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Labour brokerage in China today: Formal and informal dimensions

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Labour Brokerage in China Today:

Formal and Informal Dimensions

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Labour Brokerage in China Today:
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Abstract/Zusammenfassung:

Based on a three-year fieldwork in China's Fujian Province (2000-2003), this paper contains the outcome of a research on labour brokers in China. It will focus on the composition and functions of labour brokerage in today's restructuring processes of the labour market. The formal and informal dimensions and their impact will be particularly addressed. Furthermore, the institutionalization of the labour market will be discussed.

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1. General situation of the labour market

The reemergence of labour brokerage is an overt phenomenon in the context of the process of economic restructuring in current China. At present, China faces three major employment challenges: successive mass labour migration from rural to urban areas; increased unemployment and job-change deriving from the government's efforts to reform debt-ridden state-owned enterprises; moreover, every year about 10 million people of a new workforce are going to enter the labour market. While a mass workforce continuously is entering the labour market in urban areas, they need to be channeled into salaried working positions. Therefore, various employment agencies, which had disappeared for decades during the period of the Planned Economy System, have flourished in recent years.

Table I: Current situation of the labour market in China (at the end of 2002)

Items	Total Number
Total population of China	1.3 billion
People living below the poverty line I (Average annual per capita income less than 625 yuan)	28.2 million
People living below the poverty line II (Average annual per capita income less than 825 yuan)	90 million
Rural labour force living in urban areas	120 million
Unemployment of original urban workers	14 million
New workforce entering labour market per year	10 million

Source: the relevant statistics are quoted from Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's report.

In the inland areas of western China, many people are looking for jobs in the more developed areas of Southeastern China as the best way to get rid of poverty. In accordance with a survey conducted by a research group of CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) in 2002, comparing the income of migrants with their income in their original rural areas, on average, the interviewed rural labourers reported that their income had risen 8738.3 yuan per year. The following table discerns the increase of income of the rural labourers after taking over work in urban areas. Among them, about 20 percent gained an annual increase of more than RMB 10,000 and 52.4 percent an increase of more than 5,000 yuan. It is obvious that great difference is a remarkable driving force which motivates rural labourers to move to urban areas.

Table II: Increased income of rural labourers after working in urban areas

Increased amount per year (RMB yuan)	Number	%
24,000 and above	16	5.9
10,000—23,999	38	13.9
6,500—9,999	43	15.8
5,000—6,499	46	16.8
3,000—4,999	52	19.0
1,000—2,999	47	17.2
200—999	4	1.5
Income is the same as in my hometown	16	5.9
The income is lower than before	11	4.0
Total	273	100.0

Source: Li Qiang 2003.

Xiamen, one of the first four Special Economic Zones in China,¹ has been regarded as a developed area with rich economic opportunities for rural labour. Still, the total amount of local people who are waiting to be transferred from rural to urban areas is huge. At the beginning of the 21st century, Xiamen was a city with in total 650, 000 rural labourers. The urbanization process has decreased the farmland rapidly, particularly at the suburbs of Xiamen. After having received a certain amount of compensation for giving up their land, the suburban peasants need to find a job in urban areas. In accordance with the ten year plan of Xiamen Municipality, by the end of 2010, about 300, 000 rural labourers should be transferred into industrial workers. In addition, in the last two decades, mass migrants have arrived in Xiamen from various rural areas. Table III shows the increase of rural labour in Xiamen.

Table III: Total Amount of rural labourers in Xiamen

Year	Registered Rural Labourers	Rural Labourers: Permanent Residents	Source
1988	12,000		Apr. 6, 2002, Xiamen Daily
1992	80,000		Apr. 6, 2002, Xiamen Daily
1994	180,000		Apr. 6, 2002, Xiamen Daily
2001	400,000		Apr. 6, 2002, Xiamen Daily
2002	610,000	45 %	Dec. 13, 2002, Xiamen Daily
Total Rural Labourers (registered & unregistered)			
2001	≈893500	65 %	Dec. 13, 2002, Xiamen Daily

According to an investigation conducted by the relevant authorities of Xiamen at the end of 2002, among the successive rural-city migrants, only 3.87 percent were self-employed, but 83.5 percent were permanent or temporary workers, or were trying to find a salaried work. This group primarily comprises low-educated, unskilled labourers; moreover, most of them do not have strong ties in the city. The following data were derived from my questionnaires in Xiamen.²

¹ The first four Special Economic Zones in China are Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, which were established at the beginning of the 1980s.

² Between January and September 2001, in order to discover the actual functions of labour brokers from the

Table IV: Educational level of blue-collar workers in Xiamen

(%)

Items	A (255)	B (259)	C (95)	D (48)	E (79)
A few years in primary school	0.8	6.6	1.1	0	0
Primary school graduates	2.0	6.2	1.1	0	0
A certain middle school education	11.8	12.7	9.5	4.2	2.5
Middle school graduates	32.2	35.9	32.6	31.3	5.1
A certain high school education	10.0	13.5	10.5	2.1	10.1
High school graduates	18.4	18.5	14.7	41.7	40.5
Vocational school graduates	16.9	4.6	20.0	20.8	22.8
Vocational college graduates	4.7	0.8	9.5	0	6.3
University graduates	3.1	0.4	1.1	0	11.4

- A. The respondents were people without a fixed occupation or still hunting for a salaried job when interviewed.
- B. The respondents were workers in construction sites.
- C. The respondents were workers of small-scale companies based on simple technology (with about a dozen of employees).
- D. The respondents were workers of Taiwanese invested enterprises.
- E. The respondents were workers of European or American invested enterprises.

2. Development of current labour brokerage business

The general situation of the labour market in current China shows a clear contrasting phenomenon: on the one hand rather few job opportunities, on the other hand a huge amount of job-hunters in urban areas; moreover, successive unskilled rural labourers continuously flow into the urban labour market. All of them strive to find an ideal job as soon as possible. Thus, the local labourers who are looking for a job plus the successively arriving migrants have created a huge market for labour brokerage business.

In order to understand the meaning of the re-emergence of a labour market and labour brokerage in China today, it is necessary to give a brief review on the labour recruitment system in China prior to the 1980s. Generally speaking, a central feature in pre-reform China was that salaried employment was heavily regulated and controlled by the state, no matter whether the relevant occupation was a professional, administrative or simply unskilled work. In every city, two municipality bureaus were in charge of salaried job assignment. One was the Personnel Bureau, which was responsible for the assignment concerning cadres and professional occupations. The other one was the Labour Bureau. The duty of the latter was to be in charge of salaried workers'

perspective of job hunters, I conducted a survey among newly in-migrated labourers in Xiamen. The survey was conducted by means of a questionnaire given to the relevant people. Two largely identical but slightly different questionnaires have been designed. One was filled out by newly in-migrated labourers who are factory workers, labourers in the informal economy, or still looking for a job (to simplify description, this part of responders will be named Group One). The other questionnaire was designed for newly in-migrated people who belong to the white-collars, that is, middle-level administrators, head of workshop or production lines, technicians, etc. (hereafter called Group Two). Originally, I planned to distribute 1,000 questionnaires. By the end of September 2001, in total 989 questionnaires were distributed and 959 copies have been filled in and taken back. Among them, 785 questionnaires were distributed to Group One and 755 have been filled in and collected. For Group Two, 204 copies were distributed and filled in.

allocation. In short, in the period between the mid-1950s and the 1970s, all salaried occupations had been under the assignment of the relevant government offices and, moreover, a comprehensive control of the *hukou* system (permanent resident system)³ made rural-urban migration difficult. During that period, if somebody wanted to get an urban job, regardless of whether it was a skilled or a unskilled job, he needed to have an urban *hukou* first and was dependent on the assignment of a job by the relevant governmental bureau. Furthermore, job assignment was rather uniform. All people who were qualified for a job had to accept the job assigned by the government. Transfer of personnel was also an official decision to obey. If somebody rejected an assigned job, he or she had to give up his or her right to get a salaried job, and which, in pre-reform PRC, has been regarded as the only means to make a comfortable living in urban areas. This had been the basis of the *danwei* system (work-unit system)⁴ (cf. Chan & Zhang 1999; Cai 2001; Li 2001).

The economic reforms which started at the end of the 1970s brought about a great change in China. This is also true for the domain of labour and personnel. Interestingly, in order to meet the demand of labour export the Chinese government initiated the first group of employment agencies in the late 1970s. During the Mao period, China had carried out a series of development aid projects to support friendly nations. At the very beginning, to work abroad for these projects was a part of the government's assignment. The people who were sent by the Chinese government were named "honorary volunteers". Those who were selected had to match at least two standards: first, the person should be loyal to China and her cause; second, the person should be highly qualified for the duty and full of dedicating spirit. Since the 1980s, however, along with the reform of foreign policies, China's projects based on rendering economic development aid assistance was, step by step, replaced by a foreign economic cooperation program based on mutual benefits. Then, the pursuit of commercial profits was no longer a taboo. Gradually, a few labour agencies with limited authority had been established under a special permission of the local government.

In 1977 Xiamen Municipality set up the Foreign Aid Office. Literally, the major task of the office was to organize qualified technicians or skilled workers to work in the frame of China's foreign aid programs. Although at the very beginning, the relevant "volunteers" were selected among the workers and staff of the state-owned sector rather than an open recruitment, this step marked the beginning of a meaningful transition of the comprehensive job assignment system. Since the end of the 1970s, when commercial labour exportation projects between China and foreign companies were initiated, more and more workers were needed to work abroad. Then, under the reformed foreign policy, in June 1980, the Xiamen Foreign Construction Company was established that took over the task of recruiting labourers to work abroad. The Company was still affiliated to the Foreign Economic Cooperation Office of Xiamen Municipality and had to deal with labour exportation under the special authorities issued by the latter. Nevertheless, the establishment of this company was a turning point, as a new institution, although then a semi-government

³ In pre-reform PRC, the *hukou* system assigns every person not only a place of residence but also the status of "agricultural" or "non-agricultural," which could rarely be changed. The newborn baby always succeeds the mother's *hukou* status.

⁴ In pre-reform PRC, all salaried jobs were assigned by the relevant government bureaus. It has been regarded as a normal way that people should work for the unit to which they have been assigned for their entire life. And the work-unit has the responsibility to take care of its employees in a comprehensive way.

institution, started to be in charge of labour recruitment. In 1984, the Xiamen Foreign Construction Company officially stopped its affiliation relation to Xiamen Municipality and became an independent corporate body. Since then, it was renamed Xiamen International Economic and Technical Cooperation Company (XIETC Company). Its task still was primarily to recruit labourers under foreign contracts.

In Xiamen, during the early 1980s, the majority of recruited persons to work abroad were sailors. The majority worked for international shipping companies that had their general offices set up in Hong Kong. Since its establishment and until the end of the 1980s, XIETC Company was the only company authorized by Xiamen Municipality to deal with labour recruitment for formal exportation. In the early 1990s, although more companies joined that business, XIETC Company had kept its position of the number one recruitment institution until the mid-1990s. During that period, XIETC Company had derived huge profits out of the labour recruitment business. According to its public reports, concerning the business of labour exportation, from 1981 and up until 1995, the total turnover was about 161 million US-\$ and the net profit reached 30 million US-\$ (XMMYZ 1998:272). The huge profits were connected to the fact that the XIETC Company had a monopoly in the market.

Since the early 1990s, however, XIETC Company's recruitment business has been greatly challenged. When China clearly claimed its transition from a planned economy to a market economy, more and more companies attempted to jump into labour recruitment business. During the period 1992 and 1995 alone, at least five new companies were authorized to deal with export-orientation contracted labour recruitment. But the labour market for internal recruitment was in reality far from being an open entity.

As mentioned previously, the economic reform program which was initiated in the late 1970s generated major changes in China's labour market. One of the consequences was that, when the *hukou* system could no longer function as a fixed boundary to separate urban and rural people, millions of rural people rushed into urban areas where more salaried occupations were available. When rural labourers rush to find their fortune in urban and industrial areas, they have to find workable job-hunting channels. First of all, logically, all personal strong ties were used for job-hunting. When those people decided to leave their original villages for urban areas, normally the relevant rural people would select the city where they could find relatives or friends: Thus they expected the latter to provide help, that is, to offer lodging and support in order to find job opportunities. In the following, I will demonstrate this by means of a typical example: During the late 1960s, a movement launched by Chairman Mao sent thousands upon thousands of school graduates to the countryside. They were requested to live and work together with the peasants, in order to get reeducation. It was not before the late 1970s, after the ending of the Cultural Revolution, that the post-Mao government decided to let these urban young people return to their original cities. During that period about eighty thousands school graduates from Xiamen were sent to the mountain villages in Longyan District. After spending a couple of years in those mountain areas, many had built up relationships to local peasants. Thus, when the first tide of rural to urban migration emerged, many Longyan peasants simply selected to come to Xiamen and to come into contact with those returned young people from Xiamen with whom they had developed some kind of a relationship. Due to this historical background, the migration chain between Longyan and Xiamen began to develop.

However, merely a few rural people possessed such workable ties. Moreover only a few urban people could match their expectations and help them to find a job. New channels were necessary. Therefore, since the mid-1980s, a couple of street corners in the downtown of Xiamen gradually became the earliest “job-hunting places” that is, a kind of rudiment labour market for informal internal labour recruitment. One of the first job-hunting corners in Xiamen appeared in front of Siming Cinema, which was located at a crossroads where the South Siming Road and the West Siming Road meet. Early in the morning, dozens of sometimes more than one hundred people, mostly from outside Xiamen city, were waiting there in order to find a job. Many carried simple luggage in their hands. As state-owned enterprises could not easily employ rural workers, the people who went to recruit labourers basically belonged to two groups. One group was composed of private contractors looking for cheap labour. Another group of “employers” was composed of local people who wanted to find a *baomu* (nursery maid) or cleaners. Almost from its beginning, some people were active among the persons looking for a job. Most of the were local people from Xiamen city. They went there frequently and tried to get in contact to the newcomers. When an employer came to look for labour, such people would attempt to give suggestions and help to bargain between the two sides. They also distributed information concerning reasonable wages and working conditions, advised newcomers to go to a certain place to meet potential employers, etc. Sometimes the newcomers were asked to pay for information or help; but in many cases the newcomers would pay some money in exchange for potential help. Actually, these corners can be comprehended as the earliest reemergence of informal labour agencies and the actors as the first informal labour brokers in Xiamen.

Almost from the first day of its appearance, these informal job-hunting places had a bad image among the local media. These places were described as black markets where cheating was flourishing. It was reported that as no reliable references could be found from such a street employment, the recruitment was uncertain, or even dangerous towards both employers and employees. Reports concerning various frauds between employers and employees could frequently be found in local newspapers. Moreover, those brokers were sharply criticized as criminal procurers. According to an official opinion, these black corners were like dirty drops that spoiled the city. Moreover, from the perspective of the relevant authorities, the existence of such uncontrolled areas revealed their breach of duty because it offended the comprehensive system of regulation. Being troublesome places, these informal job-hunting corners were often “cleaned up” by the relevant local authorities during the early years of their appearance. This “clean up” movements, however, showed little result as the job-hunting places were needed by the people who had neither special skill nor the necessary helpful relations within the city. Similar corners reemerged almost immediately after the accomplishment of a clean up movement. Moreover, the people who had been involved in the street employment increased. True recruitments and cheating affairs were happening at the same time.

The turning point was around 1992. As mentioned earlier, this was also the year when more companies have been issued authority to recruit labourers for foreign contracts. By then it finally became a consensus that the unified allocation or employment system controlled by the state was far behind the times. Actually, an informal labour market had already existed for quite some years. The fact made relevant authorities recognize that the inflow of mass migration into urban areas like Xiamen would further increase and hence require active labour brokers to engage in formal

labour market services rather than simply clean up the informal job-hunting places. In order to regularize the labour market, the two authorized bureaus of the municipality – the Labour Bureau and the Personnel Bureau of Xiamen Municipality – began to establish official employment agencies.

In the mid-1990s, the recruitment agencies had become official authorized entities within Xiamen. Two kinds of formal recruitment service centers had been set up in Xiamen. One is the Center for Talents Intercommunion affiliated to the Personnel Bureau and the other one the Labour Service Center affiliated to the Labour Bureau. Instead of directly claiming themselves as recruitment agencies, both stressed their roles as service institutions. The former one is assigned to help college or university graduates or people having a higher professional level. The latter one has been assumed to channel the common job hunters. In fact, the establishment of these agencies marked the end of the unified assignment system although they still belong to the state-run entities. Soon after that, various recruitment agencies were established.

By the 1990s, step by step, the unified job-allocation system that had existed in China for about three decades has been replaced by an open labour market. Labour brokerage has reemerged and become involved in people's life more and more widely and deeply.

3. Features of labour brokerage

What is the collective future of the reemerged labour brokerage in current China? First of all, it is worth pointing out that the large oversupplied unskilled and low-skilled labour has to be considered as a crucial background in order to understand the general features of labour brokerage in today's China.

3.1 Short history but rich varieties

Meanwhile the reemerged employment brokerage was accepted by both government and people nearly for about one decade. However, the relevant labour brokerage has already shown a rich variety in its manner of organization and functioning. Basically, the employment brokerage can be divided into three types. The first and biggest type is engaged in labour recruitment that has been named as "Labour Market." The second one is to channel professionals (e.g. graduates of colleges or universities), which usually has been named as "Talent Market". The third one can be regarded as something like senior headhunters, which still are few in number. Moreover, instead of using the name "headhunter" many just have named themselves as "high-tech service centers" or "senior executive markets". In today's Chinese society, "headhunter", from its name to its operating model, still is strange to most people.

In view of the initiators or investors, the relevant labour brokerage can be roughly divided into four categories:

- a. An official branch or extension of the relevant government bureau
- b. State-owned companies
- c. Private entities with legal status, including branches of transnational companies
- d. Informal or illegal brokers

For instance, according to an officially published report, by the year 2000 there existed more than 4,100 registered labour agencies all over China.⁵ In Xiamen, at the end of 2001, that sector consisted of thirty-nine formally registered employment agencies and several dozens of so-called “re-employment training centers”.⁶ Among them, the biggest recruitment agency for professionals is the Xiamen Center for Talents Intercommunion, which has been affiliated to the Personal Bureau of Xiamen Municipality. In October 2000, this center was divided into two separate state-owned companies. One is concerned with the channeling of college and university graduates into employment; the other one is named “Xiamen Assessment and Recommendation Center of Senior Executives”, which major task is to find high-qualified managers or high-ranking administrators for large-scale enterprises. Next to this Center, there are two state-owned headhunting companies as well. They are: the Xiamen Senior Executives Market and the Xiamen Senior Executives Corporation. Both of them can be regarded to follow the model of focusing on headhunting, that is, senior executive searching.

Among the labour recruitment agencies, the largest one is also the one affiliated to the Xiamen Labour Bureau, which was later renamed to “Service Center for Immigrant Labour in Xiamen”. However the common name used by job-hunting labourers is “Xiamen Labour Market” or “Xiamen Labour Edifice”, because it is located in a huge building. This Labour Market has occupied three floors. One floor is for its staff members, another one consists of a huge hall, where, on the one side, a wall-wide electronic board is advertizing job information. On the other side there are dozens of counters divided into two groups: one group consists of the staff members of the Center to receive customers; the other group includes the representatives of the relevant employers interviewing applicants. Downstairs a couple of rooms are used for training classes. One class is reserved for all applicants. The latter have to attend such classes before they can get a certificate that entitles them for a job in Xiamen. Other classes provide various vocational trainings, such as cooking, painting, sewing, primary computer typing, document editing, etc. It is worth pointing out that this Labour Market frequently turns to government authorities in order to attain relevant enterprises’ cooperation. For instance, regularly, the Market will ask some well-known enterprises to send their representatives to recruit new hands. The operating model of a dozen of labour agencies affiliated to the relevant district government offices is similar to that of the Xiamen Labour Market.

Except the state-owned labour markets, there are dozens of recruitment agencies which are officially registered as private agencies. Following the models of the municipality-run centers, informal labour brokers that had already existed for some time also attempted to get formal registration. Among the newly established recruitment agencies, those dealing with unskilled or low skilled workers have rapidly developed. Some recruitment agencies have focussed on transnational brokerage, from exporting contracted unskilled or low skilled labourers. Moreover, it is not unusual that some also include in their business labour emigration, study and marriage abroad. The total number of private labour agencies is continuously increasing. Furthermore, albeit the relevant authorities have strived for to control labour brokerage, many informal labour agencies/agents continue to operate. As they are not legal entities, it is difficult to get the exact

⁵ Quoted from a wrap-up report printed in Haixia Daobao (Straits Guide), August 14 2001.

⁶ The re-employment training center is a special unit to help lay-off workers of state-owned companies. Some were set up by the relevant government offices; some were set up by the relevant companies. The total number is difficult to estimate.

number of them, as many appear and disappear here and there. According to my research, the exact number of informal labour agencies is much higher than the officially registered ones.

Compared with the four categories of labour brokerage listed above, the first two possess a more powerful background but less flexible channels while the latter two, in contrast, are without a powerful background but actively use formal and informal, legal and illegal strategies in channeling labourers. Concerning their functional spheres, some are operating locally and temporarily only. For instance, during the late 1990s, when a considerable amount of lay-off workers of the state-owned industry had become a crucial problem to be solved, in total 1,102 “re-employment centers” had been established within Fujian Province (Xiamen is a city under the jurisdiction of Fujian Province). Most were under the guidance of the relevant government offices. However, by the end of 2002, an official report announced that all relevant centers had been closed after finishing their tasks (Xiamen Daily, 13 January 2003). In fact all of these Centers were an extension of the relevant government’s offices.

3.2 A highly profitable business

Today, thousands of people are competing for a job. Meanwhile, this has become a phenomenon not unusual in today’s China. The following tables were elaborated on the basis of a working report given by the Xiamen Labour Market. It needs to be pointed out that many rural labourers may have gone to other recruitment agencies, therefore the total amount of labour applicants must be much higher than the numbers shown in the following tables.

Table V: job-hunting people and occupations available according to age groups (Jan. – Mar. 2003)

Age Group	(A) Applicants	(B) Occupations Available	(A) : (B)
16-24	69385	41063	1.69
25-34	18423	9332	1.97
35-44	5549	566	9.80
45+	2564	143	17.93

Table VI: The 10 Most Oversupplied Occupations (Jan. – Mar. 2003)

Occupation	(A) Occupation Available	(B) Applicant	Oversupply	B: A
Driver	266	1697	1431	6.38
Salesperson	2018	12464	10446	6.18
Secretary	325	1849	1524	5.69
Watchman	666	3756	3090	5.64
Cleaner	924	4973	4049	5.38
Cashier	562	3012	2450	5.36
Technician	265	1292	1027	4.88
Packer	1915	7817	5902	4.08
Restaurant Waiter	7204	22438	15234	3.11
Bar waiter	2501	6852	4351	2.74
			On average	4.94

Source: Working Report of Xiamen Labour Market, in Xiamen Daily, 8 April 2003.

As there exists a large surplus of labour, it is imaginable that labour brokerage business is highly profitable. In the Xiamen Labour Market mentioned above, the applicants from outside Xiamen have to pay 30 to 50 yuan to get the relevant working permits in Xiamen; moreover they have to pay for the training courses. The charge is reasonable, but the huge amount of applicants has brought considerable profits. For instance, the days after the Chinese New Year is the rushing period when many rural labourers would leave their villages in order to find a salaried work in the city. During the ten days after the Chinese New Year of 2003, that is, between 8 and 18 February 2003, in total, about 19,000 applicants had registered in the Xiamen Labour Market. On February 9th alone, the Xiamen Labour Market had received more than 2,400 applicants. There is, in fact, no data report of Xiamen Labour Market available. However, a report on Beijing's labour recruitment business may provide a reference. In Beijing, there were in the year 2000 about 130 officially registered labour recruitment agencies. The report reveals that their total profits in the year were nearly 800 million RMB (about 1 million US-\$).

On average, the profit of every agency meanwhile surpasses 6.15 million yuan (Zhang 2002: 9). Few businesses in China today can obtain such a huge amount of profits.

In addition, as labour brokerage is a newly emerging business domain, the authorities concerned still regard it as a unit to provide public service rather than to run a business. Therefore, even until the end of the 1990s, those recruitment centers run or initiated by the respective government offices could still expect considerable funding from the government, although they derived their profits out of the market. For instance, in about five years, 1,102 re-employment centers had received 1,824 million yuan from government's funding to run their services (Xiamen Daily, 13 January 2003). In the 1990s it had become a popular model for many state-owned recruitment agencies to count on government's financial support to run their business but benefit from the profits of the market at the same time.

The profits of those small and informal labour agencies are considerable as well. In 2000, when I started my research on labour brokers, I revealed that those small recruitment agencies normally asked every applicant to pay about 50 yuan for an application form, which was a necessary step to become registered. The payment is not refundable, but the applicants could make their choice between two or three offers. When the applicants had got a job, they had to pay another 50 to 100 yuan to the agency. I once made an observation outside of a small agency. It was a small room with two tables, one telephone and just a few chairs. One man and one woman worked there. Some papers pasted on the wall listed potential job offers. That morning, within two hours, more than ten people came in in order to inquire information and four had paid for an application form. I was told that the monthly rent of the room was 400 yuan. The monthly costs of running such an agency would not surpass 3,000 yuan including the salaries of two employees. It is obvious that labour brokerage is a business that can expect huge profits and quick returns. Moreover, to my surprise, my research in the days after the Chinese New Year of 2003 revealed that the payment for getting a job offer had risen from 200 to 1,000 yuan. According to the rules made by the relevant agencies, the payment includes so-called "training fee" or "certification fee", but in fact few small agencies had provided serious training courses. Although it is argued that the payment will be refunded if no job could be provided, it is difficult for the applicants to get the total amount of payment back, as the agency does not inform the applicants within how many days a

job offer may be provided.

Because labour brokerage is a highly profitable business, not a few people are interested to engage themselves in this field. Concerning the establishing of a recruitment business, the most difficult affair is to get a business license from the relevant authorities. According to an official report from March 2003, in Xiamen city only ten recruitment agencies for unskilled labourers were granted official licenses. Almost all of them were affiliated to one of the government's bureaus. Only a few private labour agencies can expect to get full legal status since "it is too difficult to know what they are doing", according to an official I have interviewed. The government expects to regularize employment organizations by setting up authorized institutions; however, the relevant authorities have never controlled the market as it was intended. For instance, in Malong, a small area located at the margins of Xiamen city, there exist a dozen of small labour agencies. None of them had ever got any legal business license. According to a report of Xiamen Daily, all these agencies were asked to stop running repeatedly. However, till November 2003, at least eleven of those agencies still continued to run their business (Xiamen Daily, 26 November 2003).

In short, albeit the relevant authorities are trying to control the domain of labour brokerage by restricting the distribution of licenses, the tremendous profits which can be derived out of labour brokerage push people into that market. Consequently, labour brokerage business has become one of the sectors with very low credit standing.

3.3 A sector with low credit standing

Although the labour recruitment agencies run by the government are more reliable, many people looking for a job prefer to approach small and informal agencies. The reason behind that phenomenon refers to the following perspective.

First, the authorized employment agencies are not able to meet the requests of all job seeking people. An official report published at the end of the 1990s states that all officially authorized legal recruitment agencies were running well. According to this report, on average, all of the "officially registered employment agencies" in Xiamen receive thirty thousand applicants per year and about 70 percent of the applicants have got a job via those agencies. Therefore, the success rate is very high. Meanwhile, the talents market has become the most attractive place for university graduates. Therefore, the report concludes that "employment agencies have become an important approach for the potential human resources to find a job in Xiamen; thus Xiamen labour market was heavily regulized" (XMNJ 1998:18). However, as large crowds of people are continuously entering the labour market, it is more and more difficult for authorized employment agencies to meet the huge demand. A report published in April 2003 shows that during the first three months of that year, the rate of applicants who have got a job via authorized recruitment agencies has decreased to 34 percent (Huang 2003). This is close to the results of my own research (cf. Table VII & Table VIII).

Secondly, it is not easy for low-educated and unskilled job seekers to accept the operating model of authorized big labour agencies. For instance, as I have mentioned previously, in the recruitment hall of Xiamen Labour Market, there is a big electronic screen which provides job information. If somebody got the impression that a job offer suits to his situation, he may go to

the relevant counter to make a deal. However, many low educated and unskilled labourers do not like such a “distant and offish way”; furthermore, it is often difficult for them to understand the relevant information rolling on the electronic screen. Many prefer to have a face-to-face communication with the staff members. The informal but small labour agencies in turn provide such services. Therefore, although the government advises labourers not to approach illegal and “black” labour agencies, many still prefer to go to those agencies.

Thirdly, my informants often complain about the staff members of the authorized labour agencies. This is another major reason why they approach unofficial agencies. In the Xiamen Labour Market, the staff members are government employees. Most of them are natives of Xiamen. In the eyes of job seekers from outside Xiamen, some staff members are snobbish and discriminate rural people. Sometimes, in order to organize a job fair, some well-known companies are asked to send a couple of representatives sitting in the recruitment hall, no matter whether or not they are interested to recruit new hands or not. Those people normally are impatient towards the rural labourers. In contrast, people working in small and informal agencies are more friendly. As the rural labourers in Xiamen are coming from certain areas, those small agencies usually turn to people coming from a specific area as a major target group. People from different provinces speak distinct dialects. Frequently the owners of those small and informal agencies stem from the same rural area and therefore are able to use the same dialect to communicate with their customers.

Complaints towards those non-government run small labour agencies and negative statements have never stopped. From the perspective of the relevant government officials, many are very critical towards them. According to those officials, those labour agencies only collect fees but do not provide any serious help. The applicants have to pay for every offer provided by the labour agency. The offer however often turns out to be a contingent or non-standard work. Sometimes, when the applicant rushes to the location provided by the agency, the applicant was told that it was already too late as someone else had already taken over the position. Although dozens of such “illegal employment agencies” had been banned, similar complaints can still be heard.⁷ As I mentioned above, in Malong district of Xiamen city, dozens of labour recruitment agencies without licenses are running their businesses. They are frequently changing their names in order to avoid punishment. In accordance with the press clippings collected by the author, in the first ten months of 2003, there were in total 21 reports concerning employment brokerage in Xiamen published by Xiamen Daily. Among them, seven reports sharply criticized those “black employment agencies” by revealing how the relevant employment agencies fleeced rural labourers of their money. Thirteen of them were objective reports focusing on the general situation of Xiamen labour market, therefore reminding job seeking people to avoid cheating trap set by those black labour brokers. There is only one brief report giving a positive comment on a newly established private recruitment company. It is, therefore, no doubt that small labour brokerage possesses a bad image among the popular media.


From the perspective of entrepreneurs, a shared opinion of contractors and directors of personnel departments of formal factories is that what they needed are unskilled workers. They would, therefore, prefer to recruit workers by themselves, rather than paying for the services of

⁷ Interview with Mr. CDH, the head of the Labour Bureau in Xiamen, February 5, 2000.

recruitment agencies. According to them, unskilled workers can be easily picked up even walking along the streets. Thus, why should they waste money and time to go through the procedure of labour agencies? I encountered the following case personally. In June 2001, a new joint-venture supermarket was going to recruit three hundred people for its two chain shops in Xiamen. Most positions were open for low educated and unskilled people. The supermarket made an advertisement in the local newspaper. The applicants were asked to send their application by normal mail within one week. The director received about ten thousand application letters. Such being the case, why should the employers contact any labour agencies? Therefore, the employers whom I interviewed argued that it was much easier to find cheap labour in the labour market.

From the perspective of rural labourers, their attitudes towards the brokers are ambiguous. Some of them were cheated by brokers, but many of them agreed that brokers more or less had helped them to find a job. On the basis of the questionnaires that were distributed among those people, I explored the following data.

Chart I: Approaches of finding one’s current occupations



Group one: Factory workers and labourers in informal economy sectors

Group two: White-collars, including middle-level administrators, head of workshop or production lines, technicians, etc.

- A. Own efforts
- B. Introduced by family members or relatives
- C. Introduced by friends or co-villagers
- D. Introduced by contractors or employed by the employers directly
- E. Introduced by recruitment agencies
- F. Attracted from advertisement in newspapers or internet (only listed in the questionnaires for Group 2)
- G. Others

Table VII: Personal assessments of labour agencies / agents (%)

Assessments	A	B	C	D	E	Average
Labour agency/agent has helped in some way	37.5	20.8	26.3	22.4	37.3	29.4
Have never contacted any labour agencies	25.3	60.2	57.9	44.9	36.1	43.8
Have approached labour agencies but did not receive any help	34.2	18.5	15.8	30.6	16.9	24.4
No answer	3.0	0.4	0	2.0	9.6	2.4

- A. The respondents were people without a fixed occupation or still looking for a job when interviewed.
- B. The respondents were workers on construction sites.
- C. The respondents were workers in small-scale workshops (with approximately a dozen of employees).
- D. The respondents were workers in Taiwanese invested enterprises.
- E. The respondents were workers of European or American invested enterprises.

Table VIII: The most workable approaches of finding a job in Xiamen (%)

The most workable approaches	Group One	Group Two
Advertisement in newspapers		16.7
Internet		15.7
Government-run recruitment agencies	3.0	36.8
Rely on family members or relatives	17.6	6.4
Rely on friends or co-villagers	14.4	24.5
One's own efforts	42.5	
Informal recruitment brokers	10.7	
Recruited by contractors or the owner	1.3	
Others	2.1	

Group one: Factory workers and labourers in informal economic sectors.

Group two: White-collars, including middle-level administrators, head of workshops or production lines, technicians, etc.

From the data listed above it becomes obvious that concerning their assessment of the function of recruitment agencies, clear differences exist between the two groups. Among the white-collars, 22 percent found their current jobs by means of the brokerage of talent markets and about 37 percent of them regarded the talent markets as the best way to acquire a job. Among Group One, however, the positive response on the labour brokerage was merely about one third of that among Group Two; meanwhile, about half of them had never contacted any labour agencies.

A couple of researches have provided interesting findings. A study on “rural workers” (*nongmingong*) was conducted in the three Chinese metropolises Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou in 1999. It reveals that among the graduates of secondary vocational schools, 7.7 percent have required their current jobs by means of the brokers of recruitment agencies; but the same rate among the graduates of primary middle schools drops to 2.4 percent and the rate becomes zero when the respondents are labourers who did not finish their primary education. The report's conclusion is that private strong ties among the low educated rural migrants are important (Cao 2001). On this point, it seems that there is no big difference between rural job seekers in

metropolises and those in provincial cities like Xiamen.

Another research conducted by the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission and CICETE (China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchange) has addressed job seeking channels for female workers.⁸ The team has distributed 724 questionnaires and collectively interviewed 132 people in 12 groups. 27 percent of the women interviewed got their employment through labor agencies, 24 percent through recommendation of relatives or friends, 22 percent through government allocation after graduation, 9 percent through classified advertisements or want ads, and some of them through other channels, such as worker recruitment or succession to retired parents (NDRC 2003: 177).

There is also a difference in the function of labour brokers, for instance in terms of large and small-scale enterprises. Among the female workers of state-owned and formal, large sized enterprises, about 40 percent were recruited through the labour market, but the same rate is less than 10 percent among female workers in the private and informal sector. It is worth noting that their research findings revealed significant differences between regions as well. In traditional industrial basis as they exist, for instance, in Shandong Province, about 65 percent of the female workers were recruited through labour markets, but in newly developed areas as in Guangdong Province, the same rate was below 10 percent. In the latter areas, strong ties like relatives and friends have played an important role in finding a job. Accordingly, more than 55 percent of the interviewees found their jobs through relatives and friends (NDRC 2003: 179).

4. Conclusion

First, it can be seen that nowadays in China it has become an attracting phenomenon that the reemergence of labour brokerage has been accompanied by the process of labour market restructuring. The social status of labour brokerage is continuously rising. Both government and labourers have to a certain degree accepted their existence and functions. Some have recognized that labour brokerage is an indispensable channel between employers and job-hunting people. Moreover, my research has found that, comparing professionals with unskilled job-hunters, a higher percentage of the former will ask for help from brokerage. The more interesting is, according to my research, that when unskilled labourers intend to find access to a better job as the one they currently have they need the help of brokerage. We may, therefore, conclude that brokerage contributes significantly to people's upward social mobility.

Secondly, a noted trend is that a kind of "friendly help" based on personal strong ties is changing into a chargeable business. There is no doubt that the strong ties of low educated migrants still possess an important function and the basis of an information network for recruitment in urban areas. The major nodes are their family members, relatives, friends and co-villagers. Apparently, all of these information exchanges are a kind of mutual help and free of charge. However, my further research has explored that few of them are "free lunch". For instance, one of my informants came from a village in Jiangxi Province. She arrived in Xiamen in the mid-1990s.

⁸ This is a research team with strong government background. Their research has been conducted under the guidance of the relevant authorities.

According to her own description, she regards herself as a brave and capable woman who wanted to get a more qualified job than before. First, she tried to acquire information from her co-villagers and sometimes she also distributed information among the people she knew. After she heard about the function of labour agencies, she went to an agency and payed for its services. She tried to establish good relationships to people working in a government-run labour agency and learned how they handle their business. “In fact, it is very easy”, the woman told me. “Why should I pay for the information I got from the agencies and should not attempt to do the same by myself?” This is how she started to set up her own “recruitment agency”. But she could do that only among the people she was acquainted with, as she did not possess any license.⁹ This is an interesting case showing how social ties change into a kind of a business network. Similar cases have also been found among contractors, sub-contractors and workers of construction teams. In such cases, traditional ties have been used to enter a market and expand the initiator’s business.

Thirdly, in Xiamen labour brokers still operate at a primary level, that is, they act as middlemen between employers and job hunting people. They can only compensate the existing personal information network, but do not constitute an active force to guide or regularize labour flow. In China, currently, the large rural-urban labour mobility has streamlined uncountable low educated job hunters into urban areas. As the cases described above demonstrate, the common labour market is one which requires primarily people without special skills. It is, therefore, an employers’ market. To a certain degree, labour brokerage reemerged due to the inflow of rural labourers into urban areas; it developed as there was a culturally and institutionally strong gap between rural and urban areas; it faced, however, serious challenges, as masses of rural labour-force began to overrun the cities. Then, a negative correlation has developed: as more employers can simply and directly recruit the workers they are in need, labour brokers can provide less job opportunities to their customers, and deeper disappointment of the job hunters may cherished with the labour brokers. By now the market situation in China is still imperfect. In particular labour brokerage is a market far from being standardized. More than anything else, there is a consensus that this sector is not a professional one but simply a “*guanxi* sector” (relationship sector). Its credit or business depends on how powerful the operators can handle their social contacts. The government-run institutions depend on the resources provided by the relevant authorities. The private agencies need to set up necessary contacts by themselves, from getting business licenses to having more job-offer approaches. A wider range of social contacts will lead to increased offers and therefore will attract more customers. Among job-hunting people, there exists a frequent exchange of information concerning the credit of the relevant labour agencies. When those people assess a certain one as “more powerful” that normally means that the relevant agency has more powerful relationship to channel people. Yet, finally, it will need more time to improve the operating model of labour brokerage and to standardize it.

Fourthly, concerning the employers or institutions that need brokerage in terms of the labour market, many do not understand the standard model of brokerage. As mentioned above, historically seen, the job allocation system had dominated the PRC for several decades. During the 1990s, so-called re-employment centers were set up to provide services for lay-off workers. In the current labour market, it is obvious that labour resources are heavily oversupplied. Therefore,

⁹ This woman had to stop her “black business” when she was detained after someone complained about cheating. She was sent to a detention center for about one week since she could not (or did not want to) pay the penalty.

many entrepreneurs stand high above the brokerage. In a report written by a manager of a “headhunting agency”, the author points out that only “few enterprises in Xiamen are willing to pay for professional headhunting services”. For instance, according to the request of a company, the agency found a senior executive manager for the latter. However, when the agency asked the company to pay for that service, the latter was surprised and argued that only the person who required a job but not the employer needed to pay for that service (Wang 2003). That merely a few entrepreneurs understand the functions of labour brokerage properly has significantly limited the development of a formal and high quality labour brokerage. In 2001, I once visited a company operating in the talent market in Xiamen. Its name is China International Intellect Xiamen Corp., a branch of a respective company in Beijing. However, by the year 2003, as no profit could be derived from senior and formal headhunting business, this company has changed its business and now focusses on “overseas labour service and imports and exports trade”.

Finally, among labour brokerage, transnational labour channeling is a field that needs much more research. This is a domain within which formally contracted labour exports and illegal human smuggling have lumped together. My research shows that in 2002 an applicant had to pay 50,000 to 100,000 yuan for a package deal to be sent to work in a construction site in Israel. Such a huge amount of money is equal to a five or even ten years’ total income of a construction worker in Xiamen. According to some rural labourers I interviewed, although the Chinese government is executing strict regulations in order to punish the so-called snakeheads, some formal labour brokers are worse than snakeheads.¹⁰ It is extremely difficult to standardize the market for labour export abroad, as some companies are already operating transnationally.

In general, no matter how difficult or how hard it still is, labour brokerage in China will continue to develop; more precisely, new labour agencies will be founded, and some of the existing ones will be eliminated through tough contests and some may develop by adapting themselves to the changing needs of the market. Yet, without doubt, an accomplished labour market needs a properly functioning labour brokerage.

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¹⁰ Snakehead is the translation of a Chinese term particularly used in Fujian Province meaning those people who work on smuggling people abroad.

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