an important life force (cf. ibid: 249). However, the inclusion of the external challenges negative perceptions of international migration. During socialist Tanzania the external was denied for decades in local constructions of Tanzanian selfhood, as emphasis was on developing the country through agricultural reform and internal mobility. Within this optic the diaspora and the transnational flow of financial and human resources simply do not exist as a meaningful and legitimate source of transformation and development. The legacy of looking upon international migration as harmful to the nation-state and upon the diaspora with scepticism and resentment still prevents the effective implementation of migration-development policies in Tanzania.
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