THE EUROPEANIZATION OF EUROPE:
THE TRANSFER OF NORMS TO EUROPE,
IN EUROPE AND FROM EUROPE

Trine Flockhart

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Abstract

Europeanization is a concept predominantly concerned with the domestic impact of the EU whilst less concerned with its historical foundations and wider geographical reach. By forwarding a Historical Sociological conceptualization of Europeanization it is revealed that the concept suffers from fundamental problems relating to historical and geographical scope, to uncertainty about which causal relationships to explain, and that it is based on implicit but unsustainable assumptions. This article challenges the assumption that Europeanization is based on ideas endogenous to Europe and is an activity preserved for Europeans. It suggests that ‘Europeanization’ can be conceptualized as several social processes involving different agents, structures, processes and conceptions of ‘self’ and ‘other’, and that Europeans have been more on the receiving end of ideational diffusion than promoters of a European norm set. By employing a Historical Sociological perspective it is revealed that before Europeans could ‘Europeanize’ either in or from Europe, they not only had to develop a European identity through a process of ideational diffusion to Europe, but the idea set which is today regarded as ‘European’ was diffused from the United States and stands in complete contrast to ideas previously also regarded as European.
The Europeanization of Europe: The transfer of norms to Europe, in Europe and from Europe

Trine Flockhart

Johan Olson once asked what is meant by Europeanization and whether the concept is at all useful. Since then numerous articles and books have been written on Europeanization – many of them seeking to address Johan Olson’s question – but the precise meaning of the term remains unclear and its usefulness as an analytical concept remains questionable. As a result, a growing conceptual debate within European Studies is taking place, which according to Simon Bulmer needs to address two points; 1) what processes are understood as Europeanization; and 2) what causal relationships should theory explain? The two questions are not easily separated, and include implicitly a question of which theory should explain Europeanization. Such big issues can only be partly addressed in just one article. So although the article seeks to address both points by first presenting a reconceptualized understanding of the content of Europeanization based on a Historical Sociological perspective, as well as an assessment of which causal relationships theory should explain, there is still plenty of scope for further discussion.

By presenting a broader Historical Sociological conceptualization of Europeanization, the article implies a departure from the practice in the current Europeanization literature to concentrate on the contemporary with a narrow focus at the expense of the historical with a broad focus. This approach is almost certain to lead to concerns about so called ‘conceptual overstretch’, which is the view that if Europeanization can be used to explain cultural change, new identity formation, policy change and more, it will eventually become all things to all people, and therefore meaningless. The view forwarded here is that the problem of ‘conceptual overstretch’ does not

1 I am grateful for comments on previous versions of this paper from colleagues at the Danish Institute for International Studies as well as John Hobson, Roger Kanet and John Greenaway.
2 Olsen 2002.
4 Bulmer 2007, 47.
5 Radaelli 2000.
derive from a historical approach or from a wide empirical foundation, but stems from uncertainty about which causal relationships Europeanization should seek to explain and as a result, uncertainty about what precisely the concept should include. With a more precise understanding of the content of Europeanization located within a stable framework of analysis, ‘conceptual overstretch’ will appear less daunting and will be able to cope with a broadening of both the historical and geographical scope.

The problem is that continuing concerns about ‘conceptual overstretch’ have resulted in a research programme that is increasingly focussed on political processes which relate almost exclusively to change brought about by the EU, thereby de facto excluding other processes which may also logically be regarded as Europeanization. As a result the current Europeanization research agenda has become extremely narrow in focus, and worryingly unconcerned with its own ideational foundations with a correspondingly limited field of theorizing. Like Ernest Gellner’s ‘Nations without Navels’⁶, Europeanization has become a phenomenon with no genesis, and therefore with no codified culture as a fixing point for the Europeanization debate.⁷ In fact by practically ignoring history and adhering to a narrow geographical and process-oriented scope, scholars of Europeanization have implicitly accepted a euro-centric construction of history, which has constructed Europe as technically ingenious, morally progressive and as innately and permanently superior to most other cultures. This representation is of course a myth successfully constructed by Europeans themselves⁸, yet myths have profound implications for self-understanding and for relationships with other cultures, which in the European case, is the unacknowledged source of Europe’s own identity construction and technological development.

The narrow historical conception and the acceptance of a euro-centric interpretation of history has produced a research agenda that has tended increasingly to concentrate on a limited number of questions mainly focussing on explaining domestic adaptation to European integration.

⁶ Gellner 1983.
⁷ Gellner and Smith 1996.
⁸ Hobson 2004.
through the EU. In fact it appears that most scholars *de facto* favour a definition of Europeanization either as the domestic impact of the EU, and/or the domestic impact on the EU, which is increasing differentiated as ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’\(^9\), but which nevertheless evolves exclusively around the EU. Emphasis has been on the process and extent to which Member States and prospective Member States adopt EU rules and implement EU policy-making, with a branch of the Europeanization literature concentrating on the processes of social learning, adaptation and lesson-drawing as the mechanisms involved in the process of Europeanization\(^10\). In other words Europeanization scholarship has become the study of the impact on and of the EU, analyzed through a number of policy specific case studies\(^12\), but with no clearly formulated research agenda that is grounded in an agreed understanding of the social processes involved in Europeanization or on its relationship with the past. This is a shame because although a narrow conception of Europeanization may provide a useful analytical tool for questions relating specifically to the EU, it lacks historical depth thereby preventing a thorough understanding of the origins and shifting normative and ideational content of a broader understanding of Europeanization, and contributing to an understanding of history which reinforces a myth of European culture as superior.

\(^9\) See for example some of the most prominent Europeanization scholars’ definition of Europeanization, which are all EU focussed. For example Cowles et. al. 2001: 'The emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance on the domestic structures of the Member States'; Börzel 2002, 193: 'Europeanization is a two-way process that entails a bottom-up and a top-down dimension, where the former emphasizes the evolution of European institutions as a set of new norms, rules and practices, whereas the latter refers to the impact of these new institutions on political structures and processes of the Member States'. See also Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 1, who assert that 'Europeanization is the impact of European integration', and Hix and Goertz 2000, 27, who see Europeanization as a process of change in national institutional and policy practices that can be attributed to European integration.

\(^10\) Börzel 2002.

\(^11\) See Sedelmeier and Schimmelfennig 2005b, who follow Olson in identifying several different logics of action for rule adaptation according to the 'logic of appropriateness' and 'logic of consequence', which gives rise to different processes of learning and adaptation.

\(^12\) If Europeanization is narrow in geographical and historical scope, it is characterized by a very broad approach to different policy areas. The Europeanization literature is rich on policy specific studies on environmental policy, telecommunicating policy, agricultural policy, foreign policy, gender mainstreaming and many more. See for example Börzel 2003; Boswell 2003; Burke 2004; Carporaso and J.Jupille 2001; Carruba and Murrah 2005; Checkel 2001; Connant 2001; Falkner and Lieber 2004; Harcourt 2002; Haverland 2003; Jordan and Leifferink 2004; Ladrech 2005; Major 2005; Roederer-Rynning 2002; Wong 2005.
To avoid the pitfalls of an overtly narrow and ahistorical conceptualization of Europeanization, I propose a change of name so that what is currently thought of as ‘Europeanization’ is referred to as ‘EU-ization’. EU-ization is different from ‘Europeanization’ because EU-ization is limited to ‘political encounters’, where specific political entities such as the EU and Member States engage in the transfer of institutional and organizational practices and specific policies. EU-ization is therefore a small, but important part of the much broader and longer term process of Europeanization, which is a ‘cultural encounter’. In ‘cultural encounters’ the ideational transfer includes more than institutional and organizational practices and specific policies. The ideational content of ‘cultural encounters’ include resource portfolios, cultural practices and all norms and behavioural practices that make up the identity of the community in question – in the case of Europeanization everything that is ‘European’. It must be emphasized that both ‘cultural encounters’ and ‘political encounters’ are ideational processes involving the diffusion of a set of ideas from one geographical, cultural or political setting to another. The former does not exclude the latter, and there clearly is a degree of overlap in content, structures, agents and processes. Nevertheless, there is a clear difference between the two in the kind of ideas that are transferred as Europeanization is concerned with constitutive rules – that is rules which ‘constitute’ a community, whereas EU-ization is concerned with regulative rules – that is rules which regulate behaviour within a society. By adopting the constitutive rules contained in Europeanization, membership of the European cultural community may be achieved, whereas EU-ization does not imply membership of a cultural community, but merely indicates the level of fulfillment of the conditions for political encounters with the EU. Both processes exist in ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ variants. A ‘thin’ form of Europeanization/EU-ization is likely to be limited to changes in behaviour and rhetoric, whereas ‘thick’ forms of Europeanization/EU-ization are likely to involve changes in the structures of consciousness of the group in question through internalization of the rules and norms in question.

13 This concept was first coined by Helen Wallace. Wallace 2000.
14 Europeanization is similar and for most of the modern period overlapping with processes of Westernization. However Europeanization precedes Westernization and the two processes may well be in a process of differentiation as some norms and values on either side of the Atlantic are growing apart.
15 The distinction is based on Nelson 1973. The distinction could also be applied to processes of Westernization and West-ization, where the latter is a much more limited process of specific policy transfer, such as the Washington Consensus, which of course is a process that does not imply that states with a non-western cultural identity somehow become ‘westernized’ simply because they adapt to certain political and organizational practices in the international system.
17 This is what is referred to by Frank Schimmelfennig as ‘rhetorical action’. Schimmelfennig 2001.
The two forms of ideational transfers are intricately connected as neither can exist without the other. It is inconceivable to imagine EU-ization without prior processes of Europeanization, just as it is increasingly difficult to imagine contemporary processes of Europeanization without some degree of EU-ization. Yet understanding the subtle differences is important for theorizing and conceptualizing Europeanization/EU-ization. The above distinctions are therefore useful for understanding what the content of the processes are and which causal relationships Europeanization/EU-ization should explain. The empirical focus of EU-ization is clearly more limited than the empirical focus of Europeanization. In both instances the causal relationship to be explained is how a number of European ideas are transferred through social processes from one cultural or political entity to another. Both can therefore be analyzed within the same theoretical framework – without succumbing to conceptual overstretch.

The conceptualization of Europeanization forwarded here is based on a Historical Sociological perspective, asking what the sociological and historical content of Europeanization/EU-ization is, how that content has changed over time, and how the social processes of ideational transfer involved in Europeanization/EU-ization may be explained. By adopting a Historical Sociological perspective, I challenge implicit assumptions, which seem to suggest that Europeanization is based on ideas that are endogenous to Europe, which can be traced directly back to ancient Greece, and that Europeanization is an activity preserved for Europeans. In other words the article questions the apparent implicit acceptance within the Europeanization literature that Europeanization is something that ‘comes out of’ Europe/EU. By questioning the endogenous heritage of European values and ideas it becomes apparent that Europeanization/EU-ization can be conceptualized as several different processes of diffusion of ideas where Europeans have been as much on the receiving end of ideational diffusion as they have been promoters of a specific European norm set. The puzzling discovery therefore is that before Europeans could ‘Europeanize’ either in or from Europe, they had to first develop a consciousness of themselves as different from others by developing a European identity through a process of ideational diffusion to Europe. What is perhaps most puzzling however, is that the idea set which is today unproblematically regarded as ‘European’ stands in complete contrast to ideas previously also regarded unproblematically as ‘European’, and that these ideas have been re-imported to Europe via the United States in the 20th century – yet the different ideational processes across history can be assembled within one overarching framework.

The article is divided into four sections. Section 1 and 2 provide a brief review of the current literature on Europeanization and a search within that literature for an already implicitly existing historical and sociological content. Both sections will end by suggesting the sociological and historical content of Europeanization. The article then proceeds by presenting an outline of the
theoretical apparatus derived from Historical Sociology and Social Constructivism for theorizing Europeanization. Section 4 concludes with an illustrative historical analysis of Europeanization divided into five different stages of Europeanization\textsuperscript{18} characterized by different ideational structures, agents, processes, diffusion patterns and ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ constructions.

\textsuperscript{18} The historical span of this section is large, which is why it must be emphasized that many important factors have been left out, and what is included is for illustrative purposes only.
1. The hidden sociological content in Europeanization

The search for a sociological content of Europeanization must start by looking at how the discipline itself defines the concept and its content. However, although the field is littered with definitions of Europeanization, a single and precise meaning of the term remains elusive. Definitions are often delimited to individual pieces of work with no clear over-all agreement in which direction the Europeanization concept should be taken, nor on how far back the concept should reach. Nevertheless, a closer inspection reveals that not only is there more agreement on what constitutes Europeanization than first meets the eye, but that the core elements of current Europeanization thinking contain a significant portion of sociological theorizing, albeit rarely formulated as such.

The sociological content of Historical Sociology, shares with Social Constructivism, the assumption that agent identities are highly malleable and change as normative structures change. Historical Sociology is concerned with charting changes in actor behaviour and changes in norms through historical time and how such changes impact on inter-state, inter-regional or inter-civilizational relations. Such a concern is in fact visible within some of the Europeanization literature, where some scholars have attempted to broaden the scope of the concept and to take account of the malleability of agent identities and changes of normative structures. Johan Olsen for example identifies five different phenomena that are all referred to as constituting Europeanization and which at least implicitly take note of the concerns of Historical Sociology. According to Simon Bulmer, it is possible to simplify Olsen’s five typologies of phenomena to a dual distinction in the understandings of Europeanization. This dual distinction includes Europeanization as the transfer from Europe to other jurisdictions either of policy, institutional arrangements, rules, beliefs or norms, and secondly Europeanization as capacity building in Europe, which also involves a transfer of policy, institutional arrangements, rules, beliefs or norms.

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19 Kassim 2000, 38.
20 Olsen 2002,
21 Radaelli and Pasquier 2007, 38.
23 Olsen 2002
24 Bulmer 2007, 47.
norms. In all cases of Olsen’s phenomenon what is transferred, and what needs to be explained, is essentially ideas leading to behavioural and institutional change through sociological processes.

Johan Olsen is not the only scholar who has attempted to widen the concept and who includes a sociological content in Europeanization. Also Radaelli’s definition of Europeanization to include processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms broadens the concept. However, Radaelli’s conception of Europeanization remains EU-centric as he specifies that the rules, procedures and policy paradigms are defined in the making of EU decisions and only afterwards incorporated into domestic discourses, identities and political structures. Therefore, although the definition appears broad and certainly includes sociological processes, it is nevertheless EU-centric. However, Radaelli’s conception does highlight the connection between current EU-ization and the underlying structures and their connection with the construction of identities, which is a significant step in the right direction.26

It seems fair to say that Europeanization scholarship is perhaps more grounded in a sociological approach than is acknowledged within the discipline. There is widespread agreement that Europeanization is a process involving the transfer of a specific idea set from one group of agents to another set of agents usually followed by behavioural change through different forms of internalization, social learning and institutionalization. Furthermore in all conceptions of Europeanization focus is on change in national political systems, which from a sociological perspective will involve norm change preceded by various forms of identity constructions based on conceptions of ‘Self’ or ‘Significant We’ and ‘Other’. In that sense the sociological content of the current understanding of Europeanization can be considered to be quite broad, as it engages with many different agents and social processes. Its ultimately narrow focus appears to be the result of a narrow conception of what constitutes a ‘European idea set’, which seems limited to the ideas connected with the EU.

26 Other Europeanization scholars also have a distinct sociological conceptualization of Europeanization. See for example Checkel’s chapter on the Europeanization of citizenship and Thomas Risse’s chapter on a European identity. Cowles, Caporaso et. al 2001 lately calls for using the insights from the socialization literature have also been forwarded by Radaelli and Pasquier, which clearly will add a sociological dimension to Europeanization studies, although the call for the inclusion of socialization is still seen as limited to the impact of the EU. Radaelli and Pasquier 2007, 43.
27 Grazino and Vink 2007, 3.
Thus although the sociological content of Europeanization has not been specified within a single piece of work, it is nevertheless possible to glimpse agreement in the existing literature about some of the sociological content of Europeanization/EU-ization such as a specific idea set or policy, the agents and the processes. To that can be added implicit understandings of diffusion direction, and conceptions of ‘Self’, ‘Other’ and ‘Significant We’. The sociological content of Europeanization/EU-ization can therefore be summarized as:

- Ideational structure: what are the ideas that are being promoted under the heading of Europeanization – what is ‘the European idea’?
- Ideational agents: who are the agents that are promoting/diffusing the ideas in question?
- Ideational processes: what processes are being utilized for promoting the European idea set i.e. adaptation, assimilation, social learning, socialization, force etc.?
- Norm diffusion direction: are the ideas flowing into, out of or within Europe?
- ‘Other’: what is the construction of ‘Other’ within the cultural setting of Europeanization and ongoing identity constructions?
- ‘Significant we’: what is perceived within the cultural setting to be the ‘Significant We’ – those with the most attractive and desirable European identity?

As will be illustrated later, the actual substantial content of each of the sociological factors is likely to be different at different historical epochs and within different institutional settings. Yet, as long as the ideational structure can be perceived to be ‘European’, the processes are essentially instances of Europeanization/EU-ization.
2. The missing historical content in Europeanization and its consequences

Given that a closer investigation of the current Europeanization literature revealed a hidden sociological content, the same might be true in the case of a historical content. However, most Europeanization scholarship either pays little if any attention to history, or simply reproduces a view of history that has constructed the present as a natural and linear development from the past, elegantly papering over ruptures and inconsistencies that do not fit with the current acceptance of what constitutes a European idea set. The contemporary key statements on what constitutes the European idea set are contained in numerous political statements, amongst others, the *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* from 1990 and in the *Copenhagen Criteria* from 1993\(^28\). Both documents refer very specifically to liberal democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and the principles of the market economy as key European ideas. Added to these are a whole string of further secondary European/EU norms\(^29\) contained in the *acquis communautaire* of the EU, which are being continuously refined and elaborated, but which are all part of the overall constitutive and regulative norm set that is the foundation of the policy specific case studies investigated in the current Europeanization literature.

Despite the apparent agreement within the Europeanization literature on a narrow historical and EU-centric scope, it seems that this is an unintended consequence following from a quite understandable preoccupation with contemporary policy issues and a focus on the EU as the current main agent of Europeanization. The missing historical content seems to reflect a concern for the coherence and analytical value of the concept rather than a conscious rejection of the importance of history and generalizations about the causal relationships involved in Europeanization. The problem is however, that without attention to previous Europeanization processes and other agents of Europeanization and without attention to their ideational content

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\(^{29}\) Ian Manners identifies a least nine primary and secondary norms that are under continuous development and refinement, but which may all be said to be defining what constitutes a European norm set. The secondary and more specific norms that are continuously under construction are also part of a process of differentiation of European norms from American norms, as for example social equality and the rejection of the use of capital punishment. Manners, 2002.
and implicit assumptions, current Europeanization research is reinforcing the idea that the present ideational foundations were always the basis of European policy-making.

From a Historical Sociological perspective such unquestioning acceptance of normative structures and processes is troubling because Historical Sociology has an understanding of present structures and processes as being neither natural nor permanent, but to be likely to be succeeded by different arrangements in the future.\(^{30}\) Therefore, the present de facto narrow historical scope of Europeanization is not only time and content specific, but it is uncritical in regards to questioning its own underlying normative structures. Perhaps even more worrying is that by focussing exclusively on the domestic impact on or of the EU in many specific empirical cases, the concept suffers from what John Hobson\(^{31}\) describes as the ‘first mode of ahistoricism’, a condition called ‘chronofetishism’, which refers to the assumption that the present can be adequately explained by only examining the present, thereby bracketing or ignoring the past. The unfortunate result of ‘chronofetishism’ is that it precludes a thorough understanding of the origins and shifting normative and ideational content of the concept and related processes and agent behaviour.

What is of particular concern is that according to John Hobson, chronofetishism gives rise to three illusions, which certainly all seem to be present to a greater or lesser degree in the Europeanization literature. The three illusions are the ‘reification illusion’, the ‘naturalization illusion’ and the ‘immutability illusion’. In the ‘reification illusion’ the present is effectively sealed off from the past thereby making it appear as a static, self-constituting, autonomous and reified entity, which has the important effect of obscuring its historical socio-temporal context. Although empirical policy-oriented case study research absolutely is a worthwhile area of study, their historical socio-temporal context is obscured through the reification illusion. The other two illusions; the ‘naturalization’ and ‘immutability’ illusions, can be seen in the tendency of Europeanization to highlight present EU-ization processes as ‘natural’ and in accordance with natural human imperatives. In so doing the present version of Europeanization ignores the fact that present EU-ization processes are the result of historical processes of social power, identity, social exclusion and norms that constitute the present\(^{32}\) and may lead to changes in the future. Chronofetishism is therefore a problem because it endows Europeanization with a policy and normative content that is assumed stable across time. However, as a long term historical investigation will show, the normative content of Europeanization has definitely not been stable.

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\(^{30}\) Linklater 1998.

\(^{31}\) Hobson 2002

\(^{32}\) Ibid, 6.
In fact European norms have changed dramatically on several occasions, and may have the potential for future dramatic change.

By analyzing Europeanization from a Historical Sociological perspective, I join a growing chorus of revisionist historians, who challenge the conventional euro-centric perspective that sees European culture and ideas as superior and endogenous to Europe.\(^{33}\) When employing a revisionist (non Euro-centric) perspective, an altogether different picture emerges than the picture that is routinely constructed in Europe’s own discourse about itself. Europeanization can here be seen as a process of ideational diffusion and identity constructions, where the construction of a European identity actually is based on exogenously derived ideas. Ironically many of the ideas and technological know-how, which have constructed Europe, and which have facilitated Europe’s tremendous leap forward and self perception as somehow superior, originated in Europe’s ‘Other’ - the Middle East and the Orient prior to the European age of colonial expansion.\(^{34}\) In other words many of the ideas and technological innovations that have been instrumental in constructing a European identity as superior have their origin in those cultures that Europeans historically have constructed as inferior.

A historical perspective also reveals that the ideas that today count as core European values and ideas have a much younger heritage than discursively indicated, where many contemporary core ideas actually originate in a second wave of European identity construction during the 20\(^{th}\) century. The most obvious example of such 2\(^{nd}\) wave identity construction is the ideational shift from authoritarian systems to democracy, from colonialism to anti-colonialism, and the growing institutionalism. All are idea sets diffused into Europe from the United States during three consecutive waves of ideational transfer in the 20\(^{th}\) century following the First and Second World wars and the end of the Cold War. In other words it seems clear that before Europe could embark on the current processes of EU-ization and Europeanization externally of Europe’s own borders that Europe had to internalize the very ideas that are now regarded as key European characteristics. From a Historical Sociological perspective it is clear that Europeanization is not a new phenomenon, but a historical process, which has changed over time in response to different structural conditions and changing agent identities, and which is constructed in the relationship between the domestic ‘Self’ and the international ‘Other’.\(^{35}\)

The underlying, though never directly stated assumption of a euro-centric perspective, is that European ideas have developed as an endogenous process, where Europe somehow during the


\(^{34}\) Hobson 2004.

\(^{35}\) Hobden 1998.
Middle Ages and the Renaissance ‘pulled itself up by its bootstraps’ to recapture the lost grandeur and technological sophistication of the Roman and Greek past. This view can however only be maintained through the widespread ahistoricism of the Europeanization literature, this time through the second mode of ahistoricism – ‘tempocentrism’ - the ‘sealing off’ and naturalization of the present, which was identified as the first mode of ahistoricism, called ‘chronofetishism’. According to John Hobson \(^{36}\) ‘tempocentrism’ extrapolates the ‘chronofetishised’ present backwards through time so that any discontinuous ruptures and differences between historical epochs are smoothed over and consequently obscured. ‘Tempocentrism’ is widespread within both the literature and practice of Europeanization, as the reified present system is used for reconstructing the past, so that the past appears to have the same structure as the present. For example the increasing reference to ‘democracy’ as a European idea/value represents a clear case of ‘tempocentrism’ in practice, as it presents ‘democracy’ as a part of a historically well established value system with roots in Ancient Greece and the Enlightenment. This is despite the fact that democracy as a practiced and universal European norm plainly is a relatively recent phenomenon.

The undiagnosed, yet widespread, combination of ‘chronofetishism’ and ‘tempocentrism’ means that Europeanization can be presented as at once a contemporary and natural phenomenon with no apparent links to the past, and at the same time, as a natural extension of Europe’s long history. However, as any historian will be quick to notice, scholars of Europe are selective in their use of history, utilizing only the history that fits the contemporary European norm set. In so doing scholars and practitioners alike can present the contemporary Europeanization and integration processes as a natural development rooted in a specific European set of values. The assumption is therefore one of development along a form of ‘inverted path dependency’\(^{37}\), rather than an awareness of the important structural ruptures that have shaped contemporary Europeanization. Such an extrapolation of the past into the present is clearly visible in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, where the link to the past was expressed in the first draft of the Preamble, suggesting that the Europe of today draws inspiration from:

> ‘the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, which, nourished first by the civilizations of Greece and Rome … and later by the philosophical currents of the Enlightenment, has embedded … the central role of the human person and his inviolable and inalienable rights’. \(^{38}\)

\(^{36}\) Hobson 2002, 9.

\(^{37}\) Ibid.

\(^{38}\) European Council 2003.
By utilizing historical sociology however, such a view is revealed as highly problematic, highlighting that structures that are now taken for granted are in fact the products of specific and complex social processes in which underlying structures shape the institutions and organizations into which human society is arranged.

The ‘tempocentrism’ of the Europeanization literature is clearly revealed by tracing the flow and the content of ideas within Europe and in the changing conception of Europe’s ‘Other’. Such an undertaking reveals that not only has Europeanization been characterized by serious ruptures in the ideational structure, where the actual normative content of Europeanization has changed dramatically several times, but where it is also apparent that the flow of ideas has changed direction on several occasions. By focussing on the ideational structural changes over a long-term historical perspective and in changes in the sociological content of Europeanization, it is possible to divide the process of Europeanization into several different and distinct stages, and thereby to provide the concept with the historical depth that it is currently lacking.

I have divided the long term historical process of Europeanization into five periods of Europeanization within which different complex social processes have taken place. Each stage is characterized by a different ideational structure either following a critical juncture that may have caused a sudden and violent change in the ideational structure or a more subtle process of gradual ideational change. The expectation is that each historical stage, defined by its dominant European idea, will display different patterns in its sociological content, characterized by different structures (ideational content), different agents (individual travelers and entrepreneurs, agents of states, religious missionaries and international organizations) as well as different processes (rule application, purposeful decision-making, adaptation, experimental learning, competitive selection and ideational diffusion). In addition each period is characterized by different directions of norm diffusion (inward, outward, or internal self-reflection) and different conceptions of ‘Other’ and ‘Significant We’. However, all stages are part of the same overall process of Europeanization since the causal relationships to be explained are essentially the same despite the different normative content of each stage and despite the different directions of the ideational flow at each stage.

39 Limitations of space prevent a thorough analysis of the actual processes involved in Europeanization. Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006 provide a thorough analysis of the different socialization patterns and strategies available.
Each stage of Europeanization is characterized by a different ideational structure where the normative content from one stage to the next can vary dramatically. Nevertheless, the collective memory very quickly forgets the values that went before it and come to see those values as wrong and abhorrent. Examples of such u-turns are colonialism and slavery, both of which historically have been entrenched and widely accepted European practices.

It has been suggested by Radaelli and Pasquier\(^{40}\) that concepts such as Europeanization need the flesh and bone of models and theories. Such ‘flesh and bone’ may be provided by conceptualizing Europeanization as different instances of ideational change involving a European idea set and by identifying the sociological content of Europeanization, which will enable the construction of a framework that is applicable across time and geographical boundaries. The missing link for broadening the concept across time is to accept a ‘real time definition’ of what constitutes ‘a European idea set’ – in other words to view the ideational structure as that which constitutes the agreed common narrative of what ‘being European’ entails. Despite significant changes in content such narratives are viewed as European – if that is what the contemporary discourse suggests.

**Stages of Europeanization**\(^ {41}\)

1. \(> - 1450\): The period of European self-realization
2. \(1450 – 1700\): The period of Proto-Europeanization.\(^ {42}\)
3. \(1700 – 1919\): The period of Incipit Europeanization.
4. \(1919 >:\) The period of Contemporary (inward) Europeanization
5. \(1945 >\) The period of Contemporary (outward) Europeanization and EU-ization.\(^ {43}\)

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\(^{40}\) Radaelli and Pasquier 2007, 42.

\(^{41}\) All periodization is controversial, especially in cases where change is the result of gradual changes in agent practice as opposed to the much more dramatic and apparent structural change following a critical juncture. As both agent and structural changes are at work in Europeanization, the ‘cutting points’ between different stages of Europeanization are therefore likely to be more fluid than indicated below. Hence the periodization indicated here should be viewed as indicative only with some key events located in the earlier period, but their effects in a later period.

\(^{42}\) I borrow the term ‘proto’ from Hobson’s periodization of Globalization. Hobson 2004. Incipit Europeanization is taken from Jan Aart Scholte’s (2000) concept of Incipit Globalization. Although there are many similarities between Europeanization and Globalization, Europeanization is always an ideational process carrying a specific norm set, whereas Globalization in a sense is an empty vessel – at least as far as specific ideas goes.
3. Theorizing Europeanization

Having adopted a conceptualization of Europeanization that is based on a long-term perspective necessitates a theoretical framework that can explain the essential questions related to Europeanization across time and space, which have to do with change brought about ‘in Europe, from Europe and to Europe’. Whilst sociological and historical institutionalism clearly can explain some of these changes, their focus on institutions render the theoretical framework too limited in scope and suitable mainly for political encounters (EU-ization) rather than the cultural encounters involved in Europeanization. As the re-conceptualized version of Europeanization is seen as essentially different forms of ideational change and identity constructions, it makes sense to utilize Social Constructivist theory for explaining how the ideational change has taken place. In so doing emphasis is shifted from material structures to ideational structures such as inter-subjective norms and values, where the assumption is that ideational structures shape actor’s identities, which in turn inform their interests and behaviour. In other words interest and preferences are exogenously created through processes of identity constructions, which in turn rely on the ideational content of a community’s norm set. Although norms are highly stable structures, they do change occasionally, and along with such change so do identities, interests and preferences leading to a change in agents’ behaviour.

The question of interest here is how ideational change takes place, and why it only takes place in some instances, but not in other – seemingly similar instances. It is widely recognized by social constructivists that ideational change may follow two different avenues, one where the source of change originates at the structural level, and the other where change originates at the agent level. In the former the triggering event is likely to be a so called critical juncture which will have destabilized the existing norm set, leading to an urgent need for change in agent behaviour to avoid policy failure. Alternatively ideational change may originate at the agent level through agent practices and social interaction giving rise to a more gradual form of norm change usually through persuasion and reason. Either way, structures and agents are regarded as mutually

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43 EU-ization is included as part of the post 1945 period because the ideational structure of outward Europeanization and EU-ization are identical. However clearly EU-ization is a process that is linked to the EU and therefore lies after 1957 and which is intimately linked with the process of European integration.


constitutive, hence enabling change originating either at the structural level or at the agent level to lead to changes in the ideational structure and in agent behavioural patterns.\(^{46}\)

Having established that normative change is likely to result in changed identities, interests and preferences, is however, not sufficient for explaining how norms are transferred into Europe, from Europe and within Europe, nor why agents accept some norms whilst others may be rejected or met with indifference. Although outside the scope of this article, understanding why Europeanization has been a stronger and more dynamic process in some countries and regions, whilst seemingly having completely bypassed others – even within geographic Europe, is an important task for Europeanization. In order to be able to explain why some agents are more receptive to certain norms than other agents, the analysis must shift from the structural level of norms to the agent level of individual and collective action. The problem is that Social Constructivism is not strong on theorizing at the agent level as it lacks a central agent assumption on par with rationalist theories’ assumption about agent rationality.\(^{47}\) Social constructivist theory therefore needs to be supplemented with Social Identity Theory (SIT) to provide a theoretical account for how social identities are formed, and why some norms appear to be more salient than others and therefore more likely to be adopted.\(^{48}\)

The identity constructions in the case of Europeanization take place in many different forums and within several analytically distinct, spaces of inter-action\(^{49}\), involving identity constructions at both the elite and mass levels. Moreover, all identity constructions are relational, where identities are constructed in the space between an ‘Other’ and a ‘Significant We’. The ‘Other’ defines what the ‘Self’ is seeking to distance itself from –‘what we are not’, whilst the ‘Significant We’ defines what the ‘Self’ is striving towards – what we would like to become. Adoption of particular norm sets is only likely to take place when the norm diffuser is seen as a ‘Significant We’, or if the origin of the diffused identity or resource portfolio is downplayed or hidden (as has been the case with several Oriental and Islamic resource portfolios). A further complication is that elite and

\(^{46}\) As correctly pointed out by Reus-Smit, Social Constructivism has been overtly concerned with structural change as opposed to agent generated change. Reus-Smit 2002, 132. This may be because social constructivist theory is more developed at the structural level, or it may be associated with the more challenging empirical research required at the agent level. However given the central social constructivist assumption that structure and agency exits in a mutually constitutive relationship, agent-level generated change is not only possible, but to be expected.

\(^{47}\) Flockhart, 2006.

\(^{48}\) For a more detailed account of the importance of SIT see Flockhart, 2006. This is particularly important for understanding the adoption rate of new ideas diffused into a society.

\(^{49}\) Mann 1997.
mass levels may not necessarily share the same pre-requisites for norm change, as they may not have the same conception of ‘Other’ and ‘Significant We’ leading to differences in the speed and extent of Europeanization/EU-ization at the two levels. These are undoubtedly complicated issues, which cannot adequately be addressed here, but which nevertheless raise important questions about causal relationships for the Europeanization literature to engage with.

By introducing Social Constructivist theory and assumptions along with Social Identity Theory into theorizing Europeanization a broad and long term perspective emerges, which uncovers chart changes in the ideational structures and changes at the agent level – without the disadvantages of conceptual over stretch. What is subsequently revealed is that the ‘normative content’ of Europeanization has changed fundamentally from being based on racial and religious superiority and colonialism, to a new normative content based on democracy, human rights, capitalism and institutionalism, yet this is rarely acknowledged in the Europeanization debate. Similarly Europe’s ‘Other’ has also changed from the barbarian/non-white/non-Christian, into a new ‘Other’, which (currently) is Europe’s own warring past and strong ideologies. These are questions that can only be revealed by also utilizing history in the analysis of Europeanization, which is why Historical Sociology seems a promising theoretical perspective. However, it cannot be denied that Historical Sociology is an approach, which celebrates the virtues of complexity rather than the virtues of parsimony, and that a research agenda, which includes history and sociology, will be complex. On the other hand, a continuing focus exclusively on EU-ization processes would be comparable to Democratization Studies focusing only on contemporary politics, without regard for the important social processes that produced the democratic system in the first place, and without inclusion of earlier more limited forms of democracy.

50 For the differences in mass and elite Europeanization caused by different conceptions of what constitutes the ‘Other’ and the ‘Significant We’ see Flockhart, 2005.
51 Hobden 2002, 44.
52 In many ways Democratization and Europeanization are similar processes albeit with a different ideational content.
4. Stages of Europeanization

It has already been stated that what makes a process of ideational transfer a process of Europeanization is dependent upon the ideational structure being a European idea set. As a result a historical enquiry into Europeanization must start with the question of what we might understand by the term Europe/European. Although this question has been addressed before, the question is necessary because the answer is not obvious, yet it is relevant for identifying the ideational origin of Europeanization.

Gerard Delanty\(^{53}\) has suggested that the idea of Europe existed long before people began to see themselves as Europeans. Like Italy, Europe was initially only a geographical expression, awaiting the creation of Europeans — yet there clearly were ideational structures that vaguely could be termed European, although to actually look for a European identity in history, would be to engage in ‘tempocentrism’. The starting point of the Europeanization process therefore has to be located around the time when Europe as an idea started to figure in the consciousness of those who had enough of a surplus in their lives, after satisfying primary needs, to think about such matters. To establish when such an ‘idea of Europe’ emerged is an endeavor that has been admirably accomplished amongst others by Denys Hay, Gerard Delanty and John Hobson.\(^ {54} \) My task here is therefore merely to plead for bringing existing knowledge into the Europeanization debate.

By utilizing the historical and sociological factors already identified as the content of Europeanization the following matrix can be constructed, where an initial historical analysis clearly shows the subtle and sometimes dramatic changes that have taken place in processes of Europeanization across a long historical time frame. A more thorough historical analysis will undoubtedly reveal more detail, but for now the matrix is indicative that Europeanization/EU-ization processes can be studied in a long term perspective without loosing the concepts’ analytical value. What follows below is an initial venture into history to illustrate the fruitfulness of the historical approach, and to acknowledge the importance of the East and Islam for the construction of the European ideas that we today take for granted and view as somehow ‘naturally’ European.

\(^{53}\) Delanty 1995.
| Historical Content | > 1450 European self-Realization | 1450 – 1700 Proto Europeanization | 1700 – 1914 Incipit Europeanization | 1914 > Contemporary Inward Europeanization | 1945 > Contemporary Outward Europeanization/
EU-ization |
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<td>Civilization Christianity</td>
<td>European reason and rationality expressed in admin.and org principles White man’s burden</td>
<td>Wilsonian ideas Anti-imperialism Pro-nationalism</td>
<td>‘Normative Europe’s continually expanding norm set</td>
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<td>Ideational Agents</td>
<td>Crusaders Traders Invading Moslems and Tartars</td>
<td>Traders Warriors/’Discoverers’ Jewish scholars and translators</td>
<td>Agents of colonial states Missionaries</td>
<td>American policy-makers and their agents in various institutions</td>
<td>European policy-makers and their agents in European institutions and development agencies</td>
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<td>Norm-diffusion Direction</td>
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<td>‘Other’</td>
<td>Barbarians Islam Tartars</td>
<td>Turks Savages</td>
<td>Barbarians Primitive people</td>
<td>Europe’s past The Soviet threat</td>
<td>Europe’s past Violent nationalisms Militant Islamism (?)</td>
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<td>‘Significant We’</td>
<td>Rome The Christian Church</td>
<td>The superior and limitless West</td>
<td>Civilized world Humans with reason and rationality</td>
<td>The ‘free world’</td>
<td>The EU core members</td>
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THE PERIOD OF EUROPEAN SELF-REALIZATION (< 1450)

The word Europe has clear and unequivocal biblical and Greek mythological connections yet it cannot be claimed that a European self-conception existed before the Middle Ages. Until then Roman conceptions of a ‘Significant We’ (Roman citizens/civilization) and a shared ‘Other’ (barbarians) persisted. Being a Christian simply meant ‘to be a Roman’. However, from about the 7th century a European self-consciousness gradually replaced the lingering Roman identity in a process that is inextricably linked to the simultaneous spread of Christianity in Europe and to the threat to Christendom from outside Europe. The gradual conversion of ‘barbarians’ in northern Europe to Christianity made the antithesis between barbarism and Roman/civilization less meaningful. At the same time a territorial linkage to Christianity emerged as Christian communities outside Europe became isolated or fell to the Moslems, and as Christian areas within Europe shrank as a result of Moslem occupation. As a result the increasingly unified Christian Church forged the contours of Christendom, which became the contours of Europe.

Nothing consolidates an identity more than crisis and threat, and the Europeanization of Europe is no exception. Christianity was defended in Europe against invading Moslems, but was also defended outside Europe in the Crusades between the 11th and 13th centuries, both of which were to have a major effect on European self-perception. The extended period of conflict became a permanent feature of Christian activity, which led to a linkage between geographical and cultural Europe, and which in the process forged a new conception of Europe’s ‘Other’ as the Saracens and the ‘Significant We’ as the Christian Church united under the Pope. The failure of the Crusades in restoring the fortunes of Christendom may well be the reason why European identity became so focused in its hostility towards Islam. However, Europe also had a secondary ‘Other’ – the ‘Mongol’ or the ‘Tartar’, constructed in

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1 According to the book of Genesis, Japheth was the son of Noah who after the flood went on to populate Europe. In Greek mythology Europa was the daughter of Agenor, King of Tyre, whom Zeus fell in love with. Hay 1957.
2 Hay 1957, 23.
3 Hay 1957, 23.
4 A medieval term which refers partly to the practical disposal of Christians on the earth, and as a description of the area covered by Christians.
6 As noted by Hobson and Holton even the linkage between Christianity and a European identity is ironic, as Christianity originated in the Middle East. Hobson 2004, 112; Holton 1998, 32.
connection with the extensive conquests of Ghenghis Khan during the 13th and 14th century. In both cases a dual process was in place where on the one hand conflict and the construction of ‘others’ consolidated and strengthened the conception of the ‘Self’, but where the increased interaction outside the geographical and cultural borders of Europe appears to have provided a transmission belt to Oriental and Islamic cultures for diffusion of Eastern ‘resource portfolios’ (ideas, institutions and technologies) into Europe.\(^7\) The increased travel and trade across the Mongol Empire to China and travel to the Holy Lands must have facilitated a wider distribution of both Eastern and Islamic resource portfolios. In both instances new ideas and know how from the more advanced Muslim world and China is likely to have had a decisive local impact both in identity terms and in terms of the beginnings of technological advancements based on the inflow of new ideas to the technically backward Europe.\(^8\)

By the middle of the 15th century, the forging of Europe as a distinct entity clearly associated with Christianity and recognition of Europe as different from other known civilizations in Africa and the Orient seems to have been completed through processes of ideational diffusion and adaptation. It is really only by then that the instability and fragmentation caused by the collapse of the Roman Empire, major internal population migrations and continual invasions from the East and South can be said to have ended and to have produced an ‘idea of Europe’. However, although Europe by 1450 had itself been Europeanized, there was as yet only little in this European emerging identity that could be linked to the idea set contained in today’s ideas about Europe.\(^9\)

### THE PERIOD OF PROTO-EUROPEANIZATION (1450–1700)

As suggested by Delany and later elaborated by John Hobson, ‘we often forget that the culture and civilization of the Occident owes its origin to the Orient’.\(^10\) The important period around the 15th and 16th centuries is no exception even though most Europeans are taught that the ‘rise of the West’\(^11\) is intimately connected with the ‘discoveries’ of the ‘New World’ and the sea route to India along with the technological and organizational innovations of the Italian Renaissance. Indeed Europeans are routinely taught that world history evolves around

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7 Hobson 2004, 46.
8 Tilly 1984, 62.
9 The exception here is Christianity which of course is still regarded by some as a key European value and indeed pre-requisite for EU membership.
10 Delany 1995, 16.
Europe from 1500 onwards. However, although these events are undoubtedly important historical junctures for Europe’s leap forward in developmental terms, a closer examination reveals that the connection is not quite as glorious as it is usually presented in euro-centric history.

First of all, it seems entirely implausible that Vasco da Gama’s ‘discovery’ of the sea route to India in 1498 was the first sea connection between Europe and India. The route had in fact been known for centuries by non-European navigators with far superior shipbuilding techniques and navigational know-how, but as the less developed Europe had little of interest to offer Oriental trade, it was not used. Similarly a closer inspection of the innovations usually attributed to the Italian Renaissance will reveal an Eastern or Islamic heritage suggesting that Renaissance ideas actually were diffused into Europe from the Islamic countries rather than being endogenous European ideas. The question is what changed to facilitate the increased diffusion into Europe of new resource portfolios, which could so effectively contribute to Europe’s great leap forward in terms of development and to today’s conception of Europe as inherently superior?

The answer is intimately connected with the age of discovery, especially the discovery of the ‘New World’, and its copious amounts of silver, which facilitated the increased trade with the Orient on the newly established Vasco da Gama sea route, and as a result further increased transmission of Eastern resource portfolios. It is however unlikely that the extensive trade with the Orient could have been sustained simply on the basis of what Europe had to offer of manufactured goods. Without the silver, obtained in Latin America (and the slave trade and opium trade) Europe simply did not have anything of interest to the Orient, resulting in a massive trade deficit between Europe and Asia. Hence rather than Europe’s greatness being based on a sudden surge in science, technology, culture and organizational practices originating in Renaissance Italy and attributable to great men such as Copernicus and Da Vinci, it seems that Europe’s greatness is attributable to the plundering of the Latin American bullion, human trafficking and drugs pushing!

14 Hobson 2004; Saliba 1999.
15 Frank 1998.
16 Hobson 2004, 171.
In many ways the processes of ideational diffusion of a number of resource portfolios in the period 1450–1700 are similar to the period before it since the diffusion direction is still towards Europe and is still carried by agents such as traders and warriors as well as (primarily) Jewish scholars and translators. In other words the actual ideational diffusion patterns seem to be rather different from the patterns suggested by euro-centric history, which holds that European worldwide influence started with the age of discovery – suggesting outward Europeanization in terms of ideational diffusion. However, in reality what seemed to be diffused in an outward direction by the Europeans was limited to diseases and pillaging along with some attempt at converting ‘noble savages’ to Christianity. The vast majority of diffusion was still from the East to Europe, which was a function of Europe’s relative backwardness, which remained in place until the beginning of the 18th century when the effects of the Industrial Revolution and the Enlightenment once again changed the ideational content of Europeanization.

Even though much remained the same in terms of ideational diffusion, the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, the discovery of the Americas and the Reformation and religious wars of the 17th century did result in a subtle, but important change in the construction of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. The expansion of the Ottoman Empire created a new ‘Other’ in European discourse, which came to be associated with the ‘Turk’ rather than the earlier wider ‘Other’ in the form of Islam. With the Reformation and the religious wars of the 17th century it was no longer possible to maintain the unified Christian Church as the ‘Significant We’, which meant that the juxtaposition of Christianity versus Islam lost its significance. At the same time the acquisition of the ‘New World’ greatly strengthened a sense of European superiority and provided a secondary ‘Other’ in the form of ‘savages’, which allowed the construction of a European identity as superior and civilized. As suggested by Delanty, the European identity discourse changed from the Middle Ages where it was Christianity against Islam to the early modern period where it became ‘civilization’ over ‘nature’. In so doing a ‘Significant We’ was constructed, which was the superior and limitless West, which now incorporated the ‘New World’ and which became associated with a set of European values that came to be inextricably associated with the idea of progress.17

THE PERIOD OF INCIPIT EUROPEANIZATION (1700 – 1919)

It is often said that the ideas of The Enlightenment are the basis of European identity and the foundations upon which the EU is built. Yet such an interpretation fails to distinguish between two different interpretations of the Enlightenment. The contemporary understanding of the Enlightenment can best be described as ‘liberal Enlightenment’ which arguably was the American interpretation of the Enlightenment ideas. ‘Liberal enlightenment’ sees a major cause of social evil as originating in prejudice, intolerance and superstition and advocates tolerance, freedom of thought and open-mindedness. Clearly, this understanding of the Enlightenment is adequately in line with current ideas of what constitutes a European idea set. Yet, although it is certainly the case that the Enlightenment advocated skepticism towards traditional authority in matters of religion and politics, one of the main components of the Enlightenment in its European interpretation was the emphasis on reason and rationality as the guiding principle and as the defining property of the human condition. The problem with the European use of the Enlightenment as an important foundation for the construction of a linear and endogenous process creating the Europe of today is that the idea of reason did not lead to tolerance and open-mindedness, but to a racist ideology. The racism that was derived from the ideas of the Enlightenment enabled the construction of Europeans as a superior race and provided the ideological justification for colonialism and later Fascism and Nazism. In other words, ideas, which stand in complete contradiction to the ideas that are assumed to be the content of the Enlightenment and the basis for present day Europeanization.

The emphasis on reason and rationality as a key component of Enlightenment thinking facilitated a classification of humankind along a mental continuum, in which Western man was constructed as fully rational in a mature and developed sense whereas the East was constructed as irrational, immature and under-developed and incapable of self-government. ‘The white man’s burden’ therefore became a duty on the more developed European civilizations to ‘improve’ other ‘inferior’ non-European races through conquest and colonialism. It was believed that non-Europeans could be ‘brought to adulthood’, rationality and modernity only through contact with the superior Europeans. In other words the diffusion patterns of the period are indeed now going from Europe, where the ideational content is European administrative systems and organizational principles, Christian ideas and the idea of racial superiority, supported by ‘scientific proof’ in scientific racism and social Darwinism. Unlike the earlier processes of diffusion where individual traders, travelers and

18 Scruton 1996.
19 Delanty 1995, 95.
scholars seem to have played the main role, the diffusion process during the period of incipit Europeanization was systematized through colonialism and its associated officials and through an equally systematized process of missionaries. The European ‘Significant We’ was once again the civilized world consisting of white Europeans and European culture, whereas the ‘Other’ became once again the ‘barbarians’ or uncivilized primitive peoples. The object of the ideational diffusion was to foster civilization whilst at the same time to extract resources for domestic benefit and consumption.

The period is undoubtedly Europe’s belle époque in terms of ideational diffusion, but lasting little more than two centuries. However, although the period was short in duration, it nevertheless had a remarkable and global impact by successfully diffusing a number of key European practices and principles. These included the expansion of the state system, administrative and organizational practices, industrialization and not least a euro-centric interpretation of history and a (lasting?) construction of Europe (and the West) as superior. However, the ideas that we today associate with European key values were not diffused from Europe in this instance, but came from the next global ideational diffuser – the United States.

THE PERIOD OF CONTEMPORARY (INWARD) EUROPEANIZATION (1919 >)

Few will dispute the fact that the First World War constituted a critical juncture, which spelt the end of the European empires, and which started a process of change in the global power balance away from Europe towards the United States. However, the massive slaughter of the War also placed a serious question mark on the values and principles that had given rise to such a calamity in which the supposedly reasonable, rational and superior Europeans had engaged in killing each other. The disbelief of what had happened in Europe was expressed in the arts through the surrealist movement, and in ideational terms it signified the end of Europe as the source of ideational diffusion and the beginning of a period where ideas once again flowed into Europe.
The new ideas, which were now diffused into Europe came from the United States and were based on the American creed and on an American notion of world order based on anti-imperialism and pro-nationalism, most famously expressed in the Wilsonian agenda of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Arguably the ideas were based on an American, and much more liberal, interpretation of the ideas of the Enlightenment, and as such do have a European origin, albeit in a different interpretation. The ideas expressed in Wilsonialism are basically part of an American belief in its own exceptionalism on the one hand, and in the universalism of its ideas on the other. With the changed balance of power in the post WW1 period and the discrediting of the European idea set, initially in the slaughter of the First World War and later in the atrocities of Fascism, Nazism and Stalinism, and on the latest occasion, in the violent nationalisms during the break-up of Yugoslavia, the setting was in place for a moralistic and ideological foreign policy involving a conscious transfer of the American idea set into Europe. The ideational content of Wilsonialism has been refined and further specified throughout the 20th century, but its essence has remained the three core notions of democracy, open economic markets and international institutions.

Although the Wilsonian peace of 1919 initially failed to facilitate internalization and institutionalization of the idea set and therefore greatly discredited internationalism as a foreign policy, the diffusion of ideas from the United States into Europe continued under a different name and alongside a simultaneous Realist foreign policy with renewed emphasis and through greatly improved processes of state socialization on two further occasions in 20th century history; following the end of the 2nd World War and following the end of the Cold War. Each of these critical junctures gave rise to a new cycle of ideational diffusion, which gradually enlarged the community of states having internalized and institutionalized the Wilsonian idea set, now known as the Euro-Atlantic community. On each occasion the

20 The text of the American's Creed is: ‘I believe in the United States of America as a Government of the People, by the People, for the People; whose just powers are derived from the consent of the governed; A democracy in a republic, a sovereign Nation of many Sovereign States; a perfect Union, one and inseparable; established upon those principles of Freedom, Equality, Justice, and Humanity for which American Patriots sacrificed their Lives and Fortunes’. Page 1917. Of course the ideas contained in the American Creed and in Wilsonialism are based on mainly European enlightenment ideas, but their emphasis is on the liberal interpretation of the Enlightenment rather than the rational interpretation.


22 I am here referring to the two parallel orders outlined by Ikenberry; the liberalist/institutionalist order, which facilitated European integration and the Euro-Atlantic institutional order and the ‘containment order’, which facilitated the policy of containment vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Ikenberry 2001.
process has defined the European ‘Other’ and ‘Significant We’, the ‘Other’ being constituted for internal reasons as Europe’s own war-mongering past, and during the Cold War as the Communist threat. The ‘Significant We’ has on all occasions remained ‘the free world’ and the core members of the Euro-Atlantic community. The agents of ideational diffusion have been American policy-makers formulating the overall idea set and their representatives within the growing western institutional framework, through processes of social learning, adaptation and institution building. It is clear that in the case of each cycle of 20th century ideational diffusion that the United States has been the driving force behind initiatives that have led to the gradual enlargement of the value based community. This is even the case following the end of the Cold War, where the Clinton Administration nudged the Europeans towards accepting enlargement of the EU and NATO. This is a period that is still ongoing, although much of the ideational diffusion is now conducted by the Europeans themselves – the former pupil has become a teacher, now teaching prospective newcomers to ‘the class’.

THE PERIOD OF CONTEMPORARY (OUTWARD) EUROPEANIZATION AND EU-IZATION (1945 >)

Having adapted to and internalized and institutionalized the promoted idea set through the three cycles of ideational diffusion into Europe, the Europeans have once again become diffusers of ideas in an outgoing direction. The previous ideas of racial superiority and colonialism have given way – in fact have practically been forgotten to a new idea set that is based on the diffused American Wilsonian idea. Certain specific European characteristics such as opposition to the death penalty, different views on the role of the state, social welfare and the use of force and foreign intervention have gradually been added to the European idea in a process that seems likely to increasingly differentiate the European idea set from the American idea set. Diffusion of the European/Wilsonian idea set is conducted towards prospective members of the Euro-Atlantic community and in varying degrees on a global scale through development aid and trade agreements with conditionalities attached. The specifics of the European adapted form of the Wilsonian idea set are continually being reviewed and institutionalized through internal self-reflective processes of EU-ization in a broad variety of policy-specific instances. This is a gradual process where increasing levels of detailed norms and policy guidelines are being institutionalized in the EU and its Member States, leading to an ever increasingly detailed and policy-specific ideational portfolio, and to closer integration and cooperation between the Member States of the EU. The latter is the process that has received

23 For a more complete list of the norms contained in the European norm set see Manners 2002.
most attention in the contemporary Europeanization debate, with some sporadic references to
Enlargement and EU development aid. However, the specific difference between these
inseparable, yet distinctive processes of inward and outward Europeanization and EU-ization,
has not been clearly acknowledged, which is precisely what has added to confusion and
concerns about conceptual overstretch.
Conclusion

By utilizing a Historical Sociological perspective in the conceptual debate on Europeanization a new picture has emerged which clearly reveals the complexity of the concept and processes involved in Europeanization/EU-ization, but which also reveals a comforting degree of similarity between all processes of Europeanization/EU-ization. Paradoxically, it seems that one of the main factors contributing to the conceptual and theoretical confusion within the field has been the attempts at limiting the conceptual scope of Europeanization to questions related directly to the EU. In so doing the question of origin of the present process and which causal relationships to include have become marred in an empirically determined delimitation, which has created several illogical exclusions from the field of Europeanization, and which seems to have been a main contributing factor to the inability to generate cumulative research. Concerns about conceptual overstretch are the result of the lack of models and theories, which could bring order into a very disorderly empirical field rather than concerns about including both cultural and political encounters.

The Historical Sociological framework and Social Constructivist theory put forward in this article are unlikely to contribute to simplifying the empirical field of Europeanization/EU-ization. After all neither Historical Sociology, nor agent-based theories such as Social Identity Theory lend themselves to parsimony. However, as focus has shifted from empirics and policy related instances of the impact on and of the EU to a focus on ideational transfer where the causal relationships to be explained are how ideas are transferred and why they are accepted or rejected, cumulative research is much more likely to result within a framework that focuses on structures, agents and processes, rather than the specifics of a myriad of policies. After all without having uncovered the many different, but related processes of Europeanization, it is not possible to reach a disciplinary wide consensus on what the concept entails and which causal relationships to explain – a situation which is akin to Puchala’s blind men touching an elephant – except that in relation to Europeanization, the blind men need to find the elephant on the savannah first!24 No end of empirical and policy specific case studies is going to bring the discipline any closer to an understanding of the concept and how it fits in within an overall historical process unless research is based on models and theories – for that the Historical Sociological perspective presented here seems to hold some promise.

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24 Puchala 1972, 267.
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