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## Social justice in the age of identity politics: Redistribution, recognition, participation

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**discussion paper**

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**Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics:  
Redistribution, Recognition, Participation**

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## **Abstract**

Today, claims for social justice seem to divide into two types: claims for the redistribution of resources and claims for the recognition of cultural difference. Increasingly, these two kind of claims are polarized against one another. As a result, we are asked to choose between class politics and identity politics, social democracy and multiculturalism, redistribution and recognition. These, however, are false antitheses. Justice today requires *both* redistribution *and* recognition. Neither alone is sufficient.

As soon as one embraces this thesis, however, the question of how to combine them becomes paramount. I contend that the emancipatory aspects of the two paradigms need to be integrated in a single, comprehensive framework. In this lecture, I consider two dimensions of this project. First, on the plane of moral philosophy, I propose an overarching conception of justice that can accomodate both defensible claims for social equality and defensible claims for the recognition of difference. Second, on the plane of social theory, I propose an approach that can accomodate the complex relations between interest and identity, economy and culture, class and status in contemporary globalizing capitalist society.

## **Zusammenfassung**

In der aktuellen Debatte erscheinen Forderungen nach sozialer Gerechtigkeit in zwei Typen aufgespalten: Forderungen nach Umverteilung von Ressourcen und Forderungen nach Anerkennung kultureller Verschiedenheit. Diese beiden Typen von Forderungen werden zunehmend gegeneinander polarisiert. Entsprechend sollen wir wählen zwischen Klassenpolitik und Identitätspolitik, sozialer Demokratie und Multikulturalismus, Umverteilung und Anerkennung. Es handelt sich dabei jedoch um falsche Gegensätze. Gerechtigkeit erfordert heute beides: Umverteilung und Anerkennung. Eines allein ist unzureichend.

Wenn man diese These akzeptiert, wird die Frage zentral, wie beide Forderungen zu vereinbaren sind. Ich vertrete den Standpunkt, daß die emanzipatorischen Aspekte der beiden Paradigmata in einem umfassenden Rahmen integriert werden müssen. In diesem Beitrag werden zwei Dimensionen dieses Vorhabens behandelt. Als erstes schlage ich auf der Ebene der Moralphilosophie eine übergreifende Konzeption von Gerechtigkeit vor, die sowohl vertretbare Forderungen nach sozialer Gleichheit umfaßt als auch vertretbare Forderungen nach Anerkennung von Differenz. Als zweites schlage ich auf der Ebene von Gesellschaftstheorie einen Ansatz vor, der den komplexen Beziehungen zwischen Interesse und Identität, Ökonomie und Kultur sowie Klasse und Status in der heutigen globalisierten, kapitalistischen Gesellschaft Rechnung trägt.



In today's world, claims for social justice seem increasingly to divide into two types. First, and most familiar, are redistributive claims, which seek a more just distribution of resources and goods. To be sure, the recent resurgence of free-market thinking has put proponents of redistribution on the defensive. Nevertheless, egalitarian redistributive claims have supplied the paradigm case for most theorizing about social justice for the past 150 years.<sup>1</sup>

Today, however, we increasingly encounter a second type of social-justice claim in the "politics of recognition." Here the goal, in its most plausible form, is a difference-friendly world, where assimilation to majority or dominant cultural norms is no longer the price of equal respect. This type of claim has recently attracted the interest of political philosophers, moreover, some of whom are seeking to develop a new paradigm of justice that puts recognition at its center.<sup>2</sup>

In general, then, we are confronted with a new constellation. The discourse of social justice, once centered on distribution, is now increasingly divided between claims for redistribution, on the one hand, and claims for recognition, on the other. In this new constellation, the two kinds of justice claims are often dissociated from one another. The result is a widespread decoupling of the cultural politics of difference from the social politics of equality. In some cases, moreover, this dissociation has become a polarization. Some proponents of redistribution reject the politics of recognition outright, casting claims for the recognition of difference as "false consciousness," a hindrance to the pursuit of social justice. Conversely, some proponents of recognition see distributive politics as part and parcel of an outmoded materialism, simultaneously blind to and complicit with many injustices. In such cases, we are effectively presented with what is constructed as an either/or choice: redistribution or recognition? class politics or identity politics? multiculturalism or social democracy?

These, I have argued elsewhere, are false antitheses. Justice today requires *both* redistribution *and* recognition. Neither alone is sufficient. As soon as one embraces this thesis, however, the question of how to combine them becomes paramount. I contend that the emancipatory aspects of the two paradigms need to be integrated in a single, comprehensive framework. In moral philosophy, the task is to devise an overarching conception of justice that can accommodate both defensible claims for social equality and defensible claims for the recognition of difference. In social theory, the task is to understand the complex relations between class and status, economy and culture, in social contexts that are increasingly postindustrial, transnational, and multicultural. In political theory, the task is to envision a set of institutional arrangements and associated policy reforms that can remedy both maldistribution and misrecognition, while minimizing the mutual interferences likely to arise when the two sorts of redress are sought simultaneously. In practical politics, finally, the task is to foster democratic engagement across current divides in

order to build a broad-based programmatic orientation that integrates the best of the politics of redistribution with the best of the politics of recognition.

In this lecture, I limit myself to some of the moral-philosophical and social-theoretical dimensions of this project. First, however, I want to summarize my understanding of gender, it will figure prominently as an example throughout my argument. In my conception, gender is a two-sided category. It encompasses both an-economic dimension and a cultural dimension. Understanding and redressing gender injustice requires changing attending to both distribution and recognition.

From the distributive perspective, gender is a basic organizing principle of the economic structure of society. On the one hand, it structures the fundamental division between paid "productive" labor and unpaid "reproductive" and domestic labor, assigning women primary responsibility for the latter. On the other hand, gender also structures the division within paid labor between higher-paid, male-dominated, manufacturing and professional occupations and lower-paid, female-dominated "pink collar" and domestic service occupations. The result is an economic structure that generates gender-specific forms of distributive injustice.

From the recognition perspective, in contrast, gender is a status differentiation. A major feature of gender injustice is androcentrism: the authoritative construction of norms that privilege traits associated with masculinity and the pervasive devaluation and disparagement of things coded as "feminine," paradigmatically -- but not only -- women. When these androcentric norms are institutionalized, women suffer gender-specific status injuries, including sexual assault and domestic violence; objectifying and demeaning stereotypical depictions in the media; harassment and disparagement in everyday life; and exclusion or marginalization in public spheres and deliberative bodies. These harms are injustices of misrecognition. They are relatively independent of political economy and are not merely "superstructural." Thus, they cannot be remedied by redistribution alone but require additional independent remedies of recognition.

Gender, in sum, is a two-sided category. It contains both an economic face that brings it within the ambit of redistribution and also a cultural face that brings it simultaneously within the ambit of recognition. It is an open question whether the two faces are of equal weight. But redressing gender injustice, in any case, requires changing both the economic structure and the status order of contemporary society.

Gender, moreover, is not unusual in this regard. Many other key axes of injustice are also two-sided in this way. But for present purposes I will let this analysis of gender stand as a paradigm case for my general argument that justice today requires both redistribution and recognition.

Let me turn therefore to some moral-theoretical questions that arise once we contemplate trying to integrate redistribution and recognition in a single,

comprehensive account of justice. Three such questions are especially important. First, is recognition really a matter of justice, or is it a matter of self-realization? Second, do distributive justice and recognition constitute two distinct, *sui generis*, normative paradigms, or can either of them be subsumed within the other? And third, does justice require the recognition of what is distinctive about individuals or groups, or is recognition of our common humanity sufficient?

On the first question, two major theorists, Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth, understand recognition as a matter of self-realization. Unlike them, however, I consider it an issue of justice. Thus, one should not answer the question “what’s wrong with misrecognition?” by saying that it constitutes an impediment to the self-realization of the oppressed. One should say, rather, that it is unjust that some individuals and groups are denied the status of full partners in social interaction simply as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of cultural value in whose construction they have not equally participated and which disparage their distinctive characteristics or the distinctive characteristics assigned to them.

This account offers several advantages. First, it permits one to justify claims for recognition as morally binding under modern conditions of value pluralism.<sup>3</sup> Under these conditions, there is no single conception of self-realization that is universally shared, nor any that can be established as authoritative. Thus, any attempt to justify claims for recognition that appeals to an account of self-realization must necessarily be sectarian. Unlike such approaches, I assume that it is up to men and women to define for themselves what counts as a good life and to devise for themselves an approach to pursuing it, within limits that ensure a like liberty for others. What makes misrecognition morally wrong, on my view, is that it denies some individuals and groups the possibility of participating on a par with others in social interaction. The norm of *participatory parity* is nonsectarian in the required sense. It appeals to a conception of justice that can be accepted by people with divergent views of the good life, provided that they agree to abide by fair terms of interaction under conditions of value pluralism.

Treating recognition as a matter of justice has a second advantage as well. It conceives misrecognition as a *status injury* whose locus is social relations, not individual psychology. To be misrecognized, on this view, is not simply to be thought ill of, looked down on, or devalued in others’ conscious attitudes or mental beliefs. It is rather to be denied the status of a full partner in social interaction and prevented from participating as a peer in social life as a consequence of *institutionalized* patterns of cultural value that constitute one as comparatively unworthy of respect or esteem. This approach avoids difficulties that arise when misrecognition is understood psychologically. When misrecognition is identified with internal distortions in the structure of self-consciousness of the oppressed, it is but a short step to blaming the victim. Conversely, when misrecognition is equated with prejudice in the minds of the oppressors, overcoming it seems to require policing their beliefs, an approach that is authoritarian. On the justice view, in contrast,



misrecognition is a matter of externally manifest and publicly verifiable impediments to some people's standing as full members of society. And such arrangements are morally indefensible whether or not they distort the subjectivity of the oppressed.

Finally, the justice account of recognition avoids the view that everyone has an equal right to social esteem. That view is patently untenable, because it renders meaningless the notion of esteem. The account of recognition proposed here, in contrast, entails no such *reductio ad absurdum*. What it *does* entail is that everyone has an equal right to pursue social esteem under fair conditions of equal opportunity. And such conditions do not obtain when, for example, institutionalized patterns of interpretation pervasively downgrade femininity, "non-whiteness," homosexuality, and everything culturally associated with them. For all these reasons, recognition is better viewed as a matter of justice than as a matter of self-realization. But what follows for the theory of justice?

Does it follow, turning now to the second question, that distribution and recognition constitute two distinct, *sui generis* conceptions of justice? Or can either of them be reduced to the other? The question of reduction must be considered from two different sides. From one side, the issue is whether standard theories of distributive justice can adequately subsume problems of recognition. In my view, the answer is no. To be sure, many distributive theorists appreciate the importance of status over and above the allocation of resources and seek to accommodate it in their accounts.<sup>4</sup> But the results are not wholly satisfactory. Most such theorists assume a reductive economic-cum-legalistic view of status, supposing that a just distribution of resources and rights is sufficient to preclude misrecognition. In fact, however, not all misrecognition is a byproduct of maldistribution, nor of maldistribution plus legal discrimination. Witness the case of the African-American Wall Street banker who cannot get a taxi to pick him up. To handle such cases, a theory of justice must reach beyond the distribution of rights and goods to examine patterns of cultural value. It must consider whether institutionalized patterns of interpretation and valuation impede parity of participation in social life.<sup>5</sup>

What, then, of the other side of the question? Can existing theories of recognition adequately subsume problems of distribution? Here, too, I contend the answer is no. To be sure, some theorists of recognition appreciate the importance of economic equality and seek to accommodate it in their accounts.<sup>6</sup> But once again the results are not wholly satisfactory. Such theorists tend to assume a reductive culturalist view of distribution. Supposing that economic inequalities are rooted in a cultural order that privileges some kinds of labor over others, they assume that changing that cultural order is sufficient to preclude maldistribution.<sup>7</sup> In fact, however, not all maldistribution is a byproduct of misrecognition. Witness the case of the skilled white male industrial worker who becomes unemployed due to a factory closing resulting from a speculative corporate merger. In that case, the injustice of maldistribution has little to do with misrecognition. It is rather a consequence of imperatives intrinsic to an order of specialized economic relations whose *raison*

*d'être* is the accumulation of profits. To handle such cases, a theory of justice must reach beyond cultural value patterns to examine the economic structure. It must consider whether economic mechanisms that are relatively decoupled from cultural value patterns and that operate in a relatively impersonal way can impede parity of participation in social life.

In general then, neither distribution theorists nor recognition theorists have so far succeeded in adequately subsuming the concerns of the other.<sup>8</sup> Thus, instead of endorsing either one of their paradigms to the exclusion of the other, I propose to develop what I shall call a “bivalent” conception of justice. A bivalent conception treats distribution and recognition as distinct perspectives on, and dimensions of, justice. Without reducing either one of them to the other, it encompasses both dimensions within a broader, overarching framework.

The normative core of my conception, which I have mentioned several times, is the notion of *parity of participation*.<sup>9</sup> According to this norm, justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers. For participatory parity to be possible, I claim, at least two conditions must be satisfied.<sup>10</sup> First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants' independence and “voice.” Second, the institutionalized cultural patterns of interpretation and evaluation express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem. Both these conditions are necessary for participatory parity. Neither alone is sufficient. The first one brings into focus concerns traditionally associated with the theory of distributive justice, especially concerns pertaining to the economic structure of society and to economically defined class differentials. The second one brings into focus concerns recently highlighted in the philosophy of recognition, especially concerns pertaining to the status order of society and to culturally defined hierarchies of status. Thus, a bivalent conception of justice oriented to the norm of participatory parity encompasses both redistribution and recognition, without reducing either one to the other.

This brings us to the third question: Does justice require the recognition of what is distinctive about individuals or groups, over and above the recognition of our common humanity? This question cannot be answered, I contend, by an *a priori* account of the kinds of recognition that everyone always needs. It needs rather to be approached in the spirit of pragmatism as informed by the insights of a critical social theory. From this perspective, recognition is a remedy for injustice, not a generic human need. Thus, the form(s) of recognition justice requires in any given case depend(s) on the form(s) of *misrecognition* to be redressed. Everything depends in other words on precisely what currently misrecognized people need in order to be able to participate as peers in social life. And there is no reason to assume that all of them need the same thing in every context. In some cases, they may need to be unburdened of excessive ascribed or constructed distinctiveness. In other cases, they may need to have hitherto underacknowledged distinctiveness taken into

account. In still other cases, they may need to shift the focus onto dominant or advantaged groups, outing the latter's distinctiveness, which has been falsely parading as universality. Alternatively, they may need to deconstruct the very terms in which attributed differences are currently elaborated. Finally, they may need all of the above, or several of the above, in combination with one another and in combination with redistribution. Which people need which kind(s) of recognition in which contexts depends on the nature of the obstacles they face with regard to participatory parity. That, however, can only be determined with the aid of a critical social theory.

This brings us to the social-theoretical issues that arise when we try to encompass redistribution and recognition in a single framework. Here, the principal task is to theorize the relations between class and status, and between maldistribution and misrecognition, in contemporary society. An adequate approach must allow for the full complexity of these relations. It must account *both for the differentiation of class from status and for the causal interactions between them*. It must accommodate, as well, *both the mutual irreducibility of maldistribution and misrecognition and their practical entwinement with one another*.

To this end, I propose a thought experiment. Consider an ideal-typical pre-state society of the sort described in the classical anthropological literature, while bracketing the question of ethnographic accuracy.<sup>11</sup> In such a society, the master idiom of social relations is kinship. Kinship organizes not only marriage and sexual relations, but also the labor process and the distribution of goods; relations of authority, reciprocity, and obligation; and symbolic hierarchies of status and prestige. In such a society, class structure and status order are effectively fused. Because kinship constitutes the overarching principle of distribution, kinship status dictates class position. Status injuries translate immediately into (what we would consider to be) distributive injustices. Misrecognition directly entails maldistribution.

Now consider the opposite extreme of a fully marketized society, in which economic structure dictates cultural value. In such a society, the master determining instance is the market. Markets organize not only the labor process and the distribution of goods, but also marriage and sexual relations; political relations of authority, reciprocity, and obligation; and symbolic hierarchies of status and prestige. In this society, too, class structure and status order are effectively fused. But the determinations run in the opposite direction. Because the market constitutes the sole and all-pervasive mechanism of valuation, market position dictates social status. In the absence of any quasi-autonomous cultural value patterns, distributive injustices translate immediately into status injuries. Maldistribution directly entails misrecognition.

In both of these societies, accordingly, (what we would call) class and status map perfectly onto each other. So, as well, do (what we would call) maldistribution and misrecognition, which convert fully and without remainder into one another. As a

result, one can understand both these societies reasonably well by attending exclusively to a single dimension of social life. For the fully kin-governed society, one can read off the economic dimension of domination directly from the cultural; one can infer class directly from status and maldistribution directly from misrecognition. For the fully marketized society, conversely, one can read off the cultural dimension of domination directly from the economic; one can infer status directly from class and misrecognition directly from maldistribution. For understanding the forms of domination proper to the fully kin-governed society, therefore, culturalism is a perfectly appropriate social theory.<sup>12</sup> If, in contrast, one is seeking to understand the fully marketized society, one could hardly improve on economism.<sup>13</sup>

When we turn to other types of societies, however, such simple and elegant approaches no longer suffice. They are patently inappropriate for our society, which contains specialized economic institutions and cultural institutions. The result is a partial uncoupling of economic distribution from structures of prestige and a gap between status and class. In our society, the class structure ceases perfectly to mirror the status order, even though each of them influences the other. Because the market does not constitute the sole and all-pervasive mechanism of valuation, market position does not dictate social status. Partially market-resistant cultural value patterns prevent distributive injustices from converting fully and without remainder into status injuries. Maldistribution does not directly entail misrecognition, although it certainly contributes to the latter. Conversely, because no single status principle such as kinship constitutes the sole and all-pervasive principle of distribution, status does not dictate class position. Relatively autonomous economic institutions prevent status injuries from converting fully and without remainder into distributive injustices. Misrecognition does not directly entail maldistribution, although it, too, surely contributes to the latter. As a result, one cannot understand this society by attending exclusively to a single dimension of social life. One cannot read off the economic dimension of domination directly from the cultural, nor the cultural directly from the economic. Likewise, one cannot infer class directly from status, nor status directly from class. Finally, one cannot deduce maldistribution directly from misrecognition, nor misrecognition directly from maldistribution. It follows that neither culturalism nor economism suffices for understanding capitalist society. Instead, one needs an approach that can accommodate differentiation, divergence, and interaction at every level.

What sort of social theory can handle this task? If neither economism nor culturalism is up to the task, a dualism of some sort is required. But everything depends on what sort. Two possibilities present themselves.<sup>14</sup> The first I call “substantive dualism.” It treats redistribution and recognition as two different “spheres of justice,” pertaining to two different societal domains. The former pertains to the economic domain of society, the latter to the cultural domain. When we consider economic matters, such as the structure of labor markets, we should assume the standpoint of distributive justice, attending to the impact of economic structures and institutions on the relative economic position of social actors. When,

in contrast, we consider cultural matters, such as the representation of female sexuality on MTV, we should assume the standpoint of recognition, attending to the impact of institutionalized patterns of interpretation and value on the status and relative standing of social actors.

Substantive dualism may be preferable to economism and culturalism, but it is nevertheless inadequate. Treating economy and culture as two separate spheres, it mistakes the social differentiations for institutional divisions that are impermeable and sharply bounded. In fact, the economy is not a culture-free zone, but a culture-instrumentalizing and -resignifying one. Thus, what presents itself as “the economy” is always already permeated with cultural interpretations and norms--witness the distinctions between “working” and “caregiving,” “men’s jobs” and “women’s jobs,” which are so fundamental to historical capitalism. In these cases, gender meanings and norms have been appropriated from the larger culture and bent to capitalist purposes, with major consequences for both distribution and recognition. Likewise, what presents itself as “the cultural sphere” is deeply permeated by “the bottom line”--witness global mass entertainment, the art market, and transnational advertising, all fundamental to contemporary culture. *Contra* substantive dualism, then, nominally economic matters usually affect not only the economic position but also the status and identities of social actors. Likewise, nominally cultural matters affect not only status but also economic position. In neither case, therefore, are we dealing with separate spheres.<sup>15</sup>

Substantive dualism is not a solution to, but a symptom of, the uncoupling of redistribution and recognition. A critical perspective, in contrast, must probe the connections between them. It must make visible, and *criticizable*, both the cultural subtexts of nominally economic processes and the economic subtexts of nominally cultural practices. Treating *every* practice as simultaneously economic and cultural, albeit not necessarily in equal proportions, it must assess each of them from two different perspectives. It must assume both the standpoint of distribution and the standpoint of recognition, without reducing either one of these perspectives to the other.

Such an approach I call “perspectival dualism.” Here redistribution and recognition do not correspond to two substantive societal domains, economy and culture. Rather, they constitute two analytical perspectives that can be assumed with respect to any domain. These perspectives can be deployed critically, moreover, against the ideological grain. One can use the recognition perspective to identify the cultural dimensions of what are usually viewed as redistributive economic policies. By focusing on the production and circulation of interpretations and norms in welfare programs, for example, one can assess the effects of institutionalized maldistribution on the identities and social status of single mothers.<sup>16</sup> Conversely, one can use the redistribution perspective to bring into focus the economic dimensions of what are usually viewed as issues of recognition. By focusing on the high “transaction costs” of living in the closet, for example, one can assess the effects of heterosexist

misrecognition on the economic position of gays and lesbians.<sup>17</sup> With perspectival dualism, then, one can assess the justice of any social practice from two analytically distinct normative vantage points, asking: Does the practice in question work to ensure both the economic conditions and the cultural conditions of participatory parity? Or does it, rather, undermine them?

Beyond its theoretical strengths, perspectival dualism offers a major practical advantage. It allows us to conceptualize some practical difficulties that can arise in the course of political struggles for redistribution and recognition. It appreciates that neither claims for redistribution nor claims for recognition can be contained within a separate sphere. On the contrary, they impinge on one another in ways that may give rise to unintended effects.

Consider, first, that redistribution impinges on recognition. Virtually any claim for redistribution will have some recognition effects, whether intended or unintended. Proposals to redistribute income through social welfare, for example, have an irreducible expressive dimension;<sup>18</sup> they convey interpretations of the meaning and value of different activities, for example, “childrearing” versus “wage-earning,” while also constituting and ranking different subject positions, for example “welfare mothers” versus “tax payers.”<sup>19</sup> Thus, redistributive claims invariably affect the status and social identities of social actors. These effects must be thematized and scrutinized, lest one end up fuelling misrecognition in the course of remedying maldistribution.

The classic example, once again, is “welfare.” Means-tested benefits aimed specifically at the poor are the most directly redistributive form of social welfare. Yet such benefits tend to stigmatize recipients, casting them as deviants and scroungers and invidiously distinguishing them from “wage-earners” and “tax-payers” who “pay their own way.” Welfare programs of this type “target” the poor--not only for material aid but also for public hostility. The end result is often to add the insult of misrecognition to the injury of deprivation. Redistributive policies have misrecognition effects when background patterns of cultural value skew the meaning of economic reforms, when, for example, a pervasive cultural devaluation of female caregiving inflects aid to single-parent families as “getting something for nothing.”<sup>20</sup> In this context, welfare reform cannot succeed unless it is joined with struggles for cultural change aimed at revaluing caregiving and the feminine associations that code it.<sup>21</sup> In short, *no redistribution without recognition*.

Consider, next, the converse dynamic, whereby recognition impinges on distribution. Virtually any claim for recognition will have some distributive effects, whether intended or unintended. Proposals to redress androcentric evaluative patterns, for example, have economic implications, which work sometimes to the detriment of the intended beneficiaries. For example, campaigns to suppress prostitution and pornography for the sake of enhancing women’s status may have negative effects on the economic position of sex workers, while no-fault divorce

reforms, which appeared to dovetail with feminist efforts to enhance women's status, have had negative effects on the economic position of some divorced women.<sup>22</sup> Thus, recognition claims can affect economic position, above and beyond their effects on status. These effects, too, must be scrutinized, lest one end up fuelling maldistribution in the course of trying to remedy misrecognition. Recognition claims, moreover, are liable to the charge of being "merely symbolic."<sup>23</sup> When pursued in contexts marked by gross disparities in economic position, reforms aimed at recognizing distinctiveness tend to devolve into empty gestures; like the sort of recognition that would put women on a pedestal, they mock, rather than redress, serious harms. In such contexts, recognition reforms cannot succeed unless they are joined with struggles for redistribution. In short, *no recognition without redistribution*.

The need, in all cases, is to think integratively, as in the example of comparable worth. Here a claim to redistribute income between men and women is expressly integrated with a claim to change gender-coded patterns of cultural value. The underlying premise is that gender injustices of distribution and recognition are so complexly intertwined that neither can be redressed entirely independently of the other. Thus, efforts to reduce the gender wage gap cannot fully succeed if, remaining wholly "economic," they fail to challenge the gender meanings that code low-paying service occupations as "women's work," largely devoid of intelligence and skill. Likewise, efforts to revalue female-coded traits such as interpersonal sensitivity and nurturance cannot succeed if, remaining wholly "cultural," they fail to challenge the structural economic conditions that connect those traits with dependency and powerlessness. Only an approach that redresses the cultural devaluation of the "feminine" precisely *within* the economy (and elsewhere) can deliver serious redistribution and genuine recognition.

Let me conclude by suggesting that perspectival dualism in social theory complements participatory parity in moral theory. Together, these two notions constitute a portion of the conceptual resources one needs to begin answering what I take to be the key political question of our day: How can one develop a coherent programmatic perspective that integrates redistribution and recognition? How can one develop a framework that integrates what remains cogent and unsurpassable in the socialist vision with what is defensible and compelling in the apparently "postsocialist" vision of multiculturalism?

If we fail to ask this question, if we cling instead to false antitheses and misleading either/or dichotomies, we will miss the chance to envision social arrangements that can redress both economic and cultural injustices. Only by looking to integrative approaches that unite redistribution and recognition can we meet the requirements of justice for all.

## Footnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Portions of this essay are adapted and excerpted from my Tanner Lecture on Human Values, delivered at Stanford University, April 30-May 2, 1996. The text of the Lecture is published as "Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition and Participation," in *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, volume 19, ed. Grethe B. Peterson (The University of Utah Press, 1998), pp. 1-67. I am grateful to the Tanner Foundation for Human Values for permission to adapt and reprint this material. I thank Elizabeth Anderson and Axel Honneth for their thoughtful responses to the Tanner Lecture and Rainer Forst, Theodore Koditschek, Eli Zaretsky, and especially Erik Olin Wright for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
- <sup>2</sup> See, for example, Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in his *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton University Press, 1994); and Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. Joel Anderson (Polity Press, 1995).
- <sup>3</sup> I am grateful to Rainer Forst for help in formulating this point.
- <sup>4</sup> John Rawls, for example, at times conceives "primary goods" such as income and jobs as "social bases of self-respect," while also speaking of self-respect itself as an especially important primary good whose distribution is a matter of justice. Ronald Dworkin, likewise, defends the idea of "equality of resources" as the distributive expression of the "equal moral worth of persons." Amartya Sen, finally, considers both a "sense of self" and the capacity "to appear in public without shame" as relevant to the "capability to function," hence as falling within the scope of an account of justice that enjoins the equal distribution of basic capabilities. See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Harvard University Press, 1971), §67 and §82; and *Political Liberalism* (Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 82, 181, and 318 ff.; Ronald Dworkin, "What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 10:4 (Fall 1981): 283 - 345; and Amartya Sen, *Commodities and Capabilities* (North-Holland, 1985).
- <sup>5</sup> The outstanding exception of a theorist who has sought to encompass issues of culture within a distributive framework is Will Kymlicka. Kymlicka proposes to treat access to an "intact cultural structure" as a primary good to be fairly distributed. This approach was tailored for multinational polities, such as the Canada, as opposed to polyethnic polities, such as the United States. It becomes problematic, however, in cases where mobilized claimants for recognition do not divide neatly (or even not so neatly) into groups with distinct and relatively bounded cultures. It also has difficulty dealing with cases in which claims for recognition do not take the form of demands for (some level of) sovereignty but aim rather at parity of participation within a polity that is crosscut by multiple, intersecting lines of difference and inequality. For the argument that an intact cultural structure is a primary good, see Will Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (Oxford University Press 1989). For the distinction between multinational and polyethnic politics, see Will Kymlicka, "Three Forms of Group-Differentiated Citizenship in Canada," in *Democracy and Difference*, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton University Press, 1996).
- <sup>6</sup> See especially Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition*, op. cit.



7 Ibid.

8 To be sure, this could conceivably change. Nothing I have said rules out *a priori* that someone could successfully extend the distributive paradigm to encompass issues of culture. Nor that someone could successfully extend the recognition paradigm to encompass the structure of capitalism, although that seems more unlikely to me. In either case, it will be necessary to meet several essential requirements simultaneously: first, one must avoid hypostatizing culture and cultural differences; second, one must respect the need for nonsectarian, deontological moral justification under modern conditions of value pluralism; third, one must allow for the differentiated character of capitalist society, in which status and class can diverge; fourth, one must avoid overly unitarian or Durkheimian views of cultural integration that posit a single pattern of cultural values that is shared by all and that pervades all institutions and social practices. Each of these issues is discussed in my contribution to Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (Verso, 1999, forthcoming).

9 Since I coined this phrase in 1995, the term "parity" has come to play a central role in feminist politics in France. There, it signifies the demand that women occupy a full 50% of seats in parliament and other representative bodies. "Parity" in France, accordingly, means strict numerical gender equality in political representation. For me, in contrast, "parity" means the condition of being a *peer*, of being on a *par* with others, of standing on an equal footing. I leave the question open exactly what degree or level of equality is necessary to ensure such parity. In my formulation, moreover, the moral requirement is that members of society be ensured the *possibility* of parity, if and when they choose to participate in a given activity or interaction. There is no requirement that everyone actually participate in any such activity.

10 I say "*at least* two additional conditions must be satisfied" in order to allow for the possibility of more than two. I have in mind specifically a possible third class of obstacles to participatory parity that could be called "political," as opposed to economic or cultural. Such obstacles would include decision-making procedures that systematically marginalize some people even in the absence of maldistribution and misrecognition, for example, single-district winner-take-all electoral rules that deny voice to quasi-permanent minorities. [For an insightful account of this example, see Lani Guinier, *The Tyranny of the Majority* (The Free Press 1994)]. The possibility of a third class of "political" obstacles to participatory parity adds a further Weberian twist to my use of the class/status distinction. Weber's own distinction was tripartite not bipartite: "class, status, and party." This third, "political" kind of obstacle to participatory parity might be called "marginalization" or "exclusion." I do not develop it here, however. Here I confine myself to maldistribution and misrecognition, while leaving the analysis of "political" obstacles to participatory parity character for another occasion.

11 For example, Marcel Mauss, *The Gift*, and Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*.

12 By culturalism, I mean a monistic social theory that holds that political economy is reducible to culture and that class is reducible to status. As I read him, Axel Honneth subscribes to such a theory. See Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition*, op. cit.

- 13 By economism, I mean a monistic social theory that holds that culture is reducible to political economy and that status is reducible to class. Karl Marx is often (mis)read as subscribing to such a theory.
- 14 In what follows, I leave aside a third possibility, which I call “deconstructive anti-dualism.” Rejecting the economy/culture distinction as “dichotomizing,” this approach seeks to deconstruct it altogether. The claim is that culture and economy are so deeply interconnected that it doesn’t make sense to distinguish them. A related claim is that contemporary capitalist society is so monolithically systematic that a struggle against one aspect of it necessary threatens the whole; hence, it is illegitimate, unnecessary, and counterproductive to distinguish maldistribution from misrecognition. In my view, deconstructive anti-dualism is deeply misguided. For one thing, simply to stipulate that all injustices, and all claims to remedy them, are simultaneously economic and cultural, evacuates the actually existing divergence of status from class. For another, treating capitalism as a monolithic system of perfectly interlocking oppressions evacuates its actual complexity and differentiation. For two rather different version of deconstructive anti-dualism, see Iris Marion Young, “Unruly Categories: A Critique of Nancy Fraser’s Dual Systems Theory,” *New Left Review* 222 (March/April 1997) pp. 147-160; and Judith Butler, “Merely Cultural,” *Social Text*, nos. 53/54 (Winter/Spring 1998). For detailed rebuttals, see Fraser, “A Rejoinder to Iris Young,” *New Left Review*, no. 223 (May/June 1997) pp. 126 - 129; and Fraser, “Heterosexism, Misrecognition, and Capitalism: A Response to Judith Butler,” *Social Text*, nos. 53/54 (Winter/Spring 1998).
- 15 For more detailed criticism of an influential example of substantive dualism, see Nancy Fraser, “What’s Critical About Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender,” in Fraser, *Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory* (University of Minnesota Press, 1989).
- 16 See Nancy Fraser, “Women, Welfare, and the Politics of Need Interpretation” and “Struggle Over Needs,” both in Fraser, *Unruly Practices*. Also, Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, “A Genealogy of ‘Dependency’: Tracing A Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State,” *Signs* 19, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 309-336; reprinted in 68-93; reprinted in Nancy Fraser, *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the “Postsocialist” Condition* (Routledge 1997).
- 17 Jeffrey Escoffier has discussed these issues insightfully in “The Political Economy of the Closet: Toward an Economic History of Gay and Lesbian Life before Stonewall,” in Escoffier, *American Homo: Community and Perversity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998) pp. 65-78.
- 18 This formulation was suggested to me by Elizabeth Anderson in her comments on my Tanner Lecture, presented at Stanford University, April 30-May 2, 1996.
- 19 See Nancy Fraser, “Clintonism, Welfare, and the Antisocial Wage: The Emergence of a Neoliberal Political Imaginary,” *Rethinking Marxism* vol. 6, no. 1 (1993) pp. 9-23.
- 20 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is the major means-tested welfare program in the United States. Claimed overwhelmingly by solo-mother families living below the poverty line, AFDC became a lightning rod for racist and sexist anti-welfare sentiments in the 1990s. In 1997, it was “reformed” in such a way as to eliminate the federal entitlement that had guaranteed (some, inadequate) income support to the poor.

- <sup>21</sup> This formulation, too, was suggested to me by Elizabeth Anderson's comments on my Tanner Lecture, presented at Stanford University, April 30-May 2, 1996.
- <sup>22</sup> See Lenore Weitzman, *The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social Consequences for Women and Children in America* (New York: The Free Press, 1985).
- <sup>23</sup> I am grateful to Steven Lukes for insisting on this point in conversation.

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